The 2003 Battle of Baghdad

A Case Study of Urban Battle during

Large-Scale Combat Operations
Maj. Nicolas Fiore, U.S. Army
History instructs that for a variety of reasons, cities have
always been targets for attack by adversaries.
—Gen. Donn A. Starry

Cities have been the dominant focus of military operations for

T he 2017 National Security Strategy and the U.S.
Army’s updated Field Manual 3-0, Operations,
formally reintroduced the context in which the
U.S. Army anticipates large-scale combat operations
(LSCO) against a peer adversary to seize or defend a
most of human history, and a fundamental purpose of armies major city in order to control its globally connected,
has been defending or attacking cities. Attacking defended regionally dominant concentrations of power, people, and
cities has been one of the most difficult and potentially costly resources.1 Large cities may constitute essential LSCO
military operations. … Unfortunately, although strategists campaign objectives in a limited war to liberate friendly
have advised against it and armies and generals have preferred populations, threaten an adversary’s control of its own
not to, the nature of war has required armies to attack and state, or dislocate an adversary who finds urban battle-
defend cities, and victory has required that they do it well. fields attractive as part of a cost-imposing strategy to de-
—Lt. Col. Louis DiMarco ter U.S. land forces and disrupt U.S. joint fires.2 Although
the scope of LSCO does not include battle for a megacity, adversary who is determined to fight an urban battle
a U.S. joint task force (JTF) could campaign to control against U.S. forces has already accepted the risk to its
the capital of a buffer state.3 Buffer states are often orga- forces and civilians on the battlefield, and also to the
nized around one dominant, globally connected large city high collateral damage associated with urban combat.
that contains the only operationally convenient infra- Ruthless adversaries may even seek a high-attrition,
structure for joint logistics (see figure 1 on page 129 for a high-destruction battle to deliberately inflict harm on
map of potential LSCO campaign urban objectives).4 concentrations of politically unfriendly civilians and
The U.S. Army has a long history with urban warfare, destroy their cities as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
from the Continental army’s 1775 inaugural campaign destroyed Aleppo from 2012 to 2017.11
to besiege British forces in Boston to the 2017 libera- Recognizing historical U.S. policy restraints, even
tion of Mosul from the Islamic State. Since World War adversaries with a vital postconflict interest in a theater’s
II, sweeping improvements in operational reach, mass cities are likely to seek urban battles as legitimate ways
urbanization, and the proliferation of irregular warfare to improve the correlation of forces and achieve their
increasingly compelled modern armies to fight in cities strategic objectives. U.S. commanders, bound by law
despite strategists’ aversion to the high casualties and and military ethics to establish rules of engagement that
collateral damage that characterize urban combat.5 Most minimize noncombatant deaths and wanton destruc-
recently, the major battles of the Syrian Civil War and tion, should expect to fight LSCO urban battles with the
the war against the Islamic State clearly demonstrate that dual objectives of defeating a peer-adversary force while
neither the Russian nor American armies can avoid ur- protecting the city from civilian casualties and collat-
ban battle. Although both forces achieved their strategic eral damage.12 Ever since the introduction of precision
objectives, visual media from Aleppo and the liberation of munitions, commanders in LSCO concentrated their use
Mosul reminded the world how destructive urban battles of firepower to seize urban objectives intact and man-
can still be.6 American military strategists questioned age damage to the city’s population, physical structures,
whether American voters, policy makers, and military ecology, and life-sustaining interstitial systems.13 In this
leaders would continue to accept such high levels of casu- context, a framework to structure the combat in an ur-
alties, collateral damage to infrastructure and the envi- ban battle can help U.S. Army commanders win LSCO
ronment, and the concomitant reconstruction expense to urban battles without accepting asymmetric risk to the
U.S. taxpayers.7 From a historical perspective, the dev- mission, force, and nearby civilians.
astation of Mosul’s urban center was quite normal, but
LSCO doctrine expects U.S. Army and allied land forces A Historical Framework
to replicate the exceptionally low destruction of the 2003 to Study Urban Battles
Battle of Baghdad, even when fighting peer adversaries.8 Urban battles typically follow a historical campaign
pattern that begins with fighting in the field and ends
For Context: LSCO Adversaries with one of the combatants consolidating control of
May Prefer Urban Battles the city to enable follow-on operations.14 In the classic
In an urban battle, LSCO peer adversaries can con- Jominian formulation of an offensive expeditionary cam-
test and even dominate domains in an effort to defeat paign, the line of operations leads from a base of opera-
and destroy U.S. forces who could not be effectively tions toward a decisive objective—often the adversary’s
resisted in the field.9 Adversaries defeated in the field capital.15 The adversary deploys from that base, and the
will likely retreat into the nearest city and attempt to defender accepts a decisive field battle in the frontier to
regroup, and the U.S. commander may not be able to protect the threatened city. If the attacker wins the field
spare enough combat power to operationally fix and battle, then the defender should concede the war and ne-
strategically isolate bypassed urban adversaries.10 An gotiate the terms of peace to avoid further battles. During

Previous page: A car burns on a bridge over the Euphrates River 31 March 2003 in Al Hindiyah, Iraq. U.S. Army Task Force 464, part of the 3rd
Infantry Division, seized the bridge as part of its campaign to move north toward Baghdad. (Photo by John Moore, Associated Press)

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 BATTLE OF BAGHDAD

Expeditionary large-scale combat operations land campaigns are likely to center on large cities.
In a limited war with the aim of returning the conflict to competition, the Army would probably avoid
adversary capitals, megacities, and force projection deep inland.

M M
M
M
M
M
M
M M

M M

Legend Red-filled states are the four named

M Megacity (Population > 10 million) potential adversaries in the U.S. National
Very large city (Population 2 million to 10 million) Security Strategy. Other cities are marked
Large city (Population 200 thousand to 2 million) near potential violent extremist adversaries.

(Figure by author; adapted from visualization by The Economist and the UN’s annual World Urbanization Prospects)

Figure 1. Large Cities in Potential Large-Scale

Combat Operations Conflict Areas

Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. Army executed this Synthesized from U.S. Army doctrine and historical
type of field-centric operational approach to dislocate the examples, the table (on page 130) shows an attacker-cen-
Iraqi army from Kuwait and avoided fighting an urban tric, chronologically arranged conceptual structure for
battle for Kuwait City and its surrounding oil infrastruc- an urban battle within a campaign’s line of operations.
ture. The successful conclusion of the war depended The concept starts with the defeat of the adversary field
on a credible U.S. capability to continue the attack on army and culminates with decisive exploitative actions
Basra and Baghdad. In 1991, President Saddam Hussein designed to defeat the defender’s military cohesion and
reframed the U.S. decision to refrain from such an attack prevent it from preserving control over any portion of
as a strategic victory for Iraq.16 In 2003, the U.S.-led co- the city that would be sufficient to reestablish defense
alition resumed the offensive line of operations to defeat in depth. First, U.S. joint forces can operate in a position
Hussein and forced him to fight defensive battles from his of technological advantage outside of the city, which
border rearward to Baghdad, his capital city. will help land forces dislocate the peer adversary from

MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2020 129

 Table. Historical Event Template for an Urban Battle

Attacking a large city Defending a large city

Defeat defending field army Prevent urban battle

Phase 0, • Secure line of operation to the city • If suitably advantageous, attempt to defeat
Open the • Neutralize adversary army-in-being to prevent relief of attacker away from city
Campaign city’s defenders • Or, trade space for time, withdraw to the city to
preserve combat power

Invest the city Concentrate forces within the city

• Encircle adversary forces in the city to interdict their • Disrupt and harass attacker’s approach
Phase I, lines of communication (LOC) • Remove all available terrain-and population-
Approach • Establish consolidation area, basing, and durable LOC sustainment into city
for prolonged siege • Maintain proximity to population for protection
• Negotiate to avoid siege and assault • Negotiate for time and external relief

Prepare an assault Prepare to defend

• Maintain encirclement and LOC • Protect and conserve military capabilities to
Phase II, • Reconnoiter to gain understanding sustain duration of resistance
Siege • Shape the battlefield to prepare for the assault, • Disrupt attacker’s preparation; attrit offensive
degrade adversary resistance, and influence civilian capability when economical
support • Negotiate for time and external relief

Assault to breach perimeter Attrit attacking forces

• Deliberate breaching operations • Use kill zones reinforced by obstacles
Phase III,
• Maintain command and sustainment of forces that • Maintain integrity of obstacle system
Assault
enter the city • Counterattack to stop penetrations and restore
• Establish a foothold to sustain reach defensive depth

Destroy adversary cohesion Preserve control

Phase IV, • Seize essential objectives • Reestablish a perimeter to maintain unit
Exploit • Destroy defender’s interior lines cohesion and interior lines
(Decisive) • Create information effects that defeat adversary’s • Trade space for more opportunities to attrit the
credibility and confidence attacker

Consolidate against remnants Minimize losses

• Clear city of organized defenders; prevent transition • Capitulate: negotiate for protection of
to insurgency combatants, civilians, and property
Phase V,
• Impose control and order on city, disrupt population • Denial: obliterate value from the city to degrade
Consolidate
support to adversary the attacker’s prize
Gains
• Follow-on forces assume stability role • Insurgency: transition to irregular defense;
• Consolidate gains and combat power to resume and disrupt consolidation of gains but not enough
sustain offensive operations to invite obliteration

(Table by author; applied concepts found in FM 3-0, Operations. This event template can frame tactical actions when studying or planning for urban battles.)

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 BATTLE OF BAGHDAD

the field, isolate remaining adversary forces inside the breach site and will penetrate the defender’s perimeter.
city, and shape the urban battlefield to create favorable However, modern urban density creates depth in large
conditions for an assault. Then, the JTF’s supremacy in cities that enables defensive delaying tactics, so it is more
integrated joint firepower will help land forces dominate difficult for the attacker to completely penetrate the
a small portion of the defender’s perimeter to penetrate, defensive perimeter in a way that automatically defeats
but the decisive point of the battle occurs after that suc- the cohesion of the adversary’s defense. The attacker must
cessful breach, when an assault element inside the city resource the assault for rapid and sustainable follow-on
must destroy the adversary’s defensive cohesion through operations to exploit the breach; otherwise, the defender
synchronized action in multiple domains. Finally, con- can use protected internal lines to concentrate combat
solidating the attack requires continuous operations to power to counterattack the penetrating force, establish
protect civilians and isolated adversary remnants using a new defensive perimeter, and force the attacker to pre-
the four stability mechanisms.17 pare another costly deliberate assault.
The urban battle begins in Phase I (Approach) when The fight to control the interior of the city in Phase
the defender abandons the field to consolidate its main IV (Exploit) is the operationally decisive phase of the
force within the city to defend its perimeter. Once the urban battle. When the attacker finally breaks the de-
attacker identifies that only a disruption force remains fender’s interior lines and seizes essential objectives, the
in the field, the attacker will deploy a division to ap- previously integrated defense will fragment into several
proach and invest the city while other forces deploy to unsupported positions without purpose, which the at-
protect the siege against external relief. If the attacker tacker can reduce at leisure. Conversely, if the defender
can encircle the city, it will gain the operational initia- can consistently withdraw and establish a new cohesive
tive by monopolizing the ability to deploy additional defense, then it can trade depth for fresh opportuni-
capabilities to the battlefield, and the attacker can ties to attrit the attacker until the costs of successive
leverage the city’s suburban transportation network to assaults force the attacker to quit the siege or until an
gain movement and distribution advantages. external force can come to the defender’s relief.
In Phase II (Siege), the attacker develops a siege Phase V (Consolidate Gains) is the conclusion of
that shapes the battlefield, the adversary, and friendly the battle. Whoever controls the city must consoli-
forces by improving the terrain, targeting adversary date gains in order to enable follow-on operations and
capabilities, and preparing maneuver units for the translate the outcome of the battle into the campaign’s
eventual assault.18 The defender prepares to repel desired strategic effect.
that assault by constructing shelters that protect and Whoever loses the urban Maj. Nicolas Fiore,
sustain combat power for the duration of the siege as battle could choose to U.S. Army, is an armor
well as tactical obstacles in engagement areas to attrit capitulate and negotiate officer and battalion
the attacker’s assault forces. The defender can also use with the attacker as in operations officer for 1st
regular and irregular spoiling attacks in the attacker’s Beirut (1982), or the Battalion, 67th Armored
close and consolidation areas to disrupt its prepara- loser could choose to Regiment, 3rd Brigade,
tion activities, influence negotiations, and even shift destroy the city to deny 1st Armored Division. A
the correlation of forces until it is so unfavorable that it to the attacker as in graduate of the School of
the attacker must quit the siege. Hue (1968) or Mosul Advanced Military Studies
Phase III (Assault) begins when the attacker assesses (2017). In recent U.S. at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
that conditions are most favorable to assault the city. Army urban battles in he holds a BS from the
This decision is influenced by mission considerations Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Military Academy and
(including policy, time available, and weather) and by the attacking force decisively an MBA from Dartmouth
success of both friendly and adversary shaping operations defeated adversaries in College. He has served
in altering the correlation of forces. Although a prepared Phase IV (Exploit), only in command and staff
defense will significantly attrit the assaulting force, as long to conduct years of Phase positions in Iraq, Germany,
as the attacker enjoys external freedom of maneuver, it V (Consolidate Gains) Afghanistan, Fort Hood, the
can deliberately concentrate overwhelming force at any stability operations Army Staff, and Fort Bliss.

MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2020 131

against insurgent adversaries who continued to contest A Bradley Fighting Vehicle from Company A, Task Force 1-64 Armor,
the Army for control of the city and its people. attacks up Highway 8 into Baghdad on 5 April 2003. The task force ex-
ecuted what were called “Thunder Runs” raids into Baghdad to assess
Iraqi defenses. (Photo courtesy of Fort Stewart Museum, U.S. Army)
Baghdad Was the Decisive Point in
the Coalition Forces Campaign Plan
In the following case study, we can use the framework
depicted in the table to retrospectively structure actions organization to defend the decisive capital city using a
by the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division (mechanized) cost-imposing strategy. The defenders’ hybrid tactics
(3rd ID) to seize the capital city of Iraq in the 2003 were similar to U.S. Army opposing forces doctrine, and
Battle of Baghdad. Baghdad is representative of the very in the dense urban environment, the Iraqis were able
large cities shown in figure 1 (on page 129). With a pop- to strongly contest the attacker in multiple domains, so
ulation of five million people, it was large, systemically they offered the U.S. forces a decisive urban battle for
important to the global energy economy, and composed control of Baghdad.19 The battle is most famous for 2nd
of modern physical structures serviced by integrated Brigade’s Phase III (Assault) “Thunder Run,” but the divi-
interstitial systems. In a LSCO context, the U.S. Army sional effort to shape in Phase II (Siege) and to sustain
attacked with an expeditionary division of combat maneuver in Phase IV (Exploit) to exploit 2nd Brigade’s
power to execute the campaign’s decisive battle. The de- breach were just as essential to winning the battle with-
fending Iraqis began the campaign with near-peer land out obliterating the city and its people.
and air forces but were overmatched in the field so they The seven-day long Battle of Baghdad was the
incorporated irregular forces into a hybrid-capability decisive battle of the U.S. LSCO campaign to remove

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 BATTLE OF BAGHDAD

Hussein from power and eliminate the risk that he destructive assault into Baghdad (Phase III, Assault
would use weapons of mass destruction to destabilize and Phase IV, Eploit).
the Middle East.20 Baghdad is a city of five million At this point in the war, Hussein feared a military
people, divided roughly in half by the Tigris River, coup as much as he feared a U.S. attack, so he orga-
with a generally radial pattern of modern roads. nized hybrid groups of regular army and paramilitary
During planning, American strategic and opera- organizations to ensure his control, even at the cost of
tional commanders in the Combined Forces Land undermining the coordinated defense of Baghdad (Phase
Component Command (CFLCC) agreed that seizing I, Approach).25 For weeks the Iraqi military deployed

Hussein feared a military coup as much as he feared

a U.S. attack, so he organized hybrid groups of regu-
lar army and paramilitary organizations to ensure his
control, even at the cost of undermining the coordi-
nated defense of Baghdad.

the “regime district” in western Baghdad was one of in concentric perimeters for a long siege and deliberate
the campaign’s military objectives because control clearance by U.S. light infantry (Phase II, Siege). After
of those key government headquarters in the heart studying the battles of Mogadishu and Grozny, Iraqi
of the city could defeat the adversary regime with- military planners did not expect the U.S. Army to expose
out requiring U.S. forces to clear every city block.21 its tanks to street fighting inside the city. In the absence
Unwilling to execute a deliberate, firepower-centric, of a cohesive central command, Iraqi commanders used
attritional approach to seizing the city, the CFLCC di- couriers to establish the city’s defenses, constructed hasty
rected 3rd ID and 1st Marine Division (1 MARDIV) barriers, and demolished the eastern Diyala River bridges
to attack Baghdad—but avoid house-to-house fight- to block the vehicular approaches to eastern Baghdad.26
ing—and seize only the critical nodes and infrastruc-
ture that might weaken the regime and hasten its col- U.S. 3rd Infantry Division
lapse. To reinforce the campaign’s strategic restraint (Mechanized) in the Battle
on the use of force, neither division was augmented of Baghdad, April 2003
with additional forces to clear and hold the large city’s After the initial fighting to cross the Iraqi border,
urban terrain and would not receive the replacements two U.S. corps invaded along parallel axes leading to
required to support high-attrition tactics.22 Instead, Baghdad.27 From 3 to 6 April, each corps led with a
the preinvasion plan to seize Baghdad envisioned U.S. mechanized division that destroyed two Iraqi Republican
forces invading from three different directions (Phase Guard divisions during the approach to Baghdad (Phase
I, Approach), then directed 3rd ID and 1 MARDIV 0). As expected, Iraqi forces withdrew into cities, which
to establish a loose cordon of operating bases outside the U.S. forces largely bypassed. A three-day operation-
Baghdad to invest the city (Phase II, Siege).23 Over al pause to refit 3rd ID also allowed the CFLCC to set
several weeks, mechanized forces would then con- conditions for the urban battle by first defeating Iraq’s
duct raids into the city, interdict Iraqi units trying mobile forces, attriting the Republican Guard divisions
to escape, and eventually, follow-on divisions would outside of Baghdad using joint firepower, and securing
clear the city once the Iraqi army was defeated (Phase 3rd ID’s ground supply lines back to the theater port of
V, Consolidate Gains).24 Strategic planners expected entry before ordering 3rd ID to approach Baghdad from
that pressure by land forces combined with airstrikes the south (Phase I, Approach).28
would force the Iraqi regime to capitulate and accept The 3rd ID commander, Maj. Gen. Buford C. Blount
U.S.-led regime change without an expensive and III, expected to face a sophisticated city-defense strategy

MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2020 133

in which elite Republican Guard units and Fedayeen Col. David Perkins, the brigade commander who
paramilitaries would block the approaches to key facilities commanded both Thunder Runs, decided to further
in western Baghdad’s riverside regime district. From 3 to modify the division’s operational approach. If it were
4 April, however, 3rd ID’s 1st and 2nd Brigades attacked feasible, Perkins not only wanted to attack deeper into
from the south and the northwest against ineffective western Baghdad than Blount intended, but he also
resistance over intact roads and bridges to seize Baghdad wanted to seize and hold his objective instead of con-
International Airport and surrounded the city from the ducting a raid and withdrawal. During the first Thunder
south, west, and north (Phase II, Siege). On the other Run, Perkins assessed that the Iraqi defense of western
side of the Tigris River, 1 MARDIV was still several days Baghdad was ill-prepared and uncoordinated. Iraqi
away from eastern Baghdad. forces were not systematically organized into integrated,
Intelligence and imagery reported that there were no obstacle-supported kill zones, and counterattacks were
integrated obstacles on the major highways, and coali- small and sporadic. This time, his brigade could pene-
tion airstrikes were so effective that Iraqi soldiers were trate the Iraqi defense without a deliberate breaching
deserting in large numbers. Blount concluded that the operation and sustain at least ten hours of combat in
Iraqi defense of Baghdad was much weaker than antic- central Baghdad. If resupplied on the objective, the sec-
ipated, and with control of the international airport as ond Thunder Run could even retain the regime district
a secure operating base, 3rd ID could sustain offensive where most of the essential government buildings were
operations with unexpected freedom of maneuver.29 located. The psychological effect could cause Hussein’s
He also realized that a long siege might not be neces- regime to collapse, and without those key facilities, the
sary to set conditions for a successful assault. Blount defenders’ ability to command and sustain the defense
preferred to retain the initiative and not give Hussein of Baghdad would disintegrate (Phase IV, Exploit).33
weeks to conduct an information campaign to inflame In response to 3rd Brigade’s 6 April attack to isolate
global public opinion against the blockade of Baghdad’s Baghdad from northern Iraq—and unaware that 2nd
five million civilians. Blount decided to depart from Brigade was preparing for another Thunder Run—the
the campaign plan and conduct a “Thunder Run”—in Iraqi Republican Guard concentrated a combined-arms
doctrine what is called a reconnaissance in force—on 5 brigade in northwest Baghdad and counterattacked 3rd
April to assess if it was possible to penetrate Baghdad’s Brigade at dawn on 7 April in an attempt to reopen the
defenses with minimal risk.30 On the other side of the Iraqi line of communication to reinforcements north
Diyala River, 1 MARDIV had not yet invested the of the city (Phase III, Assault). 3rd ID responded with
eastern half of the city, but Blount could still order 3rd massed artillery and airstrikes to support 3rd Brigade’s
Brigade to attack north on the following day, 6 April, to effort to block the Iraqi breakout at a bridge over the
complete the operational isolation of western Baghdad.31 Tigris River. Both sides struggled to control the essen-
The northern encirclement attack on 6 April was tial bridge, until the second Thunder Run began and
also successful but against tougher—if still ineffec- inadvertently spoiled the Republican Guard’s ability to
tive—Iraqi resistance. The two attacks validated reinforce its breakout attempt.34
that Blount could change his operational approach The second and decisive Thunder Run commenced
from a deliberate siege to a series of rapid penetra- on 7 April with a predawn breach to clear lanes through
tions to physically and psychologically dislocate the a hastily laid minefield (Phase III, Assault). Although
regime. If Thunder Runs could continue to penetrate dismounted sappers removed the mines covertly and
western Baghdad’s defenses with minimal casualties, the attack began as planned at dawn, the minefield
the psychological effect of Hussein not being able to indicated that Iraqi generals anticipated a second raid
control his own capital would be devastating to the and had improved their perimeter defense of western
regime. Instead of waiting for reinforcements and al- Baghdad.35 The division used long-range rockets to
lowing the Iraqis to improve their paltry engagement target high-payoff targets, such as Iraqi fire support and
areas, Blount ordered a second, much larger raid to air-defense artillery, and massed fires from a self-pro-
attack a little deeper along a different axis on 7 April pelled howitzer battalion to suppress each key intersec-
(Phase III, Assault).32 tion along 2nd Brigade’s route ten minutes ahead of the

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 BATTLE OF BAGHDAD

3rd Infantry Division sequenced brigade attacks to undermine Iraqi responses.

The Iraqi army could not react effectively to the daily change in 3rd ID’s direction of attack. The decisive 7 April
“2nd Thunder Run” spoiled the Iraqi breakout attempt and turned their defense of the Diyala River against 1st
Marine Division east of Baghdad.

APR 6:
PH II
X
3 ID
3rd

X
(+)

REP GD
APR 9:
PH V

OBJ
REGIME
DISTR.
APR 8-9:
PH V

X X XX (+)
3 ID 3 ID Tigris River
APR 3:
1st PH II 2nd USMC 1 DIV
(Figure by author)

Figure 2. 3rd Infantry Division’s Daily Attacks Spoiled the

Iraqi Army’s Defense of Baghdad

moving armored column.36 The division artillery denied in two hours to seize the regime district at the heart of
the Republican Guard’s use of these key terrain features Baghdad and then fought all day and night to defend
as defensive roadblocks and forced Iraqi infantry to its foothold against Iraqi counterattacks. Blount had to
harass the column with ineffective small-unit ambushes commit his reserve battalion to reinforce Perkins and
from bunkers and buildings near the road. The Iraqis resupply the 2nd Brigade so it could retain the regime
launched uncoordinated counterattacks with light district until morning. At dawn, international media
weapons, but without a well-prepared combined-arms reported that the U.S. Army had defeated the Iraqi
defense supported by integrated obstacles and artillery, Republican Guard inside its own capital, and Hussein’s
the Iraqis had no hope of stopping the mechanized regime began to collapse (Phase IV, Exploit).37 Figure 2 is
formation. 2nd Brigade penetrated twenty kilometers a map of the battle with heavy lines showing the actions

MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2020 135

on 7 April, the decisive day of the battle. Solid lines show Baghdad, reestablish order, and prepare for the next
the attacks that set conditions for the decisive Thunder combat operation (Phase V, Consolidate Gains).39 In
Run by seizing the airport for a division support area and a seven-day urban battle, two U.S. divisions dislocat-
isolating the northern and eastern sectors, and dotted ed Hussein’s regime from Baghdad and rendered the
lines show consolidation actions afterward. Iraqi regular military irrelevant. 3rd ID exploited
Thousands of Iraqi soldiers and militiamen the “Thunder Run” penetrations and made it clear to
counterattacked in small groups until the morning of Hussein’s regime, the Iraqi people, and international
8 April, but 3rd ID retained both the encirclement audiences that American forces controlled Baghdad
of western Baghdad and the decisive foothold in the and had won the LSCO phase of the war.40 Hussein
central regime district.38 The Iraqi military command was not captured, however, and his regime never

Soldiers from Company A, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, search one of the presidential palaces 8 April 2003 in Baghdad. The palace
was the second that the U.S. Army had secured in as many days; both lavish buildings were heavily damaged by U.S. Air Force bombing.
(Photo by John Moore, Associated Press)

proved unable to reestablish a perimeter to defend formally capitulated. The regime’s key leaders reorga-
the rest of the city (Phase IV, Exploit), and as early as nized the surviving soldiers for a guerrilla campaign
7 April, some Iraqi units began disbanding to pursue that soon returned him to strategic relevance.41
guerrilla warfare. Iraqi forces continued to melt away
on 8 and 9 April when 1 MARDIV crossed the Diyala Conclusion: Using the Framework
River into eastern Baghdad and linked up with 3rd to Analyze the Battle of Baghdad
ID at the Tigris. On 10 April, the U.S. Marine Corps The framework in the table is a way to understand
and 3rd ID began consolidation operations to clear the seven-day Battle of Baghdad by arranging tactical

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actions sequentially into phases. The Phase III (Assault) Historically, Phase IV (Exploit) is decisive in urban
penetration into the heart of the regime district was battles because after penetrating the defensive perim-
preceded by weeks of joint fires and shaping attacks to eter, the attacker gains an opportunity to destroy the
isolate the regime inside Baghdad, and it was decisive defenders’ interior lines and cohesion and prevent the
because it created opportunities that the division exploit- establishment of a new perimeter. Blount recognized
ed at tempo. The phases may not have firm transitions; that the tactically successful Phase III (Assault) attacks

It is obvious that the Iraqi defenders were explicit-

ly unprepared to defend Baghdad inside the city’s
urban environment and did not transition well be-
tween the phases.

for example, in the Battle of Baghdad, the coalition was to encircle Baghdad and to seize its airport, and even
still fighting to surround the city (Phase II, Siege) when the first Thunder Run inflicted heavy casualties but
Perkins’s brigade executed the 7 April Thunder Run. did not significantly impact the regime’s will to fight.42
However, actions can still be arranged by purpose to un- LSCO penetrations have proved effective at destroy-
derstand the relationship between the phases, especially ing adversary capabilities but ineffective at convincing
once 3rd ID approached Baghdad and began to isolate adversaries to negotiate a resolution to the conflict. The
the Iraqi defenders from external assistance. second Thunder Run toppled Hussein’s regime because
During Phase II (Siege) and Phase III (Assault), it was nested with a global information and psycho-
Blount sequenced his brigade attacks for maximum logical operation that convinced enough Iraqis that
effect; every day, a different brigade seized a new continuing to fight to defend Baghdad—and the regime
objective in Baghdad from a different direction than that claimed to control it—was futile.
the day before. This sequencing maintained pres- Through the lens of the framework, it is obvious
sure on Hussein’s regime and spoiled the defenders’ that the Iraqi defenders were explicitly unprepared to
response to the previous day’s attack by creating a new defend Baghdad inside the city’s urban environment
dilemma each morning. 3rd ID’s measured tempo also and did not transition well between the phases.43
ensured that the headquarters could concentrate di- Throughout the battle, routes were intact because
visional resources in support of that day’s main effort Hussein refused to allow his military to deliberate-
and maintain a mechanized battalion as the division ly destroy bridges and overpasses during Phase I
commander’s maneuver reserve at the airport. The re- (Approach).44 He forbid his military commanders
serve could respond to any threat in western Baghdad to coordinate Baghdad’s defense, prepare defensive
within two hours, and this mitigated the risk that an obstacles in depth, or withdraw the Republican Guard
element of 3rd ID could be cut off deep in Baghdad armored divisions into the city where artillery and
the way Somali militia concentrated to defeat the firepower could have engaged American armor at
U.S. mobile column in the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu. close range.45 Instead of fighting a Phase II (Siege) de-
Blount’s reserve proved essential on 7 April when it fensive delay to gain time in eastern Baghdad’s dense
escorted 2nd Brigade’s logistical resupply convoy into zones of multiple-story residences, the Iraqi military
central Baghdad to exploit the penetration’s tactical destroyed bridges over the Diyala. The river created
success. Without that resupply and the extra battalion a barrier that kept the 1 MARDIV out of eastern
of reinforcements, Perkins’s brigade could not have Baghdad for two additional days, but the decision
stayed in central Baghdad and the second Thunder also shifted the coalition to focus on western Baghdad
Run would have had no more strategic effect than its where concrete highways and the wide-open regime
Phase III (Assault) predecessors. district were vulnerable to the Thunder Run tactics.46

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If 3rd ID had followed the preinvasion plan to besiege chose not to forbid the aggressive raids, and Blount
its half of the city and waited for 1 MARDIV to clear and Perkins each took maximum advantage of their
eastern Baghdad in a series of deliberate Phase III respective higher commander’s intent when planning
assaults, then the Iraqis could have created enough and executing the Thunder Runs.48 Regardless, no
time to organize a better defense of western Baghdad. amount of U.S. soldiers would have been sufficient in
Baghdad’s rivers and canals provide natural terrain for Phase V (Consolidate Gains) to pursue and process
successive defensive perimeters; if the Iraqi military the hundreds of thousands of armed but disorganized
had developed concentric obstacle belts, each canal soldiers and militia outside of Baghdad who scattered
and neighborhood would have offered a new Phase IV across the country after the Battle of Baghdad and
(Exploit) opportunity to attrit the coalition. Weeks of later reconstituted themselves as insurgents.49
defensive delay operations could have given Hussein Even though 3rd ID did not capture enough of
the time he needed to strategically exploit collateral the regime’s key leaders, remaining military person-
damage to undermine the coalition and resolve the nel, and equipment in Phase IV (Exploit) and Phase
conflict along the lines of Desert Storm in 1991. V (Consolidate Gains) to prevent the later insur-
Hussein did not retain control of Baghdad long gency, 3rd ID’s Thunder Runs undisputedly won
enough to deliberately affect the battle’s Phase V the Battle of Baghdad.50 3rd ID defeated the Iraqi
(Consolidate Gains) activities. For several months, defenders, exploited the mechanized penetrations to
the coalition consolidated control of Baghdad and the dislocate Hussein’s regime, and seized Baghdad with
rest of Iraq, neither opposed nor assisted by Hussein’s less-than-expected civilian casualties and collateral
former regime. Perhaps the original campaign plan’s destruction.51 The historical framework used in this
slower, more-deliberate operational approach to article helps readers analyze the Baghdad Thunder
seizing Baghdad would have better mitigated the Runs within the battle’s larger context and notice the
insurgency that erupted in 2004.47 U.S. strategic and significance of the shaping and exploitation actions
operational commanders assumed that risk when they before and after the famous mechanized raids.52

Notes
Epigraph. Donn Starry, foreword to Block by Block: The 3. Michael Evans, “The Case Against Megacities,” Parameters 45,
Challenges of Urban Operations, ed. William G. Robertson and no. 1 (Spring 2015): 33–43.
Lawrence A. Yates (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command 4. “Daily Chart: Bright Lights, Big Cities,” The Economist (website),
and General Staff College [CGSC] Press, 2003), vii, accessed 1 May 4 February 2015, accessed 1 May 2020, http://www.economist.com/
2020, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Primer-on-Ur- node/21642053; United Nations (UN) Department of Economic and
ban-Operation/Documents/BlockByBlock_TheChallengesOfUr- Social Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision (New
banOperations.pdf. York: UN, 2018), accessed 1 May 2020, https://population.un.org/
wup/Publications/Files/WUP2018-Report.pdf.
5. Roger J. Spiller, Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century’s
Epigraph. Louis DiMarco, “Attacking the Heart and Guts: Urban End (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Press, 2001), v–27.
Operations through the Ages,” in Robertson and Yates, Block by 6. Thomas Arnold and Nicolas Fiore, “Five Operational Lessons
Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations, 1. from the Battle for Mosul,” Military Review 99, no. 1 ( January 2019):
56–71.
7. Gian Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character of Urban Opera-
1. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United tions for the U.S. Army: How the Past Can Inform the Present and Future
States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, 2017); Field (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017).
Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 8. John Spencer, “The Destructive Age of Urban Warfare; or,
Publishing Office [GPO], 2017). How to Kill a City and How to Protect It,” Modern War Institute
2. FM 6-27, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land at West Point, 28 March 2019, accessed 4 May 2020, https://
Warfare (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2019), para. 1-19. The U.S. mwi.usma.edu/destructive-age-urban-warfare-kill-city-protect/;
Army’s manual on the law of land warfare specifically constrains The White House, National Security Strategy, 2. The National
commanders’ use of military force in urban battles and exhorts the Security Strategy names four adversaries: China, Russia, Iran, and
commander to exceed the minimal requirements of military necessi- North Korea.
ty, humanity, honor, distinction, and proportionality when planning 9. FM 3-0, Operations, 1-9; John Spencer, “Stealing the Enemy’s
to use military force near civilians and noncombatants. Urban Advantage: The Battle of Sadr City,” Modern War Institute at

138 September-October 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 BATTLE OF BAGHDAD

West Point, 31 January 2019, accessed 4 May 2020, https://mwi.usma. 25. Ibid., 69–75. In the week before the invasion, many of
edu/stealing-enemys-urban-advantage-battle-sadr-city/. the Iraqi irregular and militia forces moved from Baghdad to
10. Russell W. Glenn, Heavy Matter: Urban Operations’ Density of defend other cities in the south. It is unclear how many returned
Challenges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 11. Glenn to Baghdad by the time the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized)
points out that even bypassed cities can become resource magnets attacked in April.
for the operational-level commander. 26. David Zucchino, Thunder Run (New York: Grove Press, 2004),
11. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent 135–48.
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/ 27. Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War: A
HRC/40/70 (New York: UN General Assembly, 2017), accessed 4 Military History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2003), 89–96.
May 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ 28. Ibid., 241–45.
G1902320.pdf; Amnesty International, Left to Die Under Siege: War 29. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 331–36.
Crimes and Human Rights Abuses in Eastern Ghouta, Syria (London: 30. Jim Lacey, Takedown: The 3rd Infantry Division’s Twenty-One
Peter Benenson House, 2015), 51, accessed 4 May 2020, https:// Day Assault on Baghdad (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007),
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/2079/2015/en/. 205-6.
12. FM 6-27, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land 31. Rayburn and Sobchak, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, 100–1.
Warfare, para. 2-22. 32. Anthony E. Carlson, “Thunder Run in Baghdad, 2003,” in 16
13. Starry, foreword to Robertson and Yates, Block by Block, viii. Cases of Mission Command, ed. Donald P. Wright (Fort Leavenworth,
Interstitial systems connect and support life and activity within a city, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 108–9.
commonly including water, food, energy, communications, transpor- 33. Zucchino, Thunder Run, 72–82.
tation, manufacturing, economic, commercial, and entertainment sys- 34. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 374–76.
tems; Michael Batty, “Cities as Complex Systems: Scaling, Interactions, 35. Zucchino, Thunder Run, 97–101.
Networks, Dynamics, and Urban Morphologies,” in Encyclopedia of 36. Ibid., 103–4.
Complexity and Systems Science, ed. Robert A. Meyers (New York: 37. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 352–54.
Springer, 2009), 1042–43. 38. Zucchino, Thunder Run, 195–97. Lt. Col. Stephen Twitty’s
14. DuPuy Institute, Measuring the Effects of Combat in Cities experience is typical of these small counterattacks by ad hoc platoon-
Phase I (Fort Belvoir, VA: Center for Army Analysis, 2002), 5–6. and company-sized groups armed with rifles and rocket-propelled
15. H. W. Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science (New grenades, and sometimes supported by vehicle-borne suicide
York: D. Appleton, 1846), 56. As translated by Halleck, Baron An- bombers. Instead of using assembly areas to organize, they often
toine-Henri de Jomini’s Art of War described the standard archetype drove or ran indiscriminately into lethal U.S. engagement areas.
for an offensive land campaign: win the war by defeating the adver- 39. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 377–78.
sary’s army in the field and seizing their capital. 40. Bing West and Ray L. Smith, The March Up: Taking Baghdad
16. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s with the 1st Marine Division (New York: Bantam Books, 2003), 231–32.
War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 41. Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 252.
1995), 480. 42. Zucchino, Thunder Run, 72–73.
17. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Operations 43. Stephen Biddle, “Speed Kills? Reassessing the Role of Speed,
(Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2016), 2-3. The four Army stability Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of Saddam,” Journal of
mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. Strategic Studies 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 3–46. Biddle assessed that
18. The term “siege” is used here instead of “isolate” to allow for the U.S. invasion owed much of its success to Iraqi military incompe-
surrounding a city without the intent to psychologically isolate the tence. Biddle specifically pointed out that in the Battle of Baghdad,
defenders. the Iraqi failure to destroy bridges to slow down the coalition and
19. Training Circular 7-100, Hybrid Threat (Washington, DC: U.S. the decision not to use the Republican Guard in an urban warfare
Government Printing Office, 2010), chap. 4 and 5. The U.S. Army’s environment.
Training Circular 7-100 series manuals describe contemporary 44. Gregory Hooker, Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Free-
hybrid adversary organization, strategy, and tactics. Chapters 4 and 5 dom: The Role of Military Intelligence Assessments, Military Research
discuss hybrid adversary urban operational approach. Papers No. 4 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East
20. Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: Policy, 2005), 70–71.
United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 45. Lacey, Takedown, 159.
Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), xxiii. 46. West and Smith, The March Up, 190–205.
21. William Wallace and Kevin C. M. Benson, “Beyond the 47. Rayburn and Sobchak, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, 103.
First Encounter: Planning and Conducting Field Army and Corps The campaign originally planned for 70–120 days of combat, includ-
Operations,” in Bringing Order to Chaos: Historical Case Studies of ing time to negotiate with the Iraqi regime, but the actual fighting
Combined Arms Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, ed. took only twenty days.
Peter J. Schifferle (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 48. Lacey, Takedown, 230–33.
2018), 6–9. 49. Walter J. Boyne, Operation Iraqi Freedom (New York: Forge
22. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 47–50. Press, 2003), 161–63.
23. Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak, eds., The U.S. Army 50. Ibid., 241.
in the Iraq War, Volume 1: Invasion, Insurgency, Civil War 2003-2006 51. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, xxiii and 378.
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College 52. Boyd L. Dastrup, Artillery Strong: Modernizing the Field
Press, 2019), 59. Artillery for the 21st Century (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies
24. Ibid., 99. Institute Press, 2018), 150–67; Lacey, Takedown, 260–61.

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