Scenario-Based Strategic Planning and Strategic Management in Family Firms, 2013

Dissertation
Scenario-Based Strategic Planning

and Strategic Management
in Family Firms
Christian Brands
Email: christian.brands@hhl.de
Abstract:
This cumulative dissertation covers the concepts of scenario-based strategic planning and stra-
tegic management in family firms over five articles. The first article gives an overview of the
cumulative dissertation explaining the research gap, approach and contribution of the disserta-
tion. The paper highlights the two research areas covered by the dissertation with two articles
focusing on scenario-based strategic planning and two on strategic management in family firms.
The second article is the first of two focusing on scenario-based strategic planning. It introduces
and describes a set of six tools facilitating the implementation of scenario-based strategic plan-
ning in corporate practice. The third paper adapts these tools to the financial management and
controlling context in private companies highlighting the tools’ flexibility in managing uncer-
tain and volatile environments. The fourth article is the first of two focusing on strategic ma-
nagement in family firms. It analyzes organizational ambidexterity as a factor explaining family
firm performance. The article shows, that a high level of organizational ambidexterity in family
firms leads to a higher family firm performance. The final paper concludes the dissertation exa-
mining the tendency of family firms to focus on capability exploration or resource exploitation
over different generations managing the family firm.
SCENARIO-BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING AND
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN FAMILY FIRMS
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Economics
(Dr. rer. oec.)
at
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
Leipzig, Germany
submitted by
Christian Brands, M.Sc.

Leipzig, August 23rd 2013
First Assessor:
Prof. Dr. Torsten Wulf

Philipps-University Marburg
Chair of Strategic and International Management
Second Assessor:
Prof. Dr. Stephan Stubner

HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG Chair of Strategic Management and Family Business
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... I

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................. IV
TABLE OF FIGURES ............................................................................................ V
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................ VII
I. SCENARIO-BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING AND STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT IN FAMILY FIRMS ................................................................ 1
1. Research Question and Goal of the Dissertation .......................................... 2
2. Summary of Papers ...................................................................................... 8
2.1. Contribution .......................................................................................... 12
2.2. Implications and Further Research ....................................................... 16
II. SIX TOOLS FOR SCENARIO-BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING AND THEIR
APPLICATION ............................................................................................... 25
1. Introducing tools one and two: The framing checklist and 360° stakeholder
feedback ..................................................................................................... 27
1.1. The framing checklist ............................................................................ 27
1.2. Description of the framing checklist ...................................................... 29
1.3. 360° stakeholder feedback ................................................................... 36
1.3.1. Existing perceptions, blind spots and weak signals ....................... 37
1.3.2. Description of 360° stakeholder feedback ...................................... 38
1.4. Evaluation of the framing checklist and 360° stakeholder feedback ..... 44
2. Applying frameworks one and two: The framing checklist and 360°
stakeholder feedback in the European airline industry ............................... 46
2.1. Introduction ........................................................................................... 46
2.2. The framing checklist ............................................................................ 46
2.3. 360° stakeholder feedback ................................................................... 48
3. Introducing tools three and four: The impact/uncertainty grid and the
scenario matrix ........................................................................................... 53
3.1. The impact/uncertainty grid .................................................................. 53
3.2. Description of the impact/uncertainty grid ............................................. 55
3.3. The scenario matrix .............................................................................. 57
I
Table of Contents
3.4. Description of the scenario matrix ........................................................ 62

3.5. Evaluating the impact/uncertainty grid and the scenario matrix ............ 67
4. Applying frameworks three and four: The impact/uncertainty grid and the
scenario matrix in the European airline industry ......................................... 69
4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................... 69
4.2. The impact/uncertainty grid .................................................................. 69
4.3. The scenario matrix .............................................................................. 71
5. Introducing tools five and six: The strategy manual and the monitoring
cockpit ........................................................................................................ 87
5.1. Introduction ........................................................................................... 87
5.2. The strategy manual ............................................................................. 87
5.3. Description of the strategy manual ....................................................... 91
5.4. The scenario cockpit ............................................................................. 95
5.5. Description of the scenario cockpit ....................................................... 96
5.6. Evaluating the strategy manual and the scenario cockpit ..................... 99
6. Applying frameworks five and six: The strategy manual and the scenario
cockpit in the European airline industry .................................................... 102
6.1. The strategy manual ........................................................................... 102
6.2. The scenario cockpit ........................................................................... 105
III. SZENARIOBASIERTE STRATEGISCHE PLANUNG IN VOLATILEN
UMFELDERN ............................................................................................... 111
1. Einführung: Unternehmen agieren in einer zunehmend volatilen Umwelt . 112
2. Volatilität als Herausforderung für die strategische Planung ..................... 112
3. Szenariobasierte strategische Planung als Lösungsansatz für Planung unter
Volatilität ................................................................................................... 114
3.1. Grundlagen der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung ................. 114
3.2. Prozess der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung ....................... 115
4. Zusammenfassung.................................................................................... 122
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AMBIDEXTERITY AND FAMILY FIRM PERFORMANCE
..................................................................................................................... 125
1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 126
2. Theory and Hypotheses ............................................................................ 127
II
Table of Contents
3. Methodology ............................................................................................. 131

3.1. Research Design and Sample Generation ......................................... 131
3.2. Measures ............................................................................................ 133
4. Analysis and Results ................................................................................. 135
5. Discussion and Conclusion ....................................................................... 139
V. THE IMPACT OF SUCCESOR GENERATION DISCOUNT IN FAMILY
FIRMS: EXAMINING NONLINEAR EFFECTS ON EXPLORATION AND
EXPLOITATION ........................................................................................... 150
1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 151
2. The RBV and the importance of exploration and exploitation ................... 154
3. The importance of exploration and exploitation in family firms .................. 156
4. The impact of generational involvement on exploration and exploitation in
family firms ............................................................................................... 159
5. Methodology ............................................................................................. 164
5.1. Constructs .......................................................................................... 165
5.2. Results ............................................................................................... 167
6. Discussion ................................................................................................. 172
6.1. Implications for theory and practice .................................................... 175
6.2. Study limitations and future research ................................................. 176
6.3. Conclusion .......................................................................................... 177
TABLE OF APPENDICIES .................................................................................... X
APPENDICIES...................................................................................................... XI
EIDESSTATTLICHE VERSICHERUNG ............................................................. XVI
III
List of Tables
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Pearson Correlations Analysis and Descriptive Statistics ..................... 136
Table 2: Regression Analysis using Organizational Ambidexterity as Dependent
and Family Power, Experience, and Culture as Independent Variables.....
........................................................................................................ 137
Table 3: Regression Analysis using Firm Performance as Dependent and
Organizational Ambidexterity as Independent Variable........................ 138
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations .................................................. 168
Table 5: Results of Regression on Exploration ................................................... 169
Table 6: Results of Regression on Exploitation .................................................. 170
IV
Table of Figures
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Structure of the dissertation ..................................................................... 5
Figure 2: Overview of dissertation results ............................................................. 13
Figure 3: Six-step scenario-based approach to strategic planning........................ 28
Figure 4: The framing checklist ............................................................................. 30
Figure 5: Six-step scenario-based approach to strategic planning........................ 36
Figure 6: 360° stakeholder feedback process ....................................................... 38
Figure 7: Scenario planning for European airline network carriers, first-round
questionnaire.......................................................................................... 39
Figure 8: Scenario planning for European airline network carriers, second-round
questionnaire.......................................................................................... 40
Figure 9: Spider diagram of the European airline scenario – Impact: External
versus internal view ................................................................................ 42
Figure 10: Spider diagram of the European airline scenario – Uncertainty: External
versus internal view.............................................................................. 43
Figure 11: Second-round questionnaire ................................................................ 50
Figure 12: Blind spots in the impact dimension ..................................................... 51
Figure 13: Blind spots in the uncertainty dimension .............................................. 51
Figure 14: The six-step scenario-based approach to strategic planning ............... 53
Figure 15: The impact/uncertainty grid (Source: van't Klooster & van Asselt, 2006)
.............................................................................................................................. 55
Figure 17: The scenario matrix (Source: van der Heijden, 2005) .......................... 63
Figure 18: The influence diagram (Source: van der Heijden, 2005) ...................... 64
Figure 19: Impact/uncertainty grid for the European airline industry ..................... 70
Figure 20: Future scenarios for the European airline industry .............................. 72
Figure 21: Simplified influence diagram for the European airline industry ............ 73
Figure 22: Scenario fact sheet: Network fortress .................................................. 76
Figure 23: Scenario fact sheet: Europe under siege ............................................. 79
Figure 24: Scenario fact sheet: The champions' decline ....................................... 83
Figure 25: Scenario fact sheet: New horizons ...................................................... 86
V
Table of Figures
Figure 27: The strategy corridor ............................................................................ 93

Figure 29: Influence diagram ................................................................................ 97
Figure 30: Indicator table ...................................................................................... 98
Figure 31: Scenario cockpit: Traffic light system ................................................... 99
Figure 32: Scenarios for the European airline industry ....................................... 102
Figure 33: Strategy corridor for the European airline industry ............................. 104
Figure 34: Influence diagram for the European airline industry ........................... 105
Figure 35: Indicator table for the European airline industry................................. 106
Figure 36: Indicator range for the European airline industry (example) .............. 107
Figure 37: Scenario cockpit: traffic light system for the European airline industry
............................................................................................................................ 108
Figure 38: Prozess der Szenariobasierten Strategischen Planung ..................... 115
Figure 39: Szenarien für die europäische Luftverkehrsbranche bis 2015 im
Überblick ............................................................................................ 120
Figure 40: Research Model ................................................................................. 131
Figure 41: Generational Involvement and Exploration ........................................ 171
Figure 42: Generational Involvement and Exploitation........................................ 172
VI
Table of Abbreviations
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
AEA ....................................................................... Association of European Airlines
AOM ................................................................................. Academy of Management
ASEAN ....................................................... Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CEO ....................................................................................... Chief Executive Office
DLR ...................................................... Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt
e.g. .............................................................................. exempli gratia – for example
EIASM ............................. European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management
EU ................................................................................................. European Union
EURAM ............................................................ European Academy of Management
GDP ................................................................................... Gross Domestic Product
HHL .................................................. HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
IATA ............................................................. International Air Transport Association
i.e. ..................................................................................................... id est – that is
Ifera....................................... International Family Enterprise Research Association
IMF .............................................................................. International Monetary Fund
KLM .......................................................................................... Royal Dutch Airlines
LCC ................................................................................................ Low-Cost Carrier
NAFTA ........................................................ North-American Free Trade Agreement
OA ............................................................................. Organizational Ambidexterity
OECD .......................... Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAX ...................................................................................... Persons Approximately
RBV ...................................................................................... Resource-Based View
R&D ............................................................................. Research and Development
TMT .................................................................................... Top Management Team
US ................................................................................... United States of America
WTO ................................................................................ World Trade Organization
VII
Scenario-Based Strategic Planning and Strategic Management in Family Firms
I. SCENARIO-BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING AND STRATEGIC

MANAGEMENT IN FAMILY FIRMS
Overview of the cumulative dissertation
Christian Brands
1
1. Research Question and Goal of the Dissertation

A sound and effective strategic management in volatile, complex and uncertain
environmental conditions requires a comprehensive strategic management to
support a firm in obtaining and sustaining a competitive advantage (Miller, 2008;
Porter, 1985). Strategic management refers to the process through which firms
align their resources with their goals and opportunities meaning that firms decide
in the present what they want to achieve in the future (Kotler, 1967).
Firms that manage their resources strategically are not only analyzing the current
state of their business, but also think ahead how to use upcoming business
opportunities in an increasingly dynamic, volatile and uncertain environment
(Porter, 1980; Tapinos, Dyson, & Meadows, 2005). Analyzing the current state of a
company gives unique insights into a company’s resources. Yet, it can be a
challenging task where strategies tend to be obtained through very formalized
processes (Ward, 1988). Consequently conflicts and debates within a firm as to
which process or form of strategic management is best suited to achieve future
goals are common. Initial studies in strategic management research often
regarded this conflict between choosing the right plan or process to obtain a
strategy as necessary to achieve a competitive advantage, i.e. earning a
persistently higher rate of profit, or having the potential to earn a persistently
higher rate of profit (Ansoff, 1991; Brews & Hunt, 1999; Grant, 2000; Mintzberg,
1990).
However, more recent studies present a range of solutions to achieve a

competitive advantage where individuals developing strategies are more important
than the company itself (Whittington, 1996) or seeing strategic management in a
wider company context where soft elements such as organizational culture or firm
values are more important in achieving a competitive advantage than the actual
process of developing a strategy (Jarzabkowski & Balogun, 2009).
One approach identified by the strategic management literature capable of

overcoming the weaknesses of existing strategic planning tools while maintaining
2
their strengths is scenario planning (Schoemaker, 1995). Scenario Planning allows

strategic planners to use a structured process, analyzing the current state of their
firm gaining unique insights into its resources whilst allowing enough room for
debate and space to think ahead in different pictures of the future how an
increasingly dynamic, volatile and uncertain environment shapes forthcoming
developments (Chermack, Lynham, & Ruona, 2001; van der Heijden, 2005; Wack,
1985; Wright & Cairns, 2011).
Yet, traditional scenario planning processes are time and resource consuming and
complex meaning they are hard to apply as a straightforward strategic planning
and management tool in corporate practice (Millet, 2003; Moyer, 1996). Moreover,
existing scenario planning techniques tend to be scarcely explained meaning no
common methodology or step-by-step guide on how companies can use scenarios
as a strategic management tool exists (Schwenker & Boetzel, 2007).
Consequently the development and open publication of a more straightforward
and tool based scenario planning methodology would be beneficial both for
strategic management research as an academic field as well as corporate
practice.
Constructing multiple future scenarios answering critical questions regarding how

a company can sustain its competitive advantage always requires participants to
think long-term, usually a minimum of five years ahead (Godet, 2000). One unique
type of firm that is particularly well suited when it comes to long-term thinking is a
family firm. Families and their corresponding firms naturally foster advantages
regarding long-term performance and survival (Nicholson, 2008) through accepting
a longer time horizon for financial returns (Zellweger, Meister, & Fueglistaller,
2007) as well as patient capital investments (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Research in the
entrepreneurship, strategic management and family firm literature has recognized
that family firms automatically adopt a long-term approach when it comes to their
strategic management practices since long-term survival across generations is the
overarching goal of any family business (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Ward,
1987). Passing the family business to the next generation in a better financial
3
shape compared to when the current generation obtained control of the business
is the prime goal of a family firm (Nicholson, 2008). Creating and sustaining a
competitive advantage not only in the short-term, but over generations is the basic
principle governing strategic management in family firms (Sharma & Salvato,
2011).
While a large body of research has demonstrated the uniqueness of family firms
compared to non-family firms (Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2003; Habbershon &
Williams, 1999; Ward, 1987), with most research largely focusing on the
performance effect of being a family business (Habbershon, Williams, &
MacMillan, 2003; Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008; Zellweger et al., 2007), only
little research has been conducted so far on how families manage their business
strategically over different generational stages (Sharma & Salvato, 2011). A new
stream on strategic management in family firms over different life-cycle stages and
thus generations has emerged to fill this gap (Dawson, Sharma, Irving, Marcus, &
Chirico, 2013; Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). Nevertheless,
more research on strategic management in family firms leading to a competitive
advantage over generations is called for (Sharma & Salvato, 2011). Above all the
effect of different generations managing a family firm on the firm’s strategic
management activities to create a competitive advantage has not been analyzed
empirically so far.
This dissertation overcomes both gaps present in the management literature on

scenario planning and the family firm literature on strategic management in family
firms by introducing a tool-based approach to scenario planning and an empirical
research design analyzing the generational impact present in family firms. The
thesis thus has two goals: First, it aims to develop a more straightforward and
structured approach to scenario-based strategic planning by systematically
analyzing the tools and steps of the developed methodology as well as providing
examples of their application in a corporate context. Second, it aims at creating
insights on how successful family firms manage their business over varying life-
4
Scenario--Based Strattegic Plannin
ng and Strate
egic Management in Fam
mily Firms
cycle sta
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ocusing on
n the impa
act of diffe
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m t
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m and theirr impact on
n the firm’s
s competitive advantaage.
In order to
t achieve these goa
als, the the
esis is structured as follows (Figure 1): The
T
first two papers presented
p in the dis
ssertation introduce and describe a new
approach ario-based strategic planning overcominng the we
h to scena eaknesses of
existing approaches
a s. They prrovide a strructured analysis andd theoretic
cal as well as
practical derivation of the new
w approach
h to scenario-based strategic planning.
p T
The
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paper “S fo Scenarrio-Based Strategic Planning aand Theirr Applicatio
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describess and introduces the innovative
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and Bergerr approach
h to scenarrio-
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uding a set of tools and
a practiccal example
es facilitating
its straig
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ntation in corporate
e practice. It thus provides the
t
methodollogical bas
sis for the sscenario pllanning section of thiis dissertattion.
Figure 1: Structure
S of the
t dissertatiion
5
The second paper “Szenariobasierte Strategische Planung in Volatilen Umfeldern”

explores the adaptability of the HHL Roland Berger approach to scenario-based
strategic planning to the financial management and controlling context in private
companies. It thus sets out to close the research gap assuming that existing
scenario-based strategic planning methodologies are too complex and resource
intensive to be applied in corporate practice. Due to the demanding characteristics
of a firm’s finance function this paper particularly contributes to relevant theoretical
and practical benefits of applying the HHL Roland Berger approach to scenario-
based strategic planning when creating future scenarios.
Focusing on the second set of goals, the third and fourth paper make the transition
to family firm research creating insights on how successful family firms manage
their business over varying life-cycle stages creating a sustained competitive
advantage. The paper “Organizational Ambidexterity and Family Firm
Performance” empirically examines how family influence affects the level of
organizational ambidexterity (OA) in creating a higher performance level and thus
a sustained competitive advantage. The paper empirically combines research on
family firms and strategic management through a survey with 104 private German
family firms introducing OA to the controversial debate on how family firms obtain
and sustain a competitive advantage.
The finale paper “The Impact of Successor Generation Discount in Family Firms:
Examining Nonlinear Effects on Exploration and Exploitation” concludes this
dissertation by empirically analyzing the effect of different generations managing a
family firm on their tendency to obtain a competitive advantage through either
capability exploration or resource exploitation. A dataset of 125 German private
family firms is used to test the paper’s hypotheses and close the previously
mentioned research gap. The paper offers distinct insights how during different
generational stages family firms attempt to achieve a competitive advantage
through capability exploration and resource exploitation suggesting a high difficulty
for family firms to simultaneously pursue both.
6
With the introduction and explanation of the HHL Roland Berger approach to
scenario-based strategic planning as well as its exemplary application to the
finance function this dissertation contributes to strategic management and
scenario planning research. It further provides insights on how family firms use
different strategic management approaches to create a competitive advantage
through two different empirical studies. It thus goes on to show how both scenario
planning and strategic management in family firms, whose effects are extensively
claimed in the literature, can in fact help companies in general and family firms in
particular attain and maintain a sustained competitive advantage.
7
2. Summary of Papers
The first paper “Six-Tools for Scenario-Based Strategic Planning and Their
Application” is a structured and hands-on explanation of the HHL Roland Berger
approach to scenario-based strategic planning. A core critique of scenario
planning has so far been its complexity and resource intensity both in terms of
time and manpower when being used as part of a company’s strategic planning
process. Moreover, senior executives and strategic planners often found it difficult
to grasp the essence of scenario planning and translate the advantages of the
approach into their existing strategic planning practices. The paper overcomes
these shortcomings by providing a detailed overview of the six steps and tools that
can be used to initiate and execute a scenario-based strategic planning project.
Based on an analysis of the HHL Roland Berger approach to scenario-based
strategic planning, the paper describes each process step and the application of
the tools in detail.
First, each process step is put into the context of the latest developments in
research on strategic and scenario planning highlighting its respective theoretical
implications. Next, each step of the process and the respective tool facilitating its
application is explained. Finally, an example based on the European airline
industry for the practical application of each process step and tool is provided and
explained in order to visualize the ease of using the HHL Roland Berger approach
as part of a scenario-based strategic planning project. The paper, co-authored by
Torsten Wulf and Philip Meissner has been published as part of the book
“Scenario-Based Strategic Planning”, edited by Burkhard Schwenker and Torsten
Wulf. The book is published by Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden (2013).1 The author’s
main contribution to the paper is the structured integration of the HHL Roland
Berger approach to scenario-based strategic planning into the latest developments
in research on strategic and scenario planning, the methodologically and
didactically sound explanation of the approach including the development of
1
ISBN: 978-3-658-02874-9
8
relevant examples as well as the knowledge transfer of an academic, theoretical

approach into practice.
The paper “Szenariobasierte Strategische Planung in Volatilen Umfeldern” is an

adaptation of the HHL Roland Berger approach to scenario-based strategic
planning to the financial management and controlling context in private
companies. Companies are constantly looking for new instruments in order to
cope with an increasing uncertainty, volatility and complexity in their daily
operations. Especially the finance and controlling functions in a company are
affected by more volatile and uncertain revenue streams as well as earnings
making it more difficult to make sound financial projections and forecasts.
The paper introduces scenario-based strategic planning as an instrument for

corporate and financial planners as well as controllers to cope with more volatile
and uncertain revenue streams helping to improve the accuracy of controlling
forecasts. In this context the paper highlights the strengths of the HHL Roland
Berger approach to scenario-based strategic planning through its standardized
tool-set facilitating the flexible implementation of the approach into a company’s
finance function and budgetary planning processes. The paper thus provides a
structured analysis of the theoretical and practical knowledge transfer of scenario
planning into the finance function companies. The paper, which is co-authored by
Torsten Wulf, Stephan Stubner and Philip Meissner has been published in the
special issue 2 / 2012 of Controlling & Management.2 The author’s main
contribution is the theoretical and practical adaptation of the HHL Roland Berger
approach to scenario-based strategic planning to the finance and controlling
context. In addition the author extensively contributed to the creation and revision
of the structure, introduction and conclusion of the paper.
The paper “Organizational Ambidexterity and Family Firm Performance” marks the
transition of the research focus from scenario planning to strategic management
2
VHB Jourqual D
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research in family firms. It introduces the concept of organizational ambidexterity

(OA) to family firm research and empirically tests a set of hypotheses on the
impact of family influence on OA and private family firm performance. The study
demonstrates that as family influence increases, family firms achieve higher
degrees of OA and subsequent firm performance. Especially the family power and
cultural alignment dimensions lead to higher degrees of OA and firm performance.
The paper contributes both to strategic management and family firm research by
combining the two fields and introducing OA to the controversial debate on family
firm heterogeneity and private family firm performance. Moreover, the paper
shows that the strategic concept of ambidexterity is also valid in the confined
context of German family firms.
The paper, which his co-authored by Stephan Stubner, W. Henning Blarr and
Torsten Wulf has been published in the Journal of Small Business and
Entrepreneurship, Vol. 25(2), 2012, pp. 217-229.3 It was previously presented
following a successful double-blind review process at the 11th European Academy
of Management Conference (EURAM) in Tallinn, Estonia in 2011 and the 11th
Annual IFERA World Family Business Research Conference 2011 in Palermo,
Italy. The author’s main contribution is the development of the paper’s structure as
well as theoretical link of OA to the family firm research context. Additionally, the
author contributed significantly to the revision of the paper as part of the
publication process with the Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship.
The final paper “The Impact of Successor Generation Discount in Family Firms:
Examining Nonlinear Effects on Exploration and Exploitation” is a theoretical and
empirical extension of the research on strategies adopted by family firms in order
to obtain a sustaining competitive advantage. It contributes to the debate on
generational involvement in family firms and its impact on two orientations present
in the strategic management literature: capability exploration and resource
exploitation. Based on a set of 125 German family firms the paper shows that as
3
VHB Jourqual C
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the generation involved in managing a family firm increases, the level of

exploration decreases. At the same time the level of exploitation of existing
resources rises to a point where efficiency improvements no longer lead to
performance advantages. Based on the resource-based view and insights from the
family firm literature the paper thus shows that – on the one hand – a U-shaped
relationship exists between generational involvement in family firms’ management
and the level of exploration and – on the other hand – an inverse U-shaped
relationship can be found between generational involvement in family firms’
management and the level of exploitation. The study offers distinct insights with
family firms applying different rent creation mechanisms during different
generational stages suggesting a high difficulty for firms to simultaneously pursue
an exploration of new opportunities and exploitation of existing resources.
The paper is co-authored with Torsten Wulf and was presented at the 9th
Workshop on Family Firm Management Research 2013 by the European Institute
for Advanced Studies in Management (EIASM) in Helsinki. The paper is currently
prepared to be submitted to a family firm research journal. The author’s main
contribution to the paper is the development of the research idea, research design,
the theoretical development of hypotheses as well as their empirical testing.
Moreover the author has integrated research on the unique generational effect
present in family firms with the resource-based view and a firm’s rent seeking
mechanism establishing a sustained competitive advantage.
11
Dissertation Results
This dissertation introduces an interdisciplinary research design integrating
scenario planning and strategic management in family firms. By providing both
academics and practitioners with a detailed overview of an innovative approach to
scenario-based strategic planning and transferring this approach to the corporate
finance function, the thesis provides insights on how companies can cope with a
complex, uncertain and volatile business environment. Moreover, the thesis
bridges the gap between scenario planning and strategic management in family
firms providing empirical support how family influence helps family firms to attain a
higher level of organizational ambidexterity and performance thus helping to
sustain their competitive advantage.
Additionally, the thesis introduces empirical support for the generational effect
present in family firms suggesting that family firms apply different rent creation
mechanisms during different generational stages to sustain a competitive
advantage. These results help both academia, corporate and family firm
management alike to better understand how scenario planning helps to cope with
complexity and uncertainty and which strategies can be adopted by family firm
managers over different life-cycle stages to increase performance. It thus supports
achieving the ultimate goal of strategic management, creating and sustaining a
competitive advantage (Figure 2).
2.1. Contribution
The presented six tools for scenario-based strategic planning contribute to existing
research on strategic management and scenario planning by offering a detailed
explanation how scenario planning can easily be integrated into a company’s
strategic planning activities through applying the six tools. The six tools overcome
the often criticized complexity associated with scenario planning in companies
(Millet, 2003; Moyer, 1996). Moreover, the approach and the six tools help
companies to better cope with volatile, complex and uncertain business
environments. It thus closes the research gap asking for more visionary strategic
management tools capable of integrating outside perspectives rather than
12
Scenario--Based Strattegic Plannin
ng and Strate
egic Management in Fam
mily Firms
following existing formalize

ed, inward
d looking strategicc planning
g processses
(Jarzabko
owski & Ba
alogun, 200
09; Wrightt & Cairns, 2011).
Figure 2: Overview
O of dissertation
d rresults
The transsfer of the six tools tto the corp

porate finan
nce functioon has bee
en perform
med
to provide
e further evidence
e o
of the apprroach’s cap
pability of reducing complexity
c y in
demandin
ng corpora
ate environ
nments. One
O of the great chaallenges off the finan
nce
function in
i a company has b
been and still
s is to cope with uuncertainty
y regarding
ga
firm’s revvenue streams. Th e increasing volatility and uuncertainty of reven
nue
streams make
m it mo
ore difficultt to strateg
gically man
nage and pplan a business (Bord
do,
Eichengre
een, Kling
gebiel, & M
Martinez-P
Peria, 2001
1) calling for new methods
m a
and
tools tha
at help co
ompanies cope with
h these challenges
c s. Traditional scena
ario
planning techniques tend to p
produce va
ague and abstract
a reesults mak
king it difficcult
13
for the finance function to develop specific strategies based on scenarios

(Bradfield, Wright, Burt, Cairns, & van der Heijden, 2005). The approach and the
transfer of the six tools to the finance function closes this gap by explaining in
detail how corporate planners can cope with volatile revenue streams using the six
tools.
The thesis thus contributes to the strategic management literature and calls for a
better understanding how complexity, volatility and uncertainty can be anticipated
and managed in companies leading to a sustained competitive advantage.
By transferring the findings on how firms can sustain a competitive advantage

through scenario planning and strategic management to family firm research this
dissertation contributes to the research domain calling for a strategic management
perspective examining how family firms attain a competitive advantage when
conducting research on family firms (Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997). This
dissertation makes a first step towards integrating the two fields, strategic
management and family firm research, by being the first to introduce the strategy
concept of organizational ambidexterity (OA) to family firm research. Through the
development of hypotheses examining the impact of family influence on OA and
subsequent family firm performance and testing them in an empirical research
design, the thesis combines and summarizes the two research streams (Zahra &
Sharma, 2004). The result showing that family influence leads to higher level of
ambidexterity through family power and culture alignment and that a higher level of
ambidexterity in family firms leads to a higher performance provides a better
understanding how family firms achieve a competitive advantage. Moreover, the
thesis makes a clear theoretical contribution by providing an approach for
integrating strategic management and family firm research which can be adopted
by other researchers from both fields.
In addition, this thesis provides insights on the generational involvement in family

firms and its impact on two important strategies for creating a competitive
advantage: new capability exploration and resource exploitation. It thus empirically
14
contributes to the family firm research debate on the strategies pursued by

successful dynastic family enterprises as to how they engage in a continuous
cycle of capability exploration and resource exploitation (Sharma & Salvato, 2011).
The results provide significant theoretical insights for family firm researchers as
the pursuit of capability exploration and resource exploitation does not take place
simultaneously, but follows a non-linear distribution over different family
generations managing the family business. Additionally, the findings provide family
firm managers with a clear indication when to adapt the right strategic focus on
capability exploration or resource exploitation depending on which family
generation currently manages the family firm. Finally a contribution is made to the
strategic management literature by using the family firm context to enrich the
debate on strategies pursued by companies to create a competitive advantage.
Our results provide a more fine-tuned analysis on the creation of a competitive
advantage as firms tend to use different strategies depending on the life-cycle
stages they are in rather than pursuing different strategies simultaneously.
These contributions to the growing literature on strategic management in family

firms responding to calls asking to conduct more empirical research in the family
firm context examining the different strategies adopted by family firms to attain a
competitive advantage.
Summarizing, this dissertation presents six tools to be used as part of a scenario-

based strategic planning process leading to a sustained competitive advantage. It
proves the tools’ relevance by transferring them to the corporate context and
highlighting their practicality when conducting strategic management projects in
volatile, uncertain and complex business environments. The pursuit of attaining a
competitive advantage is empirically transferred to the family firm research context
by integrating family firm and strategic management research describing different
strategies pursued by family firms to preserve their competitive advantage.
15
2.2. Implications and Further Research

The dissertation’s results have a high relevance for strategic management and
family firm research as well as corporate practice. The first two papers, “Six-Tools
for Scenario-Based Strategic Planning and Their Application” and
“Szenariobasierte Strategische Planung in Volatilen Umfeldern” introduce and
refine six tools to the strategic management and scenario planning literature
allowing for a better understanding of complexity, volatility and uncertainty as part
of strategic management practices.
Particularly the six tools of the approach to scenario-based strategic planning can
initiate a new, more elaborate discussion on the benefits of strategic management
in general and strategic planning in particular. A first step towards analyzing the
benefits of the six tools has already been made in the second paper of the
dissertation where they are applied in the corporate and financial planning context.
Yet, the debate could move one step further by adapting the six tools and linking
the scenarios and their outcomes to managerial accounting, i.e. flexible budgeting
processes such as rolling budgets. The advantage of such research would be a
further refinement of the approach to scenario-based strategic planning and a
further integration of research on strategic planning and managerial accounting.
Moreover, combining strategy and managerial accounting research through the

scenario-based approach to strategic planning could also lead to a more precise
analysis on how companies actually achieve a competitive advantage. As
mentioned in the first paragraph, the basic definition of a competitive advantage
posits that a firm with a competitive advantage earns a persistently higher rate of
profit, or has the potential to earn a persistently higher rate of profit (Mintzberg,
1994). Yet, strategic management research so far has not yet managed to quantify
the costs involved in attaining a competitive advantage and the exact benefits
going beyond pure profits associated with it. A quantification of scenarios derived
through a scenario-based strategic planning activity and their linkage with
accounting tools such a company’s profit and loss account or balance sheet could
close this research gap.
16
The papers “Organizational Ambidexterity and Family Firm Performance” and “The
Impact of Successor Generation Discount in Family Firms: Examining Nonlinear
Effects on Exploration and Exploitation” empirically analyze the strategies used by
family firms to attain a competitive advantage further enhance the understanding
of strategic management in a particular context. The concept of organizational
ambidexterity is of significant relevance in the strategic management context as it
describes a highly relevant strategic dilemma of firms pursuing a competitive
advantage, namely the strive of organizations to pursue two different approaches
at the same time: they have a strong exploitative orientation to improve the
performance of current business activities, e.g. through higher efficiency (March,
1991) as well as an explorative orientation geared toward innovation and flexible
operations to develop and harvest future business opportunities (Tushman &
O'Reilly III, 1996).
The dissertation introduces organizational ambidexterity to the family firm context

and shows how family influence leads to higher levels of ambidexterity and
subsequent higher performance. However, further analysis to validate and fine-
tune the relationship between organizational ambidexterity and performance in
family could lead to more detailed results on how exactly family influence leads to
a higher level of ambidexterity. Especially the social and emotional aspects of
family businesses and the relationship among family members as well as between
the family and the business are a promising domain for further research in this
area. Moreover, this promising research stream is also in line with recent findings
in the strategic management literature suggest that a strong organizational culture
or firm values are more important in achieving a competitive advantage than the
actual process of developing a strategy (Jarzabkowski & Balogun, 2009). Family
firms in general provide a strong organizational context with positive firm values
making them a suitable domain to further study how companies attain a
competitive advantage.
17
With the empirical analysis of organizational ambidexterity in German family firms

this dissertation makes a first contribution on the strategic orientations pursued by
family firms. However, organizational ambidexterity is a complex construct with
different types of ambidexterity such as structural or behavioral ambidexterity
(Simsek, 2009). Further research should take these different types of
organizational ambidexterity into account as they might provide further insights on
how family firms actually achieve a competitive advantage through structural
ambidexterity.
These findings of the dissertation also have implications for corporate managers.
They highlight the special role of family firms in attaining high levels of
ambidexterity and further demonstrate the positive performance impact achieved
by having an ambidextrous organization. Family firm managers aiming to increase
their business’s performance can thus analyze their organization’s strategy
aligning relevant activities towards a more ambidextrous focus which should
eventually result in a competitive advantage.
The dissertation’s final paper continues the debate on strategic management in

family firms by focusing on the impact a family generation managing the family firm
has on new capability exploration and resource exploitation. The paper has strong
implications for both academia as well as practitioners. It is commonly known and
empirically proven that a mere ten percent of first generation family businesses
successfully transition to the third generation (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004).
This dissertation contributes to this debate by providing insights on the degree of
capability exploration and resource exploitation present in family firms depending
on which generation controls the firm’s management. Going beyond the fact that
the findings of the dissertation show a U-shaped relationship between generational
involvement in family firms and the level of exploration with the minimum point
being during the second generation, and an inverse U-shaped relationship
between generational involvement and the level of exploitation with the maximum
point being during the third generation managing the family business, it answers a
specific research call asking for a more fine grained analysis of explorative and
18
exploitative strategies in family firms (Sharma & Salvato, 2011). This finding has
implications for research scholars and practitioners alike. Research scholars so far
have assumed that capability exploration and resource exploitation take place
simultaneously. Our results obtained in the German family firm context suggest
otherwise. A further analysis on how family firms explore capabilities and exploit
resources, ideally in a different geographic setting is thus needed to provide
further evidence for our results. Moreover, given the empirical nature of the
research design adopted in this dissertation, it is still not clear how exactly family
firms explore capabilities and exploit resources. A qualitative study could provide
further insights on this research question.
From a practitioners perspective this dissertation might answer the question why
most family firms fail to make a successful transition into the third generation over
the lifecycle of a family business: The level of exploitation increases too quickly
with the level of exploration decreasing at the same time reaching its minimum
during the third generation managing the firm. Our results suggest that only those
firms making a quick transition and refocus on exploration make it beyond the third
generation. Family firm managers aware of this finding can thus adopt the relevant
strategic orientation at the right time. With this result in mind family managers
might disprove the common notation that wealth does not pass three generations.
In summary this thesis implies for corporate practice that scenario-based strategic
planning including the six tools is a useful tool for managing complex, uncertain
and volatile business environments. Furthermore, it provides insights on how
scenario-based strategic planning can help corporate and financial planners to
cope with unforeseen challenges potentially putting their company’s competitive
advantage at risk. For family firm mangers this thesis suggests to revisit the
strategies in place focusing on exploration and exploitation since a combination of
both might lead to a higher performance. Moreover family firm managers and
owners should keep in mind which generation is currently managing the firm since
different family generations have different priorities regarding of firm’s tendency
19
towards capability exploration and resource exploitation potentially putting the

firm’s existence at risk.
20
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24
Six Tools for Scenario-Based Strategic Planning and Their Application
II. SIX TOOLS FOR SCENARIO-BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING AND

THEIR APPLICATION
Paper A
Published in
Schwenker, B. and Wulf, T. (Eds.), 2013. Scenario-based Strategic Planning:
Developing Strategies in an Uncertain World. pp. 69-153, Springer Gabler:
Wiesbaden, Germany
Christian Brands, Torsten Wulf and Philip Meissner
Abstract
Scenario planning has often been criticized for the complexity that arises when it is
grafted into a company's overall strategic planning process. To overcome this
deficiency, we have developed the HHL-Roland Berger scenario-based approach
to strategic planning. This paper explains each tool of the approach in detail,
evaluates its practicability and demonstrates how executives can immediately
apply the entire toolkit within their overall strategic planning process. To facilitate
the application of the tools, each step is explained using a practical example from
the European airline industry. Taken together, the detailed explanations that follow
present a scenario-based strategic planning framework that can help companies
cope with an uncertain, complex and volatile business environment.
25
Six Tools for Scenario-Based Strategic Planning and Their Application
This article has been published as part of the book “Scenario-based Strategic
Planning: Developing Strategies in an Uncertain World”, edited by Burkhard
Schwenker and Torsten Wulf, pp. 69-153.
(ISBN 978-3-658-02874-9; 2013; Springer Gabler: Wiesbaden, Germany).
For copyright reasons, pages 27-110 were excluded from this version of my
dissertation.
Further information on the book can be found here:

http://www.springer.com/springer+gabler/management/unternehmensführung/book/978-3-658-02874-9
26
Szenariobasierte Strategische Planung in Volatilen Umfeldern
III. SZENARIOBASIERTE STRATEGISCHE PLANUNG IN VOLATILEN

UMFELDERN
Paper B
Veröffentlicht in
Controlling & Management, 2012, 56, Sonderheft 2, Seiten 34-38.
Torsten Wulf, Stephan Stubner, Philip Meissner und Christian Brands

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1365/s12176-012-0380-z
Abstract
Unternehmen suchen verstärkt nach Instrumenten, die sie bei der Planung in
zunehmen volatileren und komplexeren Umwelten einsetzen können. Klassische
Ansätze der strategischen Planung sind in diesem Kontext nicht offen genug, um
dynamischen Änderungen in der Zukunft zu planen. Auch die sehr offene
Szenarioplanung ist für Unternehmen nur bedingt geeignet, da sie zeit- und
ressourcenaufwändig ist und nicht die Entwicklung von konkreten
Handlungsempfehlungen zum Ziel hat. Eine Lösung stellt die szenariobasierte
strategische Planung dar, die Unternehmen ermöglicht, mit Hilfe von
standardisierten Instrumenten sehr flexibel zu planen und konkrete
Strategieoptionen für zukünftige Umweltänderungen zu entwickeln.
111
1. Einführung: Unternehmen agieren in einer zunehmend volatilen Umwelt

Eine der größten Herausforderungen für die strategische Planung in Unternehmen
stellt heutzutage die zunehmende Volatilität und Komplexität der Umwelt dar.
Gerade in den letzten Jahren ist zu beobachten, dass diese Entwicklung sich
verstärkt und die Unsicherheit bei der Planung von zukünftigen Ereignissen
erhöht. Als ein Symptom für zunehmende Volatilität gelten zum Beispiel die immer
kürzer werdenden Zyklen zwischen großen Wirtschaftskrisen. So haben Bordo et
al. (2001) in ihrer Studie festgestellt, dass sich die Frequenz solcher Ereignisse
seit 1973 verdoppelt hat. Schocks wie die Ölkrise von 1973, die Asienkrise von
1997, das Platzen der Internetblase in 2001 oder auch die letzte Finanzkrise in
2008 zeigen, wie volatil und schwer vorhersagbar wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen
geworden sind. Verschärft werden die Auswirkungen wachsender Volatilität durch
die zunehmende Dynamik im Wirtschaftsgeschehen. Allein in der
Automobilbranche haben sich die Innovationszyklen in den letzten drei
Jahrzehnten von durchschnittlich elf auf weniger als sechs Jahre verkürzt. Und
auch die fortschreitende Senkung von Transaktionskosten durch neue Technolo-
gien und die zunehmend offenen Grenzen zwischen Wirtschaftszonen tragen dazu
bei, dass sich Unternehmen heute in einer immer komplexeren Umwelt bewegen
(Schwenker & Boetzel, 2007).
2. Volatilität als Herausforderung für die strategische Planung

Wenn sich Unternehmen in dieser Situation strukturiert Gedanken über ihre
zukünftige Ausrichtung machen, zählt auch heute noch die traditionelle
strategische Planung zu einem der dominanten Instrumente (Rigby & Bilodeau,
2007). Bei dieser traditionellen strategischen Planung wird üblicherweise auf Basis
einer internen und einer externen Analyse eine Strategie bestimmt, mit welcher
das Unternehmen mittel- bis langfristig Wettbewerbsvorteile entwickeln und sich
auf dem Markt behaupten will. Dieser klassische Ansatz ist aber nicht geeignet,
um Unternehmen bei zunehmender Volatilität und Umweltdynamik ausreichend zu
unterstützen (Dyer, Johansson, Helbing, Couzin, & Krause, 2009; Mintzberg,
1994b). Dies liegt zum einen daran, dass in einem formalen strategischen
Planungsprozess, für den traditionelle Strategieinstrumente entwickelt worden
112
sind, in der Regel relativ kontinuierliche Umweltveränderungen betrachtet werden.

Damit fehlt die Offenheit, um auf diskontinuierliche Veränderungen oder starke
Schwankungen im Umfeld zu reagieren (Mintzberg, 1994a). In der Kritik steht aber
der Fokus traditioneller Ansätze auf nur eine einzige zukünftige
Entwicklungsrichtung (Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001; Grant, 2003). Auch in der
Unternehmenspraxis reift zunehmend die Erkenntnis, dass in dynamischen,
komplexen und volatilen Umfeldern traditionelle Ansätze der strategischen
Planung nur eingeschränkt geeignet sind (Ramirez, Selsky, & van der Heijden,
2008). Daher suchen viele Unternehmen aktiv nach neuen Ansätzen, welche die
Offenheit und Flexibilität des strategischen Denkens stärker in den Vordergrund
stellen als traditionelle Ansätze.
Insbesondere müssen solche Ansätze es ermöglichen, nicht nur eine mögliche

Zukunft abzubilden, sondern vielmehr einen Optionenraum in der Planung zu
erfassen (Miller, 2008). Zudem sollten solche Ansätze verschiedene interne und
externe Perspektiven einbinden, um sicherzustellen, dass möglichst viele Aspekte
einer immer komplexer werdenden und dynamischeren Umwelt berücksichtigt
werden können (Elbanna/Child 2007). Schließlich sollten entsprechende Ansätze
auch schnell und flexibel einsetzbar sein, um in volatilen Umfeldern schnell
reagieren zu können (Dyer et al., 2009).
Oft versuchen Unternehmen, dies durch die Anwendung der Szenarioplanung zu

erreichen (Dyer et al., 2009; Grant, 2003). Die Szenarioplanung deckt viele der
aufgezeigten Anforderungen ab. Sie ermöglicht die Betrachtung verschiedener
Entwicklungen der Zukunft und erlaubt dadurch einen besseren Umgang mit
Unsicherheit und Volatilität (Grant, 2003; Porter, 1985; Schoemaker, 1995).
Gerade in den letzten Jahren hat die Szenarioplanung daher in der Praxis wieder
stärker an Bedeutung gewonnen.
Allerdings kann auch die klassische Szenarioplanung nicht alle Anforderungen an

die strategische Planung in volatilen Umfeldern erfüllen und ist mit einigen
Nachteilen verbunden. Gerade weil sie das Ziel hat, das offene Nachdenken über
113
zukünftige Entwicklungen zu fördern, wird sie oft ohne methodische Unterstützung

durchgeführt. So mangelt es den meisten Ansätzen zur Szenarioplanung an
standardisierten Methoden, die auch ohne Expertenunterstützung umgesetzt
werden können (Chermack, Lynham, & Ruona, 2001). Dadurch ist der Prozess in
der Regel komplex, umständlich, langwierig in seiner Anwendung und bindet viele
interne Ressourcen im Unternehmen (Bradfield, 2008). Dies führt unter anderem
dazu, dass Szenarioprojekte oft mehr als fünf Monate in Anspruch nehmen
(Moyer, 1996; Shell, 2003). Nicht zuletzt können damit auch die Qualität von
Szenarioprozessen und deren Ergebnisse sehr stark schwanken (Schwartz,
1996). Zudem erschwert der Fokus auf eher langfristige Entwicklungen die
Anwendung im strategischen Kontext, der vornehmlich Zeiträume von weniger als
fünf Jahren betrachtet (Schwartz, 1996). Schließlich zielt die Szenarioplanung
weniger auf die Entwicklung von konkreten Strategien und Umsetzungsplänen ab,
als vielmehr auf die Diskussion der eigentlichen Simulationen und Szenarien und
der Entwicklungspfade, die zu diesen Szenarien führen (Bishop, Hines, & Collins,
2007). Dadurch wird die Handhabbarkeit der Szenarioplanung als Instrument der
strategischen Planung stark eingeschränkt. Diese Nachteile der Szenarioplanung
führen dazu, dass sie in ihrer traditionellen Form für Strategieplaner nur
eingeschränkt zu empfehlen ist.
3. Szenariobasierte strategische Planung als Lösungsansatz für Planung

unter Volatilität
3.1. Grundlagen der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung
Ein Ansatz, der darauf abzielt, die Vorteile der Szenarioplanung zu nutzen und
ihre Nachteile zu vermeiden, ist der von uns entwickelte Ansatz der
szenariobasierten strategischen Planung (Wulf, Meissner, & Stubner, 2010). Er
ermöglicht die strukturierte, methodisch unterstützte Einbindung von Szenarien in
den strategischen Planungsprozess, ist für Unternehmen einfach handhabbar und
liefert umsetzbare Erkenntnisse. Die szenariobasierte strategische Planung folgt
einem sechsstufigen Prozess, in den viele Aspekte der klassischen
114
Szenariob
basierte Stra
ategische Pla
anung in Vola
atilen Umfeld
dern
Szenarioplanung eingebund
den sind
d. Unters
stützt weerden die
e einzeln
nen
Prozesssschritte jew
weils durcch spezielle, teilweis
se neu enntwickelte Instrumen
nte,
welche eine
e standardisierte Bearbeitung ermöglichen. Abbbildung 36
3 gibt ein
nen
Überblickk über dies
sen Prozesss.
g 38: Prozess
Abbildung s der Szenarriobasierten Strategische
en Planung
3.2. Pro
ozess der szenariob
s basierten strategisch
s hen Planu
ung
Im ersten
n Schritt de
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obasierten
n strategisc
chen Planuung erfolgtt die Zielde
efi-
nition, d.h
h. die Definition von Umfang und
u Umfeld
d des strateegischen Planungsp
P pro-
jekts. Hie
erfür wurde
e mit der „„Framing Checklist“
C ein neuess Instrumen
nt entwicke
elt,
welches diesen Prozesssch
P hritt unters
stützt. Die
e Framingg Checklis
st ermögliccht
anhand von fünf Kernfrage n, das Ziiel und diie Rahmeenbedingun
ngen für die
d
strategiscche Planun
ng zu Beg inn der Pla
anungspha
ase aufzuzzeigen und
d wesentlicche
Anspruch
hsgruppen zu identiifizieren, die
d in den
n Prozess eingebun
nden werd
den
sollen. Dadurch wird sicherge
estellt, das
ss alle Beteiligten daas gleiche
e Verständnis
für die me
ehrwöchige Planung sphase be
esitzen.
Mit dem zweiten Schritt, der Wahrnehm

mungsanallyse, beginnnt die eigentliche szze-
nariobasiierte strate
egische Pla
anung. Die
eser Schrittt dient dazzu, die An
nnahmen und
u
1
115
mentalen Modelle der Entscheidungsträger im Unternehmen in Bezug auf die Ent-

wicklungen der eigenen Branche zu erfassen. Dafür haben wir das Instrument
„360°-Stakeholder-Feedback“ entwickelt (Wulf, Krys, Brands, Meissner, & Stubner,
2011). Im Rahmen der Wahrnehmungsanalyse werden interne und externe
Anspruchsgruppen in den strategischen Planungsprozess eingebunden. Zu den
internen Anspruchsgruppen zählen typischerweise die Unternehmensführung,
Vertreter des Bereichs Unternehmensstrategie bzw. Unternehmensentwicklung
und die Leiter wichtiger Funktionsbereiche bzw. Sparten. Als externe
Anspruchsgruppen können z.B. Lieferanten, Kreditgeber, Gesellschafter, Vertreter
von Gewerkschaften, Kunden, Wettbewerber, Spezialisten aus Verbänden und
Forschungseinrichtungen oder Szenarioexperten berücksichtigt werden. In der
Regel werden zwischen 40 und 100 Experten befragt. Besonders wichtig ist es
jedoch, dass der Kreis der ausgewählten Personen möglichst weit gefasst ist, um
eine möglichst große Bandbreite von Sichtweisen auf die Branche und das
Unternehmen zu erfassen. Die Wahrnehmungsanalyse trägt damit zu einer
„Öffnung“ der strategischen Planung bei und vermeidet eine enge,
unternehmensbezogene Sichtweise im Planungsprozess, die gerade bei hoher
Umweltvolatilität sehr schädlich sein kann.
Die Vertreter der unterschiedlichen Anspruchsgruppen werden in einem zweistufi-

gen Prozess gebeten, wichtige Einflussfaktoren für die Entwicklung des
Unternehmens bzw. der Branche über den Planungszeitraum – üblicherweise drei
bis fünf Jahre – zu nennen und diese Faktoren nach dem Grad ihrer Unsicherheit,
d.h. danach, wie vorhersehbar die zukünftige Ausprägung der Faktoren ist, und
nach ihrem Einfluss auf die zukünftige Profitabilität des Unternehmens zu
bewerten. Ergebnis des 360° Stakeholder Feedbacks ist dann zunächst ein
umfassender Überblick über die wichtigsten Einflussfaktoren, die die zukünftige
Entwicklung des Unternehmens bzw. der Branche prägen.
Noch bedeutender ist jedoch gerade in volatilen Umfeldern ein zweites Ergebnis
des 360° Stakeholder Feedbacks. So erlaubt das Instrument die Identifikation von
so genannten „blinden Flecken“ (blind spots) und „schwachen Signalen“ (weak
116
signals). Als blinde Flecken werden Faktoren bezeichnet, die interne als
wesentlich weniger bedeutend bzw. unsicher einschätzen als externe
Anspruchsgruppen. Sie können ein Indikator für eine verengte Sichtweise – eben
für „Blindheit“ – des Unternehmens für wichtige Einflüsse und Veränderungen im
externen Umfeld sein. Schwache Signale sind dagegen solche Faktoren, die von
nur sehr wenigen, meist externen Befragten genannt werden und die erste
Indikatoren für wichtige Veränderungen im Umfeld des Unternehmens sein
können. Blinde Flecken und schwache Signale zu erkennen und im Rahmen des
strategischen Planungsprozesses zu diskutieren, dient dazu, den Blickwinkel des
Managements zu erweitern, und ist so eine wichtige Grundlage für das Ableiten
von erfolgreichen Strategien gerade in volatilen Umfeldern.
Im Rahmen einer szenariobasierten strategischen Analyse für den

Elektronikeinzelhandel in Deutschland haben wir unter anderem festgestellt, dass
die etablierten Elektronikhändler die Verfügbarkeit von Online-Preisvergleichen,
durch die es für Kunden möglich ist, direkt vor Ort die günstigsten
Beschaffungsmöglichkeiten für ein Elektrogerät zu ermitteln, stark unterschätzt
haben (Wulf et al., 2012). Dieser Einflussfaktor stellt daher für etablierte Händler
einen blinden Fleck dar. Angesichts der Volatilität in der Branche und eines
zunehmenden Wettbewerbs zwischen „online“ und „offline“ Handel erscheint die
Berücksichtigung dieses Einflussfaktors im Rahmen der strategischen Planung
jedoch unumgänglich, und das 360° Stakeholder Feedback hat zu einer Öffnung
des Denkens des Managements der betroffenen Händler beigetragen.
Im dritten Schritt der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung, der Trend-und Un-

sicherheitsanalyse, werden die Ergebnisse der Wahrnehmungsanalyse entlang
von zwei Dimensionen visualisiert. Dafür wird auf das Instrument des
Impact/Uncertainty Grid zurückgegriffen, um so genannte sekundäre Elemente,
relevante Trends und kritische Unsicherheiten zu identifizieren. Das
Impact/Uncertainty Grid hilft dabei, die Liste der Faktoren aus den 360° Stake-
holder Feedbacks zu strukturieren und zu priorisieren. Es wurde bereits in den
1970er Jahren von Kees van der Heijden für den Szenarioplanungsprozess bei
117
Royal Dutch Shell entwickelt und findet seitdem breite Anwendung in

Szenarioprozessen (van't Klooster & van Asselt, 2006).
Unter sekundären Elementen werden in diesem Zusammenhang alle Faktoren

verstanden, die nur einen untergeordneten Einfluss auf die
Unternehmensentwicklung besitzen. Zur Komplexitätsreduktion werden sie aus
der weiteren Betrachtung im Prozess ausgeschlossen. Als Trends werden jene
Faktoren bezeichnet, die einen verhältnismäßig großen Einfluss auf das
Unternehmen besitzen, deren zukünftige Entwicklung jedoch gleichzeitig mit
relativ großer Sicherheit vorhersehbar ist. Als kritische Unsicherheiten werden
dagegen Faktoren bezeichnet, die einen großen Einfluss auf den zukünftigen
Erfolg des Unternehmens haben und deren Entwicklung gleichzeitig unsicher ist.
Diese Faktoren können auch als die wesentlichen Treiber für die Volatilität im
Unternehmensumfeld angesehen werden. In der praktischen Anwendung des
Instruments zeigt sich, dass meist nicht mehr als drei bis fünf kritische
Unsicherheiten, d.h. Volatilitätshebel, identifiziert werden können.
So haben wir beispielsweise bei einer Szenarioanalyse der europäischen Luftver-

kehrsbranche festgestellt, dass aus Sicht der traditionellen
Netzwerkfluggesellschaften in Europa – wie Lufthansa oder Air France-KLM – die
geopolitische Stabilität, das Wirtschaftswachstum in Kernmärkten, der politische
Einfluss von Luftverkehrsgesellschaften sowie Kundenerwartungen hinsichtlich
Preis und Service die wichtigsten kritischen Unsicherheiten – und damit
Volatilitätstreiber – darstellen (Wulf, Meissner, Brands, & Maul, 2011). Zur
Entwicklung von Szenarien im folgenden Schritt des Prozesses der
szenariobasierten strategischen Planung müssen diese kritischen Unsicherheiten
zu zwei so genannten Schlüsselunsicherheiten verdichtet werden (van der
Heijden, 2005). Als solche Schlüsselunsicherheiten bzw. verdichteten
Volatilitätstreiber haben wir für die europäische Luftverkehrsindustrie die
Regulierung der Branche in Europa sowie die Preissensibilität der Kundenbasis
ermittelt (Wulf & Maul, 2011).
118
Die Entwicklung von vier Szenarien steht im Mittelpunkt des vierten Schrittes
unseres Prozesses der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung, der
Szenarioentwicklung. Dafür wird das von Kees van der Hejiden (2002) entwickelte
Instrument der Szenariomatrix eingesetzt (van't Klooster & van Asselt, 2006).
Diese Matrix bildet in ihren vier Quadranten jeweils ein Entwicklungsszenario für
das Unternehmen ab. Als Dimensionen der Szenariomatrix dienen die im vorange-
gangenen Prozessschritt abgeleiteten Schlüsselunsicherheiten, d.h. die verdich-
teten Volatilitätstreiber, für die jeweils Extremausprägungen definiert werden.
Entlang dieser Dimensionen werden vier Szenarien beschrieben. Als Grundlage
für diese Beschreibung dient das so genannte Einflussdiagramm, in dem die
Zusammenhänge zwischen Trends, kritischen Unsicherheiten und
Schlüsselunsicherheiten aufgezeigt werden. Letztlich verdeutlichen die Szenarien
die Bandbreite möglicher Entwicklungen und damit die Volatilität, der sich das
Unternehmen ausgesetzt sieht.
So haben wir beispielsweise im Rahmen der beschriebenen Szenariostudie für die

europäische Luftverkehrsbranche als wichtigste Ausprägungen der Volatilität in
der Branche eine sinkende bzw. steigende Preissensibilität der Kunden sowie eine
offene bzw. protektionistische Regulierung in Europa identifiziert. Daraus leiten
sich vier Szenarien ab, die im Überblick in Abbildung 37 dargestellt sind (Wulf &
Maul, 2011).
Für die vier Szenarien werden im fünften Schritt des Prozesses der szenarioba-
sierten strategischen Planung, der Strategiedefinition, konkrete Strategien und
Handlungspläne erarbeitet. Hierfür haben wir das Instrument des
Strategieleitfadens entwickelt. Im Rahmen des Strategieleitfadens werden
zunächst für jedes Szenario spezifische Strategieempfehlungen hinsichtlich
Positionierung, Gestaltung des Geschäftssystems und operativer Umsetzung
abgeleitet. Anschließend wird geprüft, inwieweit Übereinstimmungen zwischen
den Strategieempfehlungen für die vier Szenarien bestehen. Die in allen Fällen
gleichen Empfehlungen ergeben dann die Kernstrategie, welche das
Unternehmen in jedem Fall umsetzen kann, da sie von der konkreten zukünftigen
119
Szenariob
basierte Stra
ategische Pla
anung in Vola
atilen Umfeld
dern
Entwicklu
ung unabh
hängig istt. Strategiieempfehlu
ungen, diee sich zw
wischen den
d
Szenarien untersc
cheiden, w
werden alls Strateg
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d
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ung berück
ksichtigen muss, diee aber in der Regel nur
n
umgesetzzt werden, wenn die tatsächlic
che Umweltentwicklu ng in die Richtung
R d
des
betreffend
den Szena
arios führt.
g 39: Szenarien für die eu

Abbildung uropäische Luftverkehrsb
L branche bis 22015 im Übe
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Ergebnis der szena

ariobasiertten strateg
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e
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obasierten strategischen Planuung in der Praxis, da
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usrichtung sehr ähnliich sind. Unterschied
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weise aus unserer A
Analyse de
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ass
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schaften trrotz der Vo
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v
1
120
Szenarien äußert, in jedem Fall eine strategische Ausrichtung auf folgende drei
Felder anstreben sollten:
1 Sie müssen Programme zur Effizienzsteigerung weiterführen, die ihnen hel-

fen, ihre im Vergleich zu europäischen Billigfluggesellschaften und
asiatischen Wettbewerbern ungünstige Kostensituation zu verbessern.
2 Sie müssen kundenorientierte Innovationen in allen Bereichen des
Geschäftssystems vorantreiben, um insbesondere im Wettbewerb mit
asiatischen Konkurrenten weiter mithalten zu können, aber auch um
Billigfluggesellschaften auf Distanz zu halten.
3 Sie müssen eine verstärkte Lobbyarbeit betreiben, um insbesondere
asiatischen Wettbewerbern den Marktzugang nach Europa zu erschweren.
Ob alle drei Bereiche gleichmäßig betont werden oder eine

Schwerpunktverlagerung in die eine oder andere Richtung erfolgen muss, richtet
sich dann nach der tatsächlichen Entwicklung des Wettbewerbsumfelds, d.h. nach
dem tatsächlich eintretenden Szenario. Das Schaffen und der Ausbau eigener
Billigfluggesellschaften kann darüber hinaus als strategische Option angesehen
werden, die insbesondere bei zunehmendem Wettbewerbsdruck auf europäische
Netzwerkluftverkehrsgesellschaften von Seiten der Billigfluggesellschaften
gezogen werden kann.
Welche Elemente der Kernstrategie besonders betont und welche Strategieoptio-

nen gegebenenfalls verfolgt werden, wird im letzten Schritt der szenariobasierten
strategischen Planung, der kontinuierlichen Kontrolle, festgelegt. Hierfür steht mit
dem Szenario Cockpit ein Instrument zur Verfügung, das die tatsächliche
Volatilität der Umwelt, d. h. die Schwankungen bei den kritischen und
Schlüsselunsicherheiten, erfasst. Dadurch wird deutlich, welches der vier
Szenarien der realen Entwicklung am ehesten entspricht und welche strategischen
Maßnahmen dementsprechend durchgeführt werden sollten.
121
4. Zusammenfassung
Der Prozess der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung stellt einen Ansatz dar,
mit der Unternehmen angesichts zunehmender Umweltvolatilität besser für die
Zukunft planen können. Traditionelle Ansätze der strategischen Planung sind in
solchen Situationen nur eingeschränkt geeignet, da sie in der Regel nur eine
einzelne strategische Entwicklungsrichtung vorsehen und bei starken
Veränderungen in der Unternehmensumwelt nur unzureichende
Anpassungsmöglichkeiten eröffnen. Darüber hinaus tragen traditionelle Instru-
mente der strategischen Planung häufig eher zu einer stärkeren Formalisierung
der strategischen Planung bei und fördern kein offenes, strategisches Denken,
das eigentlich im Zentrum der Strategieentwicklung – gerade in volatilen
Umfeldern – stehen sollte.
Mit der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung stellen wir daher einen Ansatz
vor, der nicht nur eine einzelne strategische Entwicklungsrichtung vorsieht,
sondern vielmehr die zunehmende Umweltvolatilität, die viele Branchen heute
kennzeichnet, aktiv aufgreift und eine strategische Planung für einen durch diese
Volatilität geprägten Optionenraum ermöglicht. Gleichzeitig fördert dieser Ansatz
durch die Öffnung der strategischen Planung und die Einbeziehung externer
Anspruchsgruppen das strategische Denken und ermöglicht dem Management,
seine eigenen Denkhaltungen zu hinterfragen. Trotz dieser größeren Breite der
berücksichtigten Entwicklungen und Maßnahmen erhöht die szenariobasierte
strategische Planung nicht die Planungskomplexität. Vielmehr besteht das
Ergebnis der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung in einem Bündel
strategischer Maßnahmen, die in jedem Fall für die Entwicklung des
Unternehmens positiv sind, die jedoch abhängig von der tatsächlichen Ent-
wicklung der Umwelt eine leicht unterschiedliche Schwerpunktsetzung erfordern.
Insofern erhöht die szenariobasierte strategische Planung die Flexibilität der
strategischen Planung. Und dies ist angesichts zunehmend volatiler Umfelder in
vielen Branchen sehr wünschenswert.
122
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124
Organizational Ambidexterity and Family Firm Performance
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AMBIDEXTERITY AND FAMILY FIRM

PERFORMANCE
Paper C
Published in
Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship, Vol. 25(2), 2012, pp. 217-229
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08276331.2012.10593570?journalCode=rsbe20#.UmTdsfm-2m4
Stephan Stubner, W. Henning Blarr, Christian Brands, Torsten Wulf
Abstract
In our paper, we introduce the concept of organizational ambidexterity (OA) to
family firm research and develop hypotheses regarding the impact family influence
has on OA and on subsequent firm performance. We argue that as family
influence increases family firms achieve higher degrees of OA and firm
performance. We empirically test our hypotheses on a dataset of 104 family firms
and show that family influence leads to higher degrees of ambidexterity especially
through family power and cultural alignment between family interests and firm
interests. Furthermore, we show that higher levels of OA in family firms also result
in better financial performance. We contribute to family firm research by
introducing organizational ambidexterity into the discussion about family firm
performance and family firm heterogeneity and thus provide an approach for
integrating strategy and family firm research.
125
1. Introduction
In our paper, we analyze the impact of family influence on the level of
organizational ambidexterity (OA) as well as the subsequent effect of higher levels
of organizational ambidexterity on family firm performance. Although research on
the performance impact of family influence is one of the dominant streams in the
family firm literature (e.g. Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Dyer, 2006; Habbershon
& Williams, 1999; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella Jr, 2007), findings in
this field are so far inconclusive (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2010; Dyer,
2006; Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008). Many scholars regard the heterogeneity
of family firms as one reason for this lack of consistent results (Olson et al., 2003).
They claim that a better understanding of the causes of this heterogeneity is
needed in order to further develop family performance research (McConaughy
Daniel, Matthews, & Fialko, 2001). Accordingly, researchers have called for further
analyses of factors that are responsible for differences among family firms and
their performance (Melin & Nordqvist, 2007; Sharma, 2004; Westhead & Howorth,
2006).
We believe that OA is such a factor capable of providing a better understanding of

the heterogeneity among family firms and resulting performance differences
(Webb, Ketchen, & Ireland, 2010). The term describes the ability of organizations
to pursue two different approaches at the same time: they are able to show a
strong exploitative orientation to improve the performance of current business
activities, for example, through higher efficiency (March, 1991) as well as an
explorative orientation geared toward innovation and flexible operations to develop
and harvest future business opportunities (Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996). Despite
the potential positive relationship between OA and family firm performance
(Chrisman et al., 2010; Dyer, 2006; Rutherford et al., 2008), surprisingly, to the
best of our knowledge, thus far no scientific study has examined this relationship.
We argue that because of these organizations’ specific characteristics family firms
are especially suited for exploring future growth opportunities and exploiting
current business processes simultaneously (Webb et al., 2010) and that the
126
resulting high level of OA has a positive influence on family firm performance

(Simsek, 2009; Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996).
Based on family firm research and literature on OA, we develop a set of

hypotheses regarding the relationship between family influence and OA and the
resulting impact on family firm performance. We empirically test our hypotheses on
a sample of 104 family firms and show that certain elements of family influence
lead to higher OA, which, in turn, has a positive effect on performance.
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we add to existing
research on family firm characteristics by providing a link between family firms and
strategic management research (Zahra & Sharma, 2004). Second, we investigate
how variables associated with family firms influence affect OA and consequently
family firm performance. This also broadens the understanding of family firm
heterogeneity and family firm success.
2. Theory and Hypotheses

Organizational ambidexterity refers to the ability of firms to simultaneously pursue
explorative activities that secure future business growth and exploitative activities
that streamline current operations to maximize profits (Benner & Tushman, 2003).
Such firms are not only efficient in managing today’s business demands but also
flexible enough to adapt to changes in the increasingly volatile, uncertain, and
dynamic environment (Hamel, 2000) to ensure long-term survival (Gibson &
Birkinshaw, 2004). While focusing on either skill set is conceptually rather easy
(Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996), achieving a high level of exploration and
exploitation at the same time is a complex undertaking as it involves competition
for scarce resources (Simsek, 2009). Explorative and exploitative activities require
substantially different, sometimes even conflicting, structures, processes,
capabilities, and cultures (Sheremata, 2000; Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996).
Consequently, conflicts, contradictions, and inconsistencies are predictable. While
earlier studies often regarded the trade-off necessary to achieve high levels of
exploration and exploitation as impossible to implement, more recent studies
127
presented a range of solutions to support OA, including structural separation

(O'Reilly III & Tushman, 2004) and non-structural, context-related elements such
as culture, values, or mindset (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). We argue that family
firm characteristics provide an additional perspective to discuss OA. More
specifically, in family firms two different but mutually influencing systems interact:
the family system and the firm system (Westhead, 2003). We believe that the
resulting characteristics of family firms (Casillas, Moreno, & Barbero, 2010),
especially the influence of the family, enable them to reach a high level of balance
between exploration for future growth and exploitation of current processes (Webb
et al., 2010). Family firms are able to create an environment that provides the
necessary strong focus on performance as well as on social support (Bartlett &
Ghoshal, 1994).
Based on the F-PEC scale (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Klein, Astrachan,
& Smyrnios, 2005), we differentiate family influence into three dimensions (family
power, family experience and family culture) because we believe that all three
have very distinct, but complementary, effects on OA.
When family firms show a high level of cultural alignment, this means that the
family is committed to the company and that family and firm goals are aligned
(Klein et al., 2005). Family firms then often take a long-term perspective (Carney,
2005; Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2003; Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003;
Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006), as one of the main objectives of the involved
family is long-term survival, that is, the transfer of the firm to the next generation
(Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; Ward, 1988; Westhead, 2003). The resulting need
to develop an entrepreneurial mindset to explore new opportunities (Ireland, Hitt, &
Sirmon, 2003; Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006) is supported by their goal
preference that is not solely focused on financial targets (Astrachan & Jaskiewicz,
2008) and short-term profit maximization (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990; Morck
& Yeung, 2003). This makes family firms more apt to explore future business
opportunities (Ward, 1987) and enables them to be explorative.
128
However, family firms are also often seen as very cost efficient (Anderson & Reeb,
2003; Carney, 2005), as the profitability of family firms is directly connected to the
wealth of the owning family (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). With a long-term orientation
to ensure company survival over several family generations, family firms also
develop a reputation for high quality (Davis, 1983; Kets de Vries, 1993; Ward,
1988). Additionally, family firms have a tendency to apply centralized
organizational structures (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006) and decision making
(Lindow, Stubner, & Wulf, 2010), which indicates the unwillingness to give up
personal power and control owing to the dual roles held by family members
(Carney, 2005). This focus on optimization and quality together with the
centralized management approach then results in efficient exploitation of existing
business activities (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). Taken together, the impact of family
influence on exploration and exploitation in the family firm should then result in a
high level of organizational ambidexterity. This is reflected in hypothesis 1a:
Hypothesis 1a: A high level of family influence on a firm’s culture leads to a

higher level of organizational ambidexterity in the firm.
The power dimension of family influence measures the extent to which a family
influences a firm through direct ownership, active governance, and involvement in
management functions (Astrachan et al., 2002). Family influence is thus a
measure of how easily a family is able to influence firm behavior to impose family
goals on the family firm.
The aim to realize OA will lead to a constant state of competition for scarce
resources that need to be allocated between exploitative and explorative activities
(Simsek, 2009). Especially in family firms that often are organized as one unit
(Whiteside & Brown, 1991), ongoing alignment of operative and strategic activities
in an organizational and cultural context within one unit is needed (Bartlett &
Ghoshal, 1990, 1994; Burgelman, 1991). A high level of power then facilitates
decision-making. It enables organizations to impose decisions between explorative
and exploitative objectives and toward goals that are family-related. The family
129
firm tendency toward more centralized structures and decision-making (for

example Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006) further facilitates a direct impact on
the firm’s operations. This creates an environment where resources are swiftly and
efficiently allocated by the family exerting its controlling power when making
investment decisions. This influence of family power is reflected in hypothesis 1b:
Hypothesis 1b: A high level of family power in a firm leads to a higher level
of organizational ambidexterity.
The experience dimension of family influence measures how much experience a

family has in managing and governing the firm, for example, through long-term
ownership. Attaining an ambidextrous organization requires long-term experience
in building an organization that unites contradictory activities within a company
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Family firms are often characterized by being multi-
generational (Zellweger & Nason, 2008) and having a desire to achieve
stakeholder wealth to preserve the family heritage for future generations (Le
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006) Higher levels of family experience should thus
indicate more experience in building an ambidextrous organization. This reasoning
is reflected in hypothesis 1c:
Hypothesis 1c: A high level of family experience leads to a higher level of

organizational ambidexterity.
Research on organizational ambidexterity has shown that an increased level of OA

leads to a higher and more sustainable financial performance (He, 2004; Lubatkin,
Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006; Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, & Souder, 2009), as the
company shows efficiency in managing current business demands, while at the
same time possessing the flexibility necessary to adapt to new challenges and
opportunities in the environment (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Birkinshaw & Gibson,
2004; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004).
130
Organizational Ambid
dexterity and Family Firm Performanc
ce
Although the costs

s associate
ed with ac
chieving a high leveel of ambidexterity are
a
substantial (Gibson
n & Birkinsh
haw, 2004
4; Yang & Atuahene-G
A Gima, 200
07) and ma
any
companie
es remain unsuccesssful in the
eir efforts and
a fail (O
O'Reilly III & Tushma
an,
2004), we
w believe that the sspecial con
ntext of a family firm
m eases ambidextro
a ous
thinking and
a its imp
plementatio
on. Consequently, hiigher level s of ambid
dexterity le
ead
to a bette
er econom
mic perform
mance amo
ong family firms, as rreflected by
b hypothesis
2:
Hyypothesis 2:
2 A high level of orrganization
nal ambideexterity in a family firm
fi
po
ositively inffluences itss economic
c performa
ance.
esearch model
The full re m is gra
aphically su
ummarized
d in Figure 40.
Figure 40: Research Model

M
3. Metthodology
y
3.1. Res
search Des
sign and S
Sample Generation
To test our hypo
otheses, w
we develo
oped a la
arge-scale empirica
al instrume
ent
(Backhau
us, Erichso
on, Plinke
e, & Weib
ber, 2010)) and adddressed it to top-level
managerss of family
y firms to g
gain access
s to primarry data (foor example Chrisman
n et
al., 200
04). We developed
d our questionnaiire using methodo
ologies a
and
recomme
endations from ma
arket rese
earch lite
erature (B
Berekoven, Ecker, &
Ellenriede
er, 2009) and
a took m
methodolog
gical precau
utions for rreducing concerns ovver
response
e biases (D
Dielman, 19
991; Podsa
akoff, MacKenzie, Leee, & Pods
sakoff, 200
03).
1
131
Additionally, we conducted a pre-test involving several family firm executives and

researchers to further optimize our questionnaire.
We used a convenience sample as the address base and sent the questionnaires
to 2,200 single respondents who were top-level managers in family firms in
Germany. The mailing was sent out in June 2009 and accompanied by a
personalized letter explaining the research project (for example Phan & Hill, 1995).
After a two-wave mailing initiative, 209 companies returned the questionnaire (a
response rate of 9.5%). This rate is similar to empirical studies previously
conducted on family firms (for example Rutherford et al., 2008; Schulze, Lubatkin,
Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Before proceeding to the empirical analyses, we verified
the quality of the created dataset (Burns, 2008; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). First,
we inspected the minimum and maximum values, means, and standard deviations
from every variable for plausibility. Here, we found no mistakes regarding the
accuracy of the data entry. Although we did not find any cases of wrong data
entry, several questionnaires had missing values in different parts of the
questionnaire. To solve this problem in the most proper way (Draper & Smith,
1998), we deleted these cases from the dataset, reducing the final sample to 104
companies.
Due to the cross-sectional survey setup of this study, we checked for potential
biases, as these could reduce the validity of the results. Here, a known concern in
empirical research is that the characteristics of respondents of a study may differ
from those of non-respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Kanuk & Berenson,
1975; Oppenheim, 2000). Using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (Young, 1977) and
the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test, we tested for differences between early
and late responses. Our analyses revealed no statistically significant response
biases within this study. Beside non-response bias, the influence of common
methods bias has been an important concern in management research (Podsakoff
et al., 2003). This bias describes variance in results that is attributable to the
applied measurement method, rather than to the constructs that the measures
represent (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Harman’s single-factor test is the most widely
132
known approach for assessing common method bias in a single-method research

design (Malhotra, Kim, & Patil, 2006) (Malhotra, Kim, and Patil 2006). Again, our
results did not show any indication of being biased. To finally examine the internal
consistency and reliability of the used constructs, we computed Cronbach’s alpha
(Cronbach, 1987). For all constructs used in this study, we achieved highly
satisfactory results.
3.2. Measures
Organizational ambidexterity. As the field of organizational ambidexterity is a

relatively new domain, there is no commonly accepted measure of OA (Lubatkin et
al., 2006). While Benner and Tushman (2003) defined and conceptualized OA in
two dimensions and measured differences in exploration and exploitation in a
firm’s technological horizon, He and Wong (2004) designed a measure based on
product design differences, related to exploration and exploitation. Lubatkin
(2006)combined the measures and developed a way to assess organizational
ambidexterity by using a 12-item measure, with six items asking for exploratory
orientation and six items asking for exploitative orientation. Managers assess their
firms’ behavior over the past years using a five-point Likert scale, ranging from one
(strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree). To derive the level of OA, the individual
values along the six dimensions of exploration and exploitation were added. As we
regard this construct as the most appropriate so far, we selected the construct
from Lubatkin (2006)for this study.
Family influence. Family influence is the main independent variable in our study,
which we measured on a continuous and multidimensional scale based on the F-
PEC scale of family influence (Astrachan et al., 2002; Klein et al., 2005). Family
influence is thus measured with a construct focusing on three dimensions: family
power, family experience, and family culture. The power dimension measures a
family’s influence on the company with regard to family ownership, governance,
and management. We asked respondents about the percentage of family
133
members sharing company ownership and the percentage of family members on

the management and governance boards.
We measured the experience dimension of the F-PEC scale by asking

respondents to indicate the generation of the family owning the business, the
generation that is active on the management board, and the generation of the
family active on the governance board. As suggested by Klein, Astrachan, and
Smyrnios (2005), we weighted the experience of the company with respect to the
generation currently present in the firm. Thus, the first generation was re-coded as
zero, meaning there exists no benefit of generational experience, the second
generation was assigned a weight of 0.5, the third generation a weight of 0.75, the
fourth generation a weight of 0.875 and so forth.
The final dimension, culture, was measured with 13 items reflecting a family’s
commitment and contribution to the firm, the alignment of family and business
goals as well as pride and loyalty toward the company. Using the F-PEC scale
allowed us to measure and compare various levels of family influence among the
firms in our sample and to include family influence as an independent variable in
our analysis (Cliff & Jennings, 2005).
Firm performance. We measured the financial performance of the participating

firms based on the respondents’ subjective evaluations, for several reasons. On
the one hand, gathering and accurately interpreting a family firm’s financial
performance is challenging. The profits may be distorted by industry-specific
factors and there is barely any reliable access to performance data for privately
held firms (Dess & Robinson Jr, 1984). In addition, financial measures often fail to
adequately reflect the extent to which short- and long-term objectives have been
achieved (Geringer & Herbert, 1991) (Geringer and Herbert 1991). Overall,
strategic management researchers have increasingly employed perceived
performance measures and proved them to be valid complements for objective
performance measures (Ramanujam & Venkatraman, 1987). To measure
perceived performance, we asked the respondents to rate the financial
134
performance of their firms against that of their main competitors (Slater & Narver,
1993), against their objectives (actual performance vs. planned projections), and
against the industry average (Geringer & Herbert, 1991). Finally, to synthesize the
items to one reliable measure, we combined all three indexes into one final index
“Firm Performance,” ranging from one (significantly worse) to five (significantly
better).
Control variables. In addition to these main constructs, we added firm size as a

control since several studies indicated an influence of size on financial
performance (Daily & Dollinger, 1992). We used the number of employees to
measure firm size.
4. Analysis and Results

Table 1 indicates the descriptive statistics for all variables of this study, including
the minimum and maximum, mean values, and standard deviations. On average,
the participating family firms possess a degree of organizational ambidexterity of
7.028 (SD=1.048) and a degree of family influence comprising F-Power of 76.26
(SD=20.14), F-Experience of 52.27 (SD=33.32), and F-Culture of 91.99
(SD=0.69).
135
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
Main Variables
1. Family Power 1
2. Family Experience 0.182 1
3. Family Culture .061 0.58 1
4. Organizational Ambidexterity .191 .083 .230 * 1
5. Firm Performance .175 -.060 .133 .220 * 1
Control Variable
6. Firm Size -.251 * .145 .121 .122 .017 1
Descriptive Statistics
N 104 104 104 104 104 104

Minimum 31.33 0.00 46.67 4.66 -1.00 5.48
Maximum 100 98.44 100 9.5 2 256.9
Mean 76.2682 52.3741 91.9904 7.0287 0.6669 24.7346
Std. Deviation 20.1465 33.3203 9.0045 1.0481 0.6898 34.0790
n = 125; *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; t p < .10
Table 1: Pearson Correlations Analysis and Descriptive Statistics
136
To test our hypotheses, we conducted ordinary least squares (OLS) regression

analyses. Table 2 presents the results of these regression analyses for the
dependent variable “organizational ambidexterity” (Hypotheses 1a–1c). For this,
we estimated two models. Model 1 includes only the control variables. In model 2,
we added the main effects of family influence, specifically the variables family
power, family experience, and family culture. The models explain between 1.5%
and 7% of the variance in OA, but only the second model is significant (p<.05).
Additional tests show that the requirements of homoscedasticity and normal
distribution are met for all models and that no collinearity can be observed.
Model 1 Model 2
Standardized Coefficients (ß)
OA OA
Size .120 .151

Family Power - .215 *
Family Experience - .010
Family Culture - .198 *
R² .015 .11
Change in R² .091
Adj. r² .005 .070
Level of significance .216 .024
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; t p < .10

OA, Organizational Ambidexterity
Table 2: Regression Analysis using Organizational Ambidexterity as Dependent and Family

Power, Experience, and Culture as Independent Variables
Model 2 shows that two of the three hypotheses regarding the impact of family
influence on OA, namely hypotheses 1a and 1b, are supported. Hypothesis 1a
proposes a positive relationship between family power and OA. This hypothesis is
supported by a positive and significant coefficient for the variable “family power”
(ß=.215, p<.05). In support of hypothesis 1b, we find a positive and significant
relationship between “family culture” and OA (ß=.198, p<.05). Hypothesis 1c,
however, which proposed a positive impact of family experience on OA, is not
137
supported. In addition, the control variable “firm size” does not have a positive
impact on OA.
To test hypothesis 2, we estimated another set of two regression models.

Hypothesis 2 proposes a positive relationship between OA and firm performance.
Table 3 shows the results of OLS regression analyses for the dependent variable
“firm performance.” Model 1 includes only the control variable. In model 2, we
added the main effect of organizational ambidexterity. The two models explain up
to 4.8% of the variance in firm performance, but only model 2 shows a tendency
toward significance (p=.081). Additional tests show that the requirements of
homoscedasticity and normal distribution were met for all three models and that no
collinearity was observed.
Model 1 Model 2
Standardized Coefficients (ß)
Performance Performance
Size .017 -.010

Organizational Ambidexterity - .221 *
R² .000 .048
Change in R² - .048
Adj. r² -.010 .030
Level of significance .865 .081
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; t p < .10
Table 3: Regression Analysis using Firm Performance as Dependent and Organizational

Ambidexterity as Independent Variable
As the significant coefficient of the variable OA in model 2 (ß=.221, p<.05)

indicates, our results support hypothesis 2, which proposes a positive impact of
OA on firm performance. The influence of the control variable “firm size,” however,
was again insignificant (ß=.017).
In summary, our regression analyses show that increasing levels of family

influence lead to higher levels of OA for two of the three family influence
138
dimensions of the F-PEC. In addition, we find an indication that an increase in the

level of OA also positively influences firm performance. Thus, three of our four
hypotheses are supported.
5. Discussion and Conclusion

In our paper, we developed and tested hypotheses regarding the relation between
family influence and organizational ambidexterity in family firms as well as
between OA and firm performance. Our results indicate that an increase in family
influence, especially on a firm’s culture and family power, leads to a higher level of
OA in an organization. Subsequently, we analyzed and tested the relationship
between OA in an organization and economic performance for the same set of
family firms. Here, our results show that a higher level of ambidexterity in family
firms indeed leads to a better economic performance.
Discussing our results in more detail, we first analyzed the role of family influence
on the level of ambidexterity within an organization. In line with our expectations,
our analyses confirmed the positive effects of family influence on OA. This holds
particularly true for the level of family firm culture positively influencing the level of
OA. Furthermore, the level of family power (measured through a family’s share of
ownership as well as the percentage of family members within the management
and governance board) positively influences a firm’s ambidextrous orientation.
Against our expectations, we found no significant results for the impact of the level
of family experience on a company’s level of organizational ambidexterity.
Our findings are in line with some other studies examining family influence
(Denison, Lief, & Ward, 2004; Dyer, 1988; Miller & Breton-Miller, 2005). Recent
studies, for example, frequently mention the importance a family’s culture has in
shaping a positive atmosphere within a company (Denison et al., 2004; Miller &
Breton-Miller, 2005; Miller et al., 2007) and the resulting performance advantages.
While we do not analyze how family influence in culture leads to higher OA, we
believe that our studies provide additional support for these findings. We also
analyzed and tested the relationship between ambidexterity in a family firm and
139
economic performance. Our results indicate that a higher level of OA leads to a

better economic performance among family firms. This is in line with findings from
strategy research in general (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2006)
and supports the growing call for more transfer between research streams as
strategy and family firm research.
Some limitations that potentially could reduce the general transferability of our
results need to be addressed. We used a cross-sectional design collecting all
sample information in 2009. In some of the analyzed relationships, it might thus
not be possible to infer causality as we do not look at longitudinal data.
Nevertheless, previous studies found that particular variables relating to family
influence and culture are relatively stable over time (Craig & Moores, 2005). In
addition, our selection sample and data are not perfectly random with all included
family businesses located in Germany, and we used a convenience sample.
However, this is in line with previous research on family firms (Kellermanns &
Eddleston, 2006), and we do not expect this to be of major concern. We gathered
our data mainly by relying on primary self-assessment information. Although this
might lead to biased information deviating from objective data, this approach is
common practice in family business research (Lyon, Lumpkin, & Dess, 2000).
Furthermore, we validated several samples with secondary information from public
sources to ensure a high level of data quality.
Our final sample size of 104 might also raise concerns relating to statistical power,
which we tried to mitigate by using appropriate tests confirming data validity.
Another limitation of our findings relates to the sample focus on respondents
stemming from a strong focus on top executives working in family firms. However,
previous studies found that especially top management members are considered a
reliable source of information (Chaganti, Chaganti, & Vijay, 1989) (Glick, Huber,
Miller, Doty, & Sutcliffe, 1990), and thus, we believe that this approach is suitable
for our chosen research setup. Finally, most of our results can merely be seen as
indications as they explain only up to 7% in the variance of the dependent
variables. Nevertheless, these findings are stable and contribute to our
140
understanding of family firm performance. Based on our analyses, we identify

several directions for future research. First, we used elements of the F-PEC scale
to measure family influence. Although this measure is an accepted construct in
family firm research, other measures might be able to better explain the impact
that a family has on developing OA in a family firm. Thus, more research in this
field would be necessary using other constructs for family influence, or even
comparing several constructs in one study. Furthermore, family influence
measures do not reflect how family firms actually achieve OA. We believe that
family influence has an impact on the behavior of the family firm and that a better
understanding of this behavior would enable us to derive more concrete
statements about the how and when of creating OA in the organization. In line with
this research direction, future studies could also look at the type of OA realized in
family firms (see Simsek et al. 2009 for an overview of the different identified types
of OA in a firm). Finally, to draw conclusions on the heterogeneity of family firms
across countries, more research using a cross-country setup is needed.
In summary, our paper contributes to the understanding of family firms by

introducing organizational ambidexterity into the discussion about family firm
performance and family firm heterogeneity. Our results show that family power and
culture have a positive influence on the ambidextrous orientation in family firms
and that higher levels of OA lead to a better economic performance. Thus, our
findings add to the development of explanatory factors of family firm performance
(Melin & Nordqvist, 2007; Sharma, 2004; Westhead & Howorth, 2006). Our results
also support the call of several scholars for organizations in general to aim to
become more ambidextrous (He, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Simsek, 2009;
Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996). For managerial practice, our findings highlight the
special role of family firms as well as the positive performance impact achieved by
having an organization with a strong orientation toward ambidexterity.
141
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The Impact of Succesor Generation Discount in Family Firms: Examining Nonlinear Effects on
Exploration and Exploitation
V. THE IMPACT OF SUCCESOR GENERATION DISCOUNT IN FAMILY

FIRMS: EXAMINING NONLINEAR EFFECTS ON EXPLORATION AND
EXPLOITATION
Paper D
Christian Brands and Torsten Wulf
Abstract
This paper contributes to the debate on generational involvement in family firms
and its impact on new capability exploration and resource exploitation. Using the
resource-based view we argue that first, a U-shaped relationship between
generational involvement in family firms and the level of exploration and second,
an inverse U-shaped relationship between generational involvement and the level
of exploitation exists. We posit that as the generation managing family firms
increases, new capability exploration decreases. Simultaneously existing
resource exploitation rises up to a point where efficiency improvements no longer
lead to performance advantages. An empirical investigation involving 125 family
firms confirms our hypotheses.
Keywords
Exploration, exploitation, generational involvement, resource-based view,
empirical investigation
150
1. Introduction
Family firm researchers regard the level to which family firms concentrate on
exploitative and explorative behavior as an important driver of differences in family
firm performance (Sharma & Salvato, 2011). Exploitation refers to the orientation
of a firm towards efficiency in managing today’s business demands through
exploiting existing resources, while exploration describes a firm’s ability to be
adaptive to changes in the environment through discovering new opportunities
(Duncan, 1976; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; March, 1991; Tushman & O'Reilly III,
1996). Long-lived family firms have been found to be capable of simultaneously
exploring new possibilities while exploiting old certainties (Bergfeld & Weber,
2011; March, 1991). At the same time family firm research has also shown, that
family influence positively affects a family firm’s level of both exploration and
exploitation resulting in higher performance levels (Patel & Fiet, 2011; Stubner,
Blarr, Brands, & Wulf, 2012).
However, research suggests that the performance of family firms does not remain
constant over the life-cycle stages of the firm (Eddleston, Kellermanns, Floyd,
Crittenden, & Crittenden, 2013). Several studies in family firm research thus
distinguish between founding generation and successor generation-led family
firms (Stewart & Hitt, 2011) when trying to explain performance differences of life-
cycle stages. These studies have discovered lower performance effects for
succeeding generations than for founders (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008;
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). This successor generation discount has been attributed
to successive generations being more risk averse than founding generations
(Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Short
Jeremy, Payne, Brigham Keith, Lumpkin, & Broberg, 2009; van Essen, Carney,
Gedajlovic, & Heugens, 2011) since passing control to later generations may
weaken the entrepreneurial spirit and increase the willingness to divest resources
(Kellermanns, 2005). Since a weakened entrepreneurial spirit results in less
explorative behavior one can infer that as the family firm matures, the association
between exploration and family firm performance becomes less evident (Gómez-
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Mejía et al., 2007; Jones Carla, Makri, & Gomez-Mejia Luis, 2008; Stubner et al.,
2012). At the same time, exploitative activities become more relevant as family
firms mature with exploitative activities taking over as a performance driver
(Sharma & Salvato, 2011). Transferring these results to the level of exploration
and exploitation in family firms leads to the assumption that both vary as higher
family generations are involved in a family firm’s management (Ling &
Kellermanns, 2010).
Based on the RBV this paper examines the effects of different management
generations in family firms on the level of their explorative and exploitative
behavior. Despite existing family firm literature showing a family firm’s capability
of simultaneously exploring new possibilities through entrepreneurial risk-taking
based on unique capabilities while exploiting the valuable and rare nature of a
firm’s existing resources (Bergfeld & Weber, 2011; March, 1991), the specific
generational context unique to family firms (Chirico, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2011;
Eddleston et al., 2013) indicates that explorative and exploitative tendencies tend
to vary over the life-cycle stages of family firms. According to the resource-based
view (RBV) (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), firms use two
distinct mechanisms of rent creation for building valuable, rare, inimitable and
organizational resources (Barney, 2007): Schumpeterian rent creation
mechanisms based on explorative capabilities and Ricardian rent creation
mechanisms based on the exploitation of resources (Lim, Celly, Morse, & Rowe,
2013; Makadok, 2001). Research on the resource based view has shown that
firms tend to concentrate on one type of rent generation mechanism at a time (Lim
et al., 2013).
Based on existing family firm literature examining exploration and exploitation

(Patel & Fiet, 2011; Sharma & Salvato, 2011), the unique generational context
present in family firms (Dawson, Sharma, Irving, Marcus, & Chirico, 2013;
Eddleston et al., 2013) and drawing on the RBV (Barney, 1991; Lim et al., 2013;
Makadok, 2001), we argue that the level of exploration and exploitation varies
152
depending on the generation managing the family firm. We suggest that due to
their specific characteristics family firms are likely to apply Schumpeterian rent
generation mechanisms while early generation managers lead the firm. Thus,
they put an emphasis on explorative behavior at this stage. However, as
generational involvement in a family firm’s management increases the
concentration on existing capabilities increases (Kellermanns, 2005) meaning
efforts to create Schumpeterian rents based on explorative capabilities tend to
diminish. At the same time, increasing generational involvement in family firms
leads to an increase in conflict potential among different family members leading
to efforts to protect the wealth of the family (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino,
2005), to an increased pressure on short-term performance (Casillas, Moreno, &
Barbero, 2010) and thus to an exploitation of existing resources. Efforts to create
Ricardian rents based on exploitation of resources consequently increase to a
point where the firm has fully exploited existing resources (Patel & Fiet, 2011).
Then, the family firm is forced to concentrate on explorative behavior again and –
often – to enter into a phase of managing growth more like a nonfamily firm
(Gersick, Davis, McCollom Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997). We thus hypothesize a
U-shaped relationship between generational involvement in a family firms’
management and the level of exploration and an inverse U-shaped relationship
between the generational involvement in a family firms’ management and the level
of exploitation. An empirical analysis involving 125 private German family firms
supports our theoretical argumentation.
As such, our paper makes three contributions to the family firm literature.
Theoretically, we add to the ongoing debate regarding family firm heterogeneity by
including generational involvement in a family firms’ management as a variable
explaining observed differences in family firm behavior. Additionally, this paper
contributes to the debate on the effect of generational involvement on exploration
and exploitation. Moreover, we carefully add knowledge to the resource based-
view theory by proposing a non-linear relationship between the life-cycle stages a
family firm goes through measured by the generation managing the firm and both
Schumpeterian and Ricardian rent creation thus extending previous findings.
153
From a practical perspective our paper offers insights for family firm managers as
to the importance of focusing on both Ricardian and Schumpeterian rent creation
mechanisms during different generational stages of the firm’s development.
This paper proceeds as follows: First we lay the theoretical foundation by

reviewing the RBV and its relationship with resource exploration and exploitation.
Second we review the importance of resource exploration and exploitation for
family firms. Third, we introduce generational involvement in family firms as a
variable explaining observed differences in both strategic orientations over
different life-cycle stages. We conclude by discussing the contributions, limitations
and both theoretical and practical implications of this paper.
2. The RBV and the importance of exploration and exploitation

According to the resource-based view, which defines a firm as a bundle of tangible
and intangible resources (Barney, 1991) where organizational success and a
sustainable competitive advantage depend on the extent that these resources are
valuable, rare, inimitable and organized (Barney, 2007), firms focus on two core
rent creation mechanisms to obtain a sustained competitive advantage:
Schumpeterian rent creation based on explorative capabilities and Ricardian rent
creation based on the exploitation of resources (Lim et al., 2013). Schumpeterian
rents enable innovative processes and support firms in adapting to changing
market environments in the long-run (Teece & Pisano, 1994). These
Schumpeterian rents are predominantly created through explorative activities
based on unique capabilities (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). The RBV sees
capabilities as firm specific with a relative emphasis on explorative activities
strengthening a firm’s inimitable and organized dimensions of the RBV.
Consequently, firms that emphasize explorative activities predominantly create
value on the basis of new product development capabilities and innovation through
Schumpeterian rents (Lim et al., 2013).
In the context of this paper we define exploration of capabilities leading to

Schumpeterian rents according to March’s seminal paper as the creation of
154
distinctly different competencies through variation, risk taking, experimentation,

discovery and innovation (March, 1991) with the aim of developing new
technologies, products or markets building the base for a firm’s growth and cash
flow in the long run (Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996). Exploration thus focusses on
developing a new product or market capabilities (Voss & Voss, 2012) where
product exploration essentially leads to a completely new product while market
exploration targets new customers outside currently served markets. Following
this line of argumentation, explorative capabilities support firms in creating
Schumpeterian rents (Lim et al., 2013) leading to a sustained competitive
advantage.
In contrast to Schumpeterian rents, Ricardian rents are obtained by possessing

and using resources being a firm’s financial, physical, individual, and
organizational capital attributes (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993) for less than their
marginal productivity when utilized in combination with other resources (Makadok,
2001). The key thus is resource picking where a firm has to come into possession
of resources being able to generate economic rents by outsmarting the resource
market through superior resource-picking skills (Makadok, 2001). Once these
resources are possessed by a firm the Ricardian perspective argues that through
exploiting the valuable and rare nature of the obtained resources firms ultimately
create economic rents (Lim et al., 2013). Exploitation mechanisms applied by
firms with a Ricardian focus include property rights, resource position barriers
(Wernerfelt, 1984), immobility of valuable and rare resources (Barney, 1991) and
imperfect factor markets (Barney, 1986). The creation of economic rents thus
takes place through the selection of the right resources prior to their acquisition
and their subsequent exploitation (Makadok, 2001).
For the purpose of this paper we define exploitation as activities capturing

efficiency, production, selection and execution referring to incremental innovations
of existing products, operations and competencies to meet the needs of existing
customers to generate profits for the short run (March, 1991; Tushman & O'Reilly
III, 1996). Exploitation activities thus refine and incrementally extend existing
155
products and markets to better meet existing and enhance satisfaction for current
customers (Voss & Voss, 2012). The level of exploitation in firm is predominantly
driven through its focus on Ricardian rent creation.
3. The importance of exploration and exploitation in family firms

Research on family firms has acknowledged that a systematic exploration of
opportunities is vital to a family firm’s long-term survival across generations since
a family firm’s success often depends on its ability to enter new geographic and
product markets (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Ward, 1987). Consequently, a
family firm’s profitability and growth can be enhanced through explorative activities
looking for new ways to make a family firm’s products more distinct (Chrisman,
Chua, & Zahra, 2003). Moreover, explorative activities and investments generate
high growth (March, 1991) ensuring performance advantages and long-term
survival. Allocating the right strategic resources such as a family firm’s culture to
explorative activities is particularly important to family firms since they do not have
the slack resources required many non-family firms possess that enable them to
have explorative failures (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004).
Through their long-term nature family firms tend to have the right culture to pursue
explorative activities creating Schumpeterian rents, which allow them to dedicate
resources required for risk-taking and explorative activities (Zahra et al., 2004).
Family firms are characterized through both family and non-family members
having an exceptionally strong loyalty to the firm ensuring the family firm’s long-
term survival is secured through explorative activities (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer,
2003). This strong loyalty is enhanced through a family firm’s relative employment
security facilitating explorative activities without the fear of being punished when
failures occur (Webb, Ketchen, & Ireland, 2010). Moreover, family firms tend to
adopt an informal approach to justice meaning a lack of conflict enables
explorative activities through experimentation (Ensley & Pearson, 2005; Lubatkin,
Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006). One could thus assume that a pure focus on
exploration ensures a family firm’s long-term performance and ultimately survival.
Nevertheless, while exploration is important to generate long term competencies
156
(Levinthal & March, 1993) a sole focus on exploration does not automatically lead
to long term success since the constant renewal of products and markets can lead
to a failure trap where a firm enters a cycle of search and is not rewarded for its
change efforts (Volberda & Lewin, 2003). An overdependence on exploration can
lead to a situation where firms abandon existing routines too quickly and thus do
not fully benefit from scale economies (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; March,
1991). Family firms should thus not overemphasize explorative activities, but also
have to pursue exploitative activities.
Exploiting advantages of discovered opportunities through the accumulated stocks

of tacit knowledge ensures short term performance advantages for family firms
(Sharma & Salvato, 2011). Family firms require these constant returns from
existing resources not only to operate their daily business, but also to finance
future explorative activities (Levinthal & March, 1993). Returns from exploitative
activities tend to be more certain than returns from exploration (March, 1991)
which is why exploitative activities are also important to family firms. In a given set
of markets and products opportunity exploitation is vital for family firms to achieve
maximum returns (Sharma & Salvato, 2011). Family firms usually enjoy inimitable
knowledge and experience advantages in areas close to existing operations (Patel
& Fiet, 2011) meaning exploitation can help to advance opportunities in areas
closely related to a family firm’s existing operations.
Through their centralized decision-making structures (Pondy, 1969) and the

family’s strong influence on the delegation of power (Habbershon & Williams,
1999) family firms have the right structures to pursue exploitative activities creating
Ricardian rents. Once family firms have established family wealth or a family
legacy they tend to become more conservative (Morris, Williams, Allen, & Avila,
1997) focusing on exploitative activities. In particular, family firms that fear losing
their inheritance tend to over emphasize short-term oriented, exploitative value
creating activities (Zahra et al., 2004). Moreover, exploitation can be effective to
smaller and family firms if pursued as an internally consistent strategy compared
to a mixed strategy creating doubts as to which strategic initiatives an organization
157
is representative of (Ebben & Johnson, 2005). Family firms also have a tendency
to sustain short-term competitiveness through simplifying routines increasing
efficiency and thus exploitative activities (Levinthal & March, 1993; Webb et al.,
2010). This tendency is further enhanced through tight family-control resulting in a
homogeneous decision-making group managing the firm. Family-controlled,
homogeneous decision-making groups thus tend to be adequately suited to
pursue exploitative activities producing Ricardian rents (Webb et al., 2010).
It has generally been accepted that successful firms with a sustained competitive
advantage use a combination of resource exploration leading to Schumpeterian
rents and resource exploitation leading to Ricardian rents (Lubatkin et al., 2006;
March, 1991). However, despite the merits of pursuing both exploration and
exploitation simultaneously to create a sustained competitive advantage, research
has acknowledged that mechanisms creating Ricardian and Schumpeterian rents
vary over time (Lim et al., 2013). Regardless of most firms using a combination of
both rent creation mechanism (Makadok, 2001) one of the two is usually more
dominant in certain periods of time (Lim et al., 2013). Teece et al. (1994) argue
that capabilities creating both Schumpeterian and Ricardian rents are built over
time with one dominating over the other and vice versa depending on the age of
the firm. In the early stages of a firm, where no competitive advantage yet exists,
firms tend to focus on Schumpeterian rent creation through resource exploration.
As the firm ages and Schumpeterian rents mature, firms tend to switch to
exploiting the resources previously established through exploration thus creating
Ricardian rents (Makadok, 2001). Research thus points towards a nonlinear
development of both mechanisms over the life-cycle stages of a firm.
Given the importance of both exploration and exploitation in family firms and their
unique generational context (Dawson et al., 2013; Eddleston et al., 2013), where
clear knowledge differences and varying preferences for the strategic rent creation
orientation can be attached to generation managing a family firm (Sciascia,
Mazzola, & Chirico, 2013), one can assume a nonlinear development of both
exploration and exploitation exists over different generational stages of the family
158
firm. Transferring this argumentation to the context of our paper means the focus
on either Ricardian rent creation through exploitation or Schumpeterian rent
creation through exploration depends on the life-cycle stage of the family firm. We
address this controversial topic by focusing on an important source of life-cycle
stage differences in family firms: generational involvement of family members in a
family firm’s management. Extending the commentary by Sharma and Salvato
(2011) we argue that family generational involvement in management explains
differences in Ricardian and Schumpeterian rent creation mechanisms and thus
exploitation and exploration activities over the life-cycle stages of family firms. As
such a nonlinear approach to the influence of generational involvement on
exploration and exploitation in family firms is adopted.
4. The impact of generational involvement on exploration and exploitation

in family firms
Research on family firms has acknowledged that different generations managing a
family firm have different aspirations regarding a family firm’s focus on growth or
wealth preservation (Carlock & Janssens, 2007). First-generation or founder-led
family firms typically build up a great amount of capabilities and rituals focusing on
growth creating a critical size rather than wealth preservation since no resources
and thus competitive advantage yet exists (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002;
Bammens, Voordeckers, & Van Gils, 2008; Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005).
According to the RBV, capabilities are created through explorative activities such
as risk taking, experimentation or discovery and innovation producing pay-offs in
the form of Schumpeterian rents. The family’s original fortune is thus usually
created by a single founder (Jaffe & Lane, 2004) through explorative activities. It
is the founder of the family firm who through his entrepreneurial mindset focused
on identifying new opportunities through exploration lays the foundation of the
family business (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).
Consequently, the level of exploration in a family firm is expected to be high during
the first generation.
159
However, it is often suggested that over time founders become more risk-averse
or conservative resulting in an unwillingness to continue to invest in explorative
activities (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Zahra et al., 2004). Family-firm
founders over time sense the high risk of failure of their explorative activities
endangering past success and their desire to build a lasting legacy for future
generations (Morris et al., 1997). Moreover, this risk-averse behavior of family firm
founders is further enhanced through findings that second and subsequent
generations tend to contribute far less to a family firms’ knowledge-development
process compared to the first generation (Astrachan et al., 2002; Klein et al.,
2005). As the number of generations actively managing a family firm increases,
so does the level of task conflict among the family members involved in managing
the firm (Bammens et al., 2008). Different generations tend to have different
opinions as to whether a family firm should pursue a strategy focused on
exploration or exploitation. With an increasing number of generations managing a
family firm the number of active and passive family shareholders increases as well
(Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003; Vilaseca, 2002) with the active shareholders
emphasizing long-term performance objectives and the passive shareholders
favoring short-term payouts. Transferring this argument to our paper we can thus
infer that active, first generation shareholders favor explorative activities creating
long-term Schumpeterian rents over exploitative activities creating short-term
Ricardian rents favored by successive generations. There is thus a tendency for
the level of explorative activities to decrease as new generations enter a family
firm’s management.
This line of argumentation is further strengthened if one examines the partnership

set-ups in family firms as they pass through generations. As family firms are
transferred from the first to the second or third-and-beyond-generation family
members move away from parental firms to sibling or cousin partnerships (Steier,
2001). These relationships are characterized by a lower level of intentional trust
compared to founder-led family firms with later generation relatives attaching a
greater importance to the prosperity their direct family nucleus rather than their
extended-family (Schulze et al., 2003). Second or third-and-beyond-generation
160
family firms will thus shy away from investing in explorative activities favoring
short-term exploitative initiatives that produce instant returns for their direct family
nucleus rather than the extend family. Consequently, as the family firm matures
and is transferred from the founder to the second generation, the level of
exploration should decrease.
Needless to say that a decreased focus on exploration in the second generation

leads to a decrease in long-term growth since the family firm loses its ability to
enter new markets, revitalize existing operations and thus generate new growth
(Ward, 1987). At this stage, many family firm managers realize that assets that
previously ensured high and steady growth have reached or even overcome their
full potential. In order to continue the founder’s legacy many family firms will
require double-digit compounded annual growth rates (Jaffe & Lane, 2004) which
can only be achieved by reinventing the company (Kellermanns & Eddleston,
2006). However, due to the previously mentioned low levels of intentional trust
among sibling partnerships managing second-generation family firms, agreeing on
a common direction for change is difficult (Gersick et al., 1997). The willingness
for change towards rejuvenating the family business through exploration is thus
there, but lacks a unified direction (Eddleston et al., 2013; Zahra et al., 2004).
At this stage the family often looks for outside help in the form of family enterprise
advisors or professional managers (Davis, Dibrell, Craig, & Green, 2013; Stewart
& Hitt, 2011). One way for family firms to thus ensure its company continues to
grow is to introduce professional managers having the appropriate formal training
to coordinate different family members’ demands to overcome the dilemma of not
agreeing on a common future strategy for the family business. This introduction of
professional managers in second-generation family firms at least partially infers a
delegation of managerial authority (Stewart & Hitt, 2011), which usually results in a
hand-over of control to the third-and-beyond-generation to enable a fresh start.
These third-and-beyond-generation family firms can be described as cousin-
consortiums where a family still owns a company but an increasing number of
managers is recruited externally (Eddleston et al., 2013). However, Chrisman,
161
Chua and Steier (2011) argue that such as transition to professional management
is only successful if the behavior of the family is also changed. In practice, this
means that the family continues to own and manage the company, but leaves the
management of incremental and progressive innovations, i.e. exploitation to
professional managers whereas family managers take responsibility to identify
more radical innovations, i.e. exploration (Sharma & Salvato, 2011). The level of
exploration should thus continue to increase once a professional management has
been introduced leaving enough space for family managers to innovate. Family
firms that manage the transition to a professionally managed family firm thus
enable a new start when Ricardian rents derived from existing products through
exploitation are in decline and a stronger focus on Schumpeterian rent creating
and thus exploration is needed. Consequently:
Hypothesis 1: A U-shaped relationship exists between generational

involvement in management and the level of exploration in family firms.
As first generation family businesses are often based on innovative ideas

stemming from explorative activities (Zahra et al., 2004) the level of exploitation in
the first generational phase of a family business tends to be low. The family firm
as it is about to be established has hardly any resources and thus no competitive
advantage to be exploited yet. In the early stages family firms are entrepreneurial
ventures with the founder looking for an opportunity to exploit through explorative
activities (Eddleston et al., 2013). Once an opportunity has been identified the
founder will exploit it through an efficient production, selection and execution to
create Ricardian rents (Sharma & Salvato, 2011). From this line of reasoning one
can thus infer that in the early stages level of exploitation in a family firm is low
since the strategic focus lies on opportunity exploration. Once this opportunity has
been successfully explored the level of exploitation continues as the firm matures.
The focus on exploitative activities further increases as family firms are transferred
from the first to the second generation. Basco (2013) argues that over generations
with the acceptance of new family members into a family firm’s management the
162
firm will grow more slowly due to a general fear of losing control to other members
of the management board. In addition, with the alteration in the composition of
management family firms use more conservative strategies (Sciascia & Mazzola,
2008). Slower growth and conservative strategies are usually reflected in a focus
on exploitative rather than explorative activities. This argument is supported by
van Essen et al. (2011) who reason that successive generations in family firms are
more risk averse. Succeeding generations are believed to preserve rather than
create wealth as founders of family firms usually try to do (Stewart & Hitt, 2011).
Increasing generational involvement in family firms leads to an increase in conflict
potential among different family members leading to efforts to protect the wealth of
the family (Lubatkin et al., 2005), to an increased pressure on short-term
performance (Casillas et al., 2010) and thus to an exploitation of existing
resources.
Moreover, over time a family firm’s long-term development requiring explorative

activities is often slowed down by quality and quantity of their internal, family
human capital (Verbeke & Kano, 2010). The generations succeeding the founder
of the family firm thus seem to be less qualified to focus on explorative activities
stipulating a family firm’s growth. Heirs are usually not as driven to explore new
opportunities as founders are (Mehrotra, Morck, Shim, & Wiwattanakantang, 2011)
leading to empirical evidence that founder-controlled firms are superior performers
and firms controlled by later generation family members are inferior performers in
comparison with firms run by professional managers (Chrisman, Chua, & Steier,
2011). Hence over time a family business that wants to sustain its portfolio of
activities beyond the second generation has to ensure that it not only exploits
existing resources to create short term Ricardian rents, but that it reinvests these
returns to ensure a sustained wealth creation for future generations. At this stage
family firms face a crucial decision on whether family members want to inject
additional capital to grow the family firm through an exploration for radical
innovations (Jaffe & Lane, 2004).
163
Multigenerational family firms which have at least been passed through two
successive generations thus tend to push for the exploration of new business
opportunities while acquiring the preceding generation’s knowledge (Kellermanns
& Eddleston, 2006). Since third-and-beyond-generation family firms tend to
refocus on explorative activities through the creation of Schumpeterian rents we
assume the level of exploitation to create Ricardian rents decreases. Formally
expressed:
Hypothesis 2: An inverted U-shaped relationship exists between

generational involvement in management and the level of exploitation in
family firms.
5. Methodology
We followed recognized data collection measures of earlier studies on family firms
and used mail-surveys to obtain our data (e.g. Eddleston et al., 2013; Zellweger,
Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012) from 2,200 family firms in Germany. The
mailing list was obtained by randomly drawing from the Hoppenstedt database, the
most comprehensive SME database in Germany6. We use a SME database as the
source for our mailing list since family firms dominate among SME’s in Germany
(see Klein, 2000). Following a key informant approach (e.g. Zellweger et al.,
2012) we addressed a mailing accompanied by a personal letter to the CEO of the
private family firm. The CEO was addressed to ensure a high degree of response
quality since the head of the family firm is often the main person responsible for
driving strategic initiatives. In accordance with prior studies in the family firm
context we offered our respondents confidentiality to avoid socially desirable
responding (Davis et al., 2013). In addition to addressing the questionnaire to the
family CEO, the firms were asked to self-identify them as family firms. Having
completed a two-wave mailing initiative, 209 respondents returned the
questionnaire, resulting in 10.5% response rate. This rate is satisfactory for
private family firms (e.g. Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Zellweger et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, several responses had to be deleted from the dataset due to
6
See www.hoppenstedt.de
164
missing values (Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008) reducing the final sample to
125 private family firms. The private family firms in the final sample range in size
from 6 to 6,600 with a mean of 600 and a standard deviation of 756.
Before addressing the empirical results we have to mention our efforts in

addressing potential biases that could appear as part of our study design. First,
we checked for non-response bias (Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Kanuk &
Berenson, 1975; Oppenheim, 2000) using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Young,
1977) and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test to test for differences between
early and late responses. No statistically significant response biases were found
between early and late respondents. Second, we used Harman’s single factor test
(Malhotra, Kim, & Patil, 2006) testing for common methods bias in a single-method
research design (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Our results
showed no sign of being biased. Lastly, we also checked the internal reliability
and consistency of the constructs used computing Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach,
1987). The results achieved were satisfactory.
5.1. Constructs
Dependent Variables. Exploration (α = .73) and exploitation (α = .80) were

measured using a 12-item construct developed by Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling and
Veiga (2006), with six items measuring explorative orientation and six items
measuring exploitative orientation. The construct was measured on a 5-point
Likert scale asking family firm CEOs to assess their firm’s behavior over the past
five years with responses ranging from one (strongly disagree) to five (strongly
agree). Lubatkin et al.’s (2006) measure is seen as the most advanced construct
assessing exploration and exploitation since it combines previous
conceptualizations of both dimensions (Benner & Tushman, 2003; He, 2004)
covering all major aspects. Choosing this construct ensures comparability of our
findings with the majority of research employing this approach (Voss & Voss,
2012).
165
Independent Variable. Generational involvement was measured in accordance

with other research (e.g. Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Sciascia & Mazzola,
2008; Zahra et al., 2004) by asking the private family firm CEO to report the
generation of the owner-family currently managing the family firm and thus being
part of the family’s top management team (TMT). Respondents were asked to
note the highest generation of the owner-family managing the family firm (one,
two, three etc.) while having the opportunity to indicate that no one from the
owner-family is active in the family firm’s management. In our sample, 33% of
private family firms are managed by the first generation, 30% by the second
generation and 37% by the third-or-beyond generation.
Controls. In accordance with prior research, we controlled for eight variables

(age, size, number of family managers on the TMT, number of non-family
managers on the TMT, past performance as well as three industries) that could
influence both exploration and exploitation. Family firm age was controlled for
since older firms are expected to undertake explorative initiatives less frequently
due to inertia (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1989) while younger firms are expected to
grow faster (e.g. Eddleston et al., 2013) thus neglecting exploitative efforts of
obtained resources. It was measured by taking the number of years since the
company was founded (Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000). Next we controlled for
family firm size using the natural log of the number of employees (Zellweger et al.,
2012) as larger firms tend to have more slack resources facilitating structural
investments in explorative activities (March, 1991). Given the difficulties
associated with increasing generational involvement could be related with the
number of family members on the TMT (Sciascia et al., 2013; Zahra et al., 2004)
we controlled for number of family members on the TMT. Since professional
managers having no relationship with the owner family are considered to be more
objective when it comes to balancing explorative and exploitative activities
(Salvato, Chirico, & Sharma, 2010) we controlled for the number of non-family
members on the TMT. Additionally, past performance (α = .76) was included as a
control variable since past firm success has a tendency to encourage explorative
166
activities that without slack resources would not be undertaken (Tasi, 2001). It
was measured by asking respondents to rate their private family firm’s financial
performance relative to their main competitors, industry development and own
goals for the three-year period 2006-2008 on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from
one (considerably worse) to five (considerably better) (Hart & Banbury, 1994;
Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987). Finally, as previous research on private
family firms highlights that industry can affect the level of exploration and
exploitation we included three industries (Manufacturing 49%, Retail 16% and
Services 35%) as a control variable (Miller & Cardinal, 1994).
5.2. Results
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis was used to test our hypotheses
with Table 1 presenting the descriptive statistics and correlations for the study’s
variables. In Model 1 and 4 we only included the controls variables. In Model 2, 3,
5 and 6 we tested for both our hypotheses. We proposed in hypothesis one that a
U-shaped relationship exists between generational involvement in management
and the level of exploration in family firms. In Model 2 exploration was regressed
on generation with generation squared being added in Model 3. Despite
generation not appearing to be significantly related to exploration in Model 2 (-.08;
not significant), in Model 3 generation exposed a negative and significant
coefficient (-.45; p < .05) while generation squared was positive and significant
(.06; p < .01). The analytical results thus support our first hypothesis.
167
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Exploration 3.33 0.53

2. Exploitation 3.68 .40 0.23 **
3. Firm Age 68.14 66.38 -.03 -.19 *
a
4. Firm Size 5.40 2.02 .35 *** .26 ** .29 ***
5. Family Managers on TMT 1.56 1.03 .02 .03 -.06 -.09
6. Non-Family Managers on TMT 1.46 1.87 .19 * .13 .01 .50 *** -.29 ***
7. Performance 1.64 .98 .04 -.01 .09 -.25 ** .08 -.18 *
8. Manufacturing .56 .63 .08 .07 .05 .01 -.19 * -.02 -.05
9. Retail .13 .34 -.05 -.03 -.13 .01 .29 *** -.01 .03 -.31 ***
10. Services .33 .47 -.01 .04 .08 -.02 -.13 .10 .13 -.51 *** -.27 ***
11. Generation 2.64 1.36 -.04 .24 ** .63 *** .22 ** .07 .08 -.09 .01 .04 -.05
t
n = 125; *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; p < .10
SD, Standard Deviation; TMT, Top Management Team;
a
Variable is a natural logarithm
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

168
In hypothesis two we proposed an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between

generational involvement in management and the level of exploitation in family
firms. In Model 5 exploitation was regressed on generation. Generation appears
to be slightly significantly related to exploitation (.06; p <.10). In Model 6
generation squared was added with generation now showing a positive and
significant coefficient (.24; p < .01) and generation squared a negative and
significant coefficient (-.16; p < .01). The analytical results thus also support our
second hypothesis.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Variables
Exploration Exploration Exploration
Controls
1. Firm Age .01 .01 -.01
a
2. Firm Size .12 *** .15 *** .15 ***
3. Family Managers on TMT .06 .06 .16 *
4. Non-Family Managers on TMT .01 -.01 -.02
5. Performance .07 .05 .06
6. Manufacturing .12 .13 .17
7. Retail -.02 .05 .05
8. Services .06 .11 .30
Main Effects
Generation - -.08 -.45 *
Generation squared - - .06 **
F 3.64 *** 3.51 *** 2.88 **

R² .17 .22 .20
Change in R² .04 .01
Adj. r² .13 .15 .13
t
n = 125; *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; p < .10
TMT, Top Management Team;
a
Table 5: Results of Regression on Exploration
Further, to check for the robustness of our nonlinear relationship between

generational involvement and exploration as well as exploitation in family firms we
draw on Lind and Mehlum (2010) to assess the validity of a U-shaped relationship
between generational involvement and exploration and an inverted U-shaped
relationship between generational involvement and exploitation (see Karim, 2009;
169
Wales, Parida, & Patel, 2013). First we test the joint significance of the direct and
squared terms of generation on exploration followed by Lind and Mehlum’s (2010)
test for a U-shaped relationship (H1: The relationship is U-shaped). The U-shaped
relationship appears to be significant (p < .01) with an extreme point at the third
generation (generation: 3.01). The same procedure was performed to test the
joint significance of the direct and squared terms of generation on exploitation
followed by a test for an inverted U-shaped relationship (H1: The relationship is
inverse U-shaped). The inverse U-shaped relationship is observed to be
significant (p < .01) with an extreme point just after the second generation
(generation: 2.10). Together, the results of Model 2, 3, 5 and 6 provide consistent
support for our hypotheses indicating a U-shaped relationship between
generational involvement in management and exploration in family firms and an
inverted U-shaped relationship between generational involvement in management
and exploitation in family firms.
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Variables
Exploitation Exploitation Exploitation
Controls
t
1. Firm Age -.01 -.01 .01
a
2. Firm Size .05 * .05 * .08 ***
3. Family Managers on TMT .04 .05 .08 *
4. Non-Family Managers on TMT .01 .02 .02
5. Performance .01 .01 .01
t
6. Manufacturing .14 .13 .10
7. Retail .03 -.01 -.75
8. Services .14 .09 .18
Main Effects
t
Generation - .06 .24 **
Generation squared - - -.16 **
F 2.48 ** 2.26 ** 1.28 **

R² .13 .18 .19
Change in R² .06 .01
Adj. r² .08 0.12 .12
t
n = 125; *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; p < .10
TMT, Top Management Team;
a
Table 6: Results of Regression on Exploitation
170
The Impaact of Succes
sor Generatio
on Discount in Family Firrms: Examiniing Nonlinea
ar Effects on
Exploratio
on and Explo
oitation
Figure 41: Generationa

al Involveme
ent and Explo
oration
In order to facilitate the intterpretation

n of our results
r thee interactio
ons betwe
een
onal involv
generatio vement in private fam
mily firms and explooration we
ere plotted in
Figure 41
1 as well as exploittation in Figure
F 42 (Cohen, C
Cohen, We
est, & Aike
en,
2003). Figure 41
1 (hypothe
esis 1) sh
hows the U-shapedd relationship betwe
een
generatio
onal involvement in m
manageme xploration in private family firm
ent and ex ms.
As expeccted, the le
evel of exp
ploration is highest in
n the first ggeneration continuously
decreasin
ng until the third ge
eneration ta
akes over the manaagement of
o the priva
ate
family firm. Beyond the thiird genera
ation the le
evel of exxploration continues to
increase but neverr regains tthe innova
ative and thus explorrative edge of the first
generatio
on (Gómez
z-Mejía et a
al., 2007; Short
S Jeremy et al., 22009; van Essen et al.,
a
2011). In
n line with our predicctions Figu
ure 42 (hyp
pothesis 2)) depicts th
he increasing
focus on exploitativ
ve activitiess in private
e family firrms up to tthe second
d generatio
on.
Once third-and-bey
yond gene
erations ta
ake over th e exploitative
he managgement the
focus deccreases significantlyy. The imp
plications of
o these reesults are discussed
d in
the next section.
s
1
171
The Impaact of Succes
sor Generatio
on Discount in Family Firrms: Examiniing Nonlinea
ar Effects on
Exploratio
on and Explo
oitation
Figu
ure 42: Gene
erational Invo
olvement and
d Exploitation
n
6. Disc
cussion
Generatio
onal trans
sition and generatio vement in family firms add an
onal involv
additiona
al layer off complexi ty not fou
und in oth
her firm ccontexts. Despite this
additiona
al complexiity continu ing a firm as a family firm maaking it a dynasty
d oftten
remains the
t prime goal of an
ny family enterprise.
e Yet the re
reality draw
ws a differe
ent
picture with
w only one-third
o o
of family firms makin
ng a succeessful tran
nsition to the
t
second generation
g and a m
mere ten percent
p co d generation
ontinuing to the third
(Birley, 1986; Neub
bauer & La
ank, 1998). Unders
standing geenerationa
al differencces
amily firms is thus vita
among fa al to ensurre fewer family firms fail during generational
transition
ns.
In our paper
p ular area of family firm rese
we focus on a particu earch whe
ere
generatio ppear to have a significan t impact: opportun
onal differrences ap nity
exploratio
on creatin
ng Schum
mpeterian rents se
ecuring loong-term growth and
a
opportunity exploittation crea
ating Rica
ardian rents throughh an effic
cient use of
resourcess. Over tim
me both arre seen as
s an importtant driver of differen
nces in fam
mily
firm perfo
ormance (S
Sharma & Salvato, 2011).
2 In our paperr, we take generational
involveme
ent in a family firm’s managem
ment as a proxy
p for thhe family firm’s differe
ent
life cycle stages. Adopting a non-line
ear approa
ach to highhlight the variations in
1
172
success associated with opportunity exploration and exploitation over time, our
results show that during different generational stages family firms experience
different levels of both exploration and exploitation. Specifically, a U-shaped
relationship between generational involvement in a family firm’s management and
the level of exploration is confirmed through our empirical results. The lowest level
of exploration is attained when the third generation manages the family firm. At
this stage family firms are often in the middle of a transition process towards a
consortium of cousins ownership where an extended family owns a family and
employs some family members to manage the firm (Eddleston et al., 2013;
Gersick et al., 1997; Lubatkin et al., 2005). In these cousin consortiums family
firms employ an increasing proportion of non-family managers pushing the family
to become active shareholders rather than active managers. Altruistic attributes,
such as the prime goal turning the family enterprise into a dynasty through the
exploration for radical innovations that were strongly present in the previous
generations seem to have been lost during the generational transition process
(Lubatkin et al., 2005). With this loss and the introduction of professional
managers a stronger emphasis is placed on short-term performance and dividend
payments (Schulze et al., 2003) leading to a continuous decrease in exploration.
However, since our empirical findings confirm a U-shaped relationship the level of
exploration continues to increase again beyond the third generation managing the
family firm. We attribute this effect to Sharma and Salvato’s (2011) findings that
dynastic family firms have found a seamless balance between the controlling
family and nonfamily professionals. In this setting, radical innovations developed
through an exploration of resources are the family’s responsibility whereas
nonfamily professional managers concentrate on operational matters exploiting
existing resources. When the level of exploration is at its lowest during the third
family generation managing the firm, the family is still in a strong transition process
trying to find a balance between maintaining control of the business whilst also
managing it. Those family firms that succeed this transition process experience
higher levels of exploration and thus long-term growth through the creation of
Schumpeterian rents.
173
Furthermore, our empirical results confirm an inverted U-shape relationship

between generational involvement in a family firm’s management and the level of
exploitation. The highest level of exploitation is attained when the second family
generation manages the family firm. At this stage family firms often deal with
challenges arising from the foundations of the family firm laid by the founder. Over
time, family firm founders tend to be come afraid of losing their wealth reflected in
a higher risk-aversion and an emphasis on exploitation rather than exploration of
resources (Casillas et al., 2010; Eddleston et al., 2013). The second-generation
managing the firm tends to adopt the strategic initiatives and goals laid by the
founder thus continuing to focus on the exploitation of resources. Moreover,
second generation family firms tend to suffer from conflicts among siblings taking
over the management of the firm struggling to find a common strategy and balance
between continuing the path set by the founder and exploring new opportunities
(Lubatkin et al., 2005).
Nevertheless, since our findings confirm an inverted U-shape relationship the level
of exploitation decreases when the management of the family business is
transitioned from the second to the third-and-beyond-generation. At this stage the
generation managing the family firm seems to have found a solution for their initial
conflicts in the form of introducing external, professional managers that take over
the operational management of the family business whilst family members active
in the management focus on explorative activities (Eddleston et al., 2013). The
Overall level of exploitation should thus decrease as the family place an increased
emphasis on explorative initiatives creating long-term growth through
Schumpeterian rents.
Finally, our results offer interesting insights why a mere ten percent of first
generation family businesses successfully transition to the third generation: While
the level of exploration and thus the creation of long-term growth through
Schumpeterian rents is at its lowest in the third generation managing the family
business, the level of exploitation and thus the creation of short-term profits
174
through Ricardian rents is at its peak in the second generation managing the
family business. The crucial transition process in a family firm’s management thus
seems to occur during the second and third generation, at least in terms of the
family firms’ focus on exploration and exploitation. Yet, as exploration and
exploitation are seen as an important driver of differences in family firm
performance (Sharma & Salvato, 2011) our results suggest that in imbalance
between both occurs between the second and third family generation managing
the family firm, which might explain why so few family firms succeed in the
transition process.
6.1. Implications for theory and practice

Three important contributions emerge from our paper. First our research extends
the ongoing debate regarding family firm heterogeneity by including generational
involvement in a family firm’s management as a variable explaining observed
difference in family firm behavior. In doing so we answer Sharma and Salvato’s
(2011) to further refine and test how family firms exploit and explore new
opportunities over different life cycle stages. We show how generational
involvement in family firms influences a family firms’ focus on either exploration or
exploitation over time suggesting that during different life cycle stages both
orientations receive a varying degree of attention. Moreover, existing research
assumes that those family firms continuously combining exploration with
exploitation will perform better than other ones (e.g. Patel & Fiet, 2011). Our
findings suggest that a simultaneous combination of both is difficult to achieve for
family firms over life-cycle stages as generations place a different importance on
either exploration or exploitation. However, those family firms succeeding in
achieving both simultaneously are expected to achieve superior performance
results over the long term (Stubner et al., 2012; Webb et al., 2010).
Second, we add some knowledge to the RBV literature by proposing a non-linear

relationship between Schumpeterian rent creation through exploration and
Ricardian rent creation through exploitation. Previous findings suggest that while
most firms use a combination of both exploration and exploitation as rent creation
175
mechanisms (Makadok, 2001), one or the other dominates in certain context (Lim
et al., 2013). While previous research has mostly focused on environmental or
industry differences to describe these differences, we add a life-cycle stage
perspective to the debate by introducing generational involvement in family firms
as an explanatory variable explaining observed differences in rent creation
mechanisms through exploration and exploitation. Our findings thus confirm that
both rent creation mechanisms occur cyclically in a family firm context depending
on the generation managing the firm.
Third our work offers insights to family firm managers that both rent creation
mechanisms are important during different generational stages of the family firm’s
development. Both extremes require a careful balance depending on which
generation currently manages the family firm to be successful in the long run.
6.2. Study limitations and future research
As with any paper there are limitations to the presented research offering several
routes for future investigations. First, we take a family firm’s life cycle as a static
contingent on a specific family generation managing the family firm. However,
different life cycle stages of a family firm can occur within a single family
generation managing the family business. Future studies should therefore
account for more fine-grained life-cycle stages of a family firm in a multi-level
research design. Second, we do not account for a family firm founder’s influence
on a firm’s strategy and goals often having a wide reaching impact on the future
development of the firm well into the second or third-and-beyond-generation
managing the firm. A family firm founder’s preference for either Schumpeterian
rent creation through exploration or Ricardian rent creation through exploitation
can have a significant impact on the emphasis placed on either mechanism by
future generations managing the firm. Future research should thus incorporate the
initial strategic direction set for the business by the founder. Third, our paper is
based on cross-sectional data with answers provided by one key informant per
company. Although we found no indication of common method or respondent bias
176
(Phillips, 1981; Podsakoff et al., 2003), future studies should aim to include
multiple key informants and a longitudinal research design. Fourth our data were
collected amongst German family firms only. Given the cultural differences
occurring both in terms of generational involvement in family firms and different
rent creation mechanisms across different cultures (Chrisman et al., 2011;
Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996), our results may not be generalizable to family firms
outside Germany. A multi-country study examining the effects of cultural
influences on both exploration and exploitation as well as generational
involvement in family firms is thus desirable. Finally, including third-and-beyond
generation firms in our paper can be seen as the outcome of a selection bias since
their survival indicates a successful balance between exploration and exploitation
creating superior long-term performance returns. This limitation requires a more
detailed analysis at what stage in their development family firms achieve a strong
balance between both extremes and whether this balance actually produces
superior return compared to a strategy focused on either exploitation or
exploration.
6.3. Conclusion
The current paper examined the nonlinear effects of generational involvement in

family firm management and its impact on the level of exploration and exploitation
in privately held family firms. The unique insight of the research is that
generational involvement in family firm management leads to a U-shape
relationship in explorative activities reaching its lowest point during the third
generation and an inverse U-shape relationship in exploitative activities reaching
its peak in the second generation managing the family firm. As such generational
involvement in family firm management uniquely affects the level of exploration
and exploitation in family firms. Our paper offers distinct insights for researchers
suggesting that family firms apply different rent creation mechanisms during
different generational management stages hinting towards the difficulty of
simultaneously pursuing an exploration for new opportunities and exploitation of
existing resources in family firms.
177
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Table of Appendicies
TABLE OF APPENDICIES
Appendix 1: Exploration and Exploitation Questionnaire Items ............................. XI

Appendix 2: F-PEC Scale Questionnaire Items ................................................... XII
Appendix 3: Performance Items ........................................................................... XV
X
Appendicies
APPENDICIES
Appendix 1: Exploration and Exploitation Questionnaire Items
10. Wie stark treffen folgende Eigenschaften auf Ihr Unternehmen zu?
Bitte beurteilen Sie, inwiefern die Aussagen auf Ihr Unternehmen vor der Krise zugetroffen haben und
Trifft über‐ Trifft voll
ob sie sich in der Krise verstärkt (+) oder abgeschwächt (‐) haben.
haupt und ganz
nicht zu zu
Unser Unternehmen...
...sucht nach neuartigen Ideen, indem es "über den Tellerrand" hinausschaut.     
...sichert den Erfolg durch die Fähigkeit, neue Technologien zu entdecken.     
...entwickelt innovative Produkte oder Dienstleistungen.     
...sucht kreative Wege, um Kundenbedürfnisse zu befriedigen.     
...tritt regelmäßig entschlossen in neue Marktsegmente ein.     
...versucht aktiv neue Kundengruppen anzusprechen.     
...ist auf Qualitätsverbesserungen und Kostensenkungen ausgerichtet.     
...verbessert kontinuierlich die Zuverlässigkeit bestehender Produkte.     
...steigert ständig den Automatisierungsgrad der Prozesse.     
…prüft regelmäßig die Zufriedenheit bestehender Kunden.     
...optimiert bestehende Angebote, um aktuelle Kunden zufrieden zu stellen.     
...versucht die bestehende Kundenbasis weiter auszuschöpfen.     
(Source: Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006)
XI
Appendicies
Appendix 2: F-PEC Scale Questionnaire Items
24. Würden Sie Ihr Unternehmen als "Familienunternehmen" bezeichnen? Ja  Nein 

Unabhängig davon, wie viele Gesellschafter im Unternehmen aktiv sind: Sehen Sie sich als ein klassisches Familienunternehmen?
Falls ja: Was charakterisiert Sie als Familienunternehmen?
25. Wie hoch ist der Anteil am Unternehmen, der von Familienmitgliedern gehalten wird? Vor der Krise

Bitte geben Sie an, wie viel Prozent des Eigenkapitals durch die Eignerfamilie(n) gehalten werden. Bitte geben Sie auch an, ob sich
dieser Anteil durch die Krise erhöht (+) oder verringert (‐) hat.
Ihr Unternehmen gehört: • Eignerfamilie(n) %

• Familienfremden (z.B. Management, Investoren) %
26. Wie stark sind Mitglieder der Eignerfamilie(n) in der Führung des Unternehmens aktiv?
Bitte geben Sie jeweils an, wie viele Familienmitglieder in den Gremien aktiv sind. Bitte geben Sie auch an, ob sich die Anzah in der
Vor der Krise
Krise erhöht (+) oder verringert (‐) hat.
Aus wie vielen Mitgliedern besteht Ihre Geschäftsführung insgesamt?
Wie Familienmitglieder sind in der Geschäftsführung Ihres Unternehmens?
Wie viele der Nicht‐Familienmitglieder in der Geschäftsführung wurden von Familienmitgliedern ausgesucht?
Vor der Krise
Ja Nein
Verfügt Ihr Unternehmen über ein Aufsichts‐ oder Beiratsgremium o.ä.?  
Falls ja: Wie viele Mitglieder gehören diesem insgesamt an?
Wie viele davon sind Mitglieder der Eignerfamilie(n)?
Wie viele der Nicht‐Familienmitglieder des Gremiums wurden von Familienmitgliedern
benannt?
XII
Appendicies
27. Wie aktiv ist die Eignerfamilie im Unternehmen engagiert?
Bitte geben Sie jeweils die höchste Generationenzahl bzw. die Anzahl an Familienmitgliedern an.
Geben Sie bitte auch jeweils an, inwieweit sich diese Anzahl in der Krise erhöht (+) oder verringert (‐) hat.
Die wievielte Familiengeneration ist Eigentümer des Unternehmens?
Welche Generation führt das Unternehmen?
Welche Generation ist aktiv im Aufsichts‐ oder Beirat?
Wie viele Familienmitglieder arbeiten im Unternehmen (in leitender oder nicht leitender Funktion)?
Wie viele Familienmitglieder sind zwar nicht aktiv, aber am Unternehmen interessiert?
Wie viele Familienmitglieder haben kein Interesse am Unternehmen gezeigt?
28. Wie bewerten Sie die folgenden Aussagen in Bezug auf Ihr Unternehmen?
Bitte beurteilen Sie folgende Aussagen für Ihr Unternehmen. Geben Sie bitte auch an, ob
haupt und ganz
sich die Haltung in der Krise verstärkt (+) oder verringert (‐) hat.
nicht zu zu
Die Familie hat sehr großen Einfluss auf das Unternehmen.     
Die Familienmitglieder haben vergleichbare Wertvorstellungen.     
Eignerfamilie und Unternehmen haben die gleichen Wertvorstellungen.     
haupt und ganz
Die Familie … nicht zu zu
… steht in Diskussionen mit Freunden, Angestellten und anderen
Familienmitgliedern voll hinter dem Unternehmen.     
… engagiert sich überdurchschnittlich für den Erfolg des Unternehmens.     
… erzählt stolz, dass sie Teil des Unternehmens ist.     
… fühlt sich loyal gegenüber dem Unternehmen.     
… ist einig mit den Zielen, Werten und Strategien des Unternehmens.     
… ist wirklich interessiert an der Entwicklung des Unternehmens.     
… profitiert langfristig sehr stark durch das Engagement im Unternehmen.     
… glaubt, dass die Familien‐ und Unternehmenswerte übereinstimmen.     
XIII
Appendicies
Falls Sie selbst Mitglied der Eignerfamilie sind: Ich (als Familienmitglied) …
... erfahre durch mein Engagement im Familienunternehmen einen
    
positiven Einfluss auf mein Leben.
… verstehe und unterstütze die Entscheidung meiner Familie für
    
die Zukunft des Familienunternehmens.
(Source: Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005)
XIV
Appendicies
Appendix 3: Performance Items
19. Wie hat sich Ihr Unternehmen in den letzten Jahren entwickelt? 2006 2007 2008

Bitte geben Sie die Werte für jedes Jahr an. Geben sie bitte auch eine Schätzung für 2009 ab.
Umsatz (in Mio. EUR)
Ergebnis der gewöhnlichen Geschäftstätigkeit (EBIT; in Mio. EUR)
Eigenkapital (in Mio. EUR)
Eigenkapitalquote (in %)
Bilanzsumme (in Mio. EUR)
21. Wie beurteilen Sie das Ergebnis Ihres Unternehmens insgesamt?
Bitte geben Sie an, wie Sie die Entwicklung Ihres Unternehmens beurteilen. Deutlich Deutlich
Bitte kreuzen Sie jeweils eine Antwort an. schlechter besser
Ergebnis relativ zu Ihren größten Wettbewerbern?     
Ergebnis relativ zu Ihrer Branche?     
Ergebnis relativ zu Ihren Planzielen?     
(Source. Geringer & Herbert, 1991; Slater & Narver, 1993)
XV
Eidesstattliche Versicherung
EIDESSTATTLICHE VERSICHERUNG
VERSICHERUNG NACH § 9 ABS. 3 DER PROMOTIONSORDNUNG DER

HHL LEIPZIG GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT VOM
3. DEZEMBER 2009:
Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit ohne unzulässige Hilfe
Dritter und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt
habe; die aus fremden Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Gedanken sind
als solche kenntlich gemacht. Bei der Auswahl und Auswertung des Materials
sowie bei der Herstellung des Manuskripts habe ich keine Unterstützungsleistung
erhalten. Dritte haben von mir weder unmittelbar noch mittelbar geldwerte
Leistungen für Arbeiten erhalten, die im Zusammenhang mit dem Inhalt der
vorgelegten Dissertation stehen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher weder im Inland noch im
Ausland in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form einer Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt. Mit der
vorliegenden Arbeit wurde an anderen wissenschaftlichen Hochschulen noch kein
Promotionsverfahren in Wirtschaftswissenschaften beantragt.
Leipzig, 23. August 2013
____________________________
Christian Brands, M.Sc.
XVI
© HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, 2013
The sole responsibility for the content of this doctoral thesis lies with the author.
We encourage the use of the material for teaching or research purposes with reference to the
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Dissertation

Scenario-Based Strategic Planning

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

Christian Brands, M.Sc.

Prof. Dr. Torsten Wulf

Prof. Dr. Stephan Stubner

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... I

3.4. Description of the scenario matrix ........................................................ 62

3. Methodology ............................................................................................. 131

Figure 27: The strategy corridor ............................................................................ 93

I. SCENARIO-BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING AND STRATEGIC

Overview of the cumulative dissertation

1. Research Question and Goal of the Dissertation

However, more recent studies present a range of solutions to achieve a

One approach identified by the strategic management literature capable of

their strengths is scenario planning (Schoemaker, 1995). Scenario Planning allows

Constructing multiple future scenarios answering critical questions regarding how

This dissertation overcomes both gaps present in the management literature on

The second paper “Szenariobasierte Strategische Planung in Volatilen Umfeldern”

relevant examples as well as the knowledge transfer of an academic, theoretical

The paper “Szenariobasierte Strategische Planung in Volatilen Umfeldern” is an

The paper introduces scenario-based strategic planning as an instrument for

research in family firms. It introduces the concept of organizational ambidexterity

the generation involved in managing a family firm increases, the level of

following existing formalize

The transsfer of the six tools tto the corp

for the finance function to develop specific strategies based on scenarios

By transferring the findings on how firms can sustain a competitive advantage

In addition, this thesis provides insights on the generational involvement in family

contributes to the family firm research debate on the strategies pursued by

These contributions to the growing literature on strategic management in family

Summarizing, this dissertation presents six tools to be used as part of a scenario-

2.2. Implications and Further Research

Moreover, combining strategy and managerial accounting research through the

The dissertation introduces organizational ambidexterity to the family firm context

With the empirical analysis of organizational ambidexterity in German family firms

The dissertation’s final paper continues the debate on strategic management in

towards capability exploration and resource exploitation potentially putting the

Ansoff, H. I. 1991. Critique of Henry Mintzberg's 'The Design School:

Kellermanns, F. W., & Eddleston, K. A. 2004. Feuding Families: When Conflict

Intentions for Transgenerational Control. Organization Science, 23(3):

II. SIX TOOLS FOR SCENARIO-BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING AND

Christian Brands, Torsten Wulf and Philip Meissner

Further information on the book can be found here:

III. SZENARIOBASIERTE STRATEGISCHE PLANUNG IN VOLATILEN

Torsten Wulf, Stephan Stubner, Philip Meissner und Christian Brands

1. Einführung: Unternehmen agieren in einer zunehmend volatilen Umwelt

2. Volatilität als Herausforderung für die strategische Planung

sind, in der Regel relativ kontinuierliche Umweltveränderungen betrachtet werden.

Insbesondere müssen solche Ansätze es ermöglichen, nicht nur eine mögliche

Oft versuchen Unternehmen, dies durch die Anwendung der Szenarioplanung zu

Allerdings kann auch die klassische Szenarioplanung nicht alle Anforderungen an

zukünftige Entwicklungen zu fördern, wird sie oft ohne methodische Unterstützung

3. Szenariobasierte strategische Planung als Lösungsansatz für Planung

3.1. Grundlagen der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung

Mit dem zweiten Schritt, der Wahrnehm

mentalen Modelle der Entscheidungsträger im Unternehmen in Bezug auf die Ent-

Die Vertreter der unterschiedlichen Anspruchsgruppen werden in einem zweistufi-

Im Rahmen einer szenariobasierten strategischen Analyse für den

Im dritten Schritt der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung, der Trend-und Un-

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* p < .001; p < .01; * p < .05; t p < .10