Pertinent Cases On The General Banking Law of 2000 (R.A. No. 8791)

General Banking Law of 2000 (R.A. No.
8791)
Diligence Required of Banks—Relevant Jurisprudence
Simex International (Manila) Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88013, 19 March 1990, (183 SCRA 360)
The banking system is an indispensable institution in the modern world and plays a vital role in
the economic life of every civilized nation. Whether as mere passive entities for the safekeeping and
saving of money or as active instruments of business and commerce, banks have become a ubiquitous
presence among the people, who have come to regard them with respect and even gratitude and, most
of all, confidence. Thus, even the humble wage-earner has not hesitated to entrust his life's savings to the
bank of his choice, knowing that they will be safe in its custody and will even earn some interest for him.
The ordinary person, with equal faith, usually maintains a modest checking account for security and
convenience in the settling of his monthly bills and the payment of ordinary expenses. As for business
entities like the petitioner, the bank is a trusted and active associate that can help in the running of their
affairs, not only in the form of loans when needed but more often in the conduct of their day-to-day
transactions like the issuance or encashment of checks.
In every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost fidelity,
whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. The bank must record every
single transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be done
if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can dispose of as he sees
fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever he directs. A blunder on the part of the
bank, such as the dishonor of a check without good reason, can cause the depositor not a little
embarrassment if not also financial loss and perhaps even civil and criminal litigation.
The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its
functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care,
always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship
Sia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102970, 13 May 1993, (222 SCRA 24)
Contract of the use of a safety deposit box of a bank is not a deposit but a lease. Section 72 of
the General Banking Act [R.A. 337, as amended] pertinently provides: In addition to the operations
specifically authorized elsewhere in this Act, banking institutions other than building and loan
associations may perform the following services (a) Receive in custody funds, documents, and valuable
objects, and rent safety deposit boxes for the safeguarding of such effects.
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118492, 15 August 2001
In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals upholding a long standing doctrine, we ruled
that the degree of diligence required of banks, is more than that of a good father of a family where the
fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors is concerned. In other words banks are duty
bound to treat the deposit accounts of their depositors with the highest degree of care. But the said
ruling applies only to cases where banks act under their fiduciary capacity, that is, as depositary of the
f.a.c. spcl notes 2022

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deposits of their depositors. But the same higher degree of diligence is not expected to be exerted by
banks in commercial transactions that do not involve their fiduciary relationship with their depositors.
Considering the foregoing, the respondent bank was not required to exert more than the diligence
of a good father of a family in regard to the sale and issuance of the subject foreign exchange demand
draft. The case at bar does not involve the handling of petitioners' deposit, if any, with the respondent
bank. Instead, the relationship involved was that of a buyer and seller, that is, between the respondent
bank as the seller of the subject foreign exchange demand draft.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138569, 11 September 2003,
(410 SCRA 562)
We hold that Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa contractual.
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code
on simple loan. 1Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that." . . savings . . . deposits of money
in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan." There is a
debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor
is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand.
The savings deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the
rights and obligations of the parties.
The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. Section 2
of Republic Act No. 8791 ("RA 8791"), declares that the State recognizes the "fiduciary nature of banking
that requires high standards of integrity and performance." This new provision in the general banking law,
introduced in 2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme Court decisions, starting with the 1990 case of
Simex International v. Court of Appeals, holding that "the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts
of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe "high standards of
integrity and performance" is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its
depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than
that of a good father of a family. Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required
of an obligor is that prescribed by law or contract, and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a good
father of a family. Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks — that
banks must observe "high standards of integrity and performance" in servicing their depositors.
Central Bank of the Philippines v. Citytrust Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 141835, 04 February 2009,
(578 SCRA 27)
on simple loan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "x x x savings x x x deposits of money
in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan." There is a
debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor
is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand.

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The savings deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the
rights and obligations of the parties.
The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 8791 ("RA 8791"), which took effect on 13 June 2000, declares that the State recognizes
the "fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance." This new
provision in the general banking law, introduced in 2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme Court
decisions, starting with the 1990 case of Simex International v. Court of Appeals, holding that "the bank is
under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the
fiduciary nature of their relationship."
Bank of America, NT and SA v. Associated Citizens Bank, G.R. No. 141018, 21 May 2009 (588 SCRA 51)
In Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking Corporation, we held that:
x x x the law imposes a duty of diligence on the collecting bank to scrutinize checks deposited
with it for the purpose of determining their genuineness and regularity. The collecting bank being
primarily engaged in banking holds itself out to the public as the expert and the law holds it to a high
standard of conduct. x x x in presenting the checks for clearing and for payment, the defendant [collecting
bank] made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prior endorsements." Thus, stamped at the back
of the checks are the defendant’s clear warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF
ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. Without such warranty, plaintiff [drawee] would not have paid on the
checks. No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of defendant’s warranty. As the warranty
has proven to be false and inaccurate, the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of
its representation.
Associated Bank was also clearly negligent in disregarding established banking rules and
regulations by allowing the four checks to be presented by, and deposited in the personal bank account
of, a person who was not the payee named in the checks. The checks were issued to the "Order of Miller
Offset Press, Inc.," but were deposited, and paid by Associated Bank, to the personal joint account of
Ching Uy Seng (a.k.a. Robert Ching) and Uy Chung Guan Seng. It could not have escaped Associated Bank’s
attention that the payee of the checks is a corporation while the person who deposited the checks in his
own account is an individual. Verily, when the bank allowed its client to collect on crossed checks issued
in the name of another, the bank is guilty of negligence. As ruled by this Court in Jai-Alai Corporation of
the Philippines v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, one who accepts and encashes a check from an individual
knowing that the payee is a corporation does so at his peril.
Philippine National Bank v. Raymundo, G.R. No. 208672, 07 December 2016, (813 SCRA 326)
Since their business and industry are imbued with public interest, banks are required to exercise
extraordinary diligence, which is more than that of a Roman pater familias or a good father of a family,
in handling their transactions. Banks are also expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. By the very nature of their work in handling millions of
pesos in daily transactions, the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of bank
employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees.
A bank's disregard of its own banking policy amounts to gross negligence, which is described as
"negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where

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there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and unintentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected." Payment of the amounts of checks without
previously clearing them with the drawee bank, especially so where the drawee bank is a foreign bank
and the amounts involved were large, is contrary to normal or ordinary banking practice. Before the check
shall have been cleared for deposit, the collecting bank can only assume at its own risk that the check
would be cleared and paid out. As a bank Branch Manager, Raymundo is expected to be an expert in
banking procedures, and he has the necessary means to ascertain whether a check, local or foreign, is
sufficiently funded.
Spouses Carbonell v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 178467, 26 April 2017
The General Banking Act of 2000 demands of banks the highest standards of integrity and
performance. As such, the banks are under obligation to treat the accounts of their depositors with
meticulous care. However, the banks' compliance with this degree of diligence is to be determined in
accordance with the particular circumstances of each case.
Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties; it is a negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting, or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty
to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them.
In order for gross negligence to exist as to warrant holding the respondent liable therefor, the
petitioners must establish that the latter did not exert any effort at all to avoid unpleasant consequences,
or that it willfully and intentionally disregarded the proper protocols or procedure in the handling of US
dollar notes and in selecting and supervising its employees.
In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured person alone bears the
consequences because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that does not amount
to a legal injury or wrong.
Citystate Savings Bank v. Tobias, G.R. No. 227990, 07 March 2018, (858 SCRA 63)
The Supreme Court held that petitioner bank is jointly and solidarily liable with Robles. It
emphasized that the business of banking is one imbued with public interest, and that as such, banking
institutions are obliged to exercise the highest degree of diligence as well as high standards of integrity
and performance in all its transactions.
The Supreme Court stressed that banks may be held liable for damages for failure to exercise the
degree of diligence required of it resulting to contractual breach. In the case at bar, the records show that
the (1) petitioners did not deny the validity of the respondents’ accounts, (2) respondents entered into
two types of transactions with the bank, on of savings, and of loan agreements, and (3) transactions were
entered into outside of the petitioner bank’s premises. It was clear from the records that the proximate
cause of respondents’ loss is the misappropriation of Robles, but petitioner liable is still liable under Article
1911 of the NCC, which states that:
Art. 1911. Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarity liable with
the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers.

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It explained then that the bank is liable for the wrongful acts of its officers done in the interests
of the bank or in the course of dealings of the officers in their respective capacity, but not for the acts
outside the scope of their authority. A banking corporation is made liable to innocent third persons
where the representation is made in the course of its business by an agent acting within the general
scope of his authority, although, in the case at bar, the agent is secretly abusing his authority and
attempting to perpetuate a fraud upon his principal for his benefit. This is because banks have a fiduciary
relationship with the public and their stability depends on the confidence of the people in their honesty
and efficiency. Such faith will be eroded when banks do not exercise the care and diligence required of
them.
Ong Bun v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 212362, 14 March 2018, (589 SCRA 80)
When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the
burden of proving that it has been extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such
defense to the claim of the creditor. Even where it is the plaintiff (petitioner herein) who alleges
nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant (respondent herein) to prove
payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.
The claim of BPI that the certificates had been paid, is not supported by credible evidence and,
therefore, unsubstantiated. The fact that the petitioner still has a copy of the Custodian Certificate of the
Silver Certificates of Time Deposit is material as it is inconceivable that the bank would make payment
without requiring the surrender thereof. Hence, the conclusion that the Silver Certificates of Deposit may
have been withdrawn by the petitioner or his wife although they failed to surrender the custodian
certificates is speculative and replete of any proof or evidence.
Furthermore, the surrender of such certificates would have promoted the protection of the bank
and would have been more in line with the high standards expected of any banking institution. Banks,
their business being impressed with public interest, are expected to exercise more care and prudence
than private individuals in their dealings.
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses. Quiaoit G.R. No. 199562, 16 January 2019
In Spouses Carbonell v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, the Court emphasized that the
General Banking Act of 2000 demands of banks the highest standards of integrity and performance. The
Court ruled that banks are under obligation to treat the accounts of their depositors with meticulous care.
The Court ruled that the bank's compliance with this degree of diligence has to be determined in
accordance with the particular circumstances of each case.
BPI insists that there is no law requiring it to list down the serial numbers of the dollar bills.
However, it is well-settled that the diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a
family. Banks are required to exercise the highest degree of diligence in its banking transactions. In
releasing the dollar bills without listing down their serial numbers, BPI failed to exercise the highest
degree of care and diligence required of it. BPI exposed not only its client but also itself to the situation

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that led to this case. Had BPI listed down the serial numbers, BPI's presentation of a copy of such listed
serial numbers would establish whether the returned 44 dollar bills came from BPI or not.
Allied Banking Corporation v. Sia, G.R. No. 195341, 28 August 2019
From the foregoing, it is clear that Allied Bank could not be faulted for considering See as one of
the depositors of SA No. 0570231382. Again, it is evident that See has a share in the deposits in the subject
savings account, as could be adequately shown by the bank records available to Allied Bank at that time.
While Elizabeth was the only one expressly named as the depositor of SA No. 0570231382, the Deed of
Assignment dated December 13, 1999, indicates that the subject savings account is essentially a joint
account between her and her father. This fact is not controverted by See's mistake when he authorized
Elizabeth to claim and receive payment for Orient Bank Account No. 023190001020, which was her
individual account, instead of Orient Bank No. 023190001031. Even with this error, the fact remains that
the settlement payments for Orient Bank No. 023190001031 was one of the sources of the deposits in SA
No. 0570231382, making See a co- owner, and effectively a co-depositor, of the said account.
In sum, the Court holds that Allied Bank, was actually legally bound to temporarily withhold any
withdrawal from SA No. 0570231382 after it was informed of See's death. As such, no breach of contract
could be attributed to it. Obviously, there is also no reason to adjudge the bank liable for damages.
Philippine National Bank v. Giron-Roque, G.R. No. 240311, 18 September 2019
At the outset, it must be pointed out that PNB commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
on Felina's real property on the ground of the latter's non-payment of the first and second loans inclusive
of interests and penalties, which as per the Statement of Account provided by PNB to Felina, amounted
to P14,565.58 for the first loan and P148,608.33 for the second loan, or a grand total of P163,173.91.
However, and as unanimously found by the courts a quo: (a) Felina did not avail of the second
loan, as her signature in the subject check was forged; (b) Gloria was not duly authorized to obtain the
second loan from PNB; and (c) PNB was remiss of the diligence required of a banking institution in
allowing the withdrawal and encashment of the subject check representing the second loan. Absent
any cogent reason to overturn the aforesaid findings, the Court is inclined to uphold the same
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Carmelita Cruz and Vilma Low Tay, G.R. No. 221220, January
19, 2021
Significantly, Section 2 of the Banking Law (Republic Act [R.A.] No. 8791) highlights the essential
role of banks in our economy and the fiduciary nature of their business:
The State recognizes the vital role of banks providing an environment conducive to the sustained
development of the national economy and the fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of
integrity and performance. In furtherance thereof, the State shall promote and maintain a stable and
efficient banking and financial system that is globally competitive, dynamic and responsive to the
demands of a developing economy.

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Although R.A. No. 8791 took effect in 2000, at the time that Metrobank had been transacting with
respondents in 1993, jurisprudence had already imposed on banks the same high standard of diligence
required under the said law.
In view of the fiduciary nature of the banking business, banks are mandated to comply with two
essential and fundamental obligations - to treat their clients' accounts with utmost fidelity and meticulous
care, and to record all transactions accurately and promptly
Allied Banking Corporation v. Spouses Macam, G.R. No. 200635, February 1, 2021
RA 8791 enshrines the fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and
performance. The statute now reflects jurisprudential holdings that the banking industry is impressed with
public interest requiring banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a
family. Thus, all banks are charged with extraordinary diligence in the handling and care of its deposits as
well as the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.
The foregoing obligation of banks is absolute and deemed written into every deposit agreement
with its depositors.
Allied Bank cannot obliquely repudiate the resulting banking relationship with the Spouses Mario
Macam and the fiduciary nature thereof when it accepted the spouses' initial deposit of P1,590,000.00,
the very same funds it now claims as its own. It cannot belatedly claim ignorance of its performance of a
core banking function, i.e., accepting or creating demand deposits.
"A certificate of deposit is defined as a written acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the

receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the bank or banker promises to pay to the depositor, to the
order of the depositor, or to some other person or his order, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor
between the bank and the depositor is created. " It is presumed that the money deposited in a bank
account belongs to the person in whose name the deposit account is opened.
Remedios Banta v. Equitable Bank, G.R. No. 223694, February 10, 2021
Time and again, the Court has emphasized that it is required and expected of banks to exercise
the highest degree of diligence, along with high standards of integrity and performance in view of its
significant role in commercial transactions, not to mention its contribution, to the economy in general.
"Since their business and industry are imbued with public interest, banks are required to exercise
extraordinary diligence, which is more than that of a Roman paterfamilias or a good father of a family, in
handling their transactions." Even as a mortgagee, a bank is not relieved of its responsibility to exercise
a higher degree of caution.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Belle Corporation31 the Court underscored the following:
When the purchaser or the mortgagee is a bank, the rule on innocent purchasers or mortgagees
for value is applied more strictly. Being in the business of extending loans secured by real estate
mortgage, banks are presumed to be familiar with the rules on land registration. Since the banking
business is impressed with public interest, they are expected to be more cautious, to exercise a higher
degree of diligence, care and prudence, than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving
registered lands. Banks may not simply rely on the face of the certificate of title. Hence, they cannot
assume that, simply because the title offered as security is on its face free of any encumbrances or lien,

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they are relieved of the responsibility of taking further steps to verify the title and inspect the properties
to be mortgaged. As expected, he ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it as
security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of a bank's operations.
The Bank's failure to observe the degree of diligence expected of it clearly constitutes
negligence. Verily, the Bank was not able to prove that the petitioner participated in the loan application
or in the execution of the documents relative to it. There was no showing that any of the Bank's employees
had dealt with the petitioner regarding the loan or the mortgage despite her being one of the registered
owners of the mortgaged properties. More importantly, the Bank had not demonstrated how it took
steps or what safety measures were adopted and actually practiced ascertaining the authenticity of the
petitioner's signature in the "Amendment to Real Estate Mortgage". Simply put, the Bank's lapses in
ascertaining the identity of the petitioner as one of the signatories in the document as well as the
genuineness of her signature confirm that the Bank fell short in exercising the degree of diligence
demanded of it in the conduct of its affairs.
As the Bank is not a mortgagee in good faith, it should be held jointly and severally liable with
Antonio in the payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees in favor of the
petitioner. In Bank of Commerce v. Spouses San Pablo, the Court adjudged the Bank of Commerce liable
for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees for failing to observe the necessary degree
of caution in ascertaining the genuineness and extent of authority of the mortgagor who forged the
signature of the registered owner of the property. Parenthetically, the award of damages and attorney's
fees finds basis in several cases where the Court imposed the same against the defendant-banks for
negligence or failing to exercise extraordinary diligence in the discharge of its functions.
Definition and Classification of Banks
Republic v. Security Credit and Acceptance Corporation, G.R. No. L-20583, 23 January 1967, (19 SCRA
58)
A bank has been defined as a moneyed institute founded to facilitate the borrowing, lending and
safe keeping of money and to deal, in notes, bills of exchange, and credits. Moreover, an investment
company which loans out the money of its customers, collects the interest and charges a commission to
both lender and borrower, is a bank. Any person engaged in the business carried on by banks of deposit,
of discount, or of circulation is doing a banking business, although but one of these functions is exercised.
Distinction of Banks from Quasi-Banks and Trust Entities
Bañas v. Asia Pacific Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 128703, 18 October 2000, (343 SCRA 527
An investment company refers to any issuer which is or holds itself out as being engaged or
proposes to engage primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in securities. As defined
in Sec. 2, par. (a), of the Revised Securities Act, 9 securities "shall include . . . commercial papers evidencing
indebtedness of any person, financial or non-financial entity, irrespective of maturity, issued, endorsed,
sold, transferred or in any manner conveyed to another with or without recourse, such as promissory
notes . . ." Clearly, the transaction between petitioners and respondent was one involving not a loan but
purchase of receivables at a discount, well within the purview of "investing, reinvesting or trading in

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securities" which an investment company, like ASIA PACIFIC, is authorized to perform and does not
constitute a violation of the General Banking Act. Moreover, Sec. 2 of the General Banking Act provides
in part —
SECTION 2. Only entities duly authorized by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank may engage
in the lending of funds obtained from the public through the receipt of deposits of any kind, and all entities
regularly conducting such operations shall be considered as banking institutions and shall be subject to
the provisions of this Act, of the Central Bank Act, and of other pertinent laws
Indubitably, what is prohibited by law is for investment companies to lend funds obtained from
the public through receipts of deposit, which is a function of banking institutions. But here, the funds
supposedly "lent" to petitioners have not been shown to have been obtained from the public by way of
deposits, hence, the inapplicability of banking laws.
First Planters Pawnshop, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 174134, 30 July 2008 (560
SCRA 606)
The Court finds that pawnshops should have been treated as non-bank financial intermediaries
from the very beginning, subject to the appropriate taxes provided by law
R.A. No. 337, as amended, or the General Banking Act characterizes the terms banking institution
and bank as synonymous and interchangeable and specifically include commercial banks, savings bank,
mortgage banks, development banks, rural banks, stock savings and loan associations, and branches and
agencies in the Philippines of foreign banks. R.A. No. 8791 or the General Banking Law of 2000, meanwhile,
provided that banks shall refer to entities engaged in the lending of funds obtained in the form of deposits.
R.A. No. 8791 also included cooperative banks, Islamic banks and other banks as determined by the
Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas in the classification of banks.
Financial intermediaries, on the other hand, are defined as "persons or entities whose principal
functions include the lending, investing or placement of funds or evidences of indebtedness or equity
deposited with them, acquired by them, or otherwise coursed through them, either for their own
account or for the account of others."
It need not be elaborated that pawnshops are non-banks/banking institutions. Moreover, the
nature of their business activities partakes that of a financial intermediary in that its principal function
is lending.
Corporate Powers
Register of Deeds of Manila v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. L-11964, 28 April 1962, (04 SCRA
1146)
The Court reminded us that the constitutional prohibition under consideration has for its purpose
the preservation of patrimony of the nation.
In the examination of Section 25 of Republic Act 337, specifically paragraphs (c) and (d), the Court
found that case before them does not fall under anyone of them. Paragraph (c) of Section 25 of Republic
Act 337 allows commercial banks to purchase and hold properties conveyed to it in satisfaction of “debts”
previously contracted “in the course of its dealings”.

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In this case, such property was not conveyed in satisfaction of a debt from the business’s ordinary
course, but due to a “civil liability” arising from the criminal offense of qualified theft. Likewise, paragraph
(d) of Section 25 of Republic Act 337 is not applicable.
The Court held that in no sense that the transfer in questions can be considered a sale made by
virtue of judgement, decree, mortgage, or trust deed. In the same manner, it cannot be said that the
property in questions was purchased by appellants to secure debts due to it, considering that the term
debt employed in the provisions of the law can logically refer only to such debts as may become payable
to appellant bank as a result of a banking transaction. Conclusively, it is not the Court’s duty to determine
the wisdom or lack of wisdom of the Constitution. It is only their sworn duty to enforce it free from
qualifications and distinctions that tend to render futile the constitutional intent.
Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc. v. JAPRL Development Corporation, G.R. No. 179901, 14 April 2008, (551 SCRA
342)
Banks are entities engaged in the lending of funds obtained through deposits from the public.
They borrow the public's excess money (i.e., deposits) and lend out the same. Banks therefore redistribute
wealth in the economy by channeling idle savings to profitable investments.
Banks operate (and earn income) by extending credit facilities financed primarily by deposits from
the public. They plough back the bulk of said deposits into the economy in the form of loans. Since banks
deal with the public's money, their viability depends largely on their ability to return those deposits on
demand. For this reason, banking is undeniably imbued with public interest. Consequently, much
importance is given to sound lending practices and good corporate governance.
Should such statements required by the bank prove to be false or incorrect in any material detail,
the bank may terminate any loan or credit accommodation granted on the basis of said statements and
shall have the right to demand immediate repayment or liquidation of the obligation
Banking and Incidental Powers
Spouses Panlilio v. Citibank, N.A., G.R. No. 156335, 28 November 2007, (539 SCRA 69)
Sec. 72. In addition to the operations specifically authorized elsewhere in this Act, banking
institutions other than building and loan associations may perform the following services:
(a) Receive in custody funds, documents, and valuable objects, and rent safety deposit boxes for
the safeguarding of such effects
(b) Act as financial agent and buy and sell, by order of and for the account of their customers,
shares, evidences of indebtedness and all types of securities;
(c) Make collections and payments for the account of others and perform such other services for
their customers as are not incompatible with banking business.
(d) Upon prior approval of the Monetary Board, act as managing agent, adviser, consultant or
administrator of invstment management/ advisory/consultancy accounts.

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The banks shall perform the services permitted under subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this section
as depositories or as agents. Accordingly, they shall keep the funds, securities and other effects which
they thus receive duly separated and apart from the bank's own assets and liabilities.
The Monetary Board may regulate the operations authorized by this section in order to insure
that said operations do not endanger the interests of the depositors and other creditors of the banks.
(Emphasis supplied.)
while Section 74 prohibits banks from guaranteeing obligations of any person, thus:
Sec. 74. No bank or banking institution shall enter, directly, or indirectly into any contract of
guaranty or suretyship, or shall guarantee the interest or principal of any obligation of any person,
copartnership, association, corporation or other entity. The provisions of this section shall,
however, not apply to the following: (a) borrowing of money by banking institution through the
rediscounting of receivables; (b) acceptance of drafts or bills of exchange (c) certification of
checks; (d) transactions involving the release of documents attached to items received for
collection; (e) letters of credit transaction, including stand-by arrangements; (f) repurchase
agreements; (g) shipside bonds; (h) ordinary guarantees or indorsements in favor of foreign
creditors where the principal obligation involves loans and credits extended directly by foreign
investment purposes; and (i) other transactions which the Monetary Board may, by regulation,
define or specify as not covered by the prohibition.
White Marketing Development Corporation v. Grandwood Furniture & Woodwork, Inc. G.R. No.
222407, 23 November 2016 (810 SCRA 409)
The mortgage between Grandwood and Metrobank, as the original mortgagee, was subject to the
provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791. Section 47 provides that when a property of a juridical person
is sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, it "shall have the right to redeem the property in
accordance with this provision until, but not after, the registration of the Certificate of foreclosure sale
with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier
Measured by the foregoing parameters, the Court finds that Grandwood's redemption was made
out of time as it was done after the certificate of sale was registered on September 30, 2013. Pursuant to
Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791, it only had three (3) months from foreclosure or before the registration of
the certificate of foreclosure sale, whichever came first, to redeem the property sole in the extrajudicial
sale.
Such interpretation is in harmony with the avowed purpose of R.A. No. 8791 in providing for a
shorter redemption period for juridical persons. In Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable
PCI Bank, the Court explained that the shortened period under Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 served as
additional security for banks to maintain their solvency and liquidity, to wit:
The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature
of the properties foreclosed - whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year
redemption period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter
term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable
mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. It must be underscored that the General

11
Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, sought to
reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe and
sound banking system. In this context, the amendment introduced by Section 47 embodied one of such
safe and sound practices aimed at ensuring the solvency and liquidity of our banks. It cannot therefore
be disputed that the said provision amending the redemption period in Act 3135 was based on a
reasonable classification and germane to the purpose of the law.
To adopt Grandwood's position that Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 no longer applies would defeat
its very purpose to provide additional security to mortgagee-banks. The shorter redemption period is an
incentive which mortgagee-banks may use to encourage prospective assignees to accept the
assignment of credit for a consideration. If the redemption period under R.A. No. 8791 would be
extended upon the assignment by the bank of its rights under a mortgage contract, then it would be
tedious for banks to find willing parties to be subrogated in its place. Thus, it would adversely limit the
bank's opportunities to quickly dispose of its hard assets, and maintain its solvency and liquidity.
To reiterate, the shortened period of redemption provided in Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 serves
as additional security and protection to mortgagee-banks in order for them to maintain a solvent and
liquid financial status. The period is not extended by the mere fact that the bank assigned its interest to
the mortgage to a non-banking institution because the assignee merely steps into the shoes of the
mortgagee bank and acquires all its rights, interests and benefits under the mortgage-including the
shortened redemption period. Moreover, to extend the redemption period would prejudice the ability of
the banks to quickly dispose of its hard assets to maintain solvency and liquidity.
Nature of Bank Funds and Bank Deposits
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138569, 11 September 2003,
(410 SCRA 562)
on simple loan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "savings, deposits of money in banks
and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan." There is a debtor-
creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the
creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The
savings deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights
and obligations of the parties.
The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a trust agreement because
banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn money for themselves. The law allows
banks to offer the lowest possible interest rate to depositors while charging the highest possible interest
rate on their own borrowers. The interest spread or differential belongs to the bank and not to the
depositors who are not cestui que trust of banks. If depositors are cestui que trust of banks, then the
interest spread or income belongs to the depositors, a situation that Congress certainly did not intend in
enacting Section 2 of RA 8791.
Suan v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 6377, 12 March 2007, (518 SCRA 82)
The filing of the intra-corporate case before the RTC does not amount to forum- shopping. It is a
formal demand of respondent’s legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or

12
by the law with respect to the controversy involved. The relief sought in the case is primarily to compel
the bank to disclose its stockholdings, to allow them the inspection of corporate books and records, and
the payment of damages. It was also prayed that a TRO be issued to enjoin the holding of the annual
stockholder’s meeting and the election of the members of the Board, which, only courts of justice can
issue.
On the other hand, the complaint filed with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas was an invocation of
the BSP’s supervisory powers over banking operations which does not amount to a judicial proceeding. It
brought to the attention of the BSP the alleged questionable actions of the bank’s Board of Directors in
violation of the principles of good corporate governance. It prayed for the conduct of an investigation
over the alleged unsafe and unsound business practices of the bank and to make necessary corrective
measures to prevent the collapse of the bank.
Stipulation on Interests
Fidelity Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Cenzon, G.R. No. 46208, 05 April 1990, (184 SCRA 141)
It is settled jurisprudence that a banking institution which has been declared insolvent and
subsequently ordered closed by the Central Bank of the Philippines cannot be held liable to pay interest
on bank deposits which accrued during the period when the bank is actually closed and non-operational.
In The Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Court of Appeals and Tony D. Tapia, we held that:
It is a matter of common knowledge, which We take judicial notice of, that what enables a bank
to pay stipulated interest on money deposited with it is that thru the other aspects of its operation it is
able to generate funds to cover the payment of such interest. Unless a bank can lend money, engage in
international transactions, acquire foreclosed mortgaged properties or their proceeds and generally
engage in other banking and financing activities from which it can derive income, it is inconceivable how
it can carry on as a depository obligated to pay stipulated interest. Conventional wisdom dictates this
inexorable fair and just conclusion. And it can be said that all who deposit money in banks are aware of
such a simple economic proposition. Consequently, it should be deemed read into every contract of
deposit with a bank that the obligation to pay interest on the deposit ceases the moment the operation
of the bank is completely suspended by the duly constituted authority, the Central Bank.
Macalinao v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 175490, 17 September 2009, (600 SCRA 67)
The stipulated interest rates of 7% and 5% per month imposed on respondents’ loans must be
equitably reduced to 1% per month or 12% per annum. We need not unsettle the principle we had
affirmed in a plethora of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% per month and higher are excessive,
iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. Such stipulations are void for being contrary to morals, if not
against the law. While C.B. Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively removed
the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the
said circular could possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates
to levels which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.
Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was no express contract thereon.
Hence, courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand.

13
The same is true with respect to the penalty charge. Notably, under the Terms and Conditions
Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card, it was also stated therein that respondent BPI shall
impose an additional penalty charge of 3% per month. Pertinently, Article 1229 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been
partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty
may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.
In exercising this power to determine what is iniquitous and unconscionable, courts must consider
the circumstances of each case since what may be iniquitous and unconscionable in one may be totally
just and equitable in another
Advocates for Truth in Lending Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Board, G.R. No. 192986, 15
January 2013, (688 SCRA 530)
It is settled that nothing in CB Circular No. 905 grants lenders a carte blanche authority to raise
interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their
assets. As held in Castro v. Tan:
The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even if knowingly and
voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is tantamount to a repugnant spoliation and an
iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the common sense of man. It has no support in
law, in principles of justice, or in the human conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which
may justify such imposition as righteous and as one that may be sustained within the sphere of
public or private morals.
Stipulations authorizing iniquitous or unconscionable interests have been invariably struck down for being
contrary to morals, if not against the law. Indeed, under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, these contracts are
deemed inexistent and void ab initio, and therefore cannot be ratified, nor may the right to set up their
illegality as a defense be waived.
Nonetheless, the nullity of the stipulation of usurious interest does not affect the lender’s right to
recover the principal of a loan, nor affect the other terms thereof. Thus, in a usurious loan with mortgage,
the right to foreclose the mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by the creditor upon failure
by the debtor to pay the debt due.
Villa Crista Monte Realty & Development Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 208336, 21
November 2018
The agreement between the parties on the imposition of increasing interest rates on the loan is
commonly known as the escalation clause. Generally, the escalation clause refers to the stipulation
allowing increases in the interest rates agreed upon by the contracting parties. There is nothing
inherently wrong with the escalation clause because it is validly stipulated in commercial contracts as one
of the means adopted to maintain fiscal stability and to retain the value of money in long term contracts.
In short, the escalation clause is not void per se.
Yet, the escalation clause that "grants the creditor an unbridled right to adjust the interest
independently and upwardly, completely depriving the debtor of the right to assent to an important
modification in the agreement" is void. Such escalation clause violates the principle of mutuality of

14
contracts and should be annulled. To prevent or forestall any one-sidedness that the escalation clause
may cause in favor of the creditor, therefore, Presidential Decree No. 1684
Accordingly, the Court has ruled in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Judge Navarro
that there should be a corresponding de- escalation clause that authorizes a reduction in the interest
rates corresponding to downward changes made by law or by the Monetary Board. Verily, the escalation
clause, to be valid, should specifically provide: (1) that there can be an increase in interest rates if allowed
by law or by the Monetary Board; and (2) that there must be a stipulation for the reduction of the
stipulated interest rates in the event that the applicable maximum rates of interest are reduced by law
or by the Monetary Board. The latter stipulation ensures the mutuality of contracts, and is known as the
de-escalation clause.
Rey v. Anson, G.R. No. 211206, 07 November 2018
As case law instructs, the imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even
if knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is tantamount to a repugnant spoliation
and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the common sense of man. It has no support in
law, in principles of justice, or in the human conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which may
justify such imposition as righteous and as one that may be sustained within the sphere of public or private
morals.
Sally Go-Bangayan v. Spouses Leoncio and Judy Cham Ho, G.R. No 203020, June 28, 2021
As for petitioner's claim of stipulated interest of three percent (3%) per month, we are
constrained to deny the same. Article 1956 ordains that No interest shall be due unless it has been
expressly stipulated in writing. Thus, in the absence of any written proof of the supposed stipulation,
petitioner's claim of interest has no factual basis.
At any rate, even if proved, the Court would have just struck it down for being unconscionable.
Instead, we impose the legal interest rates in accordance with pertinent jurisprudence. Consequently,
legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum is imposed pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals from extrajudicial demand on September 21, 2001 until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, the
legal interest rate is reduced to six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this decision
pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames.
Restrictions on Bank Exposure to DOSRI (Directors, Officers, Stockholders and their Related Interests
Under Section 83, RA 337, the following elements must be present to constitute a violation of its
first paragraph:
1. the offender is a director or officer of any banking institution;
2. the offender, either directly or indirectly, for himself or as representative or agent of another,
performs any of the following acts:
a. he borrows any of the deposits or funds of such bank; or
b. he becomes a guarantor, indorser, or surety for loans from such bank to others, or
c. he becomes in any manner an obligor for money borrowed from bank or loaned by it;

15
3. the offender has performed any of such acts without the written approval of the majority of
the directors of the bank, excluding the offender, as the director concerned.
A simple reading of the above elements easily rejects Go’s contention that the law penalizes a
bank director or officer only either for borrowing the bank’s deposits or funds or for guarantying loans by
the bank, but not for acting in both capacities. The essence of the crime is becoming an obligor of the
bank without securing the necessary written approval of the majority of the bank’s directors.
The second element merely lists down the various modes of committing the offense. The third
mode, by declaring that "[no director or officer of any banking institution shall xxx] in any manner be an
obligor for money borrowed from the bank or loaned by it," in fact serves a catch-all phrase that covers
any situation when a director or officer of the bank becomes its obligor. The prohibition is directed against
a bank director or officer who becomes in any manner an obligor for money borrowed from or loaned by
the bank without the written approval of the majority of the bank’s board of directors. To make a
distinction between the act of borrowing and guarantying is therefore unnecessary because in either
situation, the director or officer concerned becomes an obligor of the bank against whom the obligation
is juridically demandable.
The language of the law is broad enough to encompass either act of borrowing or guaranteeing,
or both. While the first paragraph of Section 83 is penal in nature, and by principle should be strictly
construed in favor of the accused, the Court is unwilling to adopt a liberal construction that would defeat
the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute. The objective of the law should allow for a reasonable
flexibility in its construction. Section 83 of RA 337, as well as other banking laws adopting the same
prohibition, was enacted to ensure that loans by banks and similar financial institutions to their own
directors, officers, and stockholders are above board.
Banks were not created for the benefit of their directors and officers; they cannot use the assets
of the bank for their own benefit, except as may be permitted by law. Congress has thus deemed it
essential to impose restrictions on borrowings by bank directors and officers in order to protect the public,
especially the depositors. Hence, when the law prohibits directors and officers of banking institutions from
becoming in any manner an obligor of the bank (unless with the approval of the board), the terms of the
prohibition shall be the standards to be applied to directors’ transactions such as those involved in the
present case.
Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 162336, 01 February 2010 (611 SCRA 191)
A bank officer violates the DOSRI2 law when he acquires bank funds for his personal benefit, even
if such acquisition was facilitated by a fraudulent loan application. Directors, officers, stockholders, and
their related interests cannot be allowed to interpose the fraudulent nature of the loan as a defense to
escape culpability for their circumvention of Section 83 of Republic Act (RA) No. 337.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 166859, 169203, 180702, 12 April 2011 (648 SCRA 47)
No violation of the DOSRI and Single Borrower’s Limit restrictions
The Republic’s lack of proof on the source of the funds by which Cojuangco, et al. had acquired
their block of SMC shares has made it shift its position, that it now suggests that Cojuangco had been

16
enabled to obtain the loans by the issuance of LOI 926 exempting the UCPB from the DOSRI and the Single
Borrower’s Limit restrictions.
We reject the Republic’s suggestion.
Firstly, as earlier pointed out, the Republic adduced no evidence on the significant particulars of
the supposed loan, like the amount, the actual borrower, the approving official, etc. It did not also
establish whether or not the loans were DOSRI126 or issued in violation of the Single Borrower’s Limit.
Secondly, the Republic could not outrightly assume that President Marcos had issued LOI 926 for the
purpose of allowing the loans by the UCPB in favor of Cojuangco. There must be competent evidence to
that effect. And, finally, the loans, assuming that they were of a DOSRI nature or without the benefit of
the required approvals or in excess of the Single Borrower’s Limit, would not be void for that reason.
Instead, the bank or the officers responsible for the approval and grant of the DOSRI loan would be subject
only to sanctions under the law.
The New Central Bank Act (R.A. No. 7653)
Responsibility and Primary Objective
Perez v. Monetary Board, G.R. No. L-23307, 30 June 1967, (20 SCRA 592)
We rule that petitioners cannot seek by mandamus to compel respondents to prosecute

criminally those alleged violators of the banking laws. Although the Central Bank and its respondent
officials may have the duty under the Central Bank Act and the General Banking Act to cause the
prosecution of those alleged violators, yet We find nothing in said laws that imposes a clear, specific duty
on the former to do the actual prosecution of the latter. The Central Bank is a government corporation
created principally to administer the monetary and banking system of the Republic, not a prosecution
agency like the fiscal's office. Being an artificial person, The Central Bank is limited to its statutory powers
and the nearest power to which prosecution of violators of banking laws may be attributed is its power
to sue and be sued. But this corporate power of litigation evidently refers to civil cases only.
Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr., G.R. No. 168332, 169053, 19 June 2009, (590 SCRA 49)
It is clear that the acts complained of pertain to the conduct of Banco Filipino's banking business.
A bank, as defined in the General Banking Law, refers to an entity engaged in the lending of funds obtained
in the form of deposits. The banking business is properly subject to reasonable regulation under the police
power of the state because of its nature and relation to the fiscal affairs of the people and the revenues
of the state. Banks are affected with public interest because they receive funds from the general public in
the form of deposits. It is the Government's responsibility to see to it that the financial interests of those
who deal with banks and banking institutions, as depositors or otherwise, are protected. In this country,
that task is delegated to the BSP, which pursuant to its Charter, is authorized to administer the monetary,
banking, and credit system of the Philippines. It is further authorized to take the necessary steps against
any banking institution if its continued operation would cause prejudice to its depositors, creditors and
the general public as well.

17
The law vests in the BSP the supervision over operations and activities of banks.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. Nos. 178696, 192607, 30
July 2018
Verily, nothing changed with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7653. BSP, the independent
central monetary authority established by the law, is still given sufficient independence and latitude to
carry out its mandate. Sections to of Republic Act No. 7653 bear this out, viz.:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall maintain a central monetary authority that shall
function and operate as an independent and accountable body corporate in the discharge of its
mandated responsibilities concerning money, banking and credit. In line with this policy, and
considering its unique functions and responsibilities, the central monetary authority established
under this Act, while being government-owned corporation, shall enjoy fiscal and administrative
autonomy.
Monetary Board - Powers and Functions
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Antonio-Valenzuela, G.R. No. 184778, 02 October 2009,
(602 SCRA 698)
The respondent banks have failed to show that they are entitled to copies of the ROEs. They can
point to no provision of law, no section in the procedures of the BSP that shows that the BSP is required
to give them copies of the ROEs. Sec. 28 of RA 7653, or the New Central Bank Act, which governs
examinations of banking institutions, provides that the ROE shall be submitted to the MB; the bank
examined is not mentioned as a recipient of the ROE.
The respondent banks cannot claim a violation of their right to due process if they are not
provided with copies of the ROEs. The same ROEs are based on the lists of findings/exceptions containing
the deficiencies found by the SED examiners when they examined the books of the respondent banks. As
found by the RTC, these lists of findings/exceptions were furnished to the officers or representatives of
the respondent banks, and the respondent banks were required to comment and to undertake remedial
measures stated in said lists. Despite these instructions, respondent banks failed to comply with the SED’s
directive.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 205966, 02 March 2016, (785 SCRA 466)
Under Republic Act No. 7653, or the New Central Bank Act, the BSP Governor is authorized to
represent the Bangko Sentral, either personally or through counsel, including private counsel, as may be
authorized by the Monetary Board, in any legal proceedings, action or specialized legal studies. Under the
same law, the BSP Governor may also delegate his power to represent the BSP to other officers upon his
own responsibility.
Federal Express Corporation v. Antonino, G.R. No. 199455, 27 June 2018, (868 SCRA 450)
Money is "what is generally acceptable in exchange for goods." It can take many forms, most
commonly as coins and banknotes. Despite its myriad forms, its key element is its general acceptability.
Laws usually define what can be considered as a generally acceptable medium of exchange.

18
How the BSP handles Banks in Distress
Conservatorship
Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45710, 03 October 1985
the power of the Monetary Board to take over insolvent banks for the protection of the public is
recognized by Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, which took effect on June 15, 1948, the validity of which is not
in question.
The Board Resolution No. 1049 issued on August 13,1965 cannot interrupt the default of Island
Savings Bank in complying with its obligation of releasing the P63,000.00 balance because said resolution
merely prohibited the Bank from making new loans and investments, and nowhere did it prohibit island
Savings Bank from releasing the balance of loan agreements previously contracted. Besides, the mere
pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement does not discharge the obligation of the contract, nor does it
constitute any defense to a decree of specific performance. And, the mere fact of insolvency of a debtor
is never an excuse for the non-fulfillment of an obligation but 'instead it is taken as a breach of the contract
by him.
Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88353, 08 May 1992, (208 SCRA 652)
Pursuant to Section 28-A of the Central Bank Act, a conservator, once appointed, takes over the
management of the bank and assumes exclusive powers to oversee every aspect of the bank's operations
and affairs. However, it must be stressed that a bank retains its juridical personality even if placed under
conservatorship; it is neither replaced nor substituted by the conservator. Hence, the approval of the CB
is not necessary where the action was instituted by the bank through the majority of the bank's
stockholders.
The following requisites, therefore, must be present before the order of conservatorship may be
set aside by a court:
1. The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority
of the capital stock of the bank in the proper court;
2. Said pleading must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority
stockholders of the order placing the bank under conservatorship; and
3. There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in
bad faith
First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115849, 24 January 1996, (252 SCRA
259)
Obviously, therefore, Section 28-A merely gives the conservator power to revoke contracts that
are, under existing law, deemed to be defective — i.e., void, voidable, unenforceable or rescissible. Hence,
the conservator merely takes the place of a bank's board of directors. What the said board cannot do —
such as repudiating a contract validly entered into under the doctrine of implied authority — the
conservator cannot do either. Ineluctably, his power is not unilateral and he cannot simply repudiate valid
obligations of the Bank. His authority would be only to bring court actions to assail such contracts — as
he has already done so in the instant case. A contrary understanding of the law would simply not be

19
permitted by the Constitution. Neither by common sense. To rule otherwise would be to enable a failing
bank to become solvent, at the expense of third parties, by simply getting the conservator to unilaterally
revoke all previous dealings which had one way or another or come to be considered unfavorable to the
Bank, yielding nothing to perfected contractual rights nor vested interests of the third parties who had
dealt with the Bank.
Closure
Spouses Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal, G.R. No. L- 73884, 24 September 1987, (154 SCRA 257)
In the instant case, the stay of the execution of judgment is warranted by the fact that respondent
bank was placed under receivership. To execute the judgment would unduly deplete the assets of
respondent bank to the obvious prejudice of other depositors and creditors, since, as aptly stated in
Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Morfe (63 SCRA 114), after the Monetary Board has declared that a
bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the trustee of its assets for
the equal benefit of all the creditors, including depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking institution
are held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors, and after its insolvency, one cannot obtain an
advantage or a preference over another by an attachment, execution or otherwise.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Monetary Board, Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
70054, 68878, 77255-58, 11 December 1991, (204 SCRA 767)
Section 29 of the Republic Act No. 265, as amended known as the Central Bank Act, provides that
when a bank is forbidden to do business in the Philippines and placed under receivership, the person
designated as receiver shall immediately take charge of the bank's assets and liabilities, as expeditiously
as possible, collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, and
represent the bank personally or through counsel as he may retain in all actions or proceedings for or
against the institution, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited
to, bringing and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank. If the Monetary Board shall later
determine and confirm that banking institution is insolvent or cannot resume business safety to
depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, public interest requires, order its liquidation and
appoint a liquidator who shall take over and continue the functions of receiver previously appointed by
Monetary Board. The liquid for may, in the name of the bank and with the assistance counsel as he may
retain, institute such actions as may necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover a counts
and assets of such institution or defend any action ft against the institution.
Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88353, 92943, 08 May 1992, (208 SCRA 652)
The following requisites, therefore, must be present before the order of conservatorship may be
set aside by a court:
1. The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority
of the capital stock of the bank in the proper court;
2. Said pleading must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority
stockholders of the order placing the bank under conservatorship; and

20
3. There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in
bad faith
Rural Bank of San Miguel Inc. v. Monetary Board, Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 150886, 16
February 2007
There is no question that under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, the following are the
mandatory requirements to be complied with before a bank found to be insolvent is ordered closed and
forbidden to do business in the Philippines: Firstly, an examination shall be conducted by the head of the
appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of the
bank; secondly, it shall be disclosed in the examination that the condition of the bank is one of insolvency,
or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors; thirdly, the
department head concerned shall inform the Monetary Board in writing, of the facts; and lastly, the
Monetary Board shall find the statements of the department head to be true.
Laying down the requisites for the closure of a bank under the law is the prerogative of the
legislature and what its wisdom dictates. The lawmakers could have easily retained the word
"examination" (and in the process also preserved the jurisprudence attached to it) but they did not and
instead opted to use the word "report." The insistence on an examination is not sanctioned by RA 7653
and we would be guilty of judicial legislation were we to make it a requirement when such is not supported
by the language of the law.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Antonio-Valenzuela, G.R. No. 184778, 02 October 2009
The requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of right sought to be protected
is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Spouses Poon v. Prime Savings Bank, G.R. No. 183794, 13 June 2016
The closure of the bank was not independent of its will. The period during which the bank cannot
do business due to insolvency is not a fortuitous event since there the government’s action through the
BSP to place the bank under receivership or liquidation proceedings is tainted with arbitrariness or has
acted without authority. As the lease was long-term, it was not lost on the parties that such an eventuality
might occur, as it was in fact covered by the terms of their Contract.
In this case, it is neither fair nor reasonable to deprive depositors and creditors of what could be
their last chance to recoup whatever bank assets or receivables the PDIC can still legally recover. Nothing
has prevented petitioners from putting their building to other profitable uses, since respondent
surrendered the premises immediately after the closure of its business.
Receivership
Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45710, 03 October 1985
The Monetary Board Resolution No. 1049 issued on August 13, 1965 cannot interrupt the default
of Island Savings Bank in complying with its obligation of releasing the P63,000.00 balance because said
resolution merely prohibited the Bank from making new loans and investments, and nowhere did it
prohibit Island Savings Bank from releasing the balance of loan agreements previously contracted.

21
Further, the Court emphasized that the mere fact of insolvency of a debtor is never an excuse for the non-
fulfillment of an obligation but instead it is taken as a breach of the contract by him.
Spouses Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal, G.R. No. L- 73884, 24 September 1987
In the instant case, the stay of the execution of judgment is warranted by the fact that respondent
bank was placed under receivership. To execute the judgment would unduly deplete the assets of
respondent bank to the obvious prejudice of other depositors and creditors, since, as aptly stated in
Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Morfe (63 SCRA 114), after the Monetary Board has declared that a
bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the trustee of its assets for
the equal benefit of all the creditors, including depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking institution
are held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors, and after its insolvency, one cannot obtain an
advantage or a preference over another by an attachment, execution or otherwise.
Abacus Real Estate Development Center, Inc. v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 162270, 06 April
2005
Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, as amended,14 pertinently provides:
Sec. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the
appropriate supervising and examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any
banking institution, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of
the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the
Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do
business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank as receiver to immediately
take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and
administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes
including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the banking
institution.
Clearly, the receiver appointed by the Central Bank to take charge of the properties of Manila
Bank only had authority to administer the same for the benefit of its creditors. Granting or approving an
"exclusive option to purchase" is not an act of administration, but an act of strict ownership, involving, as
it does, the disposition of property of the bank. Not being an act of administration, the so-called
"approval" by Atty. Renan Santos amounts to no approval at all, a bank receiver not being authorized to
do so on his own.
Vivas, v. Monetary Board of the Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191424, 07 August 2013
The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the protection of
the public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire
straits. Unless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against distressed and
mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the
national economy itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and
stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government

22
The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate unwarranted dissipation
of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors,
stockholders, and the general public. Swift, adequate and determined actions must be taken against
financially distressed and mismanaged banks by government agencies lest the public faith in the banking
system deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy.
Spouses Chugani v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 230037, 19 March 2018
Section 4(f) of R.A. No. 3591, as amended by R.A. No. 9576 states that deposit means the unpaid
balance of money or its equivalent received by a bank in the usual course of business and for which it has
given or is obliged to give credit to a commercial, checking, savings, time or thrift account, or issued in
accordance with Bangko Sentral rules and regulations and other applicable laws, together with such other
obligations of a bank, which, consistent with banking usage and practices.
Section 2(d) of PDIC Regulatory Issuance No. 2011-0221 states that for deposit to be considered
as legitimate, it should be 1) received by a bank as a deposit in the usual course of business; 2) recorded
in the books of the bank as such; 3) opened in accordance with established forms and requirements of
the BSP and/or the PDIC.
Further, in Phil. Deposit Insurance Corp. v. CA, this Court held that in order for the claim for
deposit insurance with the PDIC may prosper, it is necessary that the corresponding deposit must be
placed in the insured bank.
So v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 230020, 19 March 2018
There is no controversy as to the proper remedy to question the PDIC's denial of petitioner's
deposit insurance claim. Section 4(f) of its Charter, as amended, clearly provides that:
xxx
The actions of the Corporation taken under this section shall be final and executory, and may not
be restrained or set aside by the court, except on appropriate petition for certiorari on the ground
that the action was taken in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to
amount to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed within thirty
(30) days from notice of denial of claim for deposit insurance.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 200678, 04 June 2018
A closed bank under receivership can only sue or be sued through its receiver, the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). Under R.A. 7653, when the Monetary Board finds a. bank insolvent
it may “summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the
Philippines and designate PDIC as receiver of the banking institution. The relationship between a closed
bank, in this case, Banco Filipino, and the PDIC is fiduciary in nature. Section 30 of R.A. 7653 directs the
receiver of a closed bank to “immediately gather and take charge of all the assets and liabilities of the
institution.”
Considering that the receiver has the power to take charge of ALL the assets of the closed bank
and to institute for or defend any action against it, only the receiver, in its fiduciary capacity, may sue and
be sued on behalf of the closed bank. When the petitioner was placed under receivership, the power of

23
its Board of Directors and its officers were suspended. Thus, its Board of Directors could not have validly
authorized its Executive Vice Presidents to file the suit on its behalf. Considering that the petition was filed
by signatories who were not validly authorized to do so, the petition does not produce any legal effect.
Being unauthorized to do so, the Supreme Court never validly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The
petition, therefore, must be dismissed.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 200642
When a bank is ordered closed and placed under the receivership of PDIC by the Monetary Board,
PDIC is mandated to proceed with the takeover and liquidation of the closed bank. It shall immediately
gather and take charge of all the assets and liabilities of the bank, administer the same for the benefit of
its creditors, and exercise the general powers of a receiver under the Revised Rules of Court. In its capacity
as the receiver of the closed bank, the PDIC is authorized to perform several functions in its behalf,
including bringing suits to enforce liabilities to or recoveries of the closed banks, hiring or retaining private
counsels as may be necessary, and exercising such other powers as are inherent and necessary for the
effective discharge of the duties of the corporation as a receiver. The powers and functions of the
directors, officers, and stockholders of a closed bank under receivership are deemed suspended upon
takeover by the PDIC.
Liquidation
Manalo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141297, 08 October 2001
the exclusive jurisdiction of the liquidation court pertains only to the adjudication of claims against
the bank. It does not cover the reverse situation where it is the bank which files a claim against another
person or legal entity. The requirement that all claims against the bank be pursued in the liquidation
proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent
bank and designed to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the
proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness. The lawmaking body contemplated that
for convenience, only one court, if possible, should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and
that the liquidation court should assist the Superintendents of Banks and regulate his operations. In
addition, a bank which had been ordered closed by the monetary board retains its juridical personality
which can sue and be sued through its liquidator. The only limitation being that the prosecution or defense
of the action must be done through the liquidator. Otherwise, no suit for or against an insolvent entity
would prosper. In such situation, banks in liquidation would lose what justly belongs to them through a
mere technicality.
Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 148019, 26 July 2004
It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his standing in court and his right
to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal from the judgment
by default and assail said judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is excessive
or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of
his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law. Such party declared in default is proscribed from
seeking a modification or reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by him
in the Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce
evidence, a right which he lost in the trial court when he was declared in default, and which he failed to

24
have vacated. In this case, the petitioner sought the modification of the decision of the trial court based
on the evidence submitted by it only in the Court of Appeals.
Miranda v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 169334, 08 September 2006
It is well-settled in both law and jurisprudence that the Central Monetary Authority, through the
Monetary Board, is vested with exclusive authority to assess, evaluate and determine the condition of any
bank, and finding such condition to be one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve
a probable loss to its depositors or creditors, forbid bank or non-bank financial institution to do business
in the Philippines; and shall designate an official of the BSP or other competent person as receiver to
immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities.
In Central Bank of the Philippines v. De la Cruz, we held that the actions of the Monetary Board in
proceedings on insolvency are explicitly declared by law to be "final and executory." They may not be set
aside, or restrained, or enjoined by the courts, except upon "convincing proof that the action is plainly
arbitrary and made in bad faith.
In Re : Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation in the Rural Bank of Bokod Benguet v. Bureau of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 158261, 18 December 2006
Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act lays down the proceedings for receivership and liquidation
of a bank. The said provision is silent as regards the securing of a tax clearance from the BIR. The omission,
nonetheless, cannot compel this Court to apply by analogy the tax clearance requirement of the SEC, as
stated in Section 52(C) of the Tax Code of 1997 and BIR-SEC Regulations No. 1, since, again, the dissolution
of a corporation by the SEC is a totally different proceeding from the receivership and liquidation of a
bank by the BSP. This Court cannot simply replace any reference by Section 52(C) of the Tax Code of 1997
and the provisions of the BIR-SEC Regulations No. 1 to the "SEC" with the "BSP." To do so would be to
read into the law and the regulations something that is simply not there, and would be tantamount to
judicial legislation.
It should be noted that there are substantial differences in the procedure for involuntary
dissolution and liquidation of a corporation under the Corporation Code, and that of a banking corporation
under the New Central Bank Act, so that the requirements in one cannot simply be imposed in the other.
Cu v. Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 211222
To digress, when a bank is ordered closed by the Monetary Board; PDIC is designated as the
receiver which shall then proceed with the takeover and liquidation of the closed bank. The placement of
a bank under liquidation has the following effect on interest payments: "The liability of a bank to pay
interest on deposits and all other obligations as of closure shall cease upon its closure by the Monetary
Board without prejudice to the first paragraph of Section 85 of Republic Act No. 7653 (the New Central
Bank Act)," and on final decisions against the closed bank: "The execution and enforcement of a final
decision of a court other than the liquidation court against the assets of a closed bank shall be stayed. The
prevailing party shall file the final decision as a claim with the liquidation court and settled in accordance
with the Rules on Concurrence and Preference of Credits under the Civil Code or other laws."

25
The petition for assistance in the liquidation of a closed bank is a special proceeding for the
liquidation of a closed bank, and includes the declaration of the concomitant rights of its creditors and
the order of payment of their valid claims in the disposition of assets. It is a proceeding in rem and the
liquidation court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate disputed claims against the closed bank, assist in
the enforcement of individual liabilities of the stockholders, directors and officers, and decide on all other
issues as may be material to implement the distribution plan adopted by PDIC for general application to
all closed banks. The provisions of the Securities Regulation Code or RA 8799, and Supreme Court
Administrative Matter No. 00-8-10-SC or the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation are not
applicable to the petition for assistance in the liquidation of closed banks.
Apex Bancrights Holdings, Inc. et. al. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 214866, 2 October 2017
The Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the institution
from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as
receiver of the banking institution. The receiver shall immediately gather and take charge of all the assets
and liabilities of the institution, administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, and exercise the
general powers of a receiver under the Revised Rules of Court. If the receiver determines that the
institution cannot be rehabilitated or permitted to resume business in accordance with the next preceding
paragraph, the Monetary Board shall notify in writing the board of directors of its findings and direct the
receiver to proceed with the liquidation of the institution.
Yuseco v. PDIC, as statutory liquidator of Unitrust Bank, G.R. No. 217890
According to Section 30 of the NCBA, the determination of the propriety of receivership or

liquidation proceedings is under the exclusive prerogative of the Monetary Board. The RTC, acting as
liquidation court, has no power to overrule the findings of the MB. As a liquidation court, the power of
the RTC is limited to adjudicating claims against the institution, assisting the enforcement of individual
liabilities of stockholders and deciding on essential issues relevant to the liquidation plan. In the case at
bar, the RTC, acting as liquidation court, did not have jurisdiction to decide on the propriety and validity
of the proceedings. The trial court failed to consider Sec. 30 of the NCBA when it decided on the validity
of the proceeding. Hence, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the PDIC to cease
and desist in the liquidation proceeding.
Hermosa Savings and Loan Bank v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 222972
According to the Court, Section 3029 of RA 7653 "is curative in character when it declared that
the liquidation court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the
disputed claims against the Bank."30 The Court explained that the rationale for consolidating all claims
against the bank with the liquidation court is "to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank
and x x x to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation
of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness." The Court stated that it was the intention, of the
lawmaking body "that for convenience only one court, if possible, should pass upon the claims against the
insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the Superintendent of Banks and regulate his
operations."
To allow the complaint of DBP to proceed outside the Liquidation Court could result to iniquity
not only to Hermosa Bank's depositors who were the most directly affected by its closure, but also to its

26
other creditors because it would prioritize DBP's claim over their claims. The CA also committed a
reversible error in ruling that the Liquidation Court has no jurisdiction over the bank employees who are
being sued in their personal capacities. Section 30 of RA 7653 gives the liquidation court the authority to
"adjudicate disputed claims against the institution, assist the enforcement of individual liabilities of the
stockholders, directors and officers, and decide on other issues as may be material to implement the
liquidation plan adopted." Hence, the Liquidation Court may resolve the respective liabilities, if any, of
Hermosa Bank's officers pursuant to Section 30 of RA 7653. Finally, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment
issued by the RTC Branch 136 is a provisional or ancillary remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect and
preserve certain rights and interests pending final judgment. With the dismissal of DBP's complaint, the
Writ of Preliminary Attachment no longer has a leg to stand on and should correctly be dissolved.
"Veni, vidi, vici" - Roman Emperor Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE)
“My name is Sherlock Holmes. It is my business to know what other people do not know.” - Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of the Blue
Carbuncle

27

Pertinent Cases On The General Banking Law of 2000 (R.A. No. 8791)

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General Banking Law of 2000 (R.A. No.

Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118492, 15 August 2001

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Allied Banking Corporation v. Sia, G.R. No. 195341, 28 August 2019

Philippine National Bank v. Giron-Roque, G.R. No. 240311, 18 September 2019

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"A certificate of deposit is defined as a written acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the

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Definition and Classification of Banks

Distinction of Banks from Quasi-Banks and Trust Entities

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Banking and Incidental Powers

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Nature of Bank Funds and Bank Deposits

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Rey v. Anson, G.R. No. 211206, 07 November 2018

1. the offender is a director or officer of any banking institution;

a. he borrows any of the deposits or funds of such bank; or

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No violation of the DOSRI and Single Borrower’s Limit restrictions

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We reject the Republic’s suggestion.

The New Central Bank Act (R.A. No. 7653)

Responsibility and Primary Objective

We rule that petitioners cannot seek by mandamus to compel respondents to prosecute

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Monetary Board - Powers and Functions

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Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, as amended,14 pertinently provides:

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So v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 230020, 19 March 2018

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Manalo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141297, 08 October 2001

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Cu v. Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 211222

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Yuseco v. PDIC, as statutory liquidator of Unitrust Bank, G.R. No. 217890

According to Section 30 of the NCBA, the determination of the propriety of receivership or

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"Veni, vidi, vici" - Roman Emperor Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE)

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