An all-encompassing partnership: Agenda 21 and Habitat II

The spirit of the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 is very much a spirit of global partnership:

The global threats – mainly resource depletion, environmental degradation and climate change – require global
partnership. This global partnership has become a central issue for world peace. Global environmental and develop- ment
policy is the peace policy of the future. Just as the Helsinki process prepared the end of the Cold War between East
and West, so the Rio process must encour- age partnership in the field of the environment and devel- opment, and thus
help to prevent a new Cold War between the North and the South. Agenda 21, the final act of the Rio Conference,
must be given the same significance as was given to the final act of Helsinki (To¨pfer 1997: 238).

This partnership for sustainability and peace at the global level includes not only the nation states as
stakeholders, but also the governments and NGOs at the local level. As argued by Chip Lindner, who was
Executive Director of the Centre for Our Common Future, International Co-ordinator responsible for organ-
ising the 1992 Global Forum in Rio de Janeiro during the Earth Summit, and Secretary of the Brundtland
Commission:

A new form of governance is emerging – that of “stake-holders.” Local stakeholders in communities

are linking together, whether they are local business or local auth- orities, non-governmental organisations or
community- based organisations, women’s groups or residents’ associ- ations. Groups that have an identifiable “stake” in
the future of the community are making these links to create a vision for the future which has a set of good and
measurable criteria or indicators (Lindner 1997: 13).

The local partnership approach was further developed by the Habitat II conference in Istan- bul in 1996. The
conference may best be remembered in history as the official stamp of recognition for the importance of local
govern- ment in an increasingly urbanised world. This ascendancy of the local was seen in a number of
venues, from the parallel meetings of the world Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities, to academic
debates on current trends in local governance, to the emphasis placed on the importance of local initiatives
within the series of “Dialogues” organised by various UN agenc- ies and programmes.
Thus, taken together, the Earth Summit and Habitat II strongly propagate a broad partner- ship approach in
favour of meeting the chal- lenges raised by a global commitment to sus- tainability in a very broad sense.
In brief, the message of the Istanbul conference is that everyone has something to win (the synergy effect) from
a broad partnership approach, and no one has anything to lose. Of course such a broad concept, present
in the rhetoric of a heterogeneous mass of actors and interests, begs the question with regard to
implementation in various contexts.

Towards a research agenda

Surveying a number of current uses of the con- cept, Rhodes (1997: 53) stipulates a definition stating that
“governance refers to self-organising, interorganisational networks”, and lists the fol- lowing four
characteristics:

 Interdependence between organisations, since governance is broader than government, covering

non-state actors; changing the boundaries of the state means the boundaries between public, private,
and voluntary sectors shifted and became opaque.
 Continuing interactions between network members, caused by the need to exchange resources
and negotiate shared purposes.
 Game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed to by
network participants.
 Significant degrees of autonomy from the state, for networks are not accountable to the state; they
are self-organising. Although the state does not occupy a sovereign position, it can indirectly and
imperfectly steer networks.
Defined by these four characteristics, argu- ably the concept of governance is clear enough to function as a
general framework for empirical studies, although when it comes to concrete cases, it has to be made
more specific.
New forms of governance are the effect of a number of tendencies characterising the changing
relationship between government and society:
 Existing and traditional structures of auth- ority, methods and instruments, have failed or are
eroded.
 New fields of social-political activities exist in which organisational forms and patterns of interest-
mediation are not (yet) strongly estab- lished.
 Issues are of great concern to the (public and private) actors involved.
 Sufficient convergence of objectives and interests must make it possible to reach a synergetic
effect or a “win-win” situation (Kooiman 1993: 251).
The partnership approach applied in many policy areas is one possible answer to the chal- lenge raised by these
more or less objective conditions. Among the arguments given for such an approach, six have been
mentioned in this paper: (1) partnership may create synergetic effects of the partners; (2) partnership may
spread the risks of a project among several actors; (3) partnership may help one partner influence the
world view and way of action of other partners; (4) partnership may be an instrument for gaining additional
financial resources for the participating partners; (5) part- nership may be a way of reducing open conflict and
creating a consensual policy climate; and (6) partnership may reduce demand overload upon a government
and create a broader, more diffuse situation of accountability.
Arguments numbered 1-4 are often mentioned explicitly by the actors participating in a partnership,
while number 5 and 6 are interpretations made on the basis of a broader evaluation of partnerships in
context. These two interpretations also strongly raise the issue of the relationship between governance and
democracy. While traditional governance, at least in theory, contained a chain of account- ability
ultimately leading to some kind of elected body like a parliament or a municipal council, partnership
arrangements leave the question of accountability wide open. For example, in the partnership contexts
touched upon in this paper, a parliament or a council are, at best, two of several “partners” in a “co”-
arrangement. The British urban regeneration partnerships, the EU regional partnerships, and the Rio
Conference-inspired Agenda 21 partner- ships are all contexts, where the popularly elected partners do not
necessarily have a role as the leading partner. They may not even have a place there at all, as seems to be
the case in the EU regional policy partnerships. Thus one has good reason to ask where and how demo-
cratic accountability is to be maintained. Strik- ingly, this is the very point where Bailey et al. end in their
study of partnership agencies in British urban policy: “The challenge for the future is perhaps to accept that
urban regener- ation agencies will be facilitators, enablers and policy entrepreneurs, but to devise ways in
which they can also be democratically con- trolled and politically accountable” (Bailey et al. 1995: 231).
However, partnership is but one of several examples of new ways of governing on the borderline between
government and society, and from an analytical point of view, one has to look for concepts and
frameworks that could set the partnership approach within a broader theoretical perspective. Developed
within a US context, but increasingly discussed and applied in a European context, the urban regime
framework arguably has such a potential. Clarence N. Stone opens the first chapter of his highly praised
book Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946–1988 with the following:
What makes governance in Atlanta effective is not the formal machinery of government, but rather the informal
partnership between city hall and the downtown business elite. The informal partnership and the way it operates constitute
the city’s regime; it is the means through which major policy decisions are made. (Stone 1989: 3)

Like other network frameworks, the urban- regime approach emphasises the interdepen- dence of governmental
and non-governmental forces in meeting economic and social chal- lenges. Processes of cooperation and coordi-
nation between actors in such networks create urban regimes that involve a range of interests. Analysing the
strategies of such regimes and the outcomes of these strategies provides a ground for assessing the policy
impact exerted by different regimes. However, to be able to discover urban regimes, one has to study a city,
town, or locality over time and across a number of policy sectors, as Stone did in his Atlanta study. That
study covers more than four dec- ades, is based on a mass of empirical data, and displays considerable depth
of analysis. Thus fulfilling his intentions in other contexts would be a comprehensive, time-consuming task,
sel- dom within reach, taking into account the pri- orities and resource capacities commonly given to social
science research projects. But if one doesn’t find regimes, one may at least find tem- porarily created, sector-
bound coalitions or part- nerships. That is, the urban regime approach could be useful as a framework for
studying networks of urban policy in general.
Certainly Lyon, Hamburg, Dakar, Seoul, and Kyoto are cities within national contexts radically different
from Atlanta’s. Nevertheless, the approach developed and used by Stone and followers should be well worth
testing when studying urban politics in any country. The wave of partnerships sweeping over European
cities, for example, cries for something of a regime approach when it comes to the issue of evaluation.
Arguably, the urban regime approach has the potential to become a research agenda which could complement,
or even tran- scend and synthesise, earlier approaches to urban politics and pave the way for studies that
are comparative on a national as well as a cross- national scale.
Lately, a number of urban regime-inspired studies have emerged. Di Gaetano & Klemanski (1993), for
example, identify five types of regimes, as defined by their political orientation on the problems of economic
development: (1) pro-growth, market-led regimes; (2) pro-growth, government-led regimes; (3) growth manage-
ment regimes; (4) social reform regimes; and (5) caretaker regimes. The different types of regimes are not
mutually exclusive, “because regimes often incorporate elements from two or more approaches to
accomplish economic development objectives” (DiGaetano & Kleman- ski 1993: 59). Stoker & Mossberger
(1994) con- structed another kind of typology with three regime types: organic, instrumental, and sym- bolic,
defined through five basic characteristics, namely purpose, main motivation of parti- cipants, basis for sense of
common purpose, quality of coalition and relationship with environment (whether local or non-local). Whereas
the typology proposed by DiGaet- ano & Klemanski centres on the content of urban politics, i.e.,
policies, the Stoker/ Mossberger typology concerns style/form. Thus the two approaches have the potential to be
complementary, which well deserves to be exploited in future research.
However, as argued by Bassett (1996: 550), regimes are ideal types, “in practice, a particular urban
political system is likely to manifest features of several regime types, over- lapping and interacting in complex
ways”. Bas- sett also argues that political systems “may well be subject to conflicting and even contradictory
tendencies in different policy areas”, and he thus dismisses urban regime theory in favour of an analysis
in terms of policy networks. My own conclusion – trivial as it may seem – is that it must be an
empirical question whether a particular policy area is characterised by frag- mented policymaking, the
presence of particular policy coalitions or governance by urban regimes. Thus approaches like urban
regime theory and Rhodes’ framework do not exclude each other, but should rather be regarded as
complementary.

Research questions

As a guide for empirical research inspired by the urban regime approach, a number of ques- tions are
crucial:

 Who are the actors involved in trying to solve particular problems in a city, e.g., lagging economic
development, social segregation, or environmental pollution?
 What interests do these actors represent?
 What kinds of coalitions or partnerships do the actors form?
 What kinds of conflicts are visible, and between which actors and interests?
 Which are the power relations involved in a particular issue area and how are these relations
affected by new practices of urban governance, i.e., who are the winners and who are the losers?
 To what extent do citizens in general, and commonly excluded groups in particular, par- ticipate in
and have an influence upon urban governance?
 How are the partnership arrangements to be characterised in terms of synergy, transform- ation, and
budget enlargement?
 Which are the arguments put forth to under- pin the establishment of a particular partner- ship?
 Does the partnership include any mechanisms of democratic accountability?
Questions like these are of more than aca- demic concern. Answering them in a compara- tive context would
create a basis for learning by experience. There are common problems in different policy areas, cities and
countries, and future policy-makers should learn from the stra- tegies and methods which have been used,
when they are trying to solve these problems.
The methodological consequences of a research strategy inspired by the urban regime framework do not
demand any surprising inno- vations. As argued by Harding (1996: 652), classic approaches taken from
community power studies – reputational, positional, and decisional analysis – could be revived and
empowered by computer support. As the focus of research is upon policy processes, one has to select
cases in different urban contexts, using a combination of documentary studies, detailed interviews with key
actors, attendance at formal and informal meetings, and media coverage.
When it comes to determining the causes and mechanisms at work to produce a particular output in urban
policy, one may have good reason to keep the following maxim by Stone in mind:
Events h a v e manifold causes, many of which we may never identify or even be conscious of. But by following events
sequentially, we gain some understanding of what remains constant, what changes, and what is associated with
each . . . . Given assumption of manifold and sequential causation, however, one finds no clear line between description and theory
as an account of the emergence, modification and decline in regime forms (Stone 1989: 257).

Although the last sentence in the quotation may be read as a closing of the road leading towards a
theoretically founded understanding of urban policy, I interpret it as a call for being rigorously systematic
when analysing particular cases, for example, by trying to distinguish vari- ous levels of description and
explanation and by systematically mapping the participating agents, their interest affiliations and strategies.
With regard to context, one has to be aware of the national framework of legislation, policies and financial
resources that are contingent upon cre- ation of opportunities and obstacles for action. One also needs to
consider the local property relations and the local tradition of politics and government, where different actors
representing various interests coalesce or oppose each other. To further understand the processes and out-
comes of a particular policy or project, one has to examine the strategies and actions of the individual actors,
or at least a few crucial ones. The networks or “partnerships” (whether issue networks, coalitions or regimes)
that may be identified in relation to particular case studies are located at the meso level of analysis but
may also, on further analysis, be related to a broader, structural framework as well as to the micro level of
the individual actors. In the for- mer case, there are strong links to regulation theory (Lauria 1997), while in
the latter case, linkages could be established to communicative planning theory (Lauria & Whelan 1995).

Policy implications
Looking broadly at policy-making in European cities one is struck by the co-existence of more or less
contradictory strategies that seem to indi- cate the presence of competing partnerships, coalitions or regimes.
Considering the simul- taneous presence of the partly contradictory demands for economic growth, ecological
sus- tainability and social justice in the European cities one challenging research task would be to
search for the various networks that mobilise in favour of or against issues relating to respect- ive theme.
Are we facing a situation, where urban governance is increasingly fragmented and dispersed either to a
myriad of partnerships created in a more or less ad hoc-like manner, or to competing growth coalitions,
eco- coalitions and social justice coalitions? Can we find cases where policies for economic efficiency,
ecological sustainability and social justice are being combined in a way that could lead in the direction of
“the good city”?
Of course these questions comprise norma- tive as well as descriptive and prescriptive dimensions. Criteria of
the just city have to be developed in normative discourse, and cross- national empirical research of current
trends in urban policy is urgently needed if we have the ambition to propose normatively and empiri- cally
well-grounded courses of action. This paper has focused upon the partnership approach, highlighting its
relationship to efficiency and democracy. So far proclamations of partnerships are legion, whereas
conceptually informed empirical research is still fragmentary. In most studies issues related to efficiency
rather than to democracy have been investi- gated. However, without going into empirical detail a few ideal
type interpretations of the partnership phenomenon and its relationship to democracy can be identified.

Four interpretations

According to one interpretation partnerships generally favour private capital, which through the partnership
arrangements will have privi- leged access to the urban political process. Par- ticipation among workers and
other non-elite groups in these partnerships is exceptional, which confirms the picture of these partnerships
as an arena reinforcing the strong position in society already taken by private capital (Pierre 1998: 88).
Arguably this interpretation has clear links to the old corporatism debate.
Another interpretation says that partnerships are a way for public authorities to keep some influence in
areas that would otherwise get totally lost to private capital. In this perspec- tive partnerships become a
public policy instru- ment rather than an expression of various actors’ and interests’ search for
cooperation (Peters 1998: 23).
Following a third interpretation, partnership arrangements indicate an important channel for different citizen
groups to influence policy-making. The further development of partnership arrangements on several levels
and sectors might lead to a pluralist, self-regulating society. The role of the public interest and the state is
very subordinate in this perspective, which looks positively at the American model and regards
hyperpluralism as an absolute ideal (see the article by Savitch in this volume).
Finally, the partnership approach can also be interpreted in the context of the cosmopolitan model of
democracy developed by authors such as Richard Falk, David Held and Daniel Archi- bugi (see, for example,
Archibugi et al. 1998). From this perspective the partnership spirit as formulated in the Rio Declaration,
Agenda 21, and Habitat II can be seen as an expression of this notion of democracy, sometimes also called
the global partnership. Crucial to cosmopolitan democracy is the idea that political citizenship must not be
confined to the nation. Thus, as world citizens we have a responsibility not only for the territory where we
belong but also for people and nature in other parts of the world as for future generations. Including nine
categ- ories of “stakeholders” (women, children and youth, indigenous people, non-governmental
organisations, local authorities, trade unions, business and industry, the scientific and techni- cal community
and farmers) the task of the Agenda 21 partnerships is to implement the guidelines for an ecologically, socially,
and economically sustainable society as adopted in Rio 1992 and Istanbul 1996. In the framework of the
cosmopolitan model of democracy the global partnership is regarded not as a restric- tion but as a
complement to and an enlargement of liberal representative democracy.

Normative conclusions

Fragmentation of politics is a challenge to democratic theory. Returning to “the good old days” when politics
more or less followed the Westminster model, i.e., when there was government rather than governance, does
not seem a viable prospect, although government may perhaps regain partial responsibility for policies that
were detached from the welfare state during the 1990s. A number of big issues are not exclusively
located within the borders of a nation, region, or municipality. Issue concerning peace, war, and
disarmament are more or less successfully handled within the UN framework. With regard to issues of
economy and ecology, power is largely in the hands of multinational companies, i.e., outside demo- cratic
control. Responsibility for human rights, distribution of infectious diseases, and extension of organised crime
are issues becoming more complex as a result of growing multiculturalism and ethnic mobility. Which are
the relevant political institutions where these issues should be handled in a way that is both efficient and
democratic?
In an era when many big issues lack unequivocal territorial basis and many areas of responsibility overlap,
partnerships and other kinds of networks may be a way to fill up a void and create preconditions for at
least partial accountability. If a partnership includes the rel- evant actors with regard to one specific topic
and these actors meet as equals one may per- haps regard this as a case of deliberative or discursive
democracy as pleaded by scholars such as John Dryzek (1990), Amy Guttman (1996) and Jon Elster (1998).
On the other hand the ideal context of deliberative/discursive democracy hardly exists in real life. Experience
tells us that partnerships are often gated by walls excluding the non-elites of society.
The partnership approach in urban politics has a rhetorical strength and a mythical appeal. Partnerships are
“part of an emerging story about what is wrong with urban areas and what appro- priate solutions might
include” (Clarke 1998:36). Indeed, experience seems to indicate that many of the partnerships are
efficient, at least with regard to the aims and aspirations kept by the stronger partners. Thus, partnerships
may legitimise policies that favour actors and interests in society who are already among the winners. In
any case, the relationship between partnerships and democracy is a tricky one, which has not, so far,
attracted due interest neither in the public debate nor in research. However, considering the fact that the
partnership arrangements and out- comes vary depending on the context and the particular coalitions
forming each partnership, and also having in mind the fragmentary knowl- edge of partnerships in practice
that we have so far, there are still some normative/prescriptive conclusions that can be drawn.
First, we should be attentive that partnership as other kinds of governance will not replace government. Indeed,
partnership "should be subsumed under representative democratic politics" (Kazancigil 1997: 10). Partnerships
can at best be partially responsible to particular groups of actors and interests, whereas the parliament and the
city council are accountable to all citizens. The representative bodies have to watch out that the partnerships do
not develop as far as becoming the prime policy-making locally. Also in the age of governance especially then
– there is a need for a political government which is accountable to all citizens eligible to vote in free elections.
If the citizens cannot survey and understand the political process, if it is hidden behind more or less gated
partnerships, democratic legitimacy is at risk of getting lost. In brief, we may need governance for reasons of
efficiency, but that must not mean loss of government and democracy.
Second, it is crucial that the partnerships do not erect walls around themselves and exclude groups that are
already marginalized. Popular government at all levels – through elected representatives, planners and other
administrators – has a special duty to look after vulnerable groups, through traditional policy programmes, by
promoting their interests in planning and politics, and by encouraging them to organize themselves.
Third, the Local Agenda 21 and the Habitat II partnership may be regarded as embryos of a broader and more
open kind of partnership. Obviously, to be able to cope with many issues concerning for example economy,
ecology, peace and war, human rights, organised crime and infectious disease, both national governments and
suprastate institutions are insufficient. Transnational partnership at all levels are crucial to complement
traditional political structure. Who should participate and who is accountable in such a patchwork of policy
networks and institutions cannot be simply answered. Indeed, this is a great challenge to future policymaking
and research.