1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (INHERENT

JURISDICTION) REVIEW PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.

________OF 2020 IN SUO MOTU CONTEMPT PETITION
(CRIMINAL) NO. 1 OF 2020 [ARISING OUT OF THE IMPUGNED
FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 14.08.2020 PASSED BY
THIS HON’BLE COURT IN IN RE PRASHANT BHUSHAN & ANR.,
SUO MOTU CONTEMPT PETITION (CRL) 1 OF 2020] IN THE
MATTER OF: PRASHANT BHUSHAN …. PETITIONER Versus In
RE: … RESPONDENT AND IN THE MATTER OF: IN RE: …
PETITIONER Versus 1. PRASHANT BHUSHAN S/o Shri Shanti
Bhushan B-16, SECTOR 14, NOIDA, U.P. 2. TWITTER
COMMUNICATIONS INDIA PVT LTD C-20, G BLOCK, NEAR MCA
BANDRA KURLA COMPLEX, BANDRA (E) ,MUMBAI,
MAHARASHTRA … RESPONDENTS REVIEW PETITION UNDER
ARTICLE 137 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH
ORDER XLVII OF THE SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 2 To The Hon’ble Chief Justice of India And
His Companion Justice of the Supreme Court of India The
Review Petition of the Petitioner above named MOST
RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH: 1. That the petitioner has filed the
present petition under Article 137 of the Constitution of India
read with Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013
seeking review of its Impugned Judgment and Order dated
14.08.2020 in Su Moto Contempt Petition (Criminal) Nos. 1 of
2020,whereby it convicted the Review Petitioner of Criminal
Contempt of this Hon’ble Court. That the petitioner herein has
also filed W.P. (C) No. _____/2020 bearing provisional vide
diary 19696 of 2020 filed on 12.09.2020, with the following
prayers: “a) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction
declaring that a person convicted for criminal contempt by this
Hon’ble Court, including the petitioner herein, would have a
right to an intra-court appeal to be heard by a larger and
different bench. b) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction
framing rules and guidelines providing for intra-court appeal
against conviction in original criminal contempt cases as
referred in prayer (a.) above. c) Alternatively, issue an
appropriate writ, order, or direction declaring that review
petitions filed against orders of conviction by Supreme Court in
original criminal contempt cases would be heard in open court
by a different bench; WWW.LIVELAW.IN 3 d) Pass such other
order as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the instant case." I. THE FACTS 1. By a
Petition dated 02.07.20, one Mahek Maheshwari moved this
Hon’ble Court to initiate contempt proceedings under Article
129 read with Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
(“1971 Act”) and Rule 3 of the Rules to Regulate Proceedings
for Contempt pf the Supreme Court, 1975 (“1975 Rules”) and
to take suo motu against the Petitioner herein. The said
complaint was directed against the following tweet by the
Petitioner on a social media platform: “CJI rides a 50 Lakh
motorcycle belonging to a BJP leader at Raj Bhavan Nagpur,
without a mask or helmet, at a time when he keeps the SC in
Lockdown mode denying citizens their fundamental right to
access justice!” 2. By Order dated 22.07.20, this Hon’ble Court
took up the petition dated 02.07.20 and suo motu enlarged the
scope of the proceedings to include the following tweet of the
Petitioner: “When historians in future look back at the last 6
years to see how democracy has been destroyed in India even
without a formal Emergency, they will particularly mark the
role of the Supreme Court in this destruction, & more
particularly the role of the last 4 CJIs.” 3. By the said order,
this Hon’ble Court issued notice to the Petitioner as well as the
Hon’ble Attorney General, who was eventually not heard in the
proceedings pertaining to the WWW.LIVELAW.IN 4 conviction
of the Petitioner herein. True Copy of the Order dated
22.07.2020 passed by this Hon’ble Court in SMC No. 1 of 2020
is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE P-1 (Pages 59 to 60). 4. By
a letter dated 26.07.2020 written to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of
India, the Review Petitioner pointed out specific reasons and
apprehensions and made a request that inter-alia this Suo Motu
Contempt Petition should be listed before a bench of whom
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra is not a party and that it should
be heard when the court resumes regular physical hearings. It
is important to note that the Review Petitioner did not raise
this issue before the Court of Justice Arun Mishra himself as he
had in some other proceedings indicated that filing an
application for recusal is also an act of contempt. A True Copy
of the Letter dated 26.07.2020 by the Review Petitioner to the
Hon’ble Chie Justice of India is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE
P-2 (Pages 61 to 91). 5. By a Letter dated 28.07.2020, the
Petitioner wrote to the Secretary General of the Supreme
Court, seeking a copy of the complaint against him as well as
the administrative orders passed in the petition. These were
not provided. A true Copy of the Letter dated 28.07.2020 is
annexed herewith as ANNEXURE P-3 (Pages 92 to 93). 6. In
Prashant Bhushan v Secretary General, Supreme Court of India
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 792 of 2020 filed on 31.7.20, the
Petitioner herein brought to the notice the numerous
procedural defects in the complaint and the manner in which it
came to be placed before this Hon’ble Court, and, further, in the
Order dated 22.07.20 by which action for contempt against the
Petitioner was initiated. The Petitioner prayed for the following
reliefs: WWW.LIVELAW.IN 5 “a) Issue a Writ of Declaration or
a Writ in the nature of Declaration or any other appropriate
writ, order or direction holding and declaring that the
Respondent has acted unconstitutionally and illegally in taking
cognizance of petitions filed by Mehak Maheshwari and its
clearing, putting before the Hon’ble Court on administrative
side and then listing it before the Hon’ble Court on Judicial side
on 22.07.2020; b) Recall the orders dated 22.07.2020 as well
as Notice dated 24.07.2020 issued to the Petitioner herein in
Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Crl) No. 1 of 2020 and order
dated 24.07.2020 in Contempt Petition (Crl) No. 10 of 2009; c)
In the alternative, desist from hearing the Suo Motu Contempt
Petition (Crl) No. 1 of 2020 and Contempt Petition (Crl) No. 10
of 2009 by video-conferencing and list the matters for physical
hearing as and when this Hon’ble Court resumes physical
hearings;” A copy of Prashant Bhushan v Secretary General,
Supreme Court of India Writ Petition (Civil) No. 791 of 2020
filed on 31.07.2020 is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE P-4
(Pages 94 to 141). 7. The Petitioner filed an Affidavit-in-Reply
on 02.08.2020, which was in the nature of Preliminary Reply,
with particulars containing the defence of truth and bona fide
opinion. A copy of the Affidavit-in-Reply filed on 02.08.2020 is
annexed herewith as ANNEXURE P-5 (Pages 142 to 275).
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 6 8. By way this Preliminary Reply read out
in the of course of oral argument on 05.08.2020, the Petitioner
offered an explanation for the tweets without prejudice to his
right of having a copy of the complaint as under at Para 2
which was also read out by the Senior Counsel of the Review
Petitioner in the hearing of 05.08.2020. 9. By Order dated
05.08.2020, this Hon’ble Court dismissed Prashant Bhushan v.
Secretary General, Supreme Court of India W.P. (C) No. 792 of
2020 in limine and reserved judgment in Suo Motu Petition
(Crl.) 1 of 2020 on the issue of the Petitioner’s culpability for
contempt. A copy of the Order dated 05.08.2020 passed by this
Hon’ble Court in W.P. (C) No. 792 of 20202 is annexed herewith
as ANNEXURE P-6 (Pages 276 to 277). 10. By an Interim
Application dated 06.08.2020 preferred under Section 17(5) of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Petitioner herein moved
this Hon’ble Court for the following reliefs: “i) In case the
Hon’ble Court is not satisfied by my preliminary reply and
wishes to proceed further in the matter allow me to lead
further evidence u/s 17(5) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971, after supplying copy of the complaint by Mr. Mehak
Maheshwari to me in accordance with Paras 1 & 2 of Vijay
Kurle, In re, (2019) 9 SCC 521 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1274 at
page 521. ii. Direct that proceedings as regards the suo moto
notice issued to me with respect to tweet of 27.06.2020 be
placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 7 allocation of bench as per Para 39 of Vijay
Kurle, In Re, 2020 SCC Online SC 407” A copy of the Interim
Application dated 06.08.2020 is annexed herewith as
ANNEXURE P-7 (Pages 278 to 286). 11. By Judgment dated
14.08.20 in Suo Motu (Crl.) No. 1 of 2020, this Hon’ble Court
convicted the Petitioner of criminal contempt for both tweets,
without fully considering his defence of truth and bona fide
opinion. In the Present Review Petition this Judgment is being
impugned. By an order of the same day, the matter was
directed to be listed on 20.08.2020 for hearing on sentence. A
True copy of the Convicting Impugned Judgment dated
14.08.2020 passed by this Hon’ble Court in Suo Motu (Crl.) No.
1 of 2020 is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE P-8 (Pages 287 to
394). 12. By Order dated 20.08.2020 in Suo Motu (Crl.) No. 1 of
2020, this Hon’ble Court, after hearing some arguments from
counsel for the Petitioner, recorded that: “We have given time
to the contemnor to submit unconditional apology, if he so
desires. Let it be filed by 24.08.2020.” A copy of the Order
dated 20.08.2020 passed by this Hon’ble Court in SMC No. 1 of
2020 is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE P-9 (Pages 395). 13.
By Supplementary Statement dated 24.08.2020, the Petitioner
clarified that, during the course of the proceedings, the Court
had requested him to reconsider his earlier statement rather
than to make an unconditional apology, reaffirmed his general
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 8 faith in the Court and its capacity for
institutional reform in response to constructive criticism and
re-asserted his defence of truth and bona fide opinion. On the
same date, Written Submissions dated 24.08.2020 pertaining
to issues arising in sentencing were filed on behalf of the
Petitioner. A copy of the Supplementary Statement dated
24.08.2020 is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE P-10 (Pages
396 to 397). A copy of the Written Submissions dated
24.08.2020 are annexed herewith as ANNEXURE P-11 (Pages
398 to 436). 14. By Order dated 25.08.2020, this Hon’ble Court
reserved judgment on sentencing after hearing arguments from
Counsel for the Petitioner, and cursorily calling upon the
Attorney General for India, who submitted that this case was
not a fit one for the imposition of any punishment, but
conceded some discomfort at the prospect of the statements
contained in the Petitioner’s Affidavit-in-Reply being put to trial
in order to ascertain their veracity. A copy of the Order dated
25.08.2020 passed by this Hon’ble Court in SMC (Crl.) No. 1 of
2020 is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE P-12 (Pages 437). 15.
By Judgment dated 31.08.2020 in Suo Motu Contempt Petition
(Crl.) No. 1 of 2020, which, this Hon’ble Court imposed the
following sentence: “We, therefore, sentence the contemnor
with a fine or Re.1/(Rupee one) to be deposited with the
Registry of this Court by 15.09.2020, failing which he shall
undergo a simple imprisonment for a period of three months
and further be debarred from practising in this Court for a
period of three years.” WWW.LIVELAW.IN 9 16. The Review
Petitioner is filing a separate review petition seeking review of
the Judgment on Sentence dated 31.08.2020. 17. The
Petitioner submits that he is entitled to a review of the
Judgment dated 14.08.2020 in Suo Motu Contempt Petition
(Crl.) No. 1 of 2020 on the grounds are set out at length
hereinbelow: II. SCOPE OF COURT’S POWER IN THE PRESENT
REVIEW PETITION 18. As per Order 47, Rule 1 r/w Rule 4 of
the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, in a criminal proceeding, a
review is maintainable on the ground of an “error apparent on
the face of the record” which comprises of “mistake of law or
fact”. It is respectfully submitted that the judgment whose
review is being sought suffers from multiple errors apparent on
the face of the record of both law and of fact. 19. A Constitution
Bench of five judges of this Hon’ble Court has held in PN
Eswara Iyer v Supreme Court of India (1980) 4 SCC 680 at
paragraphs 34 and 35 that the scope of this Hon’ble Court’s
substantive power of review is “as wide for criminal as for civil
proceedings”. 20. Further, a bench of three judges in Vikram
Singh v. State of Punjab (2017) 8 SCC 518at paragraph 23 has
held that the power of review in criminal proceedings is wider
under Article 137 than under statute, in the following terms:
“…scope, ambit and parameters of review jurisdiction are well
defined. Normally in a criminal proceeding, review applications
cannot be entertained except on the ground of error apparent
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 10 on the face of the record. Further, the
power given to this Court under Article 137 is wider and in an
appropriate case can be exercised to mitigate a manifest
injustice.” 21. Conviction and sentencing are separate and
independent stages of the criminal process, and were correctly
treated as such by this Hon’ble Court by first pronouncing
judgment was in conviction proceedings, before a setting a
separate hearing for sentencing. Thus, the Petitioner is entitled
to bring separate petitions for the review of each judgement.
Nothing in the constitutional or statutory law as it applies to
this Hon’ble Court’s power of review limits this right. III. OPEN
COURT HEARING 22. In view of the sui generis nature of the
proceedings under Article 129 for criminal contempt which is
not committed ex facie curiae, a hearing in open court ought to
be granted both on the question of admitting the present
petition as well as on its merits. 23. The said sui generis nature
of suo motu proceedings for criminal contempt has been
affirmed by this Hon’ble Court in In re Vinay Chandra Mishra
(1995) 2 SCC 584 at paragraph 26. It arises from the following
features of the proceedings: Firstly, contrary to fundamental
precepts of the rule of law and natural justice in adversarial
legal systems, this Hon’ble Court sits as judge, investigator and
prosecutor in determining whether to put alleged contemnors
to criminal penalties of imprisonment, fines and debarment
from practice in the case of advocates. As a result, protections
universally afforded to criminal defendants by severing
adjudication from prosecution are not available here.
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 11 Secondly, this Hon’ble Court adopts a
summary process, in which procedural protections available
during trial and otherwise as part of the rights of accused
persons under Articles 20 to 22 are dispensed with. Thirdly, in
criminal contempt cases involving scandalising the court, this
Hon’ble Court is concerned with an offence with unspecified
ingredients and unspecified boundaries. This Hon’ble Court
recognises that the definition of the offence remains
extraordinarily vague and discretionary even in the form
codified under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 (In re S
Mulgaonkar (1978) 3 SCC 339 at paragraphs 23 to 25 (Per
Krishna Iyer, J.)). By contrast, in ordinary criminal
proceedings, an offence in which ingredients are clear and
specific are treated as sine qua non. Fourthly, acting under
Article 129, this Hon’ble Court proceeds on a footing -
otherwise unknown to legal systems operating under the rule
of law - of very broad discretion in the matter of sentencing.
Fifthly, no appeal lies from this Hon’ble Court’s failure exercise
its power to punish for criminal contempt of itself in
accordance with the requirements of the right to fair trial. As a
result, in addition to removing procedural rights and
protections during the course of trial, the Petitioner’s right to
remedy against a trial violative of due process rights is
drastically curtailed. Thus, the ordinary rationale for narrow
review jurisdiction is that an alternative and efficacious remedy
is made available in the form of an appeal before the review
jurisdiction in criminal cases can be availed of. As a
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 12 result, the ordinary rationale for a
narrow review jurisdiction is decisively superseded by the need
to assure fundamental rights under Article 21 and 32 are
protected in cases involving personal liberty. Sixthly, suo motu
proceedings for contempt of a court of record are intimately
connected with the maintenance of public confidence. In view
of the fact that contempt proceedings, by definition, involve the
court sitting as prosecutor and judge, public confidence and the
appearance of open and impartial justice cannot be served
except by the admission and open hearing of review petitions
which impugn convictions and/or sentences in cases of
contempt. 24. The grounds of the Review are as follows, which
grounds have been divided under separate headings for the
purpose of convenience: I. THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN HEARD BY A BENCH COMPRISING OF
HON’BLE JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA A. THAT vide a letter dated
26.07.2020 addressed to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, the
Review Petitioner had sought the contempt proceedings
pending against the Review Petitioner including the present
Review Petition be heard by a bench of which Hon’ble Mr.
Justice Arun Mishra was not a part. The reasons in the letter
that are restated hereinafter clearly show that the matter
should never been hear by Justice Arun Mishra.
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 13 B. THAT on several occasions Hon’ble
Justice Arun Mishra has orally accused the Review Petitioner of
committing contempt of court when he had merely mentioned
that it may be inappropriate for a particular judge to hear a
particular case in circumstances where conflict of interest was
involved. On 16.12.2016, during the hearing of an application
by the petitioner Common Cause, seeking investigation into the
alleged payment of large sums of money to the Prime Minister
and other politicians and officials in the cases of the Birla and
Sahara group of Companies (Writ Petition (C) No. 505/2015),
when the then Hon’ble Justice J. S. Kehar was to hear the
Review Petitioner suggested that since his file for being
appointed as the Chief Justice of India was pending before the
Prime Minister (after the recommendation had been made for
his appointment by the then Chief Justice) and that therefore
he should adjourn the matter till after the 3rd of January 2017
(which would be the date of retirement of the then Chief
Justice), since there would be a conflict of interest at that point
of time in his hearing the said case. Justice Arun Mishra orally
alleged that this very plea amounted to contempt of court. C.
THAT Justice Arun Mishra headed the bench which decided the
application of Common Cause and rejected the application
seeking a court monitored investigation into the alleged
payment of large sums of money to politician and bureaucrats
by the Birla and Sahara Group of Companies (as had been
discovered in documents and computers recovered from these
companies by the income tax and CBI). This petition was heard
and disposed off by the bench headed by Hon’ble Justice Arun
Mishra on 11.01.2017. In particular the WWW.LIVELAW.IN 14
Sahara papers which were part of the records showed that 10
crores had allegedly been paid to the then Chief Minister
Shivraj Singh Chauhan by the Sahara Group. While hearing this
matter, Justice Arun Mishra did not disclose that he had
recently in that December, celebrated the wedding of his
nephew in his residences in Delhi and Gwalior, and that at the
wedding he had invited many top politicians of the BJP. At the
wedding reception at Gwalior he had invited the then Chief
Minister Shivraj Singh Chauhan. The fact of his inviting a
number of BJP politicians to the reception in Delhi was
mentioned by Mr. Dushyant Dave in an article published online
in The Wire. The fact that Shivraj Singh Chauhan attended the
reception of Justice Arun Mishra’s nephew was published in
local newspapers. This fact was tweeted by me along with the
photograph of Shivraj Singh Chauhan greeting the newly
married couple at the residence of Justice Arun Mishra. D. THAT
thereafter, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal (Writ Petition (Crl) 176 of 2017)
and the Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms
(CJAR) (Writ Petition (Crl.) 169/2017) had filed petitions,
seeking court monitored investigation into a CBI FIR regarding
alleged planning and preparation for procuring favourable
orders in the case involving the Prasad Medical Trust, then
pending before this Hon’ble Court. The CJAR petition though
earlier ordered to be listed before a bench headed by Hon’ble
Justice Sikri and Hon’ble Justice Ashok Bhushan, who directed
the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice by their order
dated 10.11.2017, suddenly came to be listed before a 7judge
bench which was then reduced to a 5 judge bench, headed by
the then Hon’ble Chief WWW.LIVELAW.IN 15 Justice Dipak
Misra. The bench included Hon’ble Justice Arun Mishra. The
matter was suddenly posted for hearing by notice before the
court on afternoon of the 10.11.2017. On that date, the Review
Petitioner told the Hon’ble Chief Justice Dipak Misra that it
would not be appropriate for him to hear this case, since the
petition sought an investigation into alleged preparation and
planning to pay bribes to procure a favourable order in a case
which was being dealt with by him. There would thus be an
obvious conflict of interest involved in his hearing the matter.
On such plea, Hon’ble Justice Arun Mishra again observed that
such a plea amounted to contempt of court. That thereafter
these cases came to be listed before a three judge bench
comprising Justice R.K. Agarwal, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar and
Justice Arun Mishra. In the hearing of the Kamini Jaiswal
petition on the 13.11.2017 by this bench, in his oral
submissions the Review Petitioner asked Justice A.M.
Khanwilkar whether it would be appropriate for him to hear
this case, since he was also part of the bench along with the
Hon’ble Chief Justice Dipak Misra which had dealt with the
medical college case where the CBI FIR alleged that planning
and preparation had taken place to obtain favourable orders.
Even this request has been termed by this judgement, to
amount to contempt of court. The judgement states: “Yet
another disturbing feature which aggravates the situation is
that prayer has been made, that one of us, Justice A. M.
Khanwilkar, should recuse from the matter. This is nothing but
another attempt of forum hunting which cannot be permitted.
Rather this kind of prayer WWW.LIVELAW.IN 16 was held to be
contemptuous, aggravating the contempt in the case of Dr. D C
Saxena (supra).” By the aforesaid judgment and judgement
dated 01.12.2019 the Bench in which Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun
Mishra was a member, imposed a cost of 25 lacs on the
Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms, of which I
am the Convenor. E. THAT in contempt petition (Crl) 1/2019,
The Attorney General for India vs. Shri Prashant Bhushan, the
Advocate on record for the applicant, had, vide letter dated
21.02.2019 addressed to the Registrar (Judicial), Supreme
Court, requested that the Contempt Petition be listed before
another appropriate bench after taking orders of the Hon’ble
Chief Justice of India. The applicant had filed an application for
recall of the order dated 6.02.2019. The application had raised
serious issues about the propriety of filing of a contempt
petition in the garb of an I.A. in a pending matter and
thereafter the same having been mentioned and listed as the
Contempt petitions 1 and 2 of 2019, before the bench of Justice
Arun Mishra and Justice Navin Sinha on 6.02.2019. The
advocate on record had further requested that the application
be brought to the notice of the Chief Justice of India, so that it
is listed before the appropriate bench which has the roster of
entertaining Contempt Petitions. Despite this application, the
said matter was listed before the bench presided by Hon’ble Mr.
Justice Arun Mishra. F. THAT further, in the hearing that took
place thereafter on the 7th of March 2019, the learned Attorney
General submitted WWW.LIVELAW.IN 17 before the court that
he would like to withdraw his contempt pleas since the
applicant had made a statement that his tweet was a genuine
mistake. The Attorney General also reiterated that he did not
want any punishment for the applicant in the case. Despite the
Attorney General withdrawing his plea against the applicant,
Justice Mishra insisted on hearing the matter and deciding it.
When the Attorney General stated that he did not want to press
for his pleas, Justice Mishra stated in court, “It is for us to
decide and not you to decide. We will decide everything. We
will consider all these aspects. We understand Mr. AG that you
are very fair. We will consider everything.” During the hearing,
an application for the recusal of Justice Arun Mishra was also
moved. Justice Arun Mishra asked the Review Petitioner to
tender an unconditional apology for moving the recusal
application. However, the Review Petitioner stated that he had
moved the application in a bonafide manner and was not
inclined to tender an unconditional apology. On this, Justice
Arun Mishra without going into the merits of the application
stated, “We make it clear that there is no reason for recusal
and we will deal with it.” The court also stated that the effect
of filing the recusal application would be considered in the next
hearing.The manner in which Justice Arun Mishra, insisted on
hearing the contempt petition despite the Attorney Generals
withdrawal of plea and his taking exception to the filing of the
recusal application itself, raises serious apprehension of Justice
Arun Mishra’s bias against me. WWW.LIVELAW.IN 18 G. THAT
all the above facts raise a reasonable apprehension on part of
the Review Petitioner about him getting a fair and impartial
hearing in these contempt matters if it was heard by Justice
Arun Mishra. Accordingly, the letter dated 26.07.2020 was
addressed to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India as raising these
issues in a recusal application before Justice Arun Mishra
himself would have further invited a similar response as the
earlier recusal application, i.e. alleging that the recusal
application itself is contempt. However, as no action was taken
based on this letter and since Justice Arun Mishra heard and
decided the Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Criminal) 1of 2020,
this by itself is a ground for rehearing the entire contempt
proceedings without Justice Arun Mishra as part of the new
bench. III. POWER OF SUPREME COURT UNDER ARTICLE 129 IS
SUBJECT TO DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS THAT FLOW FROM
THE CONSTITUTION. NO POWER IS COMPLETELY
UNRESTRICTED OR UNREGULATED UNDER OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME. H. That it is no doubt true that the
Article 129 of the Constitution recognizes the inherent power of
the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of itself. However, it
is settled law that under our constitutional scheme no power is
absolute and without any regulation. Thus, while judgments of
this Hon’ble Court have noted that no statute can abrogate or
stultify such power, simultaneously they have recognized that
procedure can be regulated through statue, which is presently
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (“1971 Act”) as also the
Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 19 Supreme Court, 1975 (“1975 Rules”)
Regulation of the power under Article 129 through prescribing
procedure, maximum punishment etc. does not amount to
taking away or denuding the power but only keeping such
power within the limits that flow inter-alia from due process
requirements under Article 21 of the Constitution and from the
principle of supremacy of the Constitution rather than
supremacy of any entity that the Constitution establishes.That
the finding in Para 18 of the Impugned Judgment that “the
power of this court to initiate contempt is not in any
mannerlimited by the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971” is therefore an error of law apparent on the face of the
record. I. That in line with the above principle stated above, in
Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549 at page 566, a
three judge bench of this Hon’ble Court has held as follows:
“30. There can be no doubt that both this Court and High
Courts are courts of record and the Constitution has given them
the powers to punish for contempt. The decisions of this Court
clearly show that this power cannot be abrogated or stultified.
But if the power under Article 129 and Article 215 is absolute,
can there be any legislation indicating the manner and to the
extent that the power can be exercised? If there is any
provision of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power
under Article 129 and/or Article 215, there can be little doubt
that such law would not be regarded as having been validly
enacted. It, however, appears to us that providing for the
quantum of punishment or what may or may not be regarded
as acts of contempt or even providing for a WWW.LIVELAW.IN
20 period of limitation for initiating proceedings for contempt
cannot be taken to be a provision which abrogates or stultifies
the contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 or Article 215 of the
Constitution. 31. This Court has always frowned upon the grant
or existence of absolute or unbridled power. Just as power or
jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be exercised in accordance
with law, if any, enacted by the legislature, it would stand to
reason that the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215
should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a
validly enacted law. In case of apparent or likelihood of conflict
the provisions should be construed harmoniously. 32. …..There
is no challenge to the validity of any of the provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act as being violative or in conflict with any
provisions of the Constitution. Barring observations of this
Court in Supreme Court Bar Assn. case [(1998) 4 SCC 409]
where it did not express any opinion on the question whether
maximum punishment fixed by the 1971 Act was binding on the
Court, no doubt has been expressed about the validity of any
provision of the 1971 Act. In exercise of its constitutional
power, this Court has, on the other hand, applied the provisions
of the Act while exercising jurisdiction under Article 129 or 215
of the Constitution……A three-Judge Bench in Dr L.P. Misra
case [(1998) 7 SCC 379] observed that the procedure provided
by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 had to be followed even in
exercise of the jurisdiction under Article WWW.LIVELAW.IN 21
215 of the Constitution. It would, therefore, follow that if
Section 20 is so interpreted that it does not stultify the powers
under Article 129 or Article 215 then, like other provisions of
the Contempt of Courts Act relating to the extent of
punishment which can be imposed, a reasonable period of
limitation can also be provided. The above finding of the three-
judge bench was reached after examining the decision of this
Hon’ble Court of five judges in Supreme Court Bar Assn. case
(1998) 4 SCC 409, where this Hon’ble Court made some
observations while discussing it a statute can prescribe the
maximum punishment, but expressly left the question open to
be decided in an appropriate case. In fact, even in Supreme
Court Bar Assn. case (1998) 4 SCC 409this Hon’ble Court has
held that no power of the Supreme Court is unlimited and even
the power under Article 142 is only to ensure complete justice
to the parties before it. The relevant portion reads as follows:
“43. The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of
court, though quite wide, is yet limited and cannot be expanded
to include the power to determine whether an advocate is also
guilty of “professional misconduct” in a summary manner,
giving a go-by to the procedure prescribed under the Advocates
Act. The power to do complete justice under Article 142 is in a
way, corrective power, which gives preference to equity over
law but it cannot be used to deprive a professional lawyer of
the due process contained in the Advocates Act, 1961 by
suspending his licence to practice in a WWW.LIVELAW.IN 22
summary manner while dealing with a case of contempt of
court.” (Emphasis Supplied) “47. The plenary powers of this
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the
Court and are complementary to those powers which are
specifically conferred on the Court by various statutes though
are not limited by those statutes.… It, however, needs to be
remembered that the powers conferred on the Court by Article
142 being curative in nature cannot be construed as powers
which authorise the Court to ignore the substantive rights of a
litigant while dealing with a cause pending before it. This
power cannot be used to “supplant” substantive law applicable
to the case or cause under consideration of the Court. Article
142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to
build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring
express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby
to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved
directly. Punishing a contemner advocate, while dealing with a
contempt of court case by suspending his licence to practice, a
power otherwise statutorily available only to the Bar Council of
India, on the ground that the contemner is also an advocate, is,
therefore, not permissible in exercise of the jurisdiction under
Article 142. The construction of Article 142 must be
functionally informed by the salutary purposes of the article,
viz., to do complete justice between the parties. It
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 23 cannot be otherwise. As already noticed
in a case of contempt of court, the contemner and the court
cannot be said to be litigating parties. (Emphasis in Original)
48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary
for doing complete justice “between the parties in any cause or
matter pending before it”. The very nature of the power must
lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise
those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory
provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the
equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties
by “ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter before it.
Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only
disputesettling. It is well recognised and established that this
Court has always been a law-maker and its role travels beyond
merely dispute-settling. It is a “problem-solver in the nebulous
areas” (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC
655: 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] but the substantive statutory
provisions dealing with the subject-matter of a given case
cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an
order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers
cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions
but at the same time these powers are not meant to be
exercised when their exercise may come directly in
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 24 conflict with what has been expressly
provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.
Further, any judgments on this issue prior to coming into force
of the 1971 Act can obviously not hold the field subsequent to
the introduction of the Act. Thus, relying on English or Indian
decisions prior to the introduction of the 1971 Act to determine
the manner in which the power of Criminal Contempt is to be
exercised by this Hon’ble Court is erroneous.In light of the
above position of law, the finding in Para 18 of theimpugned
judgment that “the power of this court to initiate contempt is
not in any mannerlimited by the provisions of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971”is an error of law apparent on face of the
record and the 1971 Act as also the 1975 Rules will apply to
the extent they on their terms apply to the contempt
proceedings before this Hon’ble Court. J. THAT in particular, a
proceeding of criminal contempt that too, a proceeding, which
is initiated suo-motu must apply all the procedural safeguards
of the 1971 Act and the 1975 Rules as the Court is both the
party that is aggrieved and is also the judge acting in its own
cause. The principles of due process of law will therefore apply
with even greater force in such proceedings. That regulation of
any power does not amount to abrogating that power or
stultifying it. The observations of this Hon’ble Court that since
the power is sourced in Article 129 and 142 it cannot be
stultified or abrogated is in the context that the power cannot
be taken away by Parliament and conferred on some other
authority, or that it cannot be restricted in a way so as to make
it ineffective. However, that does not mean that the power is
unlimited or cannot be WWW.LIVELAW.IN 25 subject to any
regulationeither through binding statutory provisions or Rules
that have been framed by this Hon’ble Court under Article 145
and the 1971 Act. IV. PETITION NOT MAINTAINABLE IN
ABSENCE OF CONSENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL. IN ANY EVENT
NOTHEARING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FAILS FUNDAMENTAL
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS. K. THAT in Para 18 of the
Impugned Judgment, it has been held as follows: “18...It has
been held, that insofar as suomotu petitions are concerned, the
Court can very well initiate the proceedings suo motu on the
basis of information received by it. The only requirement is that
the procedure as prescribed in the judgment of P N Duda
(supra) has to be followed. In the present case, the same has
undoubtedly been followed. It is also equally settled, that as
far as the suo motu petitions are concerned, there is no
requirement for taking consent of anybody, including the
learned Attorney General because the Court is exercising its
inherent power to issue notice for contempt. It is equally well
settled that once the Court takes cognizance the matter is
purely between the Court and the Contemnor…” It is
respectfully submitted that each of the findings in the above
quoted para are errors of law apparent on the face of the
record. WWW.LIVELAW.IN 26 The decision in P.N. Duda v. P.
Shiv Shanker, (1988) 3 SCC 167was rendered by a bench of
two judges. The judgment for the court was rendered by
Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji. This opinion does not discuss any
such procedure. Justice S Ranganathan delivered a separate
opinion, which concurred with the opinion of the Justice
Mukharji. However, in respect of the maintainability of the
petition and the procedure in case of suo motu petition on
information received, Justice Ranganathan opinion did not
concur with that of Justice Mukharji but was in fact partly
dissenting. Thus, the aspects on the maintainability of the
petition without the permission of Attorney General, and in
particular the procedure to be followed in such cases, there
was no concurrence between both the judges and thus those
observations in the judgment of Justice Ranganathan do not
form part of ratio of the judgment. This is evident from the SCC
Report of the judgment, where in Para 49 Justice Ranganathan
concurs with Justice Mukharji on the aspect that there is no
contempt made out on the facts of the case and then goes on to
say as follows: “50. The second aspect of the case on which
arguments have been addressed before us relate to the
procedure to be followed in such matters. As this aspect raises
some important issues, I would like to state my views thereon
separately.” (Emphasis Supplied) Thus, there was no majority
view in P N Duda’s (Supra) case in respect of the procedure to
be followed. It is possibly for this reason that the 1975 Rules
have not been amended to WWW.LIVELAW.IN 27 include the
procedure prescribed in Justice Ranganathan’s separate
opinion. Thus, it is an error apparent on the face of the record
to state that suo motu contempt proceedings can be initiated
by the Court on basis of information received and the only
requirement is that procedure prescribed in P N Duda’s
case(Supra)has to be followed. L. THAT in P N Duda’s case
(Supra), even as per the opinion of the Justice Ranganathan, if
a petition is filed, giving information to the court, it must be in
proper form for it be registered as a suo-motu petition under
Rule 3(a) of the 1975 Rules. Importantly, in the facts of that
case, he found the petition totally not maintainable either as
suo motu petition or otherwise, in the following manner [Para
63(a) of SCC]: “63. For purposes of convenience, I may sum up
my conclusions. They are: (a) This petition, if treated as one
filed under Section 15(1) read with Rule 3(a) is not in proper
form and, if treated as one filed under Rules 3(b) and 3(c), is
not maintainable as it is not filed by the
Attorney-Genera1/Solicitor-General or by any person with his
consent.” In the present facts, the Review Petitioner does not
know if the petition filed by Mr. Maheswari was in the proper
form even as per the judgment of Justice Ranganathan as a
copy of the petition which formed the entire basis of the Suo
Motu petition has not been provided to the Review Petitioner.
However, a perusal of the case record on the website of this
case indicates that the petitioner Mr. Maheswari had along with
his petition WWW.LIVELAW.IN 28 filed an “Application for
Exemption from filing Prior Permission of Ld. Attorney General
of India in Contempt Criminal” which bears Reg/IA No.
61203/2020. Therefore, the Original Petitioner himself was
aware of the requirement of permission of the Attorney General
and crafted his petition accordingly. Therefore, entertaining
such a petition as a suo motu petition is error apparent on the
face of the record. M. THAT in any event in so far as the Tweet
No. 2 of 27th June, 2020 is concerned, as is evident from the
judicial order issuing notice dated 22nd July, 2020, judicial
notice of the same was taken directly on 22nd July, 2020
without following the procedure on the administrative side
mandated by the judgment of Justice Ranganathan in P. N.
Dudas case (Supra). Even assuming the impugned judgment is
correct in respect of the procedure required to be followed as
per P N Duda’s case, there is a prohibition on taking suo motu
notice directly on the judicial side and thus the entire
proceedings in respect of the Tweet No. 2 is without authority
of law and liable to be set aside. Thus, the entire proceedings
in respect of the Tweet No. 2, including the impugned judgment
is an error apparent on the face of the record. N. THAT further,
in any event, even in the absence of a permission of the
Attorney General as required under the 1971 Act and the 1975
Rules, the proceedings having been initiated and notice having
been issued to the Attorney General vide order dated
22.07.2020, the fact that this Hon’ble Court did not choose to
hear the Learned Attorney General on the aspect whether the
two tweets at all amounted to contempt is not in accordance
with established procedure.Pursuant to the notice issued to
him, the Ld. Attorney General was present in court
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 29 throughout the hearing on 5.08.2020 but
was not called upon by the court to address any submissions.
This is also evident from record of proceedings of 5.08.2020
that records the presence of Ld. Attorney General for India but
records that “Heard the submissions of Learned Senior Counsel
appearing in the matter”-a reference to Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the Review Petitioner. It is thus evident
from the proceedings that while the Attorney General was
present, he was not heard. In almost all cases of criminal
contempt of this Hon’ble Court, this Hon’ble Court has heard
the submissions of the Attorney General. Recently, in C.S.
Karnan, In re, (2017) 7 SCC 1, in para 23 it is noted as follows:
23. Having viewed the unsavoury allegations levelled by Justice
Karnan over a span of time, it was prima facie felt that his
conduct towards a large number of named Judges and the
judiciary in general, had seriously blemished and tarnished the
image of those concerned in particular, and the judiciary as a
whole. It was accordingly decided to initiate suo motu
proceedings, for contempt of court. A Bench comprising of the
seven seniormost Judges of the Supreme Court was constituted
to examine whether or not Shri Justice C.S. Karnan was guilty
of having committed contempt. On the administrative side, the
entire material referred to above, was entrusted to the
Attorney General for India. He was also requested to assist the
Court, in the matter, on the judicial side. Even in P. N. Duda’s
Case (Supra) the court lamented the fact that that the Attorney
General could not be heard as the WWW.LIVELAW.IN 30
Attorney General because he had been made a party
respondent by the Petitioner and therefore the Attorney
General was represented through counsels. In fact, the role of
the Attorney General is absolutely essential in a proceeding of
Suo Motu Criminal Contempt as the Attorney General is the only
independent mind that can throw light on if there is a any
contempt at all, the court being the aggrieved party as also the
adjudicator and the alleged contemnor being the defendant.
Thus, the finding in Para 18 of the impugned judgment that “It
is equally well settled that once the Court takes cognizance the
matter is purely between the Court and the Contemnor” is an
error of law apparent on the face of the record. V.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE INCLUDING
MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF 1971 ACT AND THE 1975
RULES HAVE BEEN VIOLATED P. THAT Rule 6(2) of the 1975
Rules requires that “When action is instituted on petition, a
copy of the petition along with the annexure and affidavits
shall be served on the person charged”. However, in complete
and direct violation of this rule, a copy of the petition of Mr.
Maheswari that was the basis for initiating the Suo Motu
proceedings was not supplied to the Review Petitioner. It is
respectfully submitted that this violation is fundamental and
goes to the very root of the matter, as the Review Petitioner
could not address before this Hon’ble Court whether the basis
on which this Hon’ble Court formed its view was substantial or
not. Q. THAT the reply filed by the Review Petitioner on
2.08.2020 clearly states that it is a preliminary reply and that
the Review Petitioner is handicapped as he does not have a
copy of the WWW.LIVELAW.IN 31 Petition of Mr. Maheswari.
Further, on 6.08.2020, the Petitioner also filed an application
specifically stating that if the Court was not inclined to drop the
proceedings and was inclined to proceed further, then the
Review Petitioner seeks to lead further material as evidence
underSection 17(5) of the 1971 Act. This section reads as
follows: “(5) Any person charged with contempt under section
15 may file an affidavit in support of his defence, and the court
may determine the matter of the charge either on the affidavits
filed or after taking such further evidence as may be necessary,
and pass such order as the justice of the case
requires.”(Emphasis Supplied) In the present case, it is
respectfully submitted that further evidence was necessary, in
particular to place before this court the comparative numbers
of cases being heard and decided by this Hon’ble Court during
normal pre-covid functioning and functioning during the
lockdown mode. The non-consideration of this plea by this
Hon’ble Court is a cause of serious prejudice to the Review
Petitioner and is an error apparent on the face of the record. R.
THAT the Review Petitioner had filed a detailed reply placing
therein the facts, which was the basis of the bonafide belief
expressed in the two tweets. It is respectfully submitted that in
para 2 the length of the reply and the length of reply with the
annexures is noted but this Hon’ble Court has failed to consider
or even note the contents of the reply, particularly in respect of
the Tweet No. 2, in respect of which the Review Petitioner had
averred detailed facts that formed the basis of his bonafide
view expressed in Tweet No. 2. However,
nonWWW.LIVELAW.IN 32 reference and non-consideration of
these facts is fatal to the finding of contempt in respect of the
Tweet No. 2and is an error of law apparent on the face of the
record. S. THAT it is settled law that even in proceedings of
criminal contempt the due process of law, including the
procedure prescribed by law must be followed. In R.S. Sujatha
v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 5 SCC at page 695, noting the law
on the point, this Hon’ble Court has held as follows:
“21...Needless to say, the contempt proceedings being quasi-
criminal in nature require strict adherence to the procedure
prescribed under the rules applicable in such proceedings. In
L.P. Misra (Dr.) v. State of U.P. [(1998) 7 SCC 379: AIR 1998 SC
337] this Court while dealing with the issue of observance of
the statutory rules held as under: (SCC p. 382, para 12) “12. …
we are of the opinion that the Court while passing the
impugned order had not followed the procedure prescribed by
law. It is true that the High Court can invoke powers and
jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of
India but such a jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law.” 22. In Three Cheers
Entertainment (P) Ltd. v. CESC Ltd. [(2008) 16 SCC 592], and
Sahdeo [(2010) 3 SCC 705 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 451] (SCC p.
773, WWW.LIVELAW.IN 33 para 22) this Court reiterated a
similar view observing that in contempt proceedings the court
must conclude the trial and complete the proceedings “in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law”. 25. This
Court in Sahdeo [(2010) 3 SCC 705: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 451]
while dealing with a similar situation held as under: (SCC pp.
717-18, para 37) “37. Every statutory provision requires strict
adherence, for the reason that the statute creates rights in
favour of persons concerned. The impugned judgment suffered
from nonobservance of the principles of natural justice and not
ensuring the compliance with statutory 1952 Rules. Thus, the
trial itself suffered from material procedural defect and stood
vitiated. The impugned judgment and order, so far as the
conviction of the appellants in contempt proceedings are
concerned, is liable to be set aside.” (Emphasis Supplied) It is
therefore respectfully submitted that in proceedings of criminal
contempt, if the procedure prescribed by law, be it as per the
statute or the rules is violated as has been done in the present
case, then the conviction is liable to be set aside and the same
is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. VI. THAT
THE TWEETS IN QUESTION WERE PRIMA-FACIE NOT CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT AS PER THE DECISION IN P. N. DUDA (SUPRA).
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 34 T. THAT in P. N. Duda’s Case (Supra) this
Hon’ble Court found that a speech that stated that “Anti-social
elements i.e. FERA violators, bride burners and a whole horde
of reactionaries have found their haven in the Supreme Court”
and also that “The Supreme Court composed of the element
from the elite class had their unconcealed sympathy for the
haves i.e. the Zamindars” was not criminal contempt and read
properly was a study of the attitude of the Supreme Court. In
fact, this was the only issue on which there was complete
agreement between both the judges which comprised the
bench. It was argued at the bar by the Senior Counsel for the
Review Petitioner that if these words have not been found to
be contemptuous by the Supreme Court in Duda’s case, then
applying the same standard, the two tweets of the Review
Petitioner were completely innocuous and could not amount to
criminal contempt. However, in the impugned judgment, there
is no discussion on this aspect on which detailed submissions
were made and this refusal to consider the statements in the
tweet in light of the standards set by this Hon’ble Court itself
amounts to ignorance of binding law/differential application of
law and is an error apparent on the face of the record. It is also
respectfully submitted that on the aspect of procedure where
there was not even any agreement between both the Learned
Judges who comprised the court, this Hon’ble Court in the
impugned judgment relied upon the same. However, on the one
aspect on which there was complete unanimity in that
judgment, i.e. on the kind of statements that do not amount to
contempt, this Hon’ble WWW.LIVELAW.IN 35 Court has chosen
to not deal with it, despite detailed arguments made at the bar.
VII. NON-CONSIDERATION OF TRUTH AS A DEFENCE U. THAT in
2006, by an amendment in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
introduced by Act 6 of 2006, the defence of truth was
introduced for the first time in Indian Law as a defence in
respect of proceedings for contempt of court. Section 13(b)
that reads as follows: “13…Notwithstanding anything
contained in any law for the time being in force,- (a)… (b) the
court may permit, in any proceeding for contempt of court,
justification by truth as a valid defence, if it is satisfied that it
is in public interest and the request for invoking the said
defence is bonafide.:” It is submitted that this is a
pathbreaking change in the Indian law of contempt and
subsequent to this change, if an alleged contemnor seeks to
rely on this defence, it is incumbent on the court to examine
and deal with that defence. Further, the applicability of a large
portion of pre-2006 case law will have to be applied keeping
this fundamental change in law in mind. V. In the impugned
judgment, in so far as the Tweet No. 2 is concerned, which
begins with the words “when historians in the future look
back…” the court has completely ignored the truthful
averments which were made in the reply justifying
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 36 each part of this tweet. However, in
paras 66 to 77 of the impugned judgment, where the Court’s
analysis in this respect is to be found, this Hon’ble Court has
straightaway determined this tweet to be not in good faith
without even attempting to examine if the averments based on
which the Review Petitioner claimed to form his view in this
tweet were true. It is respectfully submitted that this is a
completely erroneous approach. Under Section 13(b) truth and
good faith are intrinsically connected. A view based on material
which is fully true can obviously not be in bad faith and
similarly a view based on complete falsehood is highly unlikely
to be in good faith. Thus, as a matter of law, an enquiry into
truthfulness of the facts based on which the belief is claimed to
be in good faith must precede the analysis of whether the
statements are in good faith. In para 71 this Hon’ble Court
straightaway states that “we are only concerned with the
damage that is sought to be done to the institution of
administration of justice” and concludes that “in our view, the
said tweets undermines the dignity and authority of the
institution of the Supreme Court of India and the CJI and
directly affronts the majesty of law”. In subsequent paras, the
tweet is described as “scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory and
malicious”. It is respectfully submitted that the use of such
epitaphs for the tweet cannot be a replacement for
examination of truthfulness of the materials based on which
the tweet was made. In fact, by the approach followed by this
court in the impugned judgment, any criticism of the Court can
simply be described with these epitaphs and the person
convicted of criminal contempt. The non-consideration of the
truthfulness of the reply which formed the basis of the Tweet
No. 2 is therefore an error of law apparent on the face of the
record. Further, in the judgment WWW.LIVELAW.IN 37 on
conviction, it is nowhere stated that the Reply was not sought
to be relied upon. An observation to that effect comes in the
judgment on sentencing and that is being dealt with in the
review being filed in respect of that judgment. W. THAT in the
impugned judgment, in so far as the Tweet No. 1 is concerned,
an attempt is made to examine the truthfulness of the
statement while determining if the second part of the first
tweet is bonafide criticism made by the Review Petitioner on
account of his anguish of non-functioning of the courts
physically. In this respect in Para 64 the court finds that“His
contention that on account of non-physical functioning of the
Supreme Court for the last more than three months, the
fundamental rights of citizens, such as those in detention,
those destitute and poor, and others facing serious and urgent
greviances were not being addressed or taken up for redressal,
as stated herein above, is false to his knowledge.” The court
has reached the above conclusion based on quoting some
absolute figures in para 63 and 64 such as “The total number of
sittings that various branches had from 23.3.2020 till
4.08.2020 is 879. During this period, the court has heard 12748
matters, In the said period, this Court has dealt with 686 writ
petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India”.
The above approach in determining the truthfulness of the
statement made by the Review Petitioner has two fundamental
factual errors. First, the Court has noted the figures from
23.3.2020 and 4.08.2020 and not until 27.06.2020 when the
Tweet No. 1 was WWW.LIVELAW.IN 38 made. Consideration of
numbers post the tweet was made to determine if what was
stated in tweet was truthful is in an obvious error of fact on the
face of the record. Second, the consideration of absolute
numbers in the post Covid period without a reference to what
those numbers were for the same months/period in the pre
COVID era when the Courts were functioning physically is an
approach that cannot determine the extent of denial of access
to justice because of the restrictive functioning of the court.
Indeed, even as the Review Petitioner is filing this review
petition, this Hon’ble Courts is functioning with five to seven
benches everyday, with judges sitting on alternate days and
not every day. Prior to COVID, ten to fourteen benches would
sit everyday five days a week. Further, the number of matters
on the board of each court was also higher. Thus, undoubtedly,
even today, the access to justice is restricted from what was
before COVID when physical functioning was continuing. Thus,
to quote absolute figures without comparison, to determine
truthfulness of the second part of first tweet, is an error of fact
apparent on the face of the record. VIII.IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
MAKES ANY AND ALL CRITICISM OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT AN OFFENCE OFCRIMINAL CONTEMPT
X. The approach followed by this Hon’ble Court in the impugned
judgment, has the effect of making the most innocuous
critiques of the institutional role of the Supreme Court,
including how it is administered an offence of criminal
contempt. The role played by the highest Constitutional Court
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 39 of the country and the impact it has on
the functioning of the democracy is something that is regularly
commented upon by lawyers, authors, newspaper editorials,
intellectuals, national and international media, etc. In fact, in
the last few weeks and months when the court has heard and
decided this matter of contempt, numerous pieces have been
written by a whole host of individuals, commentators,
newspapers editorials etc. that will be criminal contempt by the
novel standard set by this Hon’ble Court in the impugned
judgment. Y. THAT In their famous book published in 2018
titled “How Democracies Die”, Harvard University political
scientists Steven Livitsky and Daniel Ziblatt explore how
constitutional democracies have been and can be turned intode
facto authoritarian regimes.They point out that in today’s
world, this is not done through an overnight forceful coup but
through the slow and continuous weakening of institutions
including courts and that inability of the courts to play their
constitutionally mandated role is a main factor in the death of
democracies worldwide. Thus, the type of comment in the
second tweet for which the Review Petitioner has been found
to be guilty of criminal contempt is part of academic debate
and discussion worldwide. The impugned decision will have a
very serious chilling effect on any discussion relating to this
Hon’ble Court. IX. THE STANDARD OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT IS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Z. THAT it is
settled law that the standard of proof in a case of criminal
contempt is the same as that in criminal law WWW.LIVELAW.IN
40 generally, i.e. beyond reasonable doubt [R.S. Sujatha v.
State of Karnataka, (2011) 5 SCC 689; Brahma Prakash Sharma
v. State of UP, 1953 SCR 1169: AIR 1954 SC 10]. Thus, it has to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt not just that the alleged
statement was made by the alleged contemnor but those
words/statement beyond reasonable doubt amount to criminal
contempt. With this preface, the two tweets can by no stretch
of imagination amount to criminal contempt beyond reasonable
doubt as is explained hereinafter. X. THAT THE REASONIONG
EMPLOYED IN RESPECT OF TWEET NO. 1 SUFFERS FROM
ERRORS APPARENT ON FACE OF THE RECORD AA. THAT the
finding in the Judgment under Review that Tweet No. 1
constitutes criminal contempt is unsustainable in law and
merits being set aside in review. The Contempt of Court Act
defines criminal contempt as one that “(i) scandalises or tends
to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any
court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with,
the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or
tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the
administration of justice in any other manner”. The obvious
sequitur is that there should be a finding based on evidence
that such one of these circumstances has been met. At best,
the Judgment under review records in para 64 as regards
Tweet No. 1 that “It has the tendency to shake the confidence
of the public at large in the institution of judiciary and the
institution of the CJI and undermining the dignity and authority
of the administration of justice.” It also records in para 62,
“The said tweet is capable WWW.LIVELAW.IN 41 of giving an
impression to a layman, that the CJI is enjoying his ride on a
motorbike worth Rs.50 lakh belonging to a BJP leader, at a
time when he has kept the Supreme Court in lockdown mode
denying citizens their fundamental right to access justice.” It is
respectfully submitted that these findings are insufficient basis
for conviction for criminal contempt because make no attempt
to show which head of the definition of criminal contempt they
fall under and this is an error of law apparent on the face of the
record. BB. THAT it is respectfully submitted that “tendency to
shake the confidence” or “capability to give impression to a
layman” are not tests that flow from the language or the logic
of the definition of criminal contempt, as even case law makes
clear. It is axiomatic that the ingredients of an offence are
required to be met before conviction. CC. THAT it is axiomatic
that the contempt must be clear or writ large from the
offending substance, which is admittedly not the case here
where it is not “manifest, mischievous or substantial” to quote
the test laid down in EMS Namboodripad v. T Narayanan,
(1970)2 SCC 325 at para 12. Criticism, however unfair, does
not ipso facto imply contempt, particularly when the allegation
is that criticism is alluded to and not made directly. It is
pertinent to note that even in R. v. Almon, (1765) Wilmot’s
Notes 243 which is widely regarded as the locus classicus of
contempt law, Lord Wilmot sitting in the King’s Bench was
careful to observe in his opinion at p. 257 of his eponymous
Notes on Judgments and Opinions, “…it is not their own cause
but the cause of the public; For I do not think that
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 42 Courts of Justice are to take their
complaints up of themselves; it must be left to His Majesty,
who sustains the person of the public, to determine whether
the Offence merits a public notice and animadversion.” In
India, Courts of record do have the power to initiate suo moto
contempt but the same ought to be exercised in a very
circumspect manner and in obvious cases of gross contempt
because the courts are not ideally equipped for determining
what scandalises or lowers its authority without the
determination from the Attorney or Solicitor General. DD. THAT
the Impugned Judgment under review fails to apply the correct
tests for determining whether or not the speech is actionable
under contempt law. In para 61 of the Judgment under review,
the Hon’ble Court states that it will examine the criticism of the
system and that if the same is fair, made in good faith and in
larger public interest and thus is entitled to protection under
Article 19(1). With respect, this is an incorrect reading of the
law. The Review Petitioner and every citizen of the country has
the right to free speech limited only by reasonable restrictions
imposed as under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. What a
court dealing with criminal contempt has to first see if the
speech falls under any of the heads of criminal contempt as
defined in section 3 of the 1971 Act. Only if this head is
satisfied, does the inquiry shift to whether the speech in
question is hit by a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).
EE. THAT the Judgment under review has failed to consider the
tweet in context or deal with the explanation offered by the
Review Petitioner. The Impugned Judgment operates on the
assumption that the Review Petitioner implied (though
admittedly this was not stated) that the Court was shut during
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 43 the relevant period but the tweet clearly
states that the Hon’ble Court was in “lockdown mode”. The
Review Petitioner clearly states that “lockdown mode” is not
synonymous with a complete shutdown, but merely implies
that the Hon’ble Court was functioning at a fraction of its
capacity during the period, a fact which is undisputable.
Naturally, this further implies that many cases, particularly
those not deemed extremely urgent, were adjourned, which
had an impact on the right to access to justice though nothing
in the tweet places any blame on the Hon’ble Chief Justice or
the Court. In context, it is submitted, the tweet appears to be
more in the nature of a lament than an accusation. At worst, it
unfairly links two unconnected facts in a way that “may” strike
the Hon’ble Court, and many other observers, as unfair. Even
so, it is respectfully submitted that this does not tantamount to
contempt. It has to be considered that twitter is a medium that
does not allow for a large disquisition on anything since it
limits the characters and space available. It is unfair to imbue
the silences with malicious intent to the degree needed to
make the tweet no. 1 actionable under contempt law. FF. THAT
the Impugned Judgment errs insofar as “the words do not
support the innuendo”. It cannot be said that the alleged
contempt is beyond reasonable doubt as required under law. It
is pertinent to consider the opinion of the Privy Council in Debi
Prasad Sharma v. King Emperor, AIR 1943 PC 202 where it was
held per Lord Atkin: When the comment in question in the
present case is examined it is found that there is no criticism of
any judicial act of the Chief Justice, or any imputation on him
for anything done or WWW.LIVELAW.IN 44 omitted to be done
by him in the administration of justice. It can hardly be said
that there is any criticism of him in his administrative capacity,
for, as far as their Lordships have been informed, the
administrative control of the subordinate courts of the
Province, whatever it is, is exercised, not by the Chief Justice,
but by the court over which he presides. The appellants are not
charged with saying anything in contempt of the subordinate
courts or the administration of justice by them. In truth, the
Chief Justice is alleged, untruly, as is now admitted, to have
committed an ill-advised act in writing to his subordinate
judges asking (as the news item says), enjoining (as the
comment says) them to collect for the War Fund. If the facts
were as alleged they admitted of criticism. No doubt it is
galling for any judicial personage to be criticized publicly as
having done something outside his judicial proceedings which
was ill-advised or indiscreet. But judicial personages can afford
not to be too sensitive. A simple denial in public of the alleged
request would at once have allayed the trouble. If a judge is
defamed in such a way as not to affect the administration of
justice he has the ordinary remedies for defamation if he
should feel impelled to use them. Their Lordships cannot accept
the view taken by the court as stated above of the meaning of
the comment: the words do not support the innuendo. In the
opinion of their Lordships the proceedings in contempt were
misconceived, and the appellants were not guilty of the
contempt alleged. This judgment has been re-affirmed by this
Hon’ble Court on many occasions. The findings of the Privy
Council apply a fortiori to tweet no. 1. WWW.LIVELAW.IN 45
GG. THAT the Impugned Judgment does not consider the
observations findings inBaradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of
Orissa, (1974) 1 SCC 374 where it washeld, 59. …The legal
touchstone adopted by the High Court is that any statement
which in some manner may shake the confidence of the
community in a judge or in the judicial system, is straightway
contempt, regardless of context or purpose…or absence of any
clear and present danger of disaffection or its being a bona fide
plea for orderly change in the judicature and its process. On the
facts, we agree that the spirit of defiance, extenuated partly by
a sense of despair, is writ large in the writings of the appellant
but wish to warn ourselves that his reported past violations
should not prejudice a judicial appraisal of his alleged present
criminal contempt. And the benefit of doubt, if any, belongs to
the contemnor in this jurisdiction. XI.REASONIONG EMPLOYED
IN RESPECT OF THE TWEET NO. 2SUFFERS FROM
FUNDAMENTALERRORS APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE
RECORD. HH. THAT as explained in grounds above, the
definition of the different forms of criminal contempt is
contained in Section 2 of the 1971 Act. The impugned judgment
does not in any manner demonstrate how Tweet No. 2 either
scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tender to lower
the authority of any court; or prejudices, or interferes or tends
to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to
obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 46 II. THAT instead, the impugned
judgment concludes summarily that Tweet No. 2 scandalises
the “entire institution of the Supreme Court.” But in arriving at
this conclusion the judgment does not rely on any of the tests
laid down to determine what constitutes scandalising of the
Court under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
It is submitted that the offence of scandalising the court is
vague and undefined. It is for this reason that the Supreme
Court in Baradakanta Mishra (Supra) speaking through Justice
Krishna Iyer, held that “…the Court will proceed to exercise the
jurisdiction with scrupulous care and in cases which are clear
and beyond all reasonable doubt.” But not only is Tweet No 2
far from a clear statement that scandalises the Court, the
impugned judgment does not so much as hold that it is clear
beyond “all reasonable doubt” that it constitutes contempt of
court. The absence of such a finding constitutes an error
apparent on the face of the impugned judgment. JJ. THAT It is
submitted that especially given that the term “scandalises”, as
used in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is
vague and undefined, the tests, as devised by the Supreme
Court, ought to be rigorously applied. Justice Beg, in his
separate opinion, in Re: S. Mulgaokar, (1978) 3 SCC 339, held
that it is only criticism that “is based on obvious distortion or
gross misstatement” and that is made “in a manner which
seems designed to lower respect for the judiciary and destroy
public confidence in it” that constitutes criminal contempt. The
impugned judgment, however, does not so much as attempt to
demonstrate how the statement contained in Tweet No. 2, in
fact, constitutes an “obvious distortion” or “gross
misstatement”—indeed that the opinion WWW.LIVELAW.IN 47
expressed by the petitioner is one that is commonly held, in
and of itself, shows that it is anything but an “obvious
distortion” or “gross misstatement”. KK. THAT Justice Beg
further went on to hold that although the question of “whether
an attack is malicious or ill intentioned, may be often difficult
to determine, yet, the language in which it is made, the
fairness, the factual accuracy, the logical soundness of it, the
care taken in justly and properly analysing the materials before
the maker of it, are important considerations.” What is more, in
arriving at this conclusion, Justice Beg holds that the “totality
of facts and circumstances” must be considered. The impugned
judgment, however, not only fails to consider the above
factors, despite the fact that it is but it also separates and
divides Tweet No. 2 into different parts and eschews the first
part from consideration altogether. It is submitted that to
consider the opinion expressed by the petitioner on the
Supreme Court’s role in the destruction of democracy and on
the role of the last four chief justices in the said destruction
independent of the petitioner’s opinion that democracy has
been substantially destroyed in India during the last six years
amounts to a failure to consider the “totality of facts and
circumstances” as warranted by Justice Beg’s opinion. And this
failure to consider the totality of facts and circumstances is an
error writ large on the face of the judgment. LL. THAT the
impugned judgment is also erroneous on the face of its record,
for, while it cites Justice Krishna Iyer’s separate opinion in Re:
S. Mulgaokar, (1978) 3 SCC 339, with approval, it doesn’t, in
fact, apply the principles expounded WWW.LIVELAW.IN 48
there to Tweet No. 2. It is submitted that Justice Krishna Iyer
in his opinion lays down six principles that are integral to
determining what kinds of speech constitute criminal contempt.
The impugned judgment doesn’t show on a reading of these
principles how Tweet No. 2 qualifies as an offence. (i) That
there must be a “a wise economy of use by the Court of this
branch of its jurisdiction” and that the “Court will act with
seriousness and severity where justice is jeopardized by a
gross and/or unfounded attack on the judges, where the attack
is calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial process.” The
impugned judgment far from adhering to these words of
caution summarily concludes that Tweet No. 2 constitutes
criminal contempt. It doesn’t demonstrate how the statements
contained therein constitute either a gross and/or unfounded
attack on the judges, and, more significantly, doesn’t so much
as attempt to show how the statement might obstruct or
destroy the judicial process. Further, as indicated above, it
does not at all go into the issue of truth, as is required post the
2006 amendment. (ii) That “where freedom of expression,
fairly exercised, subserves public interest in reasonable
measure, public justice cannot gag it or manacle it,
constitutionally speaking.” The impugned judgment holds that
Tweet No. 2 does not constitute “a fair criticism of the
functioning of the judiciary, made bona fide in the public
interest.” But what that public interest might be, or how that
public interest is breached the judgment doesn’t demonstrate.
In WWW.LIVELAW.IN 49 failing to so demonstrate, the
impugned judgment clearly suffers from errors apparent on its
record. (iii) That defamation of an individual judge is
independent and separate from the offence of contempt. The
impugned judgment doesn’t so much as engage with the
question of whether the comment on the last four CJIs, made
in Tweet No. 2, conforms to the third principle expounded by
Justice Krishna Iyer in Re: Mulgaokar. This failure is once again
an error that is apparent on the face of the record. (iv) That the
fourth estate should be given “free play within responsible
limits even when the focus of its critical attention is the court,
including the highest Court.” The impugned judgment in
omitting to consider whether the petitioner was acting as a
critical “intermediary between the State and the people” has
erred on the face of its record. (v) That the Court in exercise of
the jurisdiction of contempt must not be “hypersensitive even
where distortions and criticisms overstep the limits” and must
“deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified bearing,
condescending indifference and repudiation by judicial
rectitude.” As submitted supra, the impugned judgment doesn’t
arrive at any finding on whether at all Tweet No. 2 amounts to
a distortion. In any event, even assuming for the purposes of
argument, without admitting so, that Tweet No. 2 distorted
facts in some way, the impugned judgment is still erroneous on
the face of its record, because it doesn’t so WWW.LIVELAW.IN
50 much as consider whether the expression of opinion calls
for repudiation or not. (vi) That in exercising the jurisdiction of
contempt, the Court must consider the “totality of factors” and
it is only “if the court considers the attack on the judge or
judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond
condonable limits, the strong arm of the law must, in the name
of public interest and public justice, strike, a blow on him who
challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its
source and stream.” It is submitted that the impugned
judgment is erroneous on its face because it does not consider
the totality of facts. That it doesn’t do so is manifest from the
fact that it separates Tweet No. 2 into two parts and eschews
from its consideration the opinion that democracy has been
substantially destroyed in India during the last six years, even
without a formal declaration of emergency. It is submitted that
the other parts of the tweet cannot be treated as contumacious
without reading it in the context of what is said in the first part
of Tweet No. 2. This by itself shows that the totality of factors
was not considered in the impugned judgment. Furthermore,
the impugned judgment concludes on a bare reading of Tweet
No. 2 that it is scurrilous, offensive, and malicious. But it
doesn’t rely on any bright-line rule to show how the statements
made in Tweet No. 2 are, in fact, scurrilous, offensive or
malicious. In paragraph 68 of the impugned judgment, the
Court holds that Tweet No. 2 tends to convey an impression
that “the judges who have presided in the Supreme Court in
the period of last six WWW.LIVELAW.IN 51 years have
particular role in the destruction of Indian democracy and the
last four CJIs had a more particular role in it.” This might well
be the impression that the tweet in question seeks to convey,
but the Court doesn’t, in fact, show, or even attempt to show,
how the holding of this opinion constitutes contempt of court.
This is an error apparent on the face of the judgment. MM.
THAT the impugned judgment errs in holding that Tweet No. 2
was not made in good faith because its publication had the
effect of reaching millions of people. It is submitted that to
hold that the wide nature of a publication contributes to the
offence of contempt is simply not supported by the bare
reading of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. A statement
which does not fall in definition of criminal contempt does not
become one just because it is widely circulated and a
statement which amounts to criminal contempt does not cease
to be criminal contempt because of low circulation.To hold thus
is a clear error on the face of the judgment’s record. NN. THAT
the impugned judgment holds that Tweet No.2 in the “court’s
considered view” undermines the dignity and authority of the
institution of the Supreme Court of India and the CJI and
directly affronts the majesty of law and is therefore
contumacious. It is submitted, however, that none of this is, in
fact, a facet of any test to determine what constitutes criminal
contempt, and in holding Tweet No. 2 as contumacious because
it has undermined the dignity of the court or because it has
affronted the majesty of law, the impugned judgment has
clearly erred. WWW.LIVELAW.IN 52 OO. THAT the impugned
judgment has erred in concluding that the tweets are based on
“distorted facts”, because by its own admission it has pointedly
refused to go into the legitimacy and the veracity of the
statements made in Tweet No. 2. It is submitted that this
inconsistency is writ large on the face of the record. PP. THAT
there is an error apparent on the face of the impugned
judgment, which, while holding that fair criticism of a judge
and the judiciary is protected by Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution, doesn’t consider whether Tweet No. 2 in fact
amounts to fair criticism or not. QQ. THAT the impugned
judgment on the face of its record misreads Tweet No. 2 in
concluding that the comment made therein alludes in any way
to the judiciary’s role during the Emergency era of the 1970s
(See: paragraph 67 of the impugned judgment). It is submitted
that as the first part of Tweet No. 2 makes clear the petitioner
was merely invoking the potential opinion of “future
historians” that democracy has been destroyed in India during
the last six years even without a formal declaration of
emergency. The second and third part of Tweet No. 2 questions
the role of the Supreme Court, in particular that of the last four
chief justices, in this destruction. Therefore, Tweet No. 2
doesn’t on any reading draw a comparison between the
Supreme Court of the last six years and the Supreme Court of
the Emergency era of the 1970s, as recorded by the impugned
judgment. It is submitted that this conclusion is an error
apparent on the face of the record of the impugned judgment.
WWW.LIVELAW.IN 53 RR. The impugned judgment errs on the
face of its record in altogether ignoring the universally
accepted defence of fair comment. XII. THAT THE IDENTITY OF
PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT OR THE EXTENT OF
PUBLICATION IS IRRELEVANT IN DETERMINING IF THE
STATEMENT AMOUNTS TO CRIMINAL CONTEMPT. SS. THAT the
impugned judgment errs in holding that Tweet No. 2 was not
made in good faith because its publication had the effect of
reaching millions of people. It is submitted that to hold that the
wide nature of a publication contributes to the offence of
contempt is simply not supported by the bare reading of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. A statement which does not fall
in definition of criminal contempt does not become one just
because it is widely circulated and a statement which amounts
to criminal contempt does not cease to be criminal contempt
because of low circulation.To hold thus is a clear error on the
face of the judgment’s record. TT. THAT the identity of the
person making the statement cannot have any impact on
determining if the statement itself amounts to criminal
contempt. A statement that clearly does not amount to criminal
contempt cannot become criminal contempt because of the
identity of the author. Similarly, a statement or act that is
clearly criminal contempt cannot cease to be so because of the
identity or position of the maker. InC.S. Karnan, In re, (2017) 7
SCC 1another case of WWW.LIVELAW.IN 54 Suo Motu Criminal
Contempt, a seven judge bench of this Hon’ble Court held that
“But then, in the process of administration of justice, the
individual's identity, is clearly inconsequential. This Court is
tasked to evaluate the merits of controversies placed before it,
based on the facts of the case. It is expected to record its
conclusions, without fear or favour, affection or ill will.” The
position of the person as an advocate, can have relevance, if at
all, at the stage of punishment, for the kinds of punishment
that can be imposed on him/her [Mahipal Singh Rana v. State
of UP, (2016) 8 SCC 335]. Thus, this consideration that has
been used to find him guilty of contempt is an error apparent
on the face of the record. UU. THAT for all the errors apparent
on the face of the record, the impugned judgment is liable to be
set aside. 25. The Petitioner have not filed any other Review
Petition against the Judgment dated 14.08.2020 in Su Moto
Contempt Petition (Criminal) Nos. 1 of 2020, before this
Hon’ble Court or any other Court. PRAYER In light of the
aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Hon’ble Court may: a)
Treat this review petition in light of prayers in W.P. (C) No.
______/2020 bearing Provisional vide diary No. 19696 of 2020
filed on 12.09.2020 by the petitioner herein; b) Review the
Impugned Final Judgment and Order dated 14.08.2012 passed
by this Hon’ble Court in Suo Motu Petition (Criminal) No.1 of
2020 and thereafter rehear the matter; WWW.LIVELAW.IN 55
c) Grant an oral hearing in the open court to the Review
Petitioner as the facts and circumstances of the case
sufficiently necessitate; d) Pass any other order(s) or
direction(s) as may be deemed fit and proper in the interest of
justice. AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONER AS
IS DUTY BOUND SHALL EVER PRAY. Filed By: (KAMINI
JAISWAL) ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER New Delhi Dated:
14.09.2020