Gerga Prs Qra

The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company “EGAS”
Quantitative Risk Assessment

“QRA” Study
For
Gerga Pressure Reduction
Station
Prepared By
Petroleum Safety and Environmental Services Company
PETROSAFE
December 2015
EGAS.HSE.QRA.Study.PRS.01/Gerga.No.02/2015/QRA/MG/MS/DNV-PHAST.7.0-PETROSAFE-Final Report
Prepared By: Page 2 of 151
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company “EGAS”
Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment “QRA” Study For Gerga PRS
CONTENTS
Executive Summary 12/151
Introduction 24/151
Abbreviations and Technical Definitions 25/151
Objectives 30/151
Quantitative Risk Assessment Study Scope 31/151
Quantitative Risk Assessment “QRA” Studies 32/151
Method of Assessment 32/151
1.0- General Method Used 32/151
2.0- Risk Assessment 32/151
Modeling the Consequences 34/151
Criterion for Risk Tolerability 35/151
Personnel Vulnerability and Structural Damage 38/151
Quantification of the Frequency of Occurrence 41/151
Identification of Scenarios Leading to Selected Failures 41/151
Relevant Weather Data for the Study 42/151
- Weather Data 42/151
- Stability Categories 47/151
Gerga Pressure Reduction Station Description 48/151
Background 48/151
PRMS Location Coordinates 48/151
PRMS Description 48/151
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Design Data 52/151

Gas Odorant Specs 52/151
Health Hazards 52/151
Inhalation 52/151
Skin Contact 52/151
Eye Contact 52/151
Ingestion 52/151
Hygiene Standards and Limits 53/151
Fire and Explosion Hazards 53/151
Fire Fighting and Protection Systems and Facilities 53/151
Emergency Response Plan “ERP” 53/151
Analytical Results of Consequence Modeling 55/151
1.0- Pressure Reduction Station Inlet Pipeline (4 inch) 55/151
1/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release
55/151
(Horizontal)
1/2- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release (Angle
60/151
20o)
65/151
45o)
1/4- Consequence Modeling for 2 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release
69/151
(Horizontal)
1/5- Consequence Modeling for 2 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release (Angle
74/151
20o)
79/151
45o)
1/7- Consequence Modeling for 4 inch (Full Rup.) Gas Release 84/151
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2.0- Pressure Reduction Station Outlet Pipeline (6 inch) 90/151
2/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

90/151
(Horizontal)
94/151
20o)
98/151
45o)
2/4- Consequence Modeling for 3 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

102/151
(Horizontal)
107/151
20o)
112/151
45o)
2/7- Consequence Modeling for 6 inch (Full Rup.) Gas Release

116/151
(Horizontal)
3.0- Pressure Reduction Station Spotleak Tank (Odorant Tank) 122/151
Individual Risk Evaluation 129/151
• Risk Calculation 129/151
• Event Tree Analysis 132/151
Conclusion 141/151
Recommendations 150/151
Tables
Table (1) Description of Modeling of the Different Scenario 34/151
Table (2) Proposed Individual Risk (IR) Criteria (per person/year) 36/151
Criteria for Personnel Vulnerability and Structural

Table (3) 38/151
Damage
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Table (4) Fire Heat Radiation Effects on Structures (World Bank) 39/151
Table (5) Heat Radiation Effects on People 39/151
Table (6) Effects of Overpressure 40/151
Annual Average Temperature, Relative Humidity and Wind

Table (7) 42/151
Speed / Direction
Table (8) Mean of Monthly Air Temperature (°C) 46/151
Table (9) Mean of Monthly Wind Speed (m/sec) and Direction 46/151
Table (10) Mean of Monthly Relative Humidity (%) 46/151
Table (11) Mean of Cloud Cover on the Scale 0 – 8 46/151
Table (12) Mean of Monthly Sunshine Hours 46/151
Table (13) Pasqual Stability Categories 47/151
Table (14) Relationship between Wind Speed and Stability 47/151
Table (15) Sets of Weather Conditions Initially Selected for this Study 47/151
Table (16) Dispersion Modeling – 1” Horizontal Gas release 55/151
Table (17) Dispersion Modeling – 1” 20 o - Gas release 60/151
Table (19) Dispersion Modeling – 2” Horizontal - Gas release 69/151
Table (20) Dispersion Modeling – 2” 20o - Gas release 74/151
Table (22) Dispersion Modeling – 4” Gas release 84/151
Table (23) Dispersion Modeling – 1” Horizontal Gas release 90/151
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Table (30) Dispersion Modeling for Odorant Tank 122/151
Table (31) Failure Frequency for Each Scenario 131/151
PRS Inlet 4” and Outlet 6” Pipeline Scenarios (Pin Hole

Table (32) 134/151
Crack – 1” Release) – Event Tree Analysis
PRS Inlet 4” and Outlet 6” Pipeline Scenarios (Half Dia.

Table (33) 135/151
Release) – Event Tree Analysis
PRS Inlet 4” and Outlet 6” Pipeline Scenarios (Full

Table (34) 136/151
Rupture Release) – Event Tree Analysis
Table (35) Odorant Tank Release – Event Tree Analysis 137/151
Table (36) Total Frequencies for Each Scenario 138/151
Table (37) Individual Risk (IR) Calculation 139/151
Figures
Figure (1) Risk Assessment Framework 33/151
Figure (2) Criteria for Individual Risk Tolerability 35/151
Figure (3) Proposed Individual Risk Criteria 36/151
Figure (4) 2012 - Weather Data from Weather Spark "International

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Weather Data"

44/151
Weather Data"

45/151
Weather Data"
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Figure (7) Gerga Pressure Reduction Station Plotted on Google Earth

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Photo
Figure (8) Gerga Pressure Reduction Station Master Plan Elevations 50/151
Figure (9) Gerga Pressure Reduction Station Piping and
51/151
Instrumentation Diagram “P&ID”
Figure (10) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (1” hole in 4” Pipeline /
56/151
0o)
Figure (11) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1” hole in 4”
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Pipeline / 0o)
Figure (12) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (1” hole in 4”
58/151
Pipeline / 0o)
Figure (13) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (1” hole in 4” Pipeline
59/151
/ 0o)
61/151
20o)
62/151
Pipeline / 20o)
63/151
Pipeline / 20o)
64/151
/ 20o)
66/151
45o)
67/151
Pipeline / 45o)
68/151
Pipeline / 45o)
70/151
0o)
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71/151
Pipeline / 0o)

72/151
Pipeline / 0o)

73/151
/ 0o)
75/151
20o)
76/151
Pipeline / 20o)

77/151
Pipeline / 20o)

78/151
/ 20o)
80/151
45o)
81/151
Pipeline / 45o)

82/151
Pipeline / 45o)

83/151
/ 45o)
Figure (33) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (4” Pipeline Full
85/151
Rupture)
Figure (34) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (4” Pipeline Full
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Rupture)
Figure (35) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (4” Pipeline Full

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Rupture)
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Figure (36) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (4” Pipeline Full

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Rupture)
Figure (37) Heat Radiation Contours from Fireball (4” Pipeline Full
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Rupture)
91/151
0o)
92/151
Pipeline / 0o)

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Pipeline / 0o)
95/151
20o)
96/151
Pipeline / 20o)

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Pipeline / 20o)
99/151
45o)
100/151
Pipeline / 45o)

101/151
Pipeline / 45o)
103/151
0o)
104/151
Pipeline / 0o)

105/151
Pipeline / 0o)
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106/151
/ 0o)
108/151
20o)
109/151
Pipeline / 20o)

110/151
Pipeline / 20o)
111/151
/ 20o)
113/151
45o)
114/151
Pipeline / 45o)
115/151
Pipeline / 45o)
Figure (58) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (6” Pipeline Full
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Rupture)
Figure (59) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (6” Pipeline Full
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Rupture)
Figure (60) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (6” Pipeline Full

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Rupture)
Figure (61) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (6” Pipeline Full

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Rupture)
Figure (62) Heat Radiation Contours from Fireball (6” Pipeline Full
121/151
Rupture)
Figure (63) Vapor Cloud (UFL/LFL) Side View Graph (Odorant leak) 123/151
Figure (64) Vapor Cloud (UFL/LFL) Footprint on Site Map (Odorant
123/151
leak)
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Figure (65) Heat Radiation Contours - Jet Fire Graph (Odorant Leak) 125/151
Figure (66) Heat Radiation Contours - Jet Fire on Site (Odorant Leak) 125/151
Figure (67) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves Graph (Odorant Leak) 127/151
Figure (68) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves on Site (Odorant

127/151
Leak)
Figure (69) Evaluation of Individual Risk 140/151
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Date: Dec. 2015
Executive Summary
This report summarizes the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) analysis
study undertaken for the New Natural Gas Pressure Reduction & Metering
Station “PRMS” with Odorant at Gerga – Sohag Government – Upper Egypt –
which owned to Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company “EGAS” and
operated by Regional Gas Company “REGAS” in order to identify and
evaluate hazards generated from the new Gerga PRMS.
The scope of work includes performing frequency assessment, consequence
modelling analysis and Quantitative Risk Assessment of Gerga PRS in order to
assess their impacts on the surroundings.
The main objective of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study is to
demonstrate that Individual Risk “IR” for workers and Societal Risk “SR” for
public fall within the ALARP region of Risk Acceptance Criteria, and the new
Gerga PRS doesn’t lead to any unacceptable risks to the workers or the public.
QRA Study has been undertaken in accordance with the methodology outlined
in the UKHSE as well as international regulations and standards.
QRA starts by Hazard Identification (HAZID) study, which determines the
Major Accident Hazards (MAH) that requires consequence modelling,
frequency analysis, and risk calculation.
In order to perform consequence modelling analysis of the potential hazardous
scenarios resulting from loss of containment, some assumptions and design
basis have been proposed. Three scenarios of the release have been proposed:
1. Gas Release from the inlet pipeline.

2. Gas Release from the outlet pipeline.
3. Leak from odorant tank.
The QRA has been performed using DNV Phast software (ver. 7.0) for
consequence modelling of different types of hazardous consequences.
Weather conditions have been selected based on wind speed and stability class
for the area detailed weather statistics.
The worst case weather conditions has been selected represented by wind
speed of 4.7 m/s and stability class "D" representing "Neutral" weather
conditions, in order to obtain conservative results. The prevailing wind
direction is North / North West (N/NW).
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As per results from modeling the consequences of each scenario the following
table summarize the study, and as follows:
Event Scenario Effects
Pin hole (1”) gas release
0o 4” pipeline
Gas cloud The modeling shows that the gas cloud
UFL effects will be limited inside the PRS area.
LFL
50 % LFL
Heat radiation / jet The modeling shows that the heat
fire radiation value (9.5 kW/m2 and 12.5
9.5 kW/m2 kW/m2) effects will be limited inside the
12.5 kW/m2 PRS area.
Early explosion The modeling shows that the value of
0.020 bar 0.020 bar will extend outside with a
0.137 bar distances of about 50 m NW, 23 m NE, 29
0.206 bar SW and 18 m SE (road direction).
The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will
be limited inside from NE, SW and SE, but
extended from 4 to 6 meters out from NW
side.
Late explosion The modeling show that the value of 0.020
0.020 bar bar, 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be
0.137 bar limited inside the PRS boundary.
0.206 bar The 0.020 bar will reach the office
building.

20o 4” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
Heat radiation / jet The modeling shows that the heat
side.
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Date: Dec. 2015

Late explosion The modeling shows that the value of
0.020 bar 0.020 bar, 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be
0.206 bar
45o 4” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
Heat radiation / Jet The modeling shows that the heat
fire radiation value (9.5 kW/m2 & 12.5 kW/m2)
9.5 kW/m2 effects will be limited inside the PRS area.
12.5 kW/m2
extended from 7 & 3 meters out from NW
side.
Late explosion N/D
0.020 bar
0.137 bar
0.206 bar
Half Rupture (2”) gas

release 0o 4” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
9.5 kW/m2 effects will be limited inside the PRS area,
12.5 kW/m2 these values will reach the office and
security buildings, and reaching the fence
from NE and SE sides.
0.206 bar SW and 18 m SE.
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Date: Dec. 2015

extended from 8 & 4 meters outside from
NW side.
0.020 bar 0.020 bar will crossing the PRS NW fence
0.137 bar to a distance of 18 m, SE fence 22 m, NE
0.206 bar fence 28 m SW fence 15 m.
be limited inside the PRS boundary.
LFL
50 % LFL
fire radiation value of 9.5 kW/m2 will reach
9.5 kW/m2 the office building SW side and 12.5
12.5 kW/m2 kW/m2 will be near the building. The tow
values effects will be limited inside the
PRS area.
side.
0.020 bar 0.020 bar will crossing the PRS fence to a
0.137 bar distance of 17 m NE, 4 m SW fence, 6 m
0.206 bar NW fence and 15 m SE fence.
LFL
50 % LFL
fire radiation of 9.5 kW/m2 will crossing the
9.5 kW/m2 PRS NE area with about 9 m.
12.5 kW/m2 The heat radiation of 12.5 kW/m2 effect
will be limited inside the PRS area.
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Date: Dec. 2015

0.206 bar SW and 18 m SE (road direction.
NW side.
0.137 bar distances of about 17 m NE, 8 m SW, 20
0.206 bar NW and 5 m SE (road direction).
be limited inside PRS area.
Full Rupture (4”) gas

release 4” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
Heat radiation / Jet The 12.5 kW/m2 heat radiation contours
fire extend about 88.19 meters downwind and
9.5 kW/m2 44.40 meters crosswind – extend NE fence
12.5 kW/m2 with 25 m, SE fence with 45 m and SW
fence with 10 m.
The 25 kW/m2 heat radiation contours
extend about 76.37 meters downwind and
29.60 meters crosswind – extend NE fence
with 10 m and SE fence with 35 m.
The 37.5 kW/m2 heat radiation contours
side.
0.137 bar extend outside the PRS boundary.
0.206 bar
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Date: Dec. 2015

Heat radiation / The modeling shows that the heat
Fireball radiation value (9.5 kW/m2 and 12.5
9.5 kW/m2 kW/m2) effects will extend outside PRS
12.5 kW/m2 boundary for some of 10 & 12 meters
from the NW side.
The heat radiations value (25 kW/m2 and
37.5 kW/m2) will be limited inside the PRS
area with some of about 2 meters outside
the fence from NW side for 25 kW/m2.
0o 6” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
12.5 kW/m2
0.137 bar distances of about 11 m NW.
0.206 bar The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will
be limited inside PRS boundary.
Late explosion N/D
0.020 bar
0.137 bar
0.206 bar
20o 6” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
12.5 kW/m2
0.137 bar distances of about 20 m NW and 1 m SW.
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Date: Dec. 2015

Late explosion N/D
0.020 bar
0.137 bar
0.206 bar
45o 6” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
12.5 kW/m2
Late explosion N/D
0.020 bar
0.137 bar
0.206 bar

LFL
50 % LFL
fire radiation value (9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5
12.5 kW/m2 PRS area, and reaches the office building.
0.137 bar distances of about 12 m NW and 1 SW.
0.137 bar limited inside the PRS boundary reaching
0.206 bar the office at 0.020 bar.
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Date: Dec. 2015

LFL
50 % LFL
9.5 kW/m2 effects will be limited inside the PRS area
12.5 kW/m2 and reaches the office building.
0.206 bar
LFL
50 % LFL
Late explosion N/D
0.020 bar
0.137 bar
0.206 bar
LFL
50 % LFL
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Date: Dec. 2015

fire radiation of:
9.5 kW/m2 9.5 kW/m2 extend to 39 m SE / 8 m NE / 14
12.5 kW/m2 m SW
12.5 kW/m2 extend to 22 m SE / at NE
fence / 10 m SW
25 kW/m2 extend to 15 m SE
37.5 kW/m2 extend to 10 m SE
All of the heat radiations above will
effects the office and security buildings.
0.137 bar limited inside the PRS boundary effecting
0.206 bar the office building at 0.020 bar.
9.5 kW/m2 kW/m2) will be limited inside the PRS
12.5 kW/m2 area.
Odorant tank 1” leak

LFL Consideration should be taken when deal
50 % LFL with liquid, vapors and smokes according
to the MSDS for the material.
fire radiation effects will be limited inside the
9.5 kW/m2 PRS boundary from three sides, but will
12.5 kW/m2 extend beyond the NW boundary with
some of 10 to 15 meters (upwind).
Early explosion N/D
0.020 bar
0.137 bar
0.206 bar
0.020 bar 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited
0.137 bar inside the PRS boundary effecting the
0.206 bar office building at 0.020 bar.
The value of 0.020 bar will extend outside
with a distances of about 10 m NE, 10 m
SW, 15 m SE and 2 m NW.
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Date: Dec. 2015
The previous table show that there are some potential hazards with heat
radiation resulting from jet fire, and explosion overpressure waves in case of
gas release and early or late ignited.
These hazards will affect the office and security buildings, also some scenarios
will extend over the site boundary like heat radiation of 12.5 kW/m2 and
reaching the main road (Mohsen No’amany Road) or other PRS sides. These
major hazards that extend over site boundary and/or effect on workers is used
for Risk calculations.
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is an analysis technique for identifying and

evaluating the sequence of events in a potential accident scenario following the
occurrence of an initiating event. ETA utilizes a visual logic tree structure
known as an Event Tree (ET). ETA provides a Probabilistic Risk Assessment
(PRA) of the risk associated with each potential outcome. ETA has been used
for scenario development. The following data and assumptions have been
considered in the Event Tree Analysis (ETA):
• Failure frequency data (mainly E&P Forum/OGP),

• Risk reduction factors (if available),
• Ignition probabilities (both immediate and delayed),
• Vulnerability data.
Risks have been assessed for workers using International Risk Management
Guidelines as a reference. The resulting risks have been compared with
International Risk Acceptance Criteria. Risk evaluation for Individual Risk
“IR” and Societal Risk “SR” for the major hazards are presented in the
following tables:
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Date: Dec. 2015
Individual Acceptability
No. Scenario
Risk “IR” Criteria
Gas Release from 1” / 4” Pipeline (Jet Fire)

1 2.02E-04 ALARP

2 8.82E-05 ALARP
Gas Release from 4” Pipeline Full Rupture

(Jet Fire)
3 4.65E-07 Acceptable (√)
(Jet Fire)

(Fireball)
(Fireball)
5 Odorant Tank 1” Leak (Jet Fire) 7.2E-06 Acceptable (√)
TOTAL Risk for Workers 8.96E-05 ALARP
Societal Acceptability
No. Scenario
Risk “SR” Criteria

(Jet Fire)
TOTAL Risk for Public 3.58E-08 Acceptable (√)
The following figure shows the Individual Risk “IR” as well as Societal Risk “SR”
for Gerga PRMS:
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Date: Dec. 2015
UNACCEPTABLE REGION
Workers
Maximum Tolerable Limit
1 in 1000 per year
1.0E-03/year
ALARP Benchmark existing installations
1 in 5,000 per year Public
ALARP or Tolerability Region 1 in 10,000 per year
1.0E-04/year
ALARP Benchmark new installations

1 in 50,000 per year
ALARP or Tolerability Region

Minimum Tolerable Limit
1 in 100,000 per year 8.96E-05/yr. Risk must be demonstrated to have
1.0E-05/year been reduced to a level which is
practicable with a view to
cost/benefit

ACCEPTABLE REGION 1 in 1 million per year
3.58E-08/yr. 1.0E-06/year
Workers
ACCEPTABLE REGION
Public
INDIVIDUAL RISK TO WORKERS INDIVIDUAL RISK TO THE PUBLIC

Including contractor employees All those not directly involved with
company activities
The level of Individual Risk to the most exposed worker at Gerga PRS,
based on the risk tolerability criterion used, is ALARP.
The level of Individual Risk to the exposed Public at Gerga PRS area,
based on the risk tolerability criterion used, is Low (Acceptable Region)
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Date: Dec. 2015
Introduction
The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company “EGAS” has engaged Petroleum
Safety and Environmental Services Company “PETROSAFE” to identify and
evaluate hazards generated from the “New Natural Gas Pressure Reduction and
Odorant Station – PRS” at Gerga – Sohag Government – Upper Egypt – which
operated by Regional Gas Company “REGAS” in order to advice protective
measures for minimizing risk up to acceptable level.
As part of this review a QRA study is conducted for the following objectives:
• Identify hazardous scenarios related to the most critical unexpected

event(s).
• Determine the likelihood of the identified scenarios;
• Model the potential consequences of the identified scenarios;
• Determine the Potential risk of fatality resulting from the identified

hazardous scenarios.
The proposed study should also identify existing arrangements for the
prevention of major accidents and their mitigation. This would involve
emergency plan and procedure for dealing with such events.
Petrosafe was selected to carry out this study, as it has the experience in
conducting this type of work.
Petrosafe is also empowered by the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation

“EGPC” to identify and evaluate factors that relate to occupational health &
safety and environmental protection.
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Date: Dec. 2015
Abbreviations and Technical Definitions

ALARP Stands for "As Low As Reasonably Practicable", and is a term
often used in the milieu of safety-critical and safety-involved
systems. The ALARP principle is that the residual risk shall be as
low as reasonably practicable.
API American Petroleum Institute.
Confinement A qualitative or quantitative measure of the enclosure or partial

enclosure areas where vapors cloud may be contained.
Congestion A qualitative or quantitative measure of the physical layout,

spacing, and obstructions within a facility that promote
development of a vapor cloud explosion.
DNV PHAST Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool “PHAST” established by

Det Norske Veritas “DNV”. Phast examines the progress of a
potential incident from the initial release to far-field dispersion
including modelling of pool spreading and evaporation, and
flammable and toxic effects.
E&P Forum Exploration and Production “E&P” Forum is the international

association of oil companies and petroleum industry organizations
formed in 1974. It was established to represent its members’
interests at the specialist agencies of the United Nations,
governmental and other international bodies concerned with
regulating the exploration and production of oil and gas.
EGAS The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company.
EGPC The Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation.
EX Explosion Proof Type Equipment.
EERA Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment.
ESD Emergency Shut Down.
Explosion Explosion is the delayed ignition of gas in a confined or congested
area resulting in high overpressure waves.
Once the explosion occurs it creates a blast wave that has a very
steep pressure rise at the wave front and a blast wind that is a
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Date: Dec. 2015
transient flow behind the blast wave. The impact of the blast wave
on structures near the explosion is known as blast loading. The
two important aspects of the blast loading concern is the
prediction of the magnitude of the blast and of the pressure
loading onto the local structures. Pressure loading predications as
a result of a blast; resemble a pulse of trapezoidal or triangular
shape. They normally have duration of between approximately 40
msec and 400 msec. The time to maximum pressure is typically 20
msec.
Primary damage from an explosion may result from several
events:
1. Overpressure - the pressure developed between the expanding
gas and its surrounding atmosphere.
2. Pulse - the differential pressure across a plant as a pressure
wave passes might cause collapse or movement, both positive
and negative.
3. Missiles and Shrapnel - are whole or partial items that are
thrown by the blast of expanding gases that might cause
damage or event escalation. In general these “missiles” from
atmospheric vapor cloud explosions cause minor impacts to
process equipment since insufficient energy is available to lift
heavy objects and cause major impacts. Small projectile
objects are still a hazard to personnel and may cause injuries
and fatalities. Impacts from rupture incidents may produce
catastrophic results.
(ETA) Is a forward, bottom up, logical modeling technique for both
Event Tree success and failure that explores responses through a single
Analysis initiating event and lays a path for assessing probabilities of the
outcomes and overall system analysis. This analysis technique is
used to analyze the effects of functioning or failed systems given
that an event has occurred.
Failure Rate Is the frequency with which an engineered system or component
fails, expressed in failures per unit of time. It is highly used in
reliability engineering.
GASCO The Egyptian Natural Gas Company.
Gas Cloud Gas cloud air dilution naturally reduces the concentration to
Dispersion below the LEL or no longer considered ignitable (typically defined
as 50 % of the LEL).
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Date: Dec. 2015
HSE Policy Health, Safety and Environmental Policy.
Hazard An inherent physical or chemical characteristic (flammability,

toxicity, corrosively, stored chemical or mechanical energy) or set
of conditions that has the potential for causing harm to people,
property, or the environment.
(HAZOP) Is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or

Hazard And existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate
Operability problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or
Study prevent efficient operation. The HAZOP technique is qualitative,
and aims to stimulate the imagination of participants to identify
potential hazards and operability problems; structure and
completeness are given by using guideword prompts.
(HAZID) Is a tool for hazard identification, used early in a project as soon

Hazard as process flow diagrams, draft heat and mass balances, and plot
Identification layouts are available. Existing site infrastructure, weather, and
Study geotechnical data are also required, these being a source of
external hazards.
(HAC) When electrical equipment is used in, around, or near an

Hazardous atmosphere that has flammable gases or vapors, flammable
Area liquids, combustible dusts, ignitable fibers or flying’s, there is
Classification always a possibility or risk that a fire or explosion might occur.
Those areas where the possibility or risk of fire or explosion might
occur due to an explosive atmosphere and/or mixture is often
called a hazardous (or classified) location/area.
(IR) The risk to a single person inside a particular building. Maximum

Individual individual risk is the risk to the most-exposed person and assumes
Risk that the person is exposed.
Jet Fire A jet fire is a pressurized stream of combustible gas or atomized
liquid (such as a high pressure release from a gas pipe or
wellhead blowout event) that is burning. If such a release is
ignited soon after it occurs, (i.e., within 2 - 3 minutes), the result is
an intense jet flame. This jet fire stabilizes to a point that is close
to the source of release, until the release is stopped. A jet fire is
usually a very localized, but very destructive to anything close to
it. This is partly because as well as producing thermal radiation,
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
the jet fire causes considerable convective heating in the region

beyond the tip of the flame. The high velocity of the escaping gas
entrains air into the gas "jet" causing more efficient combustion to
occur than in pool fires.
Consequentially, a much higher heat transfer rate occurs to any
object immersed in the flame, i.e., over 200 kW/sq. m (62,500
Btdsq. ft) for a jet fire than in a pool fire flame. Typically the first
10% of a jet fire length is conservatively considered un-ignited
gas, as a result of the exit velocity causing the flame to lift off the
gas point of release. This effect has been measured on
hydrocarbon facility flares at 20 % of the jet length, but a value of
10% is used to account for the extra turbulence around the edges
of a real release point as compared to the smooth gas release from
a flare tip. Jet flames have a relatively cool core near the source.
The greatest heat flux usually occurs at impingement distances
beyond 40 % of the flame length, from its source. The greatest
heat flux is not necessarily on the directly impinged side.
kW/m2 Kilowatt per square meter – unit for measuring the heat radiation
(heat flux).
LFL / LEL Lower Flammable Limit / Lower Explosive Limit - The lowest
concentration (percentage) of a gas or a vapor in air capable of
producing a flash of fire in presence of an ignition source.
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet.
mm Hg A millimeter of mercury is a manometeric unit of pressure,
formerly defined as the extra pressure generated by a column of
mercury one millimeter high.
MEL Maximum Exposure Limit.
NFPA National Fire Protection Association.
N North Direction.
NE Northern East Direction.
NW Northern West Direction.
N/D Not Determined.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
OGP Oil and Gas Producers.

ppm Part Per Million.
PRS Pressure Reduction Station.
P&ID’s Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams.
PETROSAFE Petroleum Safety and Environmental Services Company.
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment Study is a formal and systematic
approach to estimating the likelihood and consequences of
hazardous events, and expressing the results quantitatively as risk
to people, the environment or your business.
ReGas Regional Gas Company.
Risk Relates to the probability of exposure to a hazard, which could
result in harm to personnel, the environment or general public.
Risk is a measure of potential for human injury or economic loss
in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the
injury / loss.
Risk The identification and analysis, either qualitative or quantitative,
Assessment of the likelihood and outcome of specific events or scenarios with
judgments of probability and consequences.
scm/hr Standard Cubic Meter Per Hour.
SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus.
SE Southern East Direction.
SW Southern West Direction.
TWA Time Weighted Averages.
UFL/UEL Upper flammable limit, the flammability limit describing the
richest flammable mixture of a combustible gas.
V Volume.
Vapor Cloud An explosion in air of a flammable material cloud.
Explosion
(VCE)
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Date: Dec. 2015
Objectives
The objectives of this QRA for the unit facilities are:
• Identify hazardous scenarios related to the facilities based on

historical data recorded.
• Determine the likelihood (frequencies) of the identified scenarios;
• Model the potential consequences of the identified scenarios;
• Determine the Potential risk of fatality resulting from the identified

hazardous scenarios;
• Evaluate the risk against the acceptable risk level to ensure that it is
within As Low As Reasonably Practicable “ALARP”, otherwise
additional control measures and recommendations will be provided at
this study to reduce the Risk, (ALARP).
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Date: Dec. 2015
Quantitative Risk Assessment Study Scope

The scope of work of this QRA study is limited to the following:
• Identification of the Most Critical Event(s) or scenarios that may lead

to fetal accidents as well as to ensure that the expected risk will not
exceed the Acceptable Risk Level as per national and international
standards.
• Normal operation of the facilities (e.g. Construction and specific

maintenance activities are excluded from this analysis);
• The study determines Frequencies, Consequences (Including

Associated Effect Contours) and Potential Risk of Fatality for the
identified hazardous scenarios.
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Date: Dec. 2015
Quantitative Risk Assessment “QRA” Studies

Method of Assessment
1.0- General Method Used
Attention was mainly focussed on those accidents where a gross failure of
containment could result in the generation of a large vapour cloud of
flammable or toxic material. The approach adopted has involved the
following stages:
• Identification of hazardous materials,
• Establishment of maximum total inventories and location.
During the site visit by the study team, the overall functioning of the site
was discussed in some detail and the Companies were asked to provide a
complete list of holdings of hazardous materials. A preliminary survey
notes was issued by the team, as a private communication to the company
concerned, and this formed the basis for subsequent more discussion and
analysis.
From the PRS design model provided by the client, it was impractical to
examine in depth all possible failure modes for all parts within the time
allowed for this study. Instead, only those potential failures which might
contribute, either directly or indirectly, to off-site risks were examined.
2.0- Risk Assessment

As the PRS is under design so it was therefore necessary for the study team
to identify and analyse the hazards potential from first principles the routes
by which a single or multiple accident could affect the community or
neighbouring.
The terms of reference required the team to investigate and determine the
overall risk to health and safety both from individual installations and then
foreseeable interactions.
The assessment of risk in a complex situation is difficult. No method is
perfect as all have advantages and limitations.
It was agreed that the quantitative approach was the most meaningful way
of comparing and evaluating different risks. The risk assessment
framework shown in Figure (1) was used for this study.
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Date: Dec. 2015
Failure Case Identify

Data
Definition Hazards
Scenario
Development
Analysis of
Frequency Analysis
Consequences
Impact Assessment
Estimate / Measure
Risks
Tolerability
Evaluate Risks Criteria
Verify Decide Risk

Reduction Measures
Figure (1) Risk Assessment Framework
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Date: Dec. 2015
Modeling the Consequences

Modeling of the consequences is one of the key steps in Quantitative Risk
Assessment ‘QRA’, as it provides the link between hazard identification (in this
study Potential Loss of Containment Incidents) and the determination of
possible impact of those incidents on People (Worker / Public), Asset and the
Environment.
In this study, Natural Gas (Mainly Methane CH4 ) was considered. There are
several types of consequences to be considered for modelling, these include: Gas
Dispersion (UFL - LFL - 50 % LFL) / Heat Radiation / Explosion Overpressure
modeling, also each of these scenarios described in the following table:
Table (1) Description of Modeling of the Different Scenario
Discharge Modeling Modeling of the mass release rate and its

variation overtime.
Radiation Modeling Modeling of the Thermal radiation from fires.
Dispersion Modeling Modeling of the Gas and two-phase releases.
Overpressure Associated with explosions or pressure burst.
Toxic hazards are considered as a result of releases / loss of containment for

which discharge modeling and gas dispersion modeling are required. The hazard
ranges are dependent upon the condition of the release pressure and rate of
release.
There are a number of commercial software for modeling gas dispersion, fire,
explosion and toxic releases. PETROSAFE select the DNV PHAST Ver. 7.0
Software package in modeling scenarios.
The software developed by DNV in order to provide a standard and validated set
of consequence models that can be used to predict the effects of a release of
hydrocarbon or chemical liquid or vapour. (Results of the modeling are shown
in the study pages from 55 to 128)
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Date: Dec. 2015
Criterion for Risk Tolerability

The main function of this phase of the work was to assess the effectiveness of
the proposed arrangement for managing risks against performance standards.
In order to do this, we need firstly to define a performance standard and
secondly, to be able to analyse the effectiveness of the arrangements in a manner
which permits a direct comparison with these standards.
The defining of performance standards is undertaken at the following three
levels:
• Policy-based
• System
• Technical
Where the present work is mainly concerned with the assessment against the
standards associated with the first two levels.
The policy-based performance standard relates to this objective to provide a
working environment, where the risk to the individual is reduced to a level,
which is ALARP.
This performance standard is, therefore, expressed in the form of individual risk
and the arrangements for managing this risk should result in a level of
‘Individual Risk’, based on a proposed Tolerability Criteria, Figure (2).
UNACCEPTABLE REGION
Workers
Maximum tolerable limit Public
1 in 1000 per year
1 in 5,000 per year Maximum tolerable limit
ALARP OR TOLERABILITY REGION 1 in 10,000 per year
ALARP Benchmark new installations ALARP OR TOLERABILITY
1 in 50,000 per year REGION
(Risk must be demonstrated to have
Minimum tolerable limit been reduced to a level which is
1 in 100,000 per year practicable with a view to cost/benefit)
Minimum tolerable limit
ACCEPTABLE REGION

(including contractor employees) (all those not directly involved with company
activities)
Figure (2) Criteria for Individual Risk Tolerability

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Date: Dec. 2015
The criterion for IR tolerability for workers and to the public is outlined in Table
(2) and Figure (3).
It should be noted that this criteria is proposed only as a guideline. Risk
assessment is no substitute to professional judgement.
Table (2) Proposed Individual Risk (IR) Criteria (per person/year)

Risk Level Workers Public
Intolerable > 10-3 per person/yr. > 10-4 per person/yr.
Negligible > 10-5 per person/yr. > 10-6 per person/yr.
1 in 10,000
1 in 1000
ALARP ALARP
Region Region
1 in 100,000
1 in 1 miillion
Individual Risk to Personnel Individual Risk to the Public
Figure (3) Proposed Individual Risk Criteria
Workers would include the Company employees and contractors. The public
includes the general public, visitors, and any third party who is not directly
involved in the Company work activities.
On this basis we have chosen to set our level of intolerability at Individual Risk
for workers of 1 in 1,000 per year, and we define an individual risk of
1 in 100,000 per year as broadly acceptable. Consequently, our ALARP region
is between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 100,000 per person/year.
It is important to ensure that conflict between these subordinate standards and
those stemming from international codes and standards are avoided and that any
subordinate standards introduced are at least on a par with or augment those
standards which are associated with compliance with these international
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
requirements. These system level performance standards are included as part of

the summaries from the QRA. These are used as the basis for assessing the
suitability and sufficiency of ReGas Site arrangements for both protecting
personnel on site and members of the public from major hazards and securing
effective response in an emergency. Failure to meet acceptance criteria at this
level results in the identification of remedial measures for assessment both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
The analytical work uses a system analysis approach and is divided into a
number of distinct phases:
• Data collection, including results from site-based qualitative

assessments.
• Definition of arrangements.
• Qualitative evaluation of arrangements against a catalogue of fire and
explosion hazards from other major accident hazards.
• Preparation of event tree analyses models.
• Consolidation of list of design events.
• Analysis of the effect of design events on fire, explosion and toxic
hazard management and emergency response arrangements.
• Quantification of that impact in terms of individual risk.
The main model is based on a systems approach, and it takes the following
form:
• Estimates of incremental individual risk (IIR) per person/yr.
• Is caused-consequences based.
• Uses event tree analysis to calculate the frequency of occurrence.
• Estimates incremental individual risk utilizing event tree analysis,
based on modeling the emergency response arrangements from
detection through to recovery to a place of safety.
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Date: Dec. 2015
Personnel Vulnerability and Structural Damage

A criterion was used in the QRA study for the calculation of personnel
vulnerability and structural / asset damage as a result of fire, explosion and toxic
release is shown in Table (3).
The criteria shown below provide some assumptions for the impairment effects
of hydrocarbon releases on personnel and structures, which are based on Health
and Safety Executive: Methods of approximation and determination of human
vulnerability for offshore major accident hazard assessment)
Table (3) Criteria for Personnel Vulnerability and Structural Damage
Event Type Threshold of Fatality Asset/Structural Damage
Jet and Diffusive Fire 6.3 kW/ m2 (1) - Flame impingement 10

minutes.
Impingement
2 - 300- 500 kW/m2
12.5 kW/m (2)
Structural Failure within
20 minutes.
Pool Fire Impingement 6.3 kW/ m2 (1) - Flame impingement 20

minutes
- 100 - 150 kW/m2
12.5 kW/m2 (2)
Structural Failure within
30 minutes.
Smoke 2.3% v/v (3)

15% v/v (4)
Explosion Overpressure 300 mbar 100 mbar

(1) Fatality within 1- 2 minutes
(2) Fatal < 1 minute
(3) Above 2.3%, escape possible but difficult
(4) No escape possible, fatal in a few seconds
The effects of exposure to fire are expressed in terms of heat radiation

(kW/m2) and overpressure waves are shown in Tables (4), (5) and (6).
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Date: Dec. 2015
Table (4) Fire Heat Radiation Effects on Structures (World Bank)
Radiation Level
Observed Effect
2
kW/m
37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment
Minimum energy to ignite wood at indefinitely long

25
exposure (non-piloted)
Minimum energy required to ignite wood, melting of

12.5
plastic tubing
Table (5) Heat Radiation Effects on People
Radiation Level
Effects on People
kw/m2
1.2 Equivalent to heat from sun at midday summer
1.6 Minimum level at which pain can be sensed
Pain caused in 15 - 20 seconds Second Degree burns

4-6
after 30 seconds.
12 20 % chance of fatality for 60 seconds exposure
100 % chance of fatality for continuous exposure

25
50 % chance of fatality for 30 seconds exposure
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Date: Dec. 2015
Table (6) Effects of Overpressure
Pressure
Effects / Damage
bar psig
0.002 0.03 Occasional breakage of glass windows
0.006 0.1 Breakage of some small windows
Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05

0.021 0.3
10 % glass broken
0.027 0.4 Minor structural damage of buildings
0.068 1.0 Partial collapse of walls and roofs, possible injuries
0.137 2.0 Some severe injuries, death unlikely
0.206 3.0 Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation
0.275 4.0 Oil storage tanks ruptured
0.344 5.0 Wooden utilities poles snapped / Fatalities
0.41 6.0 Nearly complete destruction of building
0.48 7.0 Loaded wagon train overturned
0.689 10.0 Total destruction of buildings
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Date: Dec. 2015
Quantification of the Frequency of Occurrence

The probability of a sequence of events leading to a major hazard is dependent
on the probability of each event in a sequence occurring; usually these
probabilities may be multiplied together to obtain the end event probability or
frequency.
The technique of Quantified Risk Assessment ‘QRA’ requires data in the form
of probability or frequency to be estimated for each input event.
Ideally, data relating to hardware failures and human error that are specific to
each plant should be obtained from the company’s maintenance and historical
records.
Unfortunately, records available were not in the form that allows data relevant to
this study to be obtained. Therefore, other sources of data were used as a basis
for failure/error scenarios. The sources of information and data are shown in the
References section of this report.
Identification of Scenarios Leading to Selected Failures

For each selected failure scenario, the potential contributory factors were
examined, taking into account any protective features available. Typically, the
factors examined included:
• Operator error
• Metallurgical fatigue or ageing of materials
• Internal or external Corrosion
• Loss of process control, e.g. pressure, temperature or flow, etc.
• Overfilling of vessels
• Introduction of impurities
• Fire and/or explosion
• Missiles
• Flooding
Account was taken at this stage of those limited releases, which although in
themselves did not constitute a significant off-site hazard could, under some
circumstances, initiate a sequence leading to a larger release, as a knock-on
effect.
It was noted that the proposed criterion for risk tolerability was used in Egypt by
the following organizations - British Gas / British Petroleum / Shell / Total.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Relevant Weather Data for the Study

- Weather Data
The Weather Data relevant to this study consists of a list of weather
conditions in the form of different combinations of wind-speed/direction,
temperature, humidity and atmospheric stability. Table (7)
The weather conditions are an important input into the dispersion
calculations and results for a single set of conditions could give a
misleading picture of the hazard potential.
Met-oceanographic data gathered from Weather Spark "International
Weather Data" for the Middle of Upper Egypt Area over a period of 3
years.
These data included wind speed and direction; air temperature and
humidity, as well as current speed, direction and wave height.
Table (7) Annual Average Temperature, Relative Humidity and Wind Speed /
Direction
• Air Temperature oC:
Min. Recorded 3 oC
Max. Recorded 43 oC
Annual Average 35 oC
• Relative Humidity %:
Average Daily Min. 28 %
Average Daily Max. 46 %
Annual Average 55 %
• Wind Speed
4.7 m / sec.
• Wind Direction
North / North West (N/NW)
Figures (4, 5 & 6) shows the monthly variations of the wind direction from
one month to another and the directions.
The general climatic conditions at Middle of Upper Egypt Area are
summarized in Tables No. (8, 9, 10, 11 & 12) Below.
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Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (1) Weather Data from

Weather Spark "International
Weather Data"

Weather Data"
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Date: Dec. 2015

Weather Data"
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Date: Dec. 2015

Weather Data"
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Date: Dec. 2015
Table (8) Mean of Monthly Air Temperature (°C)

Months Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
H 15 26 21 38 33 41 41 38 35 38 27 19
L 3 14 5 20 20 25 25 23 22 20 13 6
Temp. H 15 20 38 25 40 36 35 36 33 31 21 14
(°c) L 4 9 18 12 21 22 23 27 21 17 12 5
H 20 19 31 30 35 40 36 34 34 29 25 21
L 6 8 17 18 21 31 24 30 23 20 18 31
Table (9) Mean of Monthly Wind Speed (m/sec) and Direction
4.9 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.2 3.6 4.9 4.6 4.2 3.4
Wind N NE N SW NW NW NW N N N W NW
Speed
4.5 4.6 4.6 3.9 3.5 4.9 5.2 3.7 3.8 3.7 4.0 4.0
(m/sec)
SE NW S NW N NW NW NW NW NW NW NW
&
Direction 3.3 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.3 5.0 3.7 4.9 3.2 4.8 6.9
NW NW SW NW NW NW NW NW NW N N N
Table (10) Mean of Monthly Relative Humidity (%)
56 39 47 25 48 37 38 43 45 45 43 78
Relative
Humidity 65 35 22 33 23 41 39 38 49 58 66 70
(%)
68 60 31 60 47 24 41 32 41 39 50 55
Table (11) Mean of Cloud Cover on the Scale 0 – 8
5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
Cloud
Cover 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 2
(0-8)
0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4
Table (12) Mean of Monthly Sunshine Hours
10.5 11.1 11.9 12.7 13.3 13.6 13.5 12.9 12.1 11.4 10.7 10.4
Sunshine
10.5 11.1 11.9 12.7 13.3 13.6 13.5 12.9 12.1 11.4 10.7 10.4
Hours
10.5 11.1 11.9 12.7 13.3 13.6 13.5 12.9 12.1 11.4 10.7 10.4
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
- Stability Categories
The two most significant variables, which would affect the dispersion
calculations, are: Wind-speed and atmospheric stability. The stability
class is a measure of the atmospheric turbulence caused by thermal
gradients. Pasqual Stability identifies six main categories, which are
shown in the Tables (13 & 14) and summarized in Table (15).
Table (13) Pasqual Stability Categories
A B C D E F
Very Unstable Moderately Neutral Moderately Stable
Unstable Unstable Stable
Neutral conditions correspond to a vertical temperature gradient of
about 1o C per 100 m.
Table (14) Relationship between Wind Speed and Stability

Day-time Night-time
Wind speed
Solar Radiation Cloud Cover
(m/s) Strong Medium Slight Thin Medium Overcast
<3/8 >3/8 >4/5
<2 A A-B B - - D
2-3 A-B B C E F D
3-5 B B-C C D E D
5-6 C C-D D D D D
>6 C D D D D D
Table (15) Sets of Weather Conditions Initially Selected for this Study
Set for Wind Speed and Stability
Wind speed Stability
4.7 m/sec. D
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Gerga Pressure Reduction Station Description

Background
Gerga Pressure Reduction Station is owned by Regions Gas Company
“ReGas”. It is located about 12.5 km West side of Gerga City – Sohag
Government – Upper Egypt. The station will provide natural gas to public
housing.
The station natural gas feeding will be from the National Gas Pipeline
owned by GASCO with pressure from 45 to 70 bar, then reduce the gas
pressure to 7 bar and adding odorant, then connected to the Gerga City
internal distribution network to public housing.
PRMS Location Coordinates (Regions Gas Company Data)
Vertical (X) Horizontal (Y)

2905986.40 381267.49
2906020.36 381304.02
2906057.71 381270.60
2906022.77 381232.18
PRMS Description (Regions Gas Company Data)

The PRMS surrounded by 3 m height fence and will mainly consist of the
followings: (Ref. Figure 7, 8 and 9)
- Inlet module: which contains 4” # 600 manual isolation valve.
- Filter module: two identical streams, each contain inlet and
outlet isolation valves.
- Heating system module: two identical.
- Metering module: two identical.
- Regulating module: two identical regulating lines.
- Outlet module: it contains manual outlet isolation valve.
- Odorant module. 100 lit. capacity container
- Off-take will be an underground room including the isolation valves with
GASCO underground pipeline 24”.
- Security Building (one floor)
- Administration Building (one floor)
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Date: Dec. 2015
Low Tension Power Towers
31 m 30 m
17.5 m Mohsen No’amany Road
50 m
50 m
Figure (7) Gerga Pressure Reduction Station Plotted on Google Earth

Photo
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (8) Gerga Pressure Reduction Station Master Plan Elevations
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Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (9) Gerga Pressure Reduction Station Piping and Instrumentation

Diagram “P&ID”
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Date: Dec. 2015
Design Data (Region Gas Company Data)

- Gas inlet: Max. 70 barg / Oper. 45 barg / Min. 16 – 23 barg
- Gas outlet: 7 barg
- Operating temp: 5 – 25O C
- Specific gravity: 0.625 (air = 1 k/m3)
- Design flow rate: 10000 scm/hr
Gas Odorant Specifications

The odorant is supplied with a Hazard Data Sheet. This is identified as
Spotleak 1009. This is based on Aliphatic Mercaptn mixtures in clear liquid
form that is extremely flammable, with the following characteristics:
- Boiling Range 60-70o C
- Flash Point -17.8o C
- Freezing Point -45.5o C
- Density (H2 O = 1) 0.812 @ 15.5o C
- Vapor Density 3.0 (air = 1)
- Vapor Pressure (mm Hg) 6.6 @ 37.8o C
Health Hazards
Spotleak is not carcinogenic, but the major health hazards as a result of
exposure to Spotleak include the following:
Inhalation
• Short-term exposure: Irritation and central nervous system effects
• Long-term exposure: Irritation
Skin Contact
• Short-term: Irritation
• Long-term: Dermatitis
Eye Contact
• Short-term: Irritation and tearing
• Long-term: Irritation
Ingestion
• Short-term: nausea, vomiting, central nervous system effects
• Long-term: no effects are known
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Date: Dec. 2015
Hygiene Standards and Limits

Occupational Exposure Limit for Spotleak to all components is 45 ppm,
and the long-term MEL should be below 12 ppm (8 hrs. TWA).
Fire and Explosion Hazards

Spotleak is a severe fire hazard. Vapor/air mixtures are explosive. Vapor
is 3 times heavier than air. Vapor may ignite at distant ignition sources
and flash back.
Thermal decomposition products include oxides of sulphur and hydrogen
sulphide.
Fire Fighting and Protection Systems and Facilities

As per agreement with EGAS and Civil Defense the PRS will provided by
the following fire protection facilities:
• Smoke detector in all admin rooms.
• Heat detectors in buffet rooms.
• Smoke detectors in control room according to the area.
• Different sizes of fire extinguishers will be distributed at PRS site.
Emergency Response Plan “ERP”

There is an Emergency Response Plan “ERP” for Sohag Area, including the
following items:
Part “1”: Introduction
 REGAS HSE Policy
 ERP objectives
 Emergency types
 Emergency levels
Part “2”: Calling Plan

 Definition of Calling
 Calling Objective
 Notification Chart
 Types of Calling
 Execution of Calling Plan
 Calling of External Aids / Authorities
 Communication Systems and Facilities
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Date: Dec. 2015
 EGAS Responsible Team Contacts

 Emergency Rooms Contacts for EGAS / Ministry of Petroleum
 REGAS Responsible Team Contacts
 REGAS Emergency Rooms
 Contacts for Main PRSs
 Contacts for External Aids
 Contacts for Assistant Services (Assiut / Sohag)
Part “3”: Roles and Responsibilities

 Roles & Responsibilities
 Operations General Manager Responsibilities
 PRSs’ Managers Responsibilities
 Area Manager Responsibilities
 Area Safety Manager Responsibilities
 Area Communications Manager Responsibilities
 Area Security Manager Responsibilities
 Emergency Room Facilities
 Emergency Teams Responsibilities
Part “4”: Firefighting Facilities

 Firefighting facilities at PRSs with odorants
Part “5”: Odorant Hazards

 Definition of Odorant Material
 Odorant Material Hazards
 Emergency Procedures in case of Odorant Spill/Leak or Fire
Part “6”: PRSs Emergency Scenarios

 Emergency Cases at Main PRSs
 Emergency Procedures in case of Significant Risks
 Emergency Procedures in case of Normal Risks
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Analytical Results of Consequence Modeling

1.0- Pressure Reduction Station Inlet Pipeline (4 inch)
1/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release (Horizontal)
The following table no. (16) Show that:
Table (16) Dispersion Modeling – 1” Horizontal Gas release
Gas Release
Wind Category Flammability Limits Distance (m) Height (m)
UFL 2.50 1
4.7 D LFL 8.10 1.001
50 % LFL 9.20 1.008
Jet Fire
Flame Heat Distance Distance Lethality
Wind Length Radiation Downwind Crosswind Level
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 12.10 17.99 0
4 9.43 11.29 0
9.5 7.55 6.73 0
4.7 D 15.20
12.5 7.01 5.49 20% / 60 sec
25 5.50 2.68 80.34
37.5 4.60 1.18 98.74
Explosion Overpressure
Over Pressure Radius
Wind Pressure Value Overpressure Waves
(m)
Category (bar) Effect / Damage
Early Late
Probability of serious damage
0.021
0.020 58.59 37.94 bar
beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 %
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 15.17 24.65
0.137 Some severe injuries, death
bar unlikely
0.206 Steel frame buildings distorted /
0.206 11.74 23.59 bar pulled from foundation
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (10) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (1” hole in 4” Pipeline / 0o)
- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 1” hole size
at horizontal position for about 20 sec. without ignition, the flammable
vapors will reach a distance more than 21 m downwind and over 1.01 m
height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 2.50 m downwind with a height
of 1.0 m. The cloud large width will be 0.24 m crosswind at a distance
of 1.3 m from the source and 0.85 m height.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 8.10 m downwind with a height
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 9.20 m downwind with a
height of 1.01 m. The large width will be 1.80 m crosswind at a distance
of 9.20 m from the source.
The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (11) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1” hole in 4” Pipeline / 0o)
at horizontal position and ignited, the expected flame length is about
15.20 meters downwind.
- The 9.5 kW/m2 heat radiation contours extend about 7.55 meters
downwind and 6.73 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m2 heat radiation contours extend about 5.50 meters
The modeling shows that the heat radiation value (9.5 kW/m2 and 12.5
kW/m2) effects will be limited inside the PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (12) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (1” hole in 4” Pipeline / 0o)
at horizontal position and early ignited, this will give an explosion with
different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 58.59 meters
radius.
radius.
radius.
The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend outside with a
distances of about 50 m NW, 23 m NE, 29 SW and 18 m SE (road
direction).
The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside from NE, SW
and SE, but extended from 4 to 6 meters out from NW side.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (13) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (1” hole in 4” Pipeline / 0o)
at horizontal position and late ignition, this will give an explosion with
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 37.94 meters radius
and will not reaching the admin and security buildings.
radius.
radius.
The modeling show that the value of 0.020 bar, 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar
will be limited inside the PRS boundary.
The 0.020 bar will reach the office building.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
1/2- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release (Angle 20 o)
Table (17) Dispersion Modeling – 1” 20 o - Gas release
Gas Release
UFL 2.21 1.78
4.7 D LFL 7.49 3.42
50 % LFL 8.80 4.66
Jet Fire
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 15.72 20.79 0
4 11.37 13.27 0
9.5 8.13 7.94 0
4.7 D 14.72
12.5 6.84 6.34 20% / 60 sec
25 4.25 2.25 80.34
37.5 Not Reached Not Reached -------
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 58.59 27.04 bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 15.17 14.41

bar unlikely

PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
with 20o angle position for about 20 sec. without ignition, the flammable
height.
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
with 20o angle position and ignited, the expected flame length is about
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
with 20o angle position and early ignited, this will give an explosion
with different values of overpressure waves.
radius.
direction).
and SE, but extended from 4 to 6 meters out from NW side.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
with 20o angle position and late ignition, this will give an explosion with
radius.
The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar, 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Gas Release
UFL 1.57 2.49
4.7 D LFL 5.06 5.29
50 % LFL 5.52 7.27
Jet Fire
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 16.64 20.93 0
4 9.46 12.46 0
9.5 5.71 5.92 0
4.7 D 13.16
12.5 4.26 3.59 20% / 60 sec
25 Not Reached Not Reached ---
37.5 Not Reached Not Reached ---
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 58.59 N/D bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 15.17 N/D

bar unlikely

0.206 11.74 N/D bar pulled from foundation
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
height.
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
The modeling shows that the heat radiation value (9.5 kW/m2 & 12.5
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
- The previous figure show that if there is a leak from 1” hole size with
45o angle position and early ignited, this will give an explosion with
radius.
direction).
and SE, but extended from 7 & 3 meters out from NW side.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
1/4- Consequence Modeling for 2 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release (Horizontal)
Table (19) Dispersion Modeling – 2” Horizontal - Gas release
Gas Release
UFL 5.79 1.00
4.7 D LFL 20.15 1.02
50 % LFL 20.80 1.12
Jet Fire
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 35.75 52.32 0
4 24.91 33.24 0
9.5 19.36 21.28 0
4.7 D 32.81
12.5 17.98 18.19 20% / 60 sec
25 14.84 11.36 80.34
37.5 12.90 7.85 98.74
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 58.59 66.16 bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 15.17 37.77

bar unlikely

PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
height.
of 1.00 m. The cloud large width will be 0.30 m (crosswind) at a
distance of 4.00 m from the source and 0.70 m height.
of 1.02 m. The cloud large width will be 2.40 m (crosswind) at a
distance of 17.0 m from the source and 0.00 m to 1.02 m height.
height of 1.12 m. The large width will be 3.30 m (crosswind) at a
distance of 20.8 m from the source and 0 m to 1.02 m height.
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
kW/m2) effects will be limited inside the PRS area, these values will reach
the office and security buildings, and reaching the fence from NE and SE
sides.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
radius.
distances of about 58 m NW, 40 m NE, 30 SW and 18 m SE.
and SE, but extended from 8 & 4 meters outside from NW side.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
radius.
The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will crossing the PRS NW
fence to a distance of 18 m, SE fence 22 m, NE fence 28 m SW fence 15 m.
The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRS
boundary.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
1/5- Consequence Modeling for 2 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release (Angle 20o)
Table (20) Dispersion Modeling – 2” 20o - Gas release
Gas Release
UFL 5.19 2.82
4.7 D LFL 17.50 6.56
50 % LFL 18.60 8.60
Jet Fire
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 36.04 47.90 0
4 25.27 30.62 0
9.5 18.63 19.02 0
4.7 D 31.66
12.5 16.53 15.61 20% / 60 sec
25 12.10 7.17 80.34
37.5 Not Reached Not Reached -------
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 58.59 54.51 bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 15.17 28.94

bar unlikely

PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
vapors will reach a distance more than 19 m downwind and over 9 m
height.
of 11 m from the source and 3.60 m height.
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 9.5 kW/m2 will reach
the office building SW side and 12.5 kW/m2 will be near the building. The
tow values effects will be limited inside the PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
with 20o angle position and early ignited, this will give an explosion
with different values of overpressure waves.
radius.
radius.
radius.
direction).
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
with 20o angle position and late ignition, this will give an explosion with
radius.
radius.
radius.
The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will crossing the PRS fence
to a distance of 17 m NE, 4 m SW fence, 6 m NW fence and 15 m SE fence.
The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRS
boundary.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Gas Release
UFL 3.66 4.48
4.7 D LFL 11.88 10.76
50 % LFL 14.60 12.75
Jet Fire
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 41.86 49.18 0
4 21.59 29.25 0
9.5 14.11 15.65 0
4.7 D 28.29
12.5 11.77 11.29 20% / 60 sec
25 Not Reached Not Reached ----
37.5 Not Reached Not Reached ----
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 58.59 46.51 bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 15.17 19.45

bar unlikely

PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
with 45o position for about 20 sec. without ignition, the flammable
vapors will reach a distance more than 15 m downwind and over 12.75
m height.
of 10.76 m. The cloud large width will be 2.80 m crosswind at a
distance of 7.60 m from the source and 6 m height.
height of 10.20 m. The large width will be 4.20 m crosswind at a
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
with 45o position and ignited, the expected flame length is about 15.20
meters downwind.
The modeling shows that the heat radiation of 9.5 kW/m2 will crossing the
PRS NE area with about 9 m.
The heat radiation of 12.5 kW/m2 effect will be limited inside the PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
with 45o position and early ignited, this will give an explosion with
radius.
radius.
radius.
distances of about 55 m NW, 41 m NE, 29 SW and 18 m SE (road direction.
and SE, but extended from 8 & 4 meters outside from NW side.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
45o position and late ignition, this will give an explosion with different
values of overpressure waves.
radius.
radius.
radius.
distances of about 17 m NE, 8 m SW, 20 NW and 5 m SE (road direction).
The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
1/7- Consequence Modeling for 4 inch (Full Rup.) Gas Release

Table (22) Dispersion Modeling – 4” Gas release
Gas Release
UFL 14.37 1.003
4.7 D LFL 18.50 1.077
50 % LFL 18.58 1.291
Jet Fire
Wind
Length Radiation Downwind Crosswind Level
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 147.3 123.28 0
4 114.5 79.15 0
9.5 93.5 51.32 0
4.7 D 64.47
12.5 88.19 44.40 20% / 60 sec
25 76.37 29.60 80.34
37.5 68.58 22.06 98.74
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 58.59 77.19 bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 15.17 60.75
bar unlikely
Fireball
Wind Heat Radiation Distance Heat Radiation (kW/m2) Effects
Category (kW/m2) (m) on People & Structures
1.6 55.64 12.5
20 % Chance of fatality for 60 sec
4 34.99 exposure
25
9.5 21.64 100 % Chance of fatality for
4.7 D 12.5 18.23 continuous exposure
25 10.62 exposure
37.5
37.5 6.22 Sufficient of cause process equipment
damage
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (33) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (4” Pipeline Full Rupture)
- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 4” pipeline
full rupture without ignition, the flammable vapors will reach a distance
more than 19 m downwind and over 1.30 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 14.37 m downwind with a
height of 1.003 m. The cloud large width will be 0.60 m crosswind at a
height from 0 – 4.0 m. The large width will be 4.0 m crosswind at a
distance of 18.58 m from the source.
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (34) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (4” Pipeline Full Rupture)
full rupture and ignited, the expected flame length is about 64.47 meters
downwind.
downwind and 51.32 meters crosswind – extend NE fence with 27 m and
SE fence with 52 m.
downwind and 44.40 meters crosswind – extend NE fence with 25 m, SE
fence with 45 m and SW fence with 10 m.
SE fence with 35 m.
SE fence with 25 m.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (35) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (4” Pipeline Full Rupture)
- The previous figure show that if there is a leak from 1” hole size at
horizontal position and early ignited, this will give an explosion with
radius.
radius.
radius.
distances of about 55 m NW, 40 m NE, 31 SW and 18 m SE (road direction.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (36) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (4” Pipeline Full Rupture)
horizontal position and late ignition, this will give an explosion with
radius.
radius.
radius.
will be extend outside the PRS boundary.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (37) Heat Radiation Contours from Fireball (4” Pipeline Full Rupture)
horizontal position and ignited forming fireball this will gives a heat
radiation with different values and contours and will extended in four
dimensions.
radius.
radius.
- The 25 kW/m2 heat radiation contours extend about 10.62 meters radius.
radius.
kW/m2) effects will extend outside PRS boundary for some of 10 & 12
meters from the NW side.
The heat radiations value (25 kW/m2 and 37.5 kW/m2) will be limited inside
the PRS area with some of about 2 meters outside the fence from NW side
for 25 kW/m2.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
2.0- Pressure Reduction Station Outlet Pipeline (6 inch)

2/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release (Horizontal)
Table (23) Dispersion Modeling – 1” Horizontal Gas release
Gas Release
UFL 1.39 1
4.7 D LFL 5.14 1.002
50 % LFL 5.58 1.008
Jet Fire
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 6.24 8.09 0
4 4.82 4.78 0
9.5 3.44 2.35 0
4.7 D 9.03
12.5 3.00 1.64 20% / 60 sec
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 21.06 N/D bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 5.45 N/D

bar unlikely

PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
height.
height of from 0 to 1.4 m. The large width will be 2.80 m crosswind at a
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
radius.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 5.45 meters radius.
distances of about 11 m NW.
The value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside PRS boundary.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Gas Release
UFL 1.22 1.43
4.7 D LFL 4.28 2.39
50 % LFL 4.50 3.13
Jet Fire
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 9.41 12.09 0
4 6.70 7.61 0
9.5 4.43 4.37 0
4.7 D 8.89
12.5 3.64 3.37 20% / 60 sec
25 0.06 0.22 80.34
37.5 Not Reached Not Reached ------
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 21.06 N/D bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 5.45 N/D

bar unlikely

PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
vapors will reach a distance more than 4.5 m downwind and over 3.50
m height.
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
meters downwind.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
radius.
distances of about 20 m NW and 1 m SW.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Gas Release
UFL 0.87 1.83
4.7 D LFL 2.91 3.47
50 % LFL 4.77 4.64
Jet Fire
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 8.65 11.70 0
4 5.41 6.99 0
9.5 2.85 2.74 0
4.7 D 7.95
12.5 1.24 0.24 20% / 60 sec
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 21.06 N/D bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 5.45 N/D

bar unlikely

PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
vapors will reach a distance more than 5 m downwind and over 5 m
height.
of 2 m from the source and 2.50 m height.
height of 4.64 m. The large width will be 1 m crosswind at a distance of
3.24 m from the source and 3.20 m height.
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
meters downwind.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
radius.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
2/4- Consequence Modeling for 3 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release (Horizontal)
Gas Release
UFL 4.54 1.001
4.7 D LFL 13.74 1.017
50 % LFL 21.48 1.048
Jet Fire
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 27.15 40.79 0
4 19.58 25.94 0
9.5 30.86 16.46 0
4.7 D 27.16
12.5 28.70 13.99 20% / 60 sec
25 23.66 8.49 80.34
37.5 20.64 5.68 98.74
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 21.06 23.35 bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 5.45 13.46

bar unlikely

PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
height.
of 5.94 m. The cloud large width will be 1 m crosswind at a distance of
5.94 m from the source and 0.28 m height.
height of 1.05 m. The large width will be 2 m crosswind at a distance of
5.94 m from the source and from 0 – 1.9 m height.
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
The modeling shows that the heat radiation value (9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5
kW/m2) effects will be limited inside the PRS area, and reaches the office
building.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
horizontal position and early ignited, this will give an explosion with
radius.
distances of about 12 m NW and 1 SW.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
radius.
radius.
radius.
will be limited inside the PRS boundary reaching the office at 0.020 bar.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Gas Release
UFL 4.06 2.43
4.7 D LFL 7.50 4.89
50 % LFL 7.80 5.77
Jet Fire
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 28.93 38.78 0
4 20.71 24.88 0
9.5 15.21 15.34 0
4.7 D 26.18
12.5 13.43 12.52 20% / 60 sec
25 9.70 5.50 80.34
37.5 Not Reached Not Reached ------
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 21.06 21.55 bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 5.45 12.99

bar unlikely

PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
20o position for about 20 sec. without ignition, the flammable vapors
will reach a distance more than 8 m downwind and over 6 m height.
of 5.69 m from the source and 2 m height.
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
20o position and ignited, the expected flame length is about 26.18
meters downwind.
kW/m2) effects will be limited inside the PRS area and reaches the office
building.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
20o position and early ignited, this will give an explosion with different
radius.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
with 20o position and late ignition, this will give an explosion with
radius.
radius.
radius.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Gas Release
UFL 2.86 3.73
4.7 D LFL 4.24 5.20
50 % LFL 4.36 5.40
Jet Fire
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 67.18 39.87 0
4 34.20 23.69 0
9.5 22.76 12.40 0
4.7 D 23.39
12.5 18.64 8.73 20% / 60 sec
25 Not Reached Not Reached ----
37.5 Not Reached Not Reached ----
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 21.06 N/D bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 5.45 N/D

bar unlikely

PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
vapors will reach a distance more than 4.5 m downwind and over 6 m
height.
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
meters downwind.
kW/m2) effects will be limited inside the PRS area and reaches the office
building.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
radius.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
2/7- Consequence Modeling for 6 inch (Full Rup.) Gas Release (Horizontal)
Gas Release
UFL 4.12 1.00
4.7 D LFL 16.85 1.02
50 % LFL 24.60 1.052
Jet Fire
Wind
Length Radiation Downwind Crosswind Level
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 125.40 86.64 0
4 84.96 55.33 0
9.5 62.24 35.68 0
4.7 D 48.95
12.5 57.22 30.76 20% / 60 sec
25 46.62 20.03 80.34
37.5 39.90 14.50 98.74
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 21.06 26.13 bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 5.45 14.18
bar unlikely
Fireball
Wind Heat Radiation Distance Heat Radiation (kW/m2) Effects
Category (kW/m2) (m) on People & Structures
1.6 14.04 12.5
4 8.48 exposure
25
9.5 4.68 100 % Chance of fatality for
4.7 D 12.5 3.61 continuous exposure
25 Not Reached exposure
37.5
37.5 Not Reached Sufficient of cause process equipment
damage
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (58) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (6” Pipeline Full Rupture)
full rupture without ignition, the flammable vapors will reach a distance
more than 25 m downwind and over 1.06 m height.
of 1 m. The cloud large width will be 1.60 m crosswind at a distance of
8 m from the source.
of 8 m from the source.
height of 1 m. The large width will be 2.40 m crosswind at a distance of
0 m from the source.
PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (59) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (6” Pipeline Full Rupture)
full rupture and ignited, the expected flame length is about 48.95 meters
downwind.
The modeling shows that the heat radiation of:

9.5 kW/m2 extend to 39 m SE / 8 m NE / 14 m SW
12.5 kW/m2 extend to 22 m SE / at NE fence / 10 m SW
All of the heat radiations above will effects the office and security
buildings.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (60) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (6” Pipeline Full Rupture)
full rupture and early ignited, this will give an explosion with different
radius.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (61) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (6” Pipeline Full Rupture)
full rupture and late ignited, this will give an explosion with different
radius.
radius.
radius.
will be limited inside the PRS boundary effecting the office building at
0.020 bar.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (62) Heat Radiation Contours from Fireball (6” Pipeline Full Rupture)
full rupture and ignited forming fireball this will gives a heat radiation
with different values and contours and will extended in four dimensions.
- The 9.5 kW/m2 heat radiation contours extend about 4.68 meters radius.
radius.
kW/m2) will be limited inside the PRS area.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
3.0- Pressure Reduction Station Odorant Tank (Spotleak)

The following table no. (30) Show 1” hole leak form odorant Modeling:
Table (30) Dispersion Modeling for Odorant Tank
Gas Release
UFL 21.72 0
4.7 D LFL 27.74 0
50 % LFL 38.38 0
Jet Fire
Category
(m) (kW/m2) (m) (m) (%)
1.6 27.03 33.97 0
4 19.22 21.62 0
9.5 14.82 14.29 0.72
4.7 D 17.81
12.5 13.67 12.45 20% / 60 sec
25 11.32 8.40 80.34
37.5 9.98 6.29 98.74
(m)
Early Late
0.021
0.020 N/D 70.09 bar
glass broken
4.7 D 0.137 N/D 40.38

bar unlikely

0.206 N/D 38.03 bar pulled from foundation
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (63) Vapor Cloud (UFL/LFL) Side View Graph (Odorant leak)
Figure (64) Vapor Cloud (UFL/LFL) Footprint on Site Map (Odorant leak)
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
- The previous figures show that if there is a leak from odorant container
without ignition, the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than
39 m downwind and 0 m height (as the vapors heavier than air).
- The UFL (2.1E+04 ppm) will reach a distance of about 21.72 m
downwind and the cloud large width will be 0.34 m crosswind at a
- The LFL (1.4E+04 ppm) will reach a distance of about 27.74 m

downwind and the cloud large width will be 0.47 m crosswind at a
distance of 20 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL (7000 ppm) will reach a distance of about 38.38 m
downwind and the large width will be 0.72 m crosswind at a distance of
24.40 m from the source, and also with 0 m height.
PRS area.
Consideration should be taken when deal with liquid, vapors and smokes
according to the MSDS for the material.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (65) Heat Radiation Contours - Jet Fire Graph (Odorant Leak)
Figure (66) Heat Radiation Contours - Jet Fire on Site (Odorant Leak)
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
- The previous figure show that if there is a leak from the odorant tank
and ignited, the expected flame length is about 17.18 meters downwind.

The modeling shows that the heat radiation effects will be limited inside the
PRS boundary from three sides, but will extend beyond the NW boundary
with some of 10 to 15 meters (upwind).
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Figure (67) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves Graph (Odorant Leak)
Figure (68) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves on Site (Odorant Leak)
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
- The previous figure show that if there is a leak from the odorant tank
and late ignited, this will give an explosion with different values of
overpressure waves.
radius.
radius.
radius.
The modeling shows that the value of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be
limited inside the PRS boundary effecting the office building at 0.020 bar.
The value of 0.020 bar will extend outside with a distances of about 10 m
NE, 10 m SW, 15 m SE and 2 m NW.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Individual Risk Evaluation

• Risk Calculation
All identified hazards should be subject to an evaluation for risk potential.
This means analyzing the hazard for its probability to actually progress to
loss event, as well as likely consequences of this event.
There are four steps to calculate risk which determined as follows:

1- Identify failure frequency (International Data Base)
2- Calculating the frequency against control measures at site by using

Event Tree Analysis “ETA”.
3- Identify scenarios probability.
4- Calculated risk to people regarding to the vulnerability of life loses.
Basically, risk will be calculated as presented in the following equation:
Risk to people (Individual Risk – IR) =
Total Risk (Σ Frequency of fire/explosion) x Occupancy x Vulnerability
Where:
- Total risk Is the sum of contributions from all hazards
exposed to (fire / explosion).
- Occupancy Is the proportion of time exposed to work hazards.

(Expected that x man the most exposed person to
fire/explosion hazards on site. He works 8 hours
shift/day)
- Vulnerability Is the probability that exposure to the hazard will

result in fatality.
As shown in table (5) – (Page: 39) the vulnerability of people to heat

radiation starting from 12 kW/m2 will lead to fatality accident for 60 sec.
Exposure. The modeling of the different scenarios show that the heat
radiation of 12.5 kW/m2 that would be a result from release scenarios for
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
all sizes of crack and according to the space size for the PRS, all of the
sequence will be calculated for three values, and will be classified to small,
medium and large release.
Calculating frequencies needs a very comprehensive calculations which
needs a lot of data collecting related to failure of equipment’s and accident
reporting with detailed investigation to know the failure frequency rates in
order to calculate risks from scenarios.
In this study it decided that to use an international data bank for major
hazardous incident data.
The following table (31) show frequency for each failure can be raised in
pressure reduction station operations:
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Table (31) Failure Frequency for Each Scenario

Scenario Release Size
Gas Release from Small
1” / 4” Pipeline
Gas Release from
1” / 6” Pipeline Failure Cause Failure Rate
Internal Corrosion 1.19E-05
External Corrosion 3.55E-06
Maintenance Error 2.28E-05
Corrosive Liquid or Gas 4.84E-04
Total 5.22E-04
Gas Release from Medium
2” / 4” Pipeline
Gas Release from
3” / 6” Pipeline Failure Cause Failure Rate
Erosion 4.85E-04
Total 5.20E-04
Gas Release from Large
4” Pipeline Full
Rupture
Gas Release from
6” Pipeline Full
Rupture Failure Cause Failure Rate
Weld Crack 4.34E-06
Earthquake 1.33E-07
Total 1.16E-05
Spotleak (Odorant Medium
Tank) As a package Failure Rate
1.25E-05
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
• Event Tree Analysis

An event tree is a graphical way of showing the possible outcomes of a
hazardous event, such as a failure of equipment or human error.
An ETA involves determining the responses of systems and operators to the
hazardous event in order to determine all possible alternative outcomes.
The result of the ETA is a series of scenarios arising from different sets of
failures or errors.
These scenarios describe the possible accident outcomes in terms of the
sequence of events (successes or failures of safety functions) that follow the
initial hazardous event.
Event trees shall be used to identify the various escalation paths that can
occur in the process. After these escalation paths are identified, the specific
combinations of failures that can lead to defined outcomes can then be
determined.
This allows identification of additional barriers to reduce the likelihood of
such escalation.
The results of an ETA are the event tree models and the safety system
successes or failures that lead to each defined outcome.
Accident sequences represents in an event tree represent logical and

combinations of events; thus, these sequences can be put into the form of a
fault tree model for further qualitative analysis.
These results may be used to identify design and procedural weaknesses,
and normally to provide recommendations for reducing the likelihood
and/or consequences of the analyzed potential accidents.
Using ETA requires knowledge of potential initiating events (that is,

equipment failures or system upsets that can potentially cause an accident),
and knowledge of safety system functions or emergency procedures that
potentially mitigate the effects of each initiating event.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
The equipment failures, system upsets and safety system functions shall be
extracted from the likelihood data presented before.
In the case of hydrocarbon release, the event tree first branch is typically
represents "Early Ignition". These events are represented in the risk analysis
as jet fire events.
This is because sufficient time is unlikely to elapse before ignition for a

gas/air mixture to accumulate and cause either a flash fire or a gas hazard.
Subsequent branches for these events represent gas detection, fire detection,
inventory isolation (or ESD) or deluge activation.
Delayed ignitions are typically represented by the fifth branch event. This is
because, in the time taken for an ignition to occur, sufficient time is more
likely to elapse for gas detection and inventory isolation.
The scenario development shall be performed for the following cases:
- Without any control measures
- With control measures
The event tree analysis outcomes can be classified into three main
categories as follows:
“Limited Consequence” Indicates that the release has been detected

and the inventory source has been isolated
automatically.
“Controlled Consequence” Indicates that the release has been detected

but the source has not been isolated
automatically. [Needs human intervention].
“Escalated Consequence” Indicates that the release has not been

detected and consequently the source has
not been isolated.
The event trees analysis for each scenario are presented in the below pages:
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Table (32) PRS Inlet 4” and Outleut 6” Pipeline Scenrios (Pin Hole Crack – 1” Release) – Event Tree Analysis
Release of Flammable Immediate Fire ESD Fire Delayed Outcomes Frequency
Materials (1) Ignition (2) Detection (3) System (3) Protec. (3) Ignition (2)
5.22E-04 0.2 0.6 0.978 0.97 0.06
Yes 0.97
Controled Jet fire -------------
Yes 0.6
No 0.03 Not controled jet
3.13E-06
Yes 0.2 fire
No 0.4
Escaleted jet fire 4.18E-05
5.22E-04 Yes 0.978

Limited release -------------
No 0.022
Large release 9.18E-06
No 0.8
Yes 0.06
No 0.94
Escaleted release 3.93E-04
(1) Refere to QRA Study Page 129.
(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.
TOTAL 7.0E-05
(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Table (33) PRS Inlet 4” and Outleut 6” Pipeline Scenrios (Half Dia. Release) – Event Tree Analysis
5.2E-04 0.2 0.6 0.978 0.97 0.06
Yes 0.97
Controlled jet fire -------------
Yes 0.6
No 0.03
Large jet fire 3.12E-06
Yes 0.2
No 0.4
5.2E-04 Yes 0.978

No 0.022
No 0.8
Yes 0.06
No 0.94
TOTAL 2.94E-04
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Table (34) PRS Inlet 4” and Outleut 6” Pipeline Scenrios (Full Rupture Release) – Event Tree Analysis
1.16E-05 0.2 0.6 0.978 0.97 0.06
Yes 0.97
Controlled jet fire -------------
Yes 0.6
No 0.03
Large jet fire 6.96E-08
Yes 0.2
No 0.4
1.16E-05 Yes 0.978

No 0.022
No 0.8
Yes 0.06
No 0.94
TOTAL 1.55E-06
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Table (35) Odorant Tank Release – Event Tree Analysis

1.25E-05 0.2 0.6 0.978 0.97 0.06
Yes 0.97
Controlled fire -------------
Yes 0.6
No 0.03
Large fire 7.5E-08
Yes 0.2
No 0.4
Escaleted fire 1.0E-06
1.25E-05 Yes 0.978

Limited leak -------------
No 0.022
Large leak 2.2E-07
No 0.8
Yes 0.06
Escaleted fire 6.0E-07
No 0.94
Escaleted leak 9.4E-06
TOTAL 2.40E-05
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
The following table (36) shows the total frequency for each scenario from
ETA - Tables (32 to 35):
Table (36) Total Frequencies for Each Scenario
Source of Release Total Frequency (ETA)
Gas Release from 1” / 4” Pipeline
7.0E-05
2.94E-04
1.55E-06
Odorant Tank 1” Leak 2.40E-05
The modeling show that the most effective scenarios on ReGas employees
and public is the heat radiations from jet fire in case of half and full rupture
of 4” & 6” pipelines (Inlet/Outlet) which effects employees, and full
rupture of 4” (Inlet) which effects the public, so the risk calculation will
depend on total risk from these scenarios.
As per equation at page (129):
Risk to people (Individual Risk – IR) =
Total Risk (Σ Frequency of fire/explosion) x Occupancy x Vulnerability
Where:
- Total risk - is the sum of contributions from all hazards exposed to
(fire / explosion).
(Scenarios from Table-36)
- Occupancy - is the proportion of time exposed to work hazards.

(Expected that x man the most exposed person to fire/explosion
hazards on site. He works 8 hours shift/day).
(As per ReGas data Gerga PRS Occupancy is 3 persons 24 hour)
- Vulnerability - is the probability that exposure to the hazard will

result in fatality.
(Reference: Report No./DNV Reg. No.: 2013-4091/1/17 TLT 29-6 – Rev. 1)
The following table (37) show the Individual Risk (IR) calculation for the
workers and the public:
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Table (37) Individual Risk (IR) Calculation

Source of Frequency Heat Vulnerability Time IR =
Event Radiation (Indoor) Exposed
1 kW/m2 2 3 1x2x3
Gas Release
from 1” / 4”
Pipeline Jet Fire
7.0E-05 0.1 3.0 3 Person 2.02E-04
Gas Release 12.5
from 1” / 6”
Pipeline
Gas Release
from 2” / 4”
Pipeline Jet Fire
2.94E-04 0.1 3.0 3 Person 8.82E-05
Gas Release 12.5
from 3” / 6”
Pipeline
Gas Release
from 4” Pipeline Jet Fire 0.1 4.65E-07
Full Rupture
1.55E-06 Fireball 0.2 3.0 3 Person 9.3E-07
Gas Release
from 6” Pipeline 12.5
Full Rupture
Odorant Tank Jet Fire

2.40E-05 0.1 3.0 3 Person 7.2E-06
1” Leak 12.5
TOTAL Risk for Workers 8.96E-05
Gas Release Jet Fire 0.7

from 4” Pipeline 1.55E-06 0.033 3.58E-08
Full Rupture 12.5 (Outdoor)
TOTAL Risk for Public 3.58E-08
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
UNACCEPTABLE REGION
Workers
1 in 1000 per year
1.0E-03/year
1 in 5,000 per year Public
ALARP or Tolerability Region 1 in 10,000 per year
1.0E-04/year
ALARP Benchmark new installations

1 in 50,000 per year
ALARP or Tolerability Region

1 in 100,000 per year 8.96E-05/yr. Risk must be demonstrated to have
1.0E-05/year been reduced to a level which is
practicable with a view to
cost/benefit

3.58E-08/yr. 1.0E-06/year
Workers
ACCEPTABLE REGION
Public

Including contractor employees All those not directly involved with
company activities
Figure (69) Evaluation of Individual Risk
The level of Individual Risk to the most exposed worker at Gerga PRS,
based on the risk tolerability criterion used, is ALARP.
The level of Individual Risk to the exposed Public at Gerga PRS area,
based on the risk tolerability criterion used, is Low (Acceptable Region)
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Conclusion
As per results from modeling the consequences of each scenario the following
table summarize the study, and as follows:
0o 4” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
side.
Late explosion The modeling show that the value of 0.020
0.020 bar bar, 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be
0.206 bar The 0.020 bar will reach the office
building.

20o 4” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015

side.
0.206 bar

45o 4” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
12.5 kW/m2
side.
Late explosion N/D
0.020 bar
0.137 bar
0.206 bar
LFL
50 % LFL
9.5 kW/m2 effects will be limited inside the PRS area,
12.5 kW/m2 these values will reach the office and
security buildings, and reaching the fence
from NE and SE sides.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015

0.206 bar SW and 18 m SE.
NW side.
0.020 bar 0.020 bar will crossing the PRS NW fence
0.137 bar to a distance of 18 m, SE fence 22 m, NE
0.206 bar fence 28 m SW fence 15 m.
LFL
50 % LFL
fire radiation value of 9.5 kW/m2 will reach
9.5 kW/m2 the office building SW side and 12.5
12.5 kW/m2 kW/m2 will be near the building. The tow
values effects will be limited inside the
PRS area.
side.
0.020 bar 0.020 bar will crossing the PRS fence to a
0.137 bar distance of 17 m NE, 4 m SW fence, 6 m
0.206 bar NW fence and 15 m SE fence.

LFL
50 % LFL
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015

fire radiation of 9.5 kW/m2 will crossing the
9.5 kW/m2 PRS NE area with about 9 m.
12.5 kW/m2 The heat radiation of 12.5 kW/m2 effect
will be limited inside the PRS area.
NW side.
0.137 bar distances of about 17 m NE, 8 m SW, 20
0.206 bar NW and 5 m SE (road direction).
be limited inside PRS area.
LFL
50 % LFL
Heat radiation / Jet The 12.5 kW/m2 heat radiation contours
fire extend about 88.19 meters downwind and
9.5 kW/m2 44.40 meters crosswind – extend NE fence
12.5 kW/m2 with 25 m, SE fence with 45 m and SW
fence with 10 m.
The 25 kW/m2 heat radiation contours
The 37.5 kW/m2 heat radiation contours
side.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015

0.137 bar extend outside the PRS boundary.
0.206 bar
9.5 kW/m2 kW/m2) effects will extend outside PRS
12.5 kW/m2 boundary for some of 10 & 12 meters
from the NW side.
The heat radiations value (25 kW/m2 and
37.5 kW/m2) will be limited inside the PRS
area with some of about 2 meters outside
the fence from NW side for 25 kW/m2.

0o 6” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
12.5 kW/m2
0.137 bar distances of about 11 m NW.
Late explosion N/D
0.020 bar
0.137 bar
0.206 bar

20o 6” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
12.5 kW/m2
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015

Late explosion N/D
0.020 bar
0.137 bar
0.206 bar

45o 6” pipeline
LFL
50 % LFL
12.5 kW/m2
Late explosion N/D
0.020 bar
0.137 bar
0.206 bar

LFL
50 % LFL
fire radiation value (9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5
12.5 kW/m2 PRS area, and reaches the office building.
0.137 bar distances of about 12 m NW and 1 SW.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015

0.137 bar limited inside the PRS boundary reaching
0.206 bar the office at 0.020 bar.
LFL
50 % LFL
0.206 bar
LFL
50 % LFL
Late explosion N/D
0.020 bar
0.137 bar
0.206 bar
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015

LFL
50 % LFL
fire radiation of:
9.5 kW/m2 9.5 kW/m2 extend to 39 m SE / 8 m NE / 14
12.5 kW/m2 m SW
12.5 kW/m2 extend to 22 m SE / at NE
fence / 10 m SW
All of the heat radiations above will
effects the office and security buildings.
0.137 bar limited inside the PRS boundary effecting
0.206 bar the office building at 0.020 bar.
9.5 kW/m2 kW/m2) will be limited inside the PRS
12.5 kW/m2 area.
Odorant tank 1” leak
LFL Consideration should be taken when deal
50 % LFL with liquid, vapors and smokes according
to the MSDS for the material.
fire radiation effects will be limited inside the
9.5 kW/m2 PRS boundary from three sides, but will
12.5 kW/m2 extend beyond the NW boundary with
some of 10 to 15 meters (upwind).
Early explosion N/D
0.020 bar
0.137 bar
0.206 bar
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015

0.020 bar 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited
0.137 bar inside the PRS boundary effecting the
0.206 bar office building at 0.020 bar.
The value of 0.020 bar will extend outside
with a distances of about 10 m NE, 10 m
SW, 15 m SE and 2 m NW.
The previous table show that there are some potential hazards with heat
radiation resulting from jet fire, and explosion overpressure waves in case of
gas release and early or late ignited.
These hazards will affect the office and security buildings, also some scenarios
will extend over the site boundary like heat radiation of 12.5 kW/m2 and
reaching the main road (Mohsen No’amany Road) or other PRS sides.
Regarding to the risk calculations the risk to public which is in acceptable

region, and also the risk for the workers is in ALARP region, but there are
some points need to be considered to maintain the risk tolerability and this will
be describe in the study recommendations.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
Recommendations
As per results from modeling the consequences of each scenario and risk
calculations it is recommended that ReGas should:
- Ensure that all facility specifications referred to the national and

international codes and standards.
- Ensure that the inspection and maintenance plans and programs are
according to the manufacturers guidelines to keep all facility parts in a
good conditions.
- Ensure that all operation is according to the standard operating procedure
for the PRS operations and training programs in-place for operators.
- Review the emergency response plan for Sohag Area and prepare a plan for
Gerga PRS including all scenarios in this study and other needs including:
• Fire fighting brigades, mutual aids, emergency communications and

fire detection / protection systems.
• Dealing with the external road in case of major fires.
• First aid including dealing with the odorant according to the MSDS
for it, with respect of means of water supply for emergency showers,
eye washers and cleaning.
• Provide the site with SCBA “Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (at

least two sets) and arrange training programs for operators.
• Emergency shut-down detailed procedure including shut-off points at

the PRS and GASCO main line.
• Safe exits in building according to the modeling in this study, and also
to the PRS from other side beside the designed exit in lay-out
provided.
- Ensure that the office building is designed according to the technical
specifications.
- Protecting the off-take by a concrete fence with a height of about 3 m from

the inlet side, in order to protect off-take area from the heat radiation in
case of wind direction changed.
PETROSAFE
Date: Dec. 2015
- Considering that all electrical equipment, facilities and connections

according to the hazardous area classification for the PRS.
- Ensure that the surface drainage system is suitable for contaminating any
odorant spills and rainwater.
- Provide a suitable tool for wind direction (Windsock) to be installed at a
suitable place to determine the wind direction.
- Cooperation should be done with the concerned parties before planning for
housing projects around the PRS area.

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The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company “EGAS”

Quantitative Risk Assessment

Abbreviations and Technical Definitions 25/151

Quantitative Risk Assessment Study Scope 31/151

Quantitative Risk Assessment “QRA” Studies 32/151

Method of Assessment 32/151

1.0- General Method Used 32/151

2.0- Risk Assessment 32/151

Modeling the Consequences 34/151

Criterion for Risk Tolerability 35/151

Personnel Vulnerability and Structural Damage 38/151

Quantification of the Frequency of Occurrence 41/151

Identification of Scenarios Leading to Selected Failures 41/151

Relevant Weather Data for the Study 42/151

- Weather Data 42/151

- Stability Categories 47/151

Gerga Pressure Reduction Station Description 48/151

PRMS Location Coordinates 48/151

PRMS Description 48/151

Design Data 52/151

2.0- Pressure Reduction Station Outlet Pipeline (6 inch) 90/151

2/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

2/4- Consequence Modeling for 3 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

2/7- Consequence Modeling for 6 inch (Full Rup.) Gas Release

3.0- Pressure Reduction Station Spotleak Tank (Odorant Tank) 122/151

Individual Risk Evaluation 129/151

• Risk Calculation 129/151

• Event Tree Analysis 132/151

Table (1) Description of Modeling of the Different Scenario 34/151

Criteria for Personnel Vulnerability and Structural

Table (5) Heat Radiation Effects on People 39/151

Table (6) Effects of Overpressure 40/151

Annual Average Temperature, Relative Humidity and Wind

Table (8) Mean of Monthly Air Temperature (°C) 46/151

Table (10) Mean of Monthly Relative Humidity (%) 46/151

Table (11) Mean of Cloud Cover on the Scale 0 – 8 46/151

Table (12) Mean of Monthly Sunshine Hours 46/151

Table (13) Pasqual Stability Categories 47/151

Table (14) Relationship between Wind Speed and Stability 47/151

Table (16) Dispersion Modeling – 1” Horizontal Gas release 55/151

Table (17) Dispersion Modeling – 1” 20 o - Gas release 60/151

Table (18) Dispersion Modeling – 1” 45 o - Gas release 65/151

Table (19) Dispersion Modeling – 2” Horizontal - Gas release 69/151

Table (20) Dispersion Modeling – 2” 20o - Gas release 74/151

Table (21) Dispersion Modeling – 2” 45o - Gas release 79/151

Table (22) Dispersion Modeling – 4” Gas release 84/151

Table (23) Dispersion Modeling – 1” Horizontal Gas release 90/151

Table (24) Dispersion Modeling – 1” 20 o - Gas release 94/151

Table (25) Dispersion Modeling – 1” 45 o - Gas release 98/151

Table (26) Dispersion Modeling – 3” Horizontal - Gas release 102/151

Table (27) Dispersion Modeling – 3” 20o - Gas release 107/151

Table (28) Dispersion Modeling – 3” 45o - Gas release 112/151

Table (29) Dispersion Modeling – 6” Horizontal - Gas release 116/151

Table (30) Dispersion Modeling for Odorant Tank 122/151

Table (31) Failure Frequency for Each Scenario 131/151

PRS Inlet 4” and Outlet 6” Pipeline Scenarios (Pin Hole

PRS Inlet 4” and Outlet 6” Pipeline Scenarios (Half Dia.

PRS Inlet 4” and Outlet 6” Pipeline Scenarios (Full

Table (35) Odorant Tank Release – Event Tree Analysis 137/151

Table (36) Total Frequencies for Each Scenario 138/151