Submission Esther
Submission Esther
Submission Esther
YOUR HONOUR,
The Plaintiff /Applicants approached this Honorable Court vides a Notice of motion filed under
Certificate of Urgency dated 16 January, 2023and it was certified as such whilst seeking for
orders inter alia:
1. Spent
2. Spent
3. This honorable court be pleased to review, rescind, vary and set aside orders issued on
24.1.2022 dismissing plaintiff’s case.
4. The honorable court be pleased to set aside subsequent orders issued pursuant to the
dismissal of the plaintiff’s case
5. This suit be reinstated for proper determination of the rights and liabilities of the
defendant
6. The applicant be granted leave to amend her plaint
7. Costs of the suit application be on the cause
Brief Facts
1. The plaintiff/Applicant moved this honorable court vide application dated 16 th January
2023 in which she sought the grant to review, rescind, vary and set aside orders issued on
24.1.2022 dismissing plaintiff’s case and reinstate the case.
2. Sometimes back in around march,2021, the plaintiff/applicant had instituted a suit
against the respondent herein seeking an inalienable right to suit parcel of land as under
imminent danger ,the defendant had illegally encroached the plaintiff’s parcel of land of
refence No. SOUTH MUGIRANGO/BOSINANGE/6037
3. The plaintiff/applicant avers that the she acquired the proprietorship rights over the land
in dispute together with the husband at a total consideration of Kenya shillings kshs.
6,000 as well as a goat as agreed vide an agreement dated 10.03.1970 which she paid full.
She had been having a peaceful occupation of land since immemorial time
4. Around, 2013, the respondent illegally encroached the plaintiff’s title number SOUTH
MUGIRANGO/BOSINANGE/6037 by claiming proprietorship at the expense of
plaintiff. The respondent fraudulently acquired the title deed of the parcel and endangered
the plaintiff’s inalienable right.
5. The plaintiff claimed for cancellation of the illegally obtained title and permanent
injunction.
6. The plaint was followed by an application dated 29th march ,2021 seeking interlia,
a. Temporary injunction restraing defendant/ respondent from developing ,selling or
interfering with the parcel in question SOUTH
MUGIRANGO/BOSINANGE/6037 pending determination of the application
b. Temporary injunction restraing defendant/ respondent from developing ,selling or
interfering with the parcel in question SOUTH
MUGIRANGO/BOSINANGE/6037 pending determination of main suit
c. Suit of the application.
7. About 2nd Dec, 2021, a withdrawal notice of the whole suit against the defendant was
erroneously drawn and subsequently filed which was allowed.
8. The plaintiff /respondent upon realizing this, approached the firm of MOGIRE
NYAMWAYA & CO.ADVS and filed an application dated 16th Jan ,2023 seeking the
grant to review, rescind, vary and set aside orders issued on 24.1.2022 dismissing
plaintiff’s case and reinstate the case on the ground that the matter was withdrawn by
advocate on record without the plaintiff/applicant’s consent, it will be unjust foe the
plaintiff to be punished on the account of the mistake of the advocate on record and
prayed for the court to reinstate the matter.
Issues
It is in the humble view of the Plaintiff’s/Applicant’s that the issues for determination in this
application are as follows:-
1. Whether the Plaintiff/Applicant has met the threshold for granting order to review,
rescind, and / or vary orders issued on 24.1.2022 dismissing plaintiff’s case.
2. Whether the court to set aside orders issued on 24.1.2022 dismissing plaintiff’s case.
3. Whether the said suit can be reinstated for proper determination of the rights and
liabilities of the defendant
Analysis
Whether the Plaintiff/Applicant has met the threshold for granting order to review,
rescind, and / or vary orders issued on 24.1.2022 dismissing plaintiff’s case.
In Julius Ochieng Oloo & another v Lilian Wanjiku Gitonga [2019] eKLR, the Court of
Appeal expressed itself as follows on the same issue:-
‘’That said the question before us is whether lack of jurisdiction by the court against
which review was being sought albeit introduced late could have been a ground for
review as envisioned under Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules; and further,
whether the ratio decidendi by the learned Judge is erroneous in law. The grounds
for review as envisaged under the said Order are limited to; (a) Discovery of new and
important matters or evidence which was not within the knowledge of the applicant
or which could not be produced by him at the time when the decree or order was
made; (b) a mistake or error on the face of the record; or c) some other sufficient
reason. Supplemental to the above is that the application must be brought without
unreasonable delay.
Your honor, that the Plaintiff’s previous advocate never sought the Plaintiff’s instructions to
withdraw the case. The advocates are creatures of instructions and they only file suits at the
behest of their clients, and the previous absence advocate had authority to withdraw the suit.in
the case of Martha Wangari Karua v IEBC&3 Others and Philip Chemwolo & Another v
Augustine Kubede, “… no party should be driven away from the seat of justice without being
given an opportunity to have his case heard on merits irrespective of advocates mistakes.
Mbogo & Another v Shah which held that the court had power to set aside an ex parte order in
the event of a mistake and that the discretion is not intended to assist a litigant who deliberately
seeks to obstruct or delay the course of justice. also cited Belinda Murai & Others v Amoi
Wainaina which held that “the door of justice is not closed because a mistake has been made by
a lawyer. Additionally, Philip Chemwolo & Another v Augustine Kubede[12] which held: -
“Blunder will continue to be made from time to time and it does not follow that because a
mistake has been made that a party should suffer the penalty of not having his case heard
on merit. I think the broad equity approach to this matter is that un less there is fraud or
intention to over reach, there is no error or default that cannot be put right by payment of
costs. The court as is often said exists for the purpose of deciding the rights of the parties
and not the purpose of imposing discipline.”
In Candominium Plan No. 0724494 v Efuwape which held that special circumstances in the
nature of a slip must be established before a discontinuance may be withdrawn and there must be
no prejudice to the defendant. further reliance on Suleiman v Ambose Resort Limited for the
proposition that the court in exercising its discretion, should always opt for the lower rather than
the higher risk of injustice. In the Court of Appeal in Hirani v Kassam which emphasized the
binding nature of consent orders and the limited circumstances under which they can be set
aside.
we humbly submit that the delay was not inordinate, and that the Plaintiff approached the court
soon after learning what happened. We attribute that the delay to the previous advocates.and a
mistake of an advocate should not be visited on the client, (Citing Lucy Bosire v Kehancha Div-
Land Disputes Tribunal and 2 Others) and urged the court to consider the peculiar circumstances
of this case. We rely on Agip (K) Limited v Highlands Tyres Limited in support of the proposition
that all parties must be given an opportunity to be heard. also on Essanji & Another v Solanki
which held that the administration of justice requires that the substance of a dispute must be
determined on merits. (Also cited John Nahashon & Mwangi v Kenya Finance Bank Limited (in
Liquidation) and that the defendant has not demonstrated the prejudice they will suffer.
Plaintiffs have a Right to withdraw a Notice of Withdrawal but there may be instances where an
already Discontinued suit can be resurrected and allowed to continue.
In respect to the test for withdrawal of a discontinuance the Court was referred to the Canadian
case of Candominium Plan No. 0724494 vs. Efuwape 2012 ABQB 355 (CanLII), in which the
Court held:-
“The test for withdrawal of discontinuance is set out in Neis v. Yancey, (1999) ABCA
272 at para. 27. Madam Justice Russell, writing for the Court found:
[Master Funduk, in Eisenkrein v. Eisenkrein (1984) 53 A.R. 199,] adopted the test
for the withdrawal of a discontinuance equivalent to that enunciated in Barasky v.
Quinlan, supra, stating that “where a limitation period has accrued, a discontinuance
can be withdrawn only if there are ‘very special circumstances”’ such as where a
plaintiff discontinued the wrong action, or where the defendant breached conditions
upon which the discontinuance was given. Special circumstances have also been
defined to include cases of “inadvertence, mistake or misapprehension of relevant
procedural matter”: Adam and Adam v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia
(1985), 1985 CanLII 584 (BC CA), 66 B.C.L.R. 164 at p. 170 (C.A.); Morten
(Litigation guardian of) v. Fanzutti, [1994] O.J. No. 1129 (Q.L.) (Gen. Div.); Singh v.
Street Bernt and Traditional Holdings Ltd., 1990 CanLII 7820 (SK CA), [1990] 5
W.W.R. 518 at p. 523 (Sask. C.A.). Such circumstances suggest oversight rather than
the sort of substantive mistakes of law in this case. Hence, I agree with Master
Funduk that special circumstances in the nature of a slip must be established before a
discontinuance may be withdrawn. Therefore, special circumstances must include an
absence of actual prejudice to the defendant: Bararsky v. Quinlan, as well as a
consideration of the circumstances giving rise to the discontinuance.”
It would be different where a Party is required to seek Leave of Court before Withdrawing or
Discontinuing and the Court has not granted that Leave or made the endorsement. The
Withdrawal or Discontinuance having not been effectuated the Plaintiff, where appropriate,
should be able to recall the Notice of Withdrawal or Discontinuance. What is appropriate will
depend on the circumstance and facts of each case. One such instance that comes to mind, is
where there has been agreement by the parties to withdraw a suit on certain conditions which the
Defendant subsequently breaches. The Plaintiff should be permitted to recall the Notice of
withdrawal if it had not been endorsed. One theme of the Court of Appeal decision in Beijing
(supra) is that Courts should avoid a literal application of order 25 Rule 1 where such application
would aid in the abuse of the process of Court. In the same vein, I would think, even in the
absence of an express provision permitting the withdrawal of a Notice to Discontinue or
Withdraw, a Court should apply the Provisions of Order 25 Rule 1 in such manner as may be
necessary for the ends of justice where Leave for Withdrawal or Discontinuance is required but
is yet to be given. Having held that this matter falls in the category of cases where a unilateral
withdrawal could not be permitted, I must now turn to examine whether there is good reason to
permit the Plaintiffs to call back their intention.
How do the Plaintiffs explain their action and change of heart? I need not paraphrase the
Plaintiffs explanation and find it more convenient to reproduce their explanation as captured;
“…
4. The plaint was followed by an application dated 29th march ,2021 seeking interlia,
a. Temporary injunction restraing defendant/ respondent from
developing ,selling or interfering with the parcel in question SOUTH
MUGIRANGO/BOSINANGE/6037 pending determination of the application
b. Temporary injunction restraing defendant/ respondent from
developing ,selling or interfering with the parcel in question SOUTH
MUGIRANGO/BOSINANGE/6037 pending determination of main suit
c. Suit of the application.
5. About 2nd Dec, 2021, a withdrawal notice of the whole suit against the defendant was
erroneously drawn and subsequently filed which was allowed.
6. The plaintiff /respondent upon realizing this, approached the firm of MOGIRE
NYAMWAYA & CO.ADVS and filed an application dated 16 th Jan ,2023 seeking
the grant to review, rescind, vary and set aside orders issued on 24.1.2022 dismissing
plaintiff’s case and reinstate the case on the ground that the matter was withdrawn
by advocate on record without the plaintiff/applicant’s consent, it will be unjust foe
the plaintiff to be punished on the account of the mistake of the advocate on record
and prayed for the court to reinstate the matter”.
Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides as follows: -
When there is a change of advocate, or when a party decides to act in person having
previously engaged an advocate, after judgment has been passed, such change or
intention to act in person shall not be effected without an order of the court—
(b) Upon a consent filed between the outgoing advocate and the proposed
Incoming advocate or party intending to act in person as the case may be.
The reasoning behind the provision was well articulated in the case of S. K. Tarwadi v
Veronica Muehlmann (Supra) where the judge observed as follows:
“…In my view, the essence of the Order 9 Rule 9 of the CPR was to protect advocates
from the mischievous clients who will wait until a judgment is delivered and then sack the
advocate and either replace him….”
From the applications, there is total consent received from the two firms. Mr. Gichana had
filed a notice informing Mr Masese regarding the change and his coming in as new
advocate on records for the applicants/objectors. We therefore humbly request this
honorable court to grant the order prayed for.
Whether the court to set aside and/or vary orders issued on 7th March 2017
The courts are guided by the provisions of Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution and Section 1A
and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act in administering justice. The focus being on substantive
justice, rather than procedural technicalities, and the just, efficient and expeditious disposal of
cases.
Order 10, of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, addresses the issue of consequences of non-
appearance, default of defense and failure to serve by a party. Order 10, rule 4 empowers Courts
to enter interlocutory judgment in cases where the plaint is drawn with a claim for pecuniary
damages only or for detention of goods with or without a claim for pecuniary damages. On the
other hand, rule 9 gives the Plaintiff the leeway to set down a suit for hearing where no
appearance is entered for other suits not provided for by this Order. Order 10, rule 10 provides
that in cases where a defendant has failed to file a defense, rules 4 to 9 shall apply with any
necessary modification. While Rule 11 empowers the court to set a side or vary a judgment that
has been entered under Order 10.
Courts have the discretionary power to set aside ex parte judgment with the main aim being that
justice should prevail. The Courts are not required to consider the merits of a defense in an
application of this nature, although the applicant has a defense to the counter-claim which it
should be allowed to be heard on merit. Therefore, courts ought to look at the draft Defence to
the plaint and accompanying witness statements before proceeding to give its ruling as to
whether the applicant’s defense raises triable issues. In Patel -v- E.A. Handling Services Ltd
(1974) EZ 75 and Tree Shade Motor Ltd -v- D.T. Dobie Co. Ltd CA 38 of 1998 and Mania -v-
Muriuki (1984) KLR 407 the courts held that the discretion of the court should be exercised to
avoid injustice or hardship resulting from accident, inadvertence and excusable mistake or error.
The general principle is that an applicant should not suffer due to a mistake of its Counsel. This
was the position in Lee G. Muthoga -v- Habib Zurich Finance (K) Ltd & Another, Civil
Application No. Nair 236 of 2009 where it was held that:
“it is widely accepted principle of law that a litigant should not suffer because of his
Advocate’s oversight.”
In the case Winnie Wambui Kibinge & 2 Others -v- Match Electricals Limited Civil Case No.
222 of 2010 the Court held that:
“It does not follow that just because a mistake has been made a party should suffer the
penalty of not having his case heard on merit.”
In the case Mohamed & Another -v- Shoka (1990) KLR 463 the Court set out the tenets a court
should consider in entering interlocutory judgment to include:
The issue of regular judgment was addressed in the case Mwala -v- Kenya Bureau of Standards
EA LR (2001) 1 EA 148, where the court stated;
“to all that I should add my own views that a distinction is to be drawn between a
regular and irregular ex-parte judgment. Where the judgment sought to be set aside is a
regular one, then all the above consideration as to the exercise of discretion should be
borne in mind in deciding the matter. Where on the other hand, the judgment sought to
be set aside is an irregular one, for instance, one obtained either where there is no
proper service, or any service at all of the summons to enter appearance or when there is
a memorandum of appearance or defence on record but the same was in inadvertently
overlooked the same ought to be set aside not as a matter of discretion, but ex debit
justiciae for a court should never countenance an irregular judgment on its record.”
In the cases of Patel -v- E.A. Handling Services Ltd (1974) EZ 75 and Tree Shade Motor Ltd -
v- D.T. Dobie Co. Ltd CA 38 of 1998 and Thayu Kamau Mukigi -v- Francis Kibaru Karanja
(2013) eKLR, the court stated as follows:
“on the second prayer of the defendant that he be granted leave to file his defence and
counter claim, I will be guided by the principles elucidated in the case of Tree Shade
Limited -v- DT Dobie Co. Ltd. CA 38/98 where the court held that when an ex-parte
judgment was lawfully entered the court should look at the draft defence to see if it
contained a valid or reasonable defence.”
Its noticeable that the Applicants/objectors Advocate failed ignore or neglect to enter
appearance/file a defence was on their part, citing inadvertent mistake. It is a general law that
Advocate’s failure to execute his client’s instructions amounts to professional negligence. This
was the position in Water Painters International -v- Benjamin Ko’goo t/a Group of Women in
Agriculture Kochieng (Gwako) Ministries (2014) eKLR, where the Court stated that;
“…in the words of justice Ringera in Omwoyo vs African Highlands & Produce Co. Ltd
(2002 J) KLR, time has come for the legal Practitioners to shoulder the consequences of
their negligent acts of omissions like other professionals do in their fields of endeavour.
The Plaintiff should not be made to shoulder the consequences of negligence of the
defendant’s Advocates. This is a proper case where the Defendant’s remedy is against
its Advocate, while suing advocates for professional negligence and not setting aside the
judgment.”
The Court’s power to set aside a judgment is exercised with a view of doing justice between the
parties. Reliance is placed on the case of, Philip Kiptoo Chemwolo and Mumias Sugar
Company Ltd -v- Augustine Kubede (1982-1988) KAR, where the Court held:
“The Court has unlimited discretion to set aside or vary a judgment entered in default of
appearance upon such terms as are just in the light of all facts and circumstances both
prior and subsequent and of the respective merits of the parties”
In the case of Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology -v- Musa Ezekiel
Oebal (2014) e KLR, the Court stated that the purpose of clothing the court with discretion to set
aside ex-parte judgment is:
Order 10 Rule 4 (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 which provide as follows:
“4(1) Where the plaint makes a liquidated demand only and the defendant fails to
appear on or before the day fixed in the summons or all the defendants fail so to appear,
the court shall, on request in Form No. 13 of Appendix A, enter judgment against the
defendant or defendants for any sum not exceeding the liquidated demand together with
interest thereon from the filing of the suit, at such rate as the court thinks reasonable, to
the date of the judgment, and costs.
(2) Where the plaint makes a liquidated demand together with some other claim, and the
defendant fails, or all the defendants fail, to appear as aforesaid, the Court shall, on
request in Form No. 13 of Appendix A, enter judgment for the liquidated demand and
interest thereon as provided by sub-rule (1) but the award of costs shall await judgment
upon such other claim.
“Where judgment has been entered under this Order the court may set aside or vary
such judgment and any consequential decree or order upon such terms as are just.”
From the reading of this provisions, a court has the discretion to set aside a default judgment. In
the case of, Patel -v- EA Cargo Handling Services Ltd (1974) EA 75, the Court held that:
“There are no limits or restrictions on the judge’s discretion except that if he does vary
the judgment, he does so on such terms as may be just. The main concern of the court
is to do justice to the parties and the court will not impose condition on itself or fetter
wide discretion given to it by the rules, the principle obviously is that unless and until
the count has pronounced judgment upon merits or by consent, it is to have power to
revoke the expression of its coercive power where that has obtained only by a failure to
follow any rule of procedure.”
In the case of, Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd -v- Nyantange &Another (1990) KLR 443 Bosire
J, (as he then was) held that:
“Order IXA rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules donates a discretionary power to the
court to set aside or vary an ex-parte judgment entered in default of appearance or
defence and any consequential decree or order upon such terms as are just.”
The case of Rayat Trading Co. Limited v Bank of Baroda & Tetezi House Ltd [2018] eKLR. In
the exercise of this discretion the Court will consider inter alia if:
i) the defendant has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim; or
ii) it appears to the court that there is some other good reason why;
The Court in the case of Rahman -v- Rahman (1999) LTL 26/11/9, considered the nature of the
discretion to set aside a default judgment and concluded that the elements the judge had to
consider were: the nature of the defence, the period of delay (i.e., why the application to set aside
had not been made before), any prejudice the claimant was likely to suffer if the default
judgment was set aside, and the overriding objective.
One of the key factors to consider when setting aside an ex-parte judgment is whether the
defendant has a defence on merit. In the case of, Sebei District Administration -v- Gasyali &
others (1968) EA 300 Sheridan J. observed that:
“The nature of the action should be considered. The defence if one has been brought to
the notice of the court, however irregularly, should be considered, the question as to
whether the plaintiff can reasonably be compensated by costs for any delay occasioned
should be considered and finally, I think, it should always be remembered that to deny
the subject a hearing should be the last resort of the court”
In the case of, Tree Shade Motor Limited -v- DT Dobie Co Ltd CA 38/98, the Court held that
even when ex-parte judgment was lawfully entered, the court should look at the draft defence to
see if it contained a valid or reasonable defence.
In International Finance Corporation -v- Utexafrica sprl [2001] CLC 1361, it was stated that
the test of a defence having a real prospect of success means that the prospects must be better
than merely arguable.
whether to set aside or vary a judgment entered include whether the person seeking to set aside
the judgment made an application to do so promptly and the reasons advanced for the setting
aside the default judgment. In the case of, Law -v- St Margarets Insurance Ltd [2001] EWCA
Civ 30, LTL, the Court of Appeal allowed judgment in default to be set aside despite the
defendant’s solicitors’ procedural errors in failing to file an acknowledgment of service and in
failing to ensure that the statement of truth in relation to the evidence in support of the
application was signed by the right person. The overriding objective required that the default
judgment be set aside in order to enable the merits of the defence to be determined.
In the instant case, the Applicants /objectors, had filed an application dated 2 nd july 2009, with
the firm of Mr. Mases. The applicants/ objectors paid periodically the requisite fees to Advocate
Masese to prosecute the matter. On 7th March 2019, Mr Sagwe , an advocate acted on behalf of
Mr Mases withdrew the applicants/ objectors application alleging to be acting under Instructions
of Mr Masese. The very day the matter was withdrawn in their absentia neither their consent
considered. The applicants’/objectors’ were condemned to pay costs amounting to KSH 379,211
borne from the a fore stated application.
The applicants/objectors came to learn on these in May 2021 when they were served with a
notice to show cause why execution should not issue dated 20th May 2021. The applicants/
objectors did not know the matter had been withdrawn, hence sought the service of advocate
Koina Onyancha the late who negotiated the reduction of the amount to KSH 250,000. Still they
did not understand as to why they were ordered to pay the sum as Mr. Masese had failed, neglect
and or ignored to advise them accordingly on the purpose of the required sum.
Its upon the demise of Advocate Koina Onyancha in August 2021, that they were constrained to
find another Advocate to represent them in Kisii ELC no 64 of 2020 wherein the subject matter
of the suit was a property in the estate of the late Onkware Maosa Whose Successon is being
ventilated vide Kisii Succession Cause no 66 of 2007. Upon perusal of file, Mr Gichana
Mochiemo ,an Advocate advised them that the application for revocation of grant had long been
withdrawn on 7th March 2019 to their utter disbelief.
In Rayat Trading Co. Limited v Bank of Baroda & Tetezi House Ltd [2018] eKLR, the Court
held that:
“It’s an old adage that, justice delayed is justice denied and that justice is weighed on a
scale that must balance. Therefore, as much as the Court is obligated to promote the
provisions of Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and uphold
substantive justice against technicalities, the law must protect both the Applicant and the
Judgment Creditor for justice to be seen to be done. Even then a mistake by a Counsel is
not a technicality. In the same vein the provisions of Section 1A and 1B of the Civil
Procedure Act obligates the parties to assist the Court in the expeditious disposal of
cases.”
I have also had the benefit of reading through the draft defence, and in my opinion they raise
triable issues. In this scenario it would be in the interest of justice, if the parties were heard fully
on the merit of their respective claims. I however suggest that the matter should be heard
expeditiously in order that justice is seen to be done. None of the Advocates should further delay
the matter unnecessarily.
We therefore submit that the Honorable court be pleased to set aside and/or vary orders issued on
7th March 2017 and the application dated 2nd July 2009 be reinstated
Conclusion
WE HUMBLY SUBMIT
…….........…………………………….
Mochiemo Gichana & Company
Advocates for the Applicants/objectors
TO BE SERVED UPON
Ombachi & Company
Advocates,
P.O.BOX 3022-40200
KISII