Samson V Guingona
Samson V Guingona
Samson V Guingona
79.[3]
Totanes, Adriano Cruz, and police officers Ernesto Diaz, Fernando Nituan, Jaime de la
Cueva, Nestor Tiotioen and Edwin Villanueva, for the killing of Datu Gemie Sinsuat, a
son of a politician from Cotabato, on July 13, 1995, at Scout Reyes, Barangay
Pinagkaisahan, Quezon City.
The case was assigned to Prosecution Attorney Emmanuel Velasco.
Accused Diaz, Nituan and dela Cueva admitted killing Datu Sinsuat but claimed
self-defense since according to them, they killed Sinsuat during a shootout. On the
other hand, accused Samson and Totanes denied any participation in the killing and
alleged that they arrived at the scene of the crime after the shooting in response to a
radio message requesting for assistance. [6]
petitioners and other police officers, except Nestor Tiotioen and Edwin Villanueva, who
turned state witnesses.
On October 3, 1995, petitioners filed with the trial court a Very Urgent Motion for
Judicial Determination of Existence of Probable Cause (with Prayer to Hold the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest) praying:
[9]
On October 9, 1995, the trial court ruled that there was probable cause for the
arrest, with no bail, of accused Ernesto Diaz, Fernando Nituan and Jaime de la Cueva. [10]
On October 18, 1995, the trial court ruled that it was premature to discuss the merits
of Exhibits “A” to “F” (for the prosecution) for the purpose of the issuance of a warrant of
arrest considering that these exhibits were not presented during the preliminary
investigation of the case and accused were not furnished copies of the same. The trial
[11]
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds that at the time of the filing of the
information for murder against accused Samson, Totanes, Bustinera and Cruz
based on the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation and
Resolution dated September 29, 1995 issued by Prosecutor Emmanuel Y.
Velasco, the Court finds no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against accused P/Sr. Insp. Rodolfo Samson, PO3 Pablo Totanes, PO3
James Bustinera and PO1 Adriano Cruz.
Petitioners did not file any motion for reconsideration of the order. However, before
the Department of Justice could conduct a reinvestigation, on February 6, 1996,
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the instant petition to enjoin respondents from
further proceeding with the reinvestigation of the case or from resolving the same. [13]
The issue is whether or not the Court may enjoin the Secretary of Justice from
conducting a reinvestigation of the charges against petitioners as ordered by the trial
court for determination of probable cause.
We dismiss the petition.
Petitioners’ plea for injunction to restrain the reinvestigation of the criminal case
against them is not legally permissible.
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction
preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With more reason will
[14]
injunction not lie when the case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation. However, in extreme cases, we have laid the following exceptions:
[15]
(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there
is a prejudicial question which is subjudice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without
or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law; ordinance or
regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and
a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. [16]
Petitioners have not shown that the case at bar falls within any of the recognized
exceptions above set forth. Petitioners only rely on the probability that a reinvestigation
may result in the remand of the case to the court and the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
We find petitioners’ plea for a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order utterly
without merit. As a rule, we do not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations
or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will
establish probable cause for the filing of information against an offender. [17]