NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

     WRIT PETITION(CRL.) NO(S). 135 OF 2022

RADHESHYAM BHAGWANDAS SHAH
@ LALA VAKIL …PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Rastogi, J.

1. The   present  petition has been filed by the convict petitioner

seeking direction in the nature of Mandamus to the State of Gujarat

to consider his application for pre­mature release under the policy

dated   9th  July,   1992   which   was   existing   at   the   time   of   his

conviction.

2. The petitioner along with other co­accused persons faced trial

for   the   offence   under   Section  302, 376(2)(e )(g) read with Section

149 IPC committed in the State of Gujarat in 2004.
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
Rachna
Date: 2022.05.13

3.
17:41:07 IST
Reason: Indisputedly, the crime was committed in the State of Gujarat

but   this   Court   in   Transfer   Petition(Crl.)   No.   192   of   2004,   in   the

appropriate   to   transfer   Sessions   Case   No.   161   of   2004   pending

before the  learned  Additional Sessions Judge, Dahod/Ahmedabad

to   the   competent   Court   in   Mumbai   for   trial   and   disposal   by   an

Order dated 6th August 2004.

4. The learned trial Court, Mumbai in Sessions Case No. 634 of

2004,   after   holding   trial,   held   the   petitioner   guilty   and   convicted

him   for   the   afore­stated   offences   and   sentenced   him   to   undergo

rigorous   imprisonment   for   life   by   judgment   dated   21 st  January

2008.

5. It may be relevant to note that one of the co­accused Ramesh

Rupabhai, who had faced trial along with the petitioner and later

convicted   by   judgment   dated   21 st  January   2008,   approached   the

High Court of Bombay by filing Criminal Writ Petition no. 305 of

2013   seeking   pre­mature   release   but   his   application   came   to   be

dismissed by the High Court of Bombay by Order dated 5 th August,

2013 on the premise that the crime was committed in the State of

Gujarat   and   his   trial   came   to   be   transferred   in   the   peculiar

circumstances, under the directions of this Court by Order dated 6 th

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August, 2004 and once the trial stands concluded and the prisoner

has  been convicted, the  appropriate prison would be the State of

Gujarat   and   accordingly   the   application   filed   by   the   co­accused

Ramesh Rupabhai for pre­mature release was left to be examined as

per the policy applicable in the State of Gujarat.

6. The present petitioner filed his petition for pre­mature release

under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973(hereinafter being referred to as the “CrPC”) stating that he had

undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody but his petition

filed in the High Court of Gujarat came to be dismissed taking note

of Section 432(7) CrPC and placing reliance on the judgment of this

Court   in  Union   of   India  Vs.  V.   Sriharan   alias   Murugan   and

Others1  on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in

the   State   of   Maharashtra,   the   application   for   pre­mature   release

has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of

Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated

17th July 2019.

1 2016(7) SCC 1
3
7. As   per   the   custody   certificate   which   has   been   placed   on

record,   the   petitioner,   as   on   1st  April   2022,   has   undergone   the

sentence of more than 15 years 4 months without remission.

8. The   policy   with   which   the   petitioner   has   to   be   governed,

applicable in the State of Gujarat on the date of conviction, indeed

is Resolution No. JLK/3390/CM/16/Part/2/J dated 9 th July 1992.

9. It   has   been   settled   by   this   Court   in  State   of   Haryana  Vs.

Jagdish2  that the application for grant of pre­mature release will

have to be considered on the basis of the policy which stood on the

date of conviction.  The relevant para is as under:­

“54. The State authority is under an obligation to at least exercise
its discretion in relation to an honest expectation perceived by the
convict, at the time of his conviction that his case for premature
release would be considered after serving the sentence, prescribed
in the short­sentencing policy existing on that date. The State has
to exercise its power of remission also keeping in view any such
benefit to be construed liberally in favour of a convict which may
depend upon case to case and for that purpose, in our opinion, it
should relate to a policy which, in the instant case, was in favour
of the respondent. In case a liberal policy prevails on the date of
consideration   of   the   case   of   a   “lifer”   for   premature   release,   he
should be given benefit thereof.”

10. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   has   placed  reliance   on

the   judgment   of   this   Court   in  Union   of   India  Vs.  V.   Sriharan

2 2010(4) SCC 216
4
alias   Murugan   and   Others  (supra)   and   submits   that   since   the

trial   has   been   concluded   in   the   State   of   Maharashtra,   taking

assistance   of   Section   432(7)   CrPC,   the   expression   ‘appropriate

Government’ as referred to under Section 433 CrPC in the instant

case, would be the State of Maharashtra and accordingly no error

has been committed by the High Court in the order impugned.

11. In   our   considered   view,   the   submission   made   by   learned

counsel for the respondents is not sustainable for the reason that

the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the State

of Gujarat and ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the same

State   and   in   terms   of   Section   432(7)   CrPC,   the   appropriate

Government in the ordinary course would be the State of Gujarat

but the instant case was transferred in exceptional circumstances

by   this   Court   for   limited   purpose   for   trial   and   disposal   to   the

neighbouring State (State of Maharashtra) by an order dated 06 th

August,   2004   but   after   the   conclusion   of   trial   and   the   prisoner

being convicted, stood transferred to the State where the crime was

committed remain the appropriate Government for the purpose of

Section 432(7) CrPC. 

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12. Indisputedly, in the instant case, the crime was committed in

the   State   of   Gujarat   which   is   the   appropriate   Government

competent to examine the application filed for pre­mature release

and   that   is   the   reason   for   which   the   High   Court   of   Bombay   in

Criminal Writ Petition No. 305 of 2013 filed at the instance of co­

accused Ramesh Rupabhai under its Order dated 5 th August, 2013

declined   his   request   to   consider   the   application   for   pre­mature

release   and   left   the   application   to   be   examined   according   to   the

policy   applicable   in   the   State   of   Gujarat   by   the   concerned

authorities.

13. The   judgment   on   which   the   learned   counsel   for   the

respondents has placed reliance may not be of any assistance for

the   reason   that   under   Section   432(7)   CrPC,   the   appropriate

Government can be either the Central or the State Government but

there cannot be a concurrent jurisdiction of two State Governments

under Section 432(7) CrPC.  

14. In the instant case, once the crime was committed in the State

of   Gujarat,   after   the   trial   been   concluded   and   judgment   of

conviction   came   to   be   passed,  all  further  proceedings  have  to  be

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considered including remission or pre­mature release, as the case

may be, in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of

Gujarat where the crime was committed and not the State where

the trial stands transferred and concluded for exceptional reasons

under the orders of this Court.

15. Consequently,   the   petition   is   allowed.     The   judgment

impugned dated 17th July, 2019 is set aside.

16. The respondents are directed to consider the application of the

petitioner   for   pre­mature   release   in   terms   of   its   policy   dated   9 th

July, 1992 which is applicable on the date of conviction and may be

decided   within   a   period   of   two   months.     If   any   adverse   order   is

passed, the petitioner is at liberty to seek remedy available to him

under the law.

17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……………………………..J.
(AJAY RASTOGI)

……………………………..J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
NEW DELHI
MAY 13, 2022.