NEECO II vs.

 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and EDUARDO CAIRLAN, 

Facts:

Petitioner Nueva Ecija Electric Cooperative (NEECO) II employed private respondent Eduardo M. Cairlan
in 1978 as driver and was assigned at petitioner's Sub-Office at Quezon, Nueva Ecija.

On 15 January 1996, Danilo dela Cruz, petitioner's General Manager, terminated private respondent's
services on ground of abandonment. Immediately thereafter, private respondent talked with Mr. dela Cruz
regarding this matter and the latter promised him that the issue would be brought to the attention of
NEECO's Board of Directors for appropriate action. But nothing came out of Mr. dela Cruz's promise
prompting private respondent to institute a Complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement
and payment of back-wages since the NEECO's Board of Directors did not act upon his termination.

In its Position Paper and Reply,  petitioner averred that the dismissal of private respondent was for a just
cause and after due process. Petitioner added that private respondent was hired sometime in September
1981 with the latest position as driver assigned at Quezon, Nueva Ecija. Petitioner staunchly asserted
that since Danilo dela Cruz assumed his office as the new General Manager on 01 March 1995, the latter
never saw private respondent report for work prompting the former to issue a memorandum dated 22
November 1995, which required private respondent to explain in writing why he was not reporting for duty.
Private respondent was likewise directed in the said memo to report to its main office at Calipahan,
Talavera, Nueva Ecija. For failure of the private respondent to comply with the said memorandum, Mr.
dela Cruz directed a certain "Mr. Marcelo" to conduct an investigation on the whereabouts of the
petitioner. It was then that NEECO II uncovered that private respondent was at that time already working
with the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija as driver allegedly under an assumed name of "Eduardo
Caimay." For these reasons, petitioner contended that it was left with no other alternative but to terminate
private respondent's services.

On 27 August 1999, petitioner filed a motion to set case for trial on the merits. However, the
presiding Labor Arbiter Florentino R. Darlucio arrived at the decision after an evaluation of the evidence
on record that there was no necessity to conduct trial on the merits inasmuch as a just and fair decision
can be arrived at based on the pleadings. Hence, petitioner's motion to set case for trial was denied.

Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner was accorded due process; and

Ruling:

Issue No. 1

In the present case, a scrupulous study of the records reveals that the Labor Arbiter did not abuse his
discretion conferred upon him by the Rules in not conducting a formal hearing. On this, the findings of the
Court of Appeals, consistent with that of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, ought to be sustained.

Jurisprudential declarations are rich to the effect that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity
to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. A formal or
trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of
which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy.

The Court shall not fake naiveté of the prevalent practice among lawyers who, for lack of better argument
to bolster their position, engage in waxing lyrical to "a denial of due process." As a former member of this
Court noted, some lawyers who, lacking plausible support for their position, simply claim a denial of due
process as if it were a universal absolution. The ground will prove unavailing, and not surprisingly, since it
is virtually only a  pro forma argument. Due process is not to be bandied like a slogan. It is not a mere
catch phrase. As the highest hallmark of the free society, its name should not be invoked in vain but only
when justice has not been truly served.

Petitioner's avowal that the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter are patently erroneous, specifically his
conclusion that private respondent was not properly apprised of the cause for his dismissal, in our view,
lacks sufficient basis in law and in fact.
Issue No. 2
To effectuate a valid dismissal of an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid
cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself. Procedurally, if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the
employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard is
requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought, a hearing or an opportunity to be heard, and after hearing or opportunity to be heard,
a notice of the decision to dismiss.

Absent any showing that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC or the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion or otherwise acted without jurisdiction or in excess of the same, this Court is bound by its
findings of facts. Indeed, the records reveal that the questioned decision is duly supported by evidence.
Findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are accorded by this Court not only with respect
but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. This quantum of proof has been
satisfied in this case. These are, on the main, factual findings over which the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC are most equipped to determine having acquired expertise in the specific matters entrusted to
their jurisdiction.

Hence, as did the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals, after careful weighing of the
arguments of both parties and a conscientious evaluation of the records, we find wanting in the case
under consideration cogent evidence of abandonment to warrant such a harsh and drastic action as
private respondent's severance of his economic means. Where the dismissal is without just or authorized
cause and there was no due process, Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that the employee is
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive
of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation
was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement.
PHILIPPINE GEOTHERMAL, INC., vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
EDILBERTO M. ALVAREZ
G.R. No. 106370 September 8, 1994

Private respondent Edilberto M. Alvarez was first employed by petitioner on 2 July 1979. On 31 May
1989, private respondent, who was then occupying the position of Steam Test Operator II, injured his right
wrist when a steam-pressured "chicksan swivel joint assembly" exploded while he was checking a
geothermal well operated by petitioner. As a result, private respondent's right arm was placed in a plaster
cast and he was confined at the San Pablo Doctor's Hospital from 31 May 1989 to 3 June 1989.

On 16 January 1991, private respondent refiled his complaint for illegal dismissal.

On 6 September 1991 the labor arbiter rendered a decision holding private respondent's termination from
employment as valid and justified.

On appeal to the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the decision was
reversed and set aside. Petitioner was ordered to reinstate Edilberto M. Alvarez to his former position
without loss of seniority rights but without backwages.

Issues:

1. Whether or not, the respondent commission abused its discretion and acted beyond its
jurisdiction by entertaining an appeal that was filed out of time.
2. Whether or not, respondent commission abused its discretion by failing to appreciate
overwhelming evidence uniformly showing that the termination of Mr. Alvarez was valid and
justified.

Ruling:

On the issue of whether or not the appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter to the NLRC was filed
within the ten (10) day reglementary period, it is undisputed that private respondent received a copy of the
labor arbiter's decision on 5 September 1991. Alvarez thus had up to 15 September 1991 to perfect his
appeal. Since this last mentioned date was a Sunday, private respondent had to file his appeal on the
next business day, 16 September 1991.

Petitioner contends that the appeal was filed only on 20 September 1991. Respondent NLRC however
found that private respondent filed his appeal by registered mail on 16 September 1991, the same day
that petitioner's counsel was furnished copies of said appeal.

We will not disturb this factual finding of the NLRC.

The contention that even assuming arguendo that the appeal was filed on time, the appeal fee was paid
four (4) days late (and, therefore, the appeal to the NLRC should be dismissed) likewise fails to entirely
impress us. In C.W. Tan Manufacturing v. NLRC, we held that "the broader interest of justice and the
desired objective of deciding the case on the merits demand that the appeal be given due course."

On the issue of whether or not Edilberto M. Alvarez was validly dismissed, we rule in the affirmative and
consequently the decision of respondent NLRC is set aside.

Article 282(b) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may validly dismiss an employee for gross
and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. In the present case, it is clear that private respondent
was guilty of seriously neglecting his duties.
The records establish that as early as 26 July 1989, Dr. Leagogo already had certified that Alvarez could
perform light work. On 13 November 1989, Dr. Leagogo certified that Alvarez could perform moderate
work and it was further certified that by December 1989, Alvarez could return to his pre-injury duties.
Notwithstanding these certifications, Alvarez continued to incur unexplained absences until his dismissal
on 9 March 1990.

A review of Alvarez' record of attendance shows that from August to December 1989, he reported for
work only seventy-seven (77) times while he incurred forty-seven (47) absences.

An employee who earnestly desires to resume his regular duties after recovering from an injury
undoubtedly will not go through the trouble of getting opinions from five (5) different physicians before
going back to work after he has been certified to be fit to return to his regular duties.

Petitioner has not been shown to be without sympathy or concern for Alvarez. He was given fifty (50)
days work-connected accident (WCA) leave with pay to allow him to recuperate from his injury without
loss of earnings. He was allowed to use his leave credits and was actually given an additional fifteen (15)
days WCA leave to allow him to consult his doctors and fully recover from his injuries. Moreover,
petitioner gave Alvarez several warnings to report for work, otherwise, he would face disciplinary
sanctions. In spite of these warnings, Alvarez was absent without official leave (AWOL) for eighteen (18)
days. Under company policy, of which Alvarez was made aware, employees who incur without valid
reason six (6) or more absences are subject to dismissal.

Petitioner, in its fourth and last warning letter to Alvarez, was willing to allow him to resume his work in
spite of the eighteen (18) days he went on AWOL. It was made clear, however, that should private
respondent still fail to report for work on 5 March 1990, his employment would be terminated.

Private respondent failed to report for work on 5 March 1990. Petitioner validly dismissed him not only for
violation of company policy but also for violation of Section 282(b) of the Labor Code aforecited.

While it is true that compassion and human consideration should guide the disposition of cases involving
termination of employment since it affects one's source or means of livelihood, it should not be
overlooked that the benefits accorded to labor do not include compelling an employer to retain the
services of an employee who has been shown to be a gross liability to the employer. The law in protecting
the rights of the employees authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. It should
be made clear that when the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of labor, it is but a recognition of the
inherent economic inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scale of
justice; to put the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases where the circumstances
warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted if the
result is an injustice to the employer. Justitia nemini neganda est (Justice is to be denied to none).

In Cando v. National Labor Relations Commission the Court awarded separation pay to an employee who
was terminated for unauthorized absences. We believe that separation pay of one-half (1/2) month salary
for every year of service is adequate in this case.