IC 0029 02 Soufraki

IN THE MATTER OF AN ANNULMENT PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT
OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONAL OF OTHER STATES

__________
A Separate Opinion and A Statement of Dissent

By Omar Nabulsi, member of the ad hoc Committee
In the Annulment Proceedings

Between
Hussein Nuaman Soufraki,
(Claimant)
v.
The United Arab Emirates,
(Respondent)
___________
CASE NO. ARB/02/7
___________
I. Introduction
1- A Request for Arbitration was brought on May 16, 2002 by Mr. Hussein
Nuaman Soufraki (the “Claimant”). This Request was referred to an
Arbitral Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), which consisted of:
Mr. L. Yves Fortier, President
Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, Member
Dr. Aktham El Kholy, Member
2- The Request for Arbitration was registered against the United Arab
Emirates – UAE (the “Respondent”). The Claimant invoked his Italian
nationality to present claims against the Respondent under the Treaty
between Italy and UAE for the Protection and Promotion of Investment.
This Treaty was entered into force on April 29, 1997.
3- The subject matter of the dispute concerned a concession agreement
between the Claimant and the Respondent. However, before the case was
heard on the merits, the Respondent raised an objection to the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction challenging the Claimant’s allegation that he is an Italian
citizen.
Pursuant to ICSID Rule 41, the Tribunal bifurcated the arbitration in order
to hear the Respondent’s objection to jurisdiction as a separate preliminary
matter.
A Separate Opinion & A Statement of Dissent by Omar Nabulsi. 2

4- The Tribunal decided that the dispute falls outside its jurisdiction under
Article 25(1) and (2)(a) of the ICSID Convention, and Article 1(3) of the
Investment Agreement Between Italy and The United Arab Emirates for the
Protection & Promotion of Investment (BIT). Therefore, the Tribunal
declined to hear the dispute on its merits. The Tribunal’s reasoning is that
(a) it had jurisdiction only if the Claimant had Italian nationality on the
pertinent dates, (b) it is empowered to decide whether the Claimant had
Italian nationality, (c) it is not bound to accept certificates on nationality as
conclusive evidence, (d) the Claimant had Italian nationality if he could
prove that he had satisfied the requirements of Italian law, (e) the Claimant
failed to prove that he satisfied these requirements by residing in Italy for
one year on the relevant dates, and (f) the Claimant failed to prove that he
had Italian nationality. Consequently, the Tribunal decided that it lacked
jurisdiction 1 .
5- On 4 November 2004, pursuant to Article 52 of the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States (“ICSID” or “the ICSID Convention”), an Annulment Application of
the Arbitral Award issued on July 7, 2004—ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7—
was submitted to the Secretary General.
1
Award, paras. 21, 23, 27, 81, 84

6- An ad hoc Committee was appointed by the Chairman of the ICSID
Administrative Council in accordance with Article 52(3) of the ICSID
Convention, and was composed of:
Judge Florentino P. Feliciano, President
Mr. Omar Nabulsi, Member
Professor Brigitte Stern, Member
The Claimant was represented by:
Mr. Whitney Debevoise (up until April 3, 2007), Ms. Jean E. Kalicki, of
Arnold & Porter LLP, 555 Twelfth St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004,
USA;
Prof. Christopher Greenwood, CMG, QC, Essex Court Chambers, 24
Lincoln’s Inn Fields, London WC2A 3 EG, UK.
The Respondent was represented by:
Mr. Stephen Jagusch, Mr. Simon Roderick, Mr. Anthony Sinclair, of Allen
& Overy LLP, One New Change, London EC4M 9QQ, UK
Professor James Crawford, SC, FBA, Lauterpacht Research Centre for
International Law, 5 Cranmer Road, Cambridge CB3 9BL, UK.
II. Grounds for Annulment
7- The Claimant’s alleged grounds for annulment, as stated in his Request in
his Memorial in support of the Request, and in his Reply Memorial in
further support, are as follows:

a) The Tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers by making its own
determination as to whether Mr. Soufraki satisfied the requirements
for receiving Italian nationality under Italian law instead of
accepting his proffered certificates of nationality as conclusive as to
his possession of Italian nationality.
b) The Tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers by failing to apply
Italian law, which is the applicable law to nationality determinations
in accordance with the BIT.
c) The Tribunal had jurisdiction over the dispute and, therefore,
manifestly exceeded its powers by failing to exercise that
jurisdiction.
d) The Tribunal failed to state the reasons on which its award was
based.
III. Dissenting Opinion
8- As a member of the ad hoc Committee, I attended the hearings held in the
Hague, the Netherlands, on May 19, 2005, and in Washington D.C., USA
on June 13-14, 2006, and participated in the deliberations of the Committee
in Washington D.C., USA, on June 12 and 15, 2006, and in Manila, the
Philippines, on March 1 to 3, 2007.
9- I have contributed to the draft of the majority Decision adopted by my
colleagues, members of the ad hoc Committee (the “Decision”). I agree

with my colleagues’ analysis and opinion concerning the Claimant’s
allegations that the Tribunal had manifestly exceeded its power by making
its own determination on the Claimant’s nationality. I also agree with my
colleagues that “a jurisdictional error is not a separate category of excess of
powers. Only if an ICSID Tribunal commits a manifest excess of powers,
whether on a matter related to jurisdiction or to the merits, is there a basis
for annulment”. Hence, I agree with the Committee’s rejection of the
Claimant’s contention that “the Tribunal’s refusal to take jurisdiction, based
on the inexistence of the Italian nationality of Mr. Soufraki for ICSID
arbitration purposes, constituted a manifest excess of power”. So, I will not
deal in this opinion with the aforesaid two grounds as I totally concur with
the Decision in this respect.
10- However, I had different views with regard to the Claimant’s argument that
the Tribunal failed to apply Italian law, and that it failed to state reasons
upon which it based its Award. I had in particular a different point of view
regarding the Tribunal’s treatment of the official certificates submitted by
the Claimant, and whether these certificates should have been treated as
“prima facie” evidence, establishing the Claimant’s nationality. I defended
my opinion with clear argument in the ad hoc Committee’s deliberations,
and endeavoured to reach a consensus with my colleagues. Nevertheless, I
remained firmly convinced of my views, which were not congruent with

my colleagues’ judgment. Hence, I am stating herein my dissenting
opinion.
11- In performing my duty as a member of this ad hoc Committee, I took into
consideration the fact that the ICSID Convention has introduced a
progressive innovation into the international arbitration scene by enacting
the annulment procedures prescribed in Article (52) of the Convention.
This is a genuine improvement which provided an advantage over other
international arbitration rules, such as the ICC rules, the rules of the
London Court of International Arbitration, and rules of other international
arbitration systems, where there is no effective review or appeal of the
awards issued under these rules, except revision and appeal before national
courts. It is noteworthy that suggestions have been made in certain circles
that appeal or annulment procedures should be introduced to the
international arbitration systems. Such procedures would create an
incentive for arbitrators to exert extra caution since their decisions would be
under scrutiny by ad hoc Committees.
12- However, the advantage of the annulment procedure would become
ineffectual if members of ad hoc Committees were reluctant or unwilling to
exercise their power to annul an award once they have perceived through
careful examination that the Tribunal did exceed its power by not applying
strictly the rules of law as may be agreed by the parties, or the rules of the

law of the contracting state in accordance with Article (42) of the ICSID
Convention.
13- Based on the above, the Tribunal’s decision to assume the power to decide
on the alleged nationality of the Claimant must be scrutinized by the ad hoc
Committee in a precise and scrupulous manner to ascertain absolutely that
such decision was taken in strict compliance with the proper law, according
to which the Claimant’s nationality shall be determined. Precise scrutiny is
essential because a decision to disenfranchise a person from his nationality
is a serious act since it shall have drastic consequences; particularly if this
decision was taken in contradiction with official documents issued by
competent governmental authorities. Nationality of a person is of
paramount importance in all cases, and is especially important in ICSID
arbitration, where the nationality of the Claimant is pivotal in determining
his alleged rights.
14- In addressing the Claimant’s grounds for annulment, I shall deal with two
grounds: the Claimant’s assertion that the Tribunal failed to apply Italian
law, and that the Tribunal failed to state reasons for its decision. I should
note that repetitions of statements and quotations in the Decision shall
appear in this opinion because, as indicated above, I have been involved in
drafting the Decision, and I concur with the said statements.

15- I agree with the Decision’s conclusion that ICSID Tribunals have the power
to determine their jurisdiction to hear a dispute. It is a general principle of
international law that international tribunals have the competence to
determine their own competence. This principle is confirmed in Article (41)
of the ICSID Convention, which states that:
“The Tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence.
Any objection by any party that the dispute is not within
the jurisdiction of the Centre . . . shall be considered by
the Tribunal which shall determine whether to deal with it
as a preliminary question, or join it to the merits of the
dispute.”
In determining whether the jurisdictional requirements of the ICSID
Convention and the BIT have been satisfied, an ICSID Tribunal is
empowered to make its own investigation into the nationality of Claimants
on the basis of the official evidence adduced before it.
16- Jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal in this case is dependent upon
compliance with the requirements of the ICSID Convention and the
applicable BIT, which require that the Claimant be a “natural person
holding the nationality of [Italy] in accordance with [Italy’s] law,” and that
he should have this nationality on the “date on which the parties consented

to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date
on which the request was registered.” 2
17- Although the established principle is that the issue of nationality of a person
shall remain within the reserved domain of every state, this principle
coexists with the principle that international tribunals are empowered to
make their own determinations as to whether a claimant has the nationality
of a state, when that nationality has been challenged and is central to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
18- However, determination of the Claimant’s nationality should be carried out
in strict compliance with the proper law, and that official documents
pertaining to the nationality issued by the concerned State should be
accepted by an international tribunal as “prima facie evidence”, in
accordance with the definition of this term.
19- It is an established principle of ICSID jurisprudence that failure to apply the
appropriate law constitutes an excess of powers because “the provisions on
applicable law are essential elements of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate
and constitute part of the parameters for the Tribunal’s activity”.
Thus a “Tribunal’s disregard of the agreed rules of law would constitute a
derogation from the terms of reference within which the Tribunal has been
2
ICSID Convention, Article 25(2)(a)

authorized to function.” 3 . By failing to apply the law agreed upon by the
parties, a Tribunal acts in a manner to which the parties did not consent.
This is a manifest excess of power.
20- It is also an established principle of ICSID jurisprudence that a good faith
error in applying the appropriate law does not constitute an excess of
powers. 4 For example, according to one commentator: “ICSID case law
has admitted that a Tribunal’s failure to apply the proper law—as opposed
to a mere mistake in the application of the law—is subject to review under
the manifest excess of powers standard of Article 52(1)(b).” 5 Another
scholar commented:
“It is generally agreed that the failure to apply the proper
law under Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention may
constitute manifest excess of power and lead to an
annulment. It is also well established that failure to apply
the proper law is not equivalent to an error in the
application of the law.” 6
3
Christopher Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, page 943
4
M.B. Feldman, “The Annulment Proceedings and the Finality of ICSID Awards” (1987) 2 ICSID
Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 85, 100
5
E. Gaillard, “The Extent of Review of the Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration”, in
Annulment of ICSID Award (E. Gaillard and Y. Banifatemi, eds., 2004) page 236
6
G. Kaufman-Kohler, “Annulment of ICSID Awards in Contract and Treaty Arbitrations: Are there
Differences?” in Annulment of ICSID Awards (E. Gaillard and Y. Banifatemi, eds. 2004) page
207

21- An error in the application of the correct law is not a manifest excess of
power. The review of such error is appropriate for an appeal, but not for an
annulment. Feldman summarizes this point as follows:
Article 52(1)(b), which empowered annulment for excess
of power, was not intended to permit review for any error
of law. A variety of proposals to authorize annulment of
ICSID awards for ‘unwarranted interpretation of
principles of substantive law’, ‘serious misapplication of
the law’, and ‘manifestly incorrect application of the law’
were rejected by the drafters of the ICSID Convention. It
is noted that review of ‘serious error in the application of
substantive law . . . would be tantamount to providing for
an appeal.’ 7
22- The same approach was adopted by the ad hoc Committee in the Amco
case:
“The law applied by the Tribunal will be examined by the
ad hoc Committee, not for the purpose of scrutinizing
whether the Tribunal committed errors in the
interpretation of the requirements of applicable law or in
the ascertainment or evaluation of the relevant facts to
7
M.B. Feldman, loc.cit. page 100

which such law has been applied. Such scrutiny is
properly the task of a court of appeals, which the ad hoc
Committee is not. The ad hoc Committee will limit itself
to determining whether the Tribunal did in fact apply the
law it was bound to apply to the dispute”.
23- It is stated in the same case that “failure to apply the proper law,
distinguished from mere misconstruction of that law, would constitute a
manifest excess of powers on the part of the Tribunal and a ground for
nullity under Article 52(1)(b) of the Convention. The ad hoc Committee
has approached this task with caution, distinguishing failure to apply the
applicable law as a ground for annulment and misinterpretation of the
applicable law as a ground for appeal.” 8
24- Yet, it is conceded that if misinterpretation or misapplication of the proper
law was so gross (egregious) to the extent that it cannot be accepted as it
was repugnant to reason and common sense, it would be equivalent to an
exclusion of the law and the failure to apply it.
25- According to the principle that failure to apply the law constitutes an excess
of powers, while a good faith error in applying the law does not, the
question which should be addressed in this case is whether the Tribunal
failed to apply Italian law, or made a mere error in its application.
8
Amco Asia Corporation v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on
Annulment (16 May 1986), 1 ICSID Rep. 509 (1993), para. 23

26- The Claimant argues that “a State’s nationality law consists of its legal
provisions as well as the binding interpretations of those provisions by its
highest court, and that the State’s law consists of its interpretive authorities,
such as case law, official government circulars, and the consensus of
leading scholars that illuminate the application and meaning of the law.
When applying national law, an international tribunal should apply the
legal provisions as interpreted by the binding judicial authorities and strive
to apply those provisions as they are informed by the state’s interpretive
authorities.”
27- The above principle is supported by case law and commentary. For
example, the Tribunal said in the Serbian Loans case:
“For the Court itself to undertake its own construction of
municipal law, leaving on one side existing judicial
decisions, with the ensuing danger of contradicting the
construction which has been placed on such law by the
highest national Tribunal ... would not be in conformity
with the task for which the Court has been established and
would not be compatible with the principles governing the
selection of its members”. 9
9
Serbian Loans Case, Permanent Court of International Justice, 12 July 1929, PCIJ, Ser. A., No. 20,
1929

28- Also, the Tribunal stated that in the Brazilian Loans case:
“Once the Court has arrived at the conclusion that it is to
apply the municipal law of a particular country, there
seems no doubt that it must seek to apply it as it would be
applied in that country. It would not be applying the
municipal law of a country if it were to apply it in a
manner different from that in which that law would be
applied in the country in which it is in force. It follows
that the Court must pay the utmost regard to the decisions
of the municipal courts of a country, for it is with the aid
of their jurisprudence that it will be enabled to decide
what are the rules which, in actual fact, are applied in the
country the law of which is recognized as applicable in a
given case”. 10
29- By examining the Award and the reasoning upon which it was based, it
became clear that the Tribunal’s treatment of the official certificates
submitted by the Claimant requires particular scrutiny since these
documents, which were issued by competent authorities of the Italian
government, were rejected by the Tribunal without any reliance on or
10
Brazilian Federal Loans Case, Permanent Court of International Justice, 12 July 1929, PCIJ, Ser.
A, No. 21, 1929

reference to an identified rule of law, which the Tribunal must have applied
in dealing with these documents.
30- The validity and conclusiveness of the official certificates is confirmed by
the fact that there is no evidence in the record to rebut them. The competent
authorities, who decided to issue these certificates, should be presumed to
have based their decision on true facts ascertained by themselves. This
presumption should remain a true fact until it is disproved by rebuttal
evidence. The inquiry conducted by the Tribunal, and the conclusion that
the Tribunal have reached on the basis of this inquiry do not rebut this fact.
31- The Tribunal stated in the Award that it “will accord great weight to the
nationality law of the State in question and to the interpretation and
application of that law by its authorities” 11 . This statement, which was oft-
quoted in several discussions by the parties, raised a serious and crucial
question:
Did the Tribunal, by according “great weight to Italian law, apply this law
as it is interpreted and applied by Italian authorities”? Or,
Did the Tribunal, as stated in the Award, having accorded great weight to
Italian law, “decided at the end by itself whether the Claimant is an Italian
national” by applying a law other than Italian law?
11
Award, para. 55

32- It is apparent from the statement in the Award that the Tribunal ... “will in
the end decide for itself” … that the Tribunal was not bound to apply Italian
law as conclusive, albeit the Tribunal will accord great weight to this law.
The meaning of the phrase “decide for itself”, as I understand it, is that
Italian law was considered by the Tribunal as one of the factors, which was
accorded great weight, but was not the only conclusive factor in
determining the Claimant’s nationality.
33- The Tribunal applied Italian Law No. 91 of 1992 with respect to the
requirements under this law that a person who lost his Italian nationality
shall re-acquire it by a timely application or by taking up residence in Italy
for a period of no less than one year. However, in deciding on this
requirement of residency, the Tribunal did not apply all Italian rules
according to which it should have discerned whether the Claimant fulfilled
this requirement.
34- The Tribunal relied on Article 34 of the ICSID Rules of Procedure for
Arbitration Proceedings, and applied a rule of procedure of its choice -
which it did not identify- to evaluate the evidence concerning the legal
requirements for re-acquiring Italian nationality. I shall explain below that
Article 34 of the ICSID Rules is inapplicable in this case.
35- Since the Tribunal did not specify in the Award which rule it applied on its
evaluation of the testimony, then the Tribunal cannot be presumed to have

applied Italian law. It is relevant to quote in this context the Claimant’s
statement:
“But there is no way of knowing whether the Tribunal
would have reached the same result, had it properly
applied Italian law to the two major documents
corroborating Mr. Soufraki’s testimony that he had
physically returned, and had it not drawn the improper
inference under Italian law that his failure to register his
return meant he was not physically present. In an Award
as concise as this one, there is no way of knowing how the
Tribunal might have weighed other factors. It is quite
possible that it would have reached the contrary
conclusion that Mr. Soufraki remained Italian, as the
highest officials in Italy themselves concluded after
carefully reviewing the Tribunal’s written analysis”. 12
36- The vital question in this case is: Did the Tribunal treat the official
certificates submitted by the Claimant as “prima facie evidence”? In order
to answer this question, the meaning of the term and the concept of “prima
facie” must be examined.
12
The Claimant’s Post-Hearing Memorial (Tr). page 24

37- I have noted the Claimant’s comments on the term “prima facie” in
international proceedings. This term has a technical meaning in common
law countries where it is understood that if a certificate is deemed to be a
“prima facie evidence”, it shall be treated as conclusive of what is set out
therein, unless fraud is proved, or the content of the certificate is overturned
by a process in the state in which the certificate was issued. 13
The Claimant also commented that the concept of “prima facie” is used
commonly in criminal cases, where the defendant will be convicted unless
other evidence is adduced to displace the evidence against the defendant 14 .
38- Notwithstanding the comments of both parties on the definition of the term
“prima facie evidence”, the Tribunal should have treated the official
certificates as such in accordance with the accepted definition of this term,
which is as follows:
“Prima facie evidence” is evidence good and sufficient on
its face; such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is
sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of
facts constituting the party’s claim or defense, and which
if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.
“Prima facie evidence” is evidence which, if unexplained
or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a judgment in
13
Transcripts of the Hearings (Tr), page 56
14
Tr, page 90

favor of the issue which it supports, but which may be
contradicted by other evidence 15 .”
39- “Prima facie evidence” is defined as:
“Evidence which must be received and treated as true and
sufficient until and unless rebutted by other evidence 16 .”
“Prima facie evidence” is also defined as “evidence which
is not being inconsistent with the falsity of the hypothesis,
nevertheless raises such a degree of probability in its
favour that it must prevail if believed by the jury, unless
rebutted or contrary proved”17 .
40- The Respondent conceded that official certificates …“are entitled to be
treated as prima facie evidence of nationality” 18 . But, having made this
concession, the Respondent did not proceed to demonstrate how the
Tribunal treated the official documents presented by the Claimant. Instead,
the Respondent stated that … “in any event, as far as the evidence goes,
none of the officials who issued the certificates knew the critical fact that in
1991, Mr. Soufraki had lost his Italian nationality”, and that … “the
15
Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 1071
16
Ibid, page 1068
17
Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, by John Burke, 2nd Edition, page 1422
18
Respondent’s Post Hearing Memorial, para. 33

Consulate had no means of knowing about Mr. Soufraki’s loss of Italian
nationality” 19 .
41- There is no evidence about the contents of the records in the office of the
officials who issued the certificates of nationality. The fact that the
Claimant did not inform the authorities of the loss of his nationality is not
evidence that the records do not include all the information according to
which the certificates were issued.
42- Absence of evidence in the records that the authorities who issued the
certificates did not have the required information does not in any manner
rebut the official certificates, nor does it diminish their status as “prima
facie evidence”. These certificates should have remained conclusive, until
definitely rebutted by other evidence.
43- The evidence required by the Respondent that the Italian authorities did not
do their work would not appear in the certificates since they would not
normally include any such information. It is irregular for officials who
issued certificates of nationality to mention in the certificates that they have
made the necessary investigations. The certificates themselves, which do
not include any statement other than that the subject is a national of the
State, should stand alone as conclusive evidence, unless other evidence is
19
Ibid. para. 24

adduced to prove that they were issued fraudulently, negligently or without
investigation by the authorities of the circumstances of the case.
44- It is not contested that the Tribunal shall be the primary fact-finder. In this
case, the Tribunal did not find a fact that the officials who issued the
certificates did not have the necessary information, nor did they conduct an
inquiry into the reasons upon which the certificates were issued. As
indicated above, the Claimant’s statement that he did not inform the
authorities that he lost his nationality does not prove that the authorities
were not aware of such information.
45- It is correct that an Italian court can conduct an inquiry into the substantive
position under Italian law20 . But an ICSID Tribunal can conduct such
inquiry only if there were no official certificates issued by competent
authorities which should be presumed to have conducted the necessary
inquiry. Nevertheless, if official certificates were presented to the Tribunal,
it shall be bound to treat them as “prima facie evidence” in accordance with
the accepted definition of this term.
46- In accordance with the definition of the concept of “prima facie evidence”
cited above, and since the official certificates should have been considered
by the Tribunal as “prima facie evidence”, the Claimant has discharged his
burden of proof by submitting the said certificates. He did produce “prima
20
Respondent’s Post Hearing Memorial, para. 40

facie evidence” of his Italian nationality, which are official documents,
identity papers, a passport and an entry into the Registry of Italian
Overseas. By doing so, the Claimant was released from his obligation to
prove his nationality, since he produced certificates that should have been
sufficient to sustain his nationality claim, until and unless other evidence
contradicted them.
47- Since the Claimant has discharged his burden of proof, as indicated above,
this burden should have been shifted to the Respondent. However, the
Tribunal did not deal with this issue in the proper manner by requiring the
Respondent to produce evidence rebutting the official certificates, either by
proving that they were issued negligently or fraudulently, or that the
authorities issuing these certificates did not perform their duties. The
Respondent did not do anything of this sort to contradict these certificates.
Therefore, these certificates should have been treated by the Tribunal as
true and sufficient to sustain a judgment in the Claimant’s favour, since
there is no rebuttal against them in the records submitted by the
Respondent.
48- I disagree with the Claimant that “the only evidence to displace the
certificates would be evidence of fraud: a fraud on the authorities, or a
fraud by the authorities 21 . In fact, any type of evidence that contradicts the
21
Tr. page 93

certificates can be the basis of the judgment, in addition to evidence of
fraud. In other words, the Tribunal shall have the power to reject official
certificates if they were contradicted by other evidence, even if this
evidence was not related to fraud, as long as it is compelling and conclusive
in refuting the certificates.
49- The Respondent did not produce such evidence to disprove the validity of
the certificates. By not requiring the Respondent to submit proof
undermining the authenticity of the certificates, the Tribunal has committed
an erroneous reversal of the burden of proof, which is a serious departure
from the fundamental rule of procedure. This is a ground of annulment
under Article 52(1)(d) of the Convention 22 .
50- Nevertheless, despite the departure from a rule of procedure, the Claimant
did not invoke this procedural defect as a ground for annulment since the
Claimant’s request for annulment was confined to the four grounds
summarized in paragraph (7) of this opinion. The Claimant also submitted
that the powers of the Tribunal, in determining a question which is
governed by Italian law under Article I of the BIT, are limited to
determining this question in accordance with Italian law, and not in
accordance with any other standard 23 .
22
See Prof. Stern’s comments. Tr, page 93
23
Tr. page 97

51- I agree with the Claimant’s statement that “the Tribunal jurisdiction is
derived from international law; from the BIT, from the ICSID Convention
and from the consent of the parties on the international plane. It is
international law that determines the scope of the Tribunal’s powers. Since
international law requires that the question of the Claimant’s nationality be
determined in accordance with Italian law, then Italian law is relevant, and
failure to apply it would be an excess of power under international law” 24 .
52- I should mention in this context that official certificates should be rejected
if they contravene a rule of international law, such as the certificates issued
by an occupier state, or by a racist regime against a persecuted person. For
example, imposition of Iraqi nationality on Kuwaiti citizens during the
occupation of Kuwait 1990, and the deprivation of German citizens of their
nationality by the racist Nazi regime. 25
53- The Tribunal stated that it will accept the Claimant’s certificates of
nationality as “prima facie evidence” 26 but, in fact, these certificates were
not treated by the Tribunal as such. The Tribunal looked for other evidence
and conducted its own inquiry. It concluded that the Claimant did not re-
acquire Italian nationality notwithstanding the official certificates which, if
treated as “prima facie evidence”, should be sufficient to establish the
nationality of the Claimant, until they are rebutted by other evidence.

24
Tr. page 98
25
Tr. page 48
26
Award. Para 63

54- The quotation by the Tribunal from Professor C. Schreuer is irrelevant
because he did not refer to the certificate of nationality as “prima facie
evidence”. He stated that such certificates will be treated as part of the
“documents of other evidence”; whilst these certificates should have been
considered not as a mere part of the evidence, but as conclusive evidence in
accordance with the definition of “prima facie”, unless they were refuted by
other evidence.
55- It is established that international tribunals shall have the authority to make
nationality determination and go behind official government documents,
but the Tribunal should start by treating these documents as “prima facie
evidence”, which means that these documents shall be conclusive, unless
other evidence has been brought before the Tribunal to undermine their
conclusiveness.
56- The Tribunal stated that it has considered and weighed the totality of the
evidence adduced by the Claimant, and that it unanimously reached its
conclusion on the basis of the “totality of the evidence”. Based on that, the
Tribunal decided that the Claimant has failed to discharge his burden of
proof 27 . It is evident from this statement that the Tribunal did not
distinguish the official certificates, as “prima facie evidence”, from the
totality of other evidence; whilst official certificates should have been
27
Award, para. 81

perceived by the Tribunal as separate from other evidence, since they must
be treated as conclusive unless they were rebutted by other evidence.
57- The Tribunal’s inquiry about the residency of the Claimant in Italy on the
relevant dates, and its conclusion based on this inquiry does not rebut the
official certificates issued by the competent government authorities. The
fact, as stated in the Award, that there is no evidence in the record that any
Italian officials did undertake any inquiry to determine the Claimant’s
nationality, does not constitute a definite rebuttal of the official certificates.
On the contrary, absence of such evidence is a confirmation of the
conclusiveness of these certificates.
58- The only evidence in the record that the competent authorities did not carry
out the required inquiry, is that the Claimant did not inform these
authorities that he had lost his Italian nationality by acquiring Canadian
nationality. This is not a decisive proof that the consular officials did not
know these facts since they may have obtained them from other sources.
59- The inquiry into the nationality of the Claimant should have been carried
out by an Italian court. The Tribunal could have stayed the arbitration
proceedings to allow the Respondent, if he so desired, to state his
challenges against the certificates before an Italian court.
60- However, since a ruling on the Claimant’s nationality by an Italian court
was not obtained, then the Tribunal shall have the power to rule on this

issue on the basis of the adduced evidence, provided that “prima facie
evidence”, such as official certificates, shall be treated as conclusive, unless
rebutted by other evidence.
61- I concur with the view that in making inquiries into the nationality of a
Claimant, an international tribunal shall have the power to make factual
determination. However, the Tribunal in conducting such inquiry must
strictly comply with the proper law, which is in this case, the substantive
provisions of Italian law which Italian courts shall apply in determining
Italian nationality. The Tribunal was bound to proceed entirely and
exclusively under Italian law. 28
62- The determination of the Claimant’s nationality should not have been
achieved by application of procedural rules, since this determination should
be governed by the substantive rules of Italian law which stated the
conditions for the re-acquirement of Italian nationality. These rules should
have been applied by the Tribunal because they shall have a substantive
impact. The Tribunal’s application of rules other than the substantive rules
of Italian law would be a manifest excess of power.
63- As mentioned above, I am of the opinion that Article (34) of the ICSID
Rules is inapplicable in this case because determination of the Claimant’s
nationality, as I have indicated above, shall be governed by the substantive
28
Tr, pages 151 & 152

provisions of Italian law. Hence, the evidence on the residency of the
Claimant should be in accordance with the substantive rules of Italian law,
and not in accordance with any rules chosen by the Tribunal. In this
context, the Claimant stated:
“The difference between substantive rules of law and
evidentiary presumption can be illusory…both achieve the
same result, one by a substantive rule of law and the other
by evidentiary presumption…an international Tribunal
applying rules of national law must try to achieve the
same result the national legal system will do…it makes no
sense to distinguish between the two systems, requiring a
tribunal to apply the law of the first but not the law of the
second. The result would be a mockery of a coherent
system of international justice 29 .”
64- The Claimant also stated that …“very often the difference between a
substantive rule of law and an evidential or procedural rule may be difficult
to unpick.” 30 There are cases where the proper law of evidence was applied
by international tribunals. An example cited in the Decision is, if under the
proper law, two affidavits shall be sufficient to prove nationality, then a
national court shall be bound by these affidavits. In this case, this rule of
29
Claimant’s Post Hearing Memorial, page 22
30
Tr. page 382

evidence “would have to be applied by an international tribunal as an
inseparable part of the applicable substantive rule on nationality”. There is
no evidence whatsoever in the records of this case that this is not the
situation under Italian law, although the Claimant did not assert that Italian
law included such rule of evidence.
65- The law of citizenship in some jurisdictions may include a rule that a
testimony of one or two witnesses that a person was present in the territory
of the state at a certain date, shall be sufficient and conclusive. According
to this rule, the administrative and judicial authorities of the state cannot go
behind such testimony, or engage in further investigation whether the
person resided in the territory. The Tribunal did not state in the Award that
it made an inquiry whether such rule exists in Italian law. The Tribunal
dismissed the sworn witnesses’ affidavit without any reference to a
provision in Italian law. These testimonies were rejected without having the
witnesses appear before the Tribunal so that it can assess their credibility by
cross-examination. Thus, this sworn affidavit remains “as essentially
unimpeached”. 31
66- Since Article (34) of the ICSID Rules is not applicable in this case, the
Tribunal shall not have the freedom to evaluate the evidence according to
rules of its choice, and shall not be the judge of the admissibility and the
31
Claimant’s Post Hearing Memorial, page 21

probative value of this evidence. On the contrary, the Tribunal shall be
bound to apply the substantive rules of Italian law because of the
substantive impact of these rules as it is upon them the Claimant’s
nationality shall be determined.
67- However, the said Article (34) does not preclude the Tribunal from
fulfilling its main obligation to apply the proper law under Article 42(1) of
the ICSID Convention. The Claimant expressed this principle as follows:
“Article 34 does not obviate a Tribunal’s overarching
obligation under Article 42(1) to apply only the law that
the parties have agreed. Where national law provides the
exclusive rule of decision, a tribunal does not have free
rein to adopt sweeping evidentiary presumptions on
grounds that the national legal system would not accept,
or to discount entirely evidence which the national system
would carefully consider” 32 .
68- The Tribunal ostensibly intended to apply the relevant Italian laws
governing the determination of the Claimant’s nationality. According to
Article 8/1 of the Italian Law No. 555 of 1912, the Claimant lost his Italian
nationality as a consequence of his acquisition of Canadian nationality and
32
Ibid, page 22

residence in Canada33 , and according to Article 17/1 or Article 13/1/d of
the Italian Law No. 91 of 1992, the Claimant could have re-acquired
automatically his Italian nationality after 1992 by a timely application, or
by residing in Italy for a period of no less than one year 34 .
69- In applying Italian Law No. 91 of 1992, the Tribunal faced the fundamental
question, which it must resolve in order to decide on the Claimant’s alleged
nationality. Did the Claimant reside in Italy for one year during 1993-
1994?
70- I concur with the Respondent’s argument that the Tribunal did not
disregard the evidence presented by the Claimant on his residency in Italy:
the lease for an apartment, and the sworn affidavit testimony of two
witnesses, Mr. Casini and Mr. Nicotra. However, although the Tribunal did
not disregard this evidence, and may have considered them intently, yet it
rejected them as being not convincing because of the relationship of the
witnesses with the Claimant. Since this evidence, supporting the Claimant’s
residency in Italy, is so crucial in this case, the evaluation thereof by the
Tribunal should be in accordance with the applicable law.
71- It is evident from the award that the Tribunal discredited the above
mentioned decisive evidence without any reference to an Italian rule of law.
In fact, the Tribunal did not identify what is the body of rules it applied on
33
Award, para 52
34
Award, para 27

the evidence of the Claimant’s residency. In other words, as the Claimant
stated, the Tribunal did not apply “the whole Italian legal system to
determine whether the Claimant was a national of Italy in accordance with
its laws” 35 .
72- It is thus clear that failure by the Tribunal to state the legal basis upon
which it rejected the crucial evidence is an annullable error. Even if the
Tribunal’s reliance on Article (34) of the ICSID Rules was correct, failing
to state the rule of procedure it had applied on its evaluation of the evidence
is still an annullable error.
73- It is worthwhile to refer in this context to Article (11) of the Arbitration
Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which reads as
follows:
“The rules governing the proceedings before the arbitrator
shall be those resulting from these Rules and, where these
Rules are silent, any rules which the parties (or, failing
them, the arbitrator) may settle, and whether or not
reference is thereby made to a municipal procedural law to
be applied to the arbitration”.
35
Claimant’s Post-Hearing Memorial, page 18

The Tribunal could have applied municipal Italian procedural law. In this
case, the Tribunal should have referred to a specific rule of Italian law
which it had applied.
74- It is also pertinent to quote the Claimant’s demonstration of how the
Tribunal dealt with the adduced evidence:
“…. corroborating evidence was the affidavit testimony of
two witnesses, sworn under oath in the exact form that
Italian law provides. The witnesses swore that between the
relevant dates Mr. Soufraki had resided at the same
address he referenced in his testimony, namely the second
home of his Italian lawyer which he was permitted to use
pursuant to an “agreement for free accommodation”
produced in evidence. The witnesses also swore that
during the same time Mr. Soufraki used as an office the
same apartment reflected in the lease discussed above.
The affidavit was presented to the Tribunal on 2 May
2003, ten months before the Tribunal heard the U.A.E.’s
cross-examination of Mr. Soufraki on 12 March 2004. The
U.A.E. in the intervening ten months never asked to cross-
examine the two witnesses, so their sworn affidavit was
essentially unimpeached. Yet the Tribunal shunted it to

one side on the basis that one was a corporate auditor who
performed services for Mr. Soufraki’s companies as for
other companies in Italy, and the other was a receptionist
at his hotel.” 36
75- The Respondent commented that the Claimant ignored the realities of the
situation by suggesting that the Tribunal could have called the two
witnesses, Messrs. Casini and Nicotra, to give evidence personally and be
cross-examined. The Respondent stated that there was never an opportunity
for this cross-examination because the affidavit of the witnesses was
presented immediately prior to the jurisdiction hearing, and that the
Tribunal re-opened the jurisdictional phase of its own motion, but only to
order the cross-examination hearing for the sole purpose of examining the
Claimant 37 .
The Claimant responded to this comment by stating that the hearing in
question was the oral argument originally scheduled to address the UAE’s
effective nationality arguments, and that the Tribunal convened again ten
months later to hear the cross-examination of Mr. Soufraki on the specific
issue of his residenza in Italy between 1993-1994 38 .
76- I reiterate that dealing with the witnesses’ affidavit is not a procedural
matter, which the Tribunal shall deal with according to its own will
36
Ibid, page 21-22
37
Respondent’s Post-Hearing Memorial, pages 17-18
38
Claimant’s Post-Hearing Memorial, footnote 14 on page 21

pursuant to Article (34) of the ICSID Rule of Procedure, but is a
substantive matter which must be dealt with in accordance with the
substantive rules of Italian law. Omitting to examine personally the
witnesses, and failure to cross-examine them in accordance with the
applicable substantive law, is a failure to apply the proper law and,
consequently is a manifest excess of power. Hence, I disagree with the
Decision’s conclusion that “the Tribunal applied ICSID Arbitration Rule
34, which it was competent and bound to apply and therefore did not
commit a failure to apply the proper procedural law”.
77- Since the Tribunal should have applied Italian law in dealing with the
witnesses’ affidavits, it is relevant to quote below the Claimant’s
description of the rules of Italian law governing this matter:
“…the Italian legal system routinely accepts witness
evidence from employees as well as family members of
parties. As Claimant’s Italian law expert informed the
Tribunal the only witness evidence that is barred in the
Italian legal system is that from a person who have a
direct interest in the outcome of the case. The UAE did
not dispute this principle nor did it ever suggest that the
two witnesses somehow met the Italian law standard for

disqualification. The basis for discounting the evidence
was thus an invention by the Tribunal” 39 .
78- Should it be argued that the statement that … “the Italian legal system
routinely accepts witness’ evidence from employees” does not necessarily
mean that Italian courts are bound to accept such evidence, then the
Tribunal had failed to identify or refer to any Italian rule according to
which Italian courts shall not be bound to accept evidence given by
employees. In other words, the Tribunal did not specify the rule of Italian
law which granted the Tribunal the power to consider testimonies from
employees as being not convincing because of their relationship with the
employer, albeit the Tribunal held that these testimonies were admissible
under Italian law.
79- If the Tribunal relied on any rule of Italian law in its determination of the
probative value of witness evidence, this rule should have been specifically
cited in the Award. Otherwise, the Claimant would be justified to make a
credible statement that “the basis for discounting the evidence was thus an
invention by the Tribunal”.
80- It was imperative, in my opinion, for the Tribunal to call the two witnesses
to appear in person to render testimony, and be cross-examined in order to
evaluate the evidence. Cross-examination of the witnesses in this case
39
Claimant’s Post-Hearing Memorial, page 21-22

should have been considered by the Tribunal as obligatory in order to
conduct proper evaluation of their testimony, which is decisive for the
outcome of this case. This evaluation is not a mere subjective matter to be
decided in accordance with personal appreciation, but is a substantive
matter to be decided in accordance with objective criteria as stated in the
law, because the residency of the Claimant in Italy at the relevant dates is
the legal condition under Italian law for re-acquiring Italian nationality.
Therefore, as I stated above, this rule of Italian law is a substantive rule
since it shall have a substantive result, which is re-acquiring Italian
nationality.
81- It is especially imperative for the Tribunal to conduct such rigorous
investigation because no challenge has been made by the Respondent
against the official certificates submitted by the Claimant on the basis of
fraud. So, in order to dismiss the said certificates, the Tribunal should have
first carried out the aforesaid investigation and search on the potential
evidence that would have rebutted these certificates.
82- Even if the Tribunal had a discretionary power to evaluate the evidence as
granted to the Tribunal by Article 34(1) of the ICSID Rules, then the
Tribunal committed an egregious error in exercising this power, which is
tantamount to a manifest excess of powers because proper evaluation of the
witnesses’ affidavits requires imperatively in this case, as stated above,

rigorous investigation and exhaustive search, which the Tribunal failed to
do. Since the Tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence resulted in
disenfranchising the Claimant from his alleged nationality, which is a
serious deprivation, then it is a flagrant error not to conduct the proper
evaluation and to dismiss the witnesses’ affidavits as being not convincing
only because the witnesses have professional relationships with the
Claimant.
83- The Tribunal has thus dismissed the witnesses’ affidavits without taking
into consideration the probability that the witnesses may have been telling
the truth. It is as if being employees, or having a professional relationship
with the Claimant, shall automatically deter the witnesses from being
truthful. Hence, I am of the opinion that it is an egregious error to deem that
a mere professional relationship makes unreliable the testimony of
witnesses.
84- I noted the arguments rotated around the concept of “comity” (Act of State
Doctrine), which requires that courts of one country should abstain from
inquiring into the validity of acts of the government of another country.
This concept does not apply to international tribunals where their
jurisdiction depends on the nationality of the parties. In such cases, the
Tribunal shall have the power to go beyond official certificates of
nationality. But the concept of “comity” requires that international tribunals

should accord respect to official certificates by treating them as “prima
facie evidence”. Accordingly, these certificates should not be totally
discarded, and be replaced, as in this case, by the Tribunal’s findings.
85- In summary, the Tribunal failed to apply the proper law in its evaluation of
the crucial evidence. Nevertheless, even if the Tribunal had the power to
evaluate the evidence in accordance with said Article (34) of the ICSID
Rules, then the Tribunal has committed an egregious error by its evaluation
of the evidence, and by its unjustified dismissal of the witnesses’
testimonies, which constitutes a manifest excess of power and a ground for
annulment under Article 52(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention.
Conclusion:
For the foregoing reasoning, I did not agree with my colleagues’ Decision. Yet, I
should affirm that my different views on certain aspects of this case did not
diminish my respect and admiration of my colleagues’ learning and wisdom,
which were reflected in my deliberations with them, and in their well-reasoned
and distinguished Decision.
Signed in Amman, Jordan on this 27th day of May, 2007.
signed
OMAR N. NABULSI
Member of the ad hoc Committee

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IN THE MATTER OF AN ANNULMENT PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT

OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONAL OF OTHER STATES

A Separate Opinion and A Statement of Dissent

In the Annulment Proceedings

CASE NO. ARB/02/7

Nuaman Soufraki (the “Claimant”). This Request was referred to an

Arbitral Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), which consisted of:

Mr. L. Yves Fortier, President

Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, Member

Dr. Aktham El Kholy, Member

Emirates – UAE (the “Respondent”). The Claimant invoked his Italian

nationality to present claims against the Respondent under the Treaty

This Treaty was entered into force on April 29, 1997.

3- The subject matter of the dispute concerned a concession agreement

heard on the merits, the Respondent raised an objection to the Tribunal’s

jurisdiction challenging the Claimant’s allegation that he is an Italian

to hear the Respondent’s objection to jurisdiction as a separate preliminary

A Separate Opinion & A Statement of Dissent by Omar Nabulsi. 2

Protection & Promotion of Investment (BIT). Therefore, the Tribunal

pertinent dates, (b) it is empowered to decide whether the Claimant had

Italian nationality, (c) it is not bound to accept certificates on nationality as

conclusive evidence, (d) the Claimant had Italian nationality if he could

failed to prove that he satisfied these requirements by residing in Italy for

had Italian nationality. Consequently, the Tribunal decided that it lacked

5- On 4 November 2004, pursuant to Article 52 of the Convention on the

Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other

States (“ICSID” or “the ICSID Convention”), an Annulment Application of

the Arbitral Award issued on July 7, 2004—ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7—

was submitted to the Secretary General.

A Separate Opinion & A Statement of Dissent by Omar Nabulsi. 3

Administrative Council in accordance with Article 52(3) of the ICSID

Convention, and was composed of:

Judge Florentino P. Feliciano, President

Mr. Omar Nabulsi, Member

Professor Brigitte Stern, Member

The Claimant was represented by:

Prof. Christopher Greenwood, CMG, QC, Essex Court Chambers, 24

Lincoln’s Inn Fields, London WC2A 3 EG, UK.

The Respondent was represented by:

& Overy LLP, One New Change, London EC4M 9QQ, UK

Professor James Crawford, SC, FBA, Lauterpacht Research Centre for

International Law, 5 Cranmer Road, Cambridge CB3 9BL, UK.

II. Grounds for Annulment

7- The Claimant’s alleged grounds for annulment, as stated in his Request in

his Memorial in support of the Request, and in his Reply Memorial in

further support, are as follows:

A Separate Opinion & A Statement of Dissent by Omar Nabulsi. 4

determination as to whether Mr. Soufraki satisfied the requirements

for receiving Italian nationality under Italian law instead of

accepting his proffered certificates of nationality as conclusive as to

his possession of Italian nationality.

b) The Tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers by failing to apply

Italian law, which is the applicable law to nationality determinations

in accordance with the BIT.

c) The Tribunal had jurisdiction over the dispute and, therefore,

manifestly exceeded its powers by failing to exercise that

III. Dissenting Opinion

8- As a member of the ad hoc Committee, I attended the hearings held in the

on June 13-14, 2006, and participated in the deliberations of the Committee

Philippines, on March 1 to 3, 2007.