HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS: DHAMMA IN EARLY BUDDHISM

Author(s): RUPERT GETHIN

Source: Journal of Indian Philosophy , December 2004, Vol. 32, No. 5/6 (December 2004),
pp. 513-542
Published by: Springer

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23497151

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 RUPERT GETHIN

HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS: DHAMMA IN

EARLY BUDDHISM

PRELIMINARY REMARKS: BUDDHISM AND DHARMA

The basic subject of the present article is the understan

concept of dharma in early Buddhist literature - in th
Agamas and the early abhidhamma/abhidharma texts.
that early Buddhist texts were composed in some form
Indie and as my main sources will be Pali texts I shall
the Pali Middle Indie form dhammaThere are three ba
that I think need to be considered in order to present a
of the distinctively Buddhist understanding of dhamm
to establish the range of meanings found in early Buddhist
(2) we need to consider the relationship between tho
meanings and how they evolved; (3) we need also to
relationship of the distinctively Buddhist usage of dh
usage and understanding of dharma more generally in
ture and thought, and especially in early Brahmanical w
problems are, of course, not entirely separable. Clearly
out the different early Buddhist uses and their relationshi
how we understand the Buddhist usage in relation to t
dhist usage. But equally how we map out the different earl
uses and their relationship in the first place, depends in
we understand the Buddhist usage in relation to the n
usage. Moreover, the complexities and subtleties of the broader
Brahmanical and 'Hindu' usage mean that there is hardly a scholarly
consensus on how best to pick up and follow the trail of the elusive
spirit of dharma beyond the field of Buddhist literature. In the
present context, then, what I should like to do is devote some space
first of all to a consideration of the range of meanings dhamma has in
early Buddhist texts, and then move on to a consideration of the
evolution and development of the distinctively Buddhist usage and
how that might relate to Vedic and early Brahmanical usage.

Journal of Indian Philosophy 32: 513-542, 2004.

© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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514 RUPERT GETHIN

MODERN SCHOLARLY ACCOUNTS OF DHAMMA

As one of the basic terms of Buddhist thought dhamm

been the subject of a number of studies and articles o
century or so. Mostly scholars have focused on the fi
identified above - the range of meanings found in ear
literature - although they have offered some observat
theories about the development and evolution of its
dhist thought. Less, perhaps, has been said about th
between the distinctively Buddhist usage and the u
thought in general. Three books devoted to the subjec
dhamma/dharma deserve special mention as being repr
only of the information about dhamma/dharma th
scholarship has presented on the basis of the study Bud
sources, but also of somewhat different approaches and
considering the significance of that information. The f
neering study of Magdelene and Wilhelm Geiger,
vornehmlich in der kanonischen Literatur, published in 19
comprehensive philological study divided into four m
each of which considers a distinctive set of meanings
dhamma. The basic method is one of cataloguing and g
different uses and meanings and providing illustrativ
from the Pali canonical literature. The four sets of me
around 'law' (Gesetz), 'teaching' (Lehre), 'truth' (W
'thing' (Ding, Sache). This last meaning of dhamma refe
of the term dhamma in early Buddhist texts to chara
mental and physical sates and phenomena as dhammas
regard this usage of dhamma as far removed from its o
and identify the issue of how dhamma comes to be used in
the principal question to be addressed in accounting f
opment of the usage of the term in Buddhist texts.3
Three years later Stcherbatsky published his The Ce
tion of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word 'dharma\4
the Geigers' achievement in having 'drawn up a co
nearly every case where the word dhamma occurs in P
literature', and having 'established a great variety of
comments that among the various meanings, 'there is
one that really matters, that is the specifically Buddhi
term dharma.'5 This specifically Buddhist technica
dharma Stcherbatsky expresses as 'element of existence
as a basis for its exposition not the literature of the Pa

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 515

fourth or fifth century CE work of Buddhist systematic

namely Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa-bhâsya. Rather than
to consider the various meanings of dharma/dhamma and t
tionship, Stcherbatsky focuses on just one meaning, and at
provide a precise philosophical account of the Buddhist conc
a dharma as an 'element of existence'.
Just over half a century later John Ross Carter published another
book-length study: Dhamma: Western Academic and Sinhalese Bud
dhist Interpretations,6 If the Geigers' focus was basically linguistic
and philological, and Stcherbatsky's philosophical, then Carter's is
more broadly religious. He begins with a survey of the account of
dharmaj dhamma given in modern scholarly studies, beginning with
the work of Burnouf (1844), and taking into account writings by
Spence Hardy, Childers, T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Oldenberg,
Beckh, the Geigers, Keith, Stcherbatsky, Glasenapp, Thomas,
Horner, Lamotte, and Conze, among others. He then turns his
attention to the understanding of dhamma in specifically the The
ravâda Buddhist tradition, focusing not only on the Pali canonical
texts, but also on the way dhamma has been understood in the Pali
commentaries and exegetical works, as well as in later vernacular
Sinhala literature. Carter states explicitly that the 'dharma-theory'
and the role of dhammas in Buddhist systematic thought is not his
main focus;7 his book instead seeks to explore and bring out the
potency of dhamma as a religious concept: it is the teaching of a
buddha - a fully awakened being; it is a path of religious practice, an
object of devotion worthy of reverence whose qualities are to be
recollected and pondered by the practitioner in order to inspire faith
and engender calm; it is a transcendent reality and 'salvific Truth'.
What I have said so far has already introduced some of the prin
cipal meanings of dhamma/dharma that modern scholarship has
identified in the early Buddhist usage. In fact, while different schol
arly authors might identify fewer or more meanings, give more or less
emphasis to a particular aspect of the early Buddhist understanding
of dhamma, or present the relationship between the different mean
ings in different ways, there is a basic consensus in the range of
meanings identified. While no particular writer presents the usage of
the term dhamma in precisely the following terms, I think this con
sensus can be summed up by way of six basic meanings:8 (1) the
'teaching' of the Buddha; (2) 'good conduct' or 'good behaviour', in
general, but also more specifically the putting into practice of the
good conduct prescribed by the Buddha's teaching and constituting

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516 RUPERT GETHIN

the Buddhist path, namely keeping ethical precepts (slla),

calm and concentration (samatha, samâdhi, jhâna), and in
knowledge (vipassanñ, pama, vijja) through the practice o
tion; (3) the 'truth' realized by the practice of the Buddhi
any particular 'nature' or 'quality' that something posses
underlying and objective 'natural law or order' of things
Buddha has discerned; (6) a basic mental or physical 'state'
a plurality of which, at least in the texts of the Abh
becomes explicitly to be conceived as in some sense consti
'reality' of the world or experience. While the order of p
here is intended to be suggestive of a possible affinity betwe
meanings, it is not intended to indicate a judgement abo
meanings have priority, either in terms of normative usage o
of historical development. Having, with the help of t
earlier scholars, identified and set out this range of basic
what I should like to do now is to consider them more c
specific reference to the Pali Nikâyas in order to illu
establish, at least provisionally, the extent to which the
reflect the usage of the early texts.

Teaching

To say that dhamma in certain Nikàya contexts means the 'teaching' of

the Buddha is to say that it can refer to both the content of his teaching
- what he taught, the collection of instructions and doctrines taught by
the Buddha - and to the 'texts' that contain and set out those teach
ings. In the Nikàya period the latter are, of course, oral compositions
rather than written texts and are often conceived as comprising nine
'parts' (añga); but later they are referred to as consisting of the three
'baskets' (pitaka) or collections of Vinaya, Sutta, and Abhidhamma. A
clear example of this kind of usage would be the sentence: 'a monk
learns the teaching - the discourses, chants, analyses, verses, utter
ances, sayings, birth stories, marvels, and dialogues'.9

Good Conduct or Behaviour

A typical usage of the term dhamma in the broad sense of good, right
or proper behaviour and conduct is in the context of the rule of kings:
kings are described as ruling 'righteously' or 'justly' (dhammena ra
jjam kâreti)10 or as practicing 'justice' or 'righteousness' (dhammam
carati).xx More generally a person may acquire a possession 'prop

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 517

erly' or 'lawfully' (dhammena), or he may acquire it 'improp

'unlawfully' (adhammena).12 And while dhamma is character
used to refer to good, right and proper behaviour, we shou
that it can be used more neutrally of conduct and behaviou
people indulge in the 'practice' of sexual intercourse (me
dhammam patisevati).13
It is in the context of this use of dhamma in the sense of
conduct and behaviour that we need to understand the extension of
the use of the term dhamma to refer to the 'practices' taught by the
Buddha for the benefit of gods and men:

So, monks, those practices that I have taught to you for the purpose of higher
knowledge - having properly grasped them, you should practise them, develop them,
make them mature so that the spiritual life might continue and endure long; this will
be for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, for the sake of com
passion for the world, for the benefit, good and happiness of gods and men. And
what are those practices ...? Just these - the four ways of establishing mindfulness,
the four right endeavours, the four bases of success, the five faculties, the five powers,
the seven factors of awakening, the noble eightfold path.14

The significant point about the use of dhamma in such as a passage as

this, is that it is clear that at least the four ways of establishing
mindfulness, the four right endeavours, the four bases of success and
the noble eightfold path refer to things one does or practices; they are
not 'teachings' or 'texts'. Whether the five faculties, powers and factors
of awakening can be so straightforwardly characterized as 'practices'
perhaps needs further consideration. I shall return to this presently.

Truth

In certain contexts meanings such as 'teaching' or 'practice' seem not

to fit; a meaning closer to 'truth' - the truth about the world or reality
as directly realized and taught by the Buddha - seems to be required.
Thus in a number of places in the Nikâyas it is described how the
Buddha by means of step by step instruction (anupubbl katha) leads
his listeners to a vision of the truth: he talks of giving, virtuous
conduct, and heaven; he reveals the danger, vanity and impurity of
sense desires, and the benefit of desirelessness; and when he sees that
the hearts of his listeners are ready, open and without hindrance, are
inspired and confident, then he reveals the teaching of the truth that is
special to buddhas - suffering, its arising, its cessation, the path; and
at the conclusion of such step by step instruction there arises in his
listeners 'the clear and spotless vision of the truth (dhamma-cakkhuy;

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518 RUPERT GETHIN

the listeners are now 'ones who have seen the truth, gained the
known the truth, penetrated the truth, gone beyond doubt,
their questioning, and acquired full confidence in what is ta
the Teacher without having to rely on others'.15
Taking dhamma as close to 'truth', as opposed to teac
practice, would also seem to be appropriate in such statemen
well known 'he who sees dhamma sees me, he who sees me sees
dhamma', or 'he who sees dependent arising sees dhamma, he who
sees dhamma sees dependent arising'.16 That dhamma in these state
ments means something like 'truth' is reinforced by the way in which
in context they are illustrated by accounts of precisely the early
Buddhist understanding of the truth about the way things are:
physical form, feeling, recognition, volitions, consciousness are
impermanent, suffering, and not to be taken as self; the five aggre
gates of attachment arise dependent on factors and conditions.
Some scholars have suggested that dhamma in the sense of 'truth'
becomes hypostasized as the highest metaphysical principle, equiva
lent to the âtman-brahman of the Upanisads, almost personified.17
Such an interpretation is, of course, controversial and certainly
problematic from the point of view the interpretations of traditional
Theravâda Buddhism.

Nature

In the passages referred to in the previous paragraph, the particular

vision of truth that the listeners are said to have at the end of the
Buddha's instruction is described in each case in the following terms:
'the dhamma of everything whose dhamma it is to arise, is to cease'
(yam kiñci samudaya-dhammam sabbam tam nirodha-dhamman ti).
The term dhamma used at the end of a bahuvrlhi compound in this
manner has to mean something like 'nature' or 'characteristic
quality': 'the nature of everything whose nature it is to arise, is to
cease'. Similarly, in the 'Discourse on Establishing Mindfulness'
(Satipatthâna Sutta) a monk is instructed to practice watching the
nature of things to arise and fall away in the case of the body,
feelings, and consciousness.18 The use of dhamma!dharma at the end
of a compound in the sense of a particular nature or quality pos
sessed by something is a common usage in both Pali and Sanskrit
and is not a specifically Buddhist usage. We shall return to this
usage later.

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 519

Natural Law

Given that the truth one sees when one sees dhamma is that 'the
nature of everything whose nature it is to arise, is to cease', it might
seem that the truth that is dhamma is understood as some kind of
'law of the universe'. A number of modern scholars and interpreters
have thus suggested that dhamma signifies the natural law or order
which the world or reality conforms to. Thus T.W. Rhys Davids
and William Stede in their dictionary article speak of the dhamma
preached by the Buddha as 'the order of the law of the universe,
immanent, eternal, uncreated, not as interpreted by him only, much
less invented or decreed by him, but intelligible to a mind of his
range, and by him made so to mankind as bodhi: revelation,
awakening'.19 Seeing dhamma as some form of eternal natural order
or law would appear to be a more interpretative suggestion for the
meaning of dhamma than those that we have so far considered, in
that it is harder to cite passages where the translation 'Natural Law'
or 'Universal Law' is clearly required by context and to be given
preference over other translations. The kinds of passage referred to
in order to illustrate this kind of understanding of dhamma are
those which speak of the way things arise in dependence upon other
things, or of how the mental and physical factors that make up the
world (samkhara) are all impermanent, suffering and not self, and
then refer to this fact as the dhamma-tthitata, the dhamma-niyâmatâ
that endures whether or not Buddhas arise in the world. Certainly
these last two expressions might be translated 'the constancy of
nature', 'the law of nature'. And one could also suggest that the
statement quoted above - 'he who sees dependent arising sees
dhamma' - might be rendered as 'he who sees dependent arising sees
the law'. Yet it does not follow from such translations that we
should necessarily hypostasize dhamma and conceive of it as som
form of 'immanent, eternal, uncreated' law of the universe.20
sibly these two expressions should be interpreted as the constan
and law of dhammas, plural, rather than dhamma, singular,21 a
this brings us to the sixth sense of dhamma.

Mental or Physical State or Thing

We come now to the use of the term dhamma in a manner that is at

once the most distinctively Buddhist and the hardest to offer a suit
able translation for. Before considering the question of the appro

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520 RUPERT GETHIN

priateness or not of particular translations, let us consid

examples of this usage.

Completely secluded from sense desires and unwholesome dhammas, a mo

and remains in the joy and happiness of the first meditation.22

A monk ... endeavours so that bad, unwholesome dhammas that have not
not arise;... he endeavours so that bad, unwholesome dhammas that have
abandoned; ... he endeavours so that wholesome dhammas that have not a
arise; ... he endeavours so that wholesome dhammas that have arisen, are
not lost, increase, grow, develop, are complete.23

A monk ... dwells watching dhammas as dhammas .. .24

Quite clearly to understand and translate dhammas as te

truths, laws - whether of nature or otherwise - simply will n
the above contexts; 'practices' just might work in the first
but to think of 'practices' as things that have 'arisen' or 'not
as such a translation would demand in the second passage, m
it out. And when we read the full exposition of what w
dhammas as dhammas involves, such a conclusion is only rein
A monk dwells watching dhammas as dhammas in terms of
five hindrances - sensual desire, aversion, sleepiness and tir
excitement and depression, doubt - knowing whether each is
in him or not, how each arises and is abandoned such that it
arise again; (2) the five aggregates of attachment - physical
feeling, recognition, volitional formations, consciousness - h
arises and disappears; (3) the six senses and their respective o
fields, knowing the fetters that arise dependent on the two, ho
fetters arise and are abandoned such that they will not arise
the seven constituents of awakening - mindfulness, dhamma
gation, vigour, joy, tranquillity, concentration, equanimity -
whether each is present in him or not, how each arises and is
to full development; (5) the four noble truths, knowing what su
is, what the arising of suffering is, what the cessation of suffe
what the way leading to the cessation of suffering is.
Clearly if watching dhammas involves watching the hindrance
aggregates, the senses and their objects, and the constitu
awakening, then dhammas are not teachings, practices, truths, o
And while it might be possible in some contexts to take the Nik
presenting the 'four noble truths' as four doctrinal proposi
'suffering is the five aggregates of attachment' - the kind of usa
challenges such a notion. Suffering, its arising, its cessation,

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 521

leading to its cessation are here not 'truths' in the sense of doctrinal
propositions, but realities that have to be understood.
So what are dhammas? In many ways it is the usage of dhcimma at
the end of a bahuvrlhi compound in the sense of a particular nature or
quality possessed by something that seems the best fit in the present
context, only here the particular natures or qualities are not possessed
by anything, they are natural qualities in their own right, which the
meditating monk watches arising and disappearing, some of which he
strives to stop arising, and some of which he strives to keep arising.
We can define dhammas in this final sense as basic qualities, both
mental and physical. When we consider this particular understanding
of what a dhamma is alongside the defining of the world or experience
in its entirety (sabbam) in terms of the five aggregates or the twelve
spheres of sense, then we can go one step further and say that
dhammas are the basic qualities, both mental and physical, that in
some sense constitute experience or reality in its entirety.25 What I
think is undeniable is that, whether or not one accepts this as
something the Buddha himself taught, this sense and basic under
standing of a dhamma is firmly established and imbedded in the
Nikâyas. Indeed, I think it not unreasonable to suggest that it is the
prevalent usage of the word dhamma in the Nikâyas. It is, of course, a
usage that approximates to the one found in the Abhidhamma/Ab
hidharma, and the question of the relationship of this Nikâya usage
to the more technically precise Abhidhamma/Abhidharma usage is
something that I shall return to below. But before doing that I wish
first to consider how the Pali commentaries approach the issue of the
different senses of the word dhamma in the Nikâyas.

DHAMMA AND DHAMMAS IN THE PALI COMMENTARIES

Obviously the commentaries offer a rather more develope

standing of dhamma than that found in the Nikâyas and
hidhamma. Nevertheless, their understanding represents a
of interpretation that is still relatively close to the earlier
provides us with important points of references for plot
development of the usage of the term in early Buddhist th
number of scholars have paid some attention to the tr
expositions of dhamma presented in the Pali commenta
Geigers and PED, for example, both begin their accounts
lists of meanings for dhamma found in the commentaries to t

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522 RUPERT GETHIN

Nikâya, Dhammapada and Dhammasañganl.26 But it is Joh

Carter's work that provides the fullest account of the unders
of dhamma found in the Pali commentaries.27 Drawing on esp
Carter's work, I wish to highlight what seem to me the most
cant aspects of the way the early Buddhist exegetical traditi
proaches the notion of dhamma.
Some six passages from the Pali commentaries explicitly explain
in the canonical texts the word dhamma can have various m
which they then go on to list (see Table I).28 The number of m
listed ranges from 4 to 11, although each list is explicitly open en
aggregate 18 different possible meanings are suggested. Havin
the possible meanings, the commentaries proceed by citing illustr
passages from the canonical texts - mostly the Nikâyas a
hidhamma. These 18 meanings can, I think, be grouped and
stood by way of five principal meanings that broadly correspond
six meanings identified above: (1) teaching or text, (2) good qualit
conduct more generally, (3) truth, (4) the natural condition o
thing, (5) a mental or physical quality in a technical Abhidhamma
(see Table II). Let me comment briefly on these in turn.
The first meaning is straightforward: dhamma can me
teaching of the Buddha and the texts that contain those teac
defined as 'the word of the Buddha contained in the Three Baskets'
(tepitakam buddha-vacanam).29 I have grouped the next set of mean
ings together in that they all take dhamma in the sense either of the
general good qualities and conduct (guna, puñña) promoted by Bud
dhist practice or are specific examples of those qualities and conduct
(samadhi, pañña). I have also grouped with these an example of dha
mma in a more general sense of practice: in the Vinaya dhamma is used
to refer to the various categories of 'offence' (apatti), as in 'four of
fences involving defeat' (cattaro pârâjika dhamma).30 What I have
listed as the third meaning of dhamma identified by the commentaries
is again straightforward: in certain contexts dhamma should be taken
as meaning the truth or, more specifically, the four truths, more or less
in the same way that I have already outlined above. The fourth
meaning of 'natural condition' is once again unproblematic in that it
corresponds straightforwardly to a meaning that we have already
noted: dhamma as the last member of a compound means the natural
condition (pakati) possessed by something, thus to describe someone
as jâti-dhamma or jara-dhamma means that birth and old age are his
'natural condition' (pakati)?1 An alternative term used by the com
mentaries here is vikára in the sense of disposition.32

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 523

Under the fifth heading I have grouped eight distinct meanings

that all relate in various ways to the technical Abhidhamma under
standing of a dhamma as a basic 'mental or physical quality'. These
eight meanings fall into four subsets (see Table II).
As I have suggested above, the word dhamma is quite clearly al
ready used in the Nikâyas in the sense of a basic quality, both mental
and physical, a plurality of which in some sense constitutes experience
or reality in its entirety. A dhamma in the sense of one of these basic
qualities may be defined in the commentaries as a 'a particular
nature' (sabhava). The canonical passage referred to for the meaning
of dhamma in the sense of sabhava is the Abhidhamma matrix of
triplets (tika-mâtikâ) that is set out at the beginning of the Dham
masañganl and is used as a basis of exposition in that text, the
Vibhañga, Dhâtukathâ, and Patthâna; it begins 'wholesome qualities,
unwholesome qualities, undetermined qualities' (kusalâ dhamma
akusalñ dhamma avyâkatâ dhamma)?2, I shall return to the
Abhidhamma understanding of sabhava below.
We next have three terms - having no essence (nissattata), being
lifeless (nijjlvatâ), being empty (suññata) - that are perhaps best
understood as relating the understanding of dhammas as basic quali
ties to the notion of 'not-self (anattan). As illustrative of dhamma in
these senses, the commentaries consistently cite two passages.34 The
first is a section from the Dhammasañganl explicitly called 'the section
on emptiness' in the text (.suññata-vñra), which occurs after the var
ious mental dhammas or qualities that arise together constituting an
instance of consciousness have been set out and defined in detail. The
section states simply that 'at that time there are dhammas, there are
aggregates, there are sense-spheres .. .'35 What the commentaries
seem to be suggesting is that in stating this the Dhammasañganl
emphasises that these dhammas constituting an instance of con
sciousness are nothing but evanescent and insubstantial non-entities
that have no real essence or life of their own. The second passage
cited by the commentaries in this context is one I have already re
ferred to above, the passage describing the fourth way of establishing
mindfulness by watching dhammas as dhammas. In other words, when
the meditator watches dhammas as dhammas in the manner described
in the Satipatthana Sutta, what the commentaries are suggesting is
that what he is watching is the arising and disappearance of nothing
but evanescent and insubstantial non-entities that have no real es
sence or life of their own. This ties in with the way Buddhaghosa later
alludes to a number of images and similes from the Nikâyas in order

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 524 RUPERT GETHIN

TABLE I

(Ps I 17)

Commentary to DighaNkyMajhimDampdaPtismbhda g BudhavmsDham srigam (SvI9)Nikay (Dhp-aI2)(Patis- I18)(Bv-a13)(As38)

Meanings

1 Guna
Godquality193
2 Desanâ
Teaching2
3 Pariyat i
Text315 4 Nis at a(ta)-(nijlva(ta)
Withouesnc/life4 6
5 (Catu-)sac a(-dham a)
(Four)tuhs210 Concetraion32
6 Samadhi 7 Pañña
Wisdom423 8 Pakati
Naturlcondit 54 Particularnture615
9 Sabhâva

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 525

6 2

10 11

7 9
10

Emptiness Merit Offence Object of knowledge Concept Disposition Causal condition Arisenfromac usalconditon Cause

10 Suññatñ 11 Puñña 12 Àpatti 13 Ñeyya 14 Paññat i 15 Vikâra 16 Pac aya 17 Pac ayup an a 18 Hetu

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526 RUPERT GETHIN

TABLE II

Truths
(Good) conduct
Teaching/text Nature Mental/physical
quality

Desanâ Guna {Catu-)sacca Pakati Sabhâva

Teaching Good quality (Four) truths Natural Particular nature

Pariyatti Pañña condition

Text Merit Vikâra
Samadhi Disposition
Concentration Nissatta-nijjlvata
Pañña Without life
Wisdom Suññatá

Àpatti Emptiness
Offence

Paccaya
Causal

condition

Paccayuppanna
Arisen from a
causal condition
He tu

Cause

Neyya
Object of
knowledge
Paññatti

Concept

to illustrate the manner in which dhammas that are not lasting or

solid but rather things that vanish almost as soon as they appear -
like dew drops at sunrise, like a bubble on water, like a line drawn on
water, like a mustard-seed placed on the point of an awl, like a flash
of lightning; things that lack substance and always elude one's grasp -
like a mirage, a conjuring trick, a dream, the circle formed by a
whirling fire brand, a fairy city, foam, or the trunk of a banana tree.36
The third subset comprises three terms each of which brings out
the manner in which a dhamma is understood as a causal condition
itself (hetu, paccaya)and as something that has arisen as a result of
causal conditions (paccayuppanna). Seeing dhammas in this way,
while not perhaps explicit in the Nikâyas, is none the less certainly

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 527

implicit. Thus again the description of how the meditator is

dhammas as dhammas focuses in particular on the condition
lead to the arising and abandoning of particular dhammas.
commentaries put it in the context of dependent arising:
arises from a single cause, and all causes have multiple effec
Finally we have two terms that focus on dhammas as ob
consciousness: dhammas are 'things that can be known' (ñey
they are concepts (paññatti). This last meaning of dhamma
the way dhammas are presented in the list of the six senses - e
nose, tongue, body, mind - and their corresponding objectiv
visible forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible sensations, dh
As Geiger and Carter noted, in trying to evaluate the lists of
offered as possible meanings of dhamma by such commen
sages, we should not forget that they end with an 'etc.' (adi) and
explicitly open ended. In fact, it is clear that such lists of mean
not exhaust the commentarial and exegetical understandin
mma. There are two particular aspects of the commentari
standing of dhamma that Carter has drawn attention to an
should like to pick up on.38 The first concerns the underst
dhamma in terms of 'nine transcendent dhammas' (nava lo
dhammâ, navavidha-lokuttara-dhamma). the second is the un
ing in terms of a threefold division by way of texts (pariyatti
(patipatti'), and realization (pativedha) or attainment (adhiga
At the beginning of his discussion of the meditation
(kamma-tthana) of recollecting dhamma (dhammânussati), Budd
haghosa makes a distinction between dhamma as the texts {pariyatti)
containing the teaching of the Buddha on the one hand and tran
scendent dhamma on the other.39 The latter is ninefold and comprises
the four paths of stream entry, once-return, non-return, and ara
hatship, the four corresponding fruits, and nibbâna itself. Carter
notes, citing some 40 examples, that the Pali commentaries frequently
suggest that dhamma in the Nikàyas is to be understood as referring
to the nine transcendent dhammas.40 In the technical understanding
of the commentaries, this refers to the four kinds of consciousness
(citta) that arise as the attainment of the four 'paths' (magga), the
four kinds of consciousness that arise as the attainment of the 'fruits'
(phala) of those 'paths', and lastly nibbâna as the 'unconditioned
element' (asamkhata-dhâtu), 'object' (ârammâna) of those classes of
consciousness.41 In other words transcendent dhamma consists of the
mind that knows and sees nibbâna at the moment of awakening
(tbodhi), and also of what is known and seen at that moment. Such a

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528 RUPERT GETHIN

usage, in fact corresponds more or less to the usage of a wo

'knowledge' in English, which can denote both the act of kno
well as what is known.
In several places in early Buddhist texts a list of five mental 'waste
lands' (ceto-khila) is itemized and explained. The second of these
consists in having doubts about dhamma.42 The commentaries take it
that this means having doubts either about Buddhist texts (pariyatti)
- that the word of the Buddha consists of 84,000 sections - or about
realization (pativedha) - that the path is achieved by insight, the fruit
by the path and that nibbâna represents the stilling of all volitional
formations.43 The understanding of dhamma as 'realization' relates
closely to its understanding as knowledge of nibbâna. Elsewhere, in
explanation of the expression 'the true/good dhamma' (sad-dhamma),
this twofold understanding of dhamma is expanded to a threefold
one: texts (pariyatti), practice (patipatti), attainment (adhigama), with
'practice' taken as referring to Buddhist practice in its entirety -
ascetic practices, precepts, concentration, insight - and attainment to
the nine transcendent dhammas44
While the technical specificity of the commentarial explanations of
dhamma is often out of place in a Nikàya context, nevertheless the
general meanings suggested by the commentaries are more or less
consonant with the range of meanings offered by modern scholars.
One meaning, however, that is brought out by modern scholars, but
is not highlighted by the commentators is that of 'natural law'.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, some such meaning is certainly implicit
in certain contexts.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUDDHIST UNDERSTANDING OF DHAMMA

I noted above that the Geigers regard the usage of dham

sense of 'thing' (or 'basic quality') as somewhat remove
original usage, and they identify the issue of how dhamm
be used in this way as the principal question to be ad
accounting for the development of the usage of the term
texts. They go on to offer some brief comments on the d
of this usage. They point out that the meaning of 'thing'
particularly with the plural usage, and that in this p
dhammas refers to the things that constitute the world o
as perceived by the mind. It is in these things or 'norm
dhamma - the law of the world and nature consisting in

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 529

and disappearance, the fleetingness and emptiness of reali

comes manifest.45 Thus the Geigers wish to see dhamma in
of the 'law' of the world - or, perhaps, ultimate 'truth' about r
as basic. And the 'things' that constitute reality, eventually
be designated 'laws' or 'truths' because seeing them, one sees
the Truth. While I think this account certainly resonates
early Buddhist understanding of dhamma, I do not thin
quately explains the semantic development of the word an
suggest an alternative model presently.
More recently Richard Gombrich has offered a somewhat dif
account.46 Gombrich offers his account of the history of the w
word dhamma is used as a way of tracing the developm
Buddhist ontology. His starting point is that 'the Dharma'
Buddha is both the Buddha's account describing his 'exper
a message prescribing what to do about it. The basic B
understanding of dhamma and the basic brahmanical under
of dharma are thus alike, in so far as they at once describe the
of reality and prescribe how to act. They thus both 'oblite
fact-value distinction. Turning to the usage of dhamma in t
to denote 'noeta', 'phenomena' or 'things' as the object
sciousness, Gombrich finds the key to this development in me
the passage from the Satipatthâna Sutta describing the pr
watching dhammas as dhammas:

First he learns to observe physical processes in his own and other peop
then he learns to be similarly aware of feelings; then of states of mind
learns to be aware of dhamma (plural). This has been rendered as 'his tho
the dhamma that the text spells out are in fact the teachings of the Budd
the four noble truths. The meditator moves from thinking about those te
thinking with them: he learns (to use an anachronistic metaphor) to see
through Buddhist spectacles. The Buddha's teachings come to be the sam
objects of thought, because anything else is (for Buddhists) unthinkabl
dhamma are the elements of reality as understood by the Buddha.

Gombrich concludes by suggesting that it is from this specific

of meditation that the usage of dhammas in the plural ha
generalized. If I have understood him correctly Gombrich's
then, that watching (anupassati) dhammas as dhammas o
signified contemplating (as anupassati is often rendered) or
about the teachings of the Buddha. And because thinking ab
teachings involves seeing the world in the Buddha's way, what
when you think through (in both senses) those teaching
teachings, which have come to represent experience in its enti

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530 RUPERT GETHIN

the meditator. While, once again, I think the way this acco
together different senses of the word dhamma has genuine reso
with the early Buddhist understanding of dhamma, I do not
works as an account of the history of the way the word dha
used - for two reasons. First, because I think taking dhamm
sense of the teaching of the Buddha as the starting point f
history of its usage is problematic. Secondly, because, as
above, apart from the four truths the dhammas that the text sp
as objects of contemplation are not in fact the teaching
Buddha as such; certainly the Buddha of the Nikâyas teache
the hindrances, the aggregates, the senses and their objects,
these things are not actual teachings; moreover if we w
understand dhammas here in the sense of teachings about t
drances, etc., we would be left with the problem of explaining w
watching of body as body, feelings as feelings, and conscio
consciousness is not also included here under the heading of
dhammas as dhammas. In fact I think there is a much simple
approaching the development of the Buddhist usage of dhamm
sense of 'noeta', 'phenomena' or 'things'.
In order to begin to consider the question of the relationship
various meanings of dhamma in early Buddhist literature,
question of the development of the specifically Buddhist not
dhamma as a basic mental or physical quality (the Buddhist t
dhammas), we need first of all to consider what notion and
standing of dharma Buddhist thought inherited and thus started
This, however, must remain a problematic and even contro
issue, both because of the problems in dating particula
standings of dharma in relation to Buddhist developments,
cause of the problems in agreeing the contours of the 'H
understanding of dharma.47 Nevertheless, I think it is possible t
out some general lines of development.
The beginnings of the Indian concept of dharma go back
usage of the noun dharman and various verb forms derived f
root dhr in the Rg Veda. A well known example occurs at the
the 'Hymn of the Man' (Purusasükta):

With the sacrifice the gods sacrificed to the sacrifice. These were the first ritu

In his discussion of the Vedic usage of dharman Halbfass em

that the plural usage is the norm, commenting that 'only lat
essentially singular use as a "complex" or "totality of binding

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 531

gain in prominence'.49 The precise meaning of dharman in the Rg

Veda is perhaps unclear. In the verse just quoted, O'Flaherty uses
'ritual laws', explaining in a note that these are 'archetypal patterns of
behaviour established during this first sacrifice to serve as the model
for all future sacrifices'.50 In his study of dharman in the Rg Veda in
the present volume, Joel Brereton emphasises the sense of 'founda
tion' - a sense which straightforwardly reflects its etymology and
form - as the meaning common to the various contexts in which it is
used. He translates:

With the sacrifice the gods sacrificed the sacrifice: these were its foundations.

He goes on to comment that these first 'foundations' can thus be

understood as 'the model sacrifice instituted by the gods and repli
cated in human performance'; or, as he puts it later, 'they are the
ritual precedents which the present rituals follow'. Halbfass likewise
stresses the importance of the sense of the underlying root dhr:
dharmas are thus things that 'support', 'uphold', 'maintain'; and
referring to the work of Schayer, he characterises dharma in the
Bràhmanas as 'the continuous maintaining of the social and cosmic
order and norm which is achieved by the Aryan through the per
formance of his Vedic rites and traditional duties'. A.K. Warder too
considers the primary sense of dharman/dhr in the Rg Veda as closely
connected with the idea of maintaining.51 Whatever the precise
connotations of dharman in its earliest usage it seems clear that
among its earliest uses is the use in the plural to refer to certain
practices - primarily sacrificial rites - as maintaining and supporting
things - the cosmic and social order. The underlying assumption is, of
course, that maintaining and supporting the cosmic and social order
is a good thing; dharmans are therefore prescribed practices.
Another dharman or 'foundation' that the Rg Veda identifies is,
suggests Brereton, the foundational authority especially of Varuna
and Mitra; this authority consists in the commandments of Varuna
and the alliances governed by Mitra. This sense of authority is one
that Patrick Olivelle's contribution to the present volume shows being
taken up in the Bràhmanas, where dharma is understood as the social
order founded on the authority of especially the king. And if these are
the sources for the Brahmanical and general 'Hindu' understanding
of dharma, so too are they for the Buddhist. I take it then that the
plural usage of dhamma is something that early Buddhism inherited
from earlier pre-Buddhist usage, and that for early Buddhist thought

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532 RUPERT GETHIN

dhammas are in the first place the practices, the kinds of be

prescribed and recommended on the authority of the Budd
dhamma subsequently comes to refer to the Buddha's teachin
the plural, teachings is then a straightforward development,
the English word 'prescription' can denote both the act of pr
and what is prescribed. Indeed, 'prescription' can also denot
of paper handed to one by a doctor, so we have an anal
development for the way in which dhamma comes to mean t
that contain the teachings of the Buddha.
In fact all this ties in precisely with the general tendency
Buddhist thought to appropriate brahmanical terminol
reinterpret it in its own terms: the true brâhmana, the true ary
someone who is born as such and performs the duties and ri
dharmas - laid down in the Vedas, the real ariya-puggala or
person' is the one who takes up the practices - the dhamma
ommended by the Buddha and roots out greed, hatred and
Though, as Patrick Olivelle points out, again in his contribu
this volume, the relationship between the Buddhist and brah
understanding may be more complex: while the Buddhists ta
the basics of the Vedic and brahmanical understanding of d
the manner in which the notion of dhamma functions as a p
concept of religious, philosophical and ethical discourse is p
characteristically Buddhist; and dharma is developed as the
concept of Hindu thought only subsequently as a reaction
dhist and especially Asokan usage.
Be that as it may, the use of dharman/dharma in Vedic literat
the senses of 'foundational rituals' and 'foundational auth
sufficient to account for the development of early Buddhist
in its normative and prescriptive senses, but what of its des
sense, what of dhamma as the truth about the ways things are?
course of his discussion of dharma in Hinduism, Halbfass comments:

Since ancient times dharma has also possessed a meaning which may be rendered as
'property', 'characteristic attribute', 'essential feature', or more generally as 'defining
factor' or 'predicate'. Evidence of this is available since the time of the Satapatha
Brâhmana. In classical Hindu philosophy, and most clearly in the Nyàya and Vai
sesika, dharma functions as 'attribute' or 'property' in the broadest sense and is used
to characterize anything that is inherent in, or predicable of, an identifiable sub
stratum (dharmin).52

In fact this usage of dharma in the sense of 'property' or 'character

istic attribute' would seem to derive directly from the Vedic usage of
dharman to refer to 'the foundational nature of a deity', while there

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 533

are also several places in the Brâhmanas and Upanisads w

dharma appears to be used in a sense close to 'qualities', 'at
or even just 'things'.53 The passage of the Satapatha Brahm
Halbfass cites (14.7.3.15) is one in which dharman occurs a
member of a bahuvrlhi compound; the same passage is also
the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad: 'This self, you see, is imperis
has an indestructible nature.'54 The linking of the technic
sophical usage of dharma in the sense of an attribute belong
underlying substratum (dharmin) to its usage as the last me
bahuvrlhi compound is crucial. We have already noted that
of usage is common in early Buddhist texts, and again it wo
that it is a common usage inherited from earlier usage. So,
on Halbfass's remarks, to describe y as x-dharma, is to say
something that possesses the dharma - the attribute, the qualit
is .x; and in philosophical, as opposed to purely grammatica
the 'something' that possesses an attribute (dharmin) is an u
substance. As Halbfass points out, this understanding of dh
dharmin as attribute and substance respectively involves t
dharma in terms of a passive derivation: a dharma is what
ported' or 'maintained' (dhriyate) by the underlying sub
{dharmin). I think we can see a precisely parallel developme
usage of dhamma in Buddhist thought.
In fact I have already suggested that the early Buddhist
standing of dhammas as the basic mental and physical quali
constitute experience or reality is to be related to the usage
ma at the end of a bahuvrlhi compound in the sense of a
nature or quality possessed by something. To this extent t
qualities of early Buddhist thought and the attributes o
Vaisesika are the same things. The crucial différence, however,
instead of understanding these particular natures or qu
attributes that belong to some underlying substance, early
thought takes them as natural qualities in their own right
ising how they arise dependent on other qualities rather t
substratum that is somehow more real than they are.55
Seeing the development of the Buddhist understanding of dh
in this way also casts a somewhat different light on some
remarks made about dhammas in the Pali commentaries, wh
perhaps often viewed too much in the light of later contr
about the precise ontological status of dharmas and the Mad
critique of the notion of svabhava in the sense of 'inherent exi
John Ross Carter has drawn attention to the way in which

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534 RUPERT GETHIN

commentaries later come to gloss dhamma at the end of a ba

compound both by pakati and sabhâva.56 It follows from th
when the commentaries define dhammas as sabhavas this is not a
statement about their ontological status and that sabhdva should not
be translated as 'inherent existence', but is merely a gloss stating that
dhammas are 'particular natures' or 'particular qualities'. Moreover
when the commentators say that dhammas are so-called 'because they
maintain (dharenti) their own particular natures, or because they are
maintained (dharlyanti) by causal conditions',57 this should be
understood, I think, as a direct and deliberate counter to the idea of
dharmas as 'particular natures' that are 'maintained' by an underlying
substance (dharmin) distinct from themselves; it is not intended to
define dhammas as ontologically irreducible entities.58
This gives us two basic meanings of dhamma in early Buddhist
texts: the practices recommended by the Buddha and the basic
qualities that constitute reality. The first takes dhamma as something
normative and prescriptive, the second as something descriptive and
factual. Both of these meanings essentially derive from pre-Buddhist
usage but are adapted to the specifics of Buddhist thought.
The question of how the prescriptive and descriptive meanings of
dharma are related is a general one and not specific to Buddhist
thought. Halbfass refers to the work of Paul Hacker, who sees the
self-conscious and deliberate linking of dharma in its prescriptive and
descriptive senses as essentially modern and a feature of Neo-Hin
duism.59 The point here appears to be that in ancient Indian thought
there was no explicit attempt to derive dharma in its prescriptive sense
from dharma in its descriptive sense: there was no explicit suggestion
that it is because your nature (dharma) is such, your duty (dharma) is
such. While this may be so, it is not clear to me that such an
understanding is not implicit in early Indian thought. Indeed without
the latent idea that there is some sort of link between nature and
norm, the way things are and the way we should behave, it seems t
me difficult to explain the usage of dharma in these two senses -
unless, that is, one regards it as some sort of semantic accident or c
incidence.
In this context the observations of the moral philosopher Alasdair
Maclntyre seem pertinent.60 Maclntyre argues that eighteenth cen
tury European thinking about morality involved the disappearance of
a hitherto taken for granted connection between the precepts of
morality and the facts of human nature, such that moral philoso
phers, like Hume and Kant, begin to assert for the first time that

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 535

moral laws cannot be derived from factual statements, an '

cannot be derived from an 'is'. Maclntyre goes on to point
this is problematic: a statement that someone is a sea-captain
that he ought to do what a sea-captain ought to do. This is b
'sea-captain' is a 'functional' concept: being a sea-captain i
functioning as a sea-captain. What Maclntyre suggests is tha
classical tradition right through to the Enlightenment the c
used in discussions of 'morality' - how one should behave
functional: thus for Aristotle a man's living well is precisel
gous to a harpist's playing well (Nicomachean Ethics 1095a 1
relevance of this in the present context is that, if the distin
tween nature and norm is not made in the first place, becaus
connection between the two is assumed, then there can be no
argument that attempts to link the two. And thus that the
argument that derives dharma as duty directly from dharma as
is modern - in part a reflection, perhaps, of the conceptual
work of modern European philosophy - is hardly surprising.
In fact it seems clear that dharman/dharma is from th
beginning itself a functional concept: it is a foundation,
foundation that fails to perform the functions of supporti
maintaining is not much of a foundation: for something
dharma/dhamma it must maintain and support. Thus, in the
volume, Brereton suggests that in the Rg Veda there is a de
nection between the foundational nature of the Adityas and
foundational authority such that they are one and the same
And certainly in the case of brahmanical dharma it seems h
deny a deep connection between being a member of a particu
(varna) at a particular stage of life (âsrama) and acting accord
fulfilling one's dharma. And when the Pali commentaries co
define the 'particular natures' that are dhammas, they define th
what they do: it is contact (phassa) because it contacts (phusa
will (cetana) because it wills (cetayati), it is concentration (s
because it places (adhiyati) the mind evenly (samam) on the o
is trust (saddha) because it trusts (saddahati), it is memory
cause it remembers (sarati).61

HE WHO SEES DHAMMAS SEES DHAMMA

Halbfass refers to 'a certain elusive coherence' in the various mean

ings and functions of dharma in the different traditions of Hinduism,

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536 RUPERT GETHIN

Buddhism, and Jainism.62 This article has largely been an att

seek out that elusive coherence in the case of early Buddhist
I should like now to attempt to sum up by returning to the
tion of the practice of watching dhammas as dhammas foun
(Maha-) Satipatthâna Sutta and by offering a paraphrase of
final attempt at capturing that elusive coherence. Among t
mas (practices) the Buddha prescribes is this practice of wa
dhammas (mental and physical qualities) as dhammas-, to wat
truly as dhammas involves watching how they arise and dis
how the particular qualities that one wants to abandon
abandoned, and how the particular qualities that one wan
velop can be developed. Watching dhammas in this way one b
understand how they work, and in understanding how they w
begins to understand certain truths (sacca) - four to be exact
these dhammas-. their relation to suffering, its arising, its ceas
the way to its ceasing. And in seeing these four truths one reali
ultimate truth - dhamma - about the world, the extingu
(nibbana) of the fires of greed, hatred and delusion. This rea
the (Mahà-) Satipatthàna Sutta reveals the underlying equ
between seeing dhammas (that is, understanding the way me
physical qualities arise and disappear) and seeing the dhamm
truth.
In the Mahâhatthipadopama Sutta Sâriputta attributes the saying
to the Buddha: 'He who sees dependent arising sees dhamma-, he who
sees dhamma sees dependent arising.'63 The text goes on to explain
that the five aggregates of attachment have arisen dependency
(paticca-samuppanna). The commentary glosses the Buddha's saying
as 'he who sees causal conditions, sees dependently arisen dham
mas'.64 My suggestion is that this should be read in part as a quite
deliberate play on the meaning of dhamma, a play, moreover, that is
entirely consonant with the Nikâyas. As we have seen, dhammas are
mental and physical qualities, and seeing these dhammas as dhammas
- seeing how they arise and disappear, seeing how they are depen
dently arisen - one sees the ultimate truth: he who sees dhammas sees
dhamma.
Lest I should be misunderstood, I am not trying to impute a
specific technical abhidhamma/abhidharma understanding to the
Nikâyas, I am not suggesting that dhamma is used in early Buddhist
thought in the sense of an irreducible element. The use of dhamma in
the general sense of a mental or physical quality is quite distinct from
the question of the metaphysical and ontological status of those

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 537

qualities. That dhammas are mental and physical qualiti

thing; in what precise sense those mental and physical
should be said to exist is quite another. Thus the issue of
cisely dhammas/dharmas are is one that is debated and disc
the later schools - the Vibhajjavàda, the Sarvâstivàda, the
maka.65 Nevertheless, alongside the use of dhamma in the N
the senses of the practices, truths and teachings that a
mended on the authority of the Buddha, there is a furthe
already firmly embedded in the Nikâyas: dhammas are th
mental qualities, both mental and physical, that in some s
stitute - or better, support and maintain - experience or realit
entirety.
In many ways it might be the English word quality in its
uses in both the singular and plural that provides the single be
dhamma in early Buddhism.66 Yet while it might be capab
rying a wider range of appropriate meanings than some ot
such as 'truth', it clearly falls short of conveying the full
meanings. Often translators have resorted to 'teaching', 'l
trine', yet in addition to the problem of conveying the semant
of dhamma such translations highlight the problem of ev
religious and emotional power. That the precise understan
translation of dhamma in early Buddhist thought shoul
elusive and hard to pin down is perhaps fitting. It is, afte
found, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful, sublime, bey
sphere of mere reasoning, subtle, to be experienced by th
something that the buddhas of the past, present and futur
and to which they pay respect.67

NOTES

' I make no attempt in what follows to distinguish what the Buddha taug
what the Nikâyas/Àgamas in general teach. This does not mean that I consi
the Buddha taught everything just as the Nikâyas/Agamas say he did. It do
however, that I think there are serious methodological flaws in attemptin
tinguish in the Nikâyas/Agamas two clear categories consisting of 'auth
teachings of the Buddha on the one hand and later 'inauthentic' interpreta
the other. It follows from this that my drawing principally on the Pali sour
to be taken as indicating that they are necessarily a more 'authentic' witness
Buddhist thought - apart from the obvious fact that they are preserved in a
Indian language which must be relatively close to the kind of dialect or diale
by the Buddha and his first disciples - than the Chinese Agamas. In any
would seem that any account of early Buddhist thought based on the Ch
Agamas would be essentially similar to an account based on the Pali Nik

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 538 RUPERT GETHIN

Étienne Lamotte has observed, the doctrin

and Pali Nikayas is remarkably uniform; suc
of expression or the arrangement of topi
2 Geiger and Geiger (1920).
3 Geiger, and Geiger (1920, p. 8)
4 Stcherbatsky (1923).
5 Stcherbatsky (1923, p. 1)
6 Carter (1978).
7 Pp. 48^9.
8 Edward Conze, for example, has distinguished seven meanings as 'philosophically
important': (1) transcendent reality, (2) the order of law of the universe, (3) a truly
real event, (4) objective data of the mind, (5) quality or property, (6) right behaviour
and religious practice, (7) the Buddha's teaching. These seven meanings more or less
correspond to the six I have suggested, although I in effect have subsumed his (3) and
(4) under my (6). See Conze (1962, pp. 92-94).
9 Bhikkhu dhammam pariyâpunâti suttam geyyam veyyákaranam gâtham udânam
itivuttakam jâtakam abbhutadhammam vedallam (M I 133f; A II 103f, 108f, 178f,
185f; III 86f, 177f). The precise referent of the terms that make up the angas or parts
of Buddhist texts are problematic; see von Hinüber (1994).
10 A IV 90.
11 M II 78.
12 M II 257.
13 D II 9, 88, 95; M I 523; III 125.
14 D II 119-120: ye vo maya dhammâ abhiñññya desitâ te vo sâdhukam uggahetvà
asevitabbâ bhâvetabbâ bahulïkatabba yathayidam brahmacariyam addhaniyam assa
ciratthitikam. tadassa bahujana-hitâya bahujana-sukhâya lokânukampâya atthâya
hitâya sukhâva deva-manussânam. katame ca te bhikkhave dhammâ ... seyyathidam
cattâro satipatthânâ cattâro sammappadhânâ cattâro iddhipâdâ pane' indriyâni pañea
balâni satta bojjhangâ ariyo atthañgiko maggo. See also D II 127-128; M II 238, 245.
15 E.g. DI 110: bhagavâ anupubbim katham kathesi, seyyathidam dâna-katham slla
katham sagga-katham; kàmànam adinavam okâram samkilesam, nekkhamme
ànisamsam pakâsesi. yadâ bhagavâ aññási brâhmanam Pokkharasâtim kalla-cittam
mudu-cittam vinlvarana-cittam udagga-cittam pasanna-cittam, atha yâ buddhânam
sâmukkamsikâ dhamma-desanâ, tam pakâsesi dukkham samudayam nirodham mag
gam ... brâhmanassa Pokkharasâtissa tasmiññ eva âsane virajam vlta-malam dhamma
cakkhum udapâdi... atha kho brâhmano Pokkharasâti dittha-dhammo patta-dhammo
vidita-dhammo pariyogâlha-dhammo tinna-vicikiccho vigata-kathamkatho vesârajja
ppatto aparappaccayo satthu sâsane. See also D I 149; M I 380, 501; II 146.
16 S III 120: yo kho Vakkali dhammam passati so mam passati. yo mam passati so
dhammam passati. M I 190-191: yo paticcasamuppâdam passati so dhammam passati.
yo dhammam passati so paticcasamuppâdam passati.
17 See Carter (1978, p. 13).
18 D II 292 = M I 56: samudaya-dhammânupassi ... viharati, vaya-dhammânupassï
... viharati. It is possible that we should simply translate here 'the quality or nature of
arising and falling away', since it is not clear whether samudaya-dhamma and vaya
dhamma should be construed with reference to a bahuvrlhi usage describing the
nature of the unstated 'body', etc. The commentaries, in fact, construe the phrase as
'watching the conditions for arising and falling away' with reference to a more
technical abhidhamma understanding of dhamma, allowing however that 'nature' is
also a possible interpretation. See Gethin (1992, p. 55) and von Rosspatt (1995, pp.
203-205, n. 433).
19 PED s.v. Dhamma (p. 336, column 1).
20 Cf. Rahula (1974).

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 539

21 Warder, (1971, pp. 285, 288).

22 D I 73: so vivicceva kâmehi, vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkam s
vivekajam plti-sukham pathamam jhânam upasampajja viharati. This is
description of the attainment of the first jhâna and occurs in many other
23 D III 221: bhikkhu anuppannânam pâpakânam akusalânam dhamm
uppâdâya ... padahati. uppannânam pâpakânam akusalânam dhammânam
... padahati. anuppannânam kusalânam dhammânam uppâdâya ... pad
annânam kusalânam dhammânam thitiyâ asammosâya bhiyyobhâvâya v
bhâvanâya pâripuriyâ ... padahati. This is the stock account of the 'fou
endeavours' and again occurs in many places.
24 D II 290: bhikkhu ... dhammesu dhammânupassl viharati. This is
description of the fourth way of establishing mindfulness and once mor
many places.
25 See Gethin (1986). For the twelve spheres of sense as the world or experience in its
entirety (sabbam), see S IV 15.
26 Geiger and Geiger (1923, p. 4); PED s.v. Dhamma.
27 See Carter (1976); Carter (1978, pp. 58-135).
28 Five of these passages (Sv I 99, Ps I 17, Dhp-a I 22, Bv-a 13, As 38) are discussed
by Carter (see previous note); a sixth passage (Patis-a I 18) is not noted by him.
29 Sp IV 874; Sv III 1030; Ps II 68; Mp I 87; III 325; Vibh-a 504.
30 Vin II 109.
31 Ps I 17 and Bv-a 13 cite jâti-dhammâ jarâ-dhammâ atho marana-dhammino as an
example of dhamma in the sense of pakatv, Carter (1978, p. 61) takes this as a
reference to M I 161-162, which, however, reads ekacco attanâ jâti-dhammo samâno
jâti-dhammam yeva pariyesati, attanâ jarâ-dhammo ... attanâ marana-dhammo
samâno marana-dhammam yeva pariyesati. In fact, a search of CSCD gives no actual
example of the text precisely as quoted by Ps and Bv-a, only the variant vyâdhi
dhammâ jarâ-dhammâ atho marana-dhammino (A I 147; III 75).
32 Patis-a 118: jâti-dhammâ jarâ-dhammâ marana-dhammâ ti âdisu vikâre.
33 Ps I 17: kusalâ dhammâ ti âdisu sabhâve. Patis-a I 18 ayañ hi kusalâ dhammâ
akusalâ dhammâ avyâkatâ dhammâ ti âdisu sabhâve dissati.
34 Sv I 99: tasmim kho pana samaye dhammâ honti khandhâ honfi ti âdisu nissatte. Ps I
17: tasmim kho pana samaye dhammâ honfi ti âdisu suññatáyam. Dhp-a I 22: tasmim
kho pana samaye dhammâ honti khandhâ honfi ti ayam nissatta-dhammo nâma
nijjïva-dhammo ti pi eso eva. Patis-a I 18: tasmim kho pana samaye dhammâ honti,
dhammesu dhammânupassl viharati ti âdisu nissattatâyam. As 38: tasmim kho pana
samaye dhammâ honti, dhammesu dhammânupassl viharañ ti âdisu nissatta
nijjivatâyam.
35 Dhs 25: tasmim kho pana samaye dhammâ honti, khandhâ honti, âyatanâni honti.
For a brief discussion of the structure of the Dhs treatment of the arising of con
sciousness, see Gethin (1992, pp. 312-314).
36 Vism XX 104; cf. Gethin (1998, p. 190).
37 Vism VII 105-107, Vibh-a 147-148.
38 Carter (1978, pp. 115-129, 131-135).
39 Vism VII 68.
40 Carter (1978, p. 122).
41 See Cousins (1984).
42 MI 101: dhamme kahkhati vicikicchati nâdhimuceati na sampasldati.
43 Sv III 1030 = Ps II 68 = Mp III 325 = Vibh-a 504: pariyatti-dhamme kankhamâno
tepitakam buddha-vacanam caturâslti-dhamma-kkhandha-sahassânl ti vadanti atthi nu
kho etam natthi ti kahkhati. pativedha-dhamme kankhamâno vipassanânissando maggo
nâma magganissandam phalam nâma sabba-sankhâra-patinissaggo nibbânam nâmâ ti
vadanti tam atthi nu kho natthi ti kahkhati.

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 540 RUPERT GETHIN

44 Sp I 225-226 = Mp V 33: tividho saddh

saddhammo adhigama-saddhammo ti. tatt
saddhammo nâma. terasa dhutaguna câritt
patipatti-saddhammo nâma. navalokuttara-
45 Geiger, and Geiger (1923, pp. 8-9): We
auch zumeist in der Mehrzahl gebraucht. Es werden damit die Dinge der Er
scheinungswelt, bezeichnet, wie sie vom manas, dem inneren Sinn wahrgenommen
werden. In diesen Dingen oder "Normen" offenbart sich aber eben der dh., d. h. das
Natur- und Weltgesetz von dem ewigen Werden und Vergehen, von der Flüchtigkeit
und Nichtigkeit ailes Seins.
46 Gombrich (1996, pp. 34-36).
47 See Halbfass's two essays on dharma in his India and Europe: An Essay
in Understanding: 'Dharma in the Self-understanding of Traditional Hinduism'
(pp. 311-333) and 'Reinterpretations of Dharma in Modern Hinduism' (pp. 334
348).
48 RV 10.90: yajñena yajñam ayajanta devâs tâni dharmâni prathamâny âsan.
Translation quoted from O'Flaherty (1981 p. 31).
49 Halbfass (1988, p. 314); he cites Chândogya Upanisad 2.23.1 and Taittirlya
Upanisad 1.11.1 for the singular usage.
50 O'Flaherty (1981, p. 32).
51 Warder (1971, p. 275).
52 Halbfass (1988, p. 334).
53 See section 4 of Joel Brereton's contribution to this volume, and Patrick Olivelle's
discussion of Satapatha Bràhamana 11.5.7.1 and Chândogya Upanisad 2.1.4.
54 4.5.14: avinâsl vâ are 'yam âtmânucchittidharmâ. Text and translation quoted
from Olivelle (1998, pp. 130-131).
55 Warder (1971, p. 274) raises the question of the usage of dharma and dharmin in
Indian logic and its possible connection to the Buddhist understanding of a dharma
as an element of experience, but somewhat curiously, in my view, opts to treat them
as homonyms, whose homonymity is however, 'probably not accidental'.
56 Carter (1978, p. 61) cites Ps II 170, Spk I 159; see also Spk II 41 where khaya
dhamma is glossed as khaya-sabhâva.
57 As 39: attano pana sabhâvam dhárenñ ti dhammâ. dhârlyanti vâ paceayehi,
dhârlyanti va yathâ-sabhâvato ti dhammâ. (cf. Nidd-a I 16; Patis-a I 18; Moh 6)
58 The point that the commentarial definition of a dhamma as that which carries its
'own nature' should not be interpreted as implying that a dhamma is a substantial
bearer of its qualities or 'own-nature' has been made by Nyanaponika (1998, pp. 40
41) and Karunadasa (1996, pp. 14—16).
59 Halbfass (1988, p. 334).
60 Maclntyre (1985, pp. 57-59, 83-84).
61 VismXIV 134, 135, 139, 140, 141.
62 Halbfass (1988, p. 317).
63 M I 190-191: y o paticcasamuppâdam passati so dhammam passati, y o dhammatn
passati so paticcasamuppâdam passati. The saying is also found in the Chinese
equivalent of this sut ta, see T. 26, 467a; I am grateful to Kin-Tung Yit for this
reference.
64 Ps II 230: yo paticcasamuppâdam passañ ti yo paccaye passati. so dhammam passati
ti so paticcasamuppanna-dhamme passati.
65 The issue of the development of the ontology of dhammas in early Buddhist
thought is one that has been partially explored in Gal (2003).
66 Cf. Warder (1971, pp. 283, 290).
61 M I 167: dhammo gambhlro duddaso duranubodho santo pamto atakkâvacaro
nipuno pandita-vedariiyo. S I 138-140: dhammaññeva sakkatvâ garum katvâ.

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 HE WHO SEES DHAMMA SEES DHAMMAS 541

REFERENCES

Carter, J.R. (1976). Traditional definitions of the term dhamma. Philos

West 26, 329-327.
Carter, J.R. (1978). Dhamma: Western Academic and Sinhalese Buddh
tions: A Study of a Religious Concept. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press.
Conze, E. (1962). Buddhist Thought in India. London: Allen & Unwin
Cousins, L.S. (1984). Nibbâna and Abhidhamma. Buddhist Studies Rev
Gal, N. (2003). A metaphysics of experience: from the Buddha's tea
Abhidhamma. Unpublished DPhil, University of Oxford.
Geiger, M. & Geiger, W. (1920). Pali Dhamma vornehmlich in der kan
eratur. Munich: Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Reprint
W. (1973). Kleine Schriften zur Indologie und Buddhismuskunde. Wie
Steiner, pp. 102-228.
Gethin, R.M.L. (1986). The five khandhas: their treatment in the Nik
Abhidhamma. Journal of Indian Philosophy 14, 35-53.
Gethin, R.M.L. (1992). The Buddhist Path to Awakening: A Study o
Pakkhiya Dhamma. Leiden: E.J. Brill; 2nd ed. Oxford: Oneworld (20
Gethin, R.M.L. (1998). The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford: Oxfo
Press.
Gombrich, R.F. (1996). How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesi
Teachings. London: Athlone.
Halbfass, W. (1998). India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding.
University of New York Press.
Karunadasa, Y. (1996). The Dhamma Theory: Philosophical Cornerst
hidhamma, The Wheel Publication 412/413. Kandy: Buddhist Publica
Lamotte, É. (1988). History of Indian Buddhism from the Origins to
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Maclntyre, A. (1985). After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. London: Duckworth.
Nyanaponika. (1998). Abhidhamma Studies: Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness
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Olivelle, P. (1998). The Early Upanisads: Annotated Text and Translation. New York:
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(eds), Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner (pp. 181-191). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Stcherbatsky, Th. (1923). The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the
Word 'dharma'. London: Royal Asiatic Society.
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tischer Texte. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 38, 121-135.
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ABBREVIATIONS

Unless otherwise stated editions of Pali texts are those of the Pali
Text Society, Oxford.

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 542 RUPERT GETHIN

A Añguttara Nikàya
As AtthasâlinI (= DhammasañganT-atthakathá)
Bv-a Buddhavamsa-atthakathà
CSCD Chattha Sañgayana CD-ROM, Version 3.0 (Igatpuri:
Vipassana Research Institute, 1999).
D Dlgha Nikàya
Dhp-a Dhammapada-atthakathà
Dhs DhammasañganT
M Majjhima Nikàya
Moh M ohavicchedanl
Mp Manorathapûranï
Nidd-a Niddesa-atthakathâ
Patis-a Patisambhidàmagga-atthakathà
PED T.W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, Pali-English Dictiona
(London: Pali Text Society, 1921-1925).
Ps Papañcasüdaní
S Samyutta Nikàya
Sp Samantpàsàdikà
Spk SàratthappakàsinI
Sv SumangalavilàsinT
Vibh-a SammohavinodanT
Vin Vinaya
Vism Visuddhimagga

Department of Theology and Religious Studies

Centre for Buddhist Studies
University of Bristol
3 Woodland Road
Bristol BS8 1TB
UK

E-mail: Rupert.Gethin@bristol.ac.uk

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