Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 204481-82 October 14, 2015

ALBERT C. AMBAGAN, JR., Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

TOPIC

A testimony that an accused made a statement which allegedly initiated the shootout, such
testimony not being entirely credible, cannot sustain the conviction of said accused as principal by
inducement.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Accused Mayor Ambagan Jr. was charged and convicted by the Sandiganbayan with two counts of
homicide as principal by inducement or the deaths of SPO2 Reynaldo Santos (Santos) and Domingo
Bawalan. The prosecution presented statements from two persons who was said to be directly
present during the shooting.

The first witness (Bawalan) said that the shooting started after he heard the mayor

said “GE, IYAN PALA ANG GUSTO MO, MGA KASAMA BANATAN N’YO NA YAN”.

However, the second witness (Patam) contradicts this when he said that he instead pushed the
mayor out of the road where the shooting incident occurred and that he did not hear the mayor
saying those words which could have provoked and initiate the shooting of the victims.

Further, evidence provides that Rene Amparo (one of Mayor Ambagan’s men) has negative paraffin
test which would lead to the fact that it is not the Mayor’s men who initiated the shooting but rather
from the deceased Rey Santos.

The Sandiganbayan convicted Ambagan of the crime of double homicide. Aggrieved, petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the aforequoted ruling. The Sandiganbayan, however, would deny
petitioner's motion through its assailed October 31, 2012 Resolution. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused Albert Ambagan is criminally liable as a principal by inducement?

SUPREME COURT RULED

NO. The requisites for the conviction of a person as principal by inducement are (1) that the
inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and (2) that such
inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor. The
Sandiganbayan would have been correct if the statement was indeed made by the petitioner
immediately before the shooting incident. However, there are substantial inconsistencies in the
testimonies of star prosecution witnesses Patam and Ronnel Bawalan, which refer not only to minor
details but even to facts constituting important aspects of the case, seriously eroding the weight of
the evidence of the prosecution, and casting reasonable doubt on the culpability of petitioner.

Only Ronnel Bawalan allegedly heard petitioner make the utterance. Between the two star
witnesses, Patam was in closer proximity to Ambagan and was thus in a better position to know
whether the statement was indeed made by the latter. However, Patam made no such testimony
despite the several opportunities he could have done so.

The testimony of Ronnel Bawalan is not entirely credible, as (1) Ronnel testified that he saw
petitioner engage Santos in a verbal altercation in the middle of the street, but thereafter claimed he
did not see petitioner’s whereabouts when the shooting began, (2) if the facts were as Ronnel
stated, petitioner would have been caught in the middle of the crossfire he himself allegedly ordered,
(3) both petitioner and Patam testify that petitioner wanted to go back (as Patam was taking him
into the house of Javier) during the exchange of gunshots – if Ronnel was correct in saying that
petitioner initiated the shootout, it would not make sense why petitioner would want to go back to the
shootout he started, (4) if petitioner wanted to start the shootout, he would have drawn his own
pistol, (5) if it is true that, per Ronnel, only Santos from his group was armed, that meant Santos was
able to shoot down 3 of petitioner’s men before he fell himself, (6) Ronnel first claimed that he
personally witnessed the deaths of the other individuals in the shootout (Causaren and Jamon) but
reversed himself during trial and claimed that he learned of such deaths from other sources, and (7)
Ronnel is biased against petitioner, as deceased Santos is his cousin-in-law and deceased Domingo
is his brother.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Albert G.

Ambagan, Jr. is ACQUITTED of the two counts of homicide subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28259
and 28260 on reasonable doubt. The June 21, 2012 Decision of the Sandiganbayan First Division in
Crim. Case Nos. 28259-60 is hereby MODIFIED accordingly as follows: Ambagan, Jr. vs. People,
772 SCRA 489, G.R. Nos. 204481-82 October 14, 2015.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 193854               September 24, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
DINA DULAY y PASCUAL, Appellant.

TOPIC

Under the RPC, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or
by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate
in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Dina Dulay was introduced to AAA, then 12 yrs. old, by the latter’s sister as someone who is nice.
Thereafter, Dulay convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at Parañaque City. Before going to
the said wake, they went to a casino, and thereafter to Sto. Niño, to look for Dulay’s boyfriend, but
he was not there. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port to ask for some fish, they saw Dulay's
boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, Dulay and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan located at
the back of the fish port. There, Dulay suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by
the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to Dulay and heard "Speed" tell Dulay
to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife, tied AAA's hands to the papag, and
raped her. AAA asked for Dulay's help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was
being raped, but Dulay did not do so. After the rape, "Speed" and Dulay told AAA not to tell anyone
what had happened or else they would get back at her.Upon going to Laguna, AAA told her sister
what happened and the latter informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a
complaint at the barangay. Thereafter, the barangay officials referred the complaint to the police
station.

Upon conducting physical examination upon AAA, Dr. Tan issued a Medico-Legal Report stating that
there was no evident injury in the body of AAA, but medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse.
During her testimony, Dr. Tan explained that such impression or conclusion pertains to the ano-
genital examination and also stated that she found multiple abrasions on the back portion of the
body of AAA.

RTC: Dulay GUILTY of RAPE as a co-principal by indispensable coopeRation.

CA: Affirmed. Dulay cooperated in the perpetration of the crime of rape committed by "Speed" by
acts without which the crime would not have been consummated, since she prepared the way for the
perpetration thereof, convinced the victim to go with her under the guise of looking for her boyfriend
and upon arrival at the kubuhan, she pulled the victim inside a room where "Speed" was waiting,
delivered the victim to him, and then after receiving some amount of money from "Speed" she
settled in another room together with her boyfriend so that "Speed" might freely consummate the
rape with violence and intimidation, as he did.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused should be held liable as a co-principal for the crime of Rape.

SUPREME COURT RULED

NO, in order to be considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in

the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission
of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished.

The Supreme Court held that the accused did not participate in the criminal resolution of the crime of
Rape but merely delivered AAA to “Speed.” Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime
of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until
appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not

indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's
services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered
her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this
disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that
in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by
appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed."

However, the accused is still liable for violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act or a) Those who engage in
or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute.

Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It
contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a),
the child is abused primarily for profit.

The elements of paragraph (a) are:

The accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution; the act is done through,
but not limited to, the following means: acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; inducing a person to
be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means;
taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute; threatening or using
violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or giving monetary consideration, goods or
other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution;
WHEREFORE, the appeal of appellant Dina Dulay y Pascual is hereby DISMISSED. However, the
Decision of the CA is hereby MODIFlED as appellant is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape, but of violating Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610, as amended, for which she is
sentenced to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is also ORDERED to pay AAA the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 172707               October 1, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO
Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y
KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON
A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

TOPIC

Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the Revised
Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely,

(1) that there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by
previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of
the crime in an efficacious way; and

that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish deliveries,
which were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11 August
1998, two persons, one of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chan’s
residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been
mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the two
left. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion identified as Tony Abao (Abao),
returned looking for Chan but were told that she was out. When the two returned in the afternoon,
Chan informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to accompany them
to the airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao
declined and told Chan that they would be back later that evening.
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to Chan’s
residence that evening. Chan’s houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the stairs.
Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chan’s son, Levy Chan (Levy),
and the house companions. As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried to
stop the man by grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levy’s head
forcing the latter to release his grip on Chan’s feet. Levy thereafter proceeded to the Pasay Police
Headquarters to report the incident.

Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about two hours, the group
stopped at a certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not to
shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two women, later
identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad). Chan was
brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and
Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol). Ronas and Evad threatened Chan that she would be killed unless
she paid 20 Million Pesos.

On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the "Tamaraw FX" van.
After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan was brought to
a room on the second floor of the house. Inside the room were three persons whom Chan identified
in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao). Another woman, later
identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived. At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, a man who
was later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and asked Chan
"Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?” Another man, whom

Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed
Chan that he was sent by their boss to ask her how much money she has. Chan was instructed to
talk to her son through a cell phone and she gave instructions to her son to get the ₱75,000.00 she
kept in her cabinet. The group then talked to Chan’s son and negotiated the ransom amount in
exchange for his mother’s release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver ₱400,000.00 at the
"Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue.

Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who were
assigned at the Pasay City area to conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping, were
informed that the abductors called and demanded for ransom in exchange for Chan’s release.
During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red
Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victim’s residence. The inspectors observed
that the occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the house. The inspectors
and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth
Resort and stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in the cottage
was the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF)
to conduct a rescue operation.

On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information that the
abductors acceded to a ₱400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at
Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning of the information, the team immediately and
strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a light
blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the ransom money and
headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team successfully intercepted the
van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The
team was also able to recover the ₱400,000.00 ransom.
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted Cottage No. 1,
resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of her abductors, later identified
in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.

ISSUE

Whether or not Thian Perpenian be considered as an accomplice to the crime.

SUPREME COURT RULED

Yes, Thian should be considered as an accomplice to the crime. Settled is the rule that being
present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible
as an accomplice in the crime committed. As a rational person, Thian was expected to report the
incident to the police authorities. Here, Thian failed to report the said incident and to add to that, she
even spent the night at the cottage. Thus, being present and giving moral support when a crime is
being committed is attended.

Also, the testimony of the victim that she saw Thian entered the room talking to other accused of
things not related to the crime is not sufficient evidence to hold Thian as principal to the crime.
Settled is the rule that in case of doubt, the participation of the

offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal. Therefore, the
Court opines that Thian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an accomplice
to the crime

WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863 is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL,
EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI,
THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL
and NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility
of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellants are
ordered to indemnify the victim in the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as
moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages apportioned in the following manner: the
principals to the crime shall jointly and severally pay the victim the total amount of P288,000.00 while
the accomplice shall pay the victim P12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code on
several and subsidiary liability.

The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release THIAN PERPENIAN
A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN due to her having fully served the penalty imposed on her, unless her
further detention is warranted for any other lawful causes

Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the
Correctional Institute for Women by personal service. The Director of the Correctional Institute for
Women shall submit to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the decision, the
action he has taken thereon.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 125688             April 3, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
IGNACIO CUPINO,  VINCENT DEJORAS and RAMON GALOS a.k.a. Jun, accused, IGNACIO
1 

CUPINO and VINCENT DEJORAS, accused-appellants.

TOPIC

To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have

performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy, exists in a
situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly
showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim.

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which
cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore
required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice
that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the evening of August 16, 1989 at around 9:45pm, during the celebration of a certain fiesta in
Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, suspect Mr. Ramon Galos & victim Mr. Gromyko Valiente were having
a heated argument. Such incident was happening in front of a particular store called Dod’s situated
at the crossing of the town of Patag.

Suddenly a fist fight occurred between Mr. Galos and Mr. Valiente. During this instance, the
appellants arrived in the scene. Aftewards, all three individuals (Galos, Cupino and Dejoras) ganged
up against and beat up the victim Mr. Valiente. This resulted for the victim to run away but likewise
the three accused pursued him.

When Mr. Galos was able to reach the victim, he suddenly stabbed him twice in his stomach using a
small bolo. This caused the victim to fall down and thus crawl on the floor. Then afterwards, Mr.
Cupino pulled the bolo embedded within the victim’s body and tried to stab him as well also. But Mr.
Dejoras tried to prevent this from occurring by grabbing his friend’s hand which held the small bolo.

During this process, Dejoras wasn’t able to successfully grab hold of his friend’s hand but instead
caught the knife with its blade. This instantly injured the hand of Mr. Dejoras. But nonetheless, Mr.
Cupino proceeded with his intent of stabbing the victim. Then both Galos and Cupino immediately
fled the scene. The victim, Mr. Valiente, was left lying on the floor soaked with his own blood. He
was eventually brough to the hospital but later died. Mr. Dejoras, on the other hand, went to a
hospital in order to seek treatment upon the hand wound he incurred.

RTC: (1) appellants Dejoras, Galos, and Cupino were guilty of murder, as the killing was qualified by
treachery; (2) conspiracy was proven by the chain of circumstantial evidence submitted; and (3) the
aggravating circumstance of superior strength was absorbed by treachery and may no longer be
used to increase the penalty to its maximum period.

ISSUE

Whether or not the appellant-accused were guilty as charged.

SUPREME COURT RULED

RTC’s decision insofar as the conviction of Cupino and Galos, Dejoras should be acquitted.

In People v. Elijorde, a case with similar facts, we said:

Indeed, with respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot assert with moral certainty
that he is guilty of murder. Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through
clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal
by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy, exists in a situation where at the time the
malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them,
a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was
established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yielded the reasonable inference that
the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is
determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do
reasonably yield that inference.

Thus, in Elijorde we found one of the accused, a certain Punzalan, innocent under the
circumstances. Similarly, in the present case, we find Appellant Vincent Dejoras not guilty.

Unlike the trial court, we are quite mindful of the testimony of Prosecution Eyewitness Bahian
regarding Appellant Dejoras' participation in that bloody incident on the eve of the fiesta. His
answers to the propounded questions merely established that Dejoras joined Galos and Cupino
when they approached the victim. The prosecution filled, however, to show, what Dejoras specifically
did that proved his participation in the conspiracy. Rather, what the said eyewitness said was that
Dejoras tried to prevent Cupino from stabbing the victim, clearly showing that he did not support the
criminal intent and conspiracy of the other two accused. These incontrovertible data lead to one
conclusion: there is reasonable doubt on whether Dejoras conspired with Galos and Cupino in
killing Valliente. We are therefore constrained to exonerate him. Indeed, guilt must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, there is reasonable doubt on the culpability of Appellant
Dejoras as a principal.

Dejoras cannot be held liable as an accomplice, either. In Elijorde, we said:

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which
cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore
required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice
that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.

The acts of Appellant Dejoras showed that he was not aware of his companions' intent to kill
Valliente; at the very least, there is reasonable doubt as to his knowledge thereof. In any event,
community of design, the first of the requisite elements that must be present before a person may be
held liable as an accomplice, is lacking. On the prosecution's theory that Dejoras may have inflicted
injury on the victim when he joined in the fray, we have combed the records and found no basis for
this speculation. We note that the eyewitness could not recount the details of the brawl, but merely
provided a general picture, saying that everything happened so fast. Hence, we find no basis for
Appellant Dejoras' liability even for physical injuries.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed Decision insofar as it found Appellant Ignacio Cupino
GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Appellant Cupino is solely
responsible for paying the heirs of the victim, Gromyko Valliente, the amounts of P50,000 as
indemnity ex delicto, P30,000 as actual damages and P50,000 as moral damages. Appellant Vincent
Dejoras is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from custody IMMEDIATELY, unless he is being
legally held for another cause. In this regard, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
report his compliance, within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Costs against Appellant Cupino.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 121828               June 27, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused,
RENE GAYOT PILOLA, Appellant.

TOPIC

To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have

performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. The mere presence of an
accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the
act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is not enough to make
him a party to a conspiracy.

FACTS OF THE CASE

On June 7, 1998, Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and appellant Rene Gayot Pilola were
charged with the murder of Joselito Capa.

Of the three accused, Odilon Lagliba was the first to be arrested and tried, and subsequently
convicted of murder. The decision of the trial court became final and executory. Accused Edmar
Aguilos remains at large while accused Ronnie Diamante reportedly died a month after the incident.
Meanwhile, herein appellant Rene Gayot Pilola was arrested. He was arraigned on March 9, 1994,
assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.

Prosecution:

The witness Elisa Rolan was inside their store in Mandaluyong at around 11:30PM. Joselito Capa
(deceased) and Julian Azul Jr. were drinking beer when Aguilos and Odilon arrived at the store.
Joselito and Julian invited them to join their drinking which they accepted. Later on, a heated
argument between the two parties turned into an altercation. Elisa was able to pacify them.
However, as Joselito and Julian were about to leave, Edmar and Odilar returned. Edmar and Julian
got into a fist fight. Joselito tried to stop the fight however, this caused Odilon to pull out his knife and
stab Joselito in the neck. Ronnie and the appellant (Rene), who were across the street, saw their
gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives,
rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Julian was able to run away.

Appellant

The appellant denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. He claims he was
inside his cousin’s house and was suffering from ulcer.

The appellant also argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and
Odilon in stabbing the victim to death. He could not have conspired with Odilon as the incident was
only a chance encounter between victim, the appellant and his co-accused. In the absence of a
conspiracy, the appellant cannot be held liable as a principal by direct participation.

Crime Charged: Murder

Lower Court Ruling: WHEREFORE, this Court finds RENE GAYOT PILOLA of 606 Nueve de
Febrero Street, Mandaluyong City, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder.

ISSUE

Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that there was conspiracy.

SUPREME COURT RULED

NO.

Supreme Court: We are not persuaded by the ruminations of the appellant.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the
same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After
all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.

Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative. There may be
conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders, and even though
he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the
beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it.

WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated May 3, 1995, of Branch 164 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City in Criminal Case No. 73615, finding appellant Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant is hereby directed
to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa the amount of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; the amount
of ₱50,000 as moral damages; and the amount of ₱25,000 as exemplary damages.