IdeAs

Idées d'Amériques 
1 | 2011
Intégrations dans les Amériques

NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico:

Assessment and prospects
Impact socio-économique de l’ALENA au Mexique : Bilan et perspectives
Impacto socioeconómico del TLCAN sobre México: balance y perspectivas

Jean-Baptiste Velut

Édition électronique
URL : https://journals.openedition.org/ideas/71
DOI : 10.4000/ideas.71
ISSN : 1950-5701

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Institut des Amériques
 

Référence électronique
Jean-Baptiste Velut, « NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects », IdeAs
[En ligne], 1 | 2011, mis en ligne le 31 août 2011, consulté le 18 octobre 2022. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/ideas/71  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ideas.71

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 1

NAFTA's Developmental Impact on

Mexico: Assessment and prospects
Impact socio-économique de l’ALENA au Mexique : Bilan et perspectives
Impacto socioeconómico del TLCAN sobre México: balance y perspectivas

Jean-Baptiste Velut

1 In the 1990s, the proliferation or consolidation of regional trade agreements in the

Americas, Europe and Asia renewed century-old debates on the welfare effects of trade
liberalization.1 In Canada, Mexico and the United States, the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), designed to liberalize trade and investment flows across the
North American continent, crystallized tensions on the costs and benefits of free trade.
These stormy controversies took decision-makers by surprise to the extent that NAFTA
institutionalized a decade-long process of economic regionalization between North
American economies. In effect, NAFTA was the sum of two bilateral relationships that
converged in the United States. First, through a series of bilateral agreements –
reciprocal trade agreement (1935), Defense Production Sharing Agreement (1956) and
the Auto Pact (1965) – culminating with the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement of 1988, the American and Canadian economies had grown increasingly
interdependent through the course of the twentieth century. Second, the gradual
consolidation of the US-Mexican economic partnership through a series of initiatives
like the Bracero Program (1943-1964),2 the creation of maquiladoras in 1965 and
Washington’s financial rescue plans during the Mexican debt crisis of the 1980s laid the
ground for the signature of NAFTA. In this sense, NAFTA was only a logical step in the
long process of economic rapprochement in North America. However, to a greater
extent, NAFTA epitomized a power struggle for the future of globalization, pitting free
trade advocates against an unprecedented coalition of labor, environmental, consumer
and religious organizations that denounced the corporate bias of the agreement and its
neglect for social and environmental issues. In the United States, the NAFTA debates
heralded the beginning of a series of political battles on the rules of American trade
policy (Velut, 2009).

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 2

2 If the core logic of NAFTA was to liberalize trade flows between North American
economies, the agreement was as much about liberalizing and protecting foreign
investment as it was about dismantling trade barriers (Orme, 1996:126; Nishijima
Smith, 1996:36). In this sense, NAFTA’s investment provisions constituted the final
phase in the restructuring of production processes on the North American continent.
NAFTA also had long ramifications that would encroach upon national sovereignty in a
number of spheres such as procurement policies or intellectual property rights. It was
designed as a “contractual agreement” that would protect investors and companies
through a strong dispute settlement mechanism (Deblock, Rioux 2010: 9-16).
3 In contrast, NAFTA’s institutional framework largely left out important social issues
that are nonetheless central to North American relations such as internal disparities or
immigration. In addition, despite the efforts of unions and their allies, the agreement
gave little scope to labor and environmental questions, which were confined to low-
enforcement “side agreements,” the purpose of which was to improve cooperation
between the three member countries.3 Thus, while NAFTA can be considered as a classic
case of regionalism (Mansfield, Milner op.cit.), it also constitutes a sui generis regional
integration “model” developed primarily to maximize business efficiency through the
reorganization of production processes on a continental scale (Coste, 2004:187-207;
Eden, 1994). NAFTA members were reluctant to establish strong supranational
institutions, in contrast with the deeper integration approach favored by European
countries.4 The latter have adopted an ambitious agenda aimed at solving a set of
common transnational problems in a variety of policy spheres. To do so, the European
integration model rests upon a strong institutional apparatus that NAFTA undoubtedly
lacks.
4 The narrow productivist logic of the NAFTA model along with the fierce controversies
that surrounded its signature and ratification have made it a perfect case study to
assess the linkage between trade liberalization and economic welfare. Since NAFTA
came into force in 1994, numerous scholars have attempted to assess its socio-economic
impact on North American economies. In congruence with the debates that preceded
NAFTA’s implementation, most studies of its impact have focused on sectoral dynamics
(Robert, 2000; Burfisher Robinson Thierfielder, 2001: 125-144), employment (especially
in the United States) (Ojeda, 2000; Haar, 2004: 55-67) and environmental questions
(Gallagher, 2002: 119-141; Mann, Von Moltke, 1999).
5 Some analysts have examined NAFTA’s socio-economic impact in Mexico in the
prospect of determining whether the agreement can be interpreted as a successful or a
failed development strategy. Easterly and his colleagues tend to side with the former
conclusion, arguing that the income gap declined after 1995, even though convergence
was partly hampered by Mexico’s lack of institutional reforms (Easterly, Fiess,
Lederman, 2003: 1-53). By contrast, Blecker and Esquivel, along with Wise, highlighted
NAFTA’s failure to meet the promises of its advocates by demonstrating that the
income gap between US and Mexican workers had remained stable since NAFTA’s
passage(Blecker, Esquivel, 2010: 17-30; Wise, op.cit.). Findings on the evolution of social
inequality in the post-NAFTA period are similarly contested. In 2003, Bizberg analyzed
the political foundations of Mexico’s export-oriented strategy and its repercussions on
the labor market and pointed to a decline in real wages and an increase in income
inequality (Bizberg, 2004: 69-85). However, two later studies by Campos-Vásquez and
Esquivel concluded that income inequality had declined in the post-NAFTA period. Each

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 3

study highlighted different factors that are not directly related to trade liberalization: a
rise in college enrollment rates and a lack of demand for top-skilled jobs in the case of
Campos-Vásquez; the implementation of new social programs, a growing flow of
remittances as well as increasing education levels for Esquivel (Campos-Vasquez, 2010;
Esquivel, 2010).
6 To bolster NAFTA’s contested developmental record, scholars have offered either
domestic or supranational solutions. Some have put the emphasis on domestic reforms
in Mexico as a prerequisite for greater social cohesion within NAFTA (Wise, op.cit.,
Easterly, Fiess, Lederman, op.cit.), or a precondition for the adoption of supranational
reforms (Hufbauer, Schott, op.cit.). Others have stressed the institutional weakness of
NAFTA and admonish decision-makers to look to the European Union for supranational
solutions to improve social cohesion across the North American continent (Studer,
Pastor, op.cit.).
7 This article builds upon this literature with two objectives: clarifying the contrasted
findings on NAFTA’s socio-impact in Mexico during its first fifteen years of existence;
second, providing a set of policy prescriptions to improve NAFTA’s developmental
record. In contrast with the early arguments of both free trade advocates and anti-
NAFTA critics, NAFTA’s impact on Mexico has been neither a calamity nor a blessing.
This means that the agreement should not be jettisoned; nor should it be relegated the
bottom list of policymakers. Instead, the NAFTA model needs to be upgraded through
both domestic and international reforms in order to respond to the old and new
challenges that Mexico has had to face.

Trade and investment under NAFTA

8 Regardless of whether one embraces or condemns the effects of economic
liberalization, it is hard to contest the fact that NAFTA has largely contributed to
increase trade and investment flows between North American economies. In fifteen
years, trade among the NAFTA partners more than tripled, from $289 billion in 1993 to
$945 billion in 2008 (see figure 1) (Secretaria de Economia, 2010). This trend excludes
the effect of the recent recession, which took a significant toll on trade flows at both
global and regional levels. The Mexican economy directly benefited from this
intensification of trade flows with its North American partners.

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 4

Figure 1

Source: Secretaría de Economía

9 Mexico converted its bilateral merchandise trade balance with the United States from a
$2-billion deficit in 1993 to a $74-billion peak surplus in 2007 that would fall back to $48
billion in 2009. Mexican exports to the US grew fivefold between 1993 and 2008 (from
$40 billion to $216 billion), while its imports from America almost quadrupled ($42
billion to $151 billion) (see figure 2).

Figure 2

Source: US Census Bureau

10 Through increased bilateral trade, the Mexican and American economies have become
increasingly interdependent. In 2009, Mexico was the third largest trading partner of
the United States, representing nearly 12% of US trade in 2009 (against 16% for Canada
and 14% for China) (US Census Bureau, 2010). It absorbed almost one eighth of all U.S.
exports and was the first or second export destination for twenty-two U.S. states
(Wilson Center, 2009). Mexico is considerably dependent on the US economy, which
accounted for 51% of Mexican imports and as much as 84% of its exports in 2009. This
makes Mexico largely vulnerable to economic recessions in the United States, as the
recent crisis has shown. Based on foreign trade statistics from the Secretaría de Economía
and the Banco de México, two thirds of the decline in Mexico’s foreign trade in 2009 can

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 5

be attributed to the downturn in US-Mexican bilateral trade (Secretaria de Economia,

op.cit.).
11 Beyond the close economic ties between Mexico and the United States, Mexico’s
commercial relationship with Canada has also flourished under NAFTA. Despite its
minor significance for North American trilateral trade (about 3% in 2009), Mexican-
Canadian bilateral trade has surged six-fold over the past fifteen years (from $4 billion
in 1993 to $26 billion in 2008). This has, once again, largely benefited Mexico, whose
trade surplus jumped from $2 billion in 1993 to $7 billion in 2008 (Secretaria de
Economia, op.cit.).
12 At the top of Mexico’s export list are manufacturing goods ranging from auto parts to
electronic goods like TV sets and telephones, oil and petrochemicals (INEGI, 2010).
Mexican agricultural exports also increased under NAFTA, and particularly vegetables
and fruit exports, which doubled from 1994 to 2005 (Zahniser, 2007: 23). The increase in
non-oil exports was perhaps one of the most successful elements of Mexico’s export-
oriented strategy under NAFTA. According to Juan Carlos Moreno Brid, economist at
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), Mexico
experienced between 1994 and 2002 the second fastest rise in the share of world
exports of manufacturing goods after China.5 Mexican maquiladoras played a major role
in the growth of the manufacturing sector, which was concentrated in no more than
300 firms often linked with multinational corporations.6
13 Admittedly, the performance of Mexico’s exporting sector largely owes to the
devaluation of its currency during the peso crisis of 1994-1995, which boosted the
international competitiveness of Mexican exports. In addition, Mexico’s trade
expansion did not solely stem from NAFTA’s implementation but was, to a larger
extent, the result of a decade-old process of regional integration (Hufbauer, Goodrich,
2004: 37-50). However, NAFTA certainly boosted Mexico’s exporting performance,
particularly during the late 1990s.
14 Trade growth was propelled by a rise in investment flows on a regional level. Here
again, the Mexican economy benefited from this trend, and particularly from the
considerable surge in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) not only from its NAFTA
partners, but other competitors that sought to enter the North American market.
Through a system of rules of origins,7 NAFTA encouraged firms from outside North
America (especially Japanese, and more recently Chinese firms) to use Mexico as an
exporting platform to the US market. Based on data from the United Nations Trade
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), total FDI inward flows to Mexico
more than tripled from an annual average of $3.5 billion over the 1987-1993 period, to
$12.4 billion between 1994 and 2000, before reaching an annual level of $23.2 billion
dollars in 2001-2007.8 Total FDI stocks jumped from $41 billion in 1993 to $295 billion in
2008 (see figure 3).

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 6

Figure 3

Source: UNCTAD

15 The United States once again provided the lion’s share of FDI inflows. In 2008, US FDI
inflows accounted for 41% of total inflows to Mexico (rising up to 53% in 2009) –
benefiting more than 21,000 companies – along with 68% of the total amount invested
in manufacturing, and 51% in the banking sector (US Embassy in Mexico; 2009).
Canada’s cumulative FDI paled in comparison with that provided by America, reaching
$9.8 billion over the 1994-2009 period (to 2,300 firms), yet amounted to nearly ten times
as much as in 1994. Its FDI inflows to Mexico averaged $617 million during NAFTA’s
first fifteen years (1994-2008) and represented 11% of total inflows by 2008 ((Secretaria
de Economia, op.cit.). This means that North American FDI accounted for three fifths of
Mexico’s FDI inflows in 2008.9 In short, NAFTA significantly accelerated the growth of
regional trade and investment flows, to the benefit of the Mexican economy that
became increasingly dependent on its North American trading partners.

NAFTA’s developmental legacy

16 While NAFTA's macroeconomic consequences are clear, its socio-economic impact has
been the subject of greater controversies. One main reason for these debates lies in the
complexity of distinguishing what happened after NAFTA from what happened because
of NAFTA. Determining NAFTA’s direct effect on employment and wages is a difficult
task to the extent that economic indicators are determined by a wide range of political
and economic forces.
17 At first sight, the evolution of Mexico’s social indicators after 1994 might suggest that
NAFTA raised the prospects of Mexican households. Indeed, OECD statistics reveal that
poverty receded after NAFTA came into force. Different measures of the poverty rate
(under 60, 50 or 40% of the current median income after taxes and transfers) all show a
notable decline. Using the most common comparative indicator (50% of median
income), poverty declined from 21.7% in the mid-1990s to 18.4% in the mid-2000s. This
contrasts with an increase in poverty in the decade that preceded NAFTA’s
implementation (from 20.7 to 21.7%). Similarly, income inequality receded, with the
Gini Index (after taxes and transfer) decreasing from 0.52 in the mid-1990s to 0.47 in
the mid-2000s. Here again, post-NAFTA trends contrast with the rise of inequality in
the decade before the agreement went into force, a period when the Gini Index jumped

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 7

from 0.45 to 0.52 (OECD, 2010). This confirms the findings of Campos-Vásquez and
Esquivel. Finally, Mexico’s Human Development Index (HDI) – a composite indicator
derived from data on health, education and income by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) – also rose after NAFTA. However, this indicator must be used with
caution insofar as this upward trend has been constant since 1980 despite the severe
crises from which Mexico suffered (United Nations Development programme, 2010).
18 A brief look at the employment picture in the post-NAFTA period reveals that the fears
of NAFTA critics were exaggerated. According to statistics from the International Labor
Organization (ILO), general employment in Mexico steadily increased during NAFTA’s
first fifteen years, adding 11 million jobs between 1993 and 2008 (from 33 to 44 million
jobs). The official unemployment rate generally remained between 2.5 and 3.5%, except
in the aftermath of the peso crisis of 1994-1995, when it peaked at 6.9% in 1995
(International Labor Organization, 2010). Under closer scrutiny, however, Mexico’s
employment and development performance seems only partially affected by trade and
investment flows. First, as figure 4 shows, there seems to be little correlation between
total FDI inflows to Mexico and employment growth. For instance, the dramatic
increase of FDI inflows in 1999-2001 (partly due to Citibank’s acquisition of Banamex in
2001)10 did not have any significant effect on Mexico’s labor market; nor did the erratic
evolution of foreign investment after 2001 derail Mexico’s slow but steady job growth.

Figure 4

Source: ILO, UNCTAD.

19 This finding dovetails with the conclusions reached by Blecker, who found that the rise
in FDI in the post-NAFTA period has had no effect on Mexican growth (Blecker, 2009:
1274-1284). The limited gains accruing from the rise in FDI could be explained by the
concomitant decline of Mexican domestic investment. Indeed, as Zepeda, Wise and
Gallagher have shown, overall investment levels since NAFTA’s implementation
remained more or less stable after NAFTA’s implementation, hovering around 19% of
GDP during the 1994-2006 period (Zepeda, Wise, Gallagher, 2009:7).
20 If FDI inflows did not have a significant impact on job creation in Mexico, trade could
have stimulated job growth. Mexico’s rising exports to the United States under NAFTA
and its employment performance seemed to be growing in sync between 1993 and 2008

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 8

(see figure 5). But while it would be tempting to conclude that NAFTA has been an
engine for job growth, NAFTA’s employment record must be scrutinized in the two
sectors most affected by trade liberalization: manufacturing and agriculture.

Figure 5

Source: ILO, US Census Bureau.

Mexico’s manufacturing employment under NAFTA

21 In the manufacturing sector, job creation mostly occurred in the first six years after
NAFTA’s implementation (1994-2000). Employment in the maquiladoras sector reached a
peak of 1.3 million jobs in 2000 (on an annual basis) before receding to 1 million in 2003
(INEGI, 2007). In 2006, the last year for which data is available, 11 it had not regained its
2000 level (1.2 million). Two factors explain this trend. First, and as previously
mentioned, Mexico’s exporting sector largely benefited from the devaluation of the
peso until the early 2000s, when its exchange rate recovered. Secondly, after 2000,
Mexican manufacturing companies faced increased competition from China. Boosted
by its entry in the World Trade Organization in 2001 and a massive wave of investment
flows from Western multinational corporations, China came to replace Mexico as
America’s leading manufacturing supplier, thereby taking over Mexico’s rank as the US
second trading partner. The recent recession and the corollary decline of American
imports have not raised Mexico’s prospects. As of this writing, the latest statistical
survey of the new IMMEX program reveals that employment in Mexico’s exporting
sector (goods and services) declined by 17% between July 2007 (beginning of the
subprime crisis in the US) and July 2009 (from 1.910 to 1.578 million), before gradually
recovering to reach 1.853 million in April 2011 (INEGI, 2009). This reveals, once again,
the destabilizing effects of Mexico’s dependency on the US economy.
22 One of the main promises of NAFTA advocates was the idea that liberalizing trade and
investment flows across the continent would eventually reduce wage disparities
between Mexico and its North American partners. However, fifteen years after NAFTA
went into effect, Mexican living standards have hardly caught up with household
income in America. Mexico’s GDP per capita has remained roughly a sixth of that of the
United States since the early 1990s (Wilson Center, op.cit.). The evolution of

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 9

manufacturing wages shows a similar trend: in 1993, the average wage of American
workers was 5.6 times higher than those of Mexican workers; in 2007, this ratio was at
5.8. In the maquiladoras – one of the sectors directly impacted by North American trade
– real wages did increase after 1995. As revealed by the data from Mexico’s Instituto
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), this upward trend was particularly
pronounced during the 2000-2009 period, when real wages increased by 17% (INEGI,
op.cit.). In sum, employment and wage levels in the maquilas took diverging paths since
NAFTA’s implementation: between 1994 and 2000, employment increased and wages
fell before slowly recovering; whereas in the first decade of the twenty-first century,
wages rose while employment fell.
23 Mexico’s sluggish employment record over the last fifteen years cannot, however, be
attributed primarily to NAFTA. After the devaluation of the peso in 1994-1995, Mexican
workers had to face the antagonistic pressures of rampant inflation of import goods
and wage restrictions imposed by the federal government. This largely explains the
decline of real wages from 1995 to the end of the 1990s and their delayed recovery
under NAFTA. As mentioned before, the rise of China as a new industrial powerhouse
also constituted a key challenge for Mexico’s manufacturing exports. Thus, by itself,
NAFTA has only had a limited impact on Mexican manufacturing employment. This is
primarily due to the disconnect between Mexico’s exporting sector and its domestic
market. Indeed, because of the very low domestic content (only 5%) (Carillo,
2010:27-43) of the goods transformed by maquiladoras, the spillover effects of Mexico’s
export strategy have been seriously constrained (Bizberg, op.cit.: 69-85). In short,
NAFTA has neither led to a convergence between American and Mexican workers, nor
spread its benefits to the rest of the economy. In fact, given the geographic location of
the export-oriented manufactures, these limited gains are highly concentrated in the
border-region, and therefore tend to exacerbate regional disparities in Mexico. In
effect, states in Southern Mexico have remained isolated from the process of regional
economic integration.

NAFTA’s impact on Mexican agriculture

24 Any analysis of the evolution of Mexican agriculture under NAFTA should take into
consideration two important contextual elements. First, the recent evolution of the
agricultural sector reflects long-term structural transformations in the Mexican
economy, as well as political reforms undertaken by successive Mexican governments
since the 1980s, designed either to accelerate or respond to these changes. Second, it is
important to emphasize the dichotomous nature of Mexico’s farming sector, and more
precisely, the distinction between small-scale and subsistence farming, and large-scale
agribusiness.
25 A quick look at aggregate indicators reveals that Mexico’s agricultural sector at least
partly benefited from trade liberalization. As mentioned earlier, large-scale farmers in
sectors like vegetable, fruit or meats production increased their exports to the United
States and Canada. In these cases, NAFTA did help create more stable jobs and better
living conditions. A recent study of the development of agribusiness in the border-
region of San Quintin shows that NAFTA not only helped to convert seasonal jobs into
more permanent occupations, but also stimulated the local economy, thereby

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 10

improving access to services like water, sanitary drainage and electricity (Coubes, 2010:
45-61).
26 This positive picture of Mexican agriculture under NAFTA does not, however, reflect
the serious economic dislocations endured by Mexican farmers as a result of trade
liberalization. Between 1993 and 2008, Mexican agricultural jobs slumped from
8.1 million to 5.8 million, a trend that largely offset job creation in the maquiladoras. By
boosting US agricultural exports to Mexico, NAFTA had a significant impact on
employment in the agrarian sector. Under NAFTA, the market share of American corn
producers in Mexico jumped from an average of 15% over the 1984-1993 period to
about 35% during 2001-2005 (Zahniser, op.cit.: 12). The influx of subsidized crops from
American agribusiness had devastating effects on agricultural prices in Mexico and
directly threatened the revenues of Mexican farmers. This was particularly the case
with corn production, a crop on which 15% of the entire Mexican population still
depends, according to some estimates (Burstein, 2007). Hardly concerned by the scale
of this phenomenon, the Mexican government dismantled corn tariffs at a faster pace
than required under NAFTA.
27 The first victims of these tectonic shifts were subsistence farmers. The liberalization of
corn and other commodities is estimated to have reduced farm income for as many as
three million small producers (Burstein, op.cit.). Given their low education level,
campesinos were ill-equipped to transfer to other sectors of the economy. Some of them
managed to integrate the service sector, whose share of the economy has significantly
increased under NAFTA – from 51% in 1994 to 60% in 2006 (Polaski, 2006). Others were
forced to join the ranks of the informal sector, consisting mainly of self-employment
and employment in microenterprises. Yet others opted for migrating to the United
States. Throughout the 1990s, the number of Mexican immigrants crossing the US
border increased from about 350,000 per year before NAFTA to half a million in the
early 2000s before declining significantly in the second half of the decade, partly under
the effect of the financial crisis (Passel, Cohn, 2009; Zepeda, Wise, Gallagher, op.cit.: 13).
In the words of one analyst, “migration has become an alternative to development.”
(Wilson Center, op.cit.: 26) These trends contrast with the early expectations of
NAFTA’s advocates, who anticipated that economic convergence between Mexico and
the United States would reduce Mexicans’ incentives to migrate to the North. This
reveals the shortcomings of NAFTA’s productivist model: under the demand of
Washington, not only was immigration left out of the agreement, but no supranational
mechanism was devised to address the social dislocations that would result from trade
liberalization.
28 If no financial transfer mechanism was integrated in NAFTA, the Mexican government
did seek to temper the disruptive effects of agricultural reforms through three
assistance programs: 1) PROCAMPO, a transitional income support program for
agricultural producers; 2) Alianza para el Campo, an initiative designed to foster
agricultural productivity through matched grants and support services; 3) PROGRESA,
the reallocation of food subsidies to the rural poor conditioned by the participation in
basic education (for the relevant age group) and health services. But while these
programs did provide some support for the rural poor, they also disproportionately
favored Mexican agribusiness. According to the Economist magazine, PROCAMPO was
“hijacked” early on by large-scale producers in the North, who received a large share of
the program’s $1.4 billion (The Economist, 2008). This is ironic since this segment of

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 11

Mexican agriculture was the primary beneficiary of agricultural liberalization under

NAFTA; yet, somewhat understandable in the view of the government’s tendency to
prioritize the development of the export-oriented sector.
29 Three main conclusions emerge from this brief analysis of NAFTA’s socio-economic
impact. First, NAFTA should not be held responsible for all the deficiencies of the
Mexican economy and its political system. An imbroglio of structural reforms in
Mexico, “big events” (Easterly, Fiess, Lederman, op.cit.) like the peso crisis or the
financial crisis of 2008-2009 as well as changing dynamics in the world economy have
obscured NAFTA’s real impact on the Mexican economy. Second, from a reductive
business perspective, NAFTA achieved its core objectives of boosting FDI and
international trade on a continental scale. This success, however, has been tarnished by
the third lesson from NAFTA’s 15-year existence, i.e. its failure to live up to the
employment and development promises of its advocates. If poverty and social
inequality have declined in the post-NAFTA era, the positive, albeit marginal effects of
trade and investment liberalization on employment and wages in the manufacturing
sector have been offset by the significant social dislocation experienced by poor
farmers. As a result, economic convergence between Mexico and the United States has
remained an elusive goal. This does not mean that NAFTA is a failed regional
experiment. As the next section shows, NAFTA’s social credentials could be restored
with a combination of both domestic and supranational reforms.

Making Nafta more development friendly

30 The idea of reforming NAFTA might seem at odds with the original intent of NAFTA’s
architects. Some have argued that NAFTA was only designed to focus on strictly
economic issues and should not be instrumentalized to strengthen the political axiom
of the regional integration process, let alone to create a North American community.
This was the implicit response that Washington and Ottawa gave to Mexican President
Vicente Fox when the latter stressed the need to upgrade NAFTA through a series of
reforms (dubbed “NAFTA-Plus”) aiming primarily at liberalizing labor flows and
creating a trinational compensation fund to assist the development of Mexico’s poor
regions.12 This refusal is emblematic of the discrepancy between the strict economic
logic of the NAFTA model and the social repercussions of the North American
integration process. Whether North American governments like it or not, trade
liberalization has both transnational ramifications that affect each country’s interests,
as illustrated by the continuing flows of immigrants crossing the US border.
31 The limitations of NAFTA’s productivist model have become increasingly clear in the
light of the tectonic shifts of the world economy. The rapid growth of the Chinese
manufacturing sector now threatens the viability of the North American competitive
model, that some have declared to be “out of breath.”(Deblock, Rioux, op.cit.) These
new global forces make social reforms more, not less relevant for NAFTA countries.

Consolidating domestic reforms

32 For Mexican government officials, NAFTA’s limited employment benefits during its first
fifteen years of existence should have been a wake-up call about the limitations of
export-led growth strategy as developmental policy. As mentioned earlier, it has long

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 12

been clear that cross-border trade has only had marginal spillover effects on aggregate
Mexican employment. This largely explains why employment gains under NAFTA
before 2000 were concentrated in the maquiladoras, and why the limited wage increases
in this sector did not spread to the rest of the Mexican workforce. Admittedly, the
National Plan for Development (Programa Nacional de Desarollo) of 2001-2006 adopted
under the Fox administration did stress the need to increase the value-added of the
goods transformed in Mexico, and the necessity of strengthening the linkages between
the exporting sector and local industries. However, as this analysis has shown, this has
yet to bring benefits to the rest of the labor market. This program and the more recent
creation (2006) of the export support initiative IMMEX confirm the importance that
Mexican governments continue to give to international trade as a development tool.
This is not to say that maquiladoras are an outdated economic model that needs to be
abandoned. Indeed, maquilas have long proved to be both flexible and resilient in the
face of external challenges (Carillo, op.cit.). However, Mexico’s strategic focus on
export-led growth is problematic in two regards: 1) it exacerbates Mexico’s structural
dependence on the US economy; 2) it distracts government officials from a pressing
need to focus on domestic investment such as infrastructure and education.
33 The economic data discussed in the previous sections highlighted Mexico’s cruel
vulnerability to America’s business cycles – whether this be the recession of 2001 or the
financial crisis of 2008-2009. America’s economic health does not only affect the
performance of the Mexican economy through the decline of trade and investment
flows, but also through the fluctuations of remittances from the United States. For
instance, the recent crisis led to a decline of Mexican remittances of nearly one fifth,
from $26 billion in 2007 to $21 billion in 2008 (Beaubien, 2010).
34 To cope with this problem, Mexico will need to find ways to diversify its sources of
revenues, a long-lasting challenge that starts at home. As developmental specialists
have long acknowledged, Mexico must begin by improving its chronically limited fiscal
capacity by expanding its tax base. Indeed, as a proportion of GDP, Mexico’s tax
revenues are much lower than other OECD countries.13 President Calderon adopted a
welcome step in this direction by raising corporate taxes in 2007. Another solution
would be to prioritize the regulation of Mexico’s informal economy, which not only
limits tax collection but also tends to drag average wages down (Chen, 2008).
35 Another way to reduce Mexico’s dependence on the US economy would consist in
focusing on endogenous growth strategy, starting with increasing public investment in
education and research and development (R&D). Prioritizing education and training
would help address some of NAFTA’s shortcomings such as its inability to create
employment in other sectors than manufacturing. Underinvestment in education has
long been the Achilles’ heel of the Mexican economy, a chronic weakness of which
recent Mexican administrations have grown increasingly aware. The administration of
Carlos Salinas de Gortari attempted to remedy the deficiencies of the Mexican
education system by launching the Educational Modernization Program (1989-1994).
Renewed under Salinas’ successors, this program has achieved notable results in school
enrollments, a success that contributed to the decline of social inequality in Mexico
(Omelas, 2004: 285-306; Campos-Vasquez, op.cit.). Since 1997, President Zedillo’s
PROGRESA program, and its successor “Oportunidades” have also helped to boost access
to education and health services among the rural and urban poor. 14 These steps should
be complemented with larger investment in higher education, as well as targeted

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 13

research and development programs to increase Mexico’s capacity for innovation.

Emerging countries like India, China and South Korea have demonstrated the value of
combining open trade with strong public investment in education – in schools,
universities and R&D programs (Gallagher, Zarsky, 2004).
36 Investing in infrastructure could also help mitigate NAFTA’s tendency to exacerbate
regional disparities between Northern states where export-industries tend to be
concentrated and rural Southern states that are often disconnected from North
American trade. President Fox’s Puebla Panama Plan was an ambitious – albeit
controversial15 – program regrouping a series of energy and infrastructure initiatives
devised to connect Mexico’s Southern states with Central American countries. Largely
underfunded during Fox’s presidency, the PPP has been revived by the Calderón
administration and could offer the dual advantage of reducing regional inequalities and
diversifying Mexico’s economic partnerships. Mexico’s ability to invest in
infrastructure and education programs will depend on its ability to raise revenues, a
challenge that could be surmounted by supranational programs.

Reforming NAFTA

37 Although Mexico’s domestic reforms will be instrumental to improve NAFTA’s

developmental record, the scope of the North American accord should not be engraved
in stone but left open to renegotiation. The long-term success of the NAFTA model will
depend on the ability of its members to learn from their regional experience – or that
of other integration models – and adapt the contours of the agreement to the new
challenges of the world economy. This doesn't necessarily mean deepening North
American integration. The problem with NAFTA lies not so much in its “institutional
deficit” (Bellanger, 2004 : 87-105) or its "deficient institutionality" (Grinspun
Kreklewich, 1999: 17-33) per se – i.e. the absence of any supranational authority to
enforce the rules of the agreement – but in its productivist bias which led North
American governments to leave out the social ramifications of free trade. NAFTA’s
dispute settlement mechanism may not always protect investors and business interests
as efficiently as NAFTA critics claim,16 but it remains undoubtedly better enforced and
funded than e.g. the North American commission on labor cooperation (NACLC),
NAFTA’s only socially-oriented institution.17 Thus, the North American integration
model suffers from its deficient social institutionality. This final subsection aims to offer
a brief set of policy prescriptions that could consolidate NAFTA’s social provisions and
enhance its developmental potential. By no means exhaustive, this list focuses on four
crucial issue areas: investment, agriculture, immigration, resource transfers.
38 First, Mexico could greatly benefit from a loosening of NAFTA’s strict investment
provisions. Although the protection of international investors is intrinsic to NAFTA, the
devastating effects of US-based financial crises on Mexican exports and, to a broader
extent, economic growth in Mexico, have demonstrated the deleterious side effects of
the current model. To cope with this problem, the adoption of safeguards allowing a
temporary return to stricter capital controls on foreign investment – e.g. modeled after
those adopted by other emerging countries like China or Brazil – could protect Mexico
against financial instability in times of crisis. In addition, a loosening of NAFTA’s strict
procurement and investment policies could allow Mexico to favor local contractors
under certain circumstances e.g. in the regions that have hardly benefited from NAFTA

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 14

(Zepeda, Wise, Gallagher, op.cit.). This could help mitigate the unequal effects that
NAFTA has had on the Mexican economy.
39 The second issue area that has the potential to enhance NAFTA’s developmental legacy
is the contentious sphere of agricultural policy. In contradiction with the very
principles of free trade, NAFTA fostered competition between small-scale and
subsistence farming in Mexico and heavily subsidized American agribusiness
companies. In fact, while Mexican governments strove to dismantle tariff protections at
a faster pace than required by NAFTA’s provisions until 2008, the US Congress
repeatedly renewed and sometimes even increased its generous subsidies to the
farming sector (through the Farm Bills 1996, 2002 and 2008). A 2009 study by the Global
Development and Environment Institute estimated the costs for Mexico of “agricultural
dumping under NAFTA” at $12.8 billion over the 1997-2005 period. 18 Losses to corn
farmers accounted for nearly half of total costs. Considering the dramatic human
effects that NAFTA had on Mexico’s small-scale and subsistence farming, any
developmental upgrade of the NAFTA model will have to make agricultural reform one
its priorities. This does not necessarily mean that agricultural quotas should be
reintroduced. Given the recent increase in commodity prices, hampering trade flows
could hurt more poor people than it would protect. Bringing equity to the NAFTA
model would require the progressive dismantling of American agricultural subsidies,
starting with those supporting large agribusinesses, which absorb the lion’s share of
American subsidies. If the idea may seem politically unfeasible, the recent debates on
the long-term reduction of the US national debt could provide new opportunities to
address this long-lasting issue.
40 The displacement of Mexican farmers is interconnected with the question of
immigration. International migration has always been a key factor of international
economic convergence, whether it be transatlantic migration at the end of the
nineteenth century and its positive effects on European wages, or the economic
benefits of labor market integration in the European Union.19 Given the intense labor
flows within North America, immigration should be an integral part of any attempt to
make NAFTA more development-friendly – as former President Vicente Fox has long
claimed. In North America, the free movement of workers would be a noble long-term
goal, but is in the short run nothing but a chimera. In the meantime, North American
governments should seek to optimize the developmental potential of transnational
labor flows, first by protecting migrants, and second, by encouraging resource transfers
under a new trilateral remittance policy.
41 One way to address NAFTA's deficient social institutionality would be to adhere to the
strict enforcement of labor standards in North America. This is not only important for
the protection of workers in Mexico, as "fair trade" advocates have long advocated, but
also applies to the protection of authorized and unauthorized immigrants in the United
States, whose low wages can have a depreciating effect on the revenues of low-skilled
workers.
42 Another way to tap the developmental power of labor flows would be to develop an
effective trilateral remittance policy. While remittances are no substitute for domestic
investment and government assistance to the needy, they are also more politically
palatable than foreign aid. North American states should capitalize on the recent shift
of remittances from the informal to the formal sector and undertake collective efforts
to secure and reduce the costs of such financial transfers. Such measures could include

IdeAs, 1 | 2011
 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 15

harmonizing regulations between state/provincial and federal authorities, ensuring

fair competition (e.g. transparent pricing) in the banking sector, supporting the
development of distribution networks in rural regions where access to remittance
services are often limited, as well as experimenting tax deductions for resource
transfers toward underdeveloped regions.20
43 Finally, overcoming the political hurdles that stand in the way of the long-term
integration of North American labor markets will also require changing the image of
immigration to create a new form of solidarity between North American citizens. One
solution could be to intensify higher-education exchange programs and high-skilled
temporary visas to encourage knowledge transfers between Mexico and its North
American partners. This is crucial to alter the common representation of Mexicans as
low-skilled workers. Exchange programs like Erasmus in Europe have proved very
successful in changing people’s representations and could help foster North American
solidarity.
44 Perhaps the most promising reform to improve NAFTA's developmental legacy would
be the creation of a regional compensation fund – an initiative long embraced by
advocates of regional integration in both government and academic circles. Modeled
after the European Union’s structural and cohesion funds, this program could reduce
regional disparities between NAFTA members. Europe’s experience has shown that
trade and investment liberalization alone cannot achieve economic convergence.
Leaving aside the recent impact of the financial crisis, the rapid growth of Ireland,
Spain and Portugal over the past decades has shown the merits of transfer programs as
pivotal components of regional economic integration.21 In the case of Mexico, resource
transfers could help invest in transport and communication infrastructure as well as
education in Mexico’s poorest states. These new investments would not only stimulate
job creation but could also help connect rural communities with the rest of the North
American economic sphere. Of course, it is easy to anticipate opposition in the US
Congress against funding such resource transfer programs, especially in the current
context of budget cuts. To be more politically palatable, the North American
development fund must be presented for what it truly is: a policy that addresses the
root problems of immigration and drug trafficking, two endemic problems of North
American relations that have cost the United States billions of dollars during NAFTA's
fifteen years of existence. This initiative would certainly depart from NAFTA's current
productivist logic, yet could also help North American governments address the issues
that have tarnished the reputation of NAFTA.

Conclusion
45 To conclude, NAFTA has undeniably boosted trade and investment among North
American partners. At first sight, the Mexican economy seems to have benefited from
the process of regional economic integration. Yet, a closer look at employment and
wage trends shows that NAFTA has in fact done little to foster equitable development in
Mexico. Its impact on Mexico’s manufacturing sector has been in effect positive albeit
limited; yet it has largely been offset by the adjustment shocks of trade liberalization in
the agricultural sector. Some will argue that NAFTA was never designed to solve all of
Mexico’s problems and that the agreement has, after all, achieved its objectives of
boosting trade and investment flows (Hufbauer, Schott, op.cit.). However, the rise in

IdeAs, 1 | 2011
 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 16

international trade should not be the ultimate goal of regional economic integration,
but rather a means of building a more prosperous regional economy that benefit the
citizens of all NAFTA countries.
46 NAFTA's mixed results in the social realm can be partly attributed to the shortcomings
of Mexico's domestic policies. To maximize the socio-economic potential of the North
American integration model, Mexican decision-makers may have to rethink their focus
on export-led growth and prioritize domestic policies aimed at investing in Mexico’s
future, through education, R&D and infrastructure. Beyond Mexico's domestic policies,
NAFTA's shortcomings are due to its narrow productivist logic. To remedy this
problem, North American governments should address NAFTA's deficient social
institutionality through a series of measures that would target some of the most
pressing social issues, among which immigration, agriculture and resource transfers.
Although NAFTA is not the solution to all of Mexico's problems, it is embedded in the
process of regional economic integration and has, therefore, come to incarnate the
benefits, but also the costs of regionalism. Failing to address the social needs that are
inherent to trade and investment liberalization risks undermining people's already
fragile confidence in a regional integration process that North American countries have
been building for decades.

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NOTES
1. This question can be traced back to early debates on liberalism and mercantilism. For a history
of free debates, see Douglas Irwin, Against the Tide. An Intellectual History of Free Trade, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996. For a discussion of the welfare effects of trade agreements, see
among others, Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, New York: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1950; Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya, The Economics of Preferential
Trade Agreements Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1996; Edward D. Mansfield & Helen Milner, “The
New Wave of Regionalism”, International Organization, vol. 53, n°3, 1999, pp. 589-627.
2. The Bracero Program invited hundreds of thousands of Mexican farm workers to
offset America’s labor shortage in the agricultural sector.
3. Although they did create precedents to the linkage of trade and labor and especially
environmental issues, these agreements were primarily conceived as side payments to
appease and divide NAFTA opponents. Frederick M. Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA. The
Science and Art of Political Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
4. For a broader discussion of NAFTA as regional model, see Robert A. Pastor, Toward a North
American Community. Lessons from the Old World for the New, Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics, 2001, pp. 25-33; Carol Wise, “Unfulfilled Promise. Economic
Convergence under NAFTA”, in Isabel Studer & Carol Wise (eds.), Requiem or Revival? The Promise of

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 21

North American Integration, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007, pp. 29-32; Isabel Studer,
“Obstacles to Integration. NAFTA’s Institutional Weakness”, in Isabel Studer & Carol Wise (eds.),
op. cit., pp. 54-58; and Christian Deblock & Michèle Rioux, op. cit.
5. Mexico ranked only fifth on the 1985-1994 period. Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, “Economic
Development and Industrial Performance in Mexico post-NAFTA,” CEPAL, 2007. http://
www.eclac.org/celade/noticias/paginas/3/28353/JCMoreno.pdf. Accessed March 1 st, 2010.
6. Ibid.
7. Rules of origins restrict preferential tariffs to merchandise principally produced in the
contracting parties to a trade agreement. For instance, within the framework of NAFTA, 62.5% of
auto components must be made in North America in order for cars to qualify for tariff
exemption. These clauses aim to protect firms against external competition, especially Asian
firms that might benefit from NAFTA's provisions to enter the US market.
8. Author’s calculations based on data from United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), “World Investment Report 2009,” http://unctad.org/en/docs/
wir2009_en.pdf. Accessed March 1st, 2010.
9. In 2008, FDI inflows were distributed as follows: manufacturing sector including maquiladoras
(40%), services (20%), oil and mining extraction (18%), trading (13%). Secretaria de Economía,
Dirección General de Inversión Extranjera, 2010, http://www.si-rnie.economia.gob.mx/cgi-bin/
repie.sh/reportes/selperiodo. Accessed March 1st, 2010.
10. For more details, see Christine Zumello, « Les banques américaines et l’ALENA : le cas de
Citibank », in Martine Azuelos, María Eugenia Cosío-Zavala & Jean-Michel Lacroix, op. cit., pp.
209-220.
11. At the end of 2006, Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) replaced
its statistical series on maquiladoras with statistics on a new export support program called
IMMEX (Fomento de la Industria Manufacturera, Maquiladora y de Servicios de Exportacion - Promotion
of manufacturing industry, maquiladora and export services): Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, op. cit.
12. For a discussion, read Isabel Studer, op. cit.; and Robert Pastor, pp. 2-3.
13. For more details on tax reform, see Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Duanjie Chen, “The
Impact of NAFTA and Options for Tax Reform in Mexico,” World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper N°2669, September 2001.
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/
2001/10/05/000094946_01092504010964/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. Accessed March 1 st,
2010.
14. Designed for the rural poor, PROGRESA was extended to semi-urban and urban populations in
2001 and 2002 respectively. Today, 5 million families benefit from Oportunidades. For a 10-year
assessment of this education program, see Secretaria de Desarrollo Social, “External Evaluation
of Oportunidades 1997-2007: 10 Years of Intervention in Rural Areas,” 2008. lanic.utexas.edu/
project/etext/oportunidades/2008/sariego_eng.pdf. Accessed March 1st, 2010.
15. The plan raised concerns about the privatization of land and resources. See e.g. Braulio Moro,
“Une recolonisation nommée “plan Puebla-Panamá”, Le Monde Diplomatique, Décembre 2002.
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2002/12/MORO/17151. Accessed August 10 th, 2011.
16. For a discussion, see Gary C. Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, op. cit., chapter 4.
17. This institution emanated from the “toothless” labor side agreement. See footnote 3.
18. The author focused on eight agricultural goods – corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, cotton, beef,
pork, and poultry – heavily supported by the U.S. government, and which dramatically affected
Mexican production under NAFTA. Timothy A. Wise, “Agricultural Dumping Under NAFTA:
Estimating the Costs of U.S. Agricultural Policies to Mexican Producers,” Global Development and
Environment Institute, Working Paper N°09-08, Woodrow Wilson Center. http://ase.tufts.edu/
gdae/Pubs/rp/AgricDumpingWoodrowWilsonCenter.pdf. Accessed March 1st, 2010.

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 22

19. On the economics of labor market integration, read Richard Baldwin & Charles Wyplosz, The
Economics of European Integration, London: McGraw Hill Companies, 2006, pp. 190-193.
20. For a broader discussion, see Raúl Hernández-Coss, The US-Mexico Remittance Corridor.
Lessons on Shifting from Informal to Formal Transfer Systems, World Bank Working Paper N°47,
2005, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/396511-1146581427871/US-
Mexico_Remittance_Corridor_WP.pdf. Accessed August, 14th, 2011.
21. As Pastor rightly points out by contrasting the examples of Ireland and Greece, the success of
such financial transfers is contingent upon the implementation of effective domestic reforms.
Robert Pastor, op. cit., p. 135.

RÉSUMÉS
Cet article dresse le bilan socio-économique de l’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain
(ALENA) pour le Mexique quinze ans après son entrée en vigueur. À travers une analyse de
l’évolution des flux de capitaux et de commerce et de leur impact sur l’emploi et le niveau des
salaires dans les secteurs industriels et agricoles, l’auteur révèle les succès et limites du modèle
d’intégration de l’ALENA. Il conclut que si l’ALENA n’est pas une solution à tous les problèmes
socio-économiques du Mexique, l'accord souffre malgré tout d'une "institutionalité [sociale]
déficiente" qui peut être consolidée par le biais de réformes nationales et supranationales. Au
niveau national, le gouvernement mexicain doit repenser sa stratégie de croissance tirée par les
exportations et donner la priorité à la réforme fiscale et aux investissements dans l'éducation et
l'infrastructure. À l'échelle supranationale, le modèle de l'ALENA devrait être amélioré afin de
combler ses lacunes sociales, en particulier dans les domaines de l'investissement, l'immigration,
l'agriculture et des transferts de ressources.

This article assesses the developmental record of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in Mexico fifteen years after its implementation. After analyzing the evolution of trade
and investment flows and their impact on employment and wage levels in the manufacturing and
agricultural sectors, the author highlights the success and limits of the NAFTA integration model.
He concludes that while NAFTA should not be seen as a solution to all of Mexico’s socio-economic
problems, NAFTA nonetheless suffers from a "deficient [social] institutionality" that can be
addressed through both domestic and supranational reforms. At the domestic level, the Mexican
government should rethink its export-led growth strategy and prioritize tax reforms and
domestic investments in education and infrastructure. At the supranational level, the NAFTA
model should be upgraded to address its social lacunae, especially in the policy spheres of
investment, immigration, agriculture, and resource transfers.

Este artículo presenta el balance socioeconómico del Acuerdo de Libre comercio de América del
Norte (TLCAN) para México quince años después de su entrada en vigor. Mediante un análisis de
la evolución de los flujos de capitales y del comercio, y de su impacto sobre el empleo y el nivel de
los salarios en los sectores industriales y agrícolas, el autor revela los logros y los límites del
modelo de integración del TLCAN. Concluye que aunque el TLCAN no puede ser la solución a
todos los problemas socioeconómicos de México, lo que el acuerdo padece, a pesar de todo, es una
"institucionalidad (social) deficiente" que puede consolidarse por medio de reformas nacionales y
supranacionales. A nivel nacional, el gobierno mexicano tiene que replantearse su estrategia de

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 NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects 23

crecimiento dependiente de las exportaciones y dar prioridad a la reforma fiscal y a las

inversiones en el sector de la educación y las infraestructuras. A nivel supranacional, el modelo
del TLCAN debería mejorarse con el fin de subsanar sus carencias sociales, particularmente en los
sectores de la inversión, la inmigración, la agricultura y las transferencias de recursos.

INDEX
Keywords : NAFTA, regional integration, free trade, Mexico; development, employment
Mots-clés : ALENA, intégration régionale, libre-échange, Mexique, développement, emploi
Palabras claves : TLCAN, integración regional, libre comercio, México, desarrollo, empleo

AUTEUR
JEAN-BAPTISTE VELUT
Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée

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