11) Bernardo vs. NLRC. 310 SCRA 186.

FACTS

The petitioners numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on various
periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and
Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called 'Employment Contract for Handicapped
Workers. All of the 43 petitioners were dismissed albeit on different dates as they were not
regular employees.

Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust
Company maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers — the hearing
impaired employees were hired temporarily under [a] special employment arrangement which
was a result of overtures made by some civic and political personalities to the respondent Bank.

The labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein petitioners. In affirming the
ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, NLRC ratiocinated that Art. 280 is not controlling in
the case as it gave due credence to the conclusion that complainants were hired as an
accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employment[s]
were covered by . Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of contract as
specified under Art. 80.

Hence, for NLRC, Labor Arbiter a quo was correct that the terms of the contract shall be the law
between the parties” as "special workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the
regular complement of the Bank."  Rather, they were "special" workers under Article 80 of
the Labor Code. The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not
applicable, "considering the prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case.

Hence, the Petition for Certiorari challenging NLRC’s decision where:

Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as
money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank.
They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280
and to bar them from becoming regular employees.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners have become regular employees.

RULING: Yes, except for the 16 whose contracts were not renewed. The facts, viewed in
light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the
petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees. As such, they have
acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of
compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.

The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with provisions the Artcle 80
of the Labor Code. Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons), however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers
and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily,
the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the
conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these
facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In
other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to
them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled
employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as
a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides: cdll

"SECTION 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. — No disabled person shall be denied access
to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the
same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits,
fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able-bodied person."

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the
employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the
rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code,
which provides:

"ARTICLE 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except
where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.

"An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:
Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be considered as regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists."

The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC , in which
this Court held: "The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to
the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can
be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of
the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the
job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely
intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as
sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business.
Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while
such activity exists."

Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the
business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these
tasks for more than six months.

As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is,
their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent
failed to show such cause, these twenty-seven petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed
and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122917. July 12, 1999.]

MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID,

DAVID P. PASCUAL, RAQUEL ESTILLER, ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND
M. CORTEZ, JOSELITO O. AGDON, GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR., CELSO M.
YAZAR, ALEX G. CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN, ROWENA M.
TABAQUERO, CORAZON C. DELOS REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA,
MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI, IKE
CABANDUCOS, COCOY NOBELLO, DORENDA CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT
MARCELO, LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO, JOSE E. SALES, ISABEL
MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO TECSON, MELODY V.
GRUELA, BERNADETH D. AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R. CORTEZ,
MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION, DINDO VALERIO, ZENAIDA MATA, ARIEL
DEL PILAR, MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA, THELMA SEBASTIAN, MA.
JEANETTE CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY
BALOLOA, ELIZABETH VENTURA, GRACE S. PARDO and RICO
TIMOSA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION &
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,respondents.

Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panlegal (SALIGAN) for petitioners.

Picazo Buyco Tan Fider & San for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

This petition sought the reversal of the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that they could not be deemed regular
employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.
The Court granted the petition. Respondent bank entered into employment contracts
with handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. This showed that these
workers were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. The Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms
of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. This being so, petitioners are thus covered by
Art. 280 of the Labor Code which defines regular employment to be that the employee has been
engaged to perform activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
the employer. The task of counting and sorting bills is necessary to the business of respondent
bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six
months. Therefore, the 27 petitioners should be deemed regular employees entitled to security
of tenure. Their services may only be terminated for a just and authorized cause. Because
respondents failed to show such cause, these 27 petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and
hence entitled to backwages and separation pay.
 SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; FACTUAL FINDINGS,

NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW. — True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings
of public respondents in a certiorari proceeding. In resolving whether the petitioners have
become regular employees, we shall not change the facts found by the public respondent. Our
task is merely to determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying
the law to the established facts, as above-quoted from the assailed Decision.
2. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS;
QUALIFIED DISABLED PERSONS REMOVE CONTRACT FROM AMBIT OF ARTICLE 80 OF
LABOR CODE. — The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled
employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-
bodied person. The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily
removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords
them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of
the Labor Code.
3. ID.; ID.; EMPLOYMENT; TEST WHETHER EMPLOYEE IS REGULAR. — The test of
whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC, in which this Court held:
"The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by
considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular
business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least
one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems
repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not
indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular,
but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting
bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the exception of
sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Thus, the twenty-
seven petitioners should be deemed regular employees. As held by the Court, "Articles 280 and
281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making permanent casuals of our
lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them probationary appointments, ad
infinitum." The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which
the bank determined the employees' fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract
after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular
employees. No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGULAR EMPLOYEES ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE;
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF
REINSTATEMENT. — As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to
security of tenure; that is, their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause.
Because respondent failed to show such cause, these twenty-seven petitioners are deemed
illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges. Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of
money sorting is no longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it
originally belonged, petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees
and hence not entitled to the same benefits.
 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH FIXED TERM; RULING IN BRENT
CASE NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Respondent bank, citing Brent School v.
Zamora in which the Court upheld the validity of an employment contract with a fixed term,
argues that the parties entered into the contract on equal footing. It adds that the petitioners had
in fact an advantage, because they were backed by then DSWD Secretary Mita Pardo de
Tavera and Representative Arturo Borjal. We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract
was premised on the fact that the petitioners were disabled, and that the bank had to determine
their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of the Labor Code.But as
noted earlier, petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under
the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment
enjoyed by qualified able-bodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because
petitioners are qualified for their positions. The validation of the limit imposed on their contracts,
imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring instance of the very mischief sought to be
addressed by the new law.
7. ID.; ID.; EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT; IMPRESSED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST;
PARTIES ARE NOT AT LIBERTY TO INSULATE THEMSELVES. — It must be emphasized
that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest. Provisions of applicable statutes
are deemed written into the contract, and the "parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves
and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with
each other." Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot
prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that
petitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied employees. DTEIaC
8. ID.; ID.; EMPLOYMENT; CHARACTER OF EMPLOYMENT; HOW DETERMINED. —
As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of
service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them. In L.T. Datu v. NLRC, the
Court held that "the determination of whether employment is casual or regular does not depend
on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of hiring . . . but on the nature of the
activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of performance and its
continued existence." The character of employment is determined not by stipulations in the
contract, but by the nature of the work performed. Otherwise, no employee can become regular
by the simple expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of employment.
9. ID.; MAGNA CARTA FOR DISABLED PERSONS; OBJECTIVES BASED NOT
MERELY ON CHARITY BUT ON JUSTICE AND EQUAL TREATMENT OF QUALIFIED
PERSONS. — In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias
in favor of the working class, but also the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The
noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on charity or
accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons, disabled or not. In
the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their work. The
eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment contracts. Why
then should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired? The Court
believes, that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them, they should be treated
and granted the same rights like any other regular employees.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:
 The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be
granted the same terms and conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees.
Once they have attained the status of regular workers, they should be accorded all the benefits
granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to the contrary. This treatment is
rooted not merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice for all. LLjur
The Case
Challenged in the Petition for Certiorari 1 before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision 2 of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), 3 which affirmed the August, 22 1994 ruling
of Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan. The labor arbiter's Decision disposed as follows: 4
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-
mentioned complaint for lack of merit."
Also assailed is the August 4, 1995 Resolution 5 of the NLRC, which denied the Motion
for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise: 6
"Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who
were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank
and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded
agreement called 'Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers'. (pp. 68 &
69, Records) The full text of said agreement is quoted below:
'EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR HANDICAPPED WORKERS
This Contract, entered into by and between:
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws
of the Philippines, with business address at FEBTC Building, Muralla,
Intramuros, Manila, represented herein by its Assistant Vice President,
MR. FLORENDO G. MARANAN, (hereinafter referred to as the 'BANK');
- and -
__________________________, _______ years old, of legal
age, _____________, and residing at ______________________
(hereinafter referred to as the ('EMPLOYEE').
WITNESSETH: That
WHEREAS, the BANK, cognizant of its social responsibility,
realizes that there is a need to provide disabled and handicapped
persons gainful employment and opportunities to realize their potentials,
uplift their socio-economic well being and welfare and make them
productive, self-reliant and useful citizens to enable them to fully
integrate in the mainstream of society; cdtai
WHEREAS, there are certain positions in the BANK which may
be filled-up by disabled and handicapped persons, particularly deaf-
mutes, and the BANK ha[s] been approached by some civic-minded
citizens and authorized government agencies [regarding] the possibility
of hiring handicapped workers for these positions;
 WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE is one of those handicapped
workers who [were] recommended for possible employment with the
BANK;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing
premises and in compliance with Article 80 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines as amended, the BANK and the EMPLOYEE have entered
into this Employment Contract as follows:
1. The BANK agrees to employ and train the EMPLOYEE, and
the EMPLOYEE agrees to diligently and faithfully work with the BANK,
as Money Sorter and Counter.
2. The EMPLOYEE shall perform among others, the following
duties and responsibilities:
i. Sort out bills according to color;
ii. Count each denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid
of a counting machine;
iii. Wrap and label bills per hundred;
iv. Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and
v. Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.
3. The EMPLOYEE shall undergo a training period of one (1)
month, after which the BANK shall determine whether or not he/she
should be allowed to finish the remaining term of this Contract.
4. The EMPLOYEE shall be entitled to an initial compensation of
P118.00 per day, subject to adjustment in the sole judgment of the
BANK, payable every 15th and end of the month.
5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5)
days per week, from Mondays thru Fridays, at eight (8) hours a day.
The EMPLOYEE may be required to perform overtime work as
circumstance may warrant, for which overtime work he/she [shall] be
paid an additional compensation of 125% of his daily rate if performed
during ordinary days and 130% if performed during Saturday or [a] rest
day.
6. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following
benefits:
i. Proportionate 13th month pay based on his basic daily wage.
ii. Five (5) days incentive leave.
iii. SSS premium payment.
7. The EMPLOYEE binds himself/herself to abide [by] and
comply with all the BANK Rules and Regulations and Policies, and to
conduct himself/herself in a manner expected of all employees of the
BANK.
8. The EMPLOYEE acknowledges the fact that he/she had been
employed under a special employment program of the BANK, for which
 reason the standard hiring requirements of the BANK were not applied
in his/her case. Consequently, the EMPLOYEE acknowledges and
accepts the fact that the terms and conditions of the employment
generally observed by the BANK with respect to the BANK's regular
employee are not applicable to the EMPLOYEE, and that therefore, the
terms and conditions of the EMPLOYEE's employment with the BANK
shall be governed solely and exclusively by this Contract and by the
applicable rules and regulations that the Department of Labor and
Employment may issue in connection with the employment
of disabled and handicapped workers. More specifically, the
EMPLOYEE hereby acknowledges that the provisions of Book Six of
the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, particularly on
regulation of employment and separation pay are not applicable to
him/her. dctai
9. The Employment Contract shall be for a period of six (6)
months or from ____ to ____ unless earlier terminated by the BANK for
any just or reasonable cause. Any continuation or extension of this
Contract shall be in writing and therefore this Contract will automatically
expire at the end of its terms unless renewed in writing by the BANK.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, have hereunto affixed
their signature[s] this ____ day of _________________, ____________
at Intramuros, Manila, Philippines.'
"In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989
another two (2); in 1990, nineteen (19); in 1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in
1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were renewed every six months
such that by the time this case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who
were employed by respondent under the said employment agreement. The last
one was Thelma Malindoy who was employed in 1992 and whose contract
expired on July 1993.
xxx xxx xxx
"Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far
East Bank and Trust Company maintained that complainants who are a special
class of workers — the hearing impaired employees were hired temporarily
under [a] special employment arrangement which was a result of overtures
made by some civic and political personalities to the respondent Bank; that
complainant[s] were hired due to 'pakiusap' which must be considered in the
light of the context of the respondent Bank's corporate philosophy as well as its
career and working environment which is to maintain and strengthen a corps of
professionals trained and qualified officers and regular employees who are
baccalaureate degree holders from excellent schools which is an unbending
policy in the hiring of regular employees; that in addition to this, training
continues so that the regular employee grows in the corporate ladder; that the
idea of hiring handicapped workers was acceptable to them only on a special
arrangement basis; that it adopted the special program to help tide over a
group of handicapped workers such as deaf-mutes like the complainants who
could do manual work for the respondent Bank; that the task of counting and
sorting of bills which was being performed by tellers could be assigned to deaf-
mutes; that the counting and sorting of money are tellering works which were
always logically and naturally part and parcel of the tellers' normal functions;
that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent
 Bank plantilla for sorters or counters; that the tellers themselves already did the
sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral part of their duties
(p. 97, Records); that through the 'pakiusap' of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were
relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without
creating new positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any
other bank in the Philippines which deals with purely counting and sorting of
bills in banking operations." cda
Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dismissed, viz: 7
"NAME OF PETITIONER WORKPLAC Date Hired Date
E Dismissed
         
1. MARITES BERNARDO Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
2. ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE Intramuros 24 JAN 90 11 JAN 94
3. REBECCA E. DAVID Intramuros 16 APR 90 23 OCT 93
4. DAVID P. PASCUAL Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 21 NOV 94
5. RAQUEL ESTILLER Intramuros 2 JUL 92 4 JAN 94
6. ALBERT HALLARE West 4 JAN 91 9 JAN 94
7. EDMUND M. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 JAN 91 3 DEC 93
8. JOSELITO O. AGDON Intramuros 5 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
9. GEORGE P. LIGUTAN, JR. Intramuros 6 SEPT 89 19 JAN 94
10. CELSO M. YAZAR Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93
11. ALEX G. CORPUZ Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
12. RONALD M. DELFIN Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
13. ROWENA M. TABAQUERO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
14. CORAZON C. DELOS REYES Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93
15. ROBERT G. NOORA Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
16. MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN Intramuros 1 FEB 93 1 AUG 93
17. ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI Intramuros 22 JAN 93 22 JUL 93
18. IKE CABANDUCOS Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93
19. COCOY NOBELLO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
20. DORENDA CATIMBUHAN Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
21. ROBERT MARCELO West 31 JUL 93 8 1 AUG 93
22. LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO West 15 JUN 90 21 NOV 93
23. JOSE E. SALES West 6 AUG 92 12 OCT 93
24. ISABEL MAMAUAG West 8 MAY 92 10 NOV 93
25. VIOLETA G. MONTES Intramuros 2 FEB 90 15 JAN 94
26. ALBINO TECSON Intramuros 7 NOV 91 10 NOV 93
27. MELODY V. GRUELA West 28 OCT 91 3 NOV 93
28. BERNADETH D. AGERO West 19 DEC 90 27 DEC 93
29. CYNTHIA DE VERA Bel-Air 26 JUN 90 3 DEC 93
30. LANI R. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 10 DEC 93
31. MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION West 6 SEPT 90 6 FEB 94
32. DINDO VALERIO Intramuros 30 MAY 93 30 NOV 93
33. ZENAIDA MATA Intramuros 10 FEB 93 10 AUG 93
34. ARIEL DEL PILAR Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93
35. MARGARET CECILIA Intramuros 27 JUL 90 4 FEB 94
CANOZA 
36. THELMA SEBASTIAN Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
37. MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES West 6 JUN 92 7 DEC 93
38. JEANNIE RAMIL Intramuros 23 APR 90 12 OCT 93
39. ROZAIDA PASCUAL Bel-Air 20 APR 89 29 OCT 93
 40. PINKY BALOLOA West 3 JUN 91 2 DEC 93
41. ELIZABETH VENTURA West 12 MAR 90 FEB 94 [sic]
42. GRACE S. PARDO West 4 APR 90 13 MAR 94
43. RICO TIMOSA Intramuros 28 APR 93 28 OCT 93" 
As earlier noted, the labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein
petitioners. Hence, this recourse to this Court. 9
The Ruling of the NLRC
In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed
regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission
ratiocinated as follows:
"We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence
to the conclusion that complainants were hired as an accommodation to [the]
recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employment[s] were
covered by . . . Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of
contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, as correctly held by the Labor
Arbiter a quo, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the
parties." 10
The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable,
"considering the prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case."
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause:
"I. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the petitioners — money sorters and counters working in a bank —
were not regular employees.
"II. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the employment contracts signed and renewed by the petitioners
— which provide for a period of six (6) months — were valid.
"III. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in
not applying the provisions of the Magna Carta for the Disabled (Republic Act
No. 7277), on proscription against discrimination against disabled persons." 11
In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular employees.
This Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six
months and whose contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from
employment was illegal.
Preliminary Matter:
Propriety of Certiorari
Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of
facts of the NLRC is not allowed in a petition for certiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the
Court cannot pass upon the findings of public respondents that petitioners were not regular
employees. prcd
True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in
a certiorari proceeding. In resolving whether the petitioners have become regular employees,
we shall not change the facts found by the public respondent. Our task is merely to determine
whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the law to the established
facts, as above-quoted from the assailed Decision.
Main Issue:
Are Petitioners Regular Employees?
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their
task as money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent
bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article
280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as
"special workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of
the Bank." 12 Rather, they were "special" workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.Private
respondent contends that it never solicited the services of petitioners, whose employment was
merely an "accommodation" in response to the requests of government officials and civic-
minded citizens. They were told from the start, "with the assistance of government
representatives," that they could not become regular employees because there were no plantilla
positions for "money sorters," whose task used to be performed by tellers. Their contracts were
renewed several times, not because of need "but merely for humanitarian reasons."
Respondent submits that "as of the present, the 'special position' that was created for the
petitioners no longer exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to
renew anymore their special employment contracts." cdphil
At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private
respondent's effort to provide employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them
more productive members of society. However, we cannot allow it to elude the legal
consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their employment irrelevant. The
facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably
show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees. As
such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as
a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained
for a period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should
be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate
the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the
employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in
accordance with Article 80 of the Labor Code,which provides:
"ARTICLE 80. Employment agreement. — Any employer who employs
handicapped workers shall enter into an employment agreement with them,
which agreement shall include:
(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be
employed;
(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less
than seventy five (75%) per cent of the applicable legal minimum
wage;
(c) The duration of employment period; and
(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.
 The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the
Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives."
The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited
provision. Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons), 13 however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped
workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to
1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others
lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More
important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks
assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled
employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-
bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides: cdll
"SECTION 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. — No disabled
person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable employment. A
qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions
of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe
benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able-bodied person."
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the
employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the
rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code,
which provides:
"ARTICLE 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where
the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except
where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
"An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least
one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists."
The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC , 14 in
which this Court held:
"The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is
the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is
whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by
considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of
the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been
 performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not
continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and
continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the
necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the
employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and
while such activity exists."
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the
business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these
tasks for more than six months. Thus, the following twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed
regular employees: Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P.
Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P.
Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino
Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B.
Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie
Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. Cdpr
As held by the Court, "Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the
pernicious practice of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple
expedient of extending to them probationary appointments, ad infinitum." 15 The contract
signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank determined
the employees' fitness for the job.  When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the
six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees. 16 No
employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that
is, their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent
failed to show such cause, 17 these twenty-seven petitioners are deemed  illegally
dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges. 18 Considering the allegation of respondent that the job
of money sorting is no longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to
whom it originally belonged, 19 petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. 20
Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular
employees and hence not entitled to the same benefits.
Applicability of the Brent Ruling
Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora, 21 in which the Court upheld the
validity of an employment contract with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the
contract on equal footing. It adds that the petitioners had in fact an advantage, because they
were backed by then DSWD Secretary Mita Pardo de Tavera and Representative Arturo Borjal.
We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the
petitioners were disabled, and that the bank had to determine their fitness for the position.
Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of the Labor Code.But as noted earlier, petitioners
proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment enjoyed by qualified able-bodied
individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners are qualified for their positions.
The validation of the limit imposed on their contracts, imposed by reason of their disability, was
a glaring instance of the very mischief sought to be addressed by the new law.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public
interest. 22 Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the
"parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor
laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other." 23 Clearly, the agreement of the
parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified able-
bodied employees. Cdpr
Respondent's reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive.
Because the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned over to
the BSP during business hours from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., respondent resorted to nighttime
sorting and counting of money. Thus, it reasons that this task "could not be done by deaf mutes
because of their physical limitations as it is very risky for them to travel at night." 24 We find no
basis for this argument. Travelling at night involves risks to handicapped and able-bodied
persons alike. This excuse cannot justify the termination of their employment.
Other Grounds Cited by Respondent
Respondent argues that petitioners were merely "accommodated" employees. This fact
does not change the nature of their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular
because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of the mode or even the
reason for hiring them.
Equally unavailing are private respondent's arguments that it did not go out of its way to
recruit petitioners, and that its plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T . Datu v.
NLRC, 25 the Court held that "the determination of whether employment is casual or regular
does not depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of hiring . . . but on the
nature of the activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of
performance and its continued existence."
Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they
could not become regular employees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the stipulation in
the contract regarding this point. Still, we are not persuaded. The well-settled rule is that the
character of employment is determined not by stipulations in the contract, but by the nature of
the work performed. 26 Otherwise, no employee can become regular by the simple expedient of
incorporating this condition in the contract of employment.
In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC : 27
"Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the
circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure by
indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements
inconsistent with the concept of regular employment defined therein. Where an
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business of the employer, such employee is deemed a
regular employee and is entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the
contrary provisions of his contract of employment. cda
"xxx xxx xxx
"At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v.
Zamora proves instructive. As reaffirmed in subsequent cases, this Court has
upheld the legality of fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive
determinant in 'term employment' should not be the activities that the employee
is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon the parties for the
commencement and termination of their employment relationship. But this
Court went on to say that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the
periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the
 employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public
policy and morals."
In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias
in favor of the working class, but also the concern of the State for the plight of the
disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on
charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of  qualified persons, disabled
or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their
work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment
contracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired?
The Court believes, that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them, they should
be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular employees.
In this light, we note the Office of the Solicitor General's prayer joining the petitioners'
cause. 28
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20,
1995 Decision and the August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company is hereby ORDERED to pay back
wages and separation pay to each of the following twenty-seven (27) petitioners, namely,
Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller,
Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q.
Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V.
Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion,
Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida
Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. The NLRC is hereby directed to
compute the exact amount due each of said employees, pursuant to existing laws and
regulations, within fifteen days from the finality of this Decision. No costs. LibLex
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.