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Carag V NLRC Digest

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CARAG v.

NLRC
ANTONIO CARAG v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ISABEL G.
PANGANIBAN-ORTIGUERRA, as Executive Labor Arbiter, NAFLU, and
MARIVELES APPAREL CORPORATION LABOR UNION

FACTS:
Respondents National Federation of Labor Union (NAFLU) and Mariveles
Apparel Corporation Labor Union, on behalf of the rank-and-file employees, filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against the MARIVELES APPRAREL CORPORATION
brought about by its illegal closure of business.
The complainants aver that respondent company prior to its closure did not even
bother to serve written notice to employees and to the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one month before the intended date of closure. The respondents
did not even establish that its closure was done in good faith. Moreover, the
respondents did not pay the affected employees separation pay, the amount of which is
provided in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement between the complainants and
the respondents.
The complainants prayed to implead Atty. Antonio Carag and Mr. Armando
David, as owners and responsible officers of respondent corporation to assure the
satisfaction of the judgment, should a decision favorable to them be rendered.
The complainants invoked the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court in the case
of A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU vs. NLRC, where it was held that a corporate
officer can be held liable for acting on behalf of the corporation when the latter is
no longer in existence and there are valid claims of workers that must be
satisfied.
Respondents opposed the impleader petitioner Atty. Antonio C. Carag and Mr.
Armando David since they are not the owners of Mariveles Apparel Corporation, and
they are only minority stockholders holding qualifying shares. Piercing the veil of
corporate fiction cannot be done in the present case for such remedy can only be
availed of in case of closed or family owned corporations.
ISSUE:  Whether or not a corporate director could be held personally liable for the
debts of a corporation.

RULING:
No, the corporate director could not be held personally liable for the debt of
a corporation.
Generally, a director is NOT personally liable for the debts of a corporation, which has a
separate legal personality of its own. However, Section 31 of the Corporation Code
provides that, the personal liability of corporate officers validly attaches only
when:
(a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation; or
(b) they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs; or
(c) they incur conflict of interest, resulting in damages to the corporation, its
stockholders or other persons.
In this case, the complainants failed to allege in their complaint that Carag wilfully
and knowingly voted for or assented to any patently unlawful act of MAC. Complainants
also did not present any evidence showing that Carag wilfully and knowingly voted for or
assented to any patently unlawful act of MAC. Neither did Arbiter Ortiguerra make any
finding to this effect in her Decision. Therefore, petitioners, as directors cannot be held
liable.

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