MONITOR

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Volume 12, Number 1 Winter 2006

THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY

Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli
Targeted Killings Against Hamas’
Religio-Military Command as a
Counter-terrorism Tool
Adam E. Stahl

P
alestinian terrorist activity throughout the al-Aqsa Intifada, which be-
gan in September of 2000, had a direct impact on Israel’s counter-ter-
rorism policies. Since the onslaught of the Intifada the government of
Israel has authorized various methods to counter the threats from Palestinian
terrorist organizations such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. A
security barrier was erected as one way to respond to the continual wave of sui-
cide bombings, cross-border infiltrations, and other belligerent actions aimed
at harming Israelis. The practice of “Assigned Residence”, coupled with an
increase in Israeli Defense Force (IDF) incursions into Palestinian-controlled
territory represented additional efforts to deter Palestinian terror activity.1
Arguably the most controversial counter-terrorism tool that Israel utilizes is
targeted killings, which bring forth a myriad of issues on the legality, morality,
and efficiency of such counter-terrorism methods. The purpose of this paper
is to briefly examine the efficacy of this counter-terrorism tool when employed
against the religio-military leaders of Hamas. Israel has proven that Hamas’s
“spiritual guides” are not immune from targeted killing operations, raising
questions as to whether Israel’s policy of “hitting” a terror organization’s religio-
military leadership is in fact an efficient tool in preventing terrorist attacks.
What is a “targeted killing”?
Before questioning the efficiency of Israel’s targeted operations against
Sheik Salah Shehade and Sheik Ahmed Yassin, two case studies utilized in this
paper, one must understand what constitutes a targeted killing. Currently, a

ADAM STAHL is a recent graduate of the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and
Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel. He carries a double BA in Inter-
national Relations and Conflict Resolution with a focus in Security Studies. He is planning
on pursuing his Master’s Degree in International Relations in Fall 2007. Adam is currently
working as a research assistant for Dr. Isaac Kfir of the Lauder School of Government.
56 The Monitor - Winter 2006

collectively agreed upon definition of a targeted killing does not exist. “Tar-
geted killing” carries various definitions, all of which are contingent upon on
the specific wording of the definer. The Israeli Security Establishment (ISE)
employs an offensive and preventative military tactic referred to as sikul memu-
kad, or “focused foiling”.2 The more common expression, “targeted killing,”
has no place within ISE terminology.3 In addition, the ISE does not consider
a “focused foiling” to be the same as an “assassination.” Colonel Daniel Reis-
ner, head of the International Law Section of the Israeli Army Legal Division,
argues, “Assassination is not a legal term, at least not in international law.”4
And according to one analyst at the Terrorism Intelligence Centre, “This seems
accurate, as the word assassination does not appear in the United Nations Char-
ter, the Geneva Conventions, Hague Conventions, international case law, or
the Statute of the International Criminal Court.”5 Yet humanitarian organiza-
tions openly refer to Israel’s “focused foiling” operations as “assassinations” and
therefore “illegal”. How is sikul memukad defined given that it is neither re-
ferred to as a targeted killing nor an assassination? An Israeli “focused foiling”
operation aims to prevent future acts of belligerence against Israelis by killing
an individual or group of individuals suspected of terrorist activity, while Israeli
targeted killings have pinpointed Palestinian terrorists for elimination due to
past attacks. The logic concerning the elimination of Palestinian terrorists for
past attacks is rooted in the belief that the terrorists’ continued existence repre-
sents a future threat to Israeli lives.
The international human rights organization Amnesty International
applies its own definition of what a targeted killing represents. Amnesty deems
the ISE’s offensive targeted operations against Palestinian suspected terrorists
as being equivalent “to a policy of state assassination” and refers to the targets
as “Palestinian suspects” rather than “known Palestinian terrorists” (which is
precisely what targeted killings are utilized for).6 Here, Amnesty chooses to
utilize the term “assassination”, which is the equivalent of “political murder” or
“extrajudicial killings”. In addition to defining a targeted killing, Amnesty also
describes its view of the consequences stemming from Israeli “assassinations”,
in that, “The use of state assassinations by Israel against Palestinian suspects is
undermining the rule of law and fuelling the cycle of violence in the region.”7
Here, not only is Amnesty implying that the cycle of violence is continuously
in motion due to Israel’s military targeted actions (i.e. it is viewed as coun-
terproductive), but also asserting that Israel is overtly breaching international
humanitarian law by targeting Palestinian terrorists.
 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 57

Amnesty International (Israel-Section) holds that, “Extrajudicial kill-

ings are killings which can reasonably be assumed to be the result of a policy
at any level of government to eliminate specific individuals as an alternative to
arresting them and bringing them to justice. These killings take place outside
any judicial framework.”8 Here, Amnesty assumes that the Israeli government
prefers killing suspects to apprehending them. This view, according to the
Israeli Shin Bet, is inaccurate.9 One high-ranking Shin Bet officer has stated,
“I prefer, when it’s possible, to arrest. When you are able to arrest someone
you become privy to information, to intelligence. It cannot be done in every
case [arrest].” After all, dead men tell no tales, and Israeli intelligence prefers
tales to targeting. Israeli legal expert Professor Amnon Rubenstein adds that
there has never existed a situation in which the Palestinian Authority has fully
complied with any ISE requests for arresting suspected terrorists.10 Therefore,
the burden of apprehension falls on Israel’s shoulders. When apprehension
proves infeasible, offensive surgical strikes become the next best (of the worst)
options.11
Issues of Legality
The issue of and discourse on legality becomes more complex when
considering the “Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War,” the Fourth Geneva Convention. The 1949 agreement focuses
on a number of issues concerning civilians in wartime. This paper is concerned
specifically with the Convention’s reference to “murder.” The Convention ex-
plicitly states that murder “is forbidden by the Geneva Conventions, both in
cases of internal conflicts…wounded combatants…civilians in occupied terri-
tories…civilians in international conflicts...and civilians in internal conflicts.”12
Here, “murder” is equivalent to assassination; in the eyes of advocates of In-
ternational Humanitarian Law (IHL), this is analogous to a “targeted killing”.
However, in respect to the Fourth Geneva Convention’s definition of murder
it is crucial to question how many Palestinian “combatants” are “wounded” as
Israel performs a targeted killing, and moreover, it may seem troublesome to
many to refer to known Palestinian terrorists or even those who aid terrorists
as “civilians.” The Convention also states that murder by “treacherous means”
or “perfidy” is illegal. Since the onset of the al-Aqsa Intifada the ISE has acted
overtly in carrying out “focused foiling” operations. The use of an apache he-
licopter firing a missile in broad daylight may be defined as “treacherous” but
not “perfidious.”
58 The Monitor - Winter 2006

Do Israeli targeted killings against Palestinian terrorists violate any of

the international legal guidelines? According to IHL expert Michael Booth,
“It depends.”13 Booth holds that when a conflict is absent, and a “state-spon-
sored transnational assassination” occurs, international law has been breached.
Should an international armed conflict be present, then specific rules are ap-
plied to the new scenario. Is the al-Aqsa Intifada not an armed conflict or
possibly a low intensity war? According to Professor Amnon Rubenstein, the
al-Aqsa Intifada, which began in 2000, is a “belligerent action tantamount to
war.”14 Harvard University law professor Alan Dershowitz has stated that it is
“perfectly proper under the laws of war” to target military leaders on the enemy
side. The Israeli government considers the armed conflict with the Palestinians
to be a belligerent armed conflict, thus allowing Israeli Security Forces to carry
out specific operations that are in line with international law.
In spite of widespread popular belief, the goal of a targeted killing is
not the death of the terrorist. The nucleus of the policy is to prevent harm
to Israeli citizens. Though the death of the suspected terrorist is a desired
result, the goal of preventing terrorism is the critical element of the policy. The
former head of Israel’s Mossad, Shabtai Shavit, states, “sikul is to deter, which
means ideologically and normatively, to prevent and to deter your enemy from
perpetrating future attacks in order to kill your people.”15 According to this
view, the “focus” in “focused foiling” refers to prevention of terrorism and not
the death of the target.
Dr. Boaz Ganor, the head of the International Policy Institute for
Counter-terrorism (ICT) states, “A nation fighting against terrorism attacks an
individual, or a group of activists within an organization, who are engaged in
initiating, directing, preparing, recruiting, training or aiding in attacks, for the
purpose of killing—or at least neutralizing—the terrorist.”16 In other words,
an individual is not eliminated for the sake of elimination but rather in order to
prevent future belligerence. Ganor’s view coincides with Shavit’s observation
that “individual offensive action” (targeted killing) is utilized for the purpose of
prevention and not simply for elimination of an individual.17
Despite the emphasis put on the ongoing legal discourse on Israel’s
policy of targeted killings, examining whether these operations are truly pre-
ventative and thus efficient in reducing terrorism is equally critical. If a targeted
killing is deemed legal yet fails to prevent terrorism then the debate will shift
from legality to effectiveness (or lack thereof ). Moreover, if a Palestinian terror
organization is headed by “spiritual leaders” involved in the decision-making
 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 59

process in carrying out terror attacks, can these religious leaders become legiti-
mate targets of Israeli “focused foiling” operations?
Offensive Surgical Strikes: Going After the Religio-Military Command
From the mid-20th century, international rules pertaining to war have
remained nearly unaltered; the Geneva Conventions have only been ratified
twice since 1949.18 Do the laws of armed conflict still remain suitable for a
world facing post-modern terrorism emanating from non-state actors? Today,
the world is witnessing a rise in spiritual leaders as the ultimate decision-mak-
ers within religious-based terrorist organizations, making them the ultimate
threat.
Israel’s former head of the Mossad, Shabbtai Shavit, views spiritual
leaders within Palestinian terrorist organizations as legitimate targets, claim-
ing that targeting them is both preventative and efficient. Shavit states that
Hamas’s former spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin represented the peak of
the hierarchical structure of Hamas. Though elderly and in a wheelchair, Sheik
Yassin was charismatic and convincing. His words were verbal weapons that
caused massive destruction and death over the course of the first four years of
the al-Aqsa Intifada. Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz has stated that
to target spiritual leaders involved in terrorism is “perfectly legitimate and law-
ful under the laws of war.”19
Professor Galia Golan provides a different perspective. “[Targeted kill-
ings] are generally proven to be ineffective as a new leader is always ready to
take the place of the former.” Professor Golan believes that such killings are
counterproductive since they only produce greater hatred. That is, the elimi-
nation of spiritual leaders only intensifies hatred towards Israelis, producing
retaliatory attacks and hindering the peace process.20
Professor Michael Scharf concurs that “focused foiling” operations are
counterproductive in that they embolden “enemy morale via martyrdom.”21
Scharf, like many advocates of International Law, refers to Israel’s use of “fo-
cused foiling” operations as “assassinations”. He calls for other avenues to be
utilized by the ISE, such as approaching Palestinian terrorists as criminals, ar-
resting them, and using courts.
Following these views by high-ranking security officials and distin-
guished academics, a critical question remains: Have Israeli “focused foiling”
operations against Hamas’s religious-militant command reduced terrorism
against Israeli civilians? The most logical approach to answering this question
60 The Monitor - Winter 2006

is to examine the statistics from the targeted killing operations against Sheik
Salah Shehade and Sheik Ahmed Yassin. Both leaders represented two of the
highest-ranking religio-militant commanders of Hamas. If the operation re-
sulted in a decline in terror activity then proof must be discovered.
Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya: HAMAS
Hamas is a three-tier terrorist organization. At the top of Hamas’s
structure lies the religious command followed by the socio-political division,
and subsequently the military wing, known as the Izz al Din al Qassam Bat-
talions. Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, Hamas’s Qassam
battalions have successfully targeted Israeli civilians and IDF soldiers, as well
as various foreigners. The exact number of Hamas victims is impossible to de-
termine, as numerous Palestinian terrorist organizations have simultaneously
claimed responsibility following a terror attack. As of late 2004, statistics show
that the IDF and the Israeli General Security Services (GSS) have killed over
460 Hamas members by targeted killings and gun battles.22
Sheik Salah Shehade
Sheik Salah Shehade was long associated with terrorism. As an influ-
ential military and religious leader, Shehade “rebuilt” Hamas in the West Bank
and offered religious justification and the operational “green light” for terrorist
attacks against Israelis.23 Shehade represents how the religious command in
Hamas is directly linked with military operational decisions in carrying out ter-
rorist attacks. The ISE identified Shehade as having directed dozens of attacks,
killing over 200 Israeli civilians and more than 15 Israeli soldiers, all within a
period of 24 months.24 Israeli government officials made a number of requests
to the Palestinian Authority for his arrest, but none ever succeeded. According
to Moshe Ya’alon, Israel’s former Chief of Staff, it was only after learning that
an IDF-mounted operation to arrest Shehade would not be possible that Israeli
decision-makers ordered the targeted killing.25 Shehade was killed on July 22,
2002, when a 1-ton bomb fell on the apartment building he was occupying in
Gaza City. While the exclusive target was Sheik Shehade, 14 civilians includ-
ing nine children were killed in the operation. Can the Shehade operation be
viewed as a success? If the death of Sheik Shehade were the sole objective then
clearly the operation would be regarded as successful. However, the death of
Shehade was only one element of an operation to ultimately prevent future
attacks.
 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 61

From September 25, 2000 until Shehade’s death on July 22, 2002,
Hamas successfully carried out nearly 40 attacks on Israeli civilians and sol-
diers. The 40 attacks produced over 900 injuries and over 200 deaths.26 These
attacks included non-suicidal terrorism tactics, such as sniping, rocket fire, and
knifings. However, suicide terrorism was clearly the most effective weapon in
Hamas’ arsenal, both in cost and fatalities. Seventeen suicide attacks were car-
ried out during this period, which caused 175 of the 200 fatalities.
During the 12 months following Shehade’s death, the MIPT Terrorism
Data Base reports that the number of attacks perpetrated by Hamas increased
by 10, from 39 to 49. However, does an increase in attacks necessarily mean
that the prevention of terrorism was unsuccessful? The total number of attacks
represents one element of the entire equation. When examining the number of
injuries and deaths during this one-year period, it becomes clear that the fatali-
ties from these attacks substantially increased, though the number of injured
Israelis decreased. During these 12 months, the total number of injuries stood
at 439; the total number of Israeli deaths are reported to be 94.27 Compar-
ing this 12-month period to the previous 24 months in which Shehade was
in command, the number of injuries fell by 473, while the death total from
Hamas’s attacks increased by 58 to a total of 94. Interestingly, the number of
suicide attacks during this one-year period totaled eight, yet those eight attacks
resulted in 298 injuries (from 439) and 58 deaths (from 94).
These statistics, from a 36-month total, hardly show any common pat-
tern as the number of Hamas attacks, injuries, and deaths vary greatly. How-
ever, they do allow for conclusions to be hypothesized. One year following
the targeted killing of Salah Shehade, Israel witnessed an increase in the total
number of attacks, though suicide terrorism declined. Israeli deaths rose nearly
threefold during this period. Did the targeted killing of this spiritual leader re-
sult in prevention on any level? One could argue that the decrease in the total
number of suicidal terror attacks following Shehade’s death proves that Israeli
forces were successful in preventing terrorism. It can also be argued that Hamas
experienced a certain amount of disarray resulting from Shehade’s elimination.
Yet it is not possible to measure just how large or effective the power vacuum
became once Shehade was removed. The issue of any organizational disarray
that did occur is subject to conjecture and cannot be understood by statistics.
One can argue that prevention was not obtained since the death toll increased
substantially. Moreover, one can deduce that the decrease in total injuries and
the increase in total deaths may prove that Hamas-perpetrated terror attacks
62 The Monitor - Winter 2006

actually became more precise and effective.

When asked if the targeted operation against Salah Shehade was pro-
ductive, one former senior officer in Israel’s GSS stated, “My answer is yes;
it was productive because Shehade represented an important role; he was a
key leader within the Hamas movement who continued to direct countless
attacks against Israelis, which led to the deaths of hundreds.”28 When asked
if Shehade’s elimination threw the organization into disarray, the same senior
GSS officer stated that organizational chaos did not occur. “The answer is no,
no it didn’t…Still, one of the keys of counter-terrorism is to take the key play-
ers out of the game…I know for sure, by looking at the picture from Hamas’
point of view, that after the death of Salah Shehade, Gaza became a vacuum,
an operational vacuum; no one was able to rise to the leadership position. This
type of disarray was beneficial to us.” However, it is important to remember
that the question is not how beneficial organizational disarray was for the ISE
but rather whether Shehade’s death aided in the reduction of terrorist attacks
on Israelis; the statistics do not prove this to be true. The statistics show that
during the 12-month post-Shehade era, Hamas’s suicide terrorism decreased,
but the number of dead Israelis increased as did attacks. In this case, it would
be difficult to claim that the ISE was successful in preventing terrorism, as
more Israelis lay dead than during the previous year.
Sheik Ahmed Ismail Yassin
On March 22, 2004, Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual
leader of Hamas, was killed by an Israeli Air Force (IAF) helicopter gunship.29
The wheelchair-bound religious leader of Hamas wore no military uniform,
no identifiable insignia of any army, and carried no physical weapon. How,
then, was Yassin considered a grave threat? According to Shabtai Shavit, the
enemy of today is structured differently from the enemy of the past. Yassin
represented the top of the hierarchy of Hamas. Shavit states, “He was not
only the preacher but also the visionary. Yassin was directly involved in setting
missions and involved in almost all operational decisions. He gave the bless-
ing for nearly each and every terror attack. Why should he be immune? Is it
because he is old, religious, and in a wheelchair?” According to this view, the
religious diatribes of Yassin are as dangerous as any physical weaponry carried
by a Hamas foot soldier. To the former head of the Mossad, “His words have
more force than a man on two legs that stutters.”30
From July 22, 2003 to July 22, 2004, 55 Hamas-perpetrated attacks
 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 63

occurred. These attacks killed 64 and injured 184.31 The 55 attacks included
suicide and non-suicide attacks.32 The majority of the attacks constituted rock-
et fire into “the territories” and Israel-Proper, and only nine constituted acts of
suicide terrorism. The total number of suicide attacks, when compared to the
total number of overall terrorist activity, is much smaller, though the number
of subsequent deaths was extremely high. The nine suicide attacks produced
47 of the 64 deaths for the entire year. Compared to the previous year, attacks
increased by six, yet the total number of fatalities decreased by 30.
Here, it is crucial to note that it was during this specific 12-month
period that the IAF carried out a successful “focused foiling” operation against
Sheik Ahmed Yassin. From July 22, 2003 (exactly one year following Shehade’s
elimination) until one day prior to the targeted killing of Yassin (March 21,
2004), Hamas successfully carried out 32 terrorist attacks, of which 7 were
suicide operations. The 32 attacks left over 50 people dead. Seven suicide
terrorist attacks during this eight-month period constituted 45 out of the total
death toll of 52.
From Yassin’s death on March 22, 2004 to July 22, 2004 (the date
marking the 2-year anniversary of Shehade’s elimination) there were 21 at-
tacks, 12 deaths, and 35 injuries. For this four-month period, when Hamas
was without its spiritual command, the total number of suicide attacks was
two, with a death toll of two. However, in the 6-month period prior to Yassin’s
death (September 2003-March 2004) there were 4 suicide attacks with nearly
30 fatalities. Observing the above statistics one can view that attacks were high
while the spiritual leaders were still in command, even though suicide attacks
were low.
From July 22, 2004 until July 22, 2005, a period during which Hamas
lacked an influential spiritual command, attacks led by the group totaled 350,
a dramatic increase of 299 terrorist attacks. The total number of suicide attacks
was four, which caused 28 deaths and 106 injuries. The number of suicide at-
tacks, compared to the previous year, decreased by five, and the total number
of deaths caused by suicidal terrorism declined by 19. Though the total num-
ber of attacks increased exponentially, the total number of deaths decreased
severely: attacks rose by 299 but deaths fell by 27.
Therefore, what is witnessed is a rise in less-effective non-suicide attacks
by Hamas following the deaths of both religious leaders. Clearly, Hamas’s
motivation to carryout attacks was high, as witnessed by the sheer number of
attacks carried out. However, their capabilities had been compromised, leading
64 The Monitor - Winter 2006

to poorly executed attacks and a lower death toll. Here, one may argue the
case for success in terrorism prevention. Another claim might be that terrorism
was not prevented as attacks increased in number even though capabilities were
clearly affected as the attacks became less lethal. Moreover, if one of the ele-
ments behind eliminating spiritual leaders is to remove a terrorist organization’s
motivation, then this method was a clear failure as motivation remained high.
The Crucial Question
Given the statistics surrounding the targeted killings of both Shehade
and Yassin, the crucial question remains whether “focused foiling” operations
against Hamas’s religious command caused an eventual increase in less-effec-
tive attacks and a decrease in total Israeli deaths. The answer seems to be a
highly inconclusive maybe. Moreover, if the targeted killings of Shehade and
Yassin were effective, the results were certainly not immediate. The deaths of
the two religious commanders did cause some internal organizational disarray;
however, any organizational chaos that developed from the targeted killings
does not necessarily conclude that terrorism was prevented. In fact, there were
numerous reasons for the eventual decrease in Hamas’s capabilities to carry out
effective attacks.
One cause for the decline in Hamas’s capabilities to carry out largely fa-
tal attacks stemmed from “focused foiling” operations specifically aimed at the
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and not the religious command. In a four-year
period, from September 2000 until April 2004, Israeli forces carried out just
over 190 targeted killings against Palestinian terrorist activists. Fifty percent
of those targeted killing operations were aimed at Hamas.33 The military wing
consists not only of the bombers themselves but also the limited-in-number
bomb engineers who are central in determining a bomb’s effectiveness. Each
targeted killing of an engineer irrefutably affected Hamas’s capabilities, which
may explain why even with an increase in attacks, the death toll declined—
though this occurred only after Yassin had been eliminated. Focusing on the
military wing of Hamas may help prove the case for targeted killings overall,
but it does not contribute to determining the effectiveness, if any, of targeting
Hamas’s religious command.
From the onset of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the ISE has carried out a multi-
tude of counter-terrorism operations. The erection of the security fence helped
to decrease overall terrorist activity. According to Nancy Appel of the Anti-
Defamation League, “The simple fact is that the fence works. So far in 2004,
 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 65

no Israelis have reportedly been killed or wounded by suicide bombings in

areas protected by the fence… the security barrier has resulted in a 90 percent
reduction in terrorism originating from the northern West Bank, where the
fence has been constructed, compared to previous years since the beginning of
this second wave of Palestinian terrorism.”34
The reduction of fatal attacks by the end of 2005 may be attributed to
daily IDF incursions into Palestinian-controlled territory. In April 2002, the
IDF initiated the largest military operation in the West Bank since the Six Day
War: Operation Defensive Shield. According to an Israeli Cabinet Commu-
niqué, “Israel will act to defeat the infrastructure of Palestinian terror in all its
parts and components; to this end, broad action will be undertaken until this
goal is secured.”35 The “broad action” included entering cities and villages that
had become centers of Palestinian terrorism, arresting suspects, cutting off fi-
nance to organizations, collecting and destroying weaponry and infrastructure
such as bomb-making laboratories, and targeting anyone who aimed to harm
IDF soldiers or Israeli civilians. Strict curfews and roadblocks also effectively
aided in reducing Hamas’s capabilities.
Conclusion
Israeli targeted operations against Hamas’s religious command need
not be viewed as illegal or as ineffective. This is not to say that there are not
disadvantages to this policy; for there are many, such as collateral damage and
heavy international condemnation. However, and this is critical, what needs
amending is not the Israeli policy of targeted killings as a counter-terrorism
tool; rather, there must be amendments made to International Humanitarian
Law (IHL). These important legal guidelines are not complimentary to the
world of post-modern terrorism in the twenty-first century. The laws within
these legal guidelines have not been amended to meet the newest challenges
of stateless terrorism. The fact that a terrorist organization lacks a sovereign
state or a national standing army does not make it any less of a threat to in-
ternational peace and security. The laws are unclear as to how a state is able
and obligated to deal with terrorism emanating from a stateless terrorist or-
ganization. These stateless terror organizations, such as Hamas, pose dangers
just as threatening as terrorism stemming from sovereign states. Irrefutably,
International Humanitarian Law should always be applied to the protection of
Palestinian civilians during wartime and peacetime, but the same need not ap-
ply to Palestinian terrorists, whose explicit goal is the targeting of civilians and
66 The Monitor - Winter 2006

the destruction of the State of Israel. Israeli civilians also deserve protection,
and that is precisely what the policy of “focused foiling” provides. So long as
Palestinian terrorists continue to engage in terrorism against Israeli civilians
they will rightfully remain legitimate targets for elimination. Twisting IHL
in an attempt to protect Palestinian terrorists will negatively distort the true
essence of these important legal guidelines and it will not divert Israel from
targeting those deemed eligible for elimination.
To many, the Israeli targeted operation was viewed as state-sponsored
terrorism, which led to the intentional deaths of over a dozen Palestinians,
only one of whom was deemed a terrorist. Though the collateral damage was
both tragic and severe despite the storm of international condemnation that
quickly reached Israel’s political shores, no laws had been broken and no guide-
lines breached. The Shehade operation is an event that has become a counter-
terrorism “lesson to be learned from,” and questions of legality continue to
resonate from the operation. The targeted operation against Shehade, widely
condemned as disproportionate, was not an illegal military action; rather, it
was carried out as a justified act of self-defense.36
When “focused foiling” operations are utilized as a lone counter-terror-
ism tool against Hamas’s religious command, any proof of efficacy seemingly
cannot be determined. Whilst the targeted killing of Shehade was successful,
in that his death was ensured and therefore his direction of terror attacks came
to an end, the one-ton bomb utilized for the operation killed 14 civilians,
including nine children. As the statistics show, terrorist attacks and deaths
increased following Shehade’s elimination, hardly a case for successful preven-
tion. However, this in no way concludes that targeted killings are ineffective.
In fact, the combination of “focused foiling” and other counter-terrorism poli-
cies are useful tools in preventing future acts of terror against civilians.
Targeting Palestinian terrorists directly engaged in terrorist attacks is
viewed by some as different from the targeting of spiritual leaders, who use
words rather than weapons. However, words can be and often are utilized
as weapons. The spiritual leaders give guidance and religious approval to the
deliverers of these weapons. It is known that Sheik Yassin gave his approval for
countless terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. Shavit was correct when he
stated that Yassin’s words were more powerful than physical weaponry. Spiri-
tual leaders are able to manipulate potential suicide terrorists with charismatic
religious authority. These leaders represent the key element of the entire reli-
gious-based terrorist equation. They cannot continue to be viewed as untouch-
 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 67

able. At the same time, it seems that the operations against the spiritual leaders
had no immediate effect on the prevention of terrorism. That is, while their
words were viewed as weapons, the Israeli response—targeted killings—to
their words and actions did not produce any effective outcome or protection
for Israeli citizens, at least not immediately..
Moreover, if targeted killings against Palestinian terrorists are to con-
tinue, then it is important for Israel to learn from the United States and other
Western nations that utilize the same counter-terrorism tool. Those nations,
currently fighting in the War on Terror, have succeeded in convincing many
in the global community that targeted killings of religious terror leaders are
legitimate under certain and specific circumstances. The Israelis have failed to
convince the global community that Sheik Shehade and Sheik Yassin represent
common threats to those religio-military commanders targeted by the Ameri-
cans and others involved in fighting terrorism. The UN Secretary General ap-
plauded the targeted killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq yet condemned
Israeli attacks on Sheik Ahmed Yassin, which is counterproductive to combined
international efforts in fighting terrorism. Accepting only certain targeted kill-
ing operations, by calling one a “relief ” and the other an “assassination”, feeds
the motivations of Palestinian terror organizations and repeatedly proves to the
Israelis that what is acceptable in the war on terror does not apply to them in
the same way it does other nations.
Targeted killings may be far from popular, but this policy is in place to
protect Israeli civilians from imminent or future acts of terrorism. The results
of a targeted killing may not be immediate and could cause a temporary spike
in terrorist activity in the short term; however, utilizing “focused foiling” op-
erations against a Palestinian terrorist organization’s capabilities will eventually
cause less effective attacks in the long run. It would be wise to remember that
advocating a sikul memukad is not about promoting death but rather endorsing
the prevention of terrorism and the protection of civilian lives.
68 The Monitor - Winter 2006

Notes
1
International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, Harvard Program on Humanitarian
Policy and Conflict Research. “Deportation, forcible transfer and assigned residence in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory.” [updated July 31, 2004, retrieved December 13, 2006].
Available from http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/hvu-opt-31jul.pdf.
2
The use of “Israeli Security Establishment”, for this paper, represents a cumulative term for
any Israeli agency involved in Targeted Killings (Mossad, Shin Bet, and the IDF).
Burston, Bradley. “Background/Intifada Hebrew, a glossary.” Haaretz.com. [retrieved
December 13, 2006]. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=504766
&displayTypeCd=1&sideCd=1&contrassID=2.
3
The terms “focused foiling” and “targeted killing” are used interchangeably throughout the
academic community whilst referring to the same tactic.
4
Söderblom, Jason D. “Time to Kill? State-Sponsored Assassination and International
Law.” World International Community Experts. [updated February 12, 2004, retrieved
December 13, 2006]. Available from http://world-ice.com/Articles/Assassinations.pdf.
5
Ibid.
6
Amnesty Internationl. “Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories”. [updated February
21, 2001, retrieved December 13, 2006]. Available from http://web.amnesty.org/library/
Index/engMDE150072001?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES/ISRAEL%2FOCCUPI
ED+TERRITORIES.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Shin Bet is Israel’s domestic General Security Service (GSS). It is comparable to the
American F.B.I.
10
The Palestinian Authority has arrested suspects but these suspects were always released
early, without proper prosecution. In the mid-90’s, former Israeli Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu coined this action as the “revolving door policy”.
11
There does, in fact, exist a “judicial framework” involved in the decision-making process
before reaching the conclusion that a targeted killing is necessary. Proper legal steps must
be taken and the IDF’s Judge Advocate General officially and legally gives his ruling on the
matter before any action by the ISE is taken.
12
It should be noted that “extrajudicial executions” are referred to as “murder” under the
Geneva Conventions.
Society of Professional Journalists. “Reference Guide to the Geneva Conventions.”
[retrieved December 13, 2006]. Available from http://www.genevaconventions.org/.
13
McDonnell, Thomas Michael. “Assassination/Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists — A
Violation of International Law?” Jus in Bello. December 2005. Pace Law School. http://
library.law.pace.edu/blogs/jib/2005/12/assassinationtargeted_killing.html
14
Rubenstein, Amnon. Personal interview by Adam E. Stahl. April 9, 2006. The
Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel.
 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 69

15
Shavit, Shabtai. Personal interview by Adam E. Stahl. May 17, 2006. Herzliya, Israel.
16
Ganor, Boaz. “Targeted Killing-The Normative-Moral Dilemma.” In The Counter-terrorism
Puzzle. London: Transaction Publishers, 2005.
17
Ibid.
18
The Geneva Conventions were ratified on 8 June 1977 and adopted by the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts. The additional protocol relates to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts. See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/94.
htm. The second ratification occurred in 2005, relating to the Adoption of an Additional
Distinctive Emblem; 2 countries have since ratified the protocols. See http://www.icrc.org/
ihl.nsf/FULL/615.
19
Dershowtiz, Alan. “Killing Terrorist Chieftains is Legal.” Jerusalem Post. [updated April
23, 2004, retrieved December 13, 2006]. Available from: http://www.law.harvard.edu/
faculty/dershowitz/Articles/killingterrorists.html.
20
Professor Galia Golan is Emeritus Professor of Soviet and East European Studies
(Hebrew University) and Professor of Government at the Lauder School of Government,
Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya. Notes taken during
interview with Professor Golan at the IDC, Herzliya.
21
Guiroa, Amos. “Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense.” Project to Enforce the Geneva
Conventions. [Updated October 13, 2006, retrieved December 14, 2006]. http://
justicescholars.org/pegc/archive/Journals/Guiora_Targeted_Killing_Case_West_Sp_2005.
doc.
22
The academic community uses the terms GSS and ISA (Israeli Security Agency) in
referring to the Israeli Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic security service.
23
International Policy Institute for Counter-terrorism. “Head of Hamas Military Wing
Killed in Israeli Military Strike.” [updated July 23, 2002, retrieved December 13, 2006].
http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=808.
24
Byman, Daniel. 2006. “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs 85(2): 95-111.
25
Ibid.
26
The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge
Base (TKB). “Terrorist Incidents Reports: Incidents by group: Hamas.” http://www.
tkb.org/IncidentGroupModule.jsp?startDate=09%2F25%2F2000&endDate=07%2
F22%2F2002&domInt=0&suiInt=0&filter=0&detail=0&info=&info=&imageField.
x=68&imageField.y=14&imageField=filter+results&pagemode=group.
27
Ibid.
28
It should be noted that attacks still continued and the death toll continued to rise even
after Shehade was killed. Interview with a senior, high-ranking officer in the Shin
Bet, Israel’s domestic security services. The interview was conducted on Sunday
September 17, 2006, 12:45PM, Tel Aviv. The interviewee has requested that the
interview take place on the condition of anonymity.
29
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “IAF Strike Kills Hamas Leader Ahmed Yassin.”
[updated March 22, 2004, retrieved December 13, 2006] http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
70 The Monitor - Winter 2006

Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+and+Islamic+Fundamentalism-/Sheikh+Yassin+
killed+in+IDF+attack+22-Mar-2004.htm.
Yassin’s two sons were also killed in the attack; both were known for their involvement in
terrorist activity against Israel.
30
Shavit, Shabtai.
31
The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.
32
Non-suicidal attacks are represented as roadside bombs, mortar fire, sniping, knifings, and
Qassam rocket attacks.
33
The Communiqué was issued on 29 March 2002.
Zussman, Asaf and Noam Zussman. 2005. “Targeted Killings: Evaluating the Effectiveness
of a Counter-terrorism Policy.” Bank of Israel-Research Department 2005.02. http://www.
bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/mehkar/papers/dp0502e.pdf#search=%22Total%20number%
20%2B%20targeted%20killings%20%2B%20Israel%22.
34
Appel J, Nancy. “There’s One Reason for Israel’s Fence: Suicide Bombers.” San Jose Mercury
News. [updated July 15, 2004, retrieved December 13, 2006]. Available from http://www.
adl.org/ADL_Opinions/International_Affairs/SJMercuryNews_071504.htm.
35
Cabinet Secretariat of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Cabinet Communiqué.”
Issued March 29, 2002. Jerusalem, Israel. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/
Communiques/2002/Cabinet%20Communique%20-%2029-Mar-2002.
36
The legality of the Shehade operation is not the main point of the essay but it is crucial to
understand the Israeli view of self-defense.