10.

4 Handling of Bomb Threat Call

10.4.1 General

Bomb threat calls against civil aviation targets must always be given careful consideration and
objective assessment in order to determine the credibility of the threat and, therefore, whether
there
is, a need for reduction of risk through the implementation of additional security counter-measures.
Bomb threats are normally anonymous telephone calls which may provide information indicating the
intention to commit an unlawful act against an aircraft. Written warnings are rare but should be
assessed using the same techniques as applied to a telephoned warning.
Bomb threats can be made against aircraft in the following operational phases:
 On the ground, before boarding of passengers or crew;
 On the ground, but after boarding of passengers and crew and before take-off;
 After take-off and during the climb phase;
 During the cruise phase of the flight;
 During the descent phase of the flight;
 After landing, but before passengers and crew have disembarked.

10.4.2 Receipt of Bomb Threat Call

Telephone bomb warnings may be received by operator personnel either directly from the people
issuing the warning or from intermediaries (for example, press agencies). In either case, the recipient
should attempt to obtain as much information as possible about the threat in order to facilitate
assessment of the threat and identification of the person(s) issuing it.

10.4.3 How to Answer a Bomb Threat Call

When answering a bomb threat call which is a threat to an aircraft follow these guidelines:
 Listen without interrupting the caller and without giving any usable information;
 Then employ all possible tactics to prolong the conversation, notably by asking questions;
 Make a note of the content of the conversation and include it in the form "Bomb Threat
Call Report";
 At the end of the call, do not hang up even if the caller hangs up;
 Then, using another phone, transmit the content of the call through your manager only;
 Be discreet;
 Keep your notes and the report.

10.4.4 Guidance for Questioning the Caller

Ask those key questions (if possible)

1 What sort of device is it?
2 What does it look like?
3 Where is the device located and how is it concealed?
4 When will it detonate?
5 What type of explosive is being used?
6 What makes you sure this device will go off as you expect?
7 Supplementary questions (if possible),
8 Where are you calling from?
9 What is your name and telephone number?
10 Why do you expect me to believe you?
11 What do you hope to accomplish by doing this?
12 Why do you feel that this action will advance your cause?
13 How would your family feel if they knew what you have done?
14 Are you aware that there are many innocent people involved?
15 If they have done you no harm, why are you doing this?
16 What do you hope to gain?
17 Why did you pick this flight?

10.4.5 Report of the Bomb Threat Call

The person who has received the call shall report as accurately as possible without delay to the
immediate manager, who will relay it to the operator security manager. For this purpose, the
recipient
shall detail the entire content of the call and, to such an extent as possible, provide all information
which he is able to gather by conforming to the instruction for the receipt of bomb threat call.

10.4.6 Bomb Threat Call Report

When reporting a bomb threat call follow these guidelines:

 As soon as notification of an anonymous call has been received, check that the person
having received the call gives you a full report, by asking all the necessary questions in
accordance with the guide for receiving bomb threat calls;
 Note precisely all information pertaining to this call. Relay all the information to your
immediate supervisor or manager; or any Company superior manager available;
 Do not leave your post or, if you do, indicate to the caller where he may contact you;
 Fill in Bomb Threat Call Report - BMS 2010.

10.5 Handling of Bomb Threats

10.5.1 General

The Pilot-in-Command will be informed of threats received and subsequent security measures taken
or suggested. The Pilot-in-Command is responsible to take action upon receiving a sabotage warning
at all times. If not otherwise instructed by the operator security manager, he shall take the following
actions.
10.5.2 Airplane on Ground

10.5.2.1 Crew Actions

Bomb Threat Check List / Airplane on Ground:
 Taxi to a parking position as advised by ATC, if bomb threat is received during taxi;
 Inform company if possible;
 Disarm slides (If stairs available);
 Disembark passengers and crew with their hand baggage (except when emergency slides are
used). To avoid undue alarm and panic, no reason should be given to passengers until they are
safely disembarked;
 If the situation requires an immediate disembarkation or if no stairs available in due time, use
the slides and order emergency evacuation;
 Bring all passengers together at a safe distance from the airplane;
 Passengers evacuated from an airplane must be kept away from the airplane until cleared by
competent local authorities;
 Transport passengers and crew to a secure room at airport, in order to avoid both mixing with
other passengers and access to land/airside;
 The security checklists shall be taken along in case of evacuation in order to be readily available
for a search of the airplane. These checklists are also included in the ground operations
procedures or manual;
 Inform Company Dispatch;
 Write an Occurrence Report.
When search action has been decided, the catalogue of measures deemed necessary, shall be used
in
the interest of maximum safety for passengers, crew and other persons involved as well as operator
and third party property.

10.5.2.2 Search of Airplane on Ground

 The Pilot-in-Command advises the special task force of the respective airport or the local
police;
 Open all possible cargo, cabin and cockpit-doors (in case of explosion);
 Relief all respective systems from its pressure;
 Shut off all electrical power;
 No passenger, crew and other persons shall be on board an airplane with the exception of the
search team;
 An airplane to be searched shall be removed to a designated remote location to minimize the
possible extent of damage in case of an explosion;
 The search of the airplane shall normally be executed by the specialty trained team and/or the
competent local authorities with the co-operation of the crew and/or ground engineers;
 If the search is performed by the competent authorities, it will be carried out according to
security checklist;
 On stations where competent local authorities are not available, the Pilot-in-Command will
decide about further action in close coordination with the operator security manager;
 Require unload hold baggage, cargo, mail, catering supplies, etc. Additional security measures
shall be implemented;
 Require passengers to identify their baggage after they have been screened/ searched before
re-loading. If this is not possible, baggage will be separated and treated according to local
procedures (opening of baggage in the absence of its owner should only take place in the
presence of or by the police);
 Require passengers to be screened before re-boarding.
10.5.3 Airplane In-flight
When a bomb threat is associated with an airplane in-flight and once the threat has been assessed,
the operations/ATC will contact the Pilot-in-Command to provide him with information about the
threat and actions to be taken.
On receipt of the information, the Pilot-in-Command should require a discrete search of aircraft, in
so
far as this is possible in flight.
During the flight it is the Pilot-in-Command prerogative to decide to what extent information shall be
given to passengers concerning such a threat.
If feasible with regard to other safety requirements arrange the flight in such a manner that the
cabin
altitude does not increase beyond the altitude already attained, thereby decreasing the risk of a
pressure bomb explosion.

10.5.3.1 Airplane in-flight & Landing possible

 Make a PAX announcement, that landing due to operational/technical reasons has to be made;
 Declare an emergency priority for landing;
 Stop climb and maintain present cabin altitude;
 Advice Senior Cabin Crew of intended course of action;
 Inform cabin crew members and make announcement that landing for operational reasons
have to be made;
 CC prepare cabin for emergency landing;
 Inform Blue Air ( directly or via ATC);
 Land as soon as possible at the nearest suitable airport (check availability of fire brigade) and
flow the procedures for „airplane on ground";
 If a suspected device is found on board, follow instructions for Suspected Device Found on
Board.

10.5.3.2 Airplane In-flight, Landing NOT Possible

 Make a suitable passenger announcement and requesting the passengers to remain in their
seats and to co-operate with the crew;
 Perform in-flight search of the airplane according to circumstances by using security
checklists. If a search is requested from the crew, the cabin must be searched in a methodical
and organized manner following the search checklist. A systematic bomb search for a B 737
lasts 60 minutes, depending on the number of passengers;
 Inform flight crew about the result of the search.

10.5.4 Suspected Device Found on Board

10.5.4.1 Do not:
 Move the suspect device (unless in hazard zones);
 Open any closed containers;
 Cut any wires or tapes or strings;
 Tamper with any electrical circuits;

10.5.4.2 "Hazard Zones"

Hazard zones are the areas where, in case of an explosion, the maximum damage to the aircraft is
reached and are considered the following:
 Flight deck compartment avionics bay;
 Fuel tanks and critical components;
 Areas between main wing span;
 Areas between horizontal stabilizer spars.

10.5.4.3 Device Found Outside Hazard Zone

 Contact ATC to receive authorization for route deviation as appropriate and contact operator
to get advice regarding the suspect device;
 Reseat passengers as far from the device as possible with safety belts fastened and seatback
in upright position. Instruct them to keep their heads below the top of the seat backs;
 If no advice is received from the authority, proceed as follows:
o Leave the device exactly in place and the attitude in which it was found.
o Stabilize it in this position without disturbing it more than necessary to prevent moving
(during deceleration or landing. Cover the device with polythene (the device itself must
be kept dry) and then saturate blankets, pillows and other blast absorbent materials
with water or any non-inflammable liquid and carefully pack at least 30cm of them
around the suspect device. Then cover it with other suitable material, such as articles of
clothing and baggage, preferably wetted to reduce the risk of fire;
o Maintain existing cabin altitude in order to prevent activation of an altitude sensitive
fuse bomb;
o If operationally possible, reduce differential pressure to zero by descending the aircraft
to existing cabin altitude in order to avoid amplifying the effects of blast in the case of
an explosion;
o Consider fuel, airplane capabilities and distance to nearest suitable airport. For the
approach lower landing gear and flaps early and assume approach speed while
maintaining steady level flight for a while. In the case of an explosion the power systems
for gear and flaps could be damaged. The above mentioned action eliminates this
danger;
o As far as practicable disconnect all non-essential power to the area near the device in
order to reduce potential fire ignition hazard in this area.
 Land and evacuate the airplane as soon as possible.

10.5.4.4 Device Found Inside Hazard Zone

If an immediate landing is impossible and the device represents such a great hazard in its present
position that it must be moved, proceed as follows:
 Contact ATC to receive authorization for route deviation and contact operator to get advice
regarding the suspect device;
 Stop further climbing and maintain existing cabin altitude in order to preclude activation of an
altitude sensitive fuse bomb;
 If operationally possible, reduce differential pressure to zero by descending the aircraft to
existing cabin altitude in order to avoid amplifying the effects of blast in the case of an
explosion;
 Consider fuel, airplane capabilities and distance to nearest suitable airport. For the approach
lower landing gear and flaps early and assume approach speed while maintaining steady level
flight for a while, in the case of an explosion the power systems for gear and flaps could be
damaged. The above mentioned action eliminates this danger;
 Cabin crew members must select appropriate "least risk" bomb location for Boeing 737 (near
aft service door);
 As far as practicable disconnect all non-essential electrical power in this area In order to reduce
potential fire ignition hazard;
 Reseat passengers with safety belts fastened and seatback in upright position as far as possible
away from the device;
 A check should be made to ensure that the device can be moved. Slide a string or stiff card
under the suspect device without disturbing the device. This allows checking for an anti-lift
trigger which could cause the device to detonate if it were picked up. If string or card slips
easily under the device without catching on any protrusion from the device, it may be carefully
lifted. If not, the device must not be moved, but steps should be taken to limit the explosion
effects where the item is located. CDR has the responsibility of engaging such a way of action;
 Move the suspect device (do not open it) in the attitude found to the appropriate "least risk"
bomb location. Secure it in the same attitude against the outside structure using adhesive
tape. Keeping it in the attitude found will preclude accidental detonation;
 Stabilize it in this position without disturbing it more than necessary to prevent moving during
deceleration or landing. Cover the device with polythene (the device itself must be kept dry)
and then saturate blankets, pillows and other blast absorbent materials with water or any
noninflammable
liquid and carefully pack at least 30cm of them around the suspect device. Then
cover it with other suitable material, such as articles of clothing and baggage, preferably
wetted to reduce the risk of fire;
 Land as soon as possible.
10.5.4.5 After Landing

 Taxi to a remote location in accordance with ATC instructions;

 Evacuate the airplane immediately and avoid the exits near the bomb location;
 Assemble the passengers and the crew. Ensure they do not leave the area. Statements made
need
to be taken from them and their assistance may be required by the local authorities.

10.5.4.6 Bomb has not been found or has been removed from the Airplane

 Check for possible damage caused during the search and make a list of it;
 Check whether the A/C has been released by the authorities for further flights;
 Contact the Company Dispatch and inform about the status;
 If panels and doors have been opened which are not included in the daily pre-flight check done
by the Pilot-in-Command, a maintenance action is required;
 Check with maintenance control whether the aircraft is airworthy or not;
 Before continuing a flight a release from Flight Operations is needed.

10.6 Hijacking

10.6.1 Policy
Security measures in force on the ground are intended to reduce the possibility of potential hijackers
to gain access and control of an aircraft.
It is our general policy that the flight deck door must be kept closed and locked, inaccessible for a
possible hijacker and the flight deck crew will keep control of the flight deck at all costs.
Pending on the type of hijacking, the flight crew may decide to cooperate and/or negotiate with
the hijackers demands, or land the aircraft as soon as possible at a time and place chosen by the
Pilotin-
Command. Once on the ground, it shall be the aim to keep the aircraft at the given aerodrome. The
Pilot-in-Command shall as far as possible retain his authority over crew, passenger, aircraft and load.
There are different types of hijacker(s):
 Politically motivated;
 In pursuit of a crime;
 Mentally disturbed;
 Act for private reasons;
They may be in possession of firearms, explosives, inflammable liquids or replica or simulated
weapons. They may simply claim to be in possession of weapons.
In the case of a hijacking, the safety of passengers and crew is of prime importance. If necessary, for
this reason, the demands of hijackers shall normally be complied with.

10.6.2 Reinforced Cockpit Door

All aircrafts are equipped with a flight crew compartment door that is capable of being locked and
unlocked from each pilot’s station and designed to meet the applicable retroactive airworthiness
operational requirements. The design of this door will not hinder emergency operations, as
required in applicable retroactive airworthiness operational requirements.
10.6.3 General guideline
There is no simple recipe for dealing with terrorism. Every situation is special. Crews must be alert.
Best judgment must be applied even for small indications in order to deal with the situation at hand.
Crew members must presume the worst. Crew's good judgment may influence the dealing with the
development of a disturbance.
Flight crew must not leave the flight deck to help in the cabin.
Clear and timely communication amongst Cabin Crew members and the flight deck is vital. Frequent
updates are necessary.
Pre-departure briefing is important.
Other company employees on board or any able-bodied passenger may be able to assist during a
threat
situation.
Locations can help police forces for positive identification of a passenger committing a hostile act.
Note
down seat numbers of passengers that look strange to you or behave abnormal.
Be especially vigilant during the first 45 min. of a flight and during the last 45 min., when a suspicious
passenger is most likely to act.
A disturbance may begin at any threat level. The threat may change - disappearing completely,
persisting or escalating to another threat level. Take into consideration:
 Is anyone likely to get hurt? Or killed?
 Is an assault on the flight deck possible? Or likely?
 Can the cabin crew control the disturbance?
A verbal or written threat of a weapon, the display of a weapon or part so fit or the actual use of a
weapon is a major escalation. Life is being threatened. A hijacking may be imminent or already in
progress.
In no case will the flight crew permit entry to the flight deck of an unauthorized person.
Control of the aircraft always remains in the hands of the flight crew, no matter what threat or
violence is in the passenger cabin.
Any hijack is a criminal act and a very dangerous situation especially as long as the aircraft remains in
the air. The flight crew should land as soon as possible at a suitable aerodrome.
Pilot-in-Command makes the decision when hijack procedures go into effect.
That decision is declared to the right people on the ground by switching to transponder code 7500.
Code 7700 signals to the ground that a rescue should be attempted as soon as possible on ground.
A rapid or emergency descent can reduce flying time.
Blue Air does not recommend depressurization and aggressive aircraft manoeuvres.

10.6.4 Types of Hijacking

Based on history in civil aviation there are two different types of hijackings:
 Classical (or traditional) hijacking: this type will primarily be politically motivated, in pursuit of
a crime, by one or more mentally disturbed persons or for private reasons. In such situation
the aircraft, the crew and the passengers will be used to apply pressure to reach a specific
target.
 Hijacking at new dimensions: this second type must be expected as performed by ideologically
motivated radicals planning to use the aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction.
10.6.5 Communication
Any communication between the flight deck and the cabin shall be established by use of the
interphone.

10.6.6 Flight Crew visual signals

When on ground, and possible, pilots should attract attention of emergency situation. When
situation
is desperate and intervention is required: leave flaps full down after landing or lower full flaps while
on ground. This means that an immediate, forced armed intervention is requested.
Leave aircraft alone, do not interfere. Retract flaps after landing.
Transponder shall in this case be returned to A7500 if previously set to A7700.
Pilots may transmit "aircraft call sign back to A7500" to emphasize that intervention is no longer
required.

10.6.7 Airplane on Ground

 Return to parking position and coordinate action with the ground operations personnel;
 Park the airplane at all times with the tail overhead concrete, since the most common way to
approach the airplane is via the tail;
 Do not inform passengers of the reasons for returning as this may aggravate a potential
hijacker to take action;
 Try to establish contact with the ATC / Company Dispatch;
 Especially during night time select all cabin lights BRIGHT;
 Doors should be disarmed, although Elite Troops are trained to open the door in armed
position without the escape slide to deploy.
 Continue the flight as planned;
 Take no action which might provoke a potential hijacker into unpredicted action;
 All crew members should be alerted to keep a close watch on all passengers;
 No one should be allowed to enter the flight deck without prior contact via the interphone.
The flight deck door shall be locked;
 Communication between flight and cabin crew shall be established via interphone.

10.6.9 Response by Cabin Crew Members

In the case of an hijacking, the Pilot-in-Command shall as far as possible retain his authority over
crew,
passenger and airplane, it is a basic principle that the flight crew should stay with the airplane in
order
to retain as much control over the situation as possible and to transmit information to ground
operations. However, there might be situations where the Pilot-in-Command decides that the
escape
of the flight crew (or part of it) will improve the likelihood of a successful outcome and the saving of
lives.

10.6.9.1 DO NOT
 Argue with hijacker(s);
 Talk down to them or appear over clever;
 Offer any technical advice;
 Refer to insanity or mental disorders;
 Engage in any conversation with political overtones;
 Become mentally aligned with the hijacker(s);
 Take any physical action unless hijacker(s) understand why;
 Attempt to overpower the hijacker(s) (being aware there may be some who have not made
their presence known).

10.6.9.2 DO
 Comply with the instructions of the hijacker(s) in so far as these are compatible with the safety
of the airplane;
 Avoid discussion on politics or religion with the hijacker(s);
 Maintain normality as situation allows;
 Offer water and food to passengers - no alcoholic drinks should be served;
 Cabin and lavatories should be kept clean;
 At least one toilet should be reserved for the crew only;
 Reseat lonely passengers in the cabin together;
 Try to maintain communications with hijackers to increase inhibition against potential
aggression;
 Ask the hijacker(s) to take decision in order to tax their energy and to avoid retribution in the
case of a suggestion by a crew member being perceived to be a trick;
 Attempt to calm the hijacker(s) by exerting utmost patience;
 Explain actions and operational procedures in advance;
 Attempt to persuade hijacker(s) to land and release passengers.

10.6.10 Flight Crew Actions

 Set transponder to A7500. When a pilot has selected A7500 and is subsequently requested to
confirm his code by ATC he shall, according to circumstances, either confirm this or not reply
at all. The absence of reply from the pilot will be taken by ATC as an indication that the use of
A7500 is not due to an inadvertent false code selection;
 When not under radar control, transmit a message including airplane call sign followed by the
phrase "transponder A7500";
 The flight crew may switch to A7700 to indicate that the situation is desperate and that it
requires immediate assistance;
 Try to maintain normal communication with ATC, giving as much information as possible or
communicate in hidden form (e.g. asking for special re-clearance and requesting ATC to advise
the fuel company of additional fuel requirements);
 Keep flight loudspeaker turned off to avoid confusion;
 Switch the “fasten seat belt" sign on;
 If feasible, make a public announcement to calm the passengers and instruct them to remain
seated and avoid undue interference.

10.6.11 Crew Action in case of Hijacking

 Land the aircraft on the nearest suitable airport;

 Once the aircraft is on ground, it can no more be used as a weapon of mass destruction. Still,
the situation may be extremely dangerous for the aircraft's occupants;
 Aircraft should be parked in a remote area (if possible);
 Be calm and deliberate;
 Advise hijacker(s) to accept fixed landline communications with the aircraft;
 Encourage the hijacker(s) to negotiate with the authorities;
 Try to have hijacker(s) allow the release of as many passengers as possible especially the sick,
the elderly and the children;
 Inform hijacker(s) of aircraft un-serviceability as a means of encouraging acceptance of
another aircraft / replacement crew;
 If feasible, request maintenance activities to delay and slow the pace of events as much
as possible. Through delay tactics a hijacker, defeated in the hijack attempt, might be worn
down to the point of a peaceful surrender;
 Try to keep up information to local security authorities;
 Every effort should be made to prevent getting airborne again;
 Be patient - delays may well be caused by genuine difficulties in satisfying the hijackers'
demands by the security authorities;
 Remember that the so-called Stockholm syndrome may come into effect. When a hijacker
repeatedly threatens another person, then removes the threat, the person threatened tends
to become friendly towards the hijacker. This reflex is to be expected and avoided;
 Consider escape from the aircraft. As long as the flight crew remains on board, another takeoff
is theoretically possible. This has to be kept in mind by the flight crew when evaluating
possible options;
 Every person who can escape is one hostage less a hijacker might use as a pawn in
negotiations;
 Jurisdiction on the ground is the duty of the Authorities. Crews are asked to cooperate fully
with foreign officials;
 Crew members should not attempt to engage in negotiations with the hijackers, if a trained
negotiator is available;
 Any passenger may be an accomplice. There might be a group of hijackers, some of who may
have remained anonymous in their seats as "sleepers" to intervene if an attempted hijack were
interrupted in some unexpected manner. If a peaceful ending is reached, crew members and
law enforcement officials should treat every passenger as a suspected sleeper until each one
is properly identified by the police.

10.6.12 Crew Coordination and Communication

Good coordination and communication is essential for good crew performance. Crew Resource
Management training has been designed to address these persistent challenges in performance. The
September 11 attacks present new challenges in crew coordination and communication.
The challenges are caused by a fundamental shift in the common strategy of dealing with hijack
situations: Whenever there is a disturbance in the cabin the crew needs to set priorities to protect
passengers, themselves and people on the ground from any chance of a terrorist takeover of the
flight
deck.
The best formula for crew coordination and communication under the new strategy of hijack begins
with prevention. The importance of the pre-flight briefing conducted by the Pilot-in-Command can't
be overstated. An effective briefing involves all crew members.
Security Department will add special topics if intelligence requires so. It must be made perfectly
clear,
that the Pilot-in-Command is the in-flight security coordinator and must be kept informed as quickly
and as good as possible, especially if a passenger disturbance above Level 1 is given.
Experience has shown that acronyms, slang, code words and signals can cause more trouble than
they
are worth. Plain English is the most reliable form of communication during any passenger
disturbance,
especially if a hijack is suspected.
As to the closed and locked cockpit door policy, the cabin interphone is the only mode of
communication required to be working between passenger cabin and the flight deck.
The Pilot-in-Command will convey details by means of air traffic control and company radio. Exact
details such as the following may be important to those attempting to make effective responses on
ground:
 The number of hijackers, names if used and description;
 Their seat location;
 The nature and number of their weapons;
 Their exact demands, route and destination;
 Quantity of fuel on board and technical status of aircraft.
A successful outcome may depend on the correctness of those details and the speed with which
they
are delivered to the right people.

10.6.13 Appropriate Responses to Defend Oneself

The best defensive measures are not reactive, but proactive preparation and prevention. Be aware
and pay special attention to the pre-flight briefing. If a Cabin Crew should be grabbed and held by an
aggressor it is crucial to break free.
Any intervention by a security agent, single crew member or able bodied passenger is far more
difficult
before separation from an aggressor. Separation improves the chances of subduing an aggressor
promptly before a threat escalates. In all respects of security, our eyes, ears and judgment are
usually
the best tools for self-defence we have.
We do not support the use of harmful devices (weapons) by crew members. Experts emphasize that
proficiency in such skills is difficult to gain in the first place and even more difficult to maintain at an
adequate level over time because of the amount of commitment necessary.
Violence on board can cause more trouble than they are worth.
Crew members are instructed and trained to immobilize unruly passengers that may affect the
safety
of the aircraft by use of non-lethal protective devices. Such training is included in the initial and
requalification
training Security courses and in the recurrent training course, on a frequency in
accordance with requirements (not less than once during every 24-month period).
The National Security Training Program does not require airline operators to train cabin crew
members
on passenger restraining, but according to Blue Air policy and Tokyo Convention, crew members are
instructed to act accordingly.

10.6.14 Psychology of Terrorists to Cope with Hijacker Behaviour and Passenger Responses

A useable psychological profile of a terrorist does not exist. Some common sense indicators do. A
passenger who is nervous or the opposite, numb and distant, should arouse the crew's suspicion.
Similarly, any passenger with an unusual interest in the flight deck and the crew should arouse
suspicion. Such a passenger should be observed most carefully during the first and the last 45
minutes
of the flight, when a hijack attempt is most likely.
Passenger responses to a terrorist action on an aircraft are probably well known to would-be
hijackers.
Intimidation is the first tool of the terrorist in causing submissive and compliant behaviour of crew
and
passengers. By alternately intimidating and reassuring victim, a terrorist can cause the so-called
Stockholm syndrome in which the victim actually sympathizes with the terrorist. Crew members
should
understand the Stockholm syndrome, expect it in a hijack or other terrorist action, and resist it when
they see it in effect.
The crew and passengers will usually outnumber any hijack team by a great margin. There is strength
in numbers, favouring the crew and passengers as long as they are not paralysed by intimidation or
subverted by the Stockholm syndrome.

10.6.15 Flight Deck Procedures or Aircraft Manoeuvres to Defend the Aircraft

A group of experts concluded that it is not recommend using the aircraft itself or its systems to
defend
against an attempt to breach the flight deck door and take control of a flight. The experts dismissed
depressurization and aggressive aircraft manoeuvring as effective counter measures.
Depressurization introduces too many unwanted risks and is ineffective against a determined
hijacker.
Aggressive aircraft manoeuvring is theoretically effective and might destabilize a would-be hijacker.
Such manoeuvres would have to be carefully developed by the airline and the manufacturer of the
specific aircraft make and model. But there is no guarantee that those manoeuvres might be
effective.
Furthermore, those manoeuvres might work against the people who could subdue the hijackers
from
within the cabin-cabin crew members, security agents and able bodied passenger helpers.
There is also a very real possibility to inadvertently cause catastrophic failure of the aircraft's
structure.

10.6.16 Post-Hijacking Procedures

 Report to security authorities;

 Try to contact head office direct (SATCOM, ACARS, telephone) or via company station or via
national diplomatic channels;
 Before facing the media, obtain prior advice from company representative and ground
authorities. It is imperative not to give information or statements which may assist any future
hijacking attempts;
 If continuation of the flight is not possible, the Pilot-in-Command and his crew must stay with
the passengers until their onward transportation has taken place.
10.6.17 Upon assault of Elite Troops
 Stay calm, no sudden move, choose BRACE position;
 Evacuation will be initiated by Elite Troops after all passengers have been checked for a
possible hidden hijacker (the sleeping enemy).