Edward Shils - Tradition
Edward Shils - Tradition
Edward Shils - Tradition
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PRELIMINARY REMARKS
2 We could use the term 'tradition' to refer to every belief which is believed at a given
moment by a particular person and which was believed and accepted previously by that
person and which was believed and accepted previously by that person 'because' he accepted
(i.e. believed) it even prior to that earlier point. What a person believes at any point in time is
in a sense transmitted to him by himself. It would be an 'intrapersonal' tradition. 'Intraperso-
nal traditions' are closely connected with interpersonal traditions. The fact that a person
believes at a given moment what he previously believed enhances the likelihood that he will
continue to believe it in the future and that he will offer it to someone else in a way which will
differ from the way in which it would be offered if he had not believed it at an earlier time.
In this paper I am interested primarily in interpersonal and above all intergenerational
traditions but I do not gainsay the significance of the intrapersonal traditions for the inter-
personal.
4 There is no direct linear relationship between influence and age. The more 'juventocentric'
a society, the earlier the beginning of the downward curve of the influence of advancing age.
Even in such societies, however, elders continue to have preponderance of influence for a
substantial period; and this influence is enhanced by the correlation between the allocation of
power and age which even the most 'juventocentric' societies have not succeeded in overcom-
ing. As long as there are 'careers', those who enter earlier will have advantages not simul-
taneously available to those who have entered later. Only if 'experience' ceases to be equated
with the number of years of service or if experience comes to be excluded as a criterion of
recruitment and is replaced by other criteria which are not correlated with age will later
entrants stand on a more equal footing with the earlier entrants. This might diminish the
amount of 'traditional belief' in a society in relation to the total body of beliefs in that society
but it cannot eliminate it.
Thus every and any belief can be a traditional belief. The conte
belief, however scientific that belief, does not render it immune to be
part of a tradition and of being transmitted traditionally.
The beliefs which become traditionalized need contain no substantive
reference to the past; they need not express appreciation of the past in
order to be recommended and accepted for their connection with the
past. They can indeed disparage the past and praise the present and the
future. They can claim to legitimate their actions by reference to law
in conformity with present popular will. There is probably no belief and no
action which is not capable of being taken as 'given'. This does not mean
that beliefs and the norms of action which become 'given' do not by the
fact of their 'givenness', by the fact of their traditional transmission,
acquire certain determinate properties. Nor does the fact that any substan-
tive belief or norm of action is capable of becoming traditionalized mean
that all beliefs and norms are equally likely to become traditionalized, or
that they become traditionalized in the same way.
Whatever the substantive content of the beliefs, there are certain
properties which tend to be generated in them in consequence of their
traditionality, i.e. in consequence of their being available or 'given'
rather than by being newly promulgated by reason, experiment or revela-
tion. The length of the chain of traditionality and the mode of transmission
are further determinants of the properties which substantive beliefs
acquire. For example, oral transmission as against written transmission;
transmission in the context of unspecialized institutions rather than
through specialized institutions; reception through concentrated and
disciplined preparatory study rather than through reception in the context
of ongoing performance; transmission through exemplary models rather
than through exposition and command all have some influence on the
formal properties of the beliefs acquired through traditional transmission.
Some of the formal properties of beliefs and patterns of belief are precision/
vagueness; particularity/generality; mandatoriness/permissiveness; flexi-
bility/rigidity; coherence/disjunctiveness.
Transmission which refers to written texts of belief is conducive to
precision. Yet even written transmission cannot be exhaustive in its
prescriptions; this leaves room for interpretation, and precision introduces
some measure of modification. Traditional transmission of written beliefs
tends towards modification in the direction of greater particularity as well
as precision (e.g. casuistry and 'normal science'). Oral, exemplary trans-
mission seems to be more permissive than exposition from a written text.
The longer the presumed chain of traditionality, the greater the degree of
mandatoriness.
Flexibility is the extent of modification or the capacity for modification
of a belief or a pattern of belief through time. The levels of modification,
5 The attachment to the past might have very narrow and particular foci such as the literary
production or the books produced in a certain past period or the furniture, painting, silver-
ware, domestic ornamentation or dress. There is certainly a marked element of traditionality
in all this-it is an attachment to what has been handed down-but it is desirable to distin-
guish the aesthetic appreciation and particularly the aesthetic appreciation of a segregated
sector of the past from the handing down and reception of the cognitive and moral beliefs
which enter constitutively into social structure.
There are many other motives and conditions for the rejectio
recommended traditions. The remoteness of the recommending autho
-the lack of affinity between the authority and the subject to whom
recommendation is addressed-based on disparities and disjunctio
culture and on ecological disjunctions is certainly very common.
rejections, however, occur in situations in which the beliefs recomme
have not been previously accepted.
Much more frequent are the rejections which derive from the unfi
ness of the traditional belief to newly acquired beliefs and practices.
situations which create new problems and which offer new gratificat
and possibilities of gratification render previously accepted beliefs im
sible and disadvantageous. The beliefs might not under those circums
be explicitly renounced, but their acceptance becomes more atten
more intermittent and more blurred. They gradually turn into new
which still retain some of the idiom of the old beliefs and a little of their
content.
power of the tendency within the ego to form itself into a coherent se
directing system. The need for a high degree of individuality is we
most people. They have little need 'to see with their own eyes' or to
with their own senses'. It is not so much the strength of the drive tow
transcendence which accounts for this as it is, rather, the rudimentari
or feebleness of their sensitivity, i.e. their reactiveness, toward re
symbols. These are the people who find it easy to conform with traditi
without having a strong feeling about 'pastness'. They have no nee
reject, because they have no strong sensitivity and therefore do not feel
burden of traditionality and of the sacredness which it contains. T
have no feeling of need to be absorbed into the sacredness imbedded in
past. Therefore they do not react against it either. They neither confo
compulsively nor reject compulsively. They are people who live wi
the framework of what is 'given'. If the given is 'old', they accept it, if
'new' they accept it equally readily.
Persons who have, however, a need for an internally generated co
ence of experience and expression have a more active as well as a f
relationship to the 'given'. They incorporate elements of the 'giv
discriminatingly in accordance with criteria which are exercised f
within outwards rather than the other way round. Such persons ar
likely to be ready recipients of traditionally transmitted beliefs o
beliefs with traditional content. The sheer force of intelligence or
power of the ego results in an assimilation and to some extent transfor
tion of the content of traditional beliefs. The 'past' is not rejected beca
it is the 'past'. 'Pastness' and 'givenness' are not the essential criter
acceptance or rejection. The Burkean conception of tradition as an accum
lation of wise judgments and prudent practice is a prototype of this ki
response to tradition. In principle, the rational individual might en
accepting very much of what is handed down through traditional t
mission, not out of compulsiveness or passivity, not out of awe bef
sacred past or because there is nothing else to do, but rather becau
turns out on examination to be the most reasonable thing.
True originality is a deflection of the line of traditional transmis
True originality transfers the centre of creativity into the individual
withdraws the determination of conduct from the external inheritance.
Thus there is at the very root a war between originality and tradition. It
is not however a war into which the original person is pushed willy-nilly
by the sheer obstinacy of his character and the refusal to accept anything
from the outside. Compulsive rejection and eruptive spontaneity have
often been confused with originality or creativity, particularly in bohemian
circles and among those who carry on its traditions.6
6 Cf. W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, Vol. II, in
which the three types of bohemians, creative persons and philistines are delineated. The
from some other society where it was either a marginal or a central belief.
In either case, the charismatic generation of the new beliefs, which are in
their turn to become traditional, is accompanied by a high state of inten-
sity of attachment to the sacred things ostensibly neglected by the 'super-
seded' tradition. Tangible innovations in belief arouse among some of the
proponents of the previously dominant traditional beliefs a state of intense
consecration to a purer form of the once central tradition. This is said to
be the genuine tradition of which the recently received form was a degrada-
tion. Some of the protectors and custodians of the displaced belief become
passionate exponents of a 'revived' tradition; they are 'traditionalists'.
Both those who recommend the displacement of the once recommended
traditional belief and those who recommend its observance in purified
form are innovators.
Whereas traditional beliefs which govern conduct in corporate bodies
and primordial and civil collectivities yield when their 'unfittingness' and
the ineffectiveness of their recommending authorities become evident,
innovations in traditional beliefs and procedures in science, scholarship,
literature and art have a different source. These are subjected to modifica-
tion in consequence of the disclosure of new possibilities in the tradition-
ally received beliefs, arising from their confrontation by exceptional intel-
ligence and imagination. This kind of creativity is not the product of the
breakdown of the hitherto traditionally received beliefs arising from the
failure of their custodians to control the situation and adapt the society or
the corporate body to the new circumstances. It is not because the tradi-
tionally transmitted beliefs have failed to remain in some sort of 'appro-
priate' relationship to the circumstances of their believers but because the
intelligence and imagination of new recipients of the traditional beliefs
have perceived defects in what has been transmitted. The creative powers
themselves cause the breakdown of the hitherto traditionally transmitted
beliefs. The disclosure of deficiencies and gaps in these traditions and
efforts to correct or improve upon them sometimes involve far-reaching
modifications in the whole pattern of belief. Every system of thought, every
creative pattern which exists has such possibilities inherent in it. Science is a
continuously, partially self-dissolving and self-reorganizing pattern,
produced through the power of the human mind working under the disci-
pline of training within the framework of its own traditions. No system of
thought, no pattern of expressive objectivation is ever wholly closed.
It only appears closed because the guardians of the system at a particular
stage may be incapable of introducing and are able to resist innovations to
be made in it. They can control the recruitment, the training of persons and
opportunities for expression of those who work on these subjects and they
can criticize them so negatively when they do express themselves that they
do not succeed in finding a following. Thus they can hamper innovations
in the traditional patterns of belief. Originality may fall into such a sta
disrepute and the negative sanctions attending its manifestations may
severe that there is no incentive to modify the system by perceiving g
and deficiencies, inconsistencies, incompatibilities, etc.
Every pattern of symbolic objectivation has within it an inherent po
tiality for transformation in a limited number of directions. We may
say, where the traditions of society and the organization and custody of
institutions which guard these patterns of thought and analysis
watchful against innovations, still innovations must necessarily be
and are always being made. Sometimes they are made with the intentio
reaffirming and insisting on the coherence and validity of what has b
traditionally received. But in so far as restless human intelligence
fronts these systems which claim to be closed and settled, modific
will necessarily be made. It is the ineluctable fate of every system of tho
and every pattern of expression. They will only cease to grow when th
are totally disregarded and no strong mind ever concerns itself with t
The structure of mind is such that once receiving what appears t
settled, a powerful intelligence or imagination will perceive flaws in it
possible improvements. This happens even in cultures and societies wh
are unsympathetic with originality while in those where there is a
appreciation of originality even less intelligent and imaginative minds
to attain originality.
Creative innovations in literary traditions and artistic production ha
different structure from creative innovations in traditional scientific and
scholarly beliefs. There is more 'room for manoeuvre' in the former.
In the latter, the scientist may freely choose his problem from among
the recently canvassed problems but what he attends to in the way of
earlier and current theories and data is rigorously controlled by the opinion
of his section of the scientific community. Increased eminence increases
freedom regarding the choice of theories and data to consider but even
the great scientist cannot move among the elements of the available tradi-
tion with the freedom of the literary man or artist. The scientist is not free
to draw his substantive inspiration from Galileo or Newton and to dis-
regard what his contemporaries have done. The literary man can go back to
the Marquis de Sade or Count de Lautreaumont, the painter can go back
to Hieronymus Bosch and no one will raise an eyebrow at him. (Nowa-
days he will even be praised for such a selection from among the traditions
which are available to him.)
The artist or literary man accepts a prevailing form in so far as it is
'fitting' to his ambitions. There is already a wide variety of forms, not all
of them equally current or recommended at the moment, in which his
'genius' can find some sort of accommodation. Within that category, i.e.
within the categories of verse, narrative, lyrical or epic verse, within the
novel or short story, or the portrait, the landscape or still life, he tries to
view and see and express what he has seen and felt in himself. If his creative
powers are weak, he will accept what is given and work within it. If they
are strong, he will modify the received genre as well as express his own
substantive viewpoint and sensibility. What he accomplishes depends on
his capacity to form a coherent whole of what he accepts from what has
come down to him as part of the corpus of traditional objectivations and
what his own imaginative powers require.
An inherited form, if it has had great works accomplished in it, does not
simply disappear; it is discriminatingly assimilated and extended. If the
naturalistic novel has ceased to be a fertile form through which the imagina-
tion expresses itself, it is because rich imaginations who wish to express
something which was not expressed in the naturalistic novel no longer
attach themselves and seek to work within its form. Of course, not all of
the refusal of a traditional form within a genre is creative. Much of it is
imitative of a creation which transforms; when this happens, a 'new'
tradition has been created. (Some innovations do not find extension as a
new tradition because they are too difficult to practise. But even those,
like Ulysses, change the direction of tradition by providing new elements
to be assimilated into the previously prevailing tradition.)8
Modern culture, permeated by a high evaluation of genius which breaks
through the bounds of traditional beliefs and practices to attain to a new
level of the objective truth or to express the essence of the self's imagina-
tion and sensibility more completely, encourages a free attitude towards
the tradition of objectivations. But it cannot be completely free as long
as the educational system and the system of exhibition first presents
these works as the monuments of the past, which dominate for a time at
least the attention of those who will later seek to produce works of their
own. Creative powers in practically all instances are first aroused in their
presence-'primitives' and 'uneducated poets' who are genuinely 'primi-
tive' and 'uneducated' are practically non-existent-and however much
geniuses diverge from the received as they reach the heights of their
powers, they do have their point of departure in them. In literature and in
painting and sculpture, the modern culture of originality or genius is
greatly favoured by the relatively uninstitutionalized system of training
and qualification of writers and artists.
Institutions generally are not and have not been foyers of originality.
Most institutions and corporate bodies usually permit creativity and the
8 I reject Alfred Weber's conception of culture as an activity and a body of works which are
not cumulative in their relations to each other and which, unlike science, are constantly
being regenerated and renewed. Alfred Weber thought that cultural accomplishments (art,
literature, philosophy) do not rest on past achievement; they are not part of a cumulative and
developing tradition but depend exclusively on the stock of creativity existing in a given
population among those seeking to practise a particular expressive genre. Cf. Alfred Weber,
Prinzipielles zur Kultursoziologie, originally printed in Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft.
persistence or alienation on the part of those who are the agents and
recipients of modified traditional norms.9
One must of course also mention once more the continuous internal
pressure within the personality for the reshaping of traditionally transmit-
ted beliefs. Part of this pressure comes from the need to make them fit the
individual personality system-every personality system having to some
extent a modicum of uniqueness and more or less need for individuality.
Thus, the actual variety of personalities, all of whom have the same
traditional beliefs recommended to them, brings about certain modifica-
tions in interpretation and application; these modifications are carried
further through re-enunciation and re-transmission. This is quite apart
from the need for individuality and the strength of the impulsion toward it.
Even dull philistines are not exactly alike, despite what may be said about
their conformity, uniformity, etc.
And of course there are the antinomian tendencies with which we have
already dealt and these too certainly necessitate the modification of the
received traditional norms, i.e. where they do not actually bring about a
far-reaching and deep rejection of them.
The modification of traditional beliefs and practices proceeds at different
rates throughout any society. Some sections of the society are more likely
to accept the traditional beliefs without any modifications over them to
any serious extent. However, other sections of society may contribute
modifications from different directions, and within the same society
there will always be some parts which reject; indeed, the more intense and
aggressive the rejection, the more likely also is there to be some section
of the society brought into action which affirms with equal intensity and
passion the crucial elements in the family of traditional norms prevailing
in the society. As a result, what they promulgate and emphasize diverges
rather widely from what is normally accepted by the different sections
which are themselves bringing about different forms and modes of modifi-
cation.
Where there exist particular institutions and associated professions for
the maintenance and transmission of traditional norms, the pressure for
modification will be greater at the peripheries of the central institutional
system, which do not come so fully under the hegemony of these institu-
tions, but which are in sufficient contact with them to make the traditional
9 Nonetheless, where intentional modifications are experienced as contrary to the spirit of
the tradition, they might well leave some trace of guilt and resentment on the part of those
who have instigated them. This might also be true where the modification is not intentional
but where, for one reason or another, because it is sufficiently gross to be noticed by those
who participate in the modification or where because of a shift in the form and name of the
institution which carried out the traditional norm, it is thought to be contrary to tradition. It
is much more likely to do so in so far as, consciously or unconsciously, even if incorrectly, the
agents of the modification believe that they have been responsible for bringing about the
deviation from the traditional belief to such an extent that it appears to them to be no longer
a member of the same family of traditional belief to which it formerly belonged.
incorporation of the periphery into the centre. But in the course of tim
the culture of the centre begins to yield in the opposite direction. This
what has happened in the United States over the past one hundred
fifty years; it is what is happening in Great Britain at present. A
pockets of the 'pure culture' of traditional beliefs-i.e. less modified
ture of traditional beliefs-survive. Each pocket or rather its circ
traditionalist spokesmen becomes a laudator temporis acti.