Avenue Supermarts Investment

Presentation
(DMART IN)

1
Company Background
• India’s third largest food and grocery retailer after RIL and Future retail. Total store retail area of
~7mn sq. ft. as of Dec 2019.
• Operates a single store format under the ‘DMART brand. 196 stores across 11 states and presence
in 72 cities.
• Strong brand equity as a every day low price operator – targets the mass economy segment of the
market.
• Predominantly ownership-based store operating model.
• Last 5-year* revenue/EBITDTA/PAT CAGR of 34/37/41%. Average 5-year ROCE of ~20%.

2
Competitive advantages

3
Are there any competitive advantages? Yes
250 60% 25%

200 50% 20%

40%
150 15%
30%
100 10%
20%
50 10% 5%

- 0% 0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Sales (Rs bn) % YoY (RHS) ROCE (post tax) ROE

16 10.0%
14 • Able to grow fast through both new store
8.0%
12
10
addition and SSSG
6.0%
8 • Healthy margins and ROCEs despite high store
4.0%
6
and area addition
4
2
2.0%
• Only F&G retailer in India without any store
-
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
0.0% closures since inception – which means every
store is a success story
EBIT (Rs bn) % margin (RHS)

4
Identifying sources of competitive advantages
1
Lowest cost • Culture and processes which drive lower costs on
structure all line items versus even larger peers
versus
peers • Lower cost structure allows DMART to charge
consistently lower prices versus peers- both
4 2 organized, unorganized and e-commerce
• Lower prices drive higher footfalls leading to
Consistently higher throughputs (higher volumes)
Higher Secret lower prices • This further leads to higher operating leverage
leverage on sauce versus over store fixed costs strengthening the ability
fixed costs
peers
the defend its low-cost leadership
• This strategy resonates with how Walmart
evolved its business over the 1970s/80s
Higher
3 throughput
per stores

5
Other key contributing factors to becoming the
lowest cost retailer

• Cluster based store expansion strategy (Only retailer to consistently follow this)
• Mgmt. realises that to win the retailing war, several small battles have been won locally
• Retailing is a local business – product tastes, assortment and preferences change with every new locality
• So DMART opens more stores near existing stores and then gradually moves outwards. This drives economies of scale on distribution,
warehousing and ad spend costs (incl. word of mouth)

• Paying suppliers early to get volume discounts (Only retailer to consistently follow this)
• DMART payables days are the low at 8 which is the lowest in the industry. For comparison Future retail is at 50 days. The same can also be
verified anecdotally from FMCG companies.
• DMART prefers to get more discounts from suppliers in lieu of paying early which can then be passed on to the consumers

• Single format with optimal assortment (Only retailer to consistently follow this)
• DMART runs a single store format – supermarkets with similar look and feel and similar customer proposition across all its stores. Brand is
synonymous with decent quality at the cheapest price
• Stocks only the fastest selling SKUs – typically lower (by 30-40% vs peers) and mid tier within each category. Stocking lower number of
SKUs (but those that are fast moving) helps in running efficient supply chain and keep inventory turns high.

6
Let's look at some evidence on low costs
% sales DMART Spencer's Retail Future Retail Opex (ex-rentals) % sales
RM costs 85 79 74 20 16
GP margin 15 21 26 13
15
Employee costs 4 7 5
10 6
Rentals 0 5 8
Ad spend - 1 2 5
Other expenses 3 7 6 -
EBITDA margin 8 -0 5 DMART Spencer's Retail Future Retail
Note: Data is average o FY17-19

• Common misconception that zero rentals is the main cost advantage for DMART
• Even outside of rentals – DMART’s operating costs % sales are less than half of peers
• DMART’s lower prices are well reflected in the lower gross margins but the lower cost structure allows it
make decent margins to generate consistent 20% ROCEs

7
Lower costs lead to
lower consumer prices
• On an average consumer
basket, DMART offers prices
~15% below MRP, ~5% cheaper
than other organized
supermarkets
• Notably, DMART’s prices are 5-
10% cheaper than e-commerce
players like Big Basket and
Amazon
• Anecdotally we know that,
DMART is cheaper than some of
the cash & carry chains as well

8
 Lower prices lead to higher throughputs
• On a pure comparable basis (i.e. excluding wholesale
cash & carry), DMART has the highest throughput across
the industry. Given its lower ticket sizes, DMART’s
volumes (bill cuts) are also higher
• Bill cuts per square feet have risen at a CAGR of 5% over
the last seven years (evidence of EDLC driving increasing
footfalls)
Note: Note: All numbers are for FY19-end except Bigbasket, Walmart and More – FY18

Rising bill cuts per sq. ft.

31 7%
29 6%
27
5%
25
4%
23
3%
21
2%
19
17 1%

15 0%
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Bill cuts per sq ft (mn) % YoY (RHS)

9
Peer comparison on some key metrics
Sales per sq ft (Rs) FY18 FY19 Gross margin FY18 FY19
DMART 30,680 33,906 DMART 16% 15%
Future Retail 12,556 12,239 Future Retail 26% 27%
RIL (Grocery only) 27,142 36,347 RIL (Grocery only) 15% 15%
RIL (Core) 20,486 33,413 RIL (Core) 20% 20%
Walmart (US only) 31,893 32,931 Walmart (US only) na na
VMART 8,489 8,010 VMART 32% 32%
Spencer's retail 8,690 15,977 Spencer's retail 20% 21%

Gross profit per sq ft (Rs) FY18 FY19 EBIT margin FY18 FY19
DMART 4,893 5,091 DMART 7.9% 7.1%
Future Retail 3,290 3,340 Future Retail 4.3% 4.7%
RIL (Grocery only) 4,071 5,452 RIL (Grocery only) 5.0% 6.0%
RIL (Core) 4,097 6,683 RIL (Core) 6.0% 7.0%
Walmart (US only) na na Walmart (US only) 5.6% 5.4%
VMART 2,723 2,589 VMART 9.3% 7.8%
Spencer's retail 1,712 3,393 Spencer's retail -0.5% 0.8%

EBIT per sq ft (Rs) FY18 FY19 EVA per sq ft (Rs) FY18 FY19
DMART 2,436 2,408 DMART 1,538 1,466
Future Retail 541 581 Future Retail 250 192
RIL (Grocery only) 1,357 2,181 RIL (Grocery only) na na
RIL (Core) 1,229 2,339 RIL (Core) na na
Walmart (US only) 1,777 1,774 Walmart (US only) 1,255 1,256
VMART 792 621 VMART 582 430
Spencer's retail -44 125 Spencer's retail -536 -311

10
Concluding remark on low cost as a competitive
advantage

• Low cost of operations is not the best competitive advantage to have as always replicable
(hence not the strongest of moats). But low cost is easier to replicate where it depends on
one large variable e.g.: access to a cheaper resource, outsourcing, compromising on
quality. In retailing, low cost often requires a series of small steps which add up.

• What is required to be able to maintain a low-cost operation in retailing is the right

mindset and culture which then feeds into business practices allowing the low costs. Which
is why retailing globally and in India has been a tough business to make money in.

11
Scalability

12
A very large TAM with very low penetration

Indian retail is a ~U$1trillion market

as of today

~55% of which comprised of F&G

consumption (US$550bn market)

Only ~5% of which is in the organized space but

growing at ~25% CAGR

DMART has three supporting tailwinds for a long growth runway

1. Organized retail fast gaining share from unorganized (current penetration at
about 12%)
2. Within organized, F&G is least penetrated at ~5% and hence the fastest
growing
3. Traditional Indian FMCG retailer counts have stopped expanding and will
probably decline in the coming years due to demographic issues as well as
the unviability as organized retail grows (anecdotally known from MFCG
companies)
13
Some numbers…
Split of the overall retail market in India
US$bn FY14 FY19 FY24P FY45P
Overall retail 486 857 1,486 7,480
Organised retail 40 90 221 2,388
share of retail 8% 11% 15% 32%

% organsied retail share by each category FY16-19

FY19 FY22P FY45P % growth in organised retail CAGR
Food & grocery 4% 6% 25% Food & grocery 26%
Apparel 25% 31% 74%
Apparel 19%
Foootwear 18% 19% 42%
Foootwear 14%
Furniture/ Furnishing 7% 9% 35%
Consumer durables/ electronics 56% 63% 84% Furniture/ Furnishing 18%
Pharmacy 8% 9% 33% Consumer durables/ electronics 12%
Books & Music 6% 5% 25% Pharmacy 15%
Others 13% 13% 21% Books & Music 1%
Total 11% 13% 32% Others 17%

• As evident, ‘Food & Grocery’ is the largest retail segment overall in India
• It has the least organized penetration (5%) compared to all other segments – electronics at 60%, apparel at 30%
• Organized F&G retailing is thus the fastest growing organized segment in India today

14
 Massive store potential in India
• We consider just the top 25 Indian cities (<10% of total India population) for the below store potential exercise
• DMART, RIL SMART, Big Bazaar put together have an estimated total retail area of ~13mn sq. ft. which amounts to a per capita penetration
of 0.15 sq. ft.
• Walmart alone has a total store retail area of 700mn sq. ft. in the US (total US, not top 25 or anything) which amounts to a per capita
penetration of 2.1 sq. ft. (15x India). Given WMT’s estimated 25% share, total US per capita retail penetration is 8.5 (60x India)
• Current store equivalent count in top 25 cities in India is ~320. Assuming WMT’s penetration, the estimated store potential is ~4900. If we
consider overall US retail as the benchmark, India’s store potential is ~19000 stores.

Oganised retail area per capita in mn sq. ft. • Numbers may seem large but are conservative
• We are considering TAM in only the top 25 cities
9.00 8.5 whereas there is a large market beyond top 25
Potential India
8.00 store count: • The top three Indian retailers already have ~50% of
7.00 19200
their stores outside the top 25 cities which means
6.00 clearly, they seen an opportunity there
5.00 • DMART has one store in the town of ‘Nanded’ which is
Potential India
4.00 store count: 4900 ranked 80th by population
3.00 Current India
• Our DCF assumes DMART reaching a store count of
2.1
store count: 320 ~1200 in top 25 cities by FY45 which is 25% of
2.00
estimated store potential using WMT benchmark or
1.00 0.14
5% using overall US organized retail as a benchmark
0.00
India organised retail area per capita Walmart US organised retail area Overall US organised retail area per
(sq ft, top 25 cities) per capita (sq ft) capita (sq ft)

15
That said – is retail as a business scalable?
Walmart’s journey..100 stores in 1975; 1700 by 1992; ~5000 stores today

WMT in 1975 – 100 stores clustered around WMT in 1992 – 1,700 stores. Moving North and
Arkansas West using the cluster based strategy.

16
That said – is retail as a business scalable?
DMART’s journey – 32 stores in 2010; 110 stores in 2016; 200+ stores by 2020.
Clustering out from the West and South.

17
Being able to scale up successfully is a competitive
advantage

• Several retailers in India have

expanded too fast and then had
to close unprofitable formats
and stores
• This includes both Big Bazaar
and RIL Retail
• Others have scaled up fast using
debt and have suffered
• DMART has not had to shut a
single store since it started
operations. Uses minimal debt
and re-invests all operating cash
into store expansion

18
Major constraints to scalability

• Scalability is linear and not exponential unlike in software, FMCG, credit cards etc.
• Steady reasonable unlevered expansion better than aggressive expansion. Remains a
very localised and on the ground business.
• Major constraints to scalability: Finding real estate, understanding and perfecting
local assortment and benefits of word of mouth. Cluster based strategy best suited to
address these issues.

19
Culture

20
Scores high on corporate governance and culture

• Strong frugal mindset and culture instilled across the company by the promoter. Consistent focus on reducing wastages and
passing benefits to customers.
• CEO groomed by the promoter himself.
• No promoter pledge now or in the past.
• Zero evidence of any wrongful practices within or outside the company.
• Company’s frugal mindset does not make them shy away from investing in the business for people, technology etc.
• Store managers more empowered that peers. Flexible to decide on pricing at the store level if need be. Rated on input
metrics and not output metrics. DMART does not given sales targets.
• Media shy mgmt. and promoter. Does not set topline and bottom-line targets. Likes to talk day to day business language.
• Believe in small everyday incremental changes and not big bang reforms or shock.
• Acknowledge retailing is a boring business and needs disciplined people more than extra smart ones.

21
CEO comments in the FY19 shareholder letter
Admit mistakes publicly

“Our journey to build something valuable, exciting and endearing continued in the year 2018-19, albeit a bit slower. We ended the year with 176
stores, adding 21 new stores. We could have done better. While all operating metrics were good, I am personally disappointed with our store
opening outcomes. It is partly structural and partly our own weakness.”

Not irrationally scale driven

“Customers may also find our e-commerce service just about functional. This may mean we won’t be the largest e-commerce grocer or not even
amongst the leading e-commerce grocers in India for quite a few years. We are still not the largest brick and mortar retailer. We don’t chase to be
the biggest; we just aspire to be better than we were last year.”

Understand that retail is about getting several small things right (incremental innovation)

“I believe that the ability to constantly focus on the ‘mundane’ and make it enjoyable to all is the only recipe for success in retail. We have to have
a huge cohort of leaders who enjoy that routine. It is this mindset that sets apart the winners from the rest. The thrill is in looking for those small
wins, those little gaps of opportunity, those tiny small improvements. While ‘Retail is Detail’ and ‘Retail is SOP (Standard Operating Procedure)
centric’ is something we all hear very often, what we do not hear is constant oversight and personal engagement by supervisors and supervisor’s
supervisors and that supervisor’s supervisor with the front line.”

22
Key risks to the business
model

23
Key risks to the business model

• Aggressive price discounting from other organised

retailers
• Risk from online F&G players
• Risk from disruption from Reliance
• Risk from opening of FDI in single brand retail
• Risk from lower than expected store addition (this is
not a business risk but can be a risk to earnings and
valuation)

24
Aggressive price • Challenges with executing this. Only relevant for stores in
nearby vicinity unlike IT services or FMCG or autos
discounting from • A retailer’s price cut only affects a competing retailer if
other organised they are in the same locality. Most retailers actually divert
traffic from the convenience stores in the locality.
retailers • Little evidence of either Future or RIL deliberately opening
stores close to DMART.
• As we discussed in TAM section, there is enough headroom
to open new stores even within the top 25 cities
• DMART already lowest on pricing due to its lowest cost
structure. So hard to beat at its own game.
• Competition will have to change business model – move
lower down, offer limited SKUs, curtail own private label.

25
 RIL and Big B stores more spreadout across India
180 90%
Aggressive price discounting from 160 80%

other organised retailers (contd..) 140

120
70%
60%
100 50%
80 40%
60 30%
40 20%
20 10%
• DMART’s top five states account for ~85% of its store count 0 0%
(cluster-based approach) DMART top 5 states RIL in these states Big B in these states

• RIL SMART and Big Bazaar have only 40/50% of their stores in Store count % total (RHS)
these states. These two retailers are more panned out across
states and cities
• DMART’s top 15 cities account for 60% of its total store count. RIL not taking on DMART in the latter's top cities
These cities account for less than 20% of RIL SMART’s store 140 70%
count.
120 60%
• DMART operates in 11 states and 72 cities with high store 100 50%
concentration in top 10 states and cities
80 40%
• RIL SMART operates in 17 states and 100 cities with a much
60 30%
lower concentration top cities and states
40 20%
• Likewise Big Bazaar has stores in 28 states
20 10%
• Point here is that everyone is chasing a different market which
is possible when the market itself is large 0 0%
DMART top 15 cities RIL SMART in those cities
• Anecdotally, we know that even within the city there is seldom
Store count % total (RHS)
two retailers opening stores next to each other

26
Risk from online F&G players
a. F&G is a very challenging category for on-line. Multiple low value SKUs with limited shelf life
in fresh. Grofers has struggled in India, repeatedly changing business model.
b. Bigbasket building topline but continues to be loss making. Bigbasket’s scale up so far has no
impact on DMART’s growth.
a. Big basket’s revenues are now Rs20bn+ which is ~10% DMART’s revenue.
b. Big basket’s largest market is Bangalore which is also the second largest city for DMART
stores
c. Why has DMART not been impacted?
c. Least overlap between DMART’s target segment and on-line players’ segment. Online is more
for convenience and wider assortment. DMART is deep value targeting customers who
typically shop at kiranas. DMART’s prices cheaper than Big Basket.
d. Globally on-line in F&G has seen limited success. US penetration <2%; China <5%.
e. DMART Ready: Pick up points in select cities where consumers can pick up goods they have
ordered online.
a. Prevents any possible leakage of loyal customers to on-line players
b. Increases reach throughput for existing stores especially
c. Very small as of now at >2% of sales; mgmt. taking a calibrated approach
27
Risk from RIL
a. Don’t think RIL see’s retail as it saw telecom.
b. Winning in telecom was a zero-sum game. Subscriber gain for one is a loss for another. Large
scale tower and fibre capex and then no holds barred battle to eliminate large incumbents.
c. RIL made its intention clear with aggressive customer acquisition and made public statements
on market shares. Telecom was more amenable to regulatory influence.
d. Globally telecom is an industry which is way more consolidated than retail and still struggles
to make money. Nature of industry is high fixed capex and then a race to add more customers
(as incremental costs are low).
e. Retail is business which cannot be scaled up like telecom. Globally retail markets are much
more fragmented.
Market share of top 2 players in telecom and retail in each country
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
US Japan Germany UK

% share of top 2 players in Telecom (2018)

% share of top 2 players in Organised F&G retail(2018)
28
 • RIL SMART pricing versus DMART? Still at a premium to DMART? Why?
• RIL store map – virtually no overlap in store openings with DMART?
• Same with cities – RIL focusing more on tier 3 and 4 cities. Have largely

Some a rental model in place. Infact limited presence in strong DMART

markets.
• RIL in retail believes in share gain from unorganised (very large TAM)

evidence that unlike in telecom.

• RIL cares about making money – evidence: closure of several RIL fresh
stores. Not the first time they have done so.

RIL thinks • RIL Omni-channel - their way of competing with on-line segment
target customer (Amazon and Big Basket). Minimal direct overlap with
the target DMART customer. Major execution issues around fulfilment

differently in etc. Details remain murky.

• RIL cash and carry – trying to be the supplier to Kirana Stores. This will
hurt existing mandis for fresh and large distributors of FMCG products.

retail • Profitability matters to RIL – Grocery EBITDA margins have steadily

improved even as store addition has accelerated (in telecom, RIL
target specific market share targets)
• Will focusing on too many things be their nemesis? RIL Trends and
Jewelry considered average businesses.
• Damodar Mall – CEO of Reliance Retail was a part of Kishore Biyani’s
core team for six years.

29
 RIL Retail - % share of revenues RIL is not larger than DMART in F&G
10
9% 7.7
20% 8
9% 5.8
6
3.5
4 2.7
27%
35%
2

-
Area (mn sq ft) Sales (US$ bn)
Grocery Electronics Connectivity Fashion & Lifestyle Petro Retail
DMART RIL comparable

RIL retail’s headline • Overall RIL retail revenues would be ~US$23bn in FY20E. However, F&G would only
be ~20% of this pie. So RIL grocery revenues in FY20E will be ~US$4.5bn versus
DMART’s US$3.5bn.
numbers look big • Cash and carry is one third of RIL’s business. So excluding cash and carry, RIL’s
comparable revenues with DMART are ~US$2.9 (~20% lower).
but… • RIL reported throughput is ~Rs40k per sq. ft. but LFL vs DMART would be ~Rs30-35k
sq. ft. (same as DMART)
• Six-year revenue CAGR for RIL grocery is 26% versus 32% for DMART although last
three years CAGR has picked up to 40% versus 30% for DMART.

30
Valuation

31
Tried multiple approaches
1. Conservative DCF with 25 year explicit forecast gives FV of Rs 1950
2. Conservative DCF with 50 year explicit forecast gives FV of Rs 2500
1. 25 year seems inadequate for an industry with such low penetration
2. Think HDFC bank DCF in 2000 (20 year explicit forecast period would not have sufficed)
3. Surprisingly the increase in FV is only ~25% when we stretch explicit period from 25
years to 50 years.
3. More bullish 25 year DCF (~20% sales and EBIT CAGR over 25 years) gives FV of Rs4300
a) Not entirely ambitious as WMT did a 25/27% sales/ EBIT CAGR over 1975-2005 (30
years) for its US business. WMT in 1975 has sales of US$236mn.
b) Adjusted for inflation, that figure today would be ~US$2bn. DMART sales today
~US$3.5bn.

32
 DCF scenarios, assumptions and FV
1. Conservative DCF with 25 year explicit forecast gives FV of Rs 1950

WACC -->>
1,938 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13%
3% 3,997 2,893 2,158 1,647 1,281 1,012
growth rate

4% 4,648 3,248 2,364 1,772 1,360 1,063

Terminal

5% 5,694 3,768 2,648 1,938 1,461 1,127

6% 7,648 4,603 3,064 2,165 1,594 1,208
7% 12,611 6,165 3,732 2,499 1,777 1,315

Implied DMART market share by 2045

Key assumptions
US$bn
FY19 FY24E FY45E
FY14-20 FY20-25 FY25-45 Organised TAM 30 85 1,365
Sales CAGR 32.3% 24.6% 16.1% Organised TAM share % total retail 6% 9% 29%
Store area CAGR 23.8% 19.9% 9.7%
Average SSSG 18.4% 10.6% 9.8% DMART sales 3 9 216
EBIT CAGR 37.0% 25.6% 14.9% DMART share of organsied TAM 9% 11% 16%
Incremental ROCE 21.1% 32.2% 33.3% DMART share of total retail 1% 1% 5%
Exit ROCE 20.2% 20.4% 32.1%
DMART area (mn sq ft) 6 17 127
India population (mn) 1,350 1,419 1,749
India relevant population (mn) 25% 25% 25%
DMART area per capita (sq ft) 0.02x 0.05x 0.29x
WMT area per capita (sq ft) 2.1x

33
 DCF scenarios, assumptions and FV
1. Conservative DCF with 50 year explicit forecast gives FV of Rs 2500
WACC -->>
2,513 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13%
3% 7,098 4,758 3,314 2,382 1,757 1,325
growth rate

4% 7,679 5,010 3,431 2,438 1,785 1,340

Terminal

5% 8,614 5,378 3,591 2,513 1,822 1,358

6% 10,360 5,971 3,826 2,615 1,869 1,381
7% 14,795 7,078 4,203 2,765 1,935 1,412

Implied DMART market share by 2045

Key assumptions US$bn

FY19 FY24E FY45E FY70E
FY14-20 FY20-25 FY25-45 FY45-70 Organised TAM 30 85 1,365 10,493
Sales CAGR 32.3% 24.6% 16.1% 6.5% Organised TAM share % total retail 6% 9% 29% 56%
Store area CAGR 23.8% 19.9% 9.7% 2.8%
Average SSSG 18.4% 10.6% 9.8% 6.6% DMART sales 3 9 216 1,918
EBIT CAGR 37.0% 25.6% 14.8% 5.2% DMART share of organsied TAM 9% 11% 16% 18%
Incremental ROCE 21.1% 32.2% 32.7% 37.5% DMART share of total retail 1% 1% 5% 10%
Exit ROCE 20.2% 20.4% 31.6% 48.4%
DMART area (mn sq ft) 6 17 127 328
India population (mn) 1,350 1,419 1,749 2,082
India relevant population (mn) 25% 25% 25% 25%
DMART area per capita (sq ft) 0.02x 0.05x 0.29x 0.63x
WMT area per capita (sq ft) 2.1x

34
 DCF scenarios, assumptions and FV
1. More bullish 25 year DCF (~20% sales and EBIT CAGR over 25 years) gives FV of Rs4000

WACC -->>
3,968 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13%
3% 8,554 6,028 4,375 3,248 2,457 1,888
growth rate

4% 10,157 6,903 4,884 3,559 2,653 2,015

Terminal

5% 12,732 8,185 5,585 3,968 2,903 2,173

6% 17,544 10,244 6,612 4,531 3,232 2,374
7% 29,762 14,093 8,262 5,355 3,685 2,639

Key assumptions Implied DMART market share by 2045

FY14-20 FY20-25 FY25-45 US$bn

Sales CAGR 32.3% 24.6% 19.3% FY19 FY24E FY45E
Store area CAGR 23.8% 19.9% 12.4% Organised TAM 30 85 1,365
Average SSSG 18.4% 10.6% 11.3% Organised TAM share % total retail 6% 9% 29%
EBIT CAGR 37.0% 25.6% 19.6%
Incremental ROCE 21.1% 32.2% 41.0% DMART sales 3 9 399
Exit ROCE 20.2% 20.4% 39.9% DMART share of organsied TAM 9% 11% 29%
DMART share of total retail 1% 1% 8%

DMART area (mn sq ft) 6 17 226

India population (mn) 1,350 1,419 1,749
India relevant population (mn) 25% 25% 25%
DMART area per capita (sq ft) 0.02x 0.05x 0.52x
WMT area per capita (sq ft) 2.1x

35
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How many Indian Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Ltd.
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Havells India Ltd. 33 28
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have grown PAT HDFC Bank Ltd.

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years (FY1994-2019) Axis Bank Ltd.

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City Union Bank Ltd. 22 17
ICICI Bank Ltd. 22 27
Cadila Healthcare Ltd. 22 16
Wipro Ltd. 21 18
3M India Ltd. 20 17

36
Relative valuation
1. Our base case currently models in DMART compounding EPS at 27% over the next five years (FY20-25)
which compares to a 45% CAGR over the last five years.
2. Our projected FY26 EPS works out to ~INR 85 (high earnings visibility five years out) given the
favourable combination of a strong moat and the ability to scale in a large TAM.
3. The key question here is what should the exit multiple five year out on FY26 earnings. Currently the
stock trades at about ~85x FY21 EPS.
4. Believe 45x is a fairly conservative exit multiple for DMART. Rationale below.
I. Indian FMCG/ HDFC bank trade a ~200% premium (or 3x) to developed market FMCG/ Wells
Fargo. The premium captures the higher India growth headroom.
II. DMART currently trades at ~300% premium (or 4x) vs WMT. This premium is likely to shrink and
converge towards to ~200% over time (it may take longer than five years but being conservative).
III. Assuming premium falls to 200% over five years gives an exit multiple ~45x (~47% derating)
which generates an IRR of ~10% from the CMP. TP at FY25 end is ~INR 3900
IV. Believe unlikely the multiple goes below 45x as
a) DMART will still be a ~20% compounder at the end of FY25 and will continue to grow ahead
of most large cap FMCG and discretionary names
b) Will probably remain the only successful clean play on Indian F&G retail then just as it is
now
c) Next page has the sensitivities on IRR basis exit multiple and next five year EPS CAGR

37
Relative valuation (contd..)
Relative valuation mthodology (primary method to set TP)

CMP (INR) 2,324

# shares (mn) 644 Relative valuation is the primary
Market cap (INR bn) 1,497 method used to set a TP (DCF used a
Market cap (US$ bn) 21.1 reference check)
Net debt (US$ bn) -0.4
Enterprise value (US$bn) 20.7
EV (INR bn) 1,468

Basis CMP 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
PE 189x 161x 111x 83x 64x 51x 41x 34x

Setting DC target price

Years to TP 5.0
TP year FY25
One year fwd EPS (FY26) 85
DC TP multiple 45x
Target price (INR) 3,811

% upside/ (downside) 64%

% IRR from CMP 10%

2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E

Implied yearly target price 2,324 2,566 2,832 3,127 3,452 3,811
% upside 0% 10% 22% 35% 49% 64%

Basis Target price 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E

PE 111x 92x 78x 69x 61x 55x 38
 Relative valuation (contd..) We can triangulate the implied
probabilities we are assigning to the
different outcomes so as to match the
TP in the earlier relative multiple
method

DCF valuation methodology (as a reference check)

FV (INR) Probability weight (%)

25 year conservative DCF 1,938 70%
25 year bullish DCF 3,968 30%

FY21 TP (INR) 2,547

WACC 11%

2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E

Implied yearly target price 2,547 2,834 3,155 3,511 3,908
% upside 10% 22% 36% 51% 68%

39
IRR generated over five years in different scenarios if bought today at CMP (2300)

Exit multiple after five years on FY26 earnings

11% 40x 45x 50x 55x 60x
FY20-25 EPS CAGR

15% 8% 10% 13% 15% 17%

20% 8% 10% 13% 15% 17%
25% 8% 10% 13% 15% 17%
30% 8% 10% 13% 15% 17%
35% 8% 10% 13% 15% 17%
40% 8% 10% 13% 15% 17%

40
 What's the ideal entry price/ multiple?

1. Entry multiple of ~70-75x will generate ~12-16% IRR in the conservative case. Currently the stock is trading
at ~85x. So we need a 10-15% correction from the current market price (~INR 2000)
2. If the derating is not as sharp as we have assumed i.e. a derating to 55x (30%) versus our conservative
assumption of 45x (45% derating) can drive a ~15-18% IRR if we enter around INR2000-2100
3. So the ideal entry price is about ~2000-2100 or below i.e. ~10% below the CMP. Can get a toe hold and then
add more on further correction (its impossible to call the perfect bottom!).
4. Another way to enter is to wait for the stock to time correct so that the multiple hits ~70-75x, this will
happen around mid FY21 is the stock remains in the current range.
Entry multiple today on FY21 earnings
11% 70x 75x 80x 85x 90x
on FY26 earnings

Exit multiple in

35x 8% 7% 5% 4% 3%
40x 11% 10% 8% 7% 6%
FY25

45x 14% 12% 11% 9% 8%

50x 16% 15% 13% 12% 11%
55x 18% 17% 15% 14% 13% 41
A word of caution: No free lunch - stock not
immune to short term earnings misses
The worst-case IRR of 5% in five years does not make the stock immune from a near term decline or a
negative near-term return. We have seen the stock correct sharply in the past on earnings downgrades
although upgrades have followed downgrades.

One year fwd PE Recent re-rating partly driven by improving

95 earnings
90 95 24
85 90
23
80 85
75 80 22
75
70 21
70
65 65 20
60 60
19
55 55
50 50 18

PE (1 yr fwd) Mean +1SD -1SD PE (1 yr fwd) FY20EPS (RHS)

42
Store addition rate is a key value driver
Valuations depend on rate of store addition • Broadly speaking - every new store opened
would add about Rs2bn or US$25mn to market
90 20%
value of the company (purely from that single
19% store)
85
18% • However the impact on total market value of the
80
17% company would be higher as this increases in
16% future store addition
75 15% • Conclusion: So if estimated store addition for a
14%
given year moved up by say 10 stores, this would
70 add about US$2.5bn to market value.
13%
• Math: Number of more stores added (vs earlier
12%
65 est.) * US$25mn divided by 10% (assuming this
11% increases confidence in future store addition)
60 10% • Bulk of the re-rating over the last 11 months can
4QFY18 1QFY19 2QFY19 3QFY19 4QFY19 1QFY20 2QFY20 3QFY20 4QFY20
be explained by the higher store addition
PE (1 yr fwd) (LHS) Store addition (% YoY) (RHS) trajectory

Time line Stock price PE (x) % re-rating

31-Mar-19 1,471 75
+ Tax cuts 221 0
+ Store addition 276 14 19%
+ EPS roll fwd 353 0
Total 2,320 84
28-02-2020 2,324 89 19%
43
 On FY25 EV/EBITDA – DMART seems valued in line with high quality
consumer names. While retailing as an industry is way tougher than FMCG
or paints, runway for growth is higher. On 10-year numbers DMART will look
cheaper.

Are valuations 90
80
85

68
FY21 PE

66
40
35
35 34
FY25PE

32

really out of 70 29 28
56 30
60 53
25
50
20
40

whack? 30
20
10
-
15
10

-
5

DMART Nestle Berger HUL Asian Paints Nestle DMART Berger HUL Asian Paints

FY21 EV/EBITDA FY25 EV/EBITDA

60 53 30
47 24
50 42 25 22
39 20 20
40 35 20 18

30 15
20 10
10 5
- -
DMART Nestle Berger HUL Asian Paints Nestle DMART HUL Berger Asian Paints

Note: Pricing as of 3rd March

44
Recommendation
• This is a business we want to own over the longer term as it scores well on three of our key evaluation
metrics – competitive advantages, scalability and culture.
• This is also amongst the few names featuring in our ‘re-investors’ screen which identifies business which
have the ability compound at fast rates by re-investing as their operating cash flow back in the business.
• On the fourth parameter of ‘price’, admittedly current valuations make it hard to justify making a sold 15-
20% IRR over the next few years. The recent hype around the QIP, strong earnings momentum, store
acceleration and the tendency of ‘quality’ at any price has led to making the stock pricey.
• However as argued in slide 40, a 10-15% valuation correction from current levels make warrant us to
consider taking a toe hold position. That would mean either the stock falling to ~INR2000 in the coming few
days or time correcting at these levels for two quarters. More can be added opportunistically in the future.
Taking a toe hold also gives more confidence to average up in the future.
• Why buy now: DMART is to be a seen as a strong compounding contender with a proven business model,
strong competitive advantages and a long runway for growth. The recent pick in store addition and
managements confidence to add another 90-100 stores over the next three years gives good earnings
visibility.

45
 • Annual store addition: We DMART to add about 30 stores per year
over the next three years i.e. over FY21-23. This is also priced in by
the market – so any acceleration or deceleration versus this
expected trajectory can impact valuations. Average area addition
per year over the same period should be about 20% each year
since new stores are much larger. This number can be volatile on a
quarterly basis – two thirds or more sores are added in 2H of any
fiscal.
Key business • Overall sales growth: We expect ~25% sales growth in each of the
next three years for DMART contributed by 10-12% SSSG. Weak
monitorable sales growth may point to either soft SSSG or longer ramp ups for
new stores.
• Margins: Expect steady gross margins ~15% and EBITDA margins of
8.5-9%. Any material dip in gross margin may point to heightened
discounting aggression from peers. Lower EBITDA margins may
point to inferior economics in some of the newer store locations.
• Store clustering: West and South are core clusters for DMART. In
any given year share of new store openings should be the highest
in these core clusters (70%+). Anything lower and there is a risk to
overall profitability due to poor operating leverage on trucking,
warehousing; higher shrinkages; lower throughputs given less
brand salience in newer areas.

46
Appendix
47
 RIL retail financials summary

(Rs bn) FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20E

Revenues
- Grocery 95 86 108 140 234 321
(Rs bn) FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20E
- Consumer Electronics 42 61 115 152 392 437 No. of stores 3,616 7,573 10,415 11,472
- Fashion & Lifestyle 39 42 51 71 110 150
Net addition 3,957 2,842 1,057
Core Revenues 176 190 273 363 735 908
- Connectivity - - - 228 437 564 Avg. revenue/store (Rs mn) 93 124 145 148
- Petro Retailing - 21 64 101 133 151 Area (Mn sq. ft.) 14 18 22 26
Franchise Revenues - 21 64 329 571 715
Avg. throughput (Rs/sq. ft.) 25,011 44,358 65,776 67,178
Total Revenues 176 211 338 692 1,306 1,623
Growth YoY (%) EBITDA 12 25 62 86
- Grocery 19 -9 25 29 67 37 - Core 11 22 51 73
- Consumer Electronics 38 44 88 32 158 12
- Franchise 0 4 11 14
- Fashion & Lifestyle 11 9 20 41 54 37
Core Revenues 21 8 44 33 103 23 EBITDA margin (%) 3.5 3.7 4.7 5.3
- Connectivity - - - - 92 29 - Core 4.2 6.0 7.0 8.0
- Petro Retailing - - 204 57 32 13
- Franchise 0.5 1.1 1.8 1.9
Franchise Revenues 204 413 73 25
Total Revenues 21 19 60 105 89 24

48
Future retail financials summary
(Rs mn) 2017 2018 2019 2020E Return / Profitability Ratios (% )
Mar Mar Mar Mar Return on Capital Employed (RoCE)-Overall 16.8 19.2 17.5 12.9
# of months 12 12 12 12 Return on Invested Capital (RoIC) 17.4 20.2 18.3 13.7
Return on Net Worth (RoNW) 16.6 21.8 21.1 17.1
Total revenue 1,70,751 1,84,780 2,01,649 2,09,489 Dividend Payout Ratio 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
% YoY growth 8.2 9.1 3.9
Turnover Ratios
COGS 1,28,344 1,37,407 1,47,811 1,50,832
Inventory Turnover Ratio (x) 4.6 4.2 4.0 4.0
as a % of sales 75.2 74.4 73.3 72.0
Assets Turover Ratio (x) 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.6
Working Capital Cycle (days) 59 54 70 74
Gross profit 42,407 47,373 53,838 58,657
Average Collection Period (days of sales) 4.9 4.7 5.7 6.0
Gross margin 24.8 25.6 26.7 28.0
Average Payment Period (days of sales) 59 68 53 50
Inventory (days of sales) 80 87 92 92
EBITDA 5,813 8,323 10,369 12,648
EBITDA margin 3.4 4.5 5.1 6.0

D&A 326 534 1,006 1,633

EBIT 5,487 7,789 9,363 11,015
EBIT margin 3.2 4.2 4.6 5.3

Adjusted PAT 3,683 6,152 7,328 8,387

Net profit margin 2.2 3.4 3.7 4.1

49
DMART – Key financials and forecasts
Rs mn FY March end (consol) Historicals Forecasts
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E

P&L statement

Sales 22,086 33,409 46,865 64,394 85,838 1,18,977 1,50,332 2,00,045 2,50,944 3,18,568 3,97,934 4,91,252 6,07,421 7,52,829
% YoY 51% 40% 37% 33% 39% 26% 33% 25% 27% 25% 23% 24% 24%
COGS 18,840 28,574 39,844 54,872 73,035 1,00,810 1,26,356 1,70,008 2,12,549 2,70,783 3,38,244 4,17,564 5,16,308 6,39,905
% sales 85% 86% 85% 85% 85% 85% 84% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85%
Grosss profit 3,246 4,834 7,021 9,522 12,802 18,167 23,976 30,037 38,394 47,785 59,690 73,688 91,113 1,12,924
% sales 15% 14% 15% 14.8% 14.9% 15.3% 15.9% 15.0% 15.3% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0%
% YoY 49% 45% 36% 34% 42% 32% 25% 28% 24% 25% 23% 24% 24%
Employee costs 453 687 873 1,341 1,490 1,925 2,826 3,554 4,517 5,416 6,367 7,369 9,111 11,292
% sales 2.1% 2.1% 1.9% 2.1% 1.7% 1.6% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.7% 1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5%
% YoY 52% 27% 53% 11% 29% 47% 26% 27% 20% 18% 16% 24% 24%
Other expenses 1,413 1,997 2,729 3,592 4,676 6,429 7,622 10,150 12,171 15,132 18,504 22,352 27,638 34,254
% sales 6.4% 6.0% 5.8% 5.6% 5.4% 5.4% 5.1% 5.1% 4.9% 4.8% 4.7% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6%
% YoY 41% 37% 32% 30% 37% 19% 33% 20% 24% 22% 21% 24% 24%
EBITDA 1,380 2,150 3,418 4,590 6,636 9,812 13,528 16,333 21,707 27,238 34,819 43,967 54,364 67,378
% sales 6.2% 6.4% 7.3% 7.1% 7.7% 8.2% 9.0% 8.2% 8.7% 8.6% 8.8% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0%
% YoY 56% 59% 34% 45% 48% 38% 21% 33% 25% 28% 26% 24% 24%
D&A 375 458 570 815 984 1,278 1,590 2,125 3,513 4,141 4,775 5,404 6,074 7,528
% sales 1.7% 1.4% 1.2% 1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0%
% gross block (ex-land) 6.3% 6.5% 6.2% 6.7% 7.0% 7.4% 7.2% 7.5%
EBIT 1,006 1,692 2,848 3,775 5,652 8,534 11,938 14,208 18,193 23,096 30,044 38,563 48,290 59,850
% sales 4.6% 5.1% 6.1% 5.9% 6.6% 7.2% 7.9% 7.1% 7.3% 7.3% 7.6% 7.9% 8.0% 8.0%
% YoY 68% 68% 33% 50% 51% 40% 19% 28% 27% 30% 28% 25% 24%
Other income 138 143 158 183 179 286 693 484 314 1,100 1,210 726 363 91
% YoY 3% 11% 15% -2% 59% 143% -30% -35% 250% 10% -40% -50% -75%
% cash 26% 27% 39% 49% 3% 6% 12% 2% 4% 5% 4% 2% 0%
Interest 260 426 557 724 913 1,220 595 472 511 150 3 8 55 425
% debt 11% 12% 10% 9% 9% 7% 14% 14% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
PBT 884 1,409 2,449 3,233 4,918 7,600 12,036 14,219 17,997 24,046 31,251 39,282 48,598 59,516
% sales 4.0% 4.2% 5.2% 5.0% 5.7% 6.4% 8.0% 7.1% 7.2% 7.5% 7.9% 8.0% 8.0% 7.9%
taxes 282 472 835 1,109 1,715 2,683 4,158 5,195 4,530 6,052 7,866 9,887 12,232 14,980
% tax rate 32% 34% 34% 34% 35% 35% 35% 37% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Minority Interest - - - -0 -1 -129 -200 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
PAT (pre-excep) 602 937 1,614 2,124 3,202 4,788 7,678 9,025 13,468 17,995 23,386 29,396 36,367 44,537
% sales 2.7% 2.8% 3.4% 3.3% 3.7% 4.0% 5.1% 4.5% 5.4% 5.6% 5.9% 6.0% 6.0% 5.9%
% YoY 56% 72% 32% 51% 50% 60% 18% 49% 34% 30% 26% 24% 22%
50
DMART – Key financials and forecasts (contd..)
Financial return metrics 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E

Growth
Stores 51% 40% 37% 33% 39% 26% 33% 25% 27% 25% 23% 24% 24%
Area 14% 22% 24% 25% 22% 21% 20% 31% 24% 20% 18% 18% 19%
SSSG 32% 26% 22% 21% 21% 14% 18% 6% 11% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Total sales 51% 40% 37% 33% 39% 26% 33% 25% 27% 25% 23% 24% 24%
Gross profit 49% 45% 36% 34% 42% 32% 25% 28% 24% 25% 23% 24% 24%
EBITDA 56% 59% 34% 45% 48% 38% 21% 33% 25% 28% 26% 24% 24%
EBIT 68% 68% 33% 50% 51% 40% 19% 28% 27% 30% 28% 25% 24%
PAT 56% 72% 32% 51% 50% 60% 18% 49% 34% 30% 26% 24% 22%
EPS 60% 18% 45% 34% 30% 26% 24% 22%

Margins
Gross 14.7% 14.5% 15.0% 14.8% 14.9% 15.3% 15.9% 15.0% 15.3% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0%
EBITDA 6.2% 6.4% 7.3% 7.1% 7.7% 8.2% 9.0% 8.2% 8.7% 8.6% 8.8% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0%
EBIT 4.6% 5.1% 6.1% 5.9% 6.6% 7.2% 7.9% 7.1% 7.3% 7.3% 7.6% 7.9% 8.0% 8.0%
PAT 2.7% 2.8% 3.4% 3.3% 3.7% 4.0% 5.1% 4.5% 5.4% 5.6% 5.9% 6.0% 6.0% 5.9%

Return ratios
ROE 13% 18% 20% 24% 18% 18% 18% 16% 15% 17% 18% 18% 19%
ROCE post tax 10% 14% 15% 17% 15% 16% 17% 16% 14% 16% 17% 18% 18%
ROIC post tax 11% 15% 15% 17% 20% 21% 18% 20% 19% 19% 20% 20% 20%
Incremental 3yr ROCE (pre tax) 36% 33% 28% 19% 18% 21% 25% 26% 26%

Du Pont
EBIT margin 5.1% 6.1% 5.9% 6.6% 7.2% 7.9% 7.1% 7.3% 7.3% 7.6% 7.9% 8.0% 8.0%
Asset turns 2.9 3.4 3.4 3.5 4.0 3.4 3.6 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1
ROIC pre tax 15% 20% 20% 23% 29% 27% 26% 23% 22% 23% 24% 24% 24%
ROIC post tax 11% 15% 15% 17% 21% 20% 19% 17% 16% 17% 18% 18% 18%

Liquidity ratios
Total debt 3,277 4,335 5,115 9,194 12,165 15,345 2,533 4,298 3,000 - 50 100 1,000 7,500
Debt/EBITDA 2.4 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Coverage (EBITDA/ Interest) 5 5 6 6 7 8 23 35 42 182 13,928 5,862 988 159
Net working capital days 12 9 10 23 19 21 18 17 18 16 16 16 16 16

Cash conversion
OCF/EBITDA 40% 63% -4% 55% 28% 69% 41% 58% 69% 65% 65% 63% 63%
FCF/EBITDA -49% -26% -100% -45% -32% -5% -33% -45% -19% -10% -1% -4% -5%
FCF/OCF -125% -41% 2366% -83% -114% -7% -79% -77% -27% -15% -1% -6% -8% 51
DMART – Key assumptions summary
Key business metrics and assumptions

Stores (nos.) 62 75 89 110 131 155 176 208 238 268 298 333 373
% addition 13% 21% 19% 24% 19% 18% 14% 18% 14% 13% 11% 12% 12%

New stores added 7 13 14 21 21 24 21 32 30 30 30 35 40

Area (mn sq. ft.) 1.8 2.1 2.7 3.3 4.1 4.9 5.9 7.7 9.6 11.5 13.6 16.1 19.1
% addition 14% 22% 24% 25% 22% 21% 20% 31% 24% 20% 18% 18% 19%

SSSG (reported) 32% 26% 22% 21% 21% 14% 18% 6% 11% 12% 12% 12% 12%

Stores in SSSG count (nos) 55 62 75 89 110 131 155 176 208 238 268 298
New stores (<= 4 years old) 20 27 35 42 45 45 53 62 60 60
Mature stores (> 4 years old) 55 62 75 89 110 131 155 176 208 238

SSSG (calculated)
New stores (<= 4 years old) 30% 30% 25% 25% 16% 20% 22% 23% 23% 25%
Mature stores (> 4 years old) 20% 20% 13% 15% 3% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Calculated SSSG 21% 21% 15% 16% 6% 11% 12% 12% 12% 12%

Implied new store efficiency 66% 62% 47% 79% 59% 75% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65%

Capex calculations

Total annual capex (Rs mn) 1,863 2,999 4,333 3,654 5,803 8,949 11,965 22,398 24,021 26,231 28,645 36,493 45,544
% YoY 61% 44% -16% 59% 54% 34% 87% 7% 9% 9% 27% 25%
Capex per store (Rs mn) 266 231 310 174 276 373 570 700 801 874 955 1,043 1,139
% YoY -13% 34% -44% 59% 35% 53% 23% 14% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Capex per sq. ft. (Rs) 8,871 7,893 8,333 5,454 7,950 10,653 11,965 12,443 12,941 13,458 13,997 14,557 15,139
% YoY -11% 6% -35% 46% 34% 12% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%

52
DMART – Other company details

53
 Retail – valuation summary
PE (x) EV/EBITDA (x) ROE EPS growth
Company M cap (US$bn) CY20/FY21 CY21/FY22 CY20/FY21 CY21/FY22 CY20/FY21 CY21/FY22 CY20/FY21 CY21/FY22
India
Avenue Supermarts 20.2 104.2 80.3 67.3 52.6 20.6 21.1 48.9 29.8
Future Retail 2.2 20.4 17.2 7.2 6.3 17.2 16.0 2.0 18.6
ABFRL 2.7 154.9 62.3 21.4 17.5 9.7 18.6 (60.3) 148.5
Shoppers Stop 0.5 53.2 32.1 7.5 6.6 6.5 12.1 (3.0) 65.6
Vmart 0.6 56.9 43.3 21.9 17.6 15.8 17.6 15.7 31.5
Trent 3.7 113.8 69.3 59.5 44.3 7.8 11.4 125.3 64.4
Future Lifestyle 1.0 49.2 32.2 8.1 6.9 7.7 9.9 (28.5) 52.5
Asia, South America, Australia
Woolworths 31.7 27.7 25.3 11.0 9.9 17.4 18.6 (32.7) 9.4
Sun Art Retail 12.3 27.7 24.8 8.4 7.5 12.0 12.5 8.3 11.7
Fast Retailing Co. 53.3 33.5 28.2 15.9 13.4 16.5 17.5 1.7 18.8
North America
Walmart 305.5 20.8 19.7 10.7 10.3 18.5 19.6 (1.0) 5.6
Costco 124.2 32.3 30.1 17.7 16.1 23.3 21.7 4.7 7.1
Target 52.2 16.0 14.8 8.9 8.5 27.9 27.6 15.7 8.1
Kroger 22.5 12.8 12.0 6.6 6.4 20.0 19.8 (42.3) 7.2
Europe
Tesco 28.7 13.4 12.5 5.7 5.4 11.2 11.4 24.5 7.6
Sainsbury 5.6 10.3 9.9 4.6 4.4 5.6 5.5 150.0 4.2

54