PDEA Vs Brodett GR 196390

2/20/23, 10:46 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 658
G.R. No. 196390. September 28, 2011.*
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),

petitioner, vs. RICHARD BRODETT and JORGE JOSEPH,
respondents.
Forfeiture Proceedings; In a criminal proceeding, the court

having jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order upon
conviction of an accused the seizure of (a) the instruments to commit
the crime, including documents, papers, and other effects that are
the necessary means to commit the crime, and (b) contraband, the
ownership or possession of which is not permitted for being illegal;
In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the
convict are absolutely divested and shall pass to the Government,
but it is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the
court in such manner that it can be said to be within its
jurisdiction.—It is not open to question that in a criminal
proceeding, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has the
power to order upon conviction of an accused the seizure of (a) the
instruments to commit the crime, including documents, papers, and
other effects that are the necessary means to commit the crime; and
(b) contraband, the ownership or possession of which is not
permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first, the accused
must not profit from his crime, or must not acquire property or the
right to possession of property through his unlawful act. As
justification for the second, to return to the convict from whom the
contraband was taken, in one way or another, is not prudent or
proper, because doing so will give rise to a violation of the law for
possessing the contraband again. Indeed, the court having
jurisdiction over the offense has the right to dispose of property used
in the commission of the crime, such disposition being an accessory
penalty to be imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to
a third person not liable for the offense that it was used as the
instrument to commit. In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title
and ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and shall pass
to the Government. But it is required that the property to be
forfeited must be before the court in such manner that it can be said
to be within its jurisdiction.
_______________
* FIRST DIV ISION.
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001866f4e9a357d8d8115000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/18
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs. Brodett
Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; A proper court may order the

return of property held solely as evidence should the Government be
unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal prosecution.—
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in
connection with a criminal offense either by authority of a search
warrant or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If
the search is by virtue of a search warrant, the personal property
that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the offense;
or that which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or
fruits of the offense; or that which has been used or intended to be
used as the means of committing an offense. If the search is an
incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of dangerous
weapons or anything that may have been used or may constitute
proof in the commission of an offense. Should there be no ensuing
criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized is used
as evidence, its return to the person from whom it was taken, or to
the person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of course,
except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may order
the return of property held solely as evidence should the
Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal
prosecution. The order for the disposition of such property can be
made only when the case is finally terminated.
Same; Same; The text of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9165
relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that of Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the interpretation of the latter is extended
by analogy to the former.—There is no question, for even PDEA has
itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165
relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that of Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code, which states: Article 45. Confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.—Every
penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it
the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or
tools with which it was committed. Such proceeds and instruments
or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government, unless they be the property of a third person
not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject
of lawful commerce shall be destroyed. The Court has interpreted
and applied Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code in People v. Jose,

37 SCRA 450 (1971), concerning the
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VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 341
confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four accused when
they committed the forcible abduction with rape, although the car
did not belong to any of them, holding: xxx Article 45 of the Revised
Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or
tool used in the commission of the crime if such “be the property of a
third person not liable for the offense,” it is the sense of this Court
that the order of the court below for the confiscation of the car in
question should be set aside and that the said car should be ordered
delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in replevin case.
xxx Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20.
Same; Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; The determination
of whether or not any article confiscated in relation to the unlawful
act would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the
judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings.—We note that the
RTC granted accused Brodett’s Motion To Return Non-Drug
Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the criminal proceedings were
still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the
release of the car at that point of the proceedings was premature,
considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly
forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or
income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the
accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the
proceedings in the Regional Trial Court. Section 20 further
expressly requires that such property or income derived therefrom
should remain in custodia legis in all that time and that no bond
shall be admitted for the release of it. Indeed, forfeiture, if
warranted pursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code
and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the penalty to
be prescribed. The determination of whether or not the car (or any
other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be
subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to
be rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
Same; Same; Same; The Court rules that henceforth the
Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9165, and should not release articles,
whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before
the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person who
is not liable for the unlawful act.—The directive to return the non-
drug
342
evidence has overtaken the petition for review as to render further

action upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to
perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter of
confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those
belonging to third persons not liable for the offense, in order to
clarify the extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165. This the Court must now do in view of the question
about the confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being
susceptible of repetition in the future. We rule that henceforth the
Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of
Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and should not release articles,
whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before
the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person who
is not liable for the unlawful act.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alvaro Bernabe Lazaro for petitioner.
Verano Law Firm for respondent Brodett.
Fornier, Fornier, Saño & Lagumbay Law Firm for
respondent Joseph.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an
enforcement of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 (Republic Act No. 9165) that are the property of a third
person are subject to be returned to the lawful owner who is
not liable for the unlawful act. But the trial court may not
release such objects pending trial and before judgment.
Antecedents
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the

City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, charged Richard
Brodett (Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation
of Sec-
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VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 343

tion 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No. 91651

in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-208, the accusatory
portion of the information for which reads as follows:
“That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of

Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding each other,
they not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver and give away to
another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored tablets with Motorala (M)
logos, contained in six (6) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets
with recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which when
subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous drug.”2
Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed another
information charging only Brodett with a violation of
Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No.
09-209, with the information alleging:
“That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of

Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control the following:
a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10) transparent
capsules containing white powdery substance contained in one self-
sealing transparent plastic sachet having a net weight of 4.9007
grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded
positive results for presence of METHYLENE
DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA), commonly known as
“Ecstasy,” a dangerous drug;
_______________
1 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
2 Rollo, p. 51.
344

b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white

powdery substance with total recorded net weight of 1.2235 grams,
which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive
results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white
powdery substance, placed in a light-yellow folded paper, with total
recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which when subjected to
laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of
COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing dried
leaves with total recorded net weight of 54.5331 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results
for presence of TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a dangerous drug.”3
In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30,

2009, Brodett filed a Motion To Return Non-Drug Evidence.
He averred that during his arrest, Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had seized several personal
non-drug effects from him, including a 2004 Honda Accord
car with license plate no. XPF-551; and that PDEA refused
to return his personal effects despite repeated demands for
their return. He prayed that his personal effects be tendered
to the trial court to be returned to him upon verification.4
On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor
submitted its Comment and Objection,5 proposing thereby
that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for
safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the
trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defense to
exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the
City Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it
appeared to be the instrument in the commission of the
violation
_______________
3 Id., pp. 54-55.

4 Id., pp. 58-61.
5 Id., pp. 63-64.
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VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 345

of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the vehicle

used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directed the release of
the car, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized

officer or custodian is hereby directed to: (1) photograph the
abovementioned Honda Accord, before returning the same to its
rightful owner Myra S. Brodett and the return should be fully
documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as listed in this
Order of both accused, Richard S. Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to
this court for safekeeping, to be held as needed.
SO ORDERED.”6
PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its

motion was denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of merit, to
wit:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for

Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of
the Court dated November 4, 2009 is upheld.
SO ORDERED.”7
Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court

of Appeals (CA) by petition for certiorari, claiming that the
orders of the RTC were issued in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,8
dismissing the petition for certiorari thusly:
_______________
6 Id., p. 107.
7 Id., p. 110.
8 Id., pp. 37-46; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with
Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and Associate Justice Ramon A.
Cruz, concurring.
346

“xxxx
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this
petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett,
not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the
records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of
any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and
sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the
dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the subject
Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and
forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject

car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms.
Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law
are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a
contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial
construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are
not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation
is consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may
not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”9
Hence, PDEA appeals.
Issues
Essentially, PDEA asserts that the decision of the CA

was not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial
intent of the framers of R.A. No. 9165.10 It contends that the
CA gravely erred in its ruling; that the Honda Accord car,
registered under the name of Myra S. Brodett (Ms. Brodett),
had been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate
anti-illegal operation and should not be released from the
custody of the law; that the Motion to Return Non-Drug
Evidence did
_______________
9 Id., pp. 44-46.
10 Id., pp. 2-32.
347
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 347

not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third

person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett,
a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its
release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the
RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the
crime.
In his Comment,11 Brodett counters that the petitioner
failed to present any question of law that warranted a
review by the Court; that Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165 clearly
and unequivocally states that confiscation and forfeiture of
the proceeds or instruments of the supposed unlawful act in
favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless such

proceeds or instruments are the property of a third person
not liable for the unlawful act; that PDEA is gravely
mistaken in its reading that the third person must still
prove in the trial court that he has no knowledge of the
commission of the crime; and that PDEA failed to exhaust
all remedies before filing the petition for review.
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in
affirming the order for the release of the car to Ms. Brodett.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing
property confiscated in criminal proceedings
It is not open to question that in a criminal proceeding,

the court having jurisdiction over the offense has the power
to order upon conviction of an accused the seizure of (a) the
instruments to commit the crime, including documents,
papers, and other effects that are the necessary means to
commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or
posses-
_______________
11 Id., pp. 158-177.
348

sion of which is not permitted for being illegal. As

justification for the first, the accused must not profit from
his crime, or must not acquire property or the right to
possession of property through his unlawful act.12 As
justification for the second, to return to the convict from
whom the contraband was taken, in one way or another, is
not prudent or proper, because doing so will give rise to a
violation of the law for possessing the contraband again.13
Indeed, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has
the right to dispose of property used in the commission of
the crime, such disposition being an accessory penalty to be
imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to a
third person not liable for the offense that it was used as the
instrument to commit.14
In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and

ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and shall
pass to the Government.15 But it is required that the
property to be forfeited must be before the court in such
manner that it can be said to be within its jurisdiction.16
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may
be seized in connection with a criminal offense either by
authority of a search warrant or as the product of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue of a
search warrant, the personal property that may be seized
may be that which is the subject of the offense; or that which
has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of
the offense; or that which has been used or intended to be
used as the means of committing an offense.17 If the search
is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of
dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or
may consti-
_______________
12 24 CJS, Criminal Law, § 1733.
13 Villaruz v. Court of First Instance, 71 Phil. 72 (1940).
14 United States v. Bruhez, 28 Phil. 305 (1914).
15 United States v. Surla, 20 Phil. 163 (1911).
16 United States v. Filart and Singson, 30 Phil. 80 (1915).
17 Section 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
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VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 349

tute proof in the commission of an offense.18 Should there be

no ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal
property seized is used as evidence, its return to the person
from whom it was taken, or to the person who is entitled to
its possession is but a matter of course,19 except if it is
contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may order the
return of property held solely as evidence should the
Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a
criminal prosecution.20 The order for the disposition of such
property can be made only when the case is finally
terminated.21
Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable
legal discretion in the matter of disposing of property
claimed as evidence,22 and this discretion extends even to
the manner of proceeding in the event the accused claims
the property was wrongfully taken from him.23 In particular,
the trial court has the power to return property held as
evidence to its rightful owners, whether the property was

legally or illegally seized by the Government.24 Property
used as evidence must be returned once the criminal
proceedings to which it relates have terminated, unless it is
then subject to forfeiture or other proceedings.25
_______________
18 Section 13, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
19 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson, G.R. No. 164605, October 27, 2006, 505
SCRA 704, 711.
20 24 CJS, Criminal Law, §1733, c., citing United States v. Premises
Known as 608 Taylor Ave., Apartment 302, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
C.A. Pa., 584 F. 2d 1297.
21 Padilla v. United States, C.A. Cal., 267 F. 2d 351.
22 24 CJS, Criminal Law, §1733, c., citing State v. Allen, 66 N.W. 2d
830, 159 Neb. 314.
23 Id., citing Hutchinson v. Rosetti, 205 N.Y.S. 2d 526, 24 Misc. 2d
949.
24 Id., citing United States v. Estep, C.A. 10(Okl.), 760 F. 2d 1060.
25 Id., citing United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave.,
Apartment 302, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, C.A. Pa., 584 F. 2d 1297.
350

II
Order of release was premature and made
in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car
belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in
connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal
drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of
the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other
criminal proceedings.
In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:
“A careful reading of the above provision shows that

confiscation and forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to “all
the proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act,
including but not limited to, money and other assets obtained
thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular
unlawful act was committed unless they are the property of a
third person not liable for the unlawful act.” Simply put, the
law exempts from the effects of confiscation and forfeiture
any property that is owned by a third person who is not
liable for the unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this

petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S.
Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear
from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been
charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of
possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the
law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why
the subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation
and forfeiture.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is
clear and unambiguous, the court has no alternative but to apply
the same according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the first and fundamental
duty of courts is to apply the law according to its express terms,
interpretation being called only when such literal application is
impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be
resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for
application.
351
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 351

We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject

car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms.
Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law
are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a
contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial
construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are
not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation
is not consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person
may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law.”26 (emphases are in the original text)
The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and

forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act,
including the properties or proceeds derived from illegal
trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and essential
chemicals, is Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently
provides as follows:
“Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or

Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or
Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals.—Every penalty
imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation or manufacture
of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of

dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including
other laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and
forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived
from unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money and other
assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which
the particular unlawful act was committed, unless they are the
property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act,
but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered
destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of
this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate
criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing
_______________
26 Rollo, pp. 44-45.
352

for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense
and all the assets and properties of the accused either owned or held
by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be
found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income:
Provided, however, That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the
same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order
of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no
property, or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated
and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the
same shall be in custodia legis and no bond shall be admitted for
the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property
confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all
proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation,
forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the property pending
disposition, as well as expenses for publication and court costs. The
proceeds in excess of the above expenses shall accrue to the Board to
be used in its campaign against illegal drugs.”27
There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed

out, that the text of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165 relevant to
the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that of Article
45 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
“Article 45. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or

Instruments of the Crime.—Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the
proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was
committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the
property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those
articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed.”
_______________
27 Emphasis supplied.
353
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 353

The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45 of the

Revised Penal Code in People v. Jose,28 concerning the
confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four
accused when they committed the forcible abduction with
rape, although the car did not belong to any of them,
holding:
“xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation

and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the
crime if such “be the property of a third person not liable for the
offense,” it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court
below for the confiscation of the car in question should be set aside
and that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor
for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in replevin case. xxx”29
Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20,

supra. To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments
belonging to a third person, therefore, there must be an
indictment charging such third person either as a principal,
accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will not suffice to
prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the third
person, for a mere suspicion of that person’s participation is
not sufficient ground for the court to order the forfeiture of
the goods seized.30
However, the Office of the City Prosecutor proposed
through its Comment and Objection submitted on August
27, 2009 in the RTC31 that the delivery to the RTC of the
listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held there
throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the

Prosecution and the Defense to exhaust their possible
evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor further
objected to the return of the car because it appeared to be
the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous
drugs, and, as such,
_______________
28 No. L-28232, February 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450.
29 Id., p. 482.
30 I Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 15th Edition, pp. 638-639.
31 Rollo, pp. 63-64.
354

was the instrument in the commission of the violation of

Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be
not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent
of the framers of R.A. No. 9165,32 and contends that the car
should not be released from the custody of the law because it
had been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate
anti-illegal operation. It argues that the Motion to Return
Non-Drug Evidence did not intimate or allege that the car
had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had
belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did
not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under
the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no
knowledge of the commission of the crime. It insists that the
car is a property in custodia legis and may not be released
during the pendency of the trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City
Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted accused Brodett’s Motion
To Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when
the criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial
was yet to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at
that point of the proceedings was premature, considering
that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly
forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any
property, or income derived therefrom, that has been
confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165
during the pendency of the proceedings in the Regional Trial
Court. Section 20 further expressly requires that such
property or income derived therefrom should remain in
custodia legis in all that time and that no bond shall be

admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warranted pursuant to either Article
45 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165, would be a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The
determi-
_______________
32 Id., pp. 2-32.
355
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 355

nation of whether or not the car (or any other article

confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject
of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to
be rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to
this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in
relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in
the RTC as being in custodia legis is primarily intended to
preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as
such. To release it before the judgment is rendered is to
deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as
evidence. Consequently, that photographs were ordered to
be taken of the car was not enough, for mere photographs
might not fill in fully the evidentiary need of the
Prosecution. As such, the RTC’s assailed orders were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for being in contravention with the express
language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.
Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed
orders of the RTC, or reverse the decision of the CA. It
appears that on August 26, 2011 the RTC promulgated its
decision on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208 and
Criminal Case No. 09-209, acquitting both Brodett and
Joseph and further ordering the return to the accused of all
non-drug evidence except the buy-bust money and the
genuine money, because:
“The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links

in the chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar. The Court cannot
merely rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official function in view of the glaring blunder in the handling of
the corpus delicti of these cases. The presumption of regularity
should bow down to the presumption of innocence of the accused.
Hence, the two (2) accused BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it

is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged for Illegal
Selling and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, RICHARD BRODETT y SANTOS and JOR-
356

GE JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUITTED of the crimes charged

in Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and 09-209.
The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.
All the non-drug evidence except the buy bust money and
the genuine money are ordered returned to the accused.
The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the
genuine money confiscated from both accused are ordered escheated
in favor of the government and accordingly transmitted to the
National Treasury for proper disposition.” (emphasis supplied)33
The directive to return the non-drug evidence has

overtaken the petition for review as to render further action
upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to
perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter of
confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including
those belonging to third persons not liable for the offense, in
order to clarify the extent of the power of the trial court
under Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.34 This the Court must
now do in view of the question about the confiscation and
forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of repetition
in the future.35
We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall
comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-
drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition
of the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not
liable for the unlawful act.
_______________
33 Judgment dated August 26, 2011 rendered in Criminal Case No. 09-
208 and Criminal Case No. 09-209.
34 Salonga v. Cruz Paño, No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA
438, 463; David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489
SCRA 160, 215.
35 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489

SCRA 160, 215; Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302,
July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98; Acop v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855,
July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577; Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.
357
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 357

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review

is DENIED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to
disseminate this decision to all trial courts for their
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro (Actg. Chairperson), Del Castillo,

Perez** and Mendoza,*** JJ., concur.
Petition for review denied.
Notes.—Some might argue that the evidentiary

requirement in civil forfeiture cases has an even higher
standard, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt—forfeiture
of property is in substance a criminal proceeding, and such
forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a
penalty. (Yuchengo vs. Sandiganbayan, 479 SCRA 1 [2006])
Forfeiture retroacts to the date of the commission of the
offense. (Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Appeals, 481
SCRA 109 [2006])
——o0o——
_______________
** Vice Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. per Special Order
No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.
*** Vice Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, per Special Order No. 1093
dated September 21, 2011.
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PDEA Vs Brodett GR 196390

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2/20/23, 10:46 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 658

G.R. No. 196390. September 28, 2011.*

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),

Forfeiture Proceedings; In a criminal proceeding, the court

* FIRST DIV ISION.

340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs. Brodett

Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; A proper court may order the

and applied Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code in People v. Jose,

VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 341

Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs. Brodett

342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs. Brodett

evidence has overtaken the petition for review as to render further

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the

VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 343

tion 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No. 91651

“That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of

“That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of

344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white

In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30,

3 Id., pp. 54-55.

VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 345

of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the vehicle

“WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized

PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for

Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court

346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject

Hence, PDEA appeals.

Essentially, PDEA asserts that the decision of the CA

VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 347

not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third

favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless such

The petition is meritorious.

It is not open to question that in a criminal proceeding,

348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

sion of which is not permitted for being illegal. As

In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and

VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 349

tute proof in the commission of an offense.18 Should there be

evidence to its rightful owners, whether the property was

350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“A careful reading of the above provision shows that

Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this

VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 351

We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject

The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and

“Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or

chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of

352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed

“Article 45. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or

VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 353

The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45 of the

“xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation