MAB Article 60608 en 1
MAB Article 60608 en 1
MAB Article 60608 en 1
DOI 10.5117/mab.95.60608
Literature Review
Abstract
This paper reviews the academic literature on the different conceptualizations of audit quality. We argue that these discussions are
rooted in the historical development of the audit profession, which has shown the need for audit quality indicators. However, we also
demonstrate that audit quality means different things to different people, such that different conceptualizations of audit quality may
lead to conflicts, as these views meet and need to be reconciled. The literature largely recognizes the multi-faceted nature of audit
quality, which cannot be simply measured by a focus on adverse outcomes, such as restatements or fraud incidents. Instead, it is the
combination of process, people and motivation that drives the quality of audit services provided by firms. Finally, the qualitative
audit literature emphasizes that audit practice needs to be understood as a set of social interactions, which are embedded in a diverse
set of organizational and contextual factors that together determine audit judgments and auditor behavior.
Keywords
audit quality; audit quality indicators; literature review
1. Introduction
“Audit quality is much debated, but little understood” auditing, which provides important academic insights
(Knechel et al. 2013, p. 385). In this paper, we aim to into understanding audit quality and practice.
provide an overview of various perspectives on audit Overall, our review leads us to the following
quality and its determinants in the academic auditing conclusions. First, there is a rich history of debates
literature. We begin our synopsis by exploring the about the shortcomings of the audit profession, which
historical development of key themes associated with resonate well with contemporary debates and attempts to
the audit profession and audit quality. Next, rather change auditing (section 2). Second, audit quality means
than embarking on our own comprehensive review, we different things to different people, which may lead to
summarize two existing seminal review papers (Knechel conflicts when these views meet or need to be reconciled
et al. 2013; DeFond and Zhang 2014), which in turn have (section 3). Third, academic conceptualizations of audit
reviewed the results of key archival and experimental quality recognize the multi-faceted nature of auditing,
review papers on audit quality. We do this to illuminate the where attention needs to be paid to process, people and
different aspects and indicators of audit quality. Finally, motivation, rather than an exclusive focus on for example
we also explore the views of the qualitative literature on adverse outcomes (e.g., restatements, accounting
Copyright Dominic Detzen, Anna Gold. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
6 Dominic Detzen & Anna Gold: The different shades of audit quality: A review of the academic literature
scandals) (section 3). Finally, qualitative research Sarbanes-Oxley-Act (SOX) to address many deficiencies
highlights that audit judgments need to be understood as a in the accounting and audit framework.
set of social interactions, which are embedded in a range In the aftermath of these accounting scandals, academics
of organizational and contextual factors that together engaged in a historical-critical analysis of ‘what went
determine auditor behavior (section 4).1 wrong’ (e.g., Humphrey 2008). Zeff (2003a; 2003b) and
Before proceeding we emphasize that ‘audit quality’ Wyatt (2004) largely agree that the profession’s values
constitutes a rather broad topic in the auditing literature, had gradually declined beginning in the early 1970s: As
and different streams tend to conceptualize it in vastly audit markets became saturated, competition increased
different manners. As such, it is a challenge to synthesize considerably (as also instigated by legal changes in the
the literature in a compact and coherent way. Hence, we U.S., e.g., the ban on advertising was repealed). This
largely refrain from citing individual academic studies implied declining profits for the firms’ audit practices. To
for the sake of brevity (esp. in section 3); instead, we counter this trend, the firms began to grow their tax and
refer the reader to the respective review articles for the consulting services, starting in the 1970s and especially
relevant sources. Per definition, a literature synthesis in the 1980s/90s. This in turn emphasized revenue,
includes some level of interpretation by the authors growth, profitability, and global reach in the firms, thus
to be informative. Further, much of the research cited instilling a business mindset into the firms, partners and
focuses on countries other than the Netherlands, which audit staff, at the expense of professional values. This
means that the institutional contexts and regulatory trend is said to have impaired auditors’ independence,
environments differ. Nevertheless, it is believed that the as firms could not ‘afford’ to lose clients anymore. Audit
findings of those studies apply by extension also to the partners thus became less willing to take a stand against
Dutch audit environment, especially given their focus on their clients, who in turn faced increasing pressures from
the relatively universal concept of ‘audit quality’. capital markets to show ever-growing earnings (Moore et
al. 2006). This may have introduced a shift from focusing
on what is morally right to what is technically legal, with
2. From professionalism to the implications also being felt in auditing.
It is thus largely accepted in the academic literature
commercialism: The need for audit that, over time, commercial values have emerged as a
quality indicators significant factor in the audit firms, where they potentially
conflict with professional values (Cooper and Robson
Auditing as a self-regulated activity can be traced back to 2006; Malsch and Gendron 2013). Carter and Spence
the emergence of the regulatory framework of financial (2014, p. 968) confirmed that, in the race to become an
reporting and securities regulation. In the United States audit partner, “technical competence plays second fiddle
(on which most of the research focuses), this occurred in to [generating new business]”. The literature suggests
the 1930s, when the Securities Acts emerged following the that the shift towards commercial attitudes in audit firms
stock market crash of 1929. Legislators adopted a model seems to have been universal and has taken place across
of “participatory regulation” (McCraw 1984). This meant different jurisdictions.
that auditors would fulfill the public task of controlling Notably, several issues and debates in auditing are
companies’ financial statements. Auditing thus became recurring and seem to reflect tensions in the fundamental
a private-sector regulatory instrument, as the newly construction of the audit function (Humphrey 2008).
established Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Specifically, Chandler and Edwards (1996) refer to the
required all financial statements of listed companies to role and scope of the audit, auditor independence, the
be audited. audit report, competition between auditors, the level of
Yet this setup relied strongly on the independence of litigation against auditors, audit regulation, and the lack
auditors, so attempts were made early on to eliminate of skills. They argue that these issues “were the subject of
conflicts of interest, arising for example from financial intellectual inquiry and public debate 100 years ago” (p.
relationships between auditor and client (Moore et 4). In a similar manner, Humphrey et al. (1992) argue that
al. 2006). Over the decades, regulators and the audit the audit expectation gap has largely remained unchanged
profession have countered many crises by “tweaking” over time, even though the audit profession has repeatedly
auditors’ appearance of independence (rather than tried to educate the public and has shown willingness
independence in fact). This “has tended to increase the so- to address these concerns. Hence, the expectation gap
called expectations gap between (1) the expectation that seems to be an inevitable feature of the audit function,
companies with upbeat financial reports and “clean” audit and likely continues to exist, because ‘audit quality’ is
opinions are free of the risk of short-term business failure highly unobservable.
and (2) the reality of sudden collapse among firms whose In sum, this brief historical review implies that the
reports make them look healthy” (Moore et al. 2006, p. increased emphasis of commercial attitudes in audit firms
14). This culminated in the accounting scandals at Enron has resulted in several scandals that triggered the need
(2001) and WorldCom (2002), and the subsequent demise to focus on and measure audit quality to safeguard the
of Arthur Andersen in the early 2000s, which triggered the audit function. In the next section, we provide a summary
https://mab-online.nl
Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 95(1/2): 5–15 7
of how the auditing literature defines and conceptualizes This definition is still widely used by most academics
audit quality and its indicators. because it incorporates the two key elements of (1) auditor
competence/ability (to “discover a breach”) and (2)
auditor independence/objectivity (willingness to “report
3. Audit quality: A the breach”); and it also hints at (3) the importance of the
financial statement user’s perceptions of these attributes
conceptualization based on the (“market-assessed probability”).
academic literature More recent audit quality frameworks agree that
the concept of audit quality is best understood by
As Knechel et al. (2013) argue, conceptualizing audit conceptualizing auditing as a process and examining
quality means to integrate different parties’ differing points factors belonging to the various elements of this process.
of focus: For example, while users of financial statements These factors are often labeled audit quality indicators
may focus on the absence of material misstatements in (Gaynor et al. 2016), which are concrete measures that
their understanding of audit quality, the auditor may define can be used to assess audit quality (Knechel et al. 2013).
high audit quality as meeting the goals of their firm’s audit To illustrate, an audit quality indicator at the audit input
methodology. This becomes evident in Aobdia’s (2019) stage of the audit process would be the range of audit
comparison of academic proxies of audit quality with audit team characteristics, such as the team members’ level of
firms’ internal reviews and PCAOB inspection findings. industry expertise, or the involvement of a specialist. At
Only three out of fifteen academic measures of audit quality the output stage, an example of an audit quality indicator
were significantly associated with audit process deficiencies would be the type of audit opinion issued by the auditor.
as identified by practitioners, suggesting limited agreement In the following, we first summarize the four audit
between these parties as to what constitutes audit quality. process elements (3.1- audit inputs, 3.2- audit process,
Similarly, Brivot et al. (2018) demonstrate two different 3.3- audit outputs, and 3.4- context) and their respective
conventions of audit quality: Auditors of publicly traded audit quality indicators, closely following Knechel et al.
(i.e., listed) firms understand audit quality as resulting from (2013).2 We further borrow from similar frameworks (i.e.,
a technically flawless audit, highly formalized judgment, Francis 2011; DeFond and Zhang 2014) to add relevant
a perfectly documented audit file, and the absence of indicators to each of Knechel et al.’s (2013) category.3
inspection findings. By contrast, auditors of private (i.e., Next, we extend Knechel et al.’s (2013) conceptualization
non-listed, e.g., family owned) companies point to the by adding two additional elements from DeFond and Zhang
need of tailoring the audit to a client’s need, a high degree (2014). As such, we add the element of client demand
of judgment, and the client’s assessment that the audit (section 3.5 in our overview) to illustrate how varying
has “added value”. The authors spell out the tensions client demands have been found to affect audit quality.
between these two conventions and argue that regulatory Further, we add the element of regulatory intervention
interventions might actually hurt audit quality. (section 3.6 in our overview). Our conceptualization of
Academic research on auditing began in earnest in the resulting six elements containing the audit quality
the early 1980s with Linda DeAngelo’s (1981) article indicators discussed below is summarized in Figure 1.
on auditor size and audit quality, which defined audit
quality as follows (p. 186): “The quality of audit services 3.1 Audit inputs
is defined to be the market-assessed joint probability
that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the Each audit client is unique (“idiosyncratic”), as is the
client’s accounting system, and (b) report the breach.” level of risk associated with each engagement. Hence,
Figure 1. Conceptualization of audit quality (adapted from Knechel et al. (2013) and DeFond and Zhang (2014).
https://mab-online.nl
8 Dominic Detzen & Anna Gold: The different shades of audit quality: A review of the academic literature
the resources required to audit a given client and obtain decomposed) results in different assessments (e.g., Wilks
reasonable assurance by definition vary per engagement. and Zimbelman 2004) and that auditors sometimes struggle
What goes into the audit (audit inputs or auditor supply) with adequately modifying their audit plans in response to
will obviously affect the quality of the audit (Knechel et risk assessments (e.g., Hammersley et al. 2011).
al. 2013; DeFond and Zhang 2014). Just as any human being, auditors are subject to
Knechel et al. (2013) conclude that auditors’ heuristics and biases in their decision-making, some of
judgments are influenced by a variety of pressures and which can serve as barriers to the quality of an audit. The
incentives, such as the perceived risk of losing their behavioral auditing literature has indeed documented
clients (e.g., Blay 2005), fee pressures (Houston 1999), that auditors are susceptible to variety of judgment
incentives to retain clients (e.g., Kim and Park 2014), biases (e.g., confirmation, anchoring, etc.). One audit
but also engagement-related pressures such as superior phase in which biases have received extensive attention
preferences (e.g., Church and Schneider 1993) and time is the application of analytical procedures, during which
or budget pressures (see DeZoort and Lord 1997 for auditors tend to anchor on “inherited” information rather
review). Meanwhile, several powerful countervailing than developing their own expectations (see Messier et al.
incentives are expected to promote high audit quality, 2013 for a review). Mechanisms that appear to alleviate
such as regulatory enforcement, potential reputation and such biases are experience, expertise, group decision
litigation costs (e.g., Nelson 2009). Archival research making, and inducing a sense of accountability.
reviewed by DeFond and Zhang (2014) is inconclusive Audit firms have powerful control and monitoring
on the conjecture that higher litigation risk and reputation mechanisms in place to ensure high audit quality, and
incentives lead to higher audit quality (measured by for much research demonstrates such positive effects.
example audit fees or issuance of going concern opinions). However, some research also points to adverse effects on
Recent behavioral research in auditing has focused judgment quality. For example, while the purpose of the
on auditors’ professional skepticism as an important review process is to detect auditor errors and make timely
indicator of audit quality in the input phase, documenting corrections and to increase auditor accountability (and
a positive association between professional skepticism hence effort), research finds that reviewees are sometimes
and audit quality (e.g., Nelson 2009). Hence, behavioral biased when made aware of their reviewers’ preferences
research shows that greater auditor skepticism leads to a (e.g., Shankar and Tan 2006).
greater willingness to confront a client, performance of Finally, a large body of research has examined the
more additional procedures, higher detection of fraud, negotiation between auditor and client, and the factors
higher-quality assessments of evidence, lower trust in a that lead to superior auditor negotiation performance,
client, and more investment in high levels of audit effort. such as interpersonal factors, auditor characteristics,
Not surprisingly, Knechel et al.’s (2013) review shows client characteristics, but also the negotiation strategies
that auditor knowledge and expertise positively impact that are used (see Brown and Wright 2008 for a review).
audit quality. Such knowledge can be general (e.g., as
reflected in higher audit ranks), but particularly client- 3.3 Audit outputs
and industry-specific knowledge have been found to
matter for audit quality (e.g., Beck and Wu 2006). Examining the output of an audit is arguably the most
direct indicator of audit quality. While most of the
3.2 Audit process research discussed thus far entails experimental efforts to
examine audit quality by looking at auditor judgments,
An audit consists of several predefined phases, ranging there is considerable archival research on audit outcomes
from client acceptance, through audit planning and audit based on a variety of publicly available proxies. The most
testing, to audit completion and reporting. Based on important proxies are audit failures, financial reporting
Knechel et al. (2013) we highlight a number of elements quality, and audit reports.
which academic research reveals to be of particular First, researchers can approximate audit failures by
importance to audit quality during the audit process. measuring binary indicators for extreme, negative audit
Generally, auditing research has established that a variety quality outcomes (or audit failures), such as (1) the
of factors influence the nature of the audit production presence of an accounting restatement, (2) litigation
process, which is typically assessed by the nature and against an auditor, (3) regulator (e.g., SEC) enforcement
extent of testing, assignment of expert staff or specialists to action against an auditor or audit firm, and, more recently,
the audit etc. Research concludes that the interaction of risk oversight inspection results. In summary, the overall
factors and circumstances (e.g., client attributes, audit team evidence points to a very low audit failure rate. However,
structure, etc.) determines the auditor’s production plan. it is unclear how high the “true” failure rate is, since not
The auditor’s assessment of risk is an important all cases are reasonably observable.4 As a result, Francis
determinant of the nature, extent and timing of audit (2011) recommends conceptualizing audit quality as a
procedures, which in turn have a direct influence on the continuum, rather than a binary concept.
delivered audit quality. Prior research demonstrates that One way to measure audit quality on a more continuous
the approach used to assess risks (e.g., holistic versus scale is to turn to the client’s audited financial statements.
https://mab-online.nl
Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 95(1/2): 5–15 9
The premise is that the production of the financial to auditor tenure are mixed, documenting both a positive
statements is a joint product by clients and their auditors; (e.g., Chi et al. 2009) and negative relation (e.g., Carey
hence their quality also reflects the quality exerted by and Simnett 2006) between audit firm/partner tenure and
the auditor (Behn et al. 2008). There is an abundance of audit quality. Finally, there is also a stream of literature
research using earnings quality (employing discretionary examining market perceptions of audit quality, which
accruals models) as a measure for audit quality, with the suggests that the market rewards companies that employ
argument that a high-quality auditor is more likely to higher quality auditors (e.g., Causholli and Knechel
restrict aggressive accounting than a lower-quality auditor. 2012). There is also evidence that users respond to some
A third way to assess audit quality is to directly of the factors raised as problematic by regulators (e.g.,
examine the audit report issued by the audit firm. While non-audit services and tenure), while their actual effect
most report modifications are rare, researchers have on audit quality is limited, potentially suggesting that
primarily turned to the issuance of going-concern audit some indicators may affect independence in appearance,
reports (which is not a modification in the strict sense, while independence in mind remains unaffected.
but rather an emphasis of matter; see Carson et al. 2013
for a review of research on auditors’ going concern 3.5 Client demand
opinions). One stream of research classifies the issuance
of a going-concern opinion as an indication of higher While the elements discussed thus far concern the
audit quality or, more specifically, auditor independence, indicators of audit quality related to the auditor, a range of
and has examined a battery of factors that influence such studies have examined the exogenous demand for auditing.
reporting behavior. Another line of research focuses on In theory, “the value of auditing arises from its ability to
the accuracy of going concern opinions, distinguishing assure that the financial statements faithfully reflect the
between type I errors (opinion issued with no subsequent client’s underlying economics. These assurances reduce
bankruptcy) and type II errors (no opinion issued despite information risk, which ultimately improves resource
subsequent bankruptcy; this is sometimes labeled an audit allocation efficiency, including contracting efficiency”
failure). Interestingly, particularly type II error rates tend (DeFond and Zhang 2014, p. 292). Examining under
to be high (for the period 1995–2002 around 55 percent, what circumstances clients demand higher audit quality
according to Lennox 1999), although error rates have suggests that agency costs explain the choice of audit
decreased after SOX. quality; hence, higher agency conflicts increase the
demand for greater assurance by a third party. Another
3.4 Context stream of research finds that strong corporate governance
(e.g., independent and high expert audit committees)
Knechel et al. (2013) group a number of potential quality demand higher audit quality.
indicators under the header of “context”. First, limited Client demand for audit quality was clearly affected
evidence suggests that audit partner compensation (e.g., by the introduction of SOX. For example, stricter audit
client significance) affects audit quality, but the direction committee requirements (e.g., increased independence from
of the relation is not consistent across studies. For example, client management) changed how auditors were selected,
a recent study by Asare et al. (2019) shows that auditors retained and fired. Research finds that more independent
are more likely to waive a client’s material misstatements audit committees indeed are more likely to hire industry
as their economic incentives (e.g., abnormally high audit specialists, pay higher audit fees, purchase less non-audit
fees, provision of non-audit services) increase. Second, services, and hire fewer former audit employees.
literature suggests that both abnormally high and low While auditing is mandated for a large range of clients,
audit fees can be associated with financial reporting DeFond and Zhang (2014) examine whether auditing
problems (e.g., Hribar et al. 2014; Krishnan and Zhang adds value in the absence of regulation. Accordingly,
2014), but Knechel et al. (2013) discuss several reasons voluntary audits reduce the cost of debt, improve credit
for being cautious when using abnormal audit fees as a ratings, reduce the number of audit adjustments, and
meaningful quality indicator. Similarly, an abundance generally signal higher financial reporting quality (a
of research has examined whether non-audit services signaling value that is lost when auditing is mandatory).
create an economic bond between auditors and clients, Another stream of research examines market reactions to
impairing independence and audit quality. However, the going concern opinions, suggesting that indeed such audit
empirical evidence regarding non-audit fees is mixed, reporting is valued by the market, which again suggests
with many studies, finding either no relationship or a that auditing has value for the client. The same holds
positive association, suggesting a “knowledge spillover”, for evidence from market reactions to internal control
dominating potential independence concerns (see Bedard opinions (in the U.S.) and auditor changes.
et al. 2008 for a review). Third, research suggests that More recently, Knechel et al. (2020) emphasize
larger (Big N) audit firms (e.g., Francis and Yu 2009) the notion of financial statement audits resulting from
and industry specialists (e.g., Carson 2009) are able to a process of co-creation between auditor and client,
command an audit fee premium, which in turn leads to which has substantial implications for how audit quality
superior audit quality. Fourth, research results with respect should be conceptualized. While regulation has focused
https://mab-online.nl
10 Dominic Detzen & Anna Gold: The different shades of audit quality: A review of the academic literature
primarily on increasing independence and standardizing (2014) also offer critical views on inspections, referring
the audit process to improve audit quality, the authors to inspectors possibly lacking current auditing expertise
draw attention to the fact that quality is contingent on a and being under pressure to identify problems (see also
dyadic relationship between service provider (auditor) Aobdia 2019). Recent qualitative studies raise some
and client, emphasizing once more the importance of the further concerns as to the role of such inspection bodies
idiosyncratic nature of an audit. (e.g., Johnson et al. 2018; Westermann et al. 2019),
pointing to an overall antagonistic environment, in which
3.6 Regulatory intervention powerful regulators impose their views on auditors, who
comply due to fear of enforcement.
The regulation of audit markets intends to improve audit Regulatory intervention thus tends to have an uncertain
quality by aligning auditors’ and clients’ market-based outcome for audit quality (Humphrey et al. 2011), mainly for
incentives and competencies (DeFond and Zhang 2014). three reasons. First, while reforms place unwarranted trust in
Throughout history, regulators have intervened following regulation, little is known about the nature and effectiveness
high-profile audit failures, when market-based incentives of regulatory practices and regimes. Importantly, regulation
and competencies had seemingly failed (DeFond and is the outcome of a political process, involving a range
Francis 2005). A fundamental research question relates of parties that further influence its implementation and
to whether regulatory intervention has improved audit interpretation in practice (Cooper and Robson 2006).
quality, specifically in the areas of major reform efforts: Second, reform initiatives do not necessarily work as
auditor independence, the role of audit committees, and intended, because the respective institutions may lack the
audit oversight and inspections. legitimacy or authority to effectively regulate (Canning
First, auditor independence entails avoiding, or and O’Dwyer 2016). Third, practical implementation may
mitigating, the conflicts of interest that auditors are subject not be in line with the spirit of the regulation, thus eroding
to. Both Gramling et al. (2010) and DeFond and Zhang these changes (Fiolleau et al. 2013). Beyond these findings,
(2014) conclude that most research finds that neither the key risk of regulatory intervention seems to be that
provision of non-audit services nor excessive auditor such initiatives make audit practice overly standardized,
tenure impair audit quality, but may even improve it, due to curtailing the professional judgment and discretion of
knowledge spillover and expertise effects. While literature auditors. Finally, inspection findings may also be due to
is not very extensive, Gramling et al. (2010) confirm that differing views on audit quality, such that adverse audit
regulatory changes have achieved to increase investors’ outcomes may not be a sufficiently strong reason for further
assessment of auditors’ independence (i.e., in appearance). regulatory interventions in auditing.
Second, the position of audit clients’ audit committees
has been strengthened by recent reforms, such that
these committees now formally appoint the auditor in 4. Insights from qualitative
companies, which has direct consequences for client
demand (see section 3.5). While a range of studies
auditing research
have documented benefits of effective audit committees This section provides additional insights from the
for financial reporting quality (Cohen et al. 2007), the qualitative auditing literature, which tends not to explicitly
relation with auditing is more ambiguous (Cohen et al. use the term “audit quality”. Yet, given its prevalent use of
2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2015), although investors seem case/field study, interview, or observation methodologies,
to value a strong audit committee that takes its auditor this literature stream seems highly suited to shed light
appointment powers seriously (Gold et al. 2018). Of on the process, people and motivation, which have
note is the field study by Fiolleau et al. (2013), who been revealed as contributing to the services provided
investigated a company’s auditor selection decision, by audit firms. Accordingly, this literature understands
finding that management remains the dominant party that auditing as a social practice, which is influenced by social
hires the auditor, thus “potentially rendering proposed interactions (section 4.1), and examines how individual
audit firm rotation ineffective” (p. 867). auditors are embedded in the organizational context of
Third, a major change in the audit framework occurred audit firms (section 4.2), all of which affect the work of
when, starting with the PCAOB in 2002, audit oversight auditors, their judgments and their behavior, and hence
bodies were installed that conducted independent also audit quality.
inspections of audit files. Early archival findings as to the
efficacy of the PCAOB inspection regime are somewhat
inconclusive (e.g., Gunny and Zhang 2013), particularly for 4.1 Auditing as a social practice
larger audit firms (DeFond and Zhang 2014), while more Auditing can be viewed from a micro-perspective as a
recent studies indicate that firms consistently improve their set of practices and routines. Such notions point to the
quality in response to inspections (e.g., Lamoreaux 2016). affective or emotional dimension of auditing, which is
Notably, however, markets and decision-makers hence constituted of micro-rituals that, once completed,
have remained skeptical of the audit profession as well give ‘comfort’ to the auditor (Pentland 1993). This comfort
as such inspections (Löhlein 2016). DeFond and Zhang is “a signal that hunch and intuition are formed from
https://mab-online.nl
Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 95(1/2): 5–15 11
repeated collective interactions within the audit team”, that most knowledge is learned on-the-job, rather than
which over time teaches auditors the intuitions necessary in the classroom (Westermann et al. 2015), and that this
for their work (Power 2003, p. 385). Team interactions, learning is “similar to learning to riding a bike, i.e. not an
audit procedures, individual judgments, documentation intellectual process” (Power 1991, p. 340). As a result,
and work papers, as well as ‘signing off’ are all elements the audit credential is considered a “hurdle” that needs
of audit practice that go beyond rational cognition, but are to be passed to become an audit professional, rather than
social interactions that establish ‘order’ and ‘stability’, and conveying essential skills necessary in practice.
produce legitimacy at the micro-level (see also Carrington Once auditors advance through the ranks, other aspects
and Catasús 2007; Guénin-Paracini et al. 2014). of audit practice need to be incorporated in auditors’
Likewise, there is a perennial debate as to how much understanding of their work. As such, managers need to
audit practice should be standardized and how much navigate and manage a complex network that includes
room for judgment should be given to auditors (Power supervision of juniors and interactions with clients, and
2003). Over the years, audit firms have attempted to being an essential link to audit partners (Kornberger et al.
structure the audit process into a set of routines, which 2011). This network, however, is temporary and managers
has minimized the potential of individual auditors to are “in a constant repair mode to minimize potential
exercise professional judgment. This debate has affected damage and to ensure a smooth flow of information across
audit programs, where firms “try to balance a formal, the network” (p. 531). Audit partners, on the other hand,
defendable, economic and manageable structure for the are considered “organizational entrepreneurs”, leaving
audit process with the autonomy of auditor judgement” technical expertise mostly to subordinates, while having
(Power 2003, p. 382). Increased structure may simplify to successfully manage a client portfolio and represent
quality control and help in litigation cases, but the the firm (Carter and Spence 2014). Partners learn these
downside is constrained judgment. One example is the skills via informal communication, mentoring and
historical emergence of statistical sampling, which has management practices (Covaleski et al. 1998), resulting
shifted certain responsibilities to the audit client, and thus in a conception of ‘professional autonomy’ that auditors
contributed to widening the expectation gap (Carpenter strive to maintain.
and Dirsmith 1993). It is thus the organizational environment that weaves
Related to this is the question of understanding auditing “a web of control” around audit firm members (Ladva and
as a business, where cost controls and quality objectives Andrew 2014) and that transforms auditors into a certain
push audit firms in different directions. This trade-off is type of professional. This professional tends to be a white
visible in time budgeting, planning and reporting processes, male auditor (Anderson-Gough et al. 2005), as “the barriers
and is embedded in the management control system of to entry and ascension [to partner level] appear to be all
the firms, where it is (invisibly) imposed on individual but insurmountable for females and ethnic minorities”
auditors and resolved on the spot (i.e. on individual audit (Carter and Spence 2014, p. 977). Since professionals
engagements). Arguably, this has given rise to a business want to gain status and recognition, they readily adapt to
risk audit approach (e.g., Robson et al. 2007). the rules of the game (Lupu and Empson 2015).
Based on these insights, Power (2003, p. 389) argues
that “audit quality is defined procedurally rather than in
terms of the constantly asserted but elusive output of added 5. Summary and conclusions
assurance. From this point of view, the quality of audit
resides only in part in the judgement processes of individual This paper has argued that many of auditing’s intricate
auditors; it is also a function of what gets accepted, stabilized dilemmas, such as the expectation gap, the trade-off
and institutionalized as a way of doing things.” between professionalism and commercialism, or auditor
independence, are in fact inherent in the audit function
4.2 Individual auditors and the organizational context and have persisted in different forms throughout the
of audit firms decades. Whereas auditing was initially considered to be
part of the regulatory solution to safeguard investors’ trust
Another (qualitative) literature stream outlines the ways in firms’ financial statements, it soon was at the receiving
in which the organizational context of audit firms affects end of regulation. For a long time, the audit profession
the behavior of individual auditors and conceptions managed to deflect fundamental regulatory intervention,
of what it means to be a professional. Much of this thus preserving its status quo. As some of the more critical
literature is about how newcomers are socialized into voices in the academic literature argue, this became
audit firms, i.e. how they are made familiar with what more problematic over the decades, as commercialism
is expected of them by the environment they just joined increased in the firms, leading up to the accounting and
(e.g., Anderson-Gough et al 2000; 2001; Grey 1998). audit scandals in the early 2000s. Since then, a range of
Yet, rather than focusing on technical knowledge and regulatory changes have been enacted, but the academic
audit procedures, audit trainees largely describe what it literature casts doubt on the effectiveness of regulatory
means to be a professional in terms of demeanor, conduct intervention, that is its ability to resolve these longstanding
and appearance. These studies have also documented problems of the audit function (Humphrey et al. 2011).
https://mab-online.nl
12 Dominic Detzen & Anna Gold: The different shades of audit quality: A review of the academic literature
We have also demonstrated the multi-faceted nature of professional judgment may guide them elsewhere.
audit quality, implying that there is no one superior way Likewise, practice is based on a set of routine interactions
to measure and assess it. Notably, the academic literature that auditors have come to appreciate as part of creating
consistently highlights a procedural conceptualization of sufficient ‘comfort’ to approve a client’s financial
audit quality, and we concur with Knechel et al.’s (2013, statements. On the other hand, the qualitative literature
p. 407) conclusion that “a ‘good’ audit is one where points to the organizational context of auditing, where
there is execution of a well-designed audit process by the values, rules and norms embedded in the audit firms
properly motivated and trained auditors who understand are conveyed to individual auditors by a range of (more
the inherent uncertainty of the audit and appropriately or less subtle) social control mechanisms. Compliance
adjust to the unique conditions of the client.” In addition, with these norms has been documented to have a
we note that audit quality is not solely influenced by the strong impact on auditors’ career trajectories. In sum,
auditor and the audit firm, but also by dynamics related this literature argues that the social and organizational
to the client, market, and regulation. We also note that context of auditing has a strong impact on the work of
regulatory bodies and institutions around the world auditors, their judgments and their behavior, and thus
have come up with their own audit quality frameworks also on audit quality, however defined.
(e.g., IAASB 2014; PCAOB 2015; NBA 2017), which In sum, our literature review has been targeted at
consistently recognize the different shades and process raising awareness of the multi-faceted nature of the
orientation of audit quality. Yet the question remains concept of audit quality. Despite its widespread and
whether and to what extent such a multifaceted approach conversational use, the term escapes a simple definition.
is indeed reflected in the work of regulators: Not only Following our review, we believe that efforts to improve
does Aobdia (2019) conclude that PCAOB findings are audit quality should devote attention to the entire audit
a noisy measure of audit quality, academic research also function, that is, the process, people and motivation that
documents that regulators and inspection bodies focus together affect the services provided by auditors and the
on different aspects of audit quality than auditors, and quality thereof. While research and practice may prefer
thus hold different understandings of the concept. As a simple set of measures or dials that can be turned
such, concurrent debates related to the different views of to ‘improve’ audit quality, we caution against such a
different parties on what constitutes “good” audit quality simplistic and reductionist understanding of the concept.
inevitably create conflict. This may make reform efforts more cumbersome and
We also outlined two qualitative research streams complex, but it reduces the fuzziness of discussions and
that have a bearing on audit quality. On the one hand, prevents the binary labeling of audit quality as ‘high’ or
it is suggested that auditing is a social practice that ‘low’. As such, we advocate a holistic understanding of
consists of human interactions in a social context. In the audit function, which may increase appreciation of
their daily practice, auditors face the difficult task of auditing as a people’s business, a social practice that is
balancing structure against judgment, as firm policies integral to the functioning of capital markets and wider
and procedures may dictate one thing, while their business processes.
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on the report that the Commissie Toekomst Accountancysector (CTA) commissioned us to prepare
for their consultations on the Dutch audit sector (CTA 2020). We thank the CTA for granting us permission to re-use
the material from our report for the purposes of the current article. Also, we thank the reviewers for valuable comments
on an earlier draft of this article.
Notes
1. The current paper is an abbreviated and slightly adjusted version of the report written for the Commissie Toekomst Accountancysector (CTA).
The CTA used our report in the development of their recommendations on the future of the auditing profession in the Netherlands (CTA 2020).
2. Per category, we refer to a selection of relevant extant papers reviewed by Knechel et al. (2013) and sometimes review papers; however, for a
more complete listing of studies we recommend consulting Knechel et al.’s (2013) review paper itself.
https://mab-online.nl
Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 95(1/2): 5–15 13
3. DeFond and Zhang’s (2014) element of ‘auditor supply’ overlaps with Knechel et al.’s (2013) element of ‘audit inputs,’ so we merge these
two categories.
4. For example, the majority of lawsuits against auditors are settled outside the court; the SEC may not have the resources to pursue all cases.
References
Anderson-Gough F, Grey C, Robson K (2000) In the name Carrington T, Catasús B (2007) Auditing stories about discomfort:
of the client: The service ethic in two professional services Becoming comfortable with comfort theory. European Accounting
firms. Human Relations 53(9): 1151–1174. https://doi. Review 16(1): 35–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180701265846
org/10.1177/0018726700539003 Carson E (2009) Industry specialization by global audit firm
Anderson-Gough F, Grey C, Robson K (2001) Tests of time: networks. The Accounting Review 84(2): 355–382. https://doi.
Organizational time-reckoning and the making of accountants in two org/10.2308/accr.2009.84.2.355
multi-national accounting firms. Accounting, Organizations and Society Carson E, Fargher N, Geiger M, Lennox C, Raghunandan K,
26(2): 99–122. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0361-3682(00)00019-2 Willekens M (2013) Auditor reporting on going-concern uncertainty:
Anderson-Gough F, Grey C, Robson K (2005) “Helping them to A research synthesis. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory
forget...”: The organizational embedding of gender relations in 32(Supplement 1): 353–384. https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-50324
public audit firms. Accounting, Organizations and Society 30(5): Carter C, Spence C (2014) Being a successful professional: An
469–490. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2004.05.003 exploration of who makes partner in the Big 4. Contemporary
Aobdia D (2019) Do practitioner assessments agree with academic Accounting Research 31(4): 949–981. https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-
proxies for audit quality? Evidence from PCAOB and internal 3846.12059
inspections. Journal of Accounting and Economics 67(1): 144–174. Causholli M, Knechel WR (2012) Lending relationships, auditor
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.09.001 quality and debt costs. Managerial Auditing Journal 27(6): 550–572.
Asare S, Van Buuren J, Majoor B (2019) The joint role of https://doi.org/10.1108/02686901211236391
accountants’ and auditees’ incentives and disincentives in the Chandler R, Edwards JR (1996) Recurring issues in auditing: Back
resolution of detected misstatements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice to the future? Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 9(2):
& Theory 38(1): 29–50. https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-52153 4–29. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513579610116330
Beck P, Wu M (2006) Learning by doing and audit quality. Church BK, Schneider A (1993) Auditors’ generation of diagnostic
Contemporary Accounting Research 23(1): 1–30. https://doi. hypotheses in response to a superior’s suggestion: Interference
org/10.1506/AXU4-Q7Q9-3YAB-4QE0 effects. Contemporary Accounting Research 10(1): 333–350. https://
Bedard J, Deis D, Curtis M, Jenkins JG (2008) Risk monitoring doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1993.tb00395.x
and control in audit firms: A research synthesis. Auditing: A Journal Chi W, Huang H, Liao Y, Xie H (2009) Mandatory audit partner
of Practice & Theory 27(1): 187–218. https://doi.org/10.2308/ rotation, audit quality, and market perception: Evidence from
aud.2008.27.1.187 Taiwan. Contemporary Accounting Research 26(4): 359–391.
Behn B, Choi J, Kang T (2008) Audit quality and properties of https://doi.org/10.1506/car.26.2.2
analyst earnings forecasts. The Accounting Review 83(3): 327–349. Cohen J, Krishnamoorthy G, Wright A (2010) Corporate
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2008.83.2.327 governance in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley era: Auditors’ experiences.
Blay AD (2005) Independence threats, litigation risk, and the Contemporary Accounting Research 27(3): 751–786. https://doi.
auditor’s decision process. Contemporary Accounting Research org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01026.x
22(4): 759–789. https://doi.org/10.1506/5FQ9-ANEA-T8J0-U6GY Cohen J, Gaynor LM, Krishnamoorthy G, Wright AM (2007)
Brivot M, Roussy M, Mayer M (2018) Conventions of audit quality: Auditor communications with the audit committee and the board
The perspective of public and private company audit partners. of directors: Policy recommendations and opportunities for
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 37(2): 51–71. https://doi. future research. Accounting Horizons 21(2): 165–187. https://doi.
org/10.2308/ajpt-51772 org/10.2308/acch.2007.21.2.165
Brown HL, Wright AM (2008) Negotiation research in auditing. Commissie Toekomst Accountancysector (2020) Vertrouwen
Accounting Horizons 22(1): 91–109. https://doi.org/10.2308/ op controle. https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/
acch.2008.22.1.91 kamerstukken/2020/01/30/vertrouwen-op-controle-eindrapport-
Canning M, O’Dwyer B (2016) Institutional work and regulatory van-de-commissie-toekomst-accountancysector
change in the accounting profession. Accounting, Organizations and Cooper DJ, Robson K (2006) Accounting, professions and
Society 54: 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2016.08.001 regulation: Locating the sites of professionalization. Accounting,
Carpenter B, Dirsmith M (1993) Sampling and the abstraction of Organizations and Society 31(4–5): 415–444. https://doi.
knowledge in the auditing profession: An extended institutional org/10.1016/j.aos.2006.03.003
theory perspective. Accounting, Organizations and Society 18(1): Covaleski MA, Dirsmith MW, Heian JB, Samuel S (1998)
41–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(93)90024-Z The calculated and the avowed: Techniques of discipline and
Carey P, Simnett R (2006) Audit partner rotation and audit quality. struggles over identity in Big Six public accounting firms.
The Accounting Review 81(3): 653–656. https://doi.org/10.2308/ Administrative Science Quarterly 43(2): 293–327. https://doi.
accr.2006.81.3.653 org/10.2307/2393854
https://mab-online.nl
14 Dominic Detzen & Anna Gold: The different shades of audit quality: A review of the academic literature
DeAngelo LE (1981) Auditor size and audit quality. Journal Houston RW (1999) The effects of fee pressure and client risk on
of Accounting and Economics 3(3): 183–199. https://doi. audit seniors’ time-budget decisions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice
org/10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1 & Theory 18(2): 70–86. https://doi.org/10.2308/aud.1999.18.2.70
DeFond ML, Francis JR (2005) Audit research after Sarbanes- Hribar P, Kravet T, Wilson R (2014) A new measure of accounting
Oxley. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 24(Supplement 1): quality. Review of Accounting Studies 19(1): 506–538. https://doi.
5–30. https://doi.org/10.2308/aud.2005.24.s-1.5 org/10.1007/s11142-013-9253-8
DeFond M, Zhang J (2014) A review of archival auditing research. International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB)
Journal of Accounting and Economics 58(2–3): 275–326. https:// (2014) A framework for audit quality: Key elements that create an
doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.002 environment for audit quality. https://www.ifac.org/publications-
Dhaliwal DS, Lamoreaux PT, Lennox CS, Mauler LM (2015) resources/framework-audit-quality-key-elements-create-
Management influence on auditor selection and subsequent environment-audit-quality
impairments of auditor independence during the post-SOX period. Johnson LM, Keune MB, Winchel J (2019) US auditors’ perceptions
Contemporary Accounting Research 32(2): 575–607. https://doi. of the PCAOB inspection process: A behavioral examination.
org/10.1111/1911-3846.12079 Contemporary Accounting Research 36(3): 1540–1574. https://doi.
Fiolleau K, Hoang K, Jamal K, Sunder S (2013) How do regulatory org/10.1111/1911-3846.12467
reforms to enhance auditor independence work in practice? Kim Y, Park MS (2014) Real activities manipulation and auditors’
Contemporary Accounting Research 30(3): 864–890. https://doi. client-retention decisions. The Accounting Review 89(1): 367–401.
org/10.1111/1911-3846.12004 https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50586
Francis JR (2011) A framework for understanding and researching Knechel WR, Krishnan GV, Pevzner M, Shefchik LB, Velury
audit quality. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 30(2): 125– UK (2013) Audit quality: Insights from the academic literature.
152. https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-50006 Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 32(s1): 385–421. https://
Francis JR, Yu M (2009) Big 4 office size and audit quality. The doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-50350
Accounting Review 84(1): 1521–1552. https://doi.org/10.2308/ Knechel WR, Thomas E, Driskill M (2020) Understanding financial
accr.2009.84.5.1521 auditing from a service perspective. Accounting, Organizations and
Gaynor LM, Kelton AS, Mercer M, Yohn TL (2016) Understanding Society 81: 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019.101080
the relation between financial reporting quality and audit quality. Kornberger M, Justesen L, Mouritsen J (2011) “When you make
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 35(4): 1–22. https://doi. manager, we put a big mountain in front of you”: An ethnography of
org/10.2308/ajpt-51453 managers in a Big 4 accounting firm. Accounting, Organizations and
Gold A, Klynsmit P, Wallage P, Wright AM (2018) The impact of the Society 36(8): 514–533. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2011.07.007
auditor selection process and audit committee appointment power Krishnan GV, Zhang Y (2014) Is there a relation between audit fee
on investment recommendations. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & cuts during the global financial crisis and banks’ financial reporting
Theory 37(1): 69–87. https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-51808 quality? Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 33(3): 279–300.
Gramling AA, Jenkins JG, Taylor MH (2010) Policy and research https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2014.02.004
implications of evolving independence rules for public company Ladva P, Andrew J (2014) Weaving a web of control: “The Promise
auditors. Accounting Horizons 24(4): 547–566. https://doi. of Opportunity” and work-life balance in multinational accounting
org/10.2308/acch.2010.24.4.547 firms. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 27(4): 634–
Grey C (1998) On being a professional in a “Big Six” firm. 654. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-02-2012-00955
Accounting, Organizations and Society 23(5–6): 569–587. https:// Lamoreaux PT (2016) Does PCAOB inspection access improve
doi.org/10.1016/S0361-3682(97)00003-2 audit quality? An examination of foreign firms listed in the United
Guénin-Paracini H, Malsch B, Paillé AM (2014) Fear and risk in States. Journal of Accounting and Economics 61(2–3): 313–337.
the audit process. Accounting, Organizations and Society 39(4): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.02.001
264–288. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2014.02.001 Lennox C (1999) Are large auditors more accurate than small
Gunny KA, Zhang TC (2013) PCAOB inspection reports and audit auditors? Accounting and Business Research 29(3): 217–227.
quality. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 32(2): 136–160. https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.1999.9729582
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2012.11.002 Löhlein L (2016) From peer review to PCAOB inspections:
Hammersley JS, Johnstone K, Kadous K (2011) How do audit seniors Regulating for audit quality in the US. Journal of Accounting
respond to heightened fraud risk? Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Literature 36: 28–47. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.acclit.2016.05.002
Theory 30(3): 81–101. https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-10110 Lupu I, Empson L (2015) Illusio and overwork: playing the game in
Humphrey C (2008) Auditing research: A review across the the accounting field. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
disciplinary divide. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 28(8): 1310–1340. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-02-2015-1984
21(2): 170–203. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513570810854392 Malsch B, Gendron Y (2013) Re‐theorizing change: Institutional
Humphrey C, Moizer P, Turley S (1992) The audit expectations gap: Plus experimentation and the struggle for domination in the field of
ça change, plus c’est la même chose? Critical Perspectives on Accounting public accounting. Journal of Management Studies 50(5): 870–899.
3(2): 137–161. https://doi.org/10.1016/1045-2354(92)90008-F https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12006
Humphrey C, Kausar A, Loft A, Woods M (2011) Regulating audit Messier WF, Simon CA, Smith JL (2013) Two decades of behavioral
beyond the crisis: A critical discussion of the EU Green Paper. research on analytical procedures: What have we learned? Auditing:
European Accounting Review 20(3): 431–457. https://doi.org/10.1 A Journal of Practice & Theory 32(1). https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-
080/09638180.2011.597201 50327
https://mab-online.nl
Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 95(1/2): 5–15 15
Monitoring Commissie Accountancy (MCA) (2016) Veranderen Release No. 2015–005. Washington, DC: PCAOB. https://pcaobus.
in het publiek belang. [1 November 2016.] http://www. org/about/rules-rulemaking/rulemaking-dockets/docket-041-
monitoringaccountancy.nl/nieuws-en-publicaties/ concept-release-on-audit-quality-indicators
McCraw TK (1984) Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Robson K, Humphrey C, Khalifa R, Jones J (2007) Transforming
Louis D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn. The Belknap audit technologies: Business risk audit methodologies and the audit
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge. field. Accounting, Organizations and Society 32(4–5): 409–438.
Moore DA, Tetlock PE, Tanlu L, Bazerman MH (2006) Conflicts https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2006.09.002
of interest and the case of auditor independence: Moral seduction Shankar PG, Tan H-T (2006) Determinants of audit preparers’
and strategic issue cycling. Academy of Management Review 31(1): workpaper justifications. The Accounting Review 81(2): 473–495.
10–29. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2006.19379621 https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2006.81.2.473
NBA (Koninklijke Nederlandse Beroepsorganisatie van Westermann KD, Bedard JC, Earley CE (2015) Learning the “craft”
Accountants) (2017) Green Paper: De definitie van audit kwaliteit. of auditing: A dynamic view of auditors’ on‐the‐job learning.
https://www.nba.nl/globalassets/projecten/in-het-publiek-belang/ Contemporary Accounting Research 32(3): 864–896. https://doi.
project-toekomst-accountantsberoep/green-paper-audit-quality_ org/10.1111/1911-3846.12107
web.pdf Westermann KD, Cohen J, Trompeter G (2019) PCAOB inspections:
Nelson MW (2009) A model and literature review of professional Public accounting firms on “trial”. Contemporary Accounting
skepticism in auditing. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Research 36(2): 694–731. https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12454
28(2): 1–34. https://doi.org/10.2308/aud.2009.28.2.1 Wilks TJ, Zimbelman MF (2004) Decomposition of fraud-risk
Pentland BT (1993) Getting comfortable with the numbers: Auditing assessments and auditors’ sensitivity to fraud cues. Contemporary
and the micro-production of macro-order. Accounting, Organizations Accounting Research 21(3): 719–745. https://doi.org/10.1506/
and Society 18(7–8): 605–620. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361- HGXP-4DBH-59D1-3FHJ
3682(93)90045-8 Wyatt AR (2004) Accounting professionalism–They just don’t get
Power MK (1991) Educating accountants: Towards a critical it! Accounting Horizons 18(1): 45–53. https://doi.org/10.2308/
ethnography. Accounting, Organizations and Society 16(4): 333– acch.2004.18.1.45
353. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(91)90026-B Zeff SA (2003a) How the US accounting profession got where it
Power MK (2003) Auditing and the production of legitimacy. is today: Part I. Accounting Horizons 17(3): 189–205. https://doi.
Accounting, Organizations and Society 28(4): 379–394. https://doi. org/10.2308/acch.2003.17.3.189
org/10.1016/S0361-3682(01)00047-2 Zeff SA (2003b) How the US accounting profession got where it
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (2015) is today: Part II. Accounting Horizons 17(4): 267–286. https://doi.
Concept Release on Audit Quality Indicators. Notice of Roundtable. org/10.2308/acch.2003.17.4.267
https://mab-online.nl