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However it was soon realised that 10 Brigade Commander Haji Iftikhar was not the
best man to face the most dangerous brunt of Indian attack.8
While military history books concentrate on broad military events , unit
performance is generally overlooked and not critically appraised. The Pakistan Army chief Gracey in consultation with Major General Loftus
Tottenham then decided that the ideal man to lead Pakistan Armys most decisive
This short book , first of three concentrates on unit performance in Pakistan Armys and critical front in Kashmir was Brigadier Akbar Khan (Pareech Khel) the highest
three wars. decorated serving officer in Pakistan Army who had won a DSO in Burma and was
regarded as an expert in dealing with tribal Pathans.
This first volume deals with infantry battalion performance in Pakistans first war in
history. Gracey was Akbar Khans divisional commander in Burma and personally knew
him.It was Gracey who had recommended Akbar Khan for the award of the
The war started in late October 1947 .The official Pakistan position is that Pakistan “Distinguished Service Order” for outstanding bravery and leadership.
Army was first introduced in Kashmir war in May 1948.1

However this scribes regiment PAVO Cavalry 11th Frontier Force was inducted in
Kashmir war as early as October 1947 when wireless fitted jeep was sent by
Pakistan Armys director military intelligence to monitor the tribal invasion of
Kashmir on Abbottabad-Muzaffarabad-Uri- Srinagar axis.2

Lieutenant General Attiq ur Rahman in his history of PIFFERS states that 1st
Mountain Artillery Regiments 3rd Peshawar Mountain Battery was deployed in
Kashmir as early as February 1948.3

Attiq stated that 4th Battalion, 13th Frontier Force Rifles sent a company to
participate in Kashmir war in Poonch as early as 1st February 1948.4

Initially 10 Brigade of 7 Division was given responsibility for Jhelum and Neelum
Valley5 and one of its battalions 4/16 Punjab was deployed in Chakothi area in
Jhelum Valley.6

10 Brigade comprised 4/10 Baluch ,3/12 Frontier Force Regiment, 5/13 Frontier
Force Rifles and 4/16 Punjab.7

Only 4/16 Punjab was initially deployed in Jhelum valley while other units stayed in
Abbottabad.

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Thus 4/16 Punjab of 10 Brigade was replaced at Chakothi by 1/13 FF Rifles of 101
Brigade on 13 May 1948 10 and sent back to Abbottabad.

The official history of 1970 noted that Brigadier Akbar Khan was selected as he was
uniquely suited for the task .11 The official history noted that Akbar knew the
terrain in great detail.

This was so because Akbar had earlier led the Tribal invasion of Kashmir in
October-November 1947.

101 Brigade comprised 5/12 FF Regiment (Guides Infantry , 1/13 FF Rifles and 2/13
FF Rifles.12 2/1 Punjab earlier part of 102 Brigade at Bannu was also placed under
its command.In addition the brigade also received 4/10 Baluch earlier part of 10
Brigade.

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2/13 FF Rifles was initially deployed in Bagh.13 Later it was deployed in operations Pakistani accounts dealing with 1947-48 Kashmir war are highly confusing so we
in Pir Kanthi area in June 1948. will deal with all units regiment wise.

1/13 FF Rifles was deployed in Chakothi area while 2/1 Punjab was deployed in Researching this book took many years and I was deeply disappointed in the course
Nanga Tak area north of River Jhelum initially and later employed in attack in of this research to learn that many books we regarded as the gospel truth had
Tiplpatra area and was finally brought back to Nanga Tak later. serious factual errors like below:--

While 5/12 FF (Guides) was later placed under command 10 Brigade when the
brigade was inducted in Tithwal sector in May 1948.

Official history published in December 1970 thus stated that 101 Brigade was
alerted in first week of May 1948 to be prepared to move up the Jhelum valley if
the threat developed there.14

Collecting casualties of all units was a Herculean task.I contacted Brigadier Hafeez
of Pakistan Army Heritage cell in this regard but he was most ineffective.

Finally Major General Kaizad Maneck Sopariwala entered the arena like an angel
and was crucial in helping me gather the final part of the puzzle i.e Baluch
Regiment casualties in this war.

I visited AK Regiment centre also but was deeply disappointed with this
organisation who seemed most disinterested in assisting any researcher.

























































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7 Division
The headquarters of this division was at Rawalpindi.
It had below troops:--
1.
Divisional Troops: --
(a)
PAVO Cavalry , 11 Frontier Force
(b)
1/15 Punjab (Medium Machine Gun Battalion or MMG Bn )
2.
10 Brigade: -- Located at Campbellpur comprising: --
(a)
4/10 Baluch
(b)
3/12 Frontier Force Regiment
(c)
5/13 Frontier Force Rifles
(d)
4/16 Punjab
3.
25 Brigade: -- Located at Rawalpindi comprising: --
(a) 7/1 Punjab
(b) 4/13 Frontier Force Rifles
(c) 4/14 Punjab
(d) 1/16 Punjab
8 Division
The headquarters of this division was at Karachi and it had following troops:--
1.
51 Brigade :--
(a) 2/10 Baluch
(b) 7/10 Baluch
(c) 2/16 Punjab

2.
52 Brigade (raised in September 1948)

This brigade comprised only one unit 5/10 Baluch.
9 (Frontier) Division
1.
Divisional Troops:--
(a) Guides Cavalry
(b) 2/15 Punjab Medium Machine Gun
Battalion.
2.
100 Brigade :--Headquarters at Peshawar comprising:--
(a) 17/10 Baluch
(b) 6/13 Frontier Force Rifles
(c) 2/14 Punjab
(d) 4/15 Punjab
3.
101 Brigade :--Headquarters at Kohat comprising
(a) 8/8 Punjab
(b) 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles
(c) 2/13 Frontier Force Rifles
4.
102 Brigade: -- Headquarters at Bannu comprising :--
(a) 2/1 Punjab
(b) 1/8 Punjab
(c) 5/8 Punjab

(d) 5/12 Frontier Force Regiment

10 Division

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Headquarters at Lahore and comprised following troops:--

1.
Divisional Troops: --
(a) 6 Lancers
(b) 3/15 Punjab Medium Machine Gun
Battalion.
2.
103 Brigade :--Headquarters at Sialkot Comprised
(a) 1/1 Punjab
(b) 5/10 Baluch
(c) 4/12 Frontier Force Regiment
(d) 3/14 Punjab
3.
114 Brigade: -- Headquarters at Lahore comprised
(a) 5/1 Punjab
(b) 4/8 Punjab
(c) 6/8 Punjab
(d) 1/10 Baluch
4.
14 Para Brigade :--Headquarters at Rahwali north of Lahore
comprising:--
(a) 3/1 Punjab
(b) 1/12 Frontier Force Regiment
(c) 3/16 Punjab
6 Bahawalpur Division
1.
1 Bahawalpur Brigade:-- Located at Bahawalnagar and comprised
three infantry battalions.
2.
2 Bahawalpur Brigade:-- Located at Bahawalpur and comprised two
infantry battalions.

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1/1 Punjab Regiment (now 1 Punjab)

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Raised in 1759 the battalion had fought the second world war in Egypt,Iraq ,Burma,
Singapore and Dutch East Indies.

This battalion was part of 103 Brigade of 10 Division stationed at Sialkot.

The unit was composed of Pathans and Punjabi Muslims after partition of India in
1947.15

It did not see any serious action in the Kashmir war and suffered NIL CASUALTIES
as per Brigadier Rizvis book published in 1984.

However “The Story of Punjab Regiment” published in 2017 states that this
battalion suffered 29 fatal casualties in the 1948 war.16

It is possible that the battalion sent drafts to reinforce other battalions of Punjab
Regiment.

It moved to Chakothi on 22 September 1948 17 relieving 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles

as part of 101 Brigade.
The battalion did not win any gallantry awards.

























































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During the 1948 war the battalion was commanded by Lt Col Rahimullah.18 However the problem with these figures is that a supposedly most credible Pakistan
Army sponsored publication totally “HOODWINKS” and ‘WHITE WASHES”, where
This battalions history is the most evasive part of Pakistan Army military these 29 brave or should I say unfortunate men died ?
history.First Brigadier Rizvis false claim that it suffered “NIL” casualties in the
1948 Kashmir war. Brigadier Rizvi who I had held in very high esteem when I first met him at a lunch
at the CMA Colony residence of Nawabzada Iqbal Hassan Khan in 1978 , finally
The 2017 Punjab Regiment history sponsored by Pakistan Army created many ends up as a very pathetic military historian.
doubts as this book lists 29 fatal casualties suffered by this battalion.19
Shaukat Riza was never known or respected for being straightforward or
Serial Number
Name
Rank
intellectually honest.
1
Muhammed Sher
Lance Havaldar

2
Gul Hassan
Naik
THE STORY OF THE PAKISTAN ARMY.Fazal Muqeem Khan is a highly mediocre
3 Muhammad Azeem Lance Laik military historian and does not mention 1/1 Punjab once in his book
4 Qalandar Khan Sepoy
5 Muhammad Nawaz Sepoy Pakistan Armys official history Kashmir war has nothing to say about a battalion
6 Muhammad Din Sepoy who suffered third highest casualties in Kashmir war.But a small hint is given on
7 Misri Khan Sepoy page-173 where it was stated that Captain Rizvi of 1/1 Punjab was detailed to raid
8 Ghulam Ali Sepoy Gulmarg.20
9 Ghazzan Khan Sepoy
10 Abdul Ghani Sepoy Interestingly same Captain Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi of 1/1 Punjab Regiment
authored “VETERAN CAMPAIGNERS” , but has nothing to state about what 1/1
11 Noor Khan Naik
Punjab did in Kashmir war and how it lost 29 men ?
12 Mir Muhammad Lance Naik


13 Muhammad Hawas Lance Naik
14 Abdul Aziz Sepoy 2/1 Punjab Regiment (now 2 Punjab)
15 Nazir Hussain Sepoy
Raised in 1761 this battalion had received more gallantry awards than any other
16 Muhammad Rashid Sepoy
British Indian army battalion in WW 2.It had fought in Burma.
17 Shakar Khan Sepoy
18 Muhammad Taj Sepoy
This unit was initially located in Bannu as part of 102 Brigade.
19 Muhammad Shafi Sepoy
20 Muhammad Sarwar Sepoy On reconstitution in 1947 after partition of India this was a 100 percent Punjabi
21 Muhammad Aslam Khan Naik Muslim unit.21
22 Muhammad Taj Naik
23 Muhammad Azeem Sepoy It was deployed in Kashmir in May 1948 as part of 101 Brigade.
24 Mir Afzal Sepoy
25 Khushi Mohammad Sepoy This battalion received highest number of gallantry awards in the British Indian
26 Halim Khan Sepoy Army in WW 2.
27 Barkatullah Sepoy
28 Muhammad Akbar Sepoy So this background is important to understand its outstanding performance in 1948
29 Yaran Khan Sepoy war.
TOTAL TWENTY NINE KILLED NA
Initially the battalion was deployed in Nanga Tak area north west of Pandu.

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However later on night 29/30 June 1948 22 , two companies of 2/1 Punjab marched One of the two companies of this battalion under Captain Jamshed, MC and BAR of
south of Jhelum River under Lt Col Adam Khan , MC towards Tilpatra to counter WW 2 was used in a deception plan named “Operation Santa Singh”.
Indian threat from Pir Kanthi towards Bagh.23
Jamshed was commissioned in 1 Punjab Regiment on 8th November 1942.25
Another reason for moving half of 2/1 Punjab towards south was to take part in
diversionary attack of 101 Brigade to tie down Indian units south of Jhelum river , According to Pakistani official history this company performed admirably in this
so that they do not interfere with main 101 Brigade attack on Pandu.24 operation.

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Sarwar joined the army in the ranks and rose to a VCO in 10 Baluch Regiment. He
was commissioned in 1 Punjab Regiment during WW 2 on 22nd October 1944.26

The battalions most significant action was its failed attack on Pir Kanthi for which its
Captain Sarwar was posthumously awarded Pakistans Highest award Nishan I
Haidar.

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Towards the end of Kashmir war Lieutenant Colonel Adam Khan ,MC of 2/1 Punjab
was promoted to brigadier rank and took over command of 102 Brigade from
Brigadier Yousuf.29

Fatal casualties are a major indicator of a battalions performance.

Great hopes were attached to history of Punjab Regiment published in the period
1981-84 by Brigadier Rizvi.

Brigadier Rizvi cited 2 Punjabs fatal casualties in the 1948 war as “ONE” Killed.30
Reading this book at that time this scribe was surprised how and why this battalion
suffered only 1 killed , casualty ?

In 1984 Major General Shaukat Riza in his first volume of history of Pakistan Army
made another claim that 2/1 Punjab had suffered 20 killed in the famous attack of
Captain Sarwar on Pir Kanthi.31

For many years we were forced to accept Shaukat Rizas figures till Pakistan Army
published a new history of Punjab Regiment in 2017.This history published a
detailed “ROLL OF HONOUR” with complete names of all killed in action and listed 8
persons from 2/1 Punjab killed in action as below:--32

Serial Name Rank

Number
1 Muhammad Sarwar Captain
2 Chaudhry Khan Jemadar
3 Ali Khan Naik
4 Fateh Muhammad Sepoy
5 Ghulam Ali Sepoy
6 Suba Khan Sepoy
7 Farman Ali Sepoy
8 Mohammad Nawaz Sepoy
Interestingly the opposing Indian units Major Somnnath Sharma also received TOTAL EIGHT KILLED NA
Indias highest award. Brigadier Rizvi states in his book that this battalion won following gallantry
awards:--33
Pakistani official history claimed that this battalion achieved its operational task as NISHAN I HAIDAR - ONE (Captain Sarwar)
it successfully tied down Indian units and preveted them from reinforcing the Indian SITARA E JURRAT - ONE
position at Pandu, where main Pakistani attack was launched. TAMGHA R JURRAT - ONE
Here thankfully the 2017 Punjab Regiment history reports the same above
Towards the end of Kashmir war 2/1 Punjab was shifted to Bagh Sector, when its mentioned figures as Brigadier Rizvi.
own commanding officer Adam Khan had taken over command of 102 Brigade.27
Here the battalion was part of 102 Brigade commanded by brigadier Yousuf which
had arrived in Bagh on 17 July 1948.28
























































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3/1 Punjab Regiment (Now 3 Punjab)

Raised in 1770 this battalion saw action in WW 2 IN North Africa and Italy. The unit arrived in Chunj area to relieve 3/12 FFR in last week of September
1948.37
This battalion had ZERO ROLE in Kashmir war.
It conducted aggressive patrolling and occupied Phalakan and Ashkot as indicated
Brigadier Rizvi who wrote history of Punjab Regiment totally omitted this battalion in map below.Its most important action was capture of Saira Gali on 25th November
from the chapter on Kashmir war because it simply had no role. 1948.38

The official history of Kashmir war published in December 1970 makes one mention However sadly Brigadier Rizvi totally whitewashes all actions of 14/1 Punjab and
of this battalion as deployed as part of 14 PARA Brigade in the planned Operation totally omits its role in Kashmir War of 1948.
Venus.34
Lately Punjab Regiments new history published in 2017 confirmed 14/1 Punjabs
The recently published official production Punjab Regiment history , shockingly role in Kashmir war as already confirmed by official history of December 1970. As
“makes an attempt to project this battalions role in Kashmir war stating that “The per 2017 Punjab Regiment history 14/1 Punjab lost following two persons in
battalion aggressively dominated the no mans land and forced the Indians to Kashmir war:--39
remain on the defensive”.35
Serial Name Rank
This script has serious loopholes because 3rd Punjab figures nowhere in the roll of Number
honour listed at the end of the “ 




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1 Abdul Rahman Sepoy
2 Lal Khan Sepoy.
It did not suffer a single fatal casualty which makes THE STORY OF PUNJAB
REGIMENT claim most difficult to sustain.

That Brigadier Rizvi had no choice but to totally omit this battalion from 1948
Kashmir war makes more sense.

This also proves that over passage of years we in Pakistan Army have become far
more intellectually dishonest.

The battalion had zero war record in the Kashmir war and was thus not considered
eligible for the battle honour “Kashmir-1948”.

5/1 Punjab Regiment (Now 4 Punjab)

This battalion was not employed in 1948 Kashmir war .

1/14 Punjab Regiment (Now 5 Punjab)

Raised in 1857 this battalion was captured by Japanese in February 1942.It was re-
raised from old manpower after 1945.
This battalion saw action in Kashmir war as distinctly recorded by the official history
published in December 1970.36

















































































































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2/14 Punjab Regiment (Now 6 Punjab)

This battalion was raised in 1857 and was captured by Japanese at Hongkong.

It was re-raised after 1945 with old manpower.

The battalion fought in South Kashmir and thankfully its existence was admitted by
Brigadier Rizvi.40 As per official history 2/14 Punjab commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Sarfaraz was deployed in Saadabad Valley and Lt Colonel Sarfaraz made
various attempts to capture Reech and Maindak features which were a failure.

This battalion was captured by Japanese I Hongkong as soon as the war started and
was re-raised in 1946.This means that it was not a fully effective battalion in 1948.

Notable was company attack of the battalion on Reech feature in which Captain
Zafar Iqbal originally 3/14 Punjab and attached to 2/14 Punjab was killed in action
and his body was left in enemy held area by the retreating company.This enraged
2/14 Punjab who wanted to launch a battalion attack to recover the body.41

However apparently Lt Col Sarfaraz had cold feet and disallowed any such venture.

The official history projects Lt Col Sarfaraz a great deal and devotes many pages to
his exploits. However, the real yardstick of how hard a unit fought are casualties
and as per the latest 2017 Punjab Regiment history 2/14 Punjab suffered only three
fatal casualties:--42
Serial Name Rank
Number
1 Zafar Iqbal Captain
2 Mohammad Yaqub Havaldar
3 Sharaf Khan Sepoy

However the unit was richly awarded with gallantry awards winning a Hilal I Jurrat
for Captain Zafar Iqbal whose dead body it had abandoned and withdrawn as well
as two Sitara e Jurrats.

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.

4/14 Punjab Regiment (Now 8 Punjab)

The Battalion was raised in 1857 and seen action in WW 2 in Burma and Siam.

There is considerable confusion about the casualties suffered by this battalion.

The 2017 Punjab Regiment history which we had hoped would be most accurate
adds barrels of fuel to the the fires of statistical confusion.

Compiler Raja Tahir Mehmood Sahib sadly turns out to be more deadly and
incompetent than Brigadier Rizvi and Shaukat Riza in spreading supreme confusion
regarding simple matters like fatal casualties.

In the list of casualties at the end of the book he names two individuals of this
battalion killed in action.44
However in the section dealing with this battalion in the book he states that six
persons were killed.45 Rizvi puts fatal casualties of this battalion at 21 killed ! 46

This battalion was initially part of 25 Brigade of 7 division.

25 Brigade was sent in May 1948 to Qazi Baqar area 47 to protect the Upper Jhelum
canal headworks near Mangla as well as the general area between Jhelum and
Chenab River.

Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan admitted in his book “THE STORY OF THE
PAKISTAN ARMY” that the fighting in the south at that time was “neither on a
large scale,nor of a serious nature”.43

3/14 Punjab Regiment (Now 7 Punjab)

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At this stage Indians had already launched an offensive to capture Jhangar:--

Although not really part of this book , Pakistan Armys highest leadership in person
of General Gracey was phenomenally mediocre:--

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Pakistani military’s callous ignorance in not placing Rajauri high in priority of crucial
areas has not been critically examined by any historian.This however deserves a
serious examination.

General Gracey commanding Pakistan Army was merely reacting to Indian moves
rather than conducting the war more intelligently and Rajauri figured nowhere in
Graceys highly limited intellect ?

Pakistani accounts much exaggerate the battles around Jhangar in March-May 1948
, however a detailed examination of all published accounts clearly reveal that the
real Indian objective was Rajauri , while Jhangar was captured by Indians to secure
their left flank.

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Brigade were deployed short of Jhangar to thwart any Indian attempt to move
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Pakistani deployment was conservative to the extreme and Rajauri did not figure
anywhere in this deployment.

Although it was well known that Indians were using tanks in this area no effort was
made by Gracey or his dumb team of officers at GHQ to reinforce irregulars on
Rajauri Naushera axis with anti tank weapons.

Thus Rajauri was easily captured by a squadron of Central India Horse finally , with
irregulars having no antidote to light tanks.

Rizvi states that 4/14 Punjab lost 4 men while deployed as part of 25 Brigade.50

We are again at total loss to understand Pakistani casualties as the recently

published Punjab Regiment history places 8 Punjab casualties at two killed.51
However Rizvi claims that 8 Punjab lost 21 killed.52

4/14 Punjab was deployed to defend Assar Ridge west of Chhamb where the official
history claims that it repelled a brigade size Indian attack around 21st May 1948.53

Brigadier Rizvi makes no mention of this great battle , although it certainly merited
recognition and Rizvi had the 1970 official history which was published 14 years
earlier .

History of Indian Armoured Corps stated that a raid was carried out from Chhamb
towards Bhimbar on 10/11th May 1948 but mentions no great battle at Assar Ridge.

Brigadier Rizvi omitted this claim of repelling an Indian infantry brigade and one
may deduct that in this case the 1970 official history made a rather “inflated” and
“highly exaggerated claim”.

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4/14 Punjab as far as one can deduct from Rizvi’s account did not see much action
in this sector and as per Rizvi was sent back to Rawalpindi 54 from where it was
sent to Poonch in June 1948.55

The situation in Poonch forced Pakistani GHQ to send 4/14 Punjab to Poonch from
Rawalpindi on 24 June 1948.56

4/14 Punjab attacked an Indian strongpoints complex known as Chajja.This attack

was a failure as the Indians retaliated with massive air attacks as well as artillery
fire.

The 4/14 Punjab stayed in Poonch sector till end of the war and was deployed to
defend Sehr area against any Indian attack southwards down the Poonch River
valley towards Kotri.57

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The 2017 edition of Punjab Regiment history lists only two fatal casualties for 4/14
Punjab (Now 8 Punjab) in the Kashmir war:--58

Serial Name Rank

Number
1 Abdul Rahman Havaldar
2 Mohammad Yaqub Naik

As a military historian I am shocked and deeply disappointed with the highly

unprofessional way fatal casualties of Punjab Regiment were reported by Brigadier
Rizvi and now the latest 2017 officially produced Punjab Regiment history.

This scribe does not recognize gallantry award as the true gauge of a units
performance . However this unit won following gallantry awards:--59

SITARA E JURRAT – FOUR

TAMGHA E JURRAT -TWO
SITARA E BASALAT- TWO
Here again there is a serious discrepancy as Brigadier Rizvi states that the battalion
won the following awards:-60-
SITARA E JURRAT – ONE ( SUBEDAR MOHAMMAD
YAQUB)
TAMGHA E JURRAT- FOUR
1/15 Punjab (Now 9 Punjab)
The unit was not employed in Kashmir war.
2/15 Punjab Regiment (Now 10 Punjab)
This battalion sent machine gun detachments and mortar platoons but played no
direct role and did not suffer a single fatal casualty.Therefore it does not merit any
space in this book.
3/15 Punjab Regiment (Now 11 Punjab)
This battalion sent machine gun detachments and mortar platoons but played no
direct role and did not suffer a single fatal casualty.Therefore it does not merit any
space in this book.
4/15 Punjab Regiment (Now 12 Punjab)
The unit was not employed in Kashmir war.
1/16 Punjab Regiment (Now 13 Punjab)
The battalion was raised in 1857.It saw action in WW 2 in Burma and Dutch East
Indies.

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This battalion was concentrated at Qazi Baqar on 1st March 1948 as per Brigadier
Rizvis account.61 Rizvi states that the battalion was moved to Bhimbhar.

The battalion was moved to Matlasi in May 1948 and played main role in capture of
Matlasi.62 Matlasi was however recaptured by Indians after five hours63 in a counter
attack.

The Pakistani attack on Jhangar and Matlasi was a failure but official history of 1970
claimed that it played a decisive role in delaying Indian operations to relieve
Poonch.

Pakistani official history blamed the tribesmen , azad forces and lack of artillery
support for 25 Brigade failure in the operations at Matlasi and near Jhangar.64

Pakistan Army official history of Punjab Regiment published in 2017 from which
great hopes were attached turned out to be a shabby effort full of massive
contradictions and ridiculous confusion .

Like on page-149 official history of 2017 states that 13 Punjab (1/16 Punjab) lost
36 lives65 but lists fatal losses of 13 Punjab in the list of shuhada on 348 lists only
two fatal casualties of 13 Punjab :--66
Serial Name Rank
Number
1 Muhammad Din Lance Naik
2 Ahmad Khan Lance Naik

Brigadier Rizvi on the other hand writes that 13 Punjab suffered three fatal
casualties in 1948 Kashmir war.67

Official history of 1970 claims that this battalion was sent to Uri Sector 68 but Rizvi
instead makes a rather inflated claim that this battalion was sent to defend Kotli
where according to Rizvis account a decisive battle was fought.69

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This battalion was raised in 1857 and was captured by Japanese at Singapore in 2 Mohammad Yar Naib Subedar
February 1942. 3 Ahmed Khan Lance Havaldar
4 Sharif Khan Naik
It was re-raised after the war. 5 Lal Khan Naik
6 Faiz Muhammad Naik
Shockingly this battalion receives not a single word from Brigadier Rizvi as far as 7 Muhammad Fazal Lance Naik
participation in 1948 war is concerned. 8 Ghulam Mohammad Lance Naik
9 Fazal ur Rahman Sepoy
However 2017 official history lists this units fatal casualties as “THIRTY”.70 10 Lal Khan Sepoy
11 Abdullah Jan Sepoy
1970 December official history mentions this battalion being deployed in October 12 Suraj Ali Sepoy
1948 to relieve 4/10 Baluch at Pandu.71 On page.215 December 1970 official
13 Inam Din Sepoy
history that 2/16 Punjab under Lieutenant Colonel A.K Akbar arrived in third week
14 Ghulam Nabi Sepoy
of October 1948 to relieve 4/10 Baluch.72
15 Nur Khan Sepoy
16 Gulzar Sepoy
The third time December 1970 official history mentions this battalion is when one of
it companies 73 is employed in an operation against Chota Qazi Nag , but no details 17 Dost Mohammad Sepoy
are given about what this battalion accomplished. 18 Sakhin Gul Sepoy
19 Abdul Qadir Sepoy
The 2017 official history however new claims and states that this unit was 20 Sher Ahmed Khan Sepoy
employed in Tithwal Sector where Major Masood Qamar captured “Doarian” , 21 Bahadar Khan Sepoy
“Malang” and “Kalang” in Kishanganga Valley. 22 Sardar Khan Sepoy
23 Mohammad Iqbal Sepoy
The 2017 history also states that this battalion played key role in capturing all area 24 Alam Khan Sepoy
till Kel and that Majors Masood Qamar, Bashir Warraich,Zafar and Subedar Fateh 25 Sikandar Sepoy
Khan played key role in these operations.As per the 2017 history the battalion 26 Ujaib Khan Sepoy
received no gallantry awards in 1948 war.74 27 Raja Khan Sepoy
28 Muhammad Shafi Sepoy
This is the strangest part of Punjab Regiment military history with Brigadier Rizvi 29 Kuban Sepoy
ruthlessly burying this battalions role , official history of 1970 stating that this 30 Rab Nawaz Sepoy
battalion was at Pandu and the 2017 history claiming that this battalion was first 3/16 Punjab Regiment (Now 15 Punjab)
sent to Uri Sector and later to Tithwal sector in December 1948. How and where The battalion was raised in 1857 and was captured by Japanese at Singapore in
this battalion lost 30 men is totally omitted by the atrociously written 2017 history. February 1942.
How this battalion achieved all these laurels in December 1948 when the area is
snowbound is left to the readers imagination. It was re-raised after the war.

The list of fatal casualties of the battalion as per the 2017 history is as below:--75 This battalion is mentioned in December 1970 official only once on page.266 as part
Serial Name Rank of the force that never saw action in the planned Operation Venus.
Number
1 Mohammad Yaqub Khan Subedar However Rizvi claims that this battalion saw “fierce” actions in the 1948 war .76

2017 history repeats Rizvi’s claims but again offers no detail as the writers never
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11 Muhammad Kamal Sepoy

It is difficult to assess what role it played in 1948 war ? 12 Muhammad Sharif Sepoy
13 Muhammad Hassan Khan Sepoy
The battalion had near zero war record in the Kashmir war as a unit and was thus 14 Ghulam Mohammad Sepoy
not considered eligible for the battle honour “Kashmir-1948”. 15 Muhammad Sarwar Sepoy
16 Mana Khan Sepoy
17 Fazal Hussain Sepoy
5/14 Punjab Regiment (Now 16 Punjab) 18 Mohammad Ayub Sepoy
19 Mohammad Banaras Sepoy
This battalion did not see action in 1948 Kashmir war. Brigadier Rizvi does not 20 Ali Bahadur Sepoy
mention it at all while discussing 1948 war. 21 Nazeer Ahmad Sepoy
22 Muhammad Zariat Sepoy
However the 2017 Punjab Regiment history shockingly mentions 37 of its soldiers
23 Allah Dad Khan Sepoy
as killed in action,77 but makes no mention of what this battalion actually did in
24 Lal Khan Sepoy
1948 war.
25 Allah Ditta Sepoy
Pakistan Army official history of December 1970 makes no mention of this battalion 26 Said Hassan Khan Sepoy
in the book. 27 Muhammad Rafiq Sepoy
28 Abrar Hussain Sepoy
This appears to be a MOST SERIOUS EDITING ERROR BUT IS SIMPLY 29 Muhammad Akhmat Sepoy
INEXCUSABLE IN AN OFFICIALLY SPONSORED PUBLICATION. 30 Yunis Sanitary Worker
31 Fateh Sher Sepoy
As per Pakistan Army official history trilogy authored by Major General Shaukat Riza 32 Muhammad Qabal Khan Sepoy
this unit was not in existence for 90 percent part of Kashmir war as it was only re- 33 Dehlil Khan Sepoy
raised in October 1948.78 As per this book , this unit never went to Kashmir as it 34 Muhammad Sharif Sepoy
was sent to Rawalpindi in November 1948 and to Malakand in February 1949.This 35 Munawar Hussain Shah Sepoy
battalion did move into Kashmir but nine months after the end of Kashmir war in 36 Miran Dad Sepoy
September 1949. 37 Haider Sepoy
TOTAL 37 KILLED
The 2017 history lists the following 37 soldiers of 5/14 Punjab which was not in
existence for most part of 1948 war as killed in the war:-- 79 The battalion was thus not considered eligible for the battle honour “Kashmir-
1948”. But the badly written official history of Punjab Regiment of 2017 lists 37
Serial No Name Rank soldiers of this battalion as killed in action but offers absolutely no detail about the
1 Ghulam Sarwar Naib Subedar circumstances of their death.
2 Sultan Ali Naib Subedar
3 Mohammad Akram Havaldar 4/16 Punjab Regiment (Now 17 Punjab)
4 Noor Elahi Havaldar
5 Allah Yar Khan Lance Havaldar This battalions performance is generally accepted as one of best performances in
6 Mohammad Aslam Naik 1948 Kashmir war of Pakistan Army along with 4/10 Baluch , certainly the best
7 Ghulam Mustafa Sepoy among best as well as 2/1 Punjab.
8 Karamdad Sepoy
9 Ali Mohammad Sepoy This battalion as per Brigadier Rizvis account was part of 10 Brigade and first
10 Fayyaz Ali Sepoy deployed in Chakothi area in February 1948.80 It was commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Nausherwan.Captain Ghulam Rabbani of this battalion was drowned in River
























































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This battalion planned raids on Indian installations and successfully carried them
out from Chakothi area as map below illustrates:--

Initially 4/16 Punjab was deployed south of River Kishanganga although initially
Sadly the 2017 Pakistan Army official history of Punjab Regiment simply Major Akbar had sent one platoon to reinforce 5/12 FFR (Guides) positions at Chunj
Ridge as map below indicates:--
whitewashed these two historic raids of 4/16 Punjab.

In May 1948 101 Brigade replaced 10 Brigade in Chakothi area as a result of which
4/16 Punjab was replaced by 1/13 FF Rifles.82

4/16 Punjab returned to rest at Abbottabad but was soon pulled back into action as
Indians had captured Tithwal and were threatening Muzaffarabad .
This battalion was rushed to Tithwal area to which it marched a record 24 miles 83
in a single day over a rough mule track.

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4/16 Punjab replaced 5/12 FFR (Guides) on 1st July 1948.84

5/12 FFR (Guides) had failed to dislodge the Indians from Chunj Ridge earlier.

I interviewed various direct participants of 1948 war including Major General Akbar
Khan , DSO , Brigadier Sadiq Khan Satti MC , EX Major Ishaq MC and Brigadier
Aslam Khan MC. All FOUR had a very low opinion about military caliber of Brigadier
H.I Ahmad commander 10 Brigade and noted that planning as well as fighting was
relegated to battalion commanders.

Further commander 10 Brigade was an armour officer with very mediocre war
record since in Burma Indian Armoured Corps was overwhelmingly superior to
Japanese tanks technically , materially and numerically.

A proof of this assertion is Pakistan Army’s official history published in 1970 makes
no mention of commander 10 Brigade in the famous 4/16 attack on point 7229.

However this official history all along praises then Lieutenant Colonel Nausherwan
Khan for being the real master mind of the brilliant plan of attack on Chunj.

Thus this history noted “ Lt. Col Nausherwan fully analysed the causes of the failure
of the previous attacks by by 5/12 FFR (Guides) and the tribesmen. He concluded
that the enemy at Chunj and point 7229 was too strong to be dislodged or defeated
from the feature by half measures and without proper fire support .

The official history further noted that it was Lt Col Nausherwan who decided the
direction of attack for the point 7229/Chunj operation .

The official history thus noted “Lieutenant Colonel Nausherwan had been quick in
realising that a frontal attack on point 7229 was not possible, and that the best
approach was to roll up the enemy along the ridge from the north.He therefore
decided to concentrate his battalion in Ban forest,north of Chogali.keeping the
minimum number of troops in Khatimbal and Kailgiran opposite point 7229.”

The battalion was here employed in capture of Chunj a height held by Indians north
of Kishanganga river.Initially 5/12 FF was used to attack it but had failed.

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The Indian commander Harbaksh Singh had limited understanding of mountain

warfare and had neglected area north of Kishan Ganga River.Harbaksh Singh’s
grasp of basic tactics was so pathetic that he had neglected to occupy the highest
feature on Chunj Ridge Point 9444.85

This made the Pakistani task of capturing Point 7229 very easy.

1 Madras the battalion tasked to defend Chunj Ridge was hopelessly divided in two
parts by Kishan Ganga River and Harbaksh had shown gross ignorance of basic
tactics by not occupying the most critical and highest point 9444 on the Chunj
Ridge:--

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commanding engineer company improvised a pulley crossing over which a 3.7 inch
gun was hauled across the river in parts.86

This gun was assembled and deployed at the highest point 9444 to provide fire
support to the attack.

The attack plan of 4/16 Punjab was as shown in the two maps below:--

Lieutenant Colone Nausherwan Commanding 4/16 Punjab appreciated that western

direction previously unsuccessfully used by 5/12 FF was suicidal.He decided to
attack 1 Madras holding southern part of Chunj Ridge from point 9444. The main
issue was the fact that artillery guns could not be brought north of River Kishan
Ganga as there was no bridge or track.To overcome this drawback Major Sloan

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This action was much applauded in Pakistan but the bottom line is that these two
features were difficult for Indians to hold or maintain and did not change the overall Sadly Major Sloan who had played decisive role in the success of 4/16 Punjab
strategic situation at Tithwal. attack by transporting 3.7 inch gun across Kishan Ganga was killed while mine
clearing at 0915 Hours 8th July 1948.88
Any serious student of military history would place capture of Chunj as much lower
in odds when comparing it loss of Pandu in Jhelum Valley. While Phase 1 of 4/16 Punjab was completely successful and point 6953 was
successfully captured , attack on point 7229 was postponed till 9th July 1948
Indian Official history thus noted that the commanding officer of 1 Madras blamed because the area was heavily mined.89
the 163 Brigade commander 87 (The major blunders , dispersal of 1 Madras and not
occupying Point 9444 were committed in Harbaksh Singh tenure) however Brigadier However attack on point 7229 was not required as Indians abandoned the position
Katoch had taken over on 23 June 1948 while the attack on Chunj Ridge had taken during night 8/9 July 1948 and withdrew souith of Kishanganga River , also
place on night 7/8 July 1948. destroying the bridge as a result of which many Indian soldiers were trapped and
drowned in Kishanganga while trying to unsuccessfully swim across it.90

4/16 Punjab suffered only 2 killed and 10 wounded in the capture of points 6953
and 7229 as per the official history of 1970. However it lost additional 25 casualties
including 4 killed subsequently because of Indian mines.91

Ground south of River Kishanganga was completely dominated by 4/16 Punjab from
the high ground that it had occupied.

Lieutenant Colonel Nausherwan immediately deployed 4/16 Punjab on the high

ridges overlooking Pir Sahaba and other Indian positions in the south and started
engaging them with all his battalion weapons.

This resulted in withdrawal of 1/11 Sikh from the entire Pir Sahaba Ridge which was
occupied by 5/12 FF Regiment (Guides) without firing a shot.92

4/16 Punjab was again brought south of Kishan Ganga River in August 1948 to
relieve 3/12 FF Regiment in kafir Khan Range.93

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2 Ghulam Sarwar Jemadar

4/16 Punjab was however less successful here as the terrain was far more difficult 3 Rab Nawaz Naik
and the Indians had reinforced the area.Thus their attack on Akhrot wali tekri 4 Mir Muhammad Sepoy
launched on 13th October was repulsed with losses heavier than those sustained in 5 Sahib Khan Sepoy
the historic victory of 4/16 Punjab at Chunj , ie 36 casualties including 6 killed.94 6 Muhammad Sharif Sepoy
7 Malik Khan Sepoy
Yet another attack of 4/16 Punjab on the same place failed on 15th October 1948.95 8 Muhammad Ismail Sepoy
9 Sher Muhammad Sepoy
4/16 Punjab was finally relieved by a battalion of 8th Punjab Regiment and reached 10 Dalel Khan Sepoy
Abbottabad on 23rd November 1948.96 11 Faiz Alam Khan Sepoy
12 Allah Ditta Sepoy
The battalion won the following awards:--97
13 Ghulam Mustafa Sepoy
14 Muhammad Ayub Sepoy
1 SITARA E JURRAT Captain Ghulam Rabbani
15 Hukum Dad Sepoy
2 SITARA E JURRAT Naib Subedar Akbar
16 Ajaib Khan Sepoy
Hussain Shah (Later Lt Col)
17 Haider Khan Sepoy
3 SITARA E JURRAT Major Ghulam Rasul,MC
TOTAL SEVENTEEN KILLED
4 SITARA E JURRAT Major Mohammad Akbar
Khan
It is sad and deeply disturbing that as late as 2017 our official publications are
5 SITARA E JURRAT Major
committing “criminally inexcusable factual errors”.
6 SITARA E JURRAT Naib Subedar Sultan Ali
7 SITARA E JURRAT Subedar Suleman Khan
Reconciling Rizvis 1984 History and Official Pakistan Army Punjab Regiment
8 TAMGHA E JURRAT ONE history’s fatal casualty figures
It was also awarded 15 Imtiazi Sanad. Serial Battalion Rizvi 1984 Pakistan Army 2017 official
No. Book history
According to Brigadier Rizvi this was the highest decorated battalion of Pakistan
1 1 Punjab Nil 29
Army in 1948 Kashmir war.98
2 2 Punjab 1 8
3 3 Punjab Nil Nil
As military historians our troubles start when Rizvi reports fatal casualties of 4/16
4 5 Punjab Nil 2
Punjab at 43 99 while the 2017 Punjab Regiment official history reports 4/16 fatal
5 6 Punjab 8 3
casualties as 17 .100
6 8 Punjab Nil 2
2017 official history thus reports fatal casualties as below:--101 7 13 Punjab 3 2
8 14 Punjab Nil 30
Serial Name Rank 9 15 Punjab Nil Nil
Number 10 16 Punjab Nil 37
1 Ghulam Rabbani Captain 11 17 Punjab 43 17
GRAND TOTAL 55 130

























































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Baluch regiments role in Kashmir war as a complete regiment is limited , but one of
its battalions 4/10 Baluch , 11 Baluch from 1956 participated in one of the most
important and decisive battles of Kashmir war at Pandu .Other Baluch battalions
role in Kashmir war is extremely limited.

4/8 PUNJAB (4 BALUCH FROM 1956)

This was originally a Madras Army battalion raised in 1800 and was converted into
a Punjab based unit in 1903 and named 92nd Punjabis.

It was numbered 4/8 Punjab in the 1922 reorganisation.

Its pre WW 1 battle honours were limited to only one i.e “Ava” . It saw action in
WW 1 in Mesopotamia and Egypt but little action in WW 2 where it was employed in
the minor skirmishes in Iran and Iraq.

This unit went into action towards the end of 1948 war when it relieved 2/13 FF
Rifles in Pir Kanthi area.102The battalion was under 102 Brigade.

Pakistan Army official history of Kashmir war makes only a single mention 103 of
this battalion which implies that its role was marginal.The official history thus states
“the new battalions continued patrolling, sniping and jittering operations with
occasional artillery duels.The winter was fast approaching and Pir Panjal Range
started receiving its first snow by the middle of October”.104 This means that
operations practically ceased about two weeks after arrival of this battalion in
operational area in Kashmir.

As per Baluch Regiment Centre this battalion suffered seven fatal casualties in the
Kashmir war.105

Rafiuddin Ahmeds Baluch regiment history totally ignores Baluch units like 4 Baluch
and only states that it arrived in Pir Kanthi area in end September.

As far as existing sources are concerned we are totally blind about what this
battalion did.However the figure of 7 fatal casualties points out to the conclusion
that this battalion did not see much action.

The battalion had near zero war record in the Kashmir war and was thus not
considered eligible for the battle honour “Kashmir-1948”.

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Raised at Karachi as 2nd Belooch Battalion in 1846 , this battalion performed

5/8 Punjab (5 Baluch from 1956) outstandingly in British Companys Persian war where it won four battle honours.It
fought in Second Afghan War and was awarded two battle honour followed by battle
This was originally a Madras Army battalion raised in 1800.In 1903 it became honour for Egyptian expedition of 1881.
Punjab based with designation of 93rd Burma Infantry.It had no battle honour till
1914 and was employed in internal security roles.In WW 1 it saw intense action in In WW 1 it fought in France where one of its soldiers won British Indian Army’s first
France ,Mesopotamia and Egypt.In 1922 it was numbered 5/8 Punjab and saw Victoria Cross (Indians being barred from VC till 1911). It fought in East Africa
intense action again in WW 2 in Burma ,Malaya and Dutch East Indies. where the German commander Von Lettow Vorbeck praised it by name.

The role of this battalion in Kashmir was almost nil. It was deployed as part of It was an All Muslim unit from raising in 1846 till 1922 contrary to false claims of
newly raised 104 Brigade to replace 100 Brigade in Tithwal on 17th November 1948 Stephen Cohen and Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan that there was never an all
106
when the area had become almost snow bound. Muslim battalion in British Indian Army.
The battalion suffered only ONE fatal casualties as per the list provided by Baluch
Regiment Centre.107 In WW 2 it fought outstandingly in East Africa, Egypt , Cyprus and Italy.

Indians in Tithwal were dependent on air supply and there was no fighting in It was allotted to Pakistan Army in 1947 and its new class composition was Pathans
Tithwal sector in November December 1948. and Punjabi Muslim.

The battalion had near zero war record in the Kashmir war and was thus not This unit was deployed in Kashmir in May 1948 opposite Pandu .
considered eligible for the battle honour “Kashmir-1948”.
4/10 Baluch who is famous for the bold capture of pandu later on at this time was
part of 10 Brigade but was placed under command 102 Brigade about 22 May 1948
8/8 Punjab (17 Baluch from 1956) and ordered to move to Chakothi.110
The Indians had started their summer offensive as map below illustrates:--
This was a relatively newly raised battalion being raised only in May 1941.It saw
intense action in Burma in WW 2 and was allotted to Pakistan in 1947 .After
partition it had 50 % Pathans and 50 % Punjabi Muslims.It was deployed in Tithwal
as part of newly raised 104 Brigade on 17th November 1948 108 when the area was
almost snow bound and quiet and suffered “NIL” casualties in the war as per the
list supplied by Baluch Regiment Centre.109

The battalion had near zero war record in the Kashmir war and was thus not
considered eligible for the battle honour “Kashmir-1948”.

4/10 Baluch (11 Baluch from 1956)

This unit was regarded as one of the most outstanding Pakistani units of Kashmir
war because of its role in capture of Pandu massif. All along this battalions history
was spectacularly outstading.

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On 29th May 1948 Indians attacked and evicted D Company of 4/10 Baluch from
point 6873.

D Company was re-deployed west of Kathai Nala 111 and only B Company of 4/10
Baluch was kept deployed in its position at Gujjar Bandi east of Kathai Nala and
north of Jhelum River.

As per the December 1970 official history D Company 4/10 Baluch lost 13
casualties including three killed while the Indians lost 100 casualties.112
On night 22/23rd May 1948 4/10 Baluch was deployed at Kathai as map above
Meanwhile on 1st June 1948 4/13 FF Rifles was inducted and deployed on left side of
illustrates with a company tasked to carry out raids etc in south and the fourth
4/10 Baluch.113
company in reserve.

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The map below depicts the situation in early June 1948:--

4/10 Baluch was tasked by Brigadier Akbar Khan , DSO to raid and harass Indians
so that they are forced to disperse their forces in security duties.Notable actions
carried out by 4/10 Baluch were as following :--
•
Raid by Subedar Sadozai using platoon of 4/10 Baluch and platoon Khyber
Rifles between Pandu and Sing killing 20 Indian soldiers.114
•
19 June 1948-Section of 4/10 Baluch and platoon Khyber Rifles ambushed
Indian party near Khatir Nar killing 15 and injuring Colonel Kapur.115
•
Subedar Kala Khan and C Company 4/10 Baluch carried out various raids
south of river Jhelum.

Finally 4/10 Baluch was deployed west of Kathai Nala along with company of 5/12
FF Regiment (Guides Infantry) alonngwith 2 platoons of Khyber Rifles.116

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Pandu massif in Indian occupation made the Pakistani position very difficult to
maintain. Brigadier Akbar Khan had decided that he would use 4/10 Baluch to
attack and capture Pandu. He tasked the British commanding officer of 4/10 Baluch
Lieutenant Colonel Harvey Kelly to prepare a detailed plan 117 to capture Pandu
massif which Brigadier Akbar regarded as the most crucial objective.

The plan as conceived by Colonel Kelly envisaged attack by infiltration by 4/10

Baluch during night into the narrow area between Pandu massif and Jhelum River
from the south the first night and a two-pronged attack on Pandu and point 9187
the second night.

Indians regarded the approach from south as impossible and did not patrol it .

The attack plan is depicted as below:--

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On 17th July sadly the man who had conceived the Pandu attack plan , the British
Commanding Officer of 4/10 Baluch Lieutenant Colonel Harvey Kelly was posted out
as the Pakistani GHQ had withdrawn all British officers from fighting in Kashmir.118

The same day 101 Brigade issued final orders for attack.

On 18/19 July night 4/10 Baluch handed over its defences to two platoons of
Khyber Rifles119 and marched south east into the secret concentration area.

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The next day the force rested and maintained absolute physical as well as radio
silence. They started moving after last light.Major Afridi’s force known as right
column comprised D Company 4/10 Baluch and C Company 17/10 Baluch.

As per Baluch Regiment historian this force traversed the most difficult approach to
its objective.120 The column occupied Pandus highest point 9178 at 0445 Hours 21st
July 1948.It was occupied by Indians who vacated it on seeing the advancing force
of Major Afridi. The Indians also counter attacked it soon but this attack was
repulsed.

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The right column of Major Afridi was reinforced by two companies of 2/12 FFR on
evening 23rd July 1948.121

The Indian commander at Pandu had however lost his nerve and ordered
withdrawal of 2 Bihar under artillery fireon night 23/24 July 1948. This was a case
of sheer cowardice and commanding officer of 2 Bihar was immediately placed
under close arrest and court martialed.122

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4/10 Baluch was lucky to serve under Pakistan Armys greatest operational BEEN BADLY HIT BY THE ELEMENTS OF SURPRISE AND SUSPENSE.SO
commander in history then Brigadier Akbar Khan Pareech Khel , DSO. MUCH HAD HAPPENED TO SHATTER THEIR NERVES THAT THEY HAD LOST
THE WILL TO FIGHT.THEY FEARED THAT A STORM WAS ABOUT TO BURST
Brigadier Akbar Khan was deeply disappointed with the repulse of Lieutenant UPON THEM AND THEY DID NOT WANT TO WAIT FOR IT.THEY COULD SEE
Colonel Malik Sher Bahadur and expressed his sentiments in his book “Raiders in THAT A WAY OF ESCAPE WAS STILL OPEN AND THEY WANTED TO TAKE
Kashmir” as below:--123 IT.”

The reader may note that General Yahya Khan had lifted the Ayub Khan era ban on
writing of books and had allowed ex Major General Akbar Khan to write his
memoirs.

Simultaneously General Yahya Khan had also commissioned the Pakistani army
headquarters to write an official history of Kashmir war in which again Akbar Khan
DSO was assigned a major role.

The Pakistani official history thus simply copied Akbar Khan’s above assessment.

4/10 Baluch was rightly termed the victor of Pandu but today people forget that the
real victor of Pandu was not simply 4/10 Baluch but Major A.H Afridi assisted by
Captain Said Ghaffar (10/17 Baluch) and Lieutenant Khan Zaman (artillery).

In 1970 at least this was well known and the Pakistani official history had thus
squarely declared Major Afridi , Captain Said Ghaffar and Lieutenant Khan Zaman
as victors of Pandu:--125

Pakistani writers like Honorary Major General Rafiuddin Ahmad however

whitewashed this failure in the 2000 history of Baluch Regiment.

Ironically Major Afridi the real hero of Pandu battle was not even awarded a simple
Sitara e Jurrat (Pakistani equivalent of Military Cross) and was conveniently
forgotten.

The final Indian withdrawal two days later was not the result of a Pakistani attack
and was described by Akbar Khan and copied by Pakistani official history of 1970 as
below :--124

“PHYSICALLY UNTIL NOW THEY (2 BIHAR-MAJOR A.H AMINS ITALICS) HAD Rafiuddin also accepted Afridis crucial role and was surprised why Afridi received no
SUFFERED NO REAL HARDSHIPS AND THE ACTIONS OF PAST FOUR DAYS IN THE recognition for his most decisive and crucial role in the Pakistani victory at Pandu
ORDINARY COURSE OF BATTLES, COULD NOT BE TERMED ANYTHING MORE THAN ?
SKIRMISHES,PARTICULARLY SO BECAUSE THE INDIANS OVERWHELMING
PREPONDERANCE IN MEN,WEAPONS ARTILLERY AND AIRCRAFT WAS STILL IN But Rafiuddin also remained supremely evasive and non committal and rather most
THEIR FAVOUR AND THEIR MAIN DEFENCES WERE STILL INTACT.BUT THEY HAD mildly expressed his surprise in a foot note which hardly any one would read ?
Rafiuddin’s footnote thus said “for unknown reasons ,the two gallant company
















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commanders do not seemed to have received their well deserved Pandu in July 1948 and rejoined the battalion after the attack in July 1948.133 It
recognition “.126 was relieved from fighting in Kashmir by 7/10 Baluch in October 1948.134

4/10 Baluch stayed in Pandu area till October 1948 when it was moved to Tithwal We do not have many details about this battalion but its C Company performed
Sector.2/16 Punjab replaced 4/10 Baluch in Pandu.127 outstandingly in Pandu battles and its performance was much praised by the 1970
official history as earlier discussed.
Here it replaced the 5/12 Guides at Pir Sahaba for a short time.It was then sent to
Abbottabad for rest and recuperation. It was again sent to Qazi Baqar near Jhelum It was renumbered 19 Baluch in 1956.
as 10 Brigade reserve but did not see action.
Sadly this battalion was converted into the newly raised SSG (Special Services
4/10 Baluch no doubt till today is famous for what Major Afridi and Said Ghaffar did Group) and disappeared from history.
at Pandu. However most people only know that 4/10 Baluch now 11 Baloch is
Pandu Battalion .Very few know about Major Afridi or Said Ghaffar . This is one of Later after 1965 war a new 19 Baluch was raised but this battalion had no
the saddest ironies of history ! connection with the old 17/10 Baluch.

4/10 Baluch as per Baluch Regiment Centre records suffered 27 fatal casualties in
entire 1948 war.

It was the only Baluch Regiment battalion awarded the battle honour of “Kashmir-
1948”.

17/10 Baluch

128
This battalion was raised in Karachi in April 1942 by Lieutenant Colonel C.J.D
Tomkins as a medium machine gun battalion.129

In August 1942 it was moved to Sialkot for being converted into a tank
battalion.However the idea was dropped.130

It took part in Bengal famine relief operations in 1943-44 and was then sent to
Middle East where it served in Iraq and Persia in 1945-46 as part of Pai Force.It
was deployed in Syria , Palestine and Rhodes in 1945-46.It was also deployed in
Egypt and Libya and returned to India in February 1947 and moved to Nowshera in
August 1947.131

The battalion was part of 102 Brigade and was deployed in Bagh on 17 July
1948.132 Its C Company was placed under command 101 Brigade for attack on

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This battalion did not see action in the 1947-48 Kashmir war .It was deployed
towards the end of the war as part of 14 Para Brigade which was never employed in
actual operations.135

2/12 Frontier Force Regiment 234(later 4 FF)

Shockingly this battalion’s actions were simply not mentioned in the PIFFER history
of Lieutenant General Atiq ur Rahman, although the book lists casualties that this
battalion suffered in Kashmir war on page-234.136

Shaukat Riza places this battalion as part of Bannu Brigade (102 Brigade) .137

From page-145 of Kashmir Campaign this scribe deduced that this battalion was
initially part of Brigadier Haji Ahmads 10 Brigade deployed in Tithwal.138

However it was placed under command Brigadier Akbar Khan’s 101 Brigade in July
1948 and was reserve 139battalion in Pandu operation.

Two of its companies and battalion headquarters were used on 22/23rd July 1948 to
reinforce Major Afridi’s right column at point 9178 (Pandu Peak) which it reached on
23rd July 1948 evening , having made a forced march under its commanding officer
colonel Saeed .140

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height 500 yards short of Chota Qazi Nag peak and thought that they had captured
Chota Qazi Nag. They dug in here and reported success.

However the next morning the battalion discovered that they had not captured
Chota Qazi Nag.142

The battalion remained dug in here as the Indians had occupied Chota Qazi Nag in
strength.

On 24th July Lieutenant Colonel Saeed sent a platoon of D Company 4/10 Baluch
from Pandu peak to probe Indian defences of 2 Bihar Battalion at Pandu village.This
platoon discovered that the whole Indian battalion had withdrawn.

Colonel Saeed then occupied Pandu village.141

2/12 FF was tasked by Brigadier Akbar Khan to capture Chota Qazi Nag peak. They
attacked the peak with two companies on 25th July 1948.Due to bad map reading or
due to bad visibility mist and fog etc as per official history 2/12 FF captured a lower

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On 7th August 1948 the battalion repulsed an Indian attack on their positions
opposite Chota Qazi Nag inflicting severe losses on the Indians.143

In early November 1948 Indians again attacked 2/12 FF in strength but the attack
was repulsed.144

Brigadier Akbar Khan tasked 2/12 FF to capture Chota Qazi Nag.In order to destroy
the impregnable Indian bunkers at Chota Qazi Nag Brigadier Akbar tasked a gun of
3 Mountain Battery.However this gun sank deep into the ground after firing four
rounds and was unable to aim at the bunkers.The Indians retaliated with artillery
fire causing heavy casualties to 2/12 FF. 145Thus the operation against Chota Qazi
Nag was a failure again.

In November 1948 2/12 FFR and 2/1 Punjab were transferred from 101 Brigade to
Bagh sector under Brigadier Adam Khan as the Indian pressure against Poonch was
intense.146

There is not much to write about 2/12 FFR operations in this sector as main Indian
attack to link up Poonch was delivered from south.

As per Lieutenant General Atiq ur Rahmans Piffer history 2/12 FFR lost 16 killed , all
other ranks during the entire 1948 war.147
3/12 Frontier Force Regiment (Later 5 FF)

This battalion was part of 10 Brigade and was moved to Tithwal on 23 May 1948
from Abbottabad.148

Initially Tithwal was only defended by C Company of 5/12 FF (Guides) and was part
of area of responsibility of 101 Brigade.149

Once 163 Indian Brigade attacked Tithwal in strength 10 Brigade was mobilised
and tasked to defend Kishan Ganga Valley on 23 May 1948.150

This was a case of clear incompetence since as per Pakistani official history there
was clear intelligence reports that Indians were planning to launch an offensive in
Kishanganga Valley since December 1947.151

























































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At this time an Azad force under Captain (LATER MAJOR) Sher ex Kashmir state
forces was operating in Kishan Ganga Valley and had raided areas as far as outer
reaches of Handwara, Shulur and Trahgam in Kashmir Valley.152

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3/12 FF Regiment was stopped in between a match and sent to Tithwal post haste
by a forced march as narrated 153 by Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan in his
book.

10 Brigade comprising 4/19 Punjab and 3/12 FFR carried out a forced march from
Abbottabad with 4/16 Punjab in lead followed by 3/12 FFR.

As per the official 1970 account 3/12 FFR under Lieutenant Colonel Aziz ud Din
reached Tithwal on 25th May 1948 and was deployed on southern bank of
Kishanganga river in Pir Sahaba area.154

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The Indians launched attacks on 25th May and captured Richmar Gali which was
defended by a platoon of 3/12 FF.

On the northern bank an Indian battalion captured point 7229 on the same day, i.e
25th May and platoon 4/16

On night 30/31 May 1948 a two company attack by 4/16 Punjab and a company
attack by 3/12 FF from south was planned when the Indians attacked and captured
Point 7802 on 31st May 1948.155

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On the same day Major Akbar of 4/16 raided Indians at Richmar Gali from the
south but this raid failed to have any impact on outcome of the battle as Indian
attack on point 7802 and point 4297 was in full motion and Major Akbar on learning
about this hastily retraced his steps back to the north.156

As per the official history of 1970 Indians dislodged A and C Companies of the 3/12
FF from the whole Pir Sahaba Ridge.157

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The Tithwal position was logistically very difficult to maintain and the Indians
realised that it was very difficult to advance any further with a brigade opposed by
a Pakistani brigade.Thus during the first week of June little activity took place in the
area.158

The Pakistani front was now reorganized as map below illustrates:--

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Meanwhile Indians extended their positions northwards to include Chunj peak.159

The most decisive Indian action of Tithwal battle took place on 17 June 1948 when
Indians tried to achieve a major breakthrough opposite C Company of 3/12 FF
using a Garhwal battalion.

The battalion broke through the A Company of 3/12 FF which however immediately
readjusted its positions and attacked the Garhwal battalion from the rear.Meanwhile
the Garhwal battalion bumped into the battalion headquarter of 3/12 FF where the
adjutant Captain Mohammad Hussain organised an indomitable defence.

B company under Jemadar Qamar Din and C Company under Major I Rehman of
3/12 FF also attacked the Garhwalis from the south.Finally the Garhwalis were
repulsed but 3/12 FF also suffered serious casualties including the gallant Captain
Mohammad Hussain , one of three Piffer officers killed in 1948 war who was
awarded a posthumous Sitara e Jurrat (Military Cross).

The Pakistani official history much praised this decisive action of 3/12 FF naming its
Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Azizuddin as well as Captain Mohammad
Hussain.160

Lieutenant Colonel Atiq ur Rahman also much praised this action in his Piffer
history. 161

It may be noted that till 10 July 1948 opposing forces were equal at Tithwal.

162
However on 10 July 6 Rajputana Rifles reinforced 163 Indian Infantry Brigade
raising Indian battalions to 4 .

This did not solve the issue as the terrain was most difficult and 4 battalions against
3 battalions supported by irregulars could achieve no breakthrough.

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the fighting may be gauged from the fact that in this action 3/12 FFR , as per the
Pakistani official history did not suffer a single fatal casualty.163

3/12 FF was relieved by 4/16 Punjab in August 1948 and was relocated to northern
part of the 10 Brigade defences.It was later finally relieved by 1/14 Punjab in last
week of September 1948 164 and went back to Abbottabad.

3/12 FFR as per Atiqur Rahmans Piffer history suffered 27 fatal casualties 165 in the
entire 1948 war in the 4 months that it saw action. It performed quite well.

But the bottom line is that no breakthrough was possible in Tithwal and Indians had
lost the only chance to do so when Harbaksh Singh had ordered a two day halt
when 163 Brigade had first reached Tithwal.

5/12 FRONTIER FORCE REGIMENT (GUIDES INFANTRY) LATER 2 FRONTIER

FORCE REGIMENT (GUIDES)

This battalion was initially part of 102 Brigade at Bannu.166 However the unit was
transferred to 101 Brigade at Kohat soon .It was deployed in Kashmir in April 1948
as per Piffer History .167

The battalion was moved to Kashmir and distributed over a wide area with a
company at Kohala Bridge , a company at Muzaffarabad, a company at Domel
Bridge and a company at Tithwal.168

The official history described sending a company to Tithwal as a routine measure by
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At this time 10 Brigade was incharge of operations in Kashmir in both Jhelum Valley
and Kishanganga Valley.170

101 Brigade was made responsible for both Jhelum and Kishanganga Valleys
defence in early May 1948.171

On 14th May 1948 two companies of 5/12 FF Regiment (Guides) were deployed in
Hattian-Chinari area in Jhelum Valley by 101 Brigade.172
When 10 Brigade was assigned area of Kishanganga River in late May 1948 , C
Company of 5/12 FF Regiment (Guides) was placed under its command.At this
stage three other companies of 5/12 FF were under command of 101 Brigade , two
at Chinari-Hattian and one at Muzaffarabad.

Two companies of 5/12 FF Regiment (Guides) were deployed at Chitrian on 22/23

May 1948 and played an important role in stopping Indian advance.173

One of these two companies was withdrawn on night 24/25 May 1948 and sent to
Tithwal174 and thus placed under command the newly inducted 10 Brigade.

























































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The remaining company of 5/12 FFR (Guides) was placed under command 4/10
Baluch and deployed in the defence line at Nardajian.175

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On page 177 official history states that company of Guides Infantry (5/12 FFR) was
at Nardajian but on page- 182 states that it was deployed in defence at Bandi
Syedan a little north of Nardajian.

As per Piffer history B Company of this battalion guarding Domel-Muzaffarabad

Bridges was also sent to Tithwal and thus placed under command 10 Brigade.176

Piffer history of LTG Attiqur Rahman claims that earlier only A Company of 5/12 FF
Regiment (Guides) was at Tithwal.177

However December 1970 published Pakistan Army official history specifically states
that C Company of 5/12 FF Regiment (Guides) was at Tithwal when the Indian 163
Brigade attacked it in late May 1948.178

When news of advance of 163 Indian Brigade reached the Pakistani Army General
Headquarters at Rawalpindi C Company 5/12 FF Regiment (Guides) was placed
under command 10 Brigade and Kishanganga Valley was taken away from area of
responsibility of 101 Brigade and assigned to 10 Brigade.179

In order to coordinate and integrate the actions of the two companies placed under
command an adhoc battalion headquarters sent from 101 Brigade area under the
battalions second in command Major A.A Khaleeli to Tithwal sector.180

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5/12 FF Regiment (Guides) first battle with Indian 163 Brigade took place on 25th
May 1948 when as per the official history , an Indian unit which had crossed
Kishanganga River attacked point 7229 being held by a platoon of C Company 5/12
FF Regiment (Guides) alongwith a platoon of 4/16 Punjab. 183

There is a variation in the above mentioned claim also as 1970 official history
claims that 5/12 FF Regiment (Guides) troops arriving at Tithwal were functioning These two platoons were forced to withdraw from point 7229 and withdrew towards
under the battalion’s commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Karim Dad.181 Chogali and Khatimbal.184

However on page 147 official history credits Major Khaleeli with commanding both
companies of 5/12 FF Regiment Guides.182

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As per official history B Company of 5/12 FF Regiment (Guides) under Major A.A
Shiekh arrived from Muzaffarabad to reinforce C Company of the same battalion
less a platoon at Khatimbal.185

Major Khaleeli played a most active role in containing Indians occupying point 7229
and as per official history launched various unsuccessful attacks on point 7229.186
The reason for failure of these attacks as per official history was lack of artillery
support.187

300 Mahsuds and 150 Afridis who had arrived in the area were also placed under
command Major Khaleeli.188

Meanwhile platoon 4/16 Punjab which was present in this area was now withdrawn
south of River Kishanganga and rejoined its parent battalion.189

While 2 companies less a platoon of 5/12 FF Regiment (Guides) were north of

Kishanganga River , one platoon of the battalion under Jemadar Dost Mohammad
was in Richmar Gali.190

Jemadar Dost Mohammad was killed in action when Richmar Gali was attacked and
captured by the Indians on 31st May 1948.191

During early June the brigade was reorganized and the areas of responsibility of
various units were as shown in map below:--

On June 10 1948 Major Khaleeli commanding two Companies of 5/12 FF (Guides)

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tribals were to attack it from the north .192
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Indians counter attacked in great force.193
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Lieutenant Colonel Karim Dad , new in the area decided to attack point 7229 again
on 24 June 1948 196 but strangely decided to use only two companies for the attack.

The attack was a complete failure as surprise was lost and the Indians engaged the
two companies in the forming up place.The two companies still advanced but got
stuck in the Indian minefield around point 7229.197

I interviewed various direct participants of 1948 war including Major General Akbar
Khan , DSO , Brigadier Sadiq Khan Satti MC , EX Major Ishaq MC and Brigadier
Aslam Khan MC. All FOUR had a very low opinion about military caliber of Brigadier
H.I Ahmad commander 10 Brigade and noted that planning as well as fighting was
relegated to battalion commanders.

Further commander 10 Brigade was an armour officer with very mediocre war
record since in Burma Indian Armoured Corps was overwhelmingly superior to
Japanese tanks technically , materially and numerically.

A proof of this assertion is Pakistan Army’s official history published in 1970 makes
no mention of commander 10 Brigade in the famous 4/16 attack on point 7229.

However this official history all along praises then Lieutenant Colonel Nausherwan
Khan for being the real master mind of the brilliant plan of attack on Chunj.

Thus this history noted “ Lt. Col Nausherwan fully analysed the causes of the failure
of the previous attacks by by 5/12 FFR (Guides) and the tribesmen. He concluded
that the enemy at Chunj and point 7229 was too strong to be dislodged or defeated
from the feature by half measures and without proper fire support .198

The official history further noted that it was Lt Col Nausherwan who decided the
direction of attack for the point 7229/Chunj operation .

The official history thus noted “Lieutenant Colonel Nausherwan had been quick in
realising that a frontal attack on point 7229 was not possible, and that the best
approach was to roll up the enemy along the ridge from the north.He therefore
As per official history of 1970 this attack took place before remaining two decided to concentrate his battalion in Ban forest,north of Chogali.
companies and battalion headquarters of 5/12 FF Regiment (Guides) had joined the
battalion.But Piffer history claims that when this attack took place Guides Infantry It appears that Headquarters 10 Brigade realised that 4/16 Punjab was better
Battalions remaining two companies and battalion headquarters had arrived in the suited to capture point 7229 and 5/12 FF (Guides) was relieved by 4/16 Punjab on
1st July 1948 and was shifted south of Kishanganga River opposite Pir sahaba Ridge
area but were not employed by the brigade headquarters in the attack.194
on the Panjkot Nala as map below illustrates:--
Meanwhile remaining half battalion of the Guides Infantry (5/12 FF) joined the two
companies in Tithwal about 16-17 June 1948.195

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Guides Infantry (5/12 FFR) was tasked to carry out a long range raid in Kishan
Ganga Valley199 which was to have decisive impact on the 4/16 Punjab attack now
famous as battle of Chunj !

Sadly this historic raid was totally ignored by so called eminent Piffer historians like
LTG Attiq Ur Rahman. Or perhaps Atiq never knew its significance !

The Pakistani official history of 1970 was also ignorant about how decisively this
raid influenced Tithwal battle ! Because official history casually mentions it as
having effect on morale of Muslim population.

Here we are indebted to Indian official history , which was also ignorant about the
real background of this raid for at least highlighting its impact ! The Indian official
history saw this raid as a well conceived Pakistani deception plan, which it never
actually was that led to deployment of two companies of 3 Garhwal Rifles at
Kupwara on 7 July 1948 to attack Sharda , when they were most needed at Tithwal
on 9th July 1948 when point 7229 was overrun and captured by 4/16 Punjab.200

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Lieutenant General Atiqur Rahman who at one time was regarded by this scribe as
a respectable military historian , deeply disappointed this scribe when I read his
totally false and ludicrous claim that Guides infantry captured Pir Sahaba by
surprise !

Attiqur Rahman’s ludicrous and factually incorrect claim thus read as follows:--201

“The Guides infantry were again in action in Tithwal area.By stealth they
surprised a large force and captured the most dominating feature of Pir
Sahaba.This unhinged an enemy battalion size force which defended this
area.Later the Guides captured point 7802 as well “

Pakistani official history clearly stated on page-160 ,that Pir Sahaba etc was
abandoned by Indian Army .Thus stating “consequently the Indians now
dominated by direct and observed fire from point 7229 and apprehensive
of being cut off from their main base at Richmar Gali, hastily withdrew
from the entire ridge which was occupied by D Company of 5/12 FFR
(Guides) without further resistance”.202

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5/12 FF Regiment (Guides) was employed in an attack on Beari Ridge held by 1/11
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203
and 5/12 FFR (Guides) did not see any serious fighting after this in Tithwal
Sector.

It was sent back to 101 Brigade later and was deployed at Pandu at the time of
ceasefire.204

The battalion lost total 32 killed in action including 1 officer, 1 JCO and 30 other
ranks.205

It lost Captain Khalid Mahmood Butt killed as per Attiqur Rahman on 26 July
1948.206

However Attiqur Rahman simply hoodwinked and evaded the circumstances of his
death. A rather sloppy style of writing a regimental history.

As a battalion it performed outstandingly minus Attiqur Rahman’s massive and

fallacious exaggerations about its capturing Pir Sahaba by surprise.

6/13 FF Rifles (later 1 FF)

This battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bakhtiar Rana was deployed as

part of 100 Brigade commanded by Brigadier K.M Shiekh in Kashmir from 20th May
1948.207

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A company of 6/13 FF Rifles commanded by Major Masud Karim was deployed on

Bagsar Ridge.On June 2nd as per official Pakistan Army history Indians shelled this
area and Major Masud Karim immediately abandoned this position 208 and withdrew
south allowing the Indians to occupy the area four days later.

Official history also did not elaborate but stated that the company which had
vacated Bagsar Ridge was sent back to reoccupy it under its senior JCO.209

Where was Major Masud Karim is left as a mystery !

This incident illustrates a badly commanded battalion but Lieutenant General

Attiqur Rahman simply whitewashed and omitted this incident in his Piffer history.

Bhimbhar was the most peaceful and indecisive sector of Kashmir war and this
battalion does not seem to have done much. The intensity of fighting in which it
was involved may be gauged from the fact that it suffered only one 210fatal casualty
in the entire seven months and ten days period in which it was involved in the war.

Towards the end of May 1947 6/13 FF Rifles took over the Assar Sector and held it
till ceasefire.211

Official history states that the frontage of area of responsibility of the battalion was
soon extended from Assar to Kabutar Gali .212

Official history states that it captured Chamb on 3rd/4th November 1948 213 , which
at that time was of no importance in the Kashmir war. But lost it very soon.The
very claim that 6/13 FF Rifles in the Pakistani official history is vaguely worded .214

Indian official history makes no mention of the Pakistani claim that 6/13 FF Rifles
and irregulars had conquered Chhamb !

























































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Official history mentions one Daffadar Sadiq Hussain Shah of PAVO Cavalry , 11TH
Frontier Force in this attack on Chhamb as the hero of the battle but Colonel Yahya
Effendi in his 11 Cavalry history makes no mention of this person.

6/13 FF Rifles history of Kashmir war is the vaguest and most uninteresting part of
Kashmir war.

1/13 FF Rifles (Later 7 FF)

This battalion was introduced in Kashmir war when 10 Brigade of Brigadier H.I
Ahmad was replaced by Brigadier Akbar Khan Pareechkhel, DSOs 101 Brigade in
mid May 1948.

1/13 FF Rifles replaced 4/16 Punjab at Chakothi on 9th May 1948.215

The initial position of the battalion before Indian summer offensive was launched
was from Sultan Dhakki north of River Jhelum to Kalgai in the south and extending
in depth till Chakothi , a total 10 miles.216

When the Indian two brigade summer offensive began

1/13 FF Rifles took the impregnable position as illustrated in map below.

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All Indian attempts to breakthrough this position failed and 1/13 FF Rifles held its The battalion performed outstandingly and held its ground till ceasefire on 31st
ground supported ably by two guns of 1 Mountain Regiment and a troop of four 4.2 December 1948.
Inch mortars as well as machineguns of a company strength of 1/15 Punjab
Regiment (MMG).217 It suffered a total of 22 fatal casualties 219 in the entire six and half month’s period
During the 4/10 Baluch attack on Pandu , 1/13 FF Rifles was tasked to attack Sugna that it was deployed on active service in the Kashmir war.
and Urusa as a part of diversionary attacks to not to allow Indians to reinforce its
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This brave battalion was replaced by 1/1 Punjab in last week of September 1948.220
The battalion was redeployed in the same 101 brigade area at Kathai Nala 221 which
was a far more peaceful location that the hell it had occupied for most of the
Kashmir war.

2/13 FF Regiment (Later 8 FF)

Official history states that C Company of 2/13 FF Rifles was sent to Bagh sector in
May 1948.222

The remaining battalion arrived in Bagh sector and was then moved north in Pir
Panjal Range area (Pir Kanthi-Tilpatra) to provide flank protection to 101
Brigade.223

LTG Attiqur Rahman claims that this battalion was first employed in Poonch at
Tetrinot Ridge on 16th April 1948 and two of its companies repulsed two attacks
launched by Indian 1st Kumaon Battalion.224

Atiq states that the battalion stayed at Tetrinot till May 1948.

Official history which had far better access to all records does not mention at all
that this battalion or any of its company ever went to Tetrinot Ridge.

This battalion was part of 101 Brigade225 and was deployed at Pir Kanthi 226
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Greater disasters came when this battalions two companies holding Pir Kanthi were
D Company of this battalion while on way to occupy point 9108 in June 1948 was attacked 228 by an Indian battalion on night 27/28 June 1948 and evicted with
repulsed by a stronger Indian force.227 In the process this company lost 4 killed and heavy losses.
many wounded.

As per official history the defensive layout of these companies was badly done and
they had not followed the complete standard operating procedures as below. 229

The official history noted the serious flaws in this battalions actions that led to this
debacle at Pir Kanthi ; “the companies were sited widely apart without mutual

















































































































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support and depth.The top of the feature had not been occupied and outposts for In mid July 2/13 FF Rifles was placed under command 102 Brigade.233 Note that
early warning had not been organised”. Bagh previously under 101 Brigade (Akbar Khan Pareechkhel,DSO) was detached
and made a separate command under 102 Brigade brought from Bannu in mid July
The Indian occupation of Pir Kanthi forced Brigadier Akbar Khan Pareechkhel,DSO 1948.234
to shift two companies of 2/1 Punjab from Nanga Tak in the northern part of 101
Brigade sector to Pir Kanthi area.230 At this stage 2/13 FF Rifles was divided between 101 and 102 Brigades with one of
its company under command 101 Brigade and remainder Battalion under command
102 Brigade.235

The battalion was finally fully transferred under command 102 Brigade and stayed
in Pir Kanthi area .It was relieved by 4/8 Punjab in end of September 1948.236

The battalion went to Abbottabad for rest and recuperation.

It was deployed in 25 Brigade area in Mendhar Sector in November 1948.237

Piffer history claims that the battalion moved to Kohat in October 1948.238

The battalion lost 21 killed in the entire 1948 war.239

Its fatal casualties include Captain Liaquat Ali Khan killed on 17/18 April 1948.240

Attiqur Rahman did not bother to describe the circumstances of this officers death.

The battalion was unfortunate in being deployed in sectors where Indians had
considerable superiority and was not able to make much of an impact.

4/13 FF Rifles (Later 9 FF)

One company of this battalion was moved to Poonch in February 1948.241

This was D Company of the battalion commanded by Captain Niwaz Tiwana and the
overall force was under command Brigadier Hayauddin.242The orders were that
Pakistan Army troops would not be committed and the force’s task was top provide
A company of 2/13 FF Rifles was placed under command 2/1 Punjab.231 local protection to the artillery which was part of the force.

Brigadier Akbar Khan ordered Lieutenant Colonel Adam Khan to occupy point 9108
and Tilpatra Ridge about 8th July 1948. Adam Khan sent two companies which
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The remaining battalion was deployed in Jhangar area under 25 Brigade in May The Azad troops alongwith the battalion fled the battlefield and the 25 Brigade as
1948.243Here its D Company earlier at Poonch also rejoined the battalion.244 per the official history lost control of the battle.In these circumstances the battalion
extricated itself with great difficulty.247
It was employed in the attack on Matlasi on 10th May by 25 Brigade which was a
failure.245 Here the battalion got involved in direct fighting with Indian Army . Here However the battalion maintained its cohesion and carried out a skillful withdrawal
the battalion faced two Indian battalions supported by air power and considerable and was awarded about 25 gallantry awards.248
artillery and faced 75 casualties.246
It was then withdrawn to Rawalpindi on 29th May 1948.249

On 1st June 1948 250 the battalion was ordered to Move to 101 Brigade area where it
was deployed at the Nanga Tak feature.

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The prime role of the battalion here was to prevent Indian infiltration towards
Reshian Gali in which it was most successful.251 5/13 FF Rifles (Later 10 FF)

On 20th June 1948 the battalion returned to Rawalpindi and acting GOC of 7 5/13 Rifles was deployed in Jhangar sector in end of May 1948 256 as part of 100
Division Brigadier Hayauddin was guest of honour in the investiture ceremony held Brigade commanded by Brigadier K.M Shiekh which replaced 25 Brigade in this
for gallantry awards rewarding to the battalion.252 area. 257

The battalion was again sent to Jhangar area on 1st October 1948.253 25 Brigade was now made responsible for Poonch area.

4/13 FF Rifles was finally transferred to the 14 Para Brigade which was deployed in
Bhimbar to launch Operation Venus.254 This operation as earlier discussed was not
launched.

The battalion suffered 43 fatal casualties, 255 the highest in all Piffer units, most of
which were suffered in the disastorous Matlasi battle.

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The battalion took part in the disastorous attack on Matlasi on night 3RD/4TH July
1948 258 , however shockingly Attiqur Rahman simply evades any discussion of this
failed attack.This attack was launched on night 3rd/4th July 1948 but called off when
the two companies of this battalion were in between forming up place and objective
because the irregulars on the flanks had fled or were repulsed.259

The battalion was relieved by 4/13 FF in October 1948.260

The battalion was deployed as part of 14 Para Brigade for Operation Venus which was
never launched.261

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LTG Attiq in his Piffer history claims that 5/13 FF Rifles launched an attack on Indian
battalion as depicted in map below on 28th December 1948.262

This needs further confirmation but am reproducing it in larger interest of military

history.
5/13 FF Rifles suffered a total of 21 fatal casualties during the entire Kashmir
war.263
No Major Breakthrough achieved where Regular Battalions confronted each
other

While breakthroughs at Pandu , Chunj etc were achieved , these breakthroughs

were local affairs and did not have any decisive impact on the war as a whole.

The superior power of defence over offence was reveled convincingly in this war.

Decisive Breakthroughs achieved only when Regular Forces were pitched

against Irregulars and enjoyed massive superiority like tanks, armoured
cars,airpower and artillery

























































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Only decisive breakthroughs achieved were against irregular forces where regular
forces enjoyed massive and unique superiority as at Shalateng , Relief of Poonch,
Capture of Rajauri, Zojilla Pass breakthrough.

Pakistani problem was lack of resolution at highest political and military

level

All along Pakistani state ,both political and military leadership feared Indian
retaliation in shape of a conventional all out war , which severely limited decision
making of Pakistani side.

Thus :--

1.
Not launching main attack on Jammu which would have doomed Indian cause
in Kashmir from outset.
2.
Not agreeing to Colonel Tommy Massaud Khan’s suggestions to use PAVO
Cavalry squadron to capture Srinagar.

Not equipping irregulars with anti Tank weapons

General Gracey although a reasonable military commander lacked dynamism and

failed to equip irregulars with anti tank weapons , particularly in south Kashmir
where Indian tanks were able to capture Rajauri the gateway to Poonch.

Similarly no thought was given to strengthening Zojila Pass with artillery and anti
tank weapons which was entirely possible in second half of 1948.

Brigadier Akbar Khan DSO only dynamic commander of this war

A uniquely dynamic commander of this war whose personality had a major impact
on the war.

Had Mr Jinnah had the foresightedness to select this man as Commander in Chief of
Pakistan Army , the whole wars outcome may have been different.

No difference at operational level between both armies who were by and

large led by Mediocre leaders

Barring Akbar Khan DSO and LP Sen DSO both armies were led by highly mediocre
brigade and divisional commanders
Irregulars shamelessly used as cannon fodder by Pakistani state

Pakistani state shamelessly used irregulars both Azads and tribals as cannon fodder
and more than 60 % fatal casualties were suffered by these irregulars.
A strange war waged without any clear design by Pakistan.

Pakistani political and military leadership failed in trying to conclude a ceasefire in

early 1948 when Pakistani position was most advantageous.

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A failure of both political and military leadership.

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