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Chiang Kai Shiek

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Chiang Kai Shiek vs.

CA (172 SCRA 389)


FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-58028 April 18, 1989
CHIANG KAI SHEK SCHOOL, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FAUSTINA FRANCO OH, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:

DOCTRINE: There should also be no question that having contracted with the
private respondent every year for 32 years and thus represented itself as
possessed of juridical personality to do so, the petitioner is now estopped from
denying such personality to defeat her claim against it.

According to Article 1431 of the Civil Code, “through estoppel an admission or


representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be
denied or disproved as against the person relying on it.”

Facts: Fausta F. Oh had been teaching in the Chiang Kai Shek School since 1932 for a
continuous period of almost 33 years. She was told she had no assignment for the next
semester. For no apparent or given reason, she was dismissed from her work.

As a result, she sued and demanded separation pay, social security benefits, salary
differentials, maternity benefits and moral and exemplary damages. The original
defendant was the Chiang Kai Shek School but when it filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that it could not be sued, the complaint was amended. Certain officials of the
school were also impleaded to make them solidarily liable with the school.

The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissed the complaint. On appeal, its
decision was set aside by the respondent court, which held the school suable and liable
while absolving the other defendants. The motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the school then came to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether a school that has not been incorporated may be sued by reason alone
of its long continued existence and recognition by the government

Held: Yes. As a school, the petitioner was governed by Act No. 2706 as amended by
C.A. No. 180, which provided as follows: Unless exempted for special reasons by the
Secretary of Public Instruction, any private school or college recognized by the
government shall be incorporated under the provisions of Act No. 1459 known as the
Corporation Law, within 90 days after the date of recognition, and shall file with the
Secretary of Public Instruction a copy of its incorporation papers and by-laws.

Having been recognized by the government, it was under obligation to incorporate


under the Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. It appears that it had
not done so at the time the complaint was filed notwithstanding that it had been in
existence even earlier than 1932.
The petitioner cannot now invoke its own noncompliance with the law to immunize it
from the private respondent’s complaint. There should also be no question that having
contracted with the private respondent every year for thirty two years and thus
represented itself as possessed of juridical personality to do so, the petitioner is now
estopped from denying such personality to defeat her claim against it.

According to Article 1431 of the Civil Code, “through estoppel an admission or


representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied
or disproved as against the person relying on it.” As the school itself may be sued in its
own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which the persons joined
in an association without any juridical personality may be sued with such association.
Besides, it has been shown that the individual members of the board of trustees are not
liable, having been appointed only after the private respondent’s dismissal.

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