ECON 1192B – Macroeconomics 1

Assignment 3 - Macroeconomics Policy Report

Written Economic Policy Report

Subject Course ECON 1192B

Assignment Topic - Country Fiscal Policy Report - Singapore

Student’s Name Do Ngoc Minh Chau

Student ID Number s3877904

Teacher’s Name Nguyen Vu Hong Thai

Word Count 1557

QUESTION I

In July/1997, Thailand announced its currency to float (Moreno 1998) and this depreciation
developed into the Asian Financial Crisis. Regional countries were tremendously affected due to
 national currencies-confidence losses (Radelet 1999). Having negligible natural-resources and
largely depends on external investments and trades (Jin 2000), Singapore underwent crisis spill-
over effects. For explanation, when recession arose, foreign demand, explaining two-third of
Singapore’s total demand (Toulahoe & Ahmed 2004), declined drastically. Furthermore, foreign
investments, explaining 81% GNP (Siriwardana & Schulze 2000), curtail and competitiveness-
loss when regional-currencies collapsed were attributed to recession (Chew 2016).

GDP Growth Rate GDP per Capita Unemployment Rate

(annual %) (constant $US) (%, ILO estimate)
1990 9.82 22,572 1.78
1991 6.69 23,406 2.18
1992 6.64 24,221 3.09
1993 11.46 26,323 3.07
1994 11.10 28,342 3.03
1995 7.20 29,473 3.30
1996 7.47 30,414 3.57
1997 8.32 31,857 2.50
1998 -2.20 30,117 3.41
1999 5.72 31,587 4.85
2000 9.04 33,851 3.70
2001 -1.07 32,598 3.76
2002 3.91 33,566 5.65
2003 4.54 35,610 5.93
2004 9.82 38,620 5.84
2005 7.36 40,499 5.59

Table 1: GDP Growth Rate (%), GDP per Capita ($US), and Unemployment Rate (%) of Singapore in
1990-2005 (World Bank 2021)
 G D P G ro w th R a te o f S in g a p o re in 1 5 -y ea r-p erio d
in clu d in g A sia n F in a n cia l C risis
(1 9 9 7 -1 9 9 8 )
14.00
12.00
10.00
8.00
Annual %

6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
-2.00
-4.00
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Figure 1: GDP Growth Rate of Singapore in 1990-2005 (annual%) (World Bank 2021)

G D P p er C a p ita o f S in g a p o re in 1 5 -y ea r-p erio d

in clu d in g A sia n F in a n cia l C risis (1 9 9 7 -1 9 9 8 )
45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
$US

20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Figure 2: GDP per Capita of Singapore in 1990-2005 (constant $US) (World Bank 2021)
 U n em p lo y m en t R a te o f sin g a p o re in 1 5 -y ea r-p erio d
in clu d in g a isa n fin a n cia l crisis (1 9 9 7 -1 9 9 8 )
7.00

6.00

5.00
Annual %

4.00

3.00

2.00

1.00

0.00
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Figure 3: Unemployment Rate of Singapore in 1990-2005 (ILO, annual %) (World Bank 2021)

During 1997-1998, there were plunges sharply in GDP Growth Rate (GGR) and relatively in
GDP per Capita (GPC), whereas Unemployment Rate (UR) rose significantly. Before crisis,
GGR of Singapore fluctuate widely and peaked at 11.6% (1993). Under recession-impact, the
data found itself at nadir in 15-year-recorded, at -2.2% (1998). Contradictorily, GPC rather
disclosed a linear growth. Progressing upwards from $22.572 (1990), during recession, it
dropped minorly and hit lowest-point at $30.117 (1998), resulted from real GDP decline
meanwhile (Siriwardana & Iddamalgoda 2003). Additionally, UR escalated in 1990-1998,
marginally 2 times increases before falling in 1997 (2.5%) and recoiled in 1998 (3.41%); due to
poor performance across industries (Chew 2016), forcing enterprises to shut-down.
 Government Expenditure (G) of Singapore in 5 years
period including Asian Financial Crisis
9.60
9.40
9.20
9.00
% of GDP

8.80
8.60
8.40
8.20
8.00
7.80
7.60
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Figure 4: Government Spending (G) of Singapore in 1995-1999 (% of GDP) (World Bank 2021)

In response, Singapore adopted expansionary stance (Yue 1998) and accordingly adjusted
government spending and taxation to relieve financial-burdens on businesses and households
(Tyabji 1998). Government spending rocketed in 1998 as country stimulated regional-demand
through increasing investments in infrastructures (Glick 1998), promoting education, trainings to
enhance international-competitiveness (Goldstein 2000). Taxation incentives were announced to
lower business-costs including property tax rebate 40% for certain industries, property-tax-
discharge 5% for underdeveloped-land, and government rates-and-fees reduction. (MAS 1998).
As economy remained failure to recover, the government later introduced off-budget packages to
alleviate financial-burdens for businesses and households (Chew 2016). Total-budget worthed
$10.5B focused on providing cashflow to support damaged business-activities, job-maintenance,
consuming stimulus, and development programs (Tyabji 1998).
 Figure 5: AD/AS diagram for fiscal policy implementation demonstration

Theoretically, during recession, to raised Aggregate Demand (AD) and shift Short-Run-
Aggregate-Supply to meet Natural-Output, government increased expenditures to stimulate
domestic-demand through raising Consumption and Investment, causing AD to shift right to AD-
(2). Under Multiplier-Effect, growing Consumption and Investment generated productivities and
lessened UR, leading to higher Consumption (Agarwal 2019), catalysing AD strong-shift to the
right: AD-(3). In reality, Singapore did restore its financial-health, regained investor-confidence
(McKibbin 1998), and maintained other performances. Visualized in Figure 1, GGR rebounded
substantially in following years, with 9.04% in 2000. Nevertheless, these policies seemed trivial
to the recovery as GPC slightly increased by 1.12 times (2000), compared to 1998. Moreover,
UR grew gradually until 1999 before falling around 3.70% afterwards.
 QUESTION II

G o v ern m en t E x p en d itu re (G ) o f S in g a p o re in y ea r
2 0 1 0 -2 0 2 0 a n d 2 0 2 1 (E stim a ted )
120.00

100.00

80.00
billion $USD

60.00

40.00

20.00

0.00 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Figure 6: Government Spending (G) of Singapore in 2010-2020 and 2021 (Estimated) (billion $USD)
(World Bank 2021)

Figure 7: Government Spending Breakdown in 2010, 2019, 2020 (billion $USD)

(Data retrieved from Ministry of Finance Singapore 2021)

Over last-decade, government expenditure showed linear growth from 45.34 $B (2010) to 78.20
$B (2019), mostly on social and defenses. Under pandemic-scenario, government spending
expanded in 2020 by 1.5 times (compared to 2019) to support economic, social, and public-
 health (Goh 2021). Specifically, social region explained roughly 50% financial-resilience,
including short-term ($5.6B) for heavy-affected businesses and household-expenses (Osman
2020), and long-term ($14.3B) for GST-increases impact-cushion, economic development, and
frontline medical-officers (Medina 2020). For 2021, total $102.23B ($38.28B increases
compared to 2020) is expected to finance businesses and households (MOF 2021). Precisely,
$11B resilience-package aiming at assisting hard-hit sectors, healthcare-equipment, and
vaccination-programs (Bay 2021), whereas remains contributed to job-supported-scheme,
industries transformation, and household-expenses (Lee 2021).

Tax Revenue (T) of Singapore in 2011-2020 and 2021 (Estimated)

70.00 14.00
13.80
60.00
13.60
50.00 13.40
13.20
40.00
13.00
30.00
12.80

20.00 12.60
12.40
10.00
12.20
0.00 12.00
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Figure 8: Tax Revenue (T) of Singapore in 2011-2020 (World Bank 2021)

In 2020, Singapore tax revenue ($B) dropped significantly (Figure 8), however supposedly
recuperated in 2021 due to rational fiscal policies. During pandemic, government announced tax-
relieves, deduction up-to-10%, and payment-deferments (Wee 2021). Moreover, government
stretched Budget 2020 measurements (Meng 2021), including 25% income-and-corporate tax
rebates (PWC 2021), increasing from 20% in 2019, and payment-period extension (Andres
2021). Furthermore, qualifying-deduction is applied on manifold business-expenditures (Poh
2021), and GST is postponed and projected to rise by 7%-9% in post-crisis-period to cover
government and business losses (IRAS 2021). There were also allowance covers up to 100% for
upcoming investments and corporate-volunteering programs (MTI 2021).

Figure 9: Budget of Singapore in recent years including COVID-19

(Data retrieved from Bloomberg 2020)

Before crisis, Singapore had maintained budget surpluses (Koh 2021), allowing the country to
draw-on past reserves to ameliorate potential turmoil. In 2020, the country had to draw-on past-
reserve to process expansionary Budget (Li 2020), consequently established 13.9% GDP deficit
(MAS 2021). In 2021, Singapore Budget remained expansionary and continued dipping into
past-reserves, causing three-year deficit streak (Jamrisko 2021) as $11.01B deficit of 2021 is
estimated (Straitstimes 2021). Nevertheless, authorities have proposed fiscal modifications
aiming at a balanced budget in future (Aravindan 2021).
 Comparison of 4 components of Aggregate Demand (AD)
40.00 in 2019 and 2020
35.00

30.00

25.00
% of GDP

20.00

15.00

10.00

5.00

0.00
General Government Consumption (C) Investment (I) Net Export (NX)
Expenditure (G)

Figure 10: GDP Components Comparison in 2019-2020 (World Bank 2021)

In 2020, Government Spending (G) rose by 1.36 times compared to 2019 while Consumption
and Investment decreased. When Consumption and Investment dropped due to pandemic-
restricted-measurements, Aggregate Demand (AD) fell subsequently. As Net Exports was not
affected-directly under fiscal-policy (Herd 1989), (G) plays instrumental role in pushing
Consumption and Investment by continuously spending on infrastructure, financial-packages,
tax-relief and other sectors. As Consumption and Investment rebounded together-with increasing
(G), AD will increase to normal position and generate equilibrium-point, where the country’s
financial health progresses positively.

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Government further spending is assumed to have Multiplier-Effect on (AD) (Nelson 2006). In

recession, AD-(1) decreased to AD-(2) due to falls in Consumption and Investment, causing
Short-Run-Aggregate-Demand shift left and create new Equilibrium (point-B). Therefore,
government took action to raise Consumption and Investment, shifting AD-(2) to AD-(3). Rising
Consumption would generate more goods and services and increase employment rate, leading to
even higher consumption (Pettinger 2020), resulted in AD shift right more-substantially: AD-(4).

Figure 11: AD/AS diagrams before (left) and after (right) comparison when implementing fiscal
policy

In COVID-19, Singapore implemented tax-incentives and furlough schemes to boost

Consumption and Investment and revive economy (Zhuo 2020). Government granted tax-rebates
by 30% on non-residential-properties and 100% on commercial-properties (Tham 2021).
Furthermore, the authorities covered up-to 75% wages to support labor-forces (KPMG 2021). As
financial-assists took effect, firms started to reinvest more along with growing spending demand,
causing AD to continuously increases to AD-(3) and AD-(4) under multiplier-effect. At point-C,
Unemployment Rate decreases and rising wages lead to production-costs growth, hence,
enterprise produce less. Consequently, Short-Run-Aggregate-Supply shift left from (2) to (3),
generating new Equilibrium-Point (point-D), equals to natural output. Theoretically, fiscal-policy
in short-run helps boost GDP to, yet in long-run, price-level/inflation might increase significantly
from P-(1) to P-(3).
  Figure 12: Singapore positive economic growth in Quarter 2/2021
(Ministry of Trade and Industry 2021)
In reality, government policies were weak due to unprecedented-financial-budget and large-
scale-pandemic-restriction (MOF 2021). Consuming demand remained below pre-crisis-level as
residents inclined to savings (MAS 2021). This was because of people being uncertain about
economic progress and limited ability to freely purchases due to public-health-restrictions (Ting
2021). Enterprises concentrated on recovery and cashflow-maintenance rather than investing
(Wu 2021). Nevertheless, GDP in July/2021 expanded by 14.7%, faster than 4%-6% growth
anticipation for 2021 (Subhani 2021). Though insignificant, government spending on healthcare-
researches made Singapore cover vaccination above 70% population (Lin 2021). This positive
result relaxed COVID-19-measures, allowing for expanding economic-activities and boosting
consumption-demand (Lee 2021). Additionally, businesses supporting-schemes have lifted
multi-aspect performances (Jamrisko 2021), paving ways for new local and overseas
investments.

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Both policies adopted expansionary stances with financial-support for hard-hit sectors,
household resilience-packages, and investments in infrastructure, renovation, and trainings to
stimulate domestic-demand and attract foreign-investing.

Nevertheless, towards AFC, Singapore mainly lessened government fees-and-rates and wages.
The taxation adjustments included raising income-and-corporate tax rebates by 15%-40%,
reducing services and rentals charges by 15% (Abeysinghe 2007), and further export-rebates to
regain overseas investing (MTI 1998). Regarding government expenditure, Singapore stimulated
domestic-demand through financial-packages, spending on labour-training and development-
programs to enhance future progression.
 Conversely, in COVID-19, the government inclined to income-and-corporate tax deferment, tax-
payment extension, and intact government rates-and-charges (MOF 2021). It also allowed for
capital-allowance-claims up to 75% to cover business expenditure, and further tax coverages for
(foreign) business activities (MAS 2021). For government expenditure, Singapore mostly spent
on healthcare, defence, and vaccination-schemes (Zhuo 2021). Further off-budget measures
dedicated to welfare-insurances, financial-support for household and businesses, and renovation
projects.

QUESTION III
INFLATION RATE IN SINGAPORE (ANNUAL %)
1991 3.43 2007 2.10
1992 2.26 2008 6.63
1993 2.29 2009 0.60
1994 3.10 2010 2.82
1995 1.72 2011 5.25
1996 1.38 2012 4.58
1997 2.00 2013 2.36
1998 -0.27 2014 1.03
1999 0.02 2015 -0.52
2000 1.36 2016 -0.53
2001 1.00 2017 0.58
2002 -0.39 2018 0.44
2003 0.51 2019 0.57
2004 1.66 2020 -0.18
2005 0.43 Quarter 1/ 2021 1.30
2006 0.96 Quarter 2/ 2021 2.38

Table 2: Inflation Rate of Singapore in 1991-2021 and Quarter 1/Quarter 2 of 2021 (CPI, annual %)
(World Bank 2021)
 Inflation Rate of Singapore in 1991-2020 and Quarter 1/Quar-
ter 2 of 2021
7.00

5.00

3.00
Annual %

1.00

-1.00
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21
19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
r 1/
r te
ua
Q

Figure 13: Inflation Rate of Singapore in 1991-2021 and Quarter 1/Quarter 2 of 2021 (CPI, annual %)
(World Bank 2021)
 2006-2008:
Inflation rate (IR) of Singapore underwent top-notch point in recorded-period, at 6.63%
(2008). The main reasons were sharp increases in global oil prices and food (Reuters
2008), leading to overall production cost (OPC) growth, causing country to experience
(cost-push) high inflation. Moreover, high living cost resulted from escalating food price
required higher wages for employees and businesses paid more to cover workers-demand,
rentals, and high production cost (MAS 2008), consequently generated demand-pull
inflation as Aggregate Demand (AD) grew. Additionally, rising accommodation cost
(AC) derived from Annual-Values-Revision and 2007 GST 2%-up-hike also contributed
to this rocket (Dahinten 2008).
 2009-2011:
IR surged substantially in 2009-2011, marginally 8.75 times growth. The strong increase
rooted from rising food price, further oil prices spike resulted from political unrest in
supply regions (MTI 2011), causing high OPC (cost-push). Although AC could have
plummeted due to housing under-supply and low interest-rates (Wan 2012), the
government had cut private cars quotas drastically throughout years (Isidore 2011),
causing private transport costs (PTC) to rise. Subsequently, expanding AD (demand-pull)
from increases PTC and AC, along with wage-price-spiral as government made efforts to
 improve labor-productivity (MAS 2012) also played important parts in this multiplying
IR.
 2020-Quarter 2/2021:
2021 IR was expected to be 3.2% increase in December/2021 (Reuters 2021) due to
consuming behaviors shifts, government investing in developments schemes and stimulus
packages, and rising OPC. IR spike was mainly from regained confidence in consumer-
spending and business-activities (Yee 2021), resulted in expanding AD. Precisely, this
demand-pull surge stems from gradual needs in specific segments like healthcare (Sakpal
2021). Moreover, cost-push causes also influenced upward trend, including 8.6% hike in
electricity tariffs (Andres 2021), growing PTC, and escalating gasoline prices (MAS
2021).

INDUSTRY-ENGAGEMENT REFLECTION
The Industry Talk demonstrated Vietnam actual progress amidst COVID-19-period and
evaluated government policies to cushion pandemic-impacts, primarily addressing Monetary-
Policy, Inflation, and Saving-Investment-and-the-Financial-System concepts. Overall, Vietnam’s
growth rate contracted by 2.9% (2020) despite remaining stable 6%-7% over decades. There
were hard-damaged sectors (direct-contact businesses), and growing industries (contactless-
activities). In response, government introduced monetary policies through State Bank of Vietnam
(SBV) since it is money cycle monitor, collecting and distributing money to balance money
supply and demand. Generally, government implemented expansionary monetary-policy, where
SBV injects money into market, decreased operating interest-rate, and extended loan-payment
period. When enterprises performances decreased due to declining consuming-demand as
COVID-19 hit-hard, they receive finance from SBV with low operating-rates to maintain
operation and retain employees. However, because of pandemic-restricted-measures, firms
generated minimal-output, contrasting to public growing purchasing power as enterprises cannot
absorb all funds. Following theory, when aggregate demand outweighs aggregate supply, prices
would rise in long-run, and higher inflation rate is expected. Furthermore, SBV purchased bonds
from Commercial Banks (CB) with low Interest Rate (IR) as expecting CB to lend out money to
enterprises with decreasing IR to stimulate business-activities. This policy is ineffective however
as resources of CB mainly come from individuals/firm side. Theoretically, to attract more
loanable-funds supply to make profits, CB would raise Deposit Rate (DR) and raise borrowing
IR higher, causing lending demand to drop. Conversely, as consumers see no profits in bank-
savings when DR diminishes, they would invest in other channels such as stock-markets,
inducing security and stock-market industries growth. Lastly, debt-extension regulation was
trivially effective because it is much selective as there are various terms for participants
classification. Although these monetary policies are supposedly insignificant to the country
recovery, government regulations still have positive-effects as growth rate is optimistically
projected to rise by 6.6% in 2021.

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