(Current Issues in Social Psychology) Jan-Willem Van Prooijen - The Psychology of Political Polarization-Routledge (2021)

The Psychology of Political Polarization
The Psychology of Political Polarization was inspired by the notion that, to

understand the momentum of radical political movements, it is important to
understand the attitudes of individual citizens who support such movements.
Leading political psychologists have contributed to this important book, in
which they share their latest ideas about political polarization –a complex
phenomenon that cannot be traced back to a single cause, and that is associated
with intolerance, overconfidence, and irrational beliefs. The book explores the
basis of political polarization as being how citizens think and feel about people
with a different worldview, how they perceive minority groups, and how much
they trust leaders and experts on pressing societal issues such as climate change,
health, international relations, and poverty.The chapters are organized into two
sections that examine what psychological processes and what social factors con-
tribute to polarization among regular citizens.The book also describes practical
strategies and interventions to depolarize people.
The book offers a state-of-the-art introduction to the psychology of pol-
itical polarization which will appeal to the academic market and political
professionals.
Jan-Willem van Prooijen is Associate Professor of Psychology at Vrije

Universiteit (VU) Amsterdam, and senior researcher at the Netherlands Institute
for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR). His main research
interests are political polarization, conspiracy theories, and unethical behavior.
Current Issues in Social Psychology
Series Editor: Johan Karemmans
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The series is useful reading for students, academics, and researchers of social
psychology and related disciplines. Example topics include: self-esteem, mind-
fulness, evolutionary social psychology, minority groups, social neuroscience,
cyberbullying, and social stigma.
Mindfulness in Social Psychology

Edited by Johan C. Karremans and Esther K. Papies
Belief Systems and the Perception of Reality

Edited by Bastiaan Rutjens and Mark Brandt
Current Directions in Ostracism, Social Exclusion and Rejection

Research
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New Directions in the Psychology of Close Relationships

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Psychological Perspectives on Praise

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The Social Psychology of Humor

Edited by Madelijn Strick and Thomas E. Ford
The Psychology of Political
Polarization
Edited by
Jan-W illem van Prooijen
First published 2021
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Contents
List of contributors vii
1 The psychology of political polarization: an introduction 1

JAN-W ILLEM VAN PROOIJEN
SEC TI O N  1
Underlying processes of political polarization 15
2 When do psychological differences predict political
differences? Engagement and the psychological bases of
political polarization 17
CHRISTOPHER M. FEDERICO
3 The political mindset of supporters of radical

and populist parties 38
ALAIN VAN HIEL, JASPER VAN ASSCHE, AND TESSA HAESEVOETS
4 A psychological profile of extreme Trump supporters 53

LAURA KINSMAN AND JEREMY A. FRIMER
5 The impact of relational goals on political polarization 77

CHADLY STERN
SEC TI O N  2
The social context of political polarization 95
6 Support for populist parties: economic deprivation,
cultural backlash, or status anxiety? 97
JOLANDA JETTEN AND FRANK MOLS
newgenprepdf
vi Contents
7 The agreement paradox: how pressures to agree with

others ultimately cause more societal division 112
LUCIAN GIDEON CONWAY, III, SHANNON C. HOUCK,
LINUS CHAN, MEREDITH A. REPKE, AND JAMES D. MCFARLAND
8 Converging moral views in social networks and their

impact on protest violence 135
MARLON MOOIJMAN
9 Can the partisan divide in climate change attitudes be

bridged? A review of experimental interventions 149
JACOB B. RODE AND PETER H. DITTO
Index 169
Contributors
Linus Chan, Department of Psychology, University of Montana

Peter H. Ditto, Department of Psychological Science, University of
California, Irvine
Christopher M. Federico, Department of Political Science and Psychology,
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities
Jeremy A. Frimer, Department of Psychology, University of Winnipeg
Lucian Gideon Conway, III, Department of Psychology, University of
Montana
Tessa Haesevoets, Department of Developmental, Personality and Social
Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium
Shannon C. Houck, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Jolanda Jetten, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland
Laura Kinsman, Department of Psychology, University of Winnipeg
James D. McFarland, Department of Psychology, University of Montana
Frank Mols, School of Political Science and International Studies, The
University of Queensland
Marlon Mooijman, Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University,
Houston, Texas
Meredith A. Repke, BetterUp
Jacob B. Rode, Department of Psychological Science, University of
California, Irvine
Chadly Stern, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Jasper Van Assche, Department of Developmental, Personality and Social
viii Contributors
Alain Van Hiel, Department of Developmental, Personality and Social

Willem van Prooijen, Department of Experimental and Applied
Jan-
Psychology,VU Amsterdam / the NSCR, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Chapter 1
The psychology of political

polarization
An introduction
Jan- Willem van Prooijen
Across the world, societies polarize politically. The tone of political debate has
hardened in recent years, and the political left and right increasingly seem to
perceive each other as enemies instead of as opponents. Extremist, nationalist,
and populist leaders who blame other groups for society’s problems have bene-
fited electorally from these developments.Various countries have elected popu-
list leaders in office in recent years (e.g., the US, Italy, Hungary, Brazil), and also
elsewhere nationalist movements have significantly shaped the political land-
scape (e.g., Brexit). Against the backdrop of these developments, the world faces
important challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, geo-
political conflict, terrorism, and immigration. Moreover, governmental officials
frequently report suspicions of foreign interference in national elections, and
the public is regularly exposed to fake news, alternative facts, and conspiracy
theories that fuel further polarization.
Political polarization is often visible through macro-level processes in society,
including protest movements, electoral support for relatively radical political
parties, and increasing levels of conflict between societal movements. Yet, at
the basis of political polarization are psychological, micro- and meso-level
processes that determine how individual citizens think and feel about people
with a different worldview, how they treat ethnic, religious, and sexual minority
groups, and how much they trust leaders and experts on issues such as climate
change, health, poverty, and international conflict. Any manifestation of polit-
ical polarization starts with the concerns of individual citizens, and therefore,
the social-psychological processes associated with polarized political views are
key to understanding the broader societal implications of this phenomenon. As
such, attempts to depolarize the political debate are more likely to be effective
if they take scientific knowledge of the psychology of political polarization into
account.
The present edited volume was inspired by these issues, and sought to pro-
vide a state-of-the-art overview of scientific knowledge on the psychology of
political polarization. To achieve this aim, leading experts on the psychology
of political polarization generously contributed a chapter in which they share
2 Jan-Willem van Prooijen
their views on this phenomenon. The current introductory chapter will briefly
illuminate what political polarization is exactly, and what the main theoretical
and practical reasons are to study this phenomenon. Moreover, it will provide a
short overview of the book.
What is political polarization?

At the core of political polarization is the extent to which citizens hold strong
and moralized attitudes about political and societal issues. In general, strong
attitudes tend to be relatively resistant to social influence, stable over time, and
influential on cognition and behavior (Howe & Krosnick, 2017). Accordingly,
political beliefs that people endorse with strong moral conviction are relatively
difficult to change, drive behavior in significant ways, and form the basis of
intolerance towards competing views (Skitka, 2010). A working definition of
political polarization, therefore, is the extent to which citizens become ideo-
logically entrenched in their own values and political beliefs, thereby increasing
the divide with citizens who hold different values and political beliefs. Political
polarization thus fuels a perception of society as a struggle between “us versus
them,” and may yield high levels of mutual conflict between ideologically
opposing groups (e.g., liberals versus conservatives in the US).
Political polarization can manifest itself in various ways. One example
is through political extremism, which refers to the extent to which people
polarize into, and strongly identify with, generic left-or right-wing ideological
outlooks on society (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019). While the term polit-
ical extremism often is used in reference to underground –and sometimes
violent –extremist groups, it is also commonly used in reference to regular
citizens who ideologically are at the edges of the political spectrum, and vote
accordingly (e.g., EU socialist parties at the political left, or anti-immigration
parties at the political right). Such preference for relatively radical political parties
may suggest that societies indeed are polarizing. As a case in point, throughout
the EU electoral support for relatively moderate left-wing parties (e.g., social
democrats) and moderate right-wing parties (e.g., Christian democrats) has
dropped in the past few decades, whereas support for relatively radical parties at
the left and right has increased (Krouwel, 2012).
A closely related, yet conceptually distinct, manifestation of political polar-
ization is populism. Populism is defined as a political mentality that construes
society as an ongoing struggle between “the corrupt elites” and “the noble
people” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). As such, populism is a form of political
polarization that portrays societal elites as the enemies of the people. Populism
has several underlying dimensions, notably anti-elitism (i.e., a perception of pol-
itical and societal elites as corrupt), people-centrism (i.e., a belief that the “will
of the people” should be the leading principle in political decision making), and
relatedly, anti-pluralism (the belief that only a populist worldview reflects the true
“will of the people,” implying that different opinions should not be tolerated;
Introduction 3
Müller, 2016). Populism occurs at both the left and right, and indeed, polit-
ical parties that are considered left- or right-extreme often also are considered
populist (Akkermans, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013).
A notable difference with political extremism, however, is that populism can
occur throughout the political spectrum, including in the center. For instance,
Italy’s five-star movement is widely considered a populist party yet is not clearly
left-wing or right-wing (e.g., it has relatively left-wing positions on income
equality and sustainability, yet relatively right-wing positions on immigration).
Moreover, various well-known politicians have articulated rhetoric consistent
with populist leadership, yet are not politically extreme (e.g., Silvio Berlusconi
in Italy, or Boris Johnson in the UK, who both are center-right but not far-right;
Van Prooijen, 2018; see also Müller, 2016, for other examples).
Besides such support for broad political movements, political polarization
may be reflected in increased levels of conflict between citizens on more specific
policy issues. For instance, many citizens do not believe the scientific evidence
that climate change is real or that humans are causing it, yielding conflict with
citizens or political parties that support regulations to reduce CO2 emissions
(see Chapter 9). Such climate change skepticism is robustly associated with a
conservative ideology in the US, although the link with ideology is less clear
in various other countries (Hornsey, Harris, & Fielding, 2018). Likewise, the
COVID-19 pandemic has not only sparked agreement to global lockdown pol-
icies to contain the virus, but it has also inspired resistance and protest among
citizens who oppose the lockdown policies. Such anti-lockdown sentiments are
associated with conspiracy beliefs (Marinthe, Brown, Delouvée, & Jolley, 2020),
a common predictor of political polarization (Krouwel, Kutiyski,Van Prooijen,
Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017). In sum, although political polarization can
take many forms, the common denominators are a strong conviction in one’s
own values and beliefs, and hostility towards those who are perceived to hold
different values and beliefs.
Why study political polarization?

While many good reasons may exist to study political polarization, here I will
elaborate on two important ones. A first reason is that political polarization is a
paradox that currently is insufficiently understood by scientists, policy makers,
and the general public. Specifically, a popular assumption is that political polar-
ization is rooted in negative emotions (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019) and
detrimental societal circumstances (Midlarsky, 2011).While these factors indeed
are important, the evidence also suggests a more complicated picture. During
the past decades many societies with high levels of wealth and well-being have
polarized; at the individual level, such polarization is not exclusive to citizens
who experience economic deprivation (see Chapter 6). This suggests that a
more fine-grained analysis of the many psychological factors that are associated
with political polarization is needed.
A second reason to study political polarization is that, in many ways, it has

a disruptive influence on society. A central aspect of political polarization is a
strong belief in the moral superiority of one’s own ideological beliefs, which
easily prompts the assumption that alternative ideological beliefs are morally
inferior (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019). This may stimulate intolerance of
people and social groups that have (or are assumed to have) different ideo-
logical beliefs. Moreover, political polarization stimulates overconfidence, and
leads people to reject scientific evidence that is incompatible with their ideo-
logical beliefs (e.g., about the reality of climate change, or the necessity to
adhere to social distancing regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic).
Below, I will elaborate in more detail on both of these reasons.
Political polarization is a paradox

Various theoretical perspectives have noted that political polarization is rooted
in negative feelings and emotions, that may emerge through negative social
experiences (e.g., McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2013; Van den Bos, 2018). For
instance, significance quest theory proposes that feelings of significance loss
are important to understand ideological extremism. This theory is based on
the argument that people have a desire for significance, that is, to matter and
be respected in the eyes of themselves or significant others (Kruglanski et al.,
2014). When people experience a loss of significance, however – for example
through humiliation, injustice, economic hardship, and so on – they seek to
restore a sense of significance, which may be achieved by supporting a mean-
ingful cause. Negative experiences that challenge people’s feelings of self-worth
therefore can make them committed to their ideological beliefs, causing polar-
ization. While significance quest theory was initially developed to explain vio-
lent terrorism, it may also explain political polarization among regular citizens
(Webber et al., 2018; see also Van Prooijen & Kuijper, 2020).
Many empirical studies have yielded results that are consistent with these
links between negative emotions, aversive social experiences, and political
polarization. Political extremism is related to negative emotions, including fear
(Van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015) and anger (Frimer, Brandt,
Melton, & Motyl, 2018). Likewise, feelings of self-uncertainty increase people’s
preference for radical leaders (Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010). A meta-
analysis suggests that manipulations of mortality salience may polarize both the
political left and right (Burke, Kosloff , & Landau, 2013). Also, perceptions of
unfairness (Van den Bos, 2018) and distressing societal circumstances (Midlarsky,
2011) have been associated with politically polarized beliefs.Taken together, the
evidence supports the theoretical link between feelings of distress and political
polarization.
There is a paradox in these insights, however, which pertains to a discrep-
ancy between citizens’ aversive subjective experiences versus their objective
life circumstances. Societies increasingly seem to be getting more polarized,
Introduction 5
yet by and large, citizens’ life circumstances have improved substantially over
the past decades. Contrary to the bleak rhetoric of politically radical leaders,
objective metrics suggest that on average citizens of modern societies actu-
ally are safer, richer, happier, and healthier than ever before. Even over the last
50 years people have a longer life expectancy, are less likely to suffer from pov-
erty, unemployment, or sickness, are less likely to be sent to war, are less likely to
be victimized in a crime, are more likely to own a house and car, and so on (e.g.,
Pinker, 2018; Rosling, 2018). Why do these prosperous and successful societies
offer such fertile ground to political polarization?
One possible explanation is that the benefits of globalization are not equally
distributed among citizens, and that particularly those who are “left behind”
cause the political polarization in modern societies. Indeed, a 2020 United
Nations report shows that income inequality is on the rise throughout the
world.1 Moreover, psychological research reveals that higher levels of inequality
in societies predict a preference for radical leadership (Sprong et al., 2019).
A closer look suggests, however, that also this explanation needs more specifi-
city. Political polarization occurs not only among relatively poor but also among
relatively wealthy citizens (see Chapter 6; Mols & Jetten, 2017). Moreover,
during the past few decades life circumstances have improved not only for
wealthy people but also for the poorer segments of most societies (Rosling,
2018). All of this suggests that the psychology of political polarization is a com-
plex phenomenon that cannot be traced back to a single cause.
Political polarization is a problem

Central in political polarization are opposing values, beliefs, and opinions,
which raises the question to what extent political polarization should be
considered a problem. After all, healthy-functioning democracies often benefit
from diverging opinions between citizens and political groups, and an open
debate about different possible solutions to societal problems. One might say
that different values and opinions are part and parcel of what democracy as a
political system is all about. Admittedly, political polarization can emerge in
various degrees, and there may be a gray area between a fierce yet constructive
discussion versus a harmful and polarized conflict. My point here is that there
is a difference between an open, mutually respectful, and constructive political
debate that is focused on solving societal problems, versus a polarized political
debate that is primarily focused on justifying one’s own beliefs or defeating
competing groups –if necessary at the expense of truth or progress. Here,
I briefly review evidence that (a) political polarization implies excessive con-
fidence in the correctness of one’s views, which may lead to overconfidence
in decision making; (b) political polarization is associated with an intolerant
mindset where alternative viewpoints are seen as immoral; and (c) political
polarization enhances a motivated reasoning process, leading people to reject
scientific knowledge that is incompatible with their ideological beliefs.
Overconfidence
As political polarization implies that people are ideologically entrenched in
their beliefs, it stands to reason that it is associated with high levels of belief
confidence. Consistent with this notion, in the US both the left and right
extremes consider their own beliefs as superior –that is, as more correct than
other viewpoints –on various specific policy issues (e.g., health care; illegal
immigration; taxes; Toner, Leary, Asher, & Jongman- Sereno, 2013). Also in
non-political estimation tasks political polarization is associated with increased
judgmental confidence (Brandt, Evans, & Crawford, 2015). Moreover, politic-
ally extreme beliefs are more stable over time than politically moderate beliefs.
Over the course of an election campaign, people at the edges of the political
spectrum displayed less variation in their self-reported political ideology than
moderates, suggesting that their convictions were less sensitive to social influ-
ence (Zwicker,Van Prooijen, & Krouwel, 2020).
High confidence in one’s own beliefs can be warranted, however, and
therefore does not necessarily imply overconfidence. If experts (e.g., psych-
ology professors; medical doctors) feel confident that they know more about
their specific domain of expertise than lay people, usually they are making a
warranted judgment. Likewise, political party elites with high levels of polit-
ical knowledge (“ideologues”) also have high confidence in their own beliefs
(Converse, 1964). One might question, however, how warranted the belief con-
fidence is of regular citizens who support relatively radical political movements.
Correctly understanding reality implies appreciating the many complexities
that are inherent to most societal problems, and to political decision making.
Political polarization is associated with a tendency to cognitively simplify such
complexities, however (Lammers, Koch, Conway, & Brandt, 2017). This makes
it likely that the high levels of confidence among political radicals frequently is
overconfidence.
An illustration of such overconfidence can be found in a study that took
place during the 2016 EU refugee crisis (Van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Emmer,
2018). Left-versus right- wing citizens endorsed diametrically different
solutions for this geopolitical problem, with the political left being more likely
to support inclusion of refugees in society, and the political right more likely to
support rejecting refugees at the border. The left and right extremes converged
in a belief that the solution to this problem was simple, however. Moreover, as
compared to moderates, extremists had higher confidence in their responses on
a test assessing their factual knowledge of the refugee crisis. This higher belief
confidence did not translate into more factually correct answers, suggesting
overconfidence. Moreover, their belief in simple solutions for the refugee
crisis mediated the link between political extremism and judgmental confi-
dence. Apparently, the political extremes were overconfident in their judgments
because this geopolitical problem looked simple to them.
Introduction 7
Findings in other settings also suggest that radical political beliefs are
associated with increased confidence yet not with increased factual know-
ledge. One study took place during a Dutch referendum with a clear pro-
establishment and a more radical anti- establishment (i.e., anti- EU) voting
option. Anti-establishment voting was associated with increased self-perceived
understanding of the referendum, but this self-perceived understanding did not
translate into more factual knowledge: in fact, anti-establishment voters scored
worse on a factual knowledge test of the referendum than pro-establishment
voters. In addition, anti-establishment voters were more likely to overclaim
non-political knowledge, as reflected in the extent to which they claimed to
recognize stimuli that they actually saw for the first time (Van Prooijen &
Krouwel, 2020). These insights point at a potential risk of political polariza-
tion: The excessive confidence that politically polarized citizens display often is
overconfidence, which may decrease the quality of decision making.
Intolerance
The link between political polarization and overconfidence emerges from the
conviction that one’s own beliefs are factually correct. An additional aspect of
political polarization, however, is that they are moralized judgments. The high
levels of belief superiority associated with political polarization therefore may
imply a perception of one’s own values as morally superior. Such moral abso-
lutism is a likely source of conflict in society, as strong moral convictions stimu-
late intolerance towards people who do not share these convictions (Skitka,
2010). Accordingly, dogmatic intolerance –defined as a tendency to reject,
and consider as inferior, any ideological belief that differs from one’s own –is
stronger at the political extremes than in the political center (Rollwage, Doling,
& Fleming, 2018; Van Prooijen & Kuijper, 2020). Such dogmatic intolerance
is associated with willingness to protest, denial of free speech to people with
different views, and support for antisocial behavior as a means to reach ideo-
logical goals (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017).
While dogmatic intolerance pertains to people’s (lack of) acceptance of
incompatible beliefs, political polarization also may stimulate intolerance of
entire societal subgroups. According to the ideological conflict hypothesis,
people are prejudiced about groups that they assume to have different values
than themselves (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014).
Research designed to test this hypothesis has revealed that the high levels of
prejudice commonly observed at the political right towards a range of soci-
etal subgroups (e.g., Muslims; ethnic minorities; feminists) is associated with
the belief that these groups largely vote left-wing. This line of research also
has revealed high levels of prejudice at the political left, however, specifically
towards societal groups commonly assumed to vote right-wing (e.g., Christians;
business people; the military; for an overview, see Brandt et al., 2014). Consistent
with these insights, the political extremes derogate a larger number of soci-
etal subgroups than political moderates (Van Prooijen et al., 2015) and dis-
play relatively high levels of parochial altruism, that is, a willingness to sacrifice
their self-interest for the benefit of their group, if necessary by hurting people
from different groups (Van Prooijen & Kuijper, 2020). Taken together, these
findings are consistent with the assumption that political polarization is related
to intolerance, both towards people with different beliefs and to people who
belong to different groups.
Motivated reasoning
A basic human motivation is to have a coherently organized worldview where
people’s values, beliefs, and actions converge with their factual knowledge about
the world (Festinger, 1957). It is inevitable, however, that people regularly come
across scientific information that challenges this worldview. For instance, people
who believe that COVID-19 is “just a flu” are likely to encounter scientific evi-
dence indicating that the coronavirus is far more dangerous to humans than a
seasonal flu virus. People can resolve such discrepancies in various ways, which
may include updating their original beliefs (e.g., people accept that COVID-19
is different from, and more dangerous than, flu) or rejecting the scientific evi-
dence (e.g., people embrace beliefs such as that scientists are mistaken, that
science is “just an opinion,” or that scientists conspired with powerful interest
groups to rig the evidence).What determines whether people update their pre-
existing beliefs or reject scientific evidence when faced with such discrepant
information?
It is likely that the more strongly people are ideologically entrenched in their
beliefs, the less willing they are to change those beliefs when faced with new
information. Indeed, political polarization is empirically associated with cog-
nitive inflexibility (Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2020). Such a decreased
willingness or ability to update beliefs when faced with incompatible infor-
mation increases the probability that people accept unscientific or otherwise
implausible statements as true. For instance, people may misperceive the sci-
entific consensus about a range of topics as consistent with their values (e.g.,
about the reality of anthropogenic climate change; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, &
Braman, 2011), or deny ideologically inconvenient scientific findings altogether
(Washburn & Skitka, 2017). Additionally, people may embrace conspiracy
theories that support their values and further polarize society. The stronger
people identify as Republican, the more likely they are to believe theories
that Democrats are conspiring, and vice versa (Miller, Saunders, & Farhart,
2016; Uscinski, Klofstad, & Atkinson, 2016). Such intergroup conspiracy the-
ories can also polarize international relationships: during the 2019 trade war,
US and Chinese citizens both endorsed beliefs that the opposing country was
conspiring against them (although these intergroup conspiracy theories were
stronger in Chinese than US samples; see Van Prooijen & Song, 2020).
Introduction 9
This tendency to reject science and accept conspiracy theories is rooted in

a motivated reasoning process where people selectively search for evidence
to support their beliefs, or initiate a committed search for flaws or malprac-
tice if confronted with evidence contrary to their beliefs (Miller et al., 2016).
The current digital era provides unprecedented opportunities to validate one’s
pre-existing beliefs and reject scientific evidence –in fact, many professionally
designed websites are dedicated to support false claims such as that the Earth
is flat, that vaccines cause autism, or that climate change is a hoax. It is hence
relatively easy to find some support for almost any claim, including those not
supported by scientific evidence. As people hold lower evidentiary standards for
preferred as opposed to unpreferred conclusions, they are capable of justifying
almost any ideological belief (Epley & Gilovich, 2016). In sum, political polar-
ization increases the likelihood that people rigidly cling to their original beliefs
when faced with contradictory scientific information, decreasing the likelihood
of evidence-based decision making, and further polarizing society.
Overview of the book
To examine the psychology of political polarization, what follows are eight
chapters that were contributed by political psychologists with substantial
expertise on these issues.The book is organized in two sections, each containing
four chapters. The first section (Chapters 2–5) focuses on underlying psycho-
logical processes: how do the emotional, cognitive, and motivational factors
that mostly take place within people’s minds contribute to political polariza-
tion? In Chapter 2, Christopher M. Federico focuses on how psychological
needs for security and certainty are related to political polarization. The author
discusses evidence for the idea that the extent to which these needs polarize
political beliefs depends on how engaged people are with the political system,
and how well they understand and care about the different options that are
provided by political elites. In Chapter 3, Alain Van Hiel, Jasper Van Assche, and
Tessa Haesevoets examine the political mindset of citizens who support radical
and populist movements. They argue that this mindset is characterized by pol-
itical cynicism, which may be a better framework than polarization to under-
stand these citizens. At the end of the chapter these authors provide evidence
that populism and cynicism indeed are closely related concepts, and offer prac-
tical suggestions for moderate parties to regain the trust of voters.
In Chapter 4, Laura Kinsman and Jeremy A. Frimer provide a psycho-
logical profile of extreme Trump supporters.These authors review evidence for
three common explanations for Trump support, notably tribal loyalties (which
includes prejudice, ingroup favoritism, and bloodlust –that is, an aggressive
desire for attacks on perceived enemies), selective media exposure, and material
self-interest. While they find some evidence for each of these, the evidence
is relatively weaker for explanations associated with tribalism, and stronger
for selective media exposure and material self-interest. Finally, in Chapter 5,
Chadly Stern examines the influence of people’s fundamental motivation

to form social relationships on political polarization. The author specific-
ally argues that conservatives and liberals prioritize different relational goals,
with conservatives particularly valuing social connection and liberals particu-
larly valuing uniqueness. The chapter then describes the implications for both
perceived and actual attitude similarity with others, how these different rela-
tional goals polarize both conservatives and liberals, and how they may inform
strategies to depolarize society.
The second section of the book focuses on the social context of political
polarization: how do social networks, social influence processes, and societal
developments contribute to polarization? In Chapter 6, Jolanda Jetten and
Frank Mols address the notion that economic deprivation as an explanation for
the rise of populism is incomplete, and propose two additional explanations.
Specifically, rapid cultural changes (the cultural backlash thesis) and fear
among relatively wealthy voters of losing their privileged position in society
(status anxiety and the wealth paradox) also contribute to support for popu-
list movements. These factors help to explain the appeal of populism among
both the poorer and richer segments of society. In Chapter 7, Lucian Gideon
Conway, III, Shannon C. Houck, Linus Chan, Meredith A. Repke, and James
D. McFarland propose that, while pressures for agreement often succeed in
creating short-term agreement, they simultaneously cause division –and hence
polarization –in the long term. At the root of this “agreement paradox” are two
processes, namely reactance (i.e., when people feel forced to agree they seek
to reestablish their freedom through a desire to resist pressure or change their
attitudes) and informational contamination (i.e., people discount the value of
expressed agreement, as they see it as a result of the pressure to agree). The
authors then present evidence that authoritarianism is associated with increased
susceptibility to the agreement paradox, and discuss practical implications for
how to build lasting consensus about divisive issues.
In Chapter 8, Marlon Mooijman focuses on the role of moral convergence
in social networks: how does exposure to others’ moral norms shape political
polarization? This author shows that perceiving converging moral norms within
social networks (as often happens in online “echo chambers”) increases people’s
perceived power to strive for political change, which in turn increases the likeli-
hood that protests turn violent. Perceiving moral diversity, in contrast, decreases
the likelihood of violence and increases non-violent protest norms. In the final
chapter, Chapter 9, Jacob B. Rode and Peter H. Ditto focus on political polar-
ization in the context of climate change, and review a range of interventions
designed to increase citizens’ belief in climate change and support for climate
change policy. Most of these interventions show limited effectiveness, although
a few of them have some promise (i.e., interventions that connect a Republican
source to climate change policies, that focus on free-market benefits of climate
change solutions, and that focus on local effects of climate change). Even so,
Introduction 11
results are mixed, and underscore the strength of people’s ideological resistance
to accept the reality of anthropogenic climate change.
Political polarization occurs in many societies around the world. Given
its impact on people’s lives, domestic policy, and international relations, it is
important to have an evidence-based understanding of this phenomenon.There
is not one single cause of political polarization, however, and it is unlikely that
there is one single solution for it. The present book aims to offer a piece to this
puzzle by examining the underlying psychological processes of polarization,
and the social context in which political polarization transpires. By establishing
these micro-and meso-level processes that shape political polarization among
regular citizens, psychology may contribute to meaningful interventions
designed to depolarize societies.
Note
1 See the UNDESA World Social Report 2020: www.un.org/development/desa/
dspd/world-social-report/2020-2.html
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Section 1
Underlying processes of
political polarization
Chapter 2
When do psychological differences

predict political differences?
Engagement and the psychological bases of
political polarization
Christopher M. Federico
With the rise of sharp partisan and ideological divides in both the United States
and other nations, social scientists have labored to make sense of why we seem
further apart than before. In this vein, a sizable body of research has focused on
the role of political parties and the “elites” who lead them. According to these
accounts, citizens have diverged from one another in their political attitudes
and in their feelings toward their opponents as leaders of different political
parties have drifted apart from one another in their ideological viewpoints
(Abramowitz, 2010; Levendusky, 2009) and as parties have diverged in terms
of the groups they attract (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Mason, 2018). These
perspectives suggest a top-down process of polarization: citizens begin to drift
apart from one another in their attitudes and in their feelings toward political
opponents when political “elites” model more extreme ideological positions
and appear to represent more ideologically opposed social groups (Johnston,
Lavine, & Federico, 2017; see also Zaller, 1992).
However, research also suggests that polarized political opinions may have
deep psychological roots. As an influential line of research in personality and
social psychology indicates, political differences can reliably be predicted from
psychological differences in a bottom-up fashion. Individuals with varying per-
sonality traits, needs, and motives tend to adopt different political preferences
(Federico & Malka, 2018; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2011; Hibbing,
Smith, & Alford, 2014; Jost, 2017; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Jost, Sulloway,
Glaser, & Kruglanski, 2003; Mondak, 2010). In particular, those who are
dispositionally inclined to seek certainty and security are more likely to lean
to the right, whereas those who are more comfortable with uncertainty, ambi-
guity, and risk lean to the left (Jost et al., 2003, 2009; Jost, Federico, & Napier,
2013). These findings imply that polarization at the mass level is not merely
a byproduct of elite divisions; rather, it reflects fundamental variation among
human beings in basic psychological motivations (Jost et al., 2003; see also
Hibbing et al., 2014).
These two perspectives on political polarization have unfolded on largely
parallel tracks, without speaking too extensively to one another. In part, this
18 Christopher M. Federico
is due to their roots in different disciplines: the top-down perspective has its

origins in political science, whereas the bottom-up perspective comes out of
personality and social psychology (for reviews, see Federico & Malka, 2018;
Johnston et al., 2017). Though the accounts of polarization offered by political
scientists and psychologists are sometimes presented as antagonistic in their
implications (e.g., Jost, 2006, 2017), they need not be. In this chapter, I review
research aimed at integrating the top-down and bottom-up accounts of pol-
itical differences in mass publics in an effort to develop a hybrid perspective
on the bases of political polarization. Like the bottom-up psychological approach,
the model I present argues that people are systematically attracted to different
positions on the basis of individual differences in needs for security and cer-
tainty. However, like the top-down approach, it also contends that the tendency
for those with different psychological dispositions to adopt polarized political
preferences depends on exposure to elite political signals that provide informa-
tion about the content and meaning of different ideological, partisan, and issue
orientations—exposure which is likely to be more pronounced among polit-
ically engaged citizens (Federico & Malka, 2018; Morgan & Wisneski, 2017).
In the sections that follow, I briefly review current research on the psycho-
logical bases of political preferences, and then provide an overview of how the
bottom-up perspective on the roots of political attitudes might be incorporated
into a broader model of mass belief systems. Next, I review research providing
evidence for various aspects of the above model. Most importantly, this research
finds that individuals with different psychological dispositions are more likely
to adopt polarized partisan and ideological identities if they are attentive to
elite discourse that provides cues about how well different parties and ideolo-
gies symbolically mesh with their core motivations. In turn, the moderating
effect of political engagement on the relationship between need for security
and certainty and partisan and ideological identities leads to relatively complex
linkages between the psychological and the political in some issue domains.
Specifically, in the realm of economic preferences, individuals low and high in
needs for security and certainty polarize in opposite directions depending on
whether they are politically engaged enough to sort into conservative ideo-
logical and partisan identities and follow elite cues suggesting that free-market
positions are normatively appropriate for those who identify with the right.
The psychological bases of political differences

Modern inquiry into the dispositional origins of political differences has a storied
history in the social and behavioral sciences. For example, Max Weber (drawing
on Johann Wolfgang von Goethe) famously discussed the notion of “elective
affinities,” or patterns of linkage between types of ideas and types of people
(Weber, 1948; see also Gerth & Mills, 1953; Jost et al., 2009; Lasswell, 1948).
Later, systematic empirical research on how various traits correlate with polit-
ical preferences took off after World War II as modern quantitative personality
Psychological and political differences 19
psychology developed (Adorno, Frenkel- Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford,

1950; Allport, 1954; Eysenck, 1954; Rokeach, 1960; Tomkins, 1963; Wilson,
1973; see also Lipset, 1960; McClosky, 1958, for similar conceptualizations in
political science). Interest in the topic has waxed and waned over the decades,
but a series of literature reviews (both narrative and quantitative) by social
psychologist John Jost and his colleagues starting in the 2000s reinvigorated
work in this area (e.g., Jost et al., 2003; see also Jost et al., 2009, 2013). This
renaissance has reverberated in other disciplines as well (see Federico & Malka,
2018; Gerber et al., 2011; Hibbing et al., 2014; Mondak, 2010).
As noted previously, much of this new body of research has focused on indi-
vidual variation in traits, needs, and motives pertaining to “existential needs to
maintain safety and security and to minimize danger and threat” and “epistemic
needs to attain certainty, order, and structure” (Jost et al., 2013, p. 236). Though
there are other clusters of individual differences that predict political attitudes
and beliefs (such as those related to competitiveness; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt
& Sibley, 2010), these “needs for security and certainty” have emerged as the
prime focus of most contemporary theorizing and research on the dispositional
foundations of political orientations (Johnston et al., 2017; Jost, 2017). Though
this literature is voluminous, its overall conclusion is simple: strong (versus
weak) needs for security and certainty are associated with greater conservatism
(versus liberalism). Federico and Malka (2018) characterize the core message
as such:
individuals with strong needs to reduce insecurity and minimize uncer-

tainty are said to be attracted to the political right and its emphases on sta-
bility and hierarchy, whereas those who are more tolerant of insecurity and
uncertainty are said to gravitate toward the left and its openness.
(p. 6)
On the psychological side of the equation, researchers have focused on a

number of specific variables reflecting differences in existential and epistemic
needs. An exhaustive listing of these variables is beyond the scope of this chapter
(see Federico & Malka, 2018; and Jost, 2017, for recent reviews), but a few
core constructs that predict more right-leaning (versus left-leaning) preferences
are worth highlighting. These include authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950;
Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013; Stenner, 2005), a
tendency to value deference to group authority and conventional ingroup
norms (Federico, Fisher, & Deason, 2011; Federico, Hunt, & Ergun, 2009;
Feldman, 2003; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Jost et al., 2009); the need for cog-
nitive closure (Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kruglanski, Pierro,
Mannetti, & DeGrada, 2006), a tendency to avoid uncertainty by “seizing”
more strongly on available information to reach conclusions about the world
and by “freezing” on those conclusions even when faced with new information
(Federico, Deason, & Fisher, 2012; Federico & Goren, 2009; Jost et al., 2003,
2008, 2009; Kemmelmeier, 1997; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004; Van
Hiel et al., 2010); high conscientiousness and low openness to experience in the con-
text of the Big Five model of personality (e.g., Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter,
2008; Gerber et al., 2010, 2011; McCrae, 1996; Mondak, 2010); a preference
for conservation values (i.e., tradition, conformity, and security) over a function-
ally opposed set of openness values (i.e., stimulation and self-direction; Caprara,
Schwartz, Capanna,Vechionne, & Barbaranelli, 2006; Goren, 2012; Malka, Soto,
Inzlicht, & Lelkes, 2014; Schwartz, 1992, 2007; Thorisdottir et al., 2007); and a
tendency to prioritize binding moral concerns linked to ingroup loyalty, respect
for authority, and the maintenance of moral purity, all of which reflect a desire
for the security and certainty provided by strong social ties (Graham, Haidt, &
Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2012; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012).
Thus, across a variety of variables, those with differing existential and epi-
stemic orientations tend to polarize in their political preferences: stronger needs
for security and certainty are reliably associated with right-leaning orientations,
whereas weaker needs for security and certainty are associated with left-leaning
ones. This point is reinforced by recent meta-analyses of this literature (Jost,
2017). With respect to existential concerns, Jost, Stern, Rule, and Sterling
(2017b) examined data from 134 studies including 369,525 participants and
found “small-to-moderate” relationships between variables linked to the sali-
ence of fear and threat and support for right-wing policies, parties, and leaders.
With respect to epistemic concerns, Jost, Sterling, and Stern (2017a) aggregated
results from 181 samples including 133,796 participants and observed signifi-
cant relationships between needs for structure and order, need for closure,
intolerance of ambiguity, rigidity, and dogmatic and right-wing preferences
and between integrative complexity, analytic thinking, need for cognition, and
uncertainty tolerance and liberal preferences.
Though the tendency for those with varying needs for security and cer-
tainty to adopt politically polarized preferences is robust, it is also subject to
important boundary conditions. One of these pertains to whether needs for
security and certainty are conceptualized in subjective or objective terms. Though
the findings reviewed above suggest a general tendency for needs for security
and certainty—which reflect a kind of psychological “rigidity”—to go with
the politics of the right, Van Hiel, Onraet, and DePauw (2010) and Van Hiel,
Onraet, Crowson, and Roets (2016) find that “objective” behavioral measures
of intolerance of ambiguity and rigidity that assess participants’ ability to
perform cognitive operations requiring flexibility and attention to multiple,
inter-related aspects of a problem are more weakly related to conservatism
than “subjective” self-report measures that explicitly ask participants to indi-
cate how well various statements describe them (e.g., “I enjoy having a clear
and structured mode of life”; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Reinforcing this,
recent studies have failed to replicate earlier results (e.g., Oxley et al., 2008)
indicating a correlation between political preferences and strong physiological
responses to objective tasks in which participants are exposed to threatening
stimuli (Bakker, Schumacher, Gothreau, & Arceneaux, 2020; Osmundsen et al.,

2020; Smith & Warren, 2020).
A second boundary condition involves political issue domain. In this vein, a
good deal of research suggests that social attitudes (i.e., those related to mor-
ality and culture) and economic attitudes (i.e., those related to redistribution,
the role of government, and so on) represent empirically distinct and variably
correlated dimensions of citizens’ political preferences (Carmines, Ensley, &
Wagner, 2012; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Evans, Heath, & Lalljee, 1996; Feldman
& Johnston, 2014; Fleishman, 1988; Knoke, 1979; Malka, Lelkes, & Soto, 2019;
Shafer & Claggett, 1995; Treier & Hillygus, 2009; see also Braithwaite, 1997;
Duckitt, 2001; Schwartz, 1992; Stangor & Leary, 2006). In general, psycho-
logically different individuals are more likely to polarize on social issues
than on economic ones: needs for security and certainty more strongly and
consistently predict right-wing preferences in the social domain than the
economic domain (Federico, Johnston, & Lavine, 2014; Federico & Malka,
2018; Johnston et al., 2017; Malka & Soto, 2015). This asymmetry appears
with respect to numerous variables tapping existential and epistemic needs,
including authoritarianism (e.g., Cizmar et al., 2014; Federico et al., 2011;
Feldman & Johnston, 2014), need for closure (e.g., Chirumbolo, Areni, &
Sensales, 2004; Federico, Ergun, & Hunt, 2014; Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003;
Van Hiel et al., 2004; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2016), and support for conservation
versus openness values (e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Duriez, Van Hiel, & Kossowska,
2005; Malka et al., 2014).1 However, as research I review below suggests, the
apparent weakness of the relationship between these variables and economic
preferences may be misleading. Rather than being completely unrelated
to economic preferences, needs for security and certainty may be related to
them in opposite directions among different subsets of the electorate due to
distinct processes of polarized opinion formation among those low and high
in political engagement.
How (and when) do psychological differences predict

political differences?
Connecting needs, traits, and motives with belief systems
While the bottom-up dispositional approach pioneered by psychologists has shed
important light on the nature of political differences, one of its shortcomings
is that it relies on a relatively simple model of how “elective affinities” connect
needs, traits, and motives with political positions. It tends to assume that the
symbolic meanings of different political identities and positions are intuitively
comprehensible enough to most people to “resonate” with their underlying
psychological dispositions and elicit an attraction (e.g., Jost et al., 2003). In
doing so, the bottom-up approach has little to say about the social and insti-
tutional contexts in which the meanings of different political orientations are
constructed, leaving the dominant psychological model of political differences

somewhat under-specified.
The perspective my colleagues and I have developed attempts to remedy
this situation by integrating the bottom-up approach with key elements of the
top-down model of polarized opinion formation mentioned at the beginning
of this chapter. This perspective starts from the core premise that “ideologies
are not facts of nature” (Federico & Malka, 2018, p. 23). The assorted ideo-
logical belief systems—left versus right, liberal versus conservative—available to
individuals in different political contexts do not exist merely as a function of
inherent logical coherence (Converse, 1964). They are discursively assembled.
In this regard, the packages of beliefs, values, and stances that comprise different
ideologies are constructed disproportionately by a small group of political
elites—namely, party leaders, elected officials, and pundits (Campbell, Converse,
Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017; Zaller, 1992; see also Noel,
2013). In other words, elites play the dominant role in putting together the
“menu” of options available to voters (Sniderman & Bullock, 2004). Even more
importantly, not all members of the mass public learn what sets of beliefs, values,
and attitudes make up different ideologies or what it means to be a “liberal,”
a “conservative,” a “socialist,” and so on. This information is most likely to be
picked by citizens who are relatively high in political engagement, i.e., polit-
ical interest and knowledge (Converse, 1964; Federico, 2015; Kalmoe, 2020;
Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991). Given that a sizable segment of the popu-
lation is relatively low in political engagement (Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini
& Keeter, 1996; Kinder, 1998) and not overly concerned about what their pol-
itical attitudes and beliefs say about them (Johnston et al., 2017; Kahan, 2015),
many individuals may not be immersed enough in politics for different political
positions to meaningfully resonate with their basic needs, traits, and motives.
These findings imply that citizens in the mass public are more likely to
polarize when elites from different parties ideologically diverge from one
another and when they are engaged enough to see this divergence (Lelkes,
2016, 2018). With respect to elite differences, research suggests that elites (e.g.,
members of Congress) have ideologically polarized in recent decades (McCarty,
Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006; see also Layman et al., 2010) and that individuals
who believe that leaders of competing parties are more ideologically far apart
are more likely to be ideologically “sorted”—i.e., to hold ideological iden-
tities that match their partisan identities (e.g., identifying as liberal if one is
Democrat; Abramowitz, 2010; Levendusky, 2009). With respect to engagement,
research suggests that engaged citizens are more likely to be “polarized” in
various ways. For example, citizens with different partisan and ideological iden-
tities are more likely to adopt the divergent issue positions that go along with
those identities when they are more engaged (Abramowitz, 2010; Baldassari &
Gelman, 2008; Layman & Carsey, 2002; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Sniderman
& Bullock, 2004; Zaller, 1992). Moreover, partisans who are relatively high in
engagement are also more likely to adopt ideological labels that match their
partisan identities (Abramowitz, 2010; Levendusky, 2009). Finally, citizens are

more likely to evaluate the out-party more negatively than the in-party if they
are more engaged (e.g., Lelkes, 2018).
The hybrid approach my colleagues and I have taken argues that polit-
ical engagement should have similar consequences for whether citizens with
different psychological dispositions adopt different political preferences. In
addition to knowing and caring more about “what goes with what” in pol-
itical terms, the highly engaged should also be more aware of how well the
content and symbolic meaning of different political identities and positions
align with whatever traits, needs, or motives they possess (Federico et al., 2014;
Federico & Malka, 2018). For example, while the preservation of traditional,
established institutions promised by conservative political parties may poten-
tially be attractive to individuals who are high in authoritarianism or need
for closure, only those who are engaged enough to receive elite signals about
which party is more conservative or what it means to be “conservative” will
sort into the correct ideological and partisan identities.
This argument leads to a core hypothesis: individuals who are low and high
in needs for security and certainty should polarize in their political preferences
to the extent that they are engaged enough to understand and care about the
differences between available political options. Put another way, different pol-
itical positions should resonate more strongly with citizens’ underlying psy-
chological motivations when the meaning and implications of those positions
for their motives are clear. In the sections that follow, I review the research my
collaborators and I have conducted in an effort to test this hypothesis.
Engagement and the psychological bases of partisan

and ideological differences
Perhaps the most important political preferences adopted by citizens are parti-
sanship and ideology (Campbell et al., 1960; Goren, 2012; Malka & Lelkes, 2010,
Zaller, 1992). These “symbolic predispositions” can be thought of as broad
social identifications, either with a party coalition that organizes to seek office
or with an abstract ideological grouping (Campbell et al., 1960; Sears, 1993;
see also Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Mason, 2018). If the approach outlined above
is correct, then the politically engaged should be more aware of how different
parties and ideologies thematically differ from one another and how well the
priorities of each aligns with basic needs, traits, and motives.
But which of the themes associated with various parties and ideologies are
needs for security and certainty likely to key in on? Party platforms and ideo-
logical frameworks incorporate concerns across a variety of political domains,
including social and cultural issues and economic concerns (Carsey & Layman,
2002; Malka et al., 2019). In this regard, recall that needs for security and cer-
tainty are more predictive of preferences in the social domain than the economic
domain. Debates about whether to preserve or depart from traditional values
and practices or how much diversity in culture and belief is desirable are more
likely to divide those with different existential and epistemic needs (Feldman
& Johnston, 2014; Johnston et al., 2017). In general, partisan and ideological
groupings in the United States and Western Europe are clearly differentiated
along this social axis; the right and parties of the right favor tradition and tighter
cultural norms, whereas the left and parties of the left are more open to change
and normative diversity (Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009;
Kitschelt et al., 2010). To the extent that the engaged are more aware of these
distinctions between political-menu options, then we should find that engaged
citizens are more polarized in their partisan and ideological identifications as a
function of differences in needs for security and certainty.
With respect to partisanship, work by my colleagues and I provides ample
evidence for this prediction. For example, Federico and Reifen-Tagar (2014)
examined the relationship between authoritarianism and party identification
in the 2004 and 2008 American National Election Studies. We found that
respondents low and high in authoritarianism were more likely to diverge in
their partisan identifications when they were higher in educational attainment
(a variable linked to political awareness; Sniderman et al., 1991). Among
those with greater education, low authoritarians were more Democratic and
high authoritarians were more Republican. Similarly, Johnston, Lavine, and
Federico (2017) found that the tendency for those low in authoritarianism
to identify with the Democratic Party and those high in authoritarianism
to identify with the Republican Party was stronger among individuals who
scored higher on a composite measure of political engagement (reflecting both
knowledge and interest) in the 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 American National
Election Studies.
Parallel results emerge for other psychological variables. Johnston, Lavine, and
Federico (2017) also examined the moderating effects of engagement on the
relationship between other existential and epistemic variables and partisanship
in multiple representative samples of American adults. In their data, individ-
uals differing in need for closure, endorsement of conservation values (versus
openness values) and binding moral concerns, and the openness to experience
and conscientious dimensions of the Big Five were more likely to polarize in
their partisan preferences when they were high in engagement. Among the
more engaged, those high in need for closure, conservation values, binding
morality, and conscientiousness were more likely to gravitate toward the GOP,
whereas those low on these dimensions were more likely to identify with the
Democratic Party. In contrast, those low in openness were more Republican
and those high in openness were more Democratic at the upper end of the
engagement spectrum.
With respect to ideological self- placement, engagement has analogous
polarizing effects. For instance, Federico, Fisher, and Deason (2011) and
Johnston, Lavine, and Federico (2017) found that the relationship between
authoritarianism and ideology was stronger among those higher in political

knowledge and interest. Among the highly engaged, those high in authori-
tarianism were more likely to adopt the conservative label and those low in
authoritarianism were more likely to state that they were liberal. As before, these
patterns extend to other variables related to existential and epistemic needs. In
a sample of students, Federico, Ergun, and Hunt (2009) found that individuals
who differed on a key existential dimension—whether they believed the world
to be a dangerous place (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010)—diverged more in their ideo-
logical identifications among those who were higher (versus lower) in political
knowledge. At high knowledge, those who saw the world as a relatively safe
place were more liberal, whereas those who saw the world as more perilous
indicated more conservative identifications; these differences were more muted
among those low in knowledge. Federico and Goren (2009) found a similar
pattern with respect to the relationship between need for closure and ideology
among individuals low and high in political engagement (see Johnston et al.,
2017, for similar results). Finally, echoing their results for partisanship, Johnston,
Lavine, and Federico (2017) found that respondents who differed in their
support for conservation (versus openness) values and binding moral concerns
and on the openness to experience and conscientiousness trait dimensions were
more likely to diverge from one another in ideological self-placement among
those who were higher (versus lower) in knowledge and interest.
Importantly, these findings have been replicated by other researchers and in
contexts other than the United States. For example, Malka, Soto, Inzlicht, and
Lelkes (2014) used data from the 2005–2008 World Values Survey (including
respondents from 51 nations) to examine the relationship between a prefer-
ence for conservation (over openness) values and identification with the pol-
itical right. Among those higher in political interest, the relationship between
endorsement of conservation values over openness values and identifica-
tion with the right was stronger; engaged respondents with different value
orientations were more likely to be ideologically polarized. Similarly, Osborne
and Sibley (2012; see also Osborne & Sibley, 2015) uncovered a similar pattern
of polarization with respect to personality traits in representative samples of
adults in the United States and New Zealand. In particular, in their American
sample, they found that individuals differing in openness to experience and
conscientiousness were more likely to differ in partisanship and ideology when
they were high (versus low) in political knowledge.
In sum, consistent with the hybrid approach to the link between psychology
and politics that I describe in this chapter, there is considerable evidence that
individuals differing in existential and epistemic needs are more polarized in
partisanship and ideology at higher levels of political engagement. The pattern
obtains across multiple operationalizations of needs for security and certainty
in numerous datasets, and it also replicates across national political contexts and
research groups.
Engagement and the psychological bases of

issue-a ttitude formation
As central as identities like partisanship and ideology are, political differences
do not end there. Citizens also differ in their attitudes toward specific issues.
A key finding of research on political belief systems is that engagement leads
those with different partisan and ideological identities to adopt different issue
positions as well (Zaller, 1992). This is because engaged citizens are more able
and willing to take cues from partisan and ideological opinion leaders about
what positions “go with” their political identities (Converse, 1964). If the logic
outlined previously holds, then engagement may also lead individuals differing
in needs for security and certainty to diverge more in their issue positions—in
part because it should lead them to be more effectively sorted into parties and
ideologies holding divergent issue positions.
In analyses that collapse across a number of specific issue domains, my
colleague Pierce Ekstrom and I have found support for this prediction (Federico
& Ekstrom, 2018). Specifically, in a large, representative sample of US adults, we
found that respondents low and high in need for closure diverged more in
the relative liberalism versus conservatism of their issue positions when they
were higher in political knowledge. Among the well informed, low-need-for-
closure respondents took more liberal issue positions and high-need-for-closure
respondents took more conservative positions.
However, there is good reason to believe that this dynamic may not be con-
sistent across issue domains. As noted above, research suggests that needs for
security and certainty are more weakly related to opinions in the economic
domain (Federico & Malka, 2018). A likely reason for this is that economic
issues are “hard” compared to social issues—i.e., they involve relatively complex
judgments about sometimes-technical matters (Carmines & Stimson, 1980).
To the extent that they acquire a symbolic meaning that is capable of reson-
ating with underlying psychological needs, it comes from how political elites
thematically tie economic issues to a broader ideological or partisan agenda
(Johnston et al., 2017). This is only likely to occur among individuals who are
highly engaged and who have learned from political elites that free-market
positions go with a “conservative,” status-quo orientation and that support for
redistribution and a stronger government hand in economic life is a “liberal”
position that challenges the status quo in the name of greater social justice
(Federico et al. 2014). But what about those who are not politically engaged?
Absent elite signals defining more left-wing economic positions as a symbolic
challenge to the status quo or to “traditional” norms about economic life, gov-
ernment intervention aimed at restraining exploitative economic behavior and
providing a safety net may be seen as an instrumental means of reducing inse-
curity, uncertainty, and risk. Among these individuals, we might expect the
relationship between needs for security and certainty to reverse, such that those
high in needs for security and certainty are more left-wing in their economic
preferences.
Consistent with this “reversal” hypothesis, Johnston, Lavine, and Federico
(2017) found that individuals low and high in needs for security and certainty
polarize in opposite ideological directions depending on their level of political
engagement. They examined this prediction in ten nationally representative
datasets of American adults, using a range of existential and epistemic variables
(including authoritarianism, need for closure, dispositional risk aversion, con-
servation versus openness values, and the openness and conscientiousness
dimensions of the Big Five). Among engaged individuals, 21 out of 21 tests
indicated that those differing in needs for security and certainty polarized in
the “traditional” ideological direction: those low in needs for security and cer-
tainty preferred a more interventionist government, whereas those high in
needs for security and certainty preferred a more market-oriented approach.
In contrast, among those low in engagement, individuals with different exist-
ential and epistemic dispositions polarized in the opposite ideological direc-
tion: those low in needs for security and certainty preferred free markets and
those high in needs for security and certainty preferred that the government
step in to provide economic security.
Again, this result has been replicated internationally by other researchers.
Specifically, using the same 51-nation World Values Survey dataset referred to
earlier,Ariel Malka and his colleagues (2014) found that a preference for conser-
vation (over openness) values predicted right-wing, market-oriented economic
attitudes among those high in political interest but left-wing, interventionist
economic attitudes among those low in interest. Thus, both our research and
that of others broadly suggests that engagement may polarize issue attitudes as a
function of psychological needs, but that this effect may be somewhat complex
in the realm of economics.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have reviewed work suggesting that psychological perspectives
on polarization need to account for the roles of both “bottom-up” and “top-
down” processes in the emergence of political differences. Like a growing
body of work in personality and social psychology (Jost et al., 2009, 2013), the
approach I outline here argues that a variety of individual differences in needs
for security and certainty intuitively prepare people to be more attracted to
some political identities and preferences than others. At the same time, drawing
on a venerable line of research in political science on elite opinion leader-
ship, it also suggests that differences in existential and epistemic needs will not
express themselves in terms of polarized political positions unless individ-
uals are politically engaged to learn what positions “match” their underlying
needs, traits, and motives. In support of this hybrid model, I have reviewed
research suggesting that individual variation in needs for security and certainty
is more likely to be associated with polarized partisan and ideological affinities
among the politically engaged. Moreover, my colleagues and I have also found
that the moderating role of engagement extends to the relationship between
existential and epistemic needs and issue attitudes, with the nature of pattern
being especially complex in the “hard” domain of economics. In the latter
case, engagement does not merely amplify the relationship between psycho-
logical dispositions and issue preferences. Rather, it actually reverses them, such
that needs for security and certainty are associated with right-wing economic
preferences among the engaged and left-wing economic preferences among
the less engaged.
Together, the findings reviewed here suggest a number of broader
implications. First, though they reinforce the general argument that psycho-
logical differences matter for the formation of political preferences, they also
suggest that these differences are translated into political differences via mul-
tiple mechanisms (Federico & Malka, 2018). Sometimes the connection is
direct, such that individuals with strong needs for security and certainty seek
the symbolic “safety” of the status quo by gravitating to the right and those
who are less sensitive to threat and uncertainty are more open to the change
implied by positions on the left. This process appears to be at work in rela-
tionship between existential and epistemic needs and social-issue preferences,
as well as the relationship between these needs and political identities (such as
partisanship and ideology) that have become discursively linked to social-issue
disagreements. The research reviewed here also suggests that this process is at
work in the relationship between strong needs for security and certainty and
left-wing economic preferences found among those low in political engagement.
In other cases, the connection is indirect or “menu-dependent” (Malka & Soto,
2015; see also Johnston et al., 2017), such that individuals with different needs
for security and certainty adopt different political positions mainly because they
have sorted into different political identities and take cues about issue positions
from elites who share those identities. This process is the one at work in the
relationship between strong needs for security and certainty and right-wing
economic preferences among the engaged.
Of course, the model I develop here (like others) is not without its limitations.
In particular, it speaks primarily to the political implications of “subjective,” self-
report measures of psychological dispositions; none of the studies in question
examined whether engagement also moderates the relationship between
“objective” behavioral measures of rigidity and threat sensitivity and political
preferences. As noted previously, subjective measures are more strongly related
than objective measures to political preferences (Van Hiel et al., 2016). Thus,
the patterns predicted by the approach outlined in this chapter may or may not
generalize to objective psychological measures. On one hand, it may be the
case that the relatively implicit cognitive and motivational differences tapped
by objective measures are simply more difficult for individuals to connect with
politics than the differences measured by self-reports. In this case, the cognitive
“boost” provided by political engagement may be especially impactful with
respect to objective measures, leading to even stronger moderating effects of
engagement.
On the other hand, the asymmetry between subjective and objective psy-
chological dispositions may be more fundamental, leaving objective indices
unrelated to political preferences even among the engaged. One crucial diffe-
rence between the two types of measures potentially points in this direction.
Self-reports of needs for security and certainty—like survey items inquiring
about partisan and ideological identifications or issue attitudes—ask individuals
to consciously agree or disagree with symbol-laden content that has evalu-
ative implications. In contrast, behavioral measures usually involve tasks that
do not ask participants to make subjective semantic judgments (Van Hiel et al.,
2010). This suggests that psychological dispositions measured by self-reports
may be more matched with political preferences in terms of compatibility or
similarity (in that both ask for evaluative responses; Kraus, 1995). As such, the
self-perceptions and worldviews tapped by self-report psychological measures
may be more easily connected with (and integrated into) different symbolically
laden political belief systems. Indeed, for the politically engaged, the perceptions
and self-characterizations that comprise responses to self-report measures of
existential and epistemic needs may be thought of as extended, distal elements
of political belief systems. Conversely, the explicitly political aspects of these
belief systems may become more important aspects of the self for those who
are more politically aware (Federico & Ekstrom, 2018).
Another potential boundary condition on the model developed here is that
it might not apply equally to all variables indicative of “rigidity” or “sophistica-
tion.” As I note above, the present model is intended specifically as an approach
to understanding the interplay between “rigidity” in the form of subjective
individual-difference measures of needs for security and certainty and “sophis-
tication” in the form of domain-specific political knowledge and interest (e.g.,
Federico & Malka, 2018). But there are other forms of rigidity and sophisti-
cation, and they might exhibit dynamics different from those in my model. In
particular, rigidity can also be conceptualized as an outcome of investing the self
in specific political commitments, as opposed to a general trait prior to politics.
In this case, individuals with views that are polarized to the right and the left
may display forms of motivated rigidity reflecting a defensive commitment to
their political preferences and a tendency to parse the political world in black-
and-white terms—outcomes that are often regarded as signs of low sophistication
(see Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2020)
Along these lines, when the scope of inquiry is extended beyond self-
reported traits, individuals at both extremes may show signs of rigidity, such
as higher levels of defensive bias (Ditto et al., 2019; Washburn & Skitka, 2017),
greater avoidance of opposing opinions (Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl, 2017), greater
intolerance of those in opposing political coalitions (van Prooijen & Krouwel,
2017; van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, & Eedebak, 2015; see also Brandt &
Crawford, 2020), a stronger tendency to overclaim knowledge that one does
not objectively possess (van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019), a greater prefer-
ence for simple solutions to problems (accompanied by greater judgmental
certainty; van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Emmer, 2018), and a more-pronounced
tendency to rigidly categorize political stimuli (Lammers, Koch, Conway, &
Brandt, 2017). Moreover, even generalized trait-like measures of rigidity are
associated with extremity to both the left and right (rather a right-wing orien-
tation) when extremity is operationalized as strength of partisan social identi-
fication as opposed to simple left–r ight self-placement (Luttig, 2018; Zmigrod
et al., 2020).
These findings—taken together with the theory and research that are the
primary focus of this chapter—suggest the need for several crucial concep-
tual distinctions. First, it is important for researchers to distinguish between
rigidity in the sense of subjective needs for security and certainty and rigidity
in the sense of motivated defensiveness or simplicity of perception. The former
may elicit sorting into conservative identities, especially among the politically
engaged, whereas the latter may result from committing the self to identities
and preferences on either the right or left. Second, it is necessary to distin-
guish between political engagement as a domain-specific form of sophistica-
tion and generalized indicators of cognitive sophistication. The former may act
primarily as a moderator, amplifying the sorting of individuals with different
existential and epistemic needs into polarized political camps. In contrast, the
latter may reflect the aforementioned rigidity that comes from having polit-
ical commitments at all, whether they be on the right or the left. With these
points in mind, researchers may find it easier to integrate the various strands
of an increasingly complex body of inquiry in the link between psychological
variables and political preferences.
Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank Jan-Willem van Prooijen for his comments,
suggestions, and editorial assistance.
Note
1 There are of course exceptions to this pattern, with some studies showing robust
relationships between variables related to needs for security and certainty and
attitudes in both the social and economic domains (see Jost et al., 2017b; see also
Azevedo et al., 2019; Gerber et al., 2010; Hennes, Nam, Stern, & Jost, 2012). However,
as Federico and Malka (2018, p. 14) note in their review of this literature, many of
these analyses (1) still show a stronger relationship between needs for security and cer-
tainty and social (versus economic) attitudes and (2) use measures of threat or inse-
curity that include explicit political content, thereby introducing potential artifacts.
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Chapter 3
The political mindset of

supporters of radical and
populist parties
Alain Van Hiel, Jasper Van Assche,
and Tessa Haesevoets
Polarization and populism have become key words to explain recent political
developments (e.g., Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Inglehart & Norris, 2016;
Mudde, 2004; Simas, Clifford, & Kirkland, 2020). At first sight, both phenomena
seem to imply each other. Indeed, on the one hand, polarization seems to be
an important precursor of populism, and it is almost self-evident that, in times
of polarization, populism is on the rise. On the other hand, the mere presence
of populism seems to imply that it has been based on ever-increasing polariza-
tion. However, such connections are not obvious at all. Specifically, polarization
means that the pivotal political dimensions are stretched in such a way that
the contradictions they entail become ever greater. This is something gradual,
which evolves over time. Conversely, populism implies the separation of two
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt
elite’ (Mudde, 2007). This means disruption, a break between the radical voter
and the existing political establishment.We argue that the idea of a rupture best
captures the distinction between moderates and radicals.
In fact, we argue that polarization is a process that only has relevance for
explaining differences among moderate citizens, not for differences between
moderates and radicals. We thus disclaim that polarization is at the basis of the
increasing support for populist and radical parties. We, however, further argue
that the term ‘populism’ as a psychological and individual-level variable does
not add much to our understanding of such ideology and the radical-populist
Weltanschauung. Instead, we propose that political cynicism offers a better
explanation of the radical mindset. Note that we use the terms radicalism and
populism as synonyms, as both terms usually refer to the same political parties,
which are invariably extreme on either the left-wing or the right-wing side of
the political spectrum.1
In the remainder of this chapter, we will first explain how psychological
polarization operates, and how it has been used in political psychology to
explain political polarization and extremism. Next, we present evidence that
radicalism is not so much about being extreme right-wing or left-wing, but
instead is characterized on both sides of the political spectrum by political
Radical and populist supporter mindset 39
cynicism. Radical parties thus primarily attract politically cynical citizens, and
we will show that the ‘old concept’ of political cynicism and the ‘new’ individual
differences variable of populism coincide and are indistinguishable.We will fur-
ther argue that political cynicism offers a better explanation of the mental state
of adherents of so-called populist parties than the concept of populism itself.
Polarization in psychological literature

Political polarization has a long history in group dynamics literature. The con-
cept is used to denote the tendency of group discussions to boost the initial
sentiment among its members so that their consensual opinion becomes more
extreme (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers, 1982; Myers & Lamm, 1976).
This tendency manifests itself in increased risk taking in risk-prone decision
settings, as well as in increased caution in risk-averse settings, and in all kinds
of attitudinal judgments (Isenberg, 1986). Polarization has been explained in
classic literature in two ways. First, according to Pervasive Arguments Theory
(Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974), during group discussion, individual group
members’ opinions become more extreme because of the exposure to infor-
mation, which can consist of arguments they already knew beforehand and thus
are merely repeated by other group members, as well as new arguments which
were unknown to them. Especially new arguments that are validated as good
and solid by the other group members are considered to be effective in shaping
group members’ attitudes. Secondly, according to the Social Comparison
account (Brown, 1965; Sanders & Baron, 1977), attitudes become more extreme
because of group members’ tendency to compare themselves with each other
(Festinger, 1954). Specifically, if there is a majority faction with a particular
opinion, then the minority group members change their opinion in the direc-
tion of the majority.
Notwithstanding the fierce debate between proponents of Pervasive
Arguments Theory and Social Comparison Theory (see, Isenberg, 1986), a
middle-of-the-road compromise has been developed. According to Abrams,
Wheterell, Cochrane, Hogg, and Turner (1990), individuals are receptive to
good arguments (i.e., information) of people from the social groups with which
they identify themselves (i.e., people of their own group with whom they want
to socially compare themselves), and thus allow themselves to be influenced by
other group members. This ‘new’ compromise position allows the straightfor-
ward application of the concept of psychological polarization to political topics.
Like-minded people are likely to convince each other, and the rise of social
media and the self-created echo rooms resulting from this evolution indeed
fits in perfectly within the polarization framework. People interact with others
who have similar opinions, and they thus become increasingly persuaded by
their (own) cherished ideas (Grover, Kar, Dwivedi, & Janssen, 2018; Iyengar &
Westwood, 2015).
40 Alain Van Hiel et al.
The Catastrophe Model of radicalism and extremism

It stands to reason that the theory of psychological polarization can also be
applied to political attitudes, and to radicalism and extremism in particular.
If group members share extreme opinions and they meet each other a lot,
then their opinions will become ever more extreme. Such a model of political
polarization has been developed before. The Catastrophe Model of Political
Attitudes (Harton & Latané, 1997; Latané & Nowak, 1994; Liu & Latané, 1998)
holds that, because of attitude polarization, extreme attitudes indeed may occur
in political groups, even to the point that the consensual ideological beliefs
and the worldviews held by such groups deviate from how the general public
perceives the world. Thus, radical people are assumed to drift further and fur-
ther away from the moderate position, and at a given point the differences
become so large and they even constitute a qualitative difference.This results in
a bimodal distribution in which the curves hardly overlap, with a broad distri-
bution of attitudes of moderate people in the center, and a narrow distribution
of attitudes among radicals at the extreme position.
What is interesting about the Catastrophe Model is that it assumes that other
processes are at work as well. One such process is the tendency of radicals and
extremists to push themselves away from other political movements. They per-
ceive themselves as most correct, knowledgeable, and morally superior, and the
supporters of other political movements as ill-informed and morally inferior,
especially those who support the Establishment. The creation of a stark oppos-
ition between the own movement and the ideological opponents is a well-
known strategy to mobilize group members and to neutralize possible external
influences (Gamson, 1975). This process bears high similarity with the concept
of negative partisanship, as members of other political groups are perceived
extremely negatively (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2015). However,
there is also a difference because political radicals are most negatively inclined
towards the existing political system, which they even want to reverse.
Radicalization and issue position polarization

Do political disparities further increase? And, can this process be held account-
able for the radicalization of positions on the left–r ight dimension? These are
interesting questions for which we need empirical examinations, even though
political radicals and extremists are not studied very often. We think, however,
based on the findings that we do have at our disposal, that the psychological
polarization hypothesis cannot be maintained to explain populism and rad-
icalism. There are at least two reasons for this. First, polarization should lead
not only to more extreme attitudes, but also to more similar attitudes. Indeed,
polarization is a mechanism that creates (an extreme) consensus among group
members. However, even though this might sound somewhat counterintuitive,
members of radical groups have been found not to be ‘all alike’, at least with
respect to the personal values they cherish. Specifically,Van Hiel (2012) found
that, especially on the extreme sides of the political spectrum, there is more
variability in personal values such as openness, conformity and safety than on
the moderate positions. Exactly these values have been hypothesized to be at
the basis of left–r ight ideology.
Second, also incompatible with the polarization hypothesis, is the finding
that it is not their sheer position on the left–r ight dimension that distinguishes
moderates and radical right-wing adherents the most, but other factors come
into play as well. Political party preferences often coincide with each other and
form clusters. For instance, in the typical Western European situation, those
who like the Social Democrats also often are positively inclined toward green
parties as well, but they tend to dislike right-wing parties (e.g., Van Hiel &
Mervielde, 2002). Analysis of party preferences in Belgian (Flemish) and Dutch
samples reveals four distinct party types: libertarian, traditional left, traditional
right and radical right.2 Well, what makes adherents of the radical right different
from the other voters? Van Assche,Van Hiel, Dhont, and Roets (2019) reported
that the radical right-wing parties mainly attract voters who are highly polit-
ically cynical and who have negative attitudes towards minorities and immi-
gration. The left–right dimension –operationalized in terms of right-wing
authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) and social dominance orientation (Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) –was less important to characterize the
radical-right position, but was particularly relevant to distinguish among the
adherents of the various moderate parties. Should polarization in terms of an
expanding left–r ight position be the real cause of radicalism and populism, then
supporters of a right-radical party would have to distinguish themselves from
the advocates of the other parties, especially on this dimension, that is, in terms
of left–r ight attitudes. But, such a supreme effect of left–r ight attitudes is not
what the data showed.
The data we just discussed pertained to the ideological attitudes of supporters
of radical and populist parties. Also note that we can make a similar case against
polarization solely based on the political level, that is, on the level of ideology
itself. Indeed, Mudde (2004) already stated that populist parties are ‘ideologic-
ally poor’. For example, they select left and right recipes that they embed in
their own story as they see fit. The Italian Five-Star movement, for example,
combines both typical left and right recipes, and thus cannot be called left or
right, which the party officials consider to be an outdated dichotomy (Mosca
& Tronconi, 2019). During the last elections of the Belgian parliament, the
Flemish radical right-wing party Vlaams Belang positioned itself on the left for
socio-economic themes. The radical right-wing PVV in the Netherlands had
also been in favor of policies that can be called progressive, especially in the
domain of welfare.
For all these reasons, both located at the individual-attitudinal level as well
as on the level of populist-radical ideology itself, polarization in terms of ever-
expanding differences between the left and the right does not offer the best
explanation. We, of course, wholeheartedly agree that radical right-wing-side

voters are indeed right-wingers, but it should be emphasized that the level of
right-wing attitudes is somewhat curbed, and therefore not very distinctive.
Populist ideology does not equal populist ideological

attitude
Empirical findings thus seem to imply that the supporters of populist and radical
right-wing parties are not characterized by especially high right-wing attitudes,
but by other characteristics, that is, political cynicism and anti-immigration
sentiment. Contemporary attempts to define the radical position –both at the
left and the right –often depart from the concept of ‘populism’ (Akkerman,
Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; Mudde, 2007). The term ‘populism’ is attached to
both the political parties, thus called ‘populist parties’, as well as to the elect-
orate which supports these parties, who are called ‘populists’. According to this
rationale, populism has a supply side in the form of radical-populist political
parties, and a demand side in the form of a populist electorate. In other words,
populist parties ‘serve’ populist people, and provide them directly with a pol-
itical translation of their ideas and worldviews. It is exactly this fit of ideas and
views that connects the party and the individual.
In political psychology, however, the relationship between the characteristics
of an ideology on the one hand, and the characteristics and attitudes of the
individual on the other, are often less direct and ‘tautological’ than has been
suggested in the context of populism. The idea of ideological attitudes assumes
that such attitudes are at the basis of ideology, and that such attitudes are not a
part of ideology itself. Rather, ideological attitudes make an individual recep-
tive to an ideology (see Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, de Plessis, & Birum,
2002). For example, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950)
considered authoritarianism as the readiness of the individual to adhere to
extreme right- wing parties, and the authoritarianism scale does not con-
tain items about the particular ideology (i.e., fascism) itself. The pull towards
authoritarianism is thus located at a ‘deeper’ level; it does not start from the phe-
nomenon on the surface –namely the ideology itself. Ideological attitudes are
therefore ‘psychologized’ and there is no such thing as a one-to-one relation-
ship with ideology. The direct translation of political populism into a personal
ideological attitude should thus not be considered as the most habitual way of
investigating such questions.
There is nothing wrong with taking an ‘unusual’ approach, of course, but
there is still another theoretical problem. What exactly is ‘psychological’ popu-
lism? Akkerman et al. (2014) introduced a scale that measures ‘the demand side’
of radicalism-populism, and more specifically the populism facet scale of this
measure has been developed in this respect. This scale is the most widely used
populism scale in literature (Roccato, Corbetta, Cavazza, & Colloca, 2019).
Akkerman et al. (2014) use the definition of populism which has been advanced
by Mudde (2007, p. 23): “A thin-centered ideology that considers society to

be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the
pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be
an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2007,
p. 23).
A closer look at Akkerman et al.’s (2014) scale reveals that all eight items
reflect a very negative attitude towards politics and politicians. Four of these
items contrast the perverse politicians with the pure people. What is remark-
able, however, is that not a single item exclusively gauges the purity of the
common people. It is therefore no exaggeration to state that the backbone
of this scale is the grotesque negative conception of traditional politics and
politicians. However, and this is an important point, we do not think that this
is a coincidence. We believe that items probing into ‘the good and pure people’
would never work. The idea of the good people is just rhetoric; it serves popu-
list politicians well, to legitimize themselves and their views.We seriously doubt
whether adherents of populist parties have an ‘in-depth’ positive image of their
fellow citizens and people in general. Ever since the work of Adorno et al.
(1950) on authoritarianism, we know that cynicism is alive and kicking among
(right-wing) radical people. It is thus very unlikely that populist voters have a
humane attitude towards common people. Hence, because the populism scale
targets surface characteristics of populist ideology, it does not succeed in pene-
trating into deep-rooted personality and, more specifically, into the antagonistic
views on others held by populist voters.
Populism as an ideological attitude: old wine in a

new bottle
The negative orientation toward politics and politicians, which constitutes the
core of the populism scale, is, in fact, nothing but sheer political cynicism. The
‘new’ populism scale thus does not seem to add much to the ‘old’ political
cynicism concept. In order to advance the literature, a new concept must be
distinctive vis-à-vis already-known variables. This does not seem the case with
the ‘new’ populism scale as compared to the ‘old’ political cynicism scale. As a
case in point, a further analysis of the Akkerman et al. (2014) populism scale by
Van Hauwaert, Schimpf, and Azevedo (2020) identified the following item as
the most discriminating between populists and non-populists: “What people
call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles”. This
item lacks any reference to common ‘pure’ people, and it would not be out of
place in a scale that measures (political) cynicism.
To empirically show that populism and political cynicism are essentially
measuring the same mindset, we have administered the populism items of
Akkerman et al. (2014) together with the political cynicism items of Pattyn,
Van Hiel, Dhont, and Onraet (2012). Towards this end, we recruited a sample
of 202 adults living in the United States through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk; www.mturk.com). Participants completed our study in exchange for

payment ($0.70). To safeguard data quality, we implemented two attention
checks (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). Four participants (2%) were excluded
from further analyses because they failed on these check questions. The final
sample (N = 198) consisted of 90 males and 118 females and had a mean age
of 41.96 years (SD = 13.67, range = 20–74). They rated all items on five-point
Likert scales ranging from (1) totally disagree to (5) totally agree. The items of
Akkerman et al. (2014) yielded an acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s
α = 0.70, M = 3.67, SD = 0.58), and the political cynicism scale showed an
even greater internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.83, M = 3.56, SD = 0.69).
The correlation between both scales was highly significant and strong: r = 0.69,
p < 0.001.
We conducted principal component analysis of the populism and cynicism
items. The rationale behind this is that, if the scales are truly distinctive, the
joint analysis of two scales should yield clean, separate dimensions, each of
them with high loading items that refer to one of the scales (for the rationale of
such analyses, see Lemery, Essex, & Smider, 2002 and Lengua, West, & Sandler,
1998). The eigenvalues of the first two components were 5.52 and 1.98 (34.5%
and 12.4% of the total variance, respectively), and after OBLIMIN rotation the
eigenvalues of the two components were 4.57 and 4.12 (28.6% and 25.8% of
the total variance). Six populism items and four political cynicism items had
their primary loadings on the first component (all loadings greater than 0.50),
whereas two populism items and four cynicism items loaded on the second
component (all loadings greater than 0.46). From this analysis, it can thus be
concluded that the items tend to mix up, which does not lend support to their
distinctiveness.
Next, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis to test two models: a
first model in which all items load on one dimension, and a second model in
which the populism items load on one dimension and the political cynicism
items are forced to load on another dimension. The fit of the one-factor model
was: χ²(104) = 344.99 (χ²/df = 3.32), comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.73, root
main squre error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.11, and standardized root
mean square residual (SRMR) = 0.09. The fit of the two-factor model was:
χ²(103) = 338.06 (χ²/ df = 3.28), CFI = 0.73, RMSEA = 0.11, and
SRMR = 0.09.3 The improvement in fit in the latter (two-factor) model was
not statistically significant (Δχ²(1) = 3.07, p = 0.08), which thus again indicates
that these two scales probe into essentially the same content.
These analyses provide empirical evidence that there is little distinctive-
ness between the populism and political cynicism items, and that the intro-
duction of the ‘new’ concept does not add much on top of the ‘old’ concept.
Moreover, the concept of political cynicism allows one to tackle the so-called
humane orientation of people-formerly-known-as-populists towards ordinary
folks and common people, the Mr. Joe Six-Packs of this world. As we wrote
above, adherents of radical-populist parties do not like other people in general,
whereas the populism concept would predict a positive inclination towards

them. The data of Pattyn et al. (2012) are particularly interesting in this respect.
These authors reported that the correlation between political cynicism and
general cynicism is positive and strong (r = 0.49, p < 0.001). The general cyni-
cism scale consists of items such as ‘Most people are just out for themselves’
and ‘People are out for what they can get’. These items, of course, do not go
together with the gentle orientation towards ordinary people which has been
assumed to be present in adherents of populist parties (see Akkerman et al.,
2014; Mudde, 2007).
In conclusion, we agree with Mudde and colleagues (Akkerman et al., 2014;
Mudde, 2004, 2007; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018) that adherents of populist-
radical parties are truly distinctive from supporters of moderate parties. We also
agree that this distinctiveness is reflected in particular worldviews and attitudes,
and that this can be measured through the use of scales. However, and here
we disagree, this distinctiveness is best measured not at the level of ideology in
itself, not at the level of what politicians say, but instead at the ‘deeper’ level, at
the level ‘beyond’ surface beliefs. That is, this distinctiveness is best reflected in
political cynicism. This also allows us to explain that, albeit populist and radical
politicians refer to ordinary people in the kindest and gentlest of words, such
kindness is not characteristic of their adherents. For these reasons, we prefer
the use of political cynicism. The latter concept further has the advantage of
its longstanding rootedness in political science and political thinking. A long
time ago, Machiavelli (1532) and Rousseau (1762; see Grant, 2008) mentioned
that deception and hypocrisy are basic ingredients of political success. Another
advantage of using the term political cynicism is that it forms an applied mani-
festation of a ‘deeper’ personality concept, that is, cynicism. This is useful for
exploring the personality base of this construct in the form of related individual
traits, and for locating the construct in personality literature in general and in
more comprehensive personality models such as the Five-Factor Model (Costa &
McCrae, 1992; Digman, 1990).
The new political alignments in citizens’ mind

Political cynicism is, however, not the whole story why individuals are converted
to support radical parties. We know that the left–right attitudinal dimension
is no longer the dominant alignment between moderates and radicals, but
others have come into place. These other dimensions relate directly to policy
choices and are particularly topical today, but already have a long history. These
alignments are attitudes about the ever-increasing diversity that characterizes
most Western countries (Van Assche, Dhont, Van Hiel, & Roets, 2018; Van
Assche et al., 2019), and a negative attitude towards financial and economic
globalization.
There is a downright negative opinion about immigration and the presence
of different ethnic-cultural groups in society in radical right-wing circles. It
seems as if this dimension took some time to crystallize into a topic in its own
right. Indeed, right-wing ideological attitudes were invariably seen as the basis
of prejudice. A lot of evidence was gathered for this over the years, in many
political contexts (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). The idea that prejudice itself can
form a basis –alongside right-wing ideological beliefs –was not seen as an
interesting research question, as it seemed too self-evident. However, although
diversity has been a lingering issue for quite some time, it is becoming increas-
ingly important in political debate, and it has become a topic in its own right.
Attitudes towards diversity may show an increasingly looser connection with
left–r ight attitudes than in the past, and it may become an important source of
radicalization (in contrast to left–r ight attitudes, which do not have this radic-
alizing potential any more).
A second substantive alignment runs along the socio-economic axis. The
radical left draws on a reservoir of people who are anti-capitalist and perceive
globalization, international banking and unbridled capitalism as major threats
to society (see Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). Traditional parties, and even
social democratic parties, have been unable to provide sufficient counterweight
to socio-economic globalization and deregulation. They have even actively
participated in this, and therefore they no longer offer an ideological home to
people who are against this evolution.
The research by Van Assche et al. (2019) shed some light on these issues,
by showing exactly how these alignments rearrange the political field. In a
regression analysis in which left–right ideology, political cynicism and ethnic
prejudice are included, the preference for radical-r ight parties was significantly
determined by increased political cynicism and ethnic prejudice, whereas the
relationship with left–r ight attitudes was less important. Specifically, the radical
right parties are particularly charming to voters who are highly politically
cynical and who are biased against minorities and negatively inclined towards
immigration. Hence, political cynicism and immigration attitudes on the right-
wing side, and political cynicism and undoubtedly anti-capitalism attitudes on
the left-wing side (this should still be demonstrated in a suitable political con-
text, like for instance in Southern Europe), are particularly useful to distinguish
the electorate of radical parties from supporters of moderate parties.
Political cynicism on the rescue for democracy?

Many surveys have shown that trust in politics is at a historical minimum.
We agree that we now seem to live in an ‘age of distrust’ (De Silva, 2009,
p. 86; also see Hardin, 2006), but politics really seem to have hit rock bottom.
According to the Pew Research Center (2019), the percentage of Americans
who said they trust the government had dropped from 73% in 1958 to below
30% from 2007. Such trends of declining trust cannot only be observed
in the US, but also in Europe. For instance, the influential Edelman Trust
Barometer (2017) –an annual online survey conducted in 28 countries with
over 33,000 respondents –reported that in 2017 government was distrusted

in 75% of the 28 surveyed countries. The IPSOS Global Trust in Professions
poll (2019) (N ≈ 20,000) revealed that politicians and government officials are
considered the least trustworthy professionals. More specifically, in their 2019
poll, politicians were considered the most untrustworthy professionals in all
23 surveyed countries –with 67% of the respondents agreeing that politicians
cannot be trusted.
If the CEO of a private firm published such figures about what is in essence
its core business, he or she would be fired immediately. There is something
rotten in politics, and this feeling is well captured by radical-populist parties,
which successfully succeed in attracting an ever-increasing army of political
cynics. Radical parties are like ‘canaries in the coalmine’, clarifying that an
important part of the electorate believes that the political establishment is
inadequate. Radical parties are highlighting major societal problems, just as
any other political party that tries to gain voter approval. Fleshing out certain
program points is not an attack on democracy, nor does it constitute anti-
politics, but instead it is an inherent feature of the democratic process itself.
Pattyn et al. (2012) stated: ‘Historically, the term cynicism stems from a
Hellenistic philosophical school famous for criticizing ancient Greek society.
By publicly ridiculing anyone who seemed pompous, materialistic or preten-
tious, they held up a mirror to society, hoping to elicit change therein’ (p. 566).
Moreover, according to de Vreese (2005), cynicism reflects political refine-
ment, suggesting that cynicism is a mark of an ‘interested and critical citizen’.
Furthermore, this author stated: ‘It seems that citizens have the capacity to be
both interested and knowledgeable about politics while at the same time crit-
ical and rather disparaging about politicians and their performance’ (p. 294).
Most researchers, however, have expressed negative ideas about (political)
cynicism. Indeed, a recurring theme in literature is that political cynicism is
harmful to politics and political participation (e.g., Ansolabehere & Iyengar,
1995; Patterson, 2002). Because democratic governments derive their authority
from public support, a persistently high level of political cynicism threatens
their credibility and legitimacy. In the light of the trust crisis in politics, how-
ever, the reversed path from illegitimate politics to increased political cynicism
could be of greater importance. The rise of political cynicism, then, can be
considered to be a justified reaction of the public (see Agger, Goldstein, & Pearl,
1961; Newton, 2006).
Polarization needs to be overcome, indeed

The expansion of the political left–right dimension is certainly a reality, but
this reality is most relevant for adherents of traditional parties. As we already
noted, Van Assche et al. (2019) reported that differences in the psychological
left–
r ight dimension remain particularly important to distinguish between
adherents of different moderate political parties. Thus, if people have shown
increased polarization over the last few years, then this would be of the greatest
relevance for our understanding of the electorate of traditional left-wing and
right-wing parties. Thus, even though adherents of moderate parties are ‘in the
system’, and even though they order their opinions on the shared, left–right
dimension, polarization can create serious disparities, which makes it difficult
to find common ground.
We guess that moderate political parties, however, do not have any other
option left other than to bridge their ideological differences, in order to be able to
reach compromises that are acceptable to all. Traditional parties urgently need to
depolarize, leave their typical left-versus-r ight discussions, and instead try to solve
together the most important problems, and as such act as role models for their
followers. There is no other option left than to become trust agents, to become
bridge builders at the service of society. Indeed, a mutual ‘combat strategy’ among
traditional parties would probably be best attuned with the attitudes of their
followers, but it underlines their powerlessness to arrive at solutions together. One
could say that the lack of unity and decisiveness comes across as a never-ending
struggle for power, at the cost of searching for substantial solutions and showing
genuine concern for citizens.These so-called ‘political games’ –real or portrayed
as such in the media –further increase political cynicism (e.g., Cappella &
Jamieson, 1997; Erber & Lau, 1990), and thus pave the way for the further success
of radical parties. In this view, not ‘psychological polarization’ (at the attitudinal
level), but ‘political polarization’ at the level of political parties, may fuel political
cynicism, and therefore, the electoral success of populist and radical parties.
The political counter-reaction, of course, can also come from non-traditional
parties. Western Europe is witnessing anti-radical initiatives that try to unite
citizens.The best-known example of such an attempt is the political movement
of Emmanuel Macron, La République en Marche (or, abbreviated, en Marche).
But, here again, the key to success resided not in firm left-wing or right-wing
recipes, but instead in the attempt to find a consensus that transcends left–r ight
contradictions.This new movement united the political middle and at the same
time wiped out the important political parties that had dominated France for
decades (especially the Social Democrats and Republicans). En Marche became
the challenger of the radical right (i.e., Front National). The positive alternative
presented by the Macron movement was striking, and paid off electorally. This
seems to be a better strategy than either to emphasize left–r ight contradictions,
or to portray radical parties as populist, demagogic and irresponsible (Stavrakakis
& Katsambekis, 2019). It is indeed doubtful that the latter strategy will bring
the radical voter back to the traditional herd, as has been shown by Stavrakakis
and Katsambekis, who analyzed the Greek political situation.
Conclusion
Do polarization and populism coincide? We have argued that there is
no direct link between polarization and populism, and that adherents of
populist-radical parties are by no means polarized moderates. Rather, radicals

can be distinguished –in qualitative terms –from moderates, and the pri-
mary distinction resides in their high level of political cynicism. Political cynics
dislike the political establishment, and they do not believe in ‘the good people’.
Polarization is indeed important, but its relevance is limited to moderate left-
wing and right-wing electorates. Because of this, moderate people seem to
have ever-growing disputes. As we have explained, however, traditional parties
that represent this polarizing public should avoid continuing their paralyzing
left-versus-r ight discussions, and should try to find common ground for good
compromises.
Notes
1 Although relatively rare, various authors (e.g., Muller, 2016) have noted that centric
populism is a possibility, and a common example in this respect is Silvio Berlusconi,
a populist who was center-r ight but not far-r ight.
2 The party landscape in these contexts lacks a successful radical left-wing party.
3 These measurement models show modest values on a number of fit indices. Both
the populism and political cynicism measures should thus be further refined in
future studies.
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Chapter 4
A psychological profile of
extreme Trump supporters
Laura Kinsman and Jeremy A. Frimer
President Trump’s extraordinary tenure in office will end. Whether that end
comes in 2021 or in 2025 (or beyond), it will come. This is probably good
news to most people in the US and around the world, where Trump is almost
universally disliked (Wike, Poushter, Fetterolf & Schumacher, 2020). However,
Trump’s exit will not be the end of Trumpism. Approximately 140 million
Americans still approve of President Trump. When he leaves, they will remain.
To properly understand the Trump era, one must also understand his followers.
Our objective is to psychologically profile supporters of US President Donald
Trump, whom we characterize as extremists. Characterizing such a large sector
of society and supporters of a major political figure in a major democracy as
extremists might raise eyebrows. We suggest that a broad geopolitical and his-
torical perspective will support the view that President Trump’s supporters, as
numerous as they are, are indeed extreme.
Perhaps the least controversial thing about the Trump presidency is that it has
been unusual. Some political and economic regularities (Drezner, 2018) not-
withstanding, Trump had the least prior political experience of any US presi-
dent, and his policies (e.g., on NATO, Russia, free trade, executive authority)
and his personal behavior (e.g., braggadocio, insults, lack of financial transpar-
ency) make him a highly unusual US president or democratically elected head
of state. People will likely disagree about whether such an unusual presidency
has moved the country in the right or the wrong direction. But we suggest
that people of varying political stripes probably agree that an unusual presi-
dency it indeed has been.The Trump presidency itself being far from the main-
stream of presidencies renders Trump support extreme in the sense that it is
non-normative.
Trump’s support has been steady and around 42% of Americans.The “Trump
supporter” demographic is not homogeneous, however. Some of his supporters
are more tentative, conditional, and ambivalent whereas others are more fer-
vent, unconditional, and full- throated in their approval of their president.
Self-identified political conservatism has been strongly associated with levels
of Trump support (Frimer & Skitka, 2018). This is noteworthy in that many
54 Laura Kinsman and Jeremy A. Frimer
of Trump’s policies have been at variance with conservative beliefs, such as

those concerning free markets, international allegiances, balanced budgets, basic
human decency, and moral character. Regardless of whether Trump and his
policies are philosophically conservative, it is safe to say that they do embody
modern US political conservatism, at least in the self-identified form. In this way,
the Trump presidency has piggybacked upon (and stoked) the ever-growing
culture war between liberals and conservatives in the US (Kabaservice, 2018).
Our analyses thus arrive in the context of a growing culture war between
liberals and conservatives. Our method is to examine the psychological basis of
extreme Trump support guided by common media portrayals and then “fact-
check” them with the available psychological and political science evidence.We
focus on three broad explanations for extreme Trump support. Trump support
may be rooted in tribal loyalties and hatred of outsiders; it may be rooted in
people living in information bubbles where they consume unrepresentative
and even false information; and it may be explained by material self-interest.
We chose to focus on these three themes because they are relatively preva-
lent in media portrayals and because of the availability of rich psychological
research literatures on each, and because they vary considerably in their moral
undertones. Support based in having access to restricted and biased informa-
tion and an interest in taking care of oneself and one’s family has more favor-
able moral undertones than support based in a desire to harm one’s political
enemies.
The three explanations are not mutually exclusive. Any one or combin-
ation thereof could be explanatory, and they could work in tandem. For
instance, information bubbles might stoke tribal loyalties, and having access
to only limited and potentially false information might affect whether people
perceive a particular policy to further their self-interest. They are nonethe-
less discrete processes, each with different potential remedies, and respective
literatures.
In the course of our review, we aim to expound both on whether an explan-
ation is valid and also on whether the psychological phenomenon (e.g., tri-
balism) is limited to the Trump orbit or generalizes to extreme Trump opponents
as well (and thus a symptom of the escalating culture war more generally).
This prompts us to consider both whether the psychological tendency is more
pronounced among Trump supporters/conservatives than Trump opponents/
liberals, and whether it is more pronounced among people who are extremely
(versus moderately) in support of/opposition to Trump.
Tribalism
The first common media explanation for Trump support that we con-
sider is tribalism, which comes in three forms: prejudice against outsiders,
unwavering favoritism toward the ingroup, and bloodlust (Pew Research
Center, 2019b).
Psychology of extreme Trump supporters 55
Prejudice
Trump supporters’ animosity toward “the other” can often surface in racialized
and gendered forms in that Trump supporters and opponents tend to look
(demographically) different from one another. According to Thought Co the
typical Trump supporter is white and male (Cole, 2019; Pew Research Center,
2019a) whereas Trump’s opponents tend to be more demographically diverse
(The Washington Post; Blake, 2015), with greater representation of black people,
Hispanics, and Asians (The L.A Times; Pearce, 2019). Women and the LGBTQ
community tend to be better represented among Trump’s opponents (Pew
Research Center, 2019a).
President Trump’s promises to “Make America Great Again” might signal
to white Americans that Trump aims to revert to laws that favor the white
majority as they formerly did during the nation’s less diverse past (The Atlantic;
Green, 2017; Khazan, 2018). Non-white immigrants have also been a major
focus of Trump’s attacks. According to The Chicago Counsel, immigration has
become a deeply polarizing issue (Kafura, 2019), with Republicans gener-
ally feeling threatened by immigrants (The Washington Post; Clement & Balz,
2019), and seeing it as a more important issue than do Democrats (MSNBC;
Benen, 2018). To Republicans, immigrants pose a threat to the country’s “vital
interests” (The Washington Post; Clement & Balz, 2019), the traditional American
way of life (USA Today; Collins, 2016), and to their job security (The Washington
Post; Bump, 2019).
President Trump’s signature promise to “build a wall” was central to both
his campaign and to his presidency (The New York Times; Hirschfield-David
& Baker, 2019). His anti-immigrant rhetoric included attacking the morality
of Mexican immigrants, labeling them as “rapists” and “drug smugglers,” and
framing them as an economic threat in the way they were framed as com-
peting for jobs and depleting the social welfare system (TIME; Arce, 2019). At
times, President Trump even advocated for violence against those attempting
to immigrate to the US (The Washington Post; Sonmez, 2018; The Los Angeles
Times;Vives & Castillo, 2019). The Washington Post contends that Trump’s tough
stance on immigration was particularly alluring to conservatives who were
unsatisfied with existing, more subtle approaches to immigration (Scott, 2019a),
and may have been a major factor in his ascension to the White House (Politico;
Kumar, 2019). Proposition 1a is that Trump support is rooted in a particularly nefarious
form of tribal prejudice based in racism, xenophobia, and other forms of antipathy toward
minorities.
Scientific evidence
Conservatives in general appear to be particularly racist against black people
and illegal immigrants.When asked to report their general feelings toward black
people, illegal aliens, and white people on 100-point feeling thermometers,
conservatives showed a ~12-point gap favoring whites over blacks, and a ~45-
point gap favoring whites over illegal immigrants (Schlenker, Chambers, &
Le, 2012). The analogous gaps for liberals were approximately half the size.
This apparent racism and prejudice against minorities has been found in sev-
eral studies (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Sears & Henry, 2003; Terrizzi, Shook,
& Ventis, 2010), and appears to confirm Proposition 1a, that Trump support
may be rooted in racialized tribalism. However, this conclusion hinges upon
a correlational relationship between ideology and attitudes toward various
demographics, leaving open the possibility of a third variable explaining the
association.
Worldview conflict is an alternative explanation for conservatives’ prejudi-
cial gap: people tend to feel and express prejudice against anyone whose beliefs
conflict with their own (Brandt & Crawford, 2019; Chambers & Melnyk,
2006). For instance, gun rights advocates dislike gun restriction advocates just
as gun restriction advocates dislike gun rights advocates. And liberals tend to
dislike conservatives just as conservatives tend to dislike liberals. Black people
tend to hold liberal worldviews and favor liberal politicians. This political
leaning is evident in exit polls in which black voters overwhelmingly favored
Democrats over Republicans in recent US elections. Black voters favored
Democratic candidates over Republican candidates by 81%, 87%, 91%, and
77% in the 2016–2004 elections respectively (e.g., CNN, 2016). It is possible
that conservatives dislike black people because of black people’s race or because
of black people’s political beliefs, or both.
Attitudes toward conservatively minded black people are revealing of
the source of conservatives’ prejudice toward black people. Experimentally
crossing the race and the political beliefs of the target, Chambers, Schlenker,
and Collisson (2012) found that (white) conservatives expressed similarly posi-
tive attitudes toward conservatives, regardless of whether the conservative was
white or black. And they expressed similarly color-blind negative attitudes
toward liberals. Thus, conservatives’ prejudice against black people appears to
be explained by worldview conflict and may have little inherent basis in skin
color. (Note that we are not claiming that racism does not exist, nor that when
it exists it is always rooted in ideological conflict. We are merely citing data
that suggest that conservatives’ apparent racism may be rooted in ideological
conflict.)
Ingroup favoritism
Conservatives’ disdain for liberals (of all colors) could cause conservatives to
blindly rally behind their culture war leaders, resulting in extreme ingroup
favoritism and deference to authority. While running for president in January
2016, Donald Trump gained the impression that his supporters were unusually
dedicated and deferential to him. Expressing astonishment, he famously
stated: “They say I have the most loyal people, did you ever see that? I could
stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody and I wouldn’t lose
voters. It’s like incredible!” (CNN; Diamond, 2016). According to Axios, 62%
of those who approve of his job performance claim they cannot think of any-
thing Trump could do to lose their support (Allasan, 2019). Scandals, such as
the Hollywood access tape, impeachment for abuse of power and obstruc-
tion of Congress, and mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic seemed to
have done little to weaken support among his followers (The Washington Post;
Farenthold, 2016), with his approval ratings remaining unusually stable and
between 39% and 45% (Jones, 2018). These anecdotes and statistics suggest
an unusually robust form of deference to and support for authority among
Trump’s supporters.
According to Vox, the Trump orbit is a hotbed for authoritarian submis-
sion: people who are especially likely to defer to authoritarian leaders hold
conservative values such as a defense of hierarchy and social order as a means
to an end of maintaining order and control in an uncontrollable world (Taub,
2016). Psychology Today suggests that President Trump displays qualities con-
sistent with authoritarian leadership, subsequently attracting support from like-
minded individuals looking to thwart perceived troublemakers (Azarian, 2017).
Proposition 1b is that Trump support is rooted in their extreme tendency to defer to their
ingroup leaders.
Scientific evidence
Conservatives have been found to have a pessimistic view of human nature,
seeing people as inherently selfish (Lakoff , 2002). This perspective then justi-
fies strong external forces, such as group loyalty and strong leaders, to maintain
social order. Surveys of liberals and conservatives repeatedly confirmed that
conservatives express more positive attitudes toward the idea of social con-
formity (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010), a hierarchical social structure
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and submitting to author-
ities (Altemeyer, 2004; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Moreover, Trump
supporters per se score especially high on standard measures of authoritar-
ianism obedience (Dunwoody & Plane, 2019; Ludeke, Klitgaard, & Vitriol,
2018; Womick, Rothmund, Azevedo, King, & Jost, 2018). These results seem
to support the proposition that Trump supporters are particularly deferential
to authorities.
Presumably, the same conclusion that Trump’s base is especially loyal toward
and supportive of him should be evident in public opinion data.To find out, we
conducted a novel analysis of all 1046 presidential approval polls (each sample
was ~1000 Americans) that Gallup (2020), conducted over the past 27 years,
beginning in 1993 (President Clinton) and ending in 2020 (President Trump),
with the objective of testing whether leader-directed ingroup favoritism, in
the form of approval of the ingroup president and disapproval of the outgroup
president, was stronger among Republicans than Democrats.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
Ingroup Favoritism
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Year
Figure 4.1 Ingroup favoritism of Democrats and Republicans in their approval and disap-

proval of US presidents.
Note: The percentage of Republicans who approved of a Republican president was the
Republican ingroup favoritism score, and the percentage of Democrats who did not approve
of Republican presidents was the Democratic ingroup favoritism score; a symmetrical pro-
cedure was used to calculate Republican and Democratic ingroup favoritism scores when
the president was a Democrat. Dots represent individual polls and lines are 20- poll moving
averages.
Figure 4.1 shows that ingroup favoritism has been generally strong, with
70+% of Americans displaying ingroup favoritism most of the time. Ingroup
favoritism appears to have strengthened over the past quarter-century, as the
lines generally slope upwards, indicative of the growing culture war. But did
Republicans display more ingroup favoritism than Democrats? The Democrats’
and the Republicans’ lines appear to cross over one another repeatedly in
Figure 4.1, with neither being consistently higher than the other. This appears
Table 4.1 Are Republicans more approving of their co-partisan presidents and

disapproving of presidents from the other party than Democrats? Apparently
not.
Predictor of Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

ingroup favoritism
(Intercept) 92.46 [87.24, 94.41 [79.68, 109.14]** 89.63 [89.05, 90.21]***
97.67]***
President (1 = 4.91 [–9.82, 19.64] 0.56 [–0.03, 1.14]†
Republican, –
1 = Democrat)
Party (1 = 0.28 [–0.53, 1.09] –2.17 [–2.90, –1.44]*** –0.99 [–1.58, –0.41]**
Republican, –1
= Democrat)
Time (in years, 0.77 [0.60, 0.95]*** 1.09 [0.91, 1.27]*** 0.48 [0.43, 0.52]***
centered at
April 2020)
President × Party –6.35 [–7.08, –5.62]*** –5.17 [–5.75, –4.59]***
President × Time 0.57 [0.39, 0.75]*** –0.01 [–0.06, 0.03]
Party × Time –0.05 [–0.11, 0.01]† –0.32 [–0.37, –0.27]*** –0.07 [–0.12, –0.03]**
President × –0.67 [–0.72, –0.61]*** –0.42 [–0.47, –0.38]***
Party × Time
9–11 (Sept 2001– –12.89 [–14.36,
Nov 2002 = 1; –11.41]***
else = 0)
9–11 × Party 23.64 [22.17,
25.11]***
Notes: †p < 0.10, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Analyses are from multilevel models predicting
ingroup favoritism in presidential approval, with random intercepts for each presidency.
to not support the predominant social psychological evidence that Republicans

display stronger ingroup favoritism than Democrats. A formal analysis (a party
× time multilevel model; see Model 1 in Table 4.1), found a general increase in
ingroup favoritism over time (confirming the apparent upward trend) but no
effect of the party of the respondents, raising initial questions about whether
there might be a disconnect between psychological studies and real-world
observations on the topic of ideology and ingroup favoritism.
Closer inspection of Figure 4.1 gives the impression that ingroup favor-
itism might be stronger when the other party controls the presidency (perhaps
because the effect of bad is stronger than that of good: Baumeister, Bratslavsky,
Finkenauer, & de Vohs, 2001). For example, Republican non- approval of
President Obama was ~90% and stronger than Democratic support (~80%)
for President Obama. This impression was borne out in analyses (President ×
Party interaction; see Model 2). Statistically controlling for this effect, it was
Democrats rather than Republicans who evidenced stronger ingroup favoritism
(controlling for the effects of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks yielded
a similar conclusion; see Model 3).
The disconnect between (previously reviewed) psychological theory and
research that suggests that Trump supporters are particularly authoritarian on
the one hand and publicly available data (that points to similarities between the
two sides) on the other hand begs for an explanation. One possibility is that the
scales used to support the conclusion that Republicans are more biased than
Democrats may themselves have been biased by conflating the act of obedi-
ence to authority with the act of obeying conservative authorities. For example,
an item on the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale asks participants to
agree or disagree with “It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper
authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers
in our society” (Altemeyer, 2004, p. 86). This wording is confounding because
it leaves open the possibility that conservatives endorse this item more than
liberals because conservatives trust the judgment of any or even all authorities
(an authoritarian tendency) on the one hand, or because of a more generic
form of ingroup favoritism manifest as conservatives trusting the judgment
of their ideologically congenial authorities, like religious leaders. Some scales
appear to avoid this conservative authority confound by not specifying the
authority object, and instead asking general questions about behaviors such as
obedience in general (Schwartz, 1992). However, an object (e.g., an authority
figure) is logically necessary for obedience to happen. Not stating what that
object is might leave the subject to infer or imagine one; when people do infer
an obedience object, they tend to conjure the image of a conservative authority
figure (Frimer, Gaucher, & Schaefer, 2014).
To validly test the idea that conservatives are more obedient than liberals, the
object of obedience needs to be specified and the perceived ideology of the
authority figure needs to be taken into account. When asked about obeying an
ideologically diverse set of authority figures, from civil rights and environmental
leaders on the left to religious and military leaders on the right, conservatives
displayed more obedience only when the authorities were perceived to hold
politically right-wing views (Frimer et al., 2014). When the authority fig-
ures were from the political left, people on the political left displayed elevated
authoritarian tendencies. And when the authority figures were perceived to
be politically neutral (e.g., an office manager), liberals and conservatives were
similarly obedient. And when the authority figures in the RWA scale were
revised to be left-wing authorities, political liberals endorsed authoritarianism,
prejudice, and dogmatism (Conway, Houck, Gornick, & Repke, 2017). These
results are consistent with Realistic Group Conflict Theory, which posits that
people in general (liberals included) fall in line with the crowd and the leader
when groups compete for limited resources like political power (Sherif, Harvey,
White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). Obedience to authority appears to not be
limited to, or even particularly elevated on, the political right vis-à-vis the left.
Rather, it appears to be a quite pronounced motive on both extremes (Frimer
et al., 2014), meaning that obedience to Trump might be a product of the larger
culture war.
Bloodlust
Another form of tribalism that might be at play in extreme Trump support is
bloodlust in the form of aggressive desires for attacks on perceived enemies.
President Trump has frequently insulted and attacked Democrats, referring to
them as “sick people” (ABC News; Scott, 2019b) and “Crooked Hillary,” having
issued more than an insult each day on Twitter alone (Frimer & Skitka, 2018).
The Nation characterized his verbal attacks on his political adversaries as tan-
tamount to President Trump “throwing red meat to his base,” which conjures
the image of Trump satiating the ravenous hunger of a vicious pack of wolves
(Abramsky, 2019). Proposition 1c is that Trump’s supporters’ tribal instincts cause them
to approve of Trump causing harm to their shared (perceived) enemies.
Scientific evidence
Conservatives score higher than liberals on standard measures of sadism, psych-
opathy, and general meanness (Lilienfeld, Latzman, Watts, Smith, & Dutton,
2014; Preston & Anestis, 2018) and extreme conservatives score especially high
on these traits (Duspara & Greitmeyer, 2017).These trends might appear to align
the media’s portrayal of Trump supporters as a pack of ravenous wolves that
enjoy a rhetorical bloodbath. But closer inspection points to a different con-
clusion, that Trump’s supporters do not approve of his attacks in the first place.
Elevated scores on a subclinical measure of psychopathy do not necessarily
qualify Trump supporters as psychopaths in the same way that being 1 kg over-
weight does not qualify a person as obese.To put conservatives’ higher desire for
interpersonal conflict in context, Frimer and Skitka (2020; Study 5) asked 1593
Americans from across the political spectrum to indicate whether they prefer
their political leaders to be culture warriors (e.g., “fight with opponents”)
or be governors for all (e.g., be a “country unifier”). Partisanship correlated
with preference in a manner consistent with prior psychopathy and ideology
findings, such that Republicans expressed a stronger preference for culture
warriors than Democrats did. However, people across the political spectrum,
strong Republicans included, preferred governors over warriors (Figure 4.2).
Inferences about Trump supporters’ self-reported preference for national
unity over culture war might be prone to the limits and biases of self-awareness
and qualified by the possibility of socially desirable responding, to which
conservatives tend to be particularly prone (Wojcik et al., 2015). Needed are
experimental designs that assess the reactions of Trump supporters to Trump’s
attacks on his adversaries wherein respondents are not aware of what a scripted
response might entail.To that end, Frimer and Skitka (2018) asked self-identified
“diehard Trump supporters” to react to a tweet in which President Trump
Leadership Style Perference
Strong Republican
Republican
Neither
Democrat
Strong Democrat
1 2 3 4 5
Culture Warrior Governor for All
Figure 4.2 Self-
reported political leadership preference of American Democrats and
Republicans in 2019.
Note: All items were bipolar, with culture warrior items being low (1) and governor- for- all
items being high (5) on the 1– 5 scale. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
attacked a political rival (e.g., Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama) or a media per-
sonality (e.g., Mika Brzezinski, Joe Scarborough) or a less uncivil version of the
same. If Trump’s diehard base has bloodlust, we should expect them to express
greater approval of his uncivil attack than for the more civil rapprochement.
But this is not what was found. In several studies, diehard Trump supporters
evaluated Trump similarly after reading a civil or uncivil message from him;
when they did show a reaction, it was disapproving of Trump’s uncivil attack.
The rest of the political spectrum univocally disapproved of Trump’s attacks, and
this included (non-diehard) Trump supporters.These results were corroborated
in longitudinal analyses of public polling data, meaning that they were not an
artifact of the artificial lab setting. They also accord with decades of research
showing that attack ads backfire upon the attacker—they harm the reputation
of the attacker more than that of the attacked (e.g., Carraro & Castelli, 2010; see
Lau, Sigelman, & Rovner, 2007 for a review). In sum, research to date seems to
disconfirm the notion that Trump’s supporters have bloodlust for the perceived
political adversaries.
The information bubble
Along with tribalism, a second common explanation that the media some-
times offers for extreme Trump support implicates the regular consumption of
pro-Trump media and opinions. While the number of media sources and the
diversity of ideas available to the public have increased over time, people have
increasingly consumed content that confirms their attitudes while remaining
unexposed to information that might alter or challenge those beliefs. The
“Trump bubble” refers to a set of media outlets, citizens, and social media circles
that share content that exclusively promotes and validates President Trump’s
agenda, policies, and behavior. According to The Financial Times, the center of
the Trump bubble might be Fox News (Bond, 2017), whose pundits tend to
support President Trump on most matters. Social media also contributes to the
formation and maintenance of information bubbles. Sites like Facebook and
Twitter use algorithms to learn from a user’s previous behaviors to selectively
present more of the same. Business Insider proposes that these sorting algorithms
help to maintain a relatively narrow ideological cocoon that reinforces asym-
metrical, biased information bubbles and echo chambers (Bremmer, 2019).
Even when belief-challenging information enters the conversation, it rarely
affects attitudes. This is because people tend to interpret information in a way
that confirms their pre-existing opinions.According to The New Yorker, this con-
firmation bias might explain why extreme Trump supporters were undeterred
by evidence that challenges their allegiance (e.g., the Access Hollywood scandal;
Konnikova, 2016).
The information circulating within the Trump bubble may not be fully
accurate, in part because some of it is false news propagated by Russian bots
(Goldman, Barnes, Haberman & Fandos, 2020). However, it succeeds in
reinforcing the beliefs of those who strongly approve of the current presi-
dent (The Washington Post; Emba, 2016), and may even deepen their extremism
(The Guardian; Grimes, 2017). Information bubbles on the political right may
be particularly impervious to outside information. However, Huffpost suggests
that both Republicans and Democrats consume media content that supports
and confirms their existing beliefs (Grenoble, 2018). Proposition 2 is that Trump
supporters are in an information bubble filled with pro-Trump opinions, Russian bots,
and fake news.
Scientific evidence
Repeated exposure to statements supporting a singular point of view is suffi-
cient to increase attitude polarization (e.g., Hinsz & David, 1984). The more
statements supporting the viewpoint, the more extreme the observer’s attitudes
are likely to become. Simply put, repetition works. Information bubbles,
sustained by social media algorithms that selectively present information that
the user previously responded positively to, have made information consump-
tion increasingly asymmetric and unbalanced in recent years.
However, artificial intelligence sorting algorithms are not the only causes
of information bubbles. Among the most robust findings in social psych-
ology is confirmation bias, the tendency for people to seek out and inter-
pret information in a way that supports their existing opinions (e.g., Kunda,
1990). Confirmation bias is a product of a desire to avoid the uncomfortable

feeling of cognitive dissonance that results from having one’s beliefs challenged
(Festinger, 1957; Webb, Change, & Benn, 2013) and from a desire to keep the
peace with one’ friends and acquaintances, which satisfies the need for a shared
sense of reality with close others (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009) and the
associated need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Confirmation bias thus
scratches a defensive itch and provides clarity in an oft-confusing world. The
scientific record strongly and consistently supports the notion that people tend
to selectively expose themselves to people and information that they expect will
reaffirm their existing beliefs (e.g., Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Barberá,
Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl, 2017; Iyengar
& Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2008).
Theories for the existence of the bias set up predictions that Trump supporters
might be particularly prone to confirmation bias insofar as conservatives (e.g.,
Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) and people with extreme political
views (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Hogg, 2007; van Prooijen & Krowel, 2019) are
thought to feel particularly threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity. The evi-
dence is mixed regarding whether conservatives/Republicans are more prone
to selectively exposing themselves to congenial information than are liberals,
and a number of studies leave open alternative explanations for their findings.
For instance, a study of media consumption of the 1940 US presidential election
found that Republicans consumed more belief-confirming political informa-
tion than did Democrats (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944). However, the
Republican party outspent the Democrats in that election by a margin of 2:1
(Overack, 1941), making pro-Republican information more available in gen-
eral. Taking into account this asymmetric amount of slanted information, Sears
and Freedman (1967) concluded that Republicans were less prone to selective
exposure than Democrats. More recent lab studies found that conservatives
were more likely to avoid interactions with liberals than vice versa (Nam, Jost,
& van Bavel, 2013); however this study failed to replicate (Brandt & Crawford,
2013). And a series of experiments found strong and consistent evidence that
selective exposure motivation is strong for both liberals and conservatives, and
to a similar degree (Frimer et al., 2017). A meta-analysis of a variety of forms
of political biases found similarly strong biases among liberals and conservatives
(Ditto et al., 2019).
Analyses of the networks and behaviors of people on social media sites have
also produced mixed results. Some studies suggest that conservatives’ bubbles
are less permeable than liberals’. For instance, on Twitter, conservatives appear
to be less likely to retweet liberals’ tweets than vice versa (Barberá, Jost, Nagler,
Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015) and conservatives and extremists have more ideo-
logically congenial social networks on Twitter than liberals and moderates,
respectively (Boutyline & Willer, 2017).Yet another study on social media found
that conservatives’ bubbles were more permeable than liberals’: conservatives
were found to be more likely to click on and share cross-cutting Facebook

posts than were liberals (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015).
Together, the evidence probably favors the proposition that Trump
supporters are in an ideologically homogeneous and impermeable informa-
tion bubble, a bubble that is of comparable impermeability and homogeneity
as the bubble on the extreme political left. However, it remains possible that
other asymmetries make the Trump bubble particularly biased. Information
within each bubble might be different in quality, for example if Russian bots
were to have infiltrated the Trump bubble, spreading false news stories with
the intent of accentuating divisions within the US. False news spreads much
faster on social media than factual information (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018),
making false news particularly potent. That said, the available evidence is
that Russian bots are not (yet) as efficacious as commonly thought. An ana-
lysis of the political attitudes of 1239 Democrats and Republicans on Twitter
found that attitudes did not change after interacting with Russian bots (Bail
et al., 2020).
In sum, the available evidence supports the idea that Trump supporters are
in an information bubble, that the bubble is probably sealed tighter than the
information bubbles of political moderates, and that the information bubble
itself helps drive up and sustain extreme beliefs. However, the evidence is too
mixed to yield any firm conclusions about whether the Trump bubble is more
ideologically uniform than information bubbles on the far left.
Material self-i nterest

Having examined and found some support for tribalism and information
bubbles explaining extreme Trump support, we now consider what is perhaps a
more rational explanation: self-interest. Four in five Americans are living pay-
check to paycheck (The Guardian; Reich, 2019). According to sources such as
Business Insider and CNBC, the costs of healthcare, education, childcare, housing
and food are increasing more quickly than are wages in the US (Hoffower,
2019; Leonhardt, 2019; Long, 2018; Rapier, 2018; Steinour, 2019). Factories are
shutting down and moving overseas, and with them the well-paying manufac-
turing jobs that previously gave many Americans a sense of purpose and pride,
and a decent living (Business Insider; McEnery, 2011). Employment in manufac-
turing has declined 27% since 2000 (Quartz; Guilford, 2018); those Americans
who lost their well-paying factory jobs that came with benefits subsequently
sought work in retail, healthcare, and construction (CNN Business; Long, 2016).
The result of these economic changes is rising anxiety and a general sense
of desperation (Detroit Free Press; Howard, 2019). Downtrodden people may
believe that Trump, who has promised to improve Americans’ financial predica-
ment, will alleviate their economic hardship; that is, they support him out of
material self-interest.
According to some media accounts, President Trump seems to have taken

care of his supporters. His support for policies that directly benefit conservative
Americans may bolster his support amongst Republicans (The Washington Post;
Olorunnipa & Parker, 2019). Many of Trump’s policies, such as the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act and the Market Facilitation Program (farmer subsidies), have been
found to benefit his base more so than his opponents. For instance, The New York
Times reports that the tax cuts President Trump signed into law in 2017 dis-
proportionately benefited white Americans over Latino and African Americans
(Tankersley, 2018). President Trump’s bailout program for American farmers
overwhelmingly benefitted white farmers while simultaneously harming small
farms and racial minorities (AG Mag; Carr, 2019). Economic anxieties have
made unconventional economic policies, including protectionism, politically
viable. According to The Conversation (Bencherki & Basque, 2018), Trump
supporters’ sense that an ever-changing world has left them behind has been
sufficiently strong for them to abandon a long-standing preference for free
trade, and instead embrace protectionist tariffs and trade wars. In sum, President
Trump’s policies may have prioritized the interests of his political base (The
Washington Post; Farenthold, Costa, & Wagner, 2017).
The Wall Street Journal states that Trump’s supporters believe that he is cap-
able of ushering in a new era of economic prosperity (Zitner, 2016). Indeed,
President Trump promised and delivered a major bill that reduced taxes; the
spirit of the bill struck a chord with his supporters (The Washington Post; Long,
2017), even though it did little in the end to lower most of their tax burdens
(The Guardian; Cary & Holmes, 2019). This observation makes salient the dis-
tinction between actual self-interest and perceived self-interest.Trump supporters
might support him because they think they are better off for it. Proposition 3 is
that Trump’s support is rooted in perceived material self-interest.
Scientific evidence
The literature on “pocketbook voting,” that is, the tendency to vote for and
support candidates and policies that maximize one’s own material self-interests,
is mixed and contentious, with some scholars suggesting that pocketbook
voting occurs and others suggesting it might not. Our review of the literature
finds support for the occurrence of a particular kind of pocketbook voting,
namely that people tend to favor candidates and policies that they believe will
advance their individual self-interests.
Early analyses seemed to support the notion that apparent pocketbook
voting is an epiphenomenon, propped up by unrelated psychological processes.
For example, analyses of survey data and experimental studies found that
correlations between personal finances and political attitudes were found only
when items measuring finances and attitudes were located in close proximity
to one another within a survey (Sears & Lau, 1983). People might have voiced
opposition toward a candidate as a form of scapegoating their personal financial
distress when their reasons for opposition were actually based in other factors.
However, Lewis-Beck (1985) evaluated Michigan Center for Political Studies-
Survey Research Center (CPS-SRC) election surveys and found no support
for the item-proximity moderator effect. Lau, Sears, and Jessor (1990) then
refined the conditions under which item proximity is likely to produce an
apparent pocketbook voting effect. Together, these studies seem to support the
idea that it is possible to socially prime a relationship between pocketbook
concerns and political attitudes.
The primed connection between personal finances and political decision
making may not be limited to surveys and questionnaires but might also extend
to the real political world. Politicians sometimes raise the psychological sali-
ence of personal finances in political decision making, which could induce
pocketbook voting. For example, Ronald Reagan successfully induced more
externalized attribution for voters’ financial improvement in his “Good
Morning America” campaign (Beschloss, 2016) and subsequently produced
a strong economic self-interest vote for himself in 1984 (Lau et al., 1990).
President Trump has drawn from the same playbook by explicitly linking his
presidency to the value of Americans’ pensions:
I won the election, the markets went up thousands of points, things started
happening. If, for some reason, I were not to have won the election, these
markets would have crashed. That will happen even more so in 2020. You
have no choice but to vote for me, because your 401(k), everything is going
to be down the tubes.
(Murray, 2019)
Whether rhetorical connections between a particular candidate and material

self-interest boost or sustain support for President Trump remains to be tested.
These earlier studies examined the connection between the personal
finances of Americans and general and political choices. However, the politics
of material self-interests of different demographic groups might diverge. For
instance, the self-interest of low-socioeconomic status racial minorities might
be aligned with the political left whereas the self-interest of wealthy white
males might be aligned with the political right. It is therefore unclear whether
these early studies captured the phenomenon of pocketbook voting per se.
More recent research carefully connected respondents’ pocketbook interests to
particular voting options, for example by studying demographics (e.g., parents)
in relation to parties with clear policies that would help or hinder those groups
(Elinder, Jordahl, & Poutvaara, 2015). This new wave of pocketbook voting
studies found relatively consistent support for a particular form of pocketbook
voting— future-
oriented or prospective pocketbook voting. That is, people
seem to support candidates who they think will benefit them financially, in the
future. This new wave also found weaker but mixed support for past-oriented
or retrospective pocketbook voting, a concept captured by a famous question
posed by then-candidate Ronald Reagan, “Are you better off today than you
were four years ago?” Some studies found support for retrospective pocketbook
voting (Tilley, Neundorf, & Hobolt, 2018) whereas others did not (Elinder
et al., 2015; Mutz, 2018).
The existing body of pocketbook voting literature is solely based on correl-
ational and observational studies, leaving open the possibility that unidentified
third variables confound or suppress observed effects. To our knowledge, no
studies have experimentally manipulated the perception that a particular can-
didate will benefit the respondent financially and then observed whether such
a manipulation altered level of support. In sum, it remains unclear whether
and to what degree extreme Trump support is rooted in perceived material
self-interest.
Conclusion
Our review of Trump support, in both its more tentative and extreme forms,
finds that all three major psychological claims advanced in the media were
consistent with the available psychological evidence. Extreme Trump support
appears to be rooted in tribalism, information bubbles, and perceived material
self-
interest. In general, the more nefarious theories (e.g., racism, Russian
bots, bloodlust) were less supported and the more banal ones (e.g., informa-
tion bubbles, self-interest) were more supported. Moreover, several of the effi-
cacious explanations generalized to extreme Trump opponents, meaning that
they might be a byproduct of a decades-long and escalating culture war. In this
way, Donald Trump’s presidency is not only stoking the culture war, but also is
a product of it. Focusing attention on ways to reduce intergroup conflict might
be a fruitful way of preventing the emergence of future would-be autocrats and
thereby preserving democracy.
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Chapter 5
The impact of relational goals

on political polarization
Chadly Stern
Philosophers and social theorists have long argued that a plurality of opinions
and constructive debate are fundamental components of a healthy society
(Arendt, 1968; Mill, 1859; Mutz, 2006). It is commonly assumed that disagree-
ment about political topics promotes societal progress. For example, without
continual debate about voting and immigration policies, a system that treats
people in the fairest way possible would be difficult to establish. Additionally,
disagreement can foster greater political knowledge, ultimately promoting a
more informed and engaged electorate (Putnam, 2000). This perspective is
commonly echoed when scholars advocate for greater attitude diversity (e.g.,
liberal and conservative perspectives) in various spaces, such as congressional
chambers, university campuses, and social media (An et al., 2011; Duarte et al.,
2015; Lukianoff & Haidt, 2019).
At the same time, researchers have also highlighted a growing trend of atti-
tude polarization (Abramowitz, 2010). The attitudes that political elites (e.g.,
party leaders) and everyday citizens hold toward various issues (e.g., abortion)
have become increasingly divergent and extreme over time (Abramowitz &
Saunders, 2008). From this perspective, attitude disagreement is generally
described as a social problem (Bishop, 2009). Political polarization can lead to
a variety of insidious consequences, ranging from a lack of contact between
people who hold different political viewpoints (Pew, 2014) to partisan gridlock
(Jacobson, 2016), and even long-term conflict and violence (Bar-Tal, 2013).
Thus, understanding the roots of political polarization is a pivotal question
in improving relations among people and forging more constructive political
discourse.
In this chapter, I review how relational motivations to connect and affiliate
with other people contribute to political polarization. I also highlight ways in
which these goals diverge across the political spectrum. Specifically, I outline
how political conservatives (those on the right) and liberals (those on the left)
differ in the relational goals that they prioritize. I discuss how these motivations
contribute to beliefs about the degree of attitude similarity within political
groups, as well as the accuracy of those beliefs among both everyday citizens
78 Chadly Stern
and political elites. I also discuss how these motivations impact the actual degree
of attitude agreement that develops within political groups. Throughout this
chapter, I outline how these processes lead both liberals and conservatives to
contribute to political polarization. Lastly, I propose psychologically informed
approaches that could be used to address the social problems that polariza-
tion creates and to foster more positive relationships between liberals and
conservatives.
The foundational nature of relational goals

At any given time, people possess a diverse set of goals and must choose
which ones to pursue given the demands of a situation and available resources
(Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, & Sleeth-Keppler, 2002). For
example, on a Saturday afternoon some students opt to pursue an academic
goal through studying whereas others progress toward a fitness goal through
working out. Although people possess a diverse set of goals, various theoret-
ical perspectives in psychology and related disciplines have long stressed the
importance of social relationships in the goal hierarchy of humans (Baumeister
& Leary, 1995; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg, &
Schaller, 2010; Maslow, 1943).These perspectives also frequently posit that social
relationships are not simply important goals that people prioritize, but in fact are
foundational to human existence. In other words, people would fail to socially
and physically exist without the formation and maintenance of relationships.
Developing and maintaining social relationships are not end goals in and
of themselves. In other words, people form friendships, join clubs, and find
a romantic partner for reasons other than simply having those relationships.
Instead, social relationships act as a means toward the end of achieving other
important goals. For example, some scholars have highlighted that the develop-
ment of social bonds increases the odds of survival through obtaining shelter,
food, and security (Ainsworth, 1989; Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Relationships
within dyads, groups, and communities also provide “social capital” that allows
individuals to call on others in times of need (e.g., help in obtaining a job) and
succeed in modern society (Putnam, 2000).
Importantly, other theoretical perspectives have stressed that social relationships
serve more “epistemic” purposes in everyday life (Berger & Luckmann, 1967;
Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 2019). For example, shared reality theory
posits that people are motivated to develop mutually held conceptions of the
world with others, as doing so facilitates everyday communication about one’s
environment (Lau, Chiu, & Lee, 2001). People develop shared ideas and beliefs
through a process of social verification and feedback. Children observe that
adults call a four-legged animal that barks a “dog” and one that meows a “cat,”
and receive positive responses when they use those same words. This process of
shared belief construction continues throughout the course of a person’s life as
they encounter new concepts.
Relational goals & political polarization 79
Once people adopt shared ideas about basic concepts in the world (e.g., the
meowing animal is a cat), they form more elaborate beliefs and attitudes about
those concepts. People not only know what a “cat” is or what it means to iden-
tify as “Black” in their culture, but also have preferences about which animals
they think would be good pets and attitudes toward different racial groups.
How do people come to feel that these preferences, attitudes, and beliefs are
valid? Festinger (1950) famously made the distinction between “physical” and
“social” aspects of the world. He argued that a person can test and validate their
perceptions of physical forms of reality, such as walking through what they
perceive to be an open door to determine whether the door is actually open.
In contrast, social forms of reality cannot be subjected to physical tests and
empirical inquiry. A person who believes that cats are better pets than dogs or
that Black people are inferior to White people cannot directly test the validity
of their perspectives. Instead, they reference other people, and similar others in
particular, to validate their attitudes and beliefs.To the degree that similar others
agree with one’s own attitudes and beliefs, those perspectives are infused with
a sense of legitimacy.
Relational verification of political attitudes and beliefs

Do people use social relationships to verify their political views? Political
issues rarely possess an objectively correct answer. Should people with criminal
records be able to vote? Should recreational marijuana use be legalized? The
subjective nature of many political beliefs and attitudes renders their validity
ambiguous. In turn, people strongly rely on social relationships to make sense
of political aspects of the world (Stern & Ondish, 2018).
There are a variety of social sources that people can draw from to verify
their political stances, such as politicians, political party platforms, and the news
(Cacciatore, Scheufele, & Iyengar, 2016; Leeper & Slothuus, 2014; Mutz, 1998).
However, people commonly rely on like-minded others in their own social
networks to validate their political views, such as their family, friends, and local
community (Festinger, Cartwright, Barber, Fleischl, Gottsdanker, Keysen, &
Leavitt, 1948; Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008).This desire for social verifica-
tion from close others leads people to purposefully select friends (Iyengar, Lelkes,
Levendusky, Malhotra, & Westwood, 2019) and romantic partners (Huber &
Malhotra, 2017; Kandler, Bleidorn, & Rieman, 2012) whose belief systems echo
their own. Although there are well-known examples of romantic couples who
hold diametrically opposed beliefs (e.g., political consultants Mary Matalin and
James Carville), these forms of coupling are more an exception than the norm.
People also sometimes take the drastic step of moving (or at least desiring to
move) into more ideologically homogeneous communities where their beliefs
and attitudes can be continually validated (Bishop, 2009; Johnston, Manley, &
Jones, 2016; Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter, & Nosek, 2014). Overall, people rely
on like-minded others to verify their political attitudes and beliefs.
80 Chadly Stern
Ideological differences in relational goals

Do people differ in the extent to which they use social relationships to val-
idate their political views? Scholars have long been interested in understanding
psychological differences between people who adopt more conservative/
right-wing ideologies that resist novel change as opposed to more liberal/left-
wing ideologies that promote novel change (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Rokeach, 1960). A generative debate concerning
the degree to which liberals and conservatives psychologically differ on
various motivations (e.g., epistemic goals) and biases continues to occur, with
varying viewpoints being proposed. Some scholars have contended that ideo-
logical differences are robust and meaningful (Baron & Jost, 2019; Jost, 2017).
In contrast, others have noted that proposed differences between liberals and
conservatives might not exist (Ditto et al., 2019) or that some differences pri-
marily emerge between people with extreme compared to moderate ideologies
(van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019).There is not a conclusive way to reconcile these
competing perspectives at the current time. It is most likely that some psycho-
logical differences vary between people on the left and the right, whereas other
differences are grounded in the extremity of one’s views, or some combination
of these possibilities. However, to the degree that liberals and conservatives do
consistently differ in at least some psychological motivations, and relational
goals in particular, such ideological “asymmetries” could contribute to political
polarization.
Although all people are motivated to connect with like- minded others
to some degree, research conducted in various cultures over the last several
decades has consistently documented that there is meaningful variation across
people in the extent to which they chronically desire to build and maintain
social connections. People who are more politically conservative (compared
to liberal) report a stronger motivation to conform, remain loyal, affiliate, and
“share reality” with ingroups and politically like- minded others (Feldman,
2003; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Hennes, Nam, Stern, & Jost, 2012; Kim,
Kang, & Yun, 2012; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; Stern,West, Jost, & Rule, 2014;
Yilmaz, Harma, Bahcekapili, & Cesur, 2016). Put another way, conservatives
more strongly value cohesive and tight-knit communities than do liberals (Haidt
& Graham, 2009; Waytz, Iyer,Young, Haidt, & Graham, 2019). Liberals, on the
other hand, tend to more readily prioritize establishing a sense of uniqueness
and individuating themselves from the collective (Cavazza & Mucchi-Faina,
2008; Stern, West, & Schmitt, 2014). Thus, liberals and conservatives both
possess relational goals, but their goals are different.
Ideological differences in perceived attitude similarity

How do people validate their political attitudes and beliefs through social
relationships? Most people form meaningful relationships throughout the course
of their life, such as through building platonic friendships, finding romantic

partners, generating close bonds with family members, and joining clubs and
organizations (Putnam, 2000; Reis, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000). Relationships
that are maintained over time generally occur with people who share one’s
political views (Huber & Malhotra, 2017; Iyengar et al., 2019). In turn, these
relationships function as a form of actual attitude verification. However, con-
tinually engaging in and maintaining relationships can sometimes be an effortful
and strenuous process. All relationships experience hurdles (e.g., couples fight,
friendships dissolve; Rusbult, Olsen, Davis, & Hannon, 2001). These challenges
threaten people’s ability to receive actual attitude verification from like-minded
others. People also do not have continual access to actual forms of verification
from like-minded others. Inquiring with a romantic partner or calling a friend
every time a person experiences uncertainty about a political view is bur-
densome and could strain the relationship. In turn, people do not solely seek
out actual verification of their attitudes and beliefs. They also perceive that close
and like-minded others share their understanding of the world. This phenom-
enon occurs for both mundane (e.g., food preferences) and political topics (e.g.,
policy positions; Hoch, 1987; Ross, Lelkes, & Russell, 2012). These perceptions
of attitude similarity increase the feeling that one’s attitudes and beliefs are valid
(Holtz, 2003).
Ideological differences in relational goals lead liberals and conservatives to
differentially perceive how widely their attitudes are shared with like-minded
others. Specifically, conservatives perceived that politically like-minded others
(i.e., fellow conservatives) shared their political beliefs and attitudes (e.g.,
whether they support legal abortion and the death penalty) to a greater degree
than did liberals (Stern & West, 2016). Conservatives’ stronger desire to affiliate
with like-minded others appears, in part, to drive their greater perceptions
of similarity. When relational goals to affiliate were experimentally attenuated,
perceptions of similarity among conservatives were reduced and compar-
able to those of liberals (Stern & West, 2016). Importantly, both liberals’ and
conservatives’ perceptions of similarity are wrong (Dvir- Gvirsman, 2015a,
2015b; Rabinowitz, Latella, Stern, & Jost, 2016; Stern, West, & Schmitt, 2014).
Conservatives overestimate the extent to which other conservatives share their
political beliefs and attitudes, whereas liberals underestimate the extent to which
other liberals share their political views. In other words, conservatives hold
positions that are less aligned with those of other conservatives than they think
they are, and liberals hold positions that are more aligned with those of other
liberals than they think they are.
Ideological differences in the misperception of attitude similarity can con-
tribute to political polarization. People receive feedback about the commonness
of their political attitudes and beliefs as they engage in everyday interactions
and discussions. Even in relatively homogeneous communities, social feed-
back will sometimes indicate that people’s perceptions of belief similarity are
distorted (Goel, Mason, & Watts, 2010). Liberals’ and conservatives’ relational
82 Chadly Stern
goals contribute to their perceptions of similarity. Receiving information that

one’s perceptions are inaccurate directly threatens the ability to satisfy those
relational goals.
When the relational goals that people prioritize are threatened, they sub-
sequently adopt attitudes that most readily satisfy those goals (Imhoff & Erb,
2009; Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005). Recognizing that one’s
attitudes are less commonly held than initially thought threatens conservatives’
stronger relational goal to connect with like-minded others. The motivation to
affiliate and “share reality” with like-minded others is associated with adopting
political attitudes that reinforce the status quo (e.g., opposition to healthcare
reform; Hennes et al., 2012), and threats to relational connection prompt more
extreme support for positions that bolster the status quo (Hess & Ledgerwood,
2014; Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008). In turn, as conservatives encounter
like-minded others and note the skewed nature of their perceptions, they are
likely to adopt more extreme conservative positions as a way of satisfying their
goal to affiliate. In contrast, realizing that one’s attitudes are more commonly
held than initially thought threatens liberals’ stronger uniqueness goal. The
motivation to stand out and be unique is associated with adopting political
positions that challenge the status quo (e.g., support for minority groups’ rights;
Snyder & Fromkin, 1977, 1980), and threats to distinctiveness and individuality
prompt people to embrace stances that deviate from the current state of affairs
(Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). As liberals
receive information that their perceptions of similarity are distorted, they are
likely to adopt more extreme liberal positions as a way of satisfying their goal
to be unique.
Ideological asymmetries in perceptions of attitude similarity also occur
among politicians. Republican (i.e., conservative) politicians and party leaders
overestimate the degree to which their constituents endorse conservative
stances (e.g., opposing same- sex marriage; Broockman, Carnes, Crowder-
Meyer, & Skovron, in press; Broockman & Skovron, 2018). Democratic (i.e.,
liberal) politicians do the same, although to a lesser degree, meaning that they
underestimate the degree to which their constituents endorse liberal stances
(e.g., supporting same-sex marriage). These misperceptions are derived in part
from Republican (versus Democratic) constituents being more likely to reach
out to representatives who share their party affiliation, potentially as a means of
verifying their beliefs with like-minded others.
These skewed perceptions can impact the candidate preferences of local
party leaders in a manner that promotes political polarization. Moderate
candidates who can appeal to a broader array of voters often have an edge
in general elections and so might be expected to recruit greater support
from party leaders (Hall, 2015). For example, Republican party leaders in the
United States were initially hesitant to support Donald Trump, who espoused
extreme views on the campaign trail, over a more moderate candidate in the
2016 presidential election (Bradner, 2016). Similarly, Democratic leaders were
more supportive of Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden (moderate liberals) over the
more ideologically extreme Bernie Sanders in the 2016 and 2020 presidential
elections, respectively (Siders, 2020). However, local party leaders often display
the exact opposite behavior. Local party leaders are more likely to prefer an
ideologically extreme (versus moderate) candidate, and the tendency to do so is
especially pronounced among Republicans (Broockman, Carnes, Crowder-
Meyer, & Skovron, in press).
What drives these counterintuitive decisions? The preferences and motiv-
ations of party leaders contribute to candidate support to a greater degree
that does strategic selection of candidates (Hassell, 2018). It is possible that
local party leaders’ relational goals contribute to their preferences for extreme
candidates. Conservative party leaders perceive their electorate as being more
conservative than it actually is (i.e., as being strongly conservative). It is feasible
that they prefer an extreme candidate whose views are consistent with those
perceptions as a means of “sharing reality” with the electorate. In contrast, lib-
eral party leaders perceive their electorate as being less liberal than it actually
is (i.e., as being moderately liberal). In turn, they might prefer a more extreme
candidate as a means of expressing uniqueness from the electorate.
It is important to note that the candidate preferences of party leaders might
vary based on the scope of the electorate. Local party leaders appear inclined
to prefer more extreme candidates. However, party leaders who are focused on
national elections might prefer moderate candidates due to the more expansive
scope of the electorate. Nevertheless, to the degree that party leaders do some-
times choose more ideologically extreme (versus moderate) candidates, this
process has the potential to further divide everyday people in their political
stances. Politicians can act as a knowledge base for citizens grappling with how
to feel about an issue (Leeper & Slothuus, 2014), and observing more ideo-
logically extreme candidates would produce more politically extreme attitudes
among the populace.
Ideological differences in actual attitude similarity

Ideological differences in relational motivation can also impact actual levels
of attitude similarity among liberals and conservatives. People create social
networks both in person and virtually. Various forms of social media (e.g.,
Twitter, Facebook) provide opportunities for people to observe and engage
with diverse political perspectives. However, social media can also be strategic-
ally employed to seek out political viewpoints that reflect and, in turn, legit-
imize one’s own views. Given this possibility, a growing number of researchers
have become interested in understanding the degree of political attitude simi-
larity that exists within social media networks, and whether there might be
ideological differences in the construction of homogeneous networks.
On Twitter, conservatives are less likely to share political perspectives that
diverge from their own (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015), and
84 Chadly Stern
are more likely to construct homophilous networks (Boutyline & Willer, 2017).
Additionally, when conservative (versus liberal) elites used moral-emotional
language in their Twitter messages, these messages more readily spread (Brady,
Wills, Burkart, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2019). Ideological asymmetries in message
diffusion were most pronounced when the messages invoked religion and pat-
riotism, both of which revolve around social connection and group loyalty.
These findings are consistent with the perspective that conservatives’ stronger
goals to connect and affiliate with like-minded others lead them to construct
more attitudinally similar networks than do liberals’.
Conservatives’ greater desire for social cohesion is oriented toward ingroup
members and like- minded others (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Stern,
West, Jost, & Rule, 2014). In turn, conservatives’ greater attitude similarity is
constrained to self-selected networks that reinforce their views. For example,
conservatives are more likely than liberals to report that most of their close
friends share their political views (Pew, 2014). Greater similarity on a local level
tends to correspond to greater distinction from others an a more expansive
level (Henrich & Boyd, 1998), such that conservatives should have less homo-
geneous attitudes than do liberals when gauged on a broader level. Indeed,
Colleoni, Rozza, and Arvidsson (2014) found that Republicans on Twitter
were more homogeneous when they were following the accounts of fellow
Republicans, but Democrats overall were more homogeneous. This pattern is
also reflected in nationally representative survey responses. When assessed on
the level of the country, liberals in the United States display greater homogen-
eity in their attitudes than do conservatives, and this difference consistently
occurs over a period of 40 years (Ondish & Stern, 2018). Overall, conservatives
possess greater attitude homogeneity on a local and self-selected level, whereas
liberals possess greater attitude homogeneity on a national level.
These patterns of attitude homogeneity among liberals and conservatives
further contribute to polarization. Forming a small social network that is highly
homogeneous distances members of that network from broader discussions and
viewpoints within a society. In other words, a person in a highly homogeneous
group will be less likely to have their attitudes and beliefs challenged. Without
exposure to diverse viewpoints, extreme perspectives on topics are more
likely to be adopted over time (Abelson, 1995; Binder, Dalrymple, Brossard,
& Scheufele, 2009). The exact topics on which people become more extreme
vary across locations and are determined, at least to some degree, through the
importance of the topic in that area (Liu & Latane, 1998). Thus, conservatives’
greater attitude homogeneity on a local and self-selected level can contribute
to greater extremity on certain issues. In contrast, liberals’ greater attitude
similarity on a national level could lead them to adopt more extreme positions
as a means of removing themselves from a homogeneous network. Ironically,
if liberals consistently become more extreme in their positions across various
issues to individuate themselves, they reinforce the very homogeneity that
they wish to escape. Liberals and conservatives both moving to more extreme
political positions to satisfy relational goals would create greater degrees of

polarization.
Psychological strategies for overcoming the

consequences of political polarization
Political polarization shows no sign of decreasing. Constructive discussions
and meaningful relationships between people on the left and right are also in
jeopardy. In turn, addressing polarization and its adverse social consequences
can seem like an intractable issue. Compounding this challenge, individuals
who vary in their political ideologies differ from one another in ways that
are unique from other group distinctions. The characteristics that define many
socially constructed groups (e.g., skin tone for racial groups) do not inherently
produce tension and conflict. Many aspects of intergroup conflict based on race,
gender, and sexual orientation arise through social ascription of attributes to
groups that are in turn distributed through cultures (Bem, 1993; Markus, 2008).
In contrast, political ideologies are constructed as a means of understanding
the world from a different perspective than other belief systems and so will
inherently invoke competing goals. Liberalism is defined as support for novel
change while conservatism is defined as resistance to such change (Jost, Glaser,
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). As a result, establishing shared interpretations of
reality between the left and right and mending ongoing tension stands as an
uphill battle.
It is important to note that some political polarization could be beneficial.
For example, greater polarization in a society is associated with lower levels of
political corruption because there is more to lose in an election (Testa, 2012).
Thus, a generative approach could focus on removing the acrimonious and
hostile social relations that polarization produces (Bougher, 2017; Miller &
Conover, 2015), rather than eliminating polarization per se. From this per-
spective, a laudable goal for social scientists is to create empirically informed
conditions in which exposure to diverse political views invokes less animosity
and generates more constructive discussion.
Research examining interventions within intergroup relations has provided a
variety of empirically informed strategies that could help to build connections
across the political divide. In general, interventions proposed to improve
relations between groups in one social category (e.g., race) might not effect-
ively translate to other distinctions (e.g., political ideology). Nevertheless,
they provide a starting point for researchers and policy makers interested in
bridging political divides. Here, I outline three approaches that are derived
from research on relational motivations that could help attenuate the negative
consequences of political polarization and allow people to build connections
across ideological lines.
First, highlighting non-political ways on which liberals and conservatives are
similar could set the stage for positive relationship development. Similarity
86 Chadly Stern
on seemingly trivial topics, such as sharing a birthday or food preference, has

the potential to foster short-term interest in relationships (Mallett, Wilson, &
Gilbert, 2008; Pinel & Long, 2012;West, Magee, Gordon, & Gullett, 2014).This
approach sidesteps the issue of invoking political topics on which liberals and
conservatives disagree and that in turn would provide a negative lens through
which an interaction is viewed (Koch, Imhoff, Dotsch, Unkelbach, & Alves,
2016). Amplifying the existence of mundane forms of similarity will by no
means act as a panacea for easing tension between liberals and conservatives.
However, making people cognizant of non-political similarities could lead
them to be slightly more open-minded about engaging in a discussion or inter-
action with someone whose views diverge from their own.
Second, inducing the perception that people are similar to one another on
non-political topics could facilitate positive interactions between liberals and
conservatives. Simply perceiving that members of a group share one’s own
non-political preferences (e.g., liking waffles over pancakes) is associated with
more positive attitudes toward the group, lower feelings of anxiety when
thinking about interacting with the group, and a greater desire to build strong
social connections with the group (Stern & Crawford, 2021). Additionally,
perceived similarity is a stronger predictor of positive relationship outcomes
when interactions occur over time than is actual similarity (Montoya, Horton,
& Kirchner, 2008; Tidwell, Eastwick, & Finkel, 2013), and perceived similarity
predicts relationship attraction even in the complete absence of actual similarity
(Hoyle, 1993).
Third, it is possible to harness liberals’ and conservatives’ relational motiv-
ations to bridge divides and foster cross-ideology rapport. The way in which a
message or policy is framed shapes people’s support for an issue (Iyengar, 1990).
Previous research has found that messages framed around relational goals dif-
ferentially affect liberals and conservatives. For example, Feinberg and Willer
(2015) assigned participants to read an opinion article that supported same-sex
marriage either with a framing of loyalty (“same-sex couples are proud and
patriotic Americans”) or fairness (“all citizens should be treated equally”), or
to read a neutral article about skiing. They found that conservatives were more
supportive of same-sex marriage when the topic was framed around loyalty
(i.e., an affiliative relational goal) compared to fairness or when they read a neu-
tral article. In contrast, liberals were less supportive of same-sex marriage when
the topic was framed around loyalty compared to fairness. A similar framing
approach could be used to align both perceived and actual forms of similarity
with liberals’ and conservatives’ relational goals. For example, highly conven-
tional clothing that is viewed as mainstream and “average” can be framed in
a manner that allows people to feel that they are fitting in or standing out
(Duncan, 2014). To the degree that conservatives and liberals generate discus-
sion over a shared interest in traditional blue jeans, even for different motiv-
ational reasons, this process could create positive feelings that translate into
more civil discourse.
Any social problem will be derived from a variety of factors, and effective
interventions target multiple sources of an issue (Lewin, 1947). The suggestions
outlined above give a sample of strategies that could be integrated into a larger
multi-step approach that creates more effective discourse between liberals and
conservatives. Actual similarity on non-political topics (e.g., favorite ice-cream
flavor) could be initially highlighted to increase interest in an interaction and
provide topics of conversation for people who hold opposing political views.
Perceptions of similarity on various non-political topics (even in the absence
of actual similarity) could then be experimentally induced prior to an inter-
action to create a general feeling of similarity that sustains an interaction over
time. Additionally, topics for both actual and perceived similarity could be
tailored to meet liberals’ and conservatives’ relational goals. Altogether, this type
of approach could begin the process of building a fruitful bond between indi-
viduals with opposing political views. Relationships also have the potential to
cascade, in the sense that a new social connection can spread through a person’s
network (Gottman, 1983; Rubin, 1985). In this way, the relational goals that
currently lead to homogeneous political networks could lead to more hetero-
geneous networks.
Connecting people on the left and right serves many positive goals, including
a general improvement in relationships among people. However, potentially
one of the most important goals is to engage people with diverse viewpoints
in sustained and civil discourse about pressing political issues. Discussions in
which people with varying perspectives respectfully engage (and disagree) with
one another create more connected communities and instill support for the
rules and laws of a society (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Mutz, 2006). As
some scholars have noted, exposure to dissimilar political views can reinforce
the negative consequences of polarization (Bail et al., 2018). However, negative
reactions based on individual pieces of information tend to occur in contexts
where people possess little or no prior information about the other person
(Fiske & Taylor, 2013). If common bonds are first forged through the intro-
duction of non-political similarity, exposure to political attitudes that challenge
one’s own would be less threatening, in turn creating an environment for more
constructive discussion.
Concluding remarks
The existence of diverse and oppositional attitudes about political topics is
an inevitable consequence of human psychology. However, the adoption of
more extreme and polarized attitudes has increased in recent years and has
contributed to adverse social relations. In this chapter, I have described how
relational motivations to connect and affiliate with other people contribute
to political polarization. I further outlined how ideological differences in
relational motivation can lead both liberals and conservatives to contribute
to polarization, but for different underlying reasons. As a point of optimism,
88 Chadly Stern
I ended this chapter through outlining empirically informed approaches that

capitalize on relational goals and could be used to attenuate tension between
liberals and conservatives. Civil discourse stands as a centerpiece of democratic
societies. Understanding the roots of polarization and its social consequences
should continue to stand as a focal topic of scientific study. Through doing so,
researchers can work to optimize chances for constructive discussion about
even the most controversial political topics.
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Section 2
The social context of political

polarization
Chapter 6
Support for populist parties

Economic deprivation, cultural backlash,
or status anxiety?
Jolanda Jetten and Frank Mols
Blacks, women, immigrants, refugees, … all have cut ahead of you in line.
But it’s people like you who have made this country great.You feel uneasy.
It has to be said: the line cutters irritate you. They are violating rules of
fairness.You resent them, and it is right that you do.
(Hochschild, 2016, p. 139)
[t]‌he discontented middle class, whose envy of those more prosperous than
themselves was considerably less than their fear of sinking from bourgeois
status into the proletariat. This was exactly the same kind of social group
living in a state of anxiety that Adolf Hitler later gathered around him to
provide his first large body of followers.
(Zweig, 1942/2009, p. 83)
The Western world is currently in the grip of a perfect storm: a lingering

global financial crisis, surging levels of refugees seeking asylum, and ongoing
uncertainty about the long-term viability of multiculturalism due to regular
Jihadist terrorist attacks.These conditions are widely regarded as having created
“fertile soil” for populist anti-establishment parties calling for stricter immi-
gration and asylum policies.1 According to this widely accepted logic, both
economic slowdowns and peaks in immigration heighten economic anxiety
among voters, and this anxiety is considered to translate into support for parties
with a nativist (“own people first”) anti-immigration agenda.
The economic deprivation thesis has a long pedigree, and is often treated in
the popular media as self-evident, and as established knowledge. For example,
when explaining when, where, and who is likely to vote for a populist party, there
seem to be three widely held assumptions, namely:
1 . When: The popular vote increases in times of economic downturn.

2. Where: The popular vote increases in areas most affected by economic
downturn.
3. Who: The popular vote increases among those most vulnerable to eco-
nomic downturn –low-income voters.
98 Jolanda Jetten and Frank Mols
The above assumptions not only underpin lay understandings of populist

movements, they are also frequently being relied upon in psychological and
political science research. In this chapter, we explore evidence for this economic
deprivation hypotheses. However, we also engage with alternative explanations
put forward by cultural backlash and status anxiety perspectives as competing
explanations that might explain support for populist political parties. This is
because it is only when we take account of psychological processes relating
to economic deprivation as well as not feeling one gets the opportunities one
deserves, or not climbing the wealth ladder as fast as one hopes or feels entitled
to, or fearing that obtained wealth and status may be lost (a combination of
cultural backlash and status anxiety reasoning), that we can come to understand
who carried Trump over the line, why people in the UK voted to leave the EU,
and why populist parties are doing so well in the Western world.
The two opening quotes were selected because they capture sentiments
relating to cultural backlash thinking and status anxiety. More specifically, in
line with cultural backlash reasoning, referring to sentiments among White
majority members in the US, Hochschild (2016) uses a cutting-the-line meta-
phor to illustrate how those who have traditionally been advantaged but fear
falling from their dominant position seek a scapegoat, and their resentment
is often directed towards those who are seen as responsible for this down-
fall: minorities such as immigrants and refugees.
This sentiment is also echoed in the second opening quote by Zweig (1942/
2009). However, the fear he describes is not so much related to the fear of cul-
tural status loss, but the fear related to wealth and status loss and the resentment
that individuals may feel when they fear that, over time, they either have lost
power, wealth, or social standing, or will lose it in the future. In line with status
anxiety thinking, he suggests that, in the lead-up to World War II, it was this
fear that led Austria to support populists such as Dr. Karl Lueger. With slogans
like “we must help the little man,” such leaders were able to connect with
disenfranchised voters who feared they would be losing their privileged status
in society. Zweig also discusses how this leads to anti-minority sentiments,
in this case anti-semitism. Specifically, he states that the public is attracted to
anti-semitist slogans because they show “the disgruntled lower middle classes a
visible enemy and at the same time imperceptibly divert[ing] their hatred from
the great landowners and feudal wealth” (Zweig, 1942/2009, p. 83). We will
start this chapter with an overview of economic deprivation theorizing, after
which we unpack reasoning relating to cultural backlash and status anxiety
perspectives in greater detail.
Economic deprivation
When, where, and why would people turn to populist parties with an anti-
immigrant agenda? These are some of the questions social scientists have been
asking for many decades. From the outset, there was considerable interest in
Support for populist parties 99
the idea that economic deprivation, which causes increased conflict over scarce
resources, might provide answers to these questions (Sherif, Harvey, White,
Hood, & Sherif, 1961; for a meta-analysis see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006).
Researchers subsequently claimed to have unearthed empirical evidence for
a link between economic downturn and harsh attitudes towards minorities
(Assumptions 1 and 2). For example, Hovland and Sears (1940) studied the link
between cotton prices (which they used as a proxy for economic conditions)
and black lynching in the Southern part of the US, and found that lynching
increased when cotton prices fell and the economy slowed down. Although
there are now serious concerns about the statistical validity of these findings
(Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998), this paper has become a classic in social psych-
ology and contributed to the above assumptions becoming accepted in many
social science circles as established knowledge.
Hovland and Sears’s proposition seemed to make perfect sense in the late
1940s, when social scientists turned their attention to the question of how the
Holocaust in Nazi Germany could have happened. This outlook also fit well
with Dollard and colleagues’ frustration–aggression thesis, according to which
failure to attain goals creates frustration and outgroup aggression (Dollard,
Miller, Doob, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), and with later work arguing frustra-
tion can lead to scapegoating of minorities (Allport, 1954). Although different
strands of social science research focused on different aspects of this puzzle (e.g.,
stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination, scapegoating), Hovland and Sears’s idea
that “harsh times produce harsh attitudes” seemed well suited to make sense of
this dark episode in human history. After all, the Holocaust happened in the
wake of the 1930s’ Great Depression, when ordinary Germans faced economic
hardship (e.g., hyperinflation, mass unemployment, increased competition for
jobs and affordable housing), and Hitler’s regime was said to have harnessed
these grievances, thereby channeling frustration with economic conditions into
aggression towards Jews and other minorities.
Social psychologists have played a prominent role in disseminating the “harsh
times producing harsh attitudes” paradigm in research into intergroup conflict
and polarization. However, the idea may have gained wider traction because it
aligned well with at least two other strands of thought. First, the idea of a causal
link between frustration, aggression, and lashing out seemed to fit well with
Marxian understandings of society, and the idea that uprisings will take place
once working-class deprivation and frustration reach a tipping point. Second,
from the 1960s onwards, rational choice theorizing became popular (Harsanyi,
1969), and although these theorists were not seeking to explain or predict the
rise and fall of populist movements, from their theoretical standpoint (in which
they conceive of humans as selfish rational utility maximizers) it also made sense
to conceive of intergroup tensions as tensions arising from competition over
scarce resources.
When considering the above, it is not surprising to see such widespread
faith in the notion that “harsh times produce harsh attitudes,” and so much
follow-up research to tease out the finer details. For example, researchers would
later distinguish between egoistic (individual) and “socio-tropic” (collective)
concerns, and between “realistic conflict threat” (perceived conflict over scarce
resources) and “symbolic threat” (perceived threat to the group’s values) (e.g.,
Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Stephan & Stephan, 1996).
When evaluating the evidence for economic deprivation thinking however,
evidence is rather mixed for the assumption that support for populist parties
with a strong anti-immigrant agenda is higher (a) in times of economic down-
turn (Assumption 1), and/or (b) in areas hardest hit by economic downturn
(Assumption 2). Of direct relevance here are findings of more contemporary
analyses of voter attitudes. For example, Mols and Jetten (2016, 2017; see also
Jetten, 2019) analyzed election results in different countries, and found no evi-
dence for the widely accepted view that economic crises or peaks in immi-
gration provide fertile soil for populist parties. If anything, this research casts
doubt on the above-mentioned assumptions, showing that populist parties are
often remarkably popular in times of economic prosperity (see also Mudde,
2007; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Consistent with this reasoning too,
Mutz (2018) observed in her research that the US economy was recovering
well during the 2016 election that saw Donald Trump come to power with
a strong anti-immigrant agenda. Put differently, these findings suggest that
there has been a tendency to rely too heavily on economic relative deprivation
explanations, thereby neglecting counterfactuals.
When it comes to the third assumption on who is most likely to be attracted
to populist parties, in line with relative deprivation theory (Walker & Smith,
2001), the reasoning typically goes that those who are most deprived are most
vulnerable economically and that might explain why they feel most threatened
by immigrants with whom they fear they might have to compete for jobs and
housing. This widespread belief that (realistic and symbolic) threat perceptions
will be more pronounced among those at the poorer end of the wealth spec-
trum who are hit hardest by economic downturn (Assumption 3) is remarkably
pervasive, and it is hence not surprising that so many commentators view “the
poor” as most prone to polarize and vote for a populist party.
While we are not questioning that such a relationship may exist at times
(manual workers have been found to be drawn to populist parties: Lubbers &
Scheepers, 2000), it is also clear that there are some important exceptions to
that widespread assumption. For example, when Donald Trump won the 2016
US presidential election, securing 46.1% of votes, it gradually became clear
that his support base was not limited to poor working-class voters in so-called
rustbelt states (states that had been negatively affected by economic down-
turn, Assumption 2), but included voters in more affluent parts of the country,
like Florida. Furthermore, the first exit poll results immediately challenged
Assumption 1, showing that Trump attracted voters from all income categories,
and that 45% of those voting for Trump had a college degree. Similar findings
were encountered in Gallup pre-election survey data research, which found
that Trump voters earned more than average, and that they were less likely than
non-voters to have been affected by globalization and immigration (Rothwell
& Diego-Rosell, 2016).
This is also evident from Mutz’s (2018) analysis of a representative panel
data set from 2012 to 2016. She found little support for the hypothesis that
an individual’s personal wealth and changes to their wealth position were
associated with a vote for Donald Trump. Mutz (2018) concludes instead that
“The 2016 election […] was an effort by members of already dominant groups
to assure their continued dominance and by those in an already powerful and
wealthy country to assure its continued dominance” (p. 9). This conclusion fits
well with the cultural backlash and status anxiety hypothesis, which we will
explain further below.
Other evidence that populist parties can be remarkably popular among
voters who are least affected by economic downturn and relatively well
off can be obtained from other opinion poll research. For example, a study
conducted in 2010 in the Netherlands revealed that voters of the right-wing
populist party, the Party for Freedom (PVV), are 40% more likely to be less
well educated than the average voter, but 21% more likely to earn an income
higher than the median (see Mols & Jetten, 2017). Likewise, exit poll research
revealed that two-thirds of those turning out to vote in the Brexit referendum
were middle class. Of all those who voted “Leave,” 59% were middle class (A,
B, or C1), as opposed to 24% of voters in the lowest two social classes (D, E)
(Dorling, 2016).
It thus appears that, even though the idea that populist parties appeal to the
unemployed, the uneducated, and blue-collar workers seems to make perfect
sense, as does the idea of this being explained by deprivation triggering frus-
tration, aggression, and scapegoating (Dollard et al., 1939), the research evi-
dence tells a more complex story. For example, although some individual-level
analyses seemed to confirm the suspected link between unemployment and
populist voting (e.g., Betz, 1994; Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Lubbers, Gijsberts,
& Scheepers, 2002), there are many researchers who fail to find support for this
link (e.g., Jetten, 2019; Mols & Jetten, 2017; Norris, 2005). As several authors
have pointed out, on the whole the evidence for the economic argument is
rather mixed and inconclusive (for overviews, see Inglehart & Norris, 2016;
Mudde, 2007). It has also been noted that this relationship does not automatic-
ally manifest in macro-level national trends (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Lubbers
et al., 2002). If anything, it is not uncommon to see populist parties thrive in
times of economic growth, low unemployment, low immigration and asylum
seeking (e.g., Gibson, 2002; Jetten, 2019; Mols & Jetten, 2017).
But why is it often middle-class voters on above-average incomes who
are drawn to populist parties and movements? One possible answer would
be cultural backlash and resistance against the rise of progressive values,
disseminated through education. After all, voters may earn an above-average
personal or household income, but still feel alienated culturally from those
able to exert social influence (e.g., elected politicians, journalists, university

professors, etc.).
According to the cultural backlash thesis, education is key because it
determines whether or not voters have been socialized into progressive values,
and in this reading populist voters are not necessarily left behind economic-
ally, but left behind culturally. This seems plausible, and may explain why eco-
nomic crises and income have proven such poor predictors. However, in our
view there is yet another explanation, one that is compatible with the cultural
backlash thesis and can be used in conjunction with it, to arrive at a more
comprehensive understanding of why relatively well-off voters (who experi-
ence relative gratification rather than relative deprivation) might vote populist,
namely wealth and status protection.
In sum then, populism researchers have consistently encountered mixed evi-
dence for the link between economic hardship and anti-minority attitudes as
well as populist voting (e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Mols & Jetten, 2016;
Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005; Rooduijn, 2018).To better understand these mixed
findings when it comes to understanding “when,” “where,” and for “whom”
populist parties and their leaders become attractive, other reasoning has been
put forward. Here, we focus on two such accounts: so-called cultural backlash
and status anxiety or wealth paradox reasoning. We discuss these in turn.
Cultural backlash
A promising alternative explanation to the economic deprivation account is
the cultural backlash thesis, according to which the current surge in votes for
populist parties (and associated polarization) can be explained not as a purely
economic phenomenon, but in large part as a reaction against rapid progres-
sive cultural change (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019).
Traditional left–r ight politics, so Inglehart and Norris argue, has become over-
laid with a new cleavage dividing populism from cosmopolitan liberalism, with
progressive causes (e.g., gender equality, same-sex marriage, refugee rights, pol-
itical correctness), rather than socio-economic status, becoming the new polit-
ical and ideological battleground. In this reading, which builds on earlier work
interpreting the rise of new social movements in Europe as a silent revolu-
tion (Inglehart, 1977) and subsequent research interpreting the rise of populist
radical-r ight parties as a “silent counter-revolution” (Ignazi, 1992), it is not so
much macro-economic conditions or voters’ personal income that determines
their voting behavior, but opposition to multiculturalism, gender equality, and
other progressive values. Based on this line of research, it has been predicted
that populist parties will thrive when the educated ruling elite are perceived as
zealously promoting progressive norms/causes, and with insufficient regard for
the interests and preferences of society’s less-well-educated voters.
Inglehart and Norris (2016) put their thesis to the test when analyzing data
from different national surveys (e.g., European Social Survey), expecting to
encounter strongest support for populist parties among the older generation,
men, those lacking college education, and people with traditional values. The
results of this analysis confirmed not only (a) that the cultural and the eco-
nomic cleavage form distinct dimensions of party competition, but also (b) that
the rise of populist parties reflects, above all, a reaction against a wide range of
rapid cultural changes that seem to be eroding the basic values and customs of
Western society (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). This sentiment is well articulated
by Mike, a Tea Party voter, who was interviewed by Hochschild (2016). Mike’s
views are summarized as follows:
the Federal government wasn’t on the side of men being manly. Liberals
were certainly on the wrong side of that one. It wasn’t easy being a man. It
was an area of numerous subtle challenges to masculinity, it seemed. These
days, a woman didn’t need a man for financial support, for procreation,
even for the status of being married. And now with talk of transgender
people, what, really, was a man? It was unsettling, wrong. At the core, to be
a man you had to be willing to lose your life in battle, willing to use your
strength to protect the weak. Who today was remembering all that?
(Hochschild, 2016, p. 202)
We know from earlier studies that populist support tends to be stronger among
the older generation, men, and the less well educated (Lubbers et al., 2002;
Norris, 2005), and these findings align well with Norris and Inglehart’s (2019)
cultural backlash thesis. However, because more educated voters tend to also
earn higher incomes, it remains unclear whether declining support for populist
parties among the well educated reflects reduced economic anxiety, socializa-
tion into progressive values, or both. What is more, researchers examining the
relative importance of “education” have revealed puzzling effects that defy such
explanations. For example, researchers have uncovered a curvilinear pattern,
suggesting populist radical-right parties receive their strongest support from
the mid-school stratum (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Evans, 2005). As we will
see in the next section, this is not the only area in which we can witness non-
linear patterns, and in our view it is worth zeroing in on such patterns because
this will enable us to do more justice to the complex processes underpinning
support for populist parties, and to recognize what existing explanations (eco-
nomic deprivation and cultural backlash) fail to capture.
Status anxiety and the wealth paradox

Another account of what underpins this polarized and radicalized voting
behavior relates to processes concerning a “fear of falling” (Ehrenreich, 1990),
and “status anxiety” (de Botton, 2004, see also de Tocqueville, 1835) among
relatively well-to-do middle-class voters (Mols & Jetten, 2017). The psycho-
logical process underpinning this third explanation relates to the idea that
populist parties thrive when relatively well-to-do voters become protective of

their wealth privileges, out of fear that previous gains may be lost and/or that
relevant comparison groups may be acquiring wealth and status at a faster pace.
Consistent with this prediction, there is growing evidence of a link between
economic prosperity and the hardening of attitudes. For example, researchers
examining intergroup relations found that outgroup hostility follows a V-curve
pattern, with strongest prejudice being displayed among those who feel they
are worse off than others (perceived relative deprivation) and those who feel
they are relatively better off than others (perceived relative gratification), and
weakest prejudice among those who feel neither relatively deprived nor grati-
fied (Dambrun, Taylor, McDonald, Crush, & Meot, 2006; Grofman & Muller,
1973; Guimond & Dambrun, 2002, Jetten, Mols, & Postmes, 2015; Mols &
Jetten, 2017; Moscatelli, Albarello, Prati, & Rubini, 2014; Postmes & Smith,
2009). Indeed, as Lipset (1955, p. 191) already observed many decades ago, those
experiencing economic prosperity often display “prosperity born bitterness,”
and he too attributed this counterintuitive pattern to status protection.
This effect also was encountered in research into charitable giving and in
research into anti-social behavior. For example, it was found that, paradoxically,
those on higher incomes tend to donate a smaller proportion of their income
to charity than low-income earners (Osman, Lv, & Proulx, 2018; Piff, Kraus,
Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010), and that upper-class individuals are more likely
than their lower-class counterparts to break road rules and cheat in games (Piff,
Stancato, Mendoza-Denton, Keltner, & Côté, 2012). Indeed, there is growing
evidence that those who have a lot want more (Wang, Jetten, & Steffens, 2019).
The findings of these studies suggest that populism researchers interested
in explaining the hardening of political attitudes (i.e., polarization) may have
focused too narrowly on deprived low-income earners and their economic
anxieties, thereby overlooking relatively gratified middle-class voters and their
status anxieties. Fortunately, researchers have begun to pay attention to status
anxiety and status protection as possible explanations for populist voting.
However, what has in our view not been fully appreciated is that such anxieties
can have real political consequences, and, more importantly here, drive support
for populist parties.
Processes underlying status anxiety

Elaborating the status anxiety account, how can we explain that wealth is
associated with support for populist leaders? We suggest that, to understand
this, we need to consider that the wealthy are not without anxieties of their
own (see Jetten, 2019; Mols & Jetten, 2017). In particular, the affluent may
feel poor when they believe that austerity measures have hit them, relatively
speaking, harder than others and this leads to resentment and dissatisfaction.
Indeed, when affluent people feel they are not getting what they are entitled
to, when they fear a decline in status or when they feel that their wealth is not
growing fast enough, their support for populism becomes easier to understand.
The main lesson to emerge from our work is that populist voting may well
be a phenomenon associated with status protection and aspiration to secure
upward social mobility. It is this phenomenon that we call the wealth paradox:
even though relatively speaking, a person can be relatively gratified, they might
still feel relatively deprived when they feel entitled to future gains or when they
fear previous gains might be lost in the future (Jetten, 2019 Jetten et al., 2015;
Mols & Jetten, 2017).
Social identity theorizing (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) helps to understand when
status anxiety is most likely to occur. Building on work by Scheepers, Ellemers,
and Sintemaartensdijk (2009; see also Ellemers & Bos, 1998; Scheepers &
Ellemers, 2005), we have argued that perceptions of the permeability of bound-
aries might enhance the fear of status loss among the more affluent and this
makes those who are objectively relatively gratified fear (future) relative depriv-
ation. In contrast, high-status group members have been found to be relatively
magnanimous towards lower-status groups, including minorities, when they
do not feel that the minority group is challenging their higher status, or when
their high status is secure and not under threat (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton,
& Hume, 2001; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985;
Turner & Brown, 1978). For example, Harvey and Bourhis (2011) found in a
context where wealth positions of poor and wealthier participants were fixed
for the duration of the study that those in a wealthy group were most likely to
share their resources equally with subordinate poor group members, presum-
ably because their high wealth position was secure and this allowed them to be
tolerant and generous.
What is more, another key principle in social identity theorizing relating to
the legitimacy of wealth relations might also play a role in the extent to which
status anxiety is triggered. The more that economic prosperity is associated
with a sense of entitlement, the more there will be a fear that “our” resources,
and resources that “we are entitled to” might be lost to immigrants, justifying
anti-immigrant sentiments (Jetten, Ryan, & Mols, 2017; LeBlanc, Beaton, &
Walker, 2015).
In sum, in line with social identity theorizing (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), when
wealth positions are locked in because group boundaries are impermeable and
when a position of affluence is stable and legitimate, we might see that a higher
wealth position may lead to noblesse oblige, whereby the wealthy feel they have
to look after those who are less well off, and this should be associated with
tolerance and support for minority groups such as immigrants. However, at
other times, and in particular when those lower in the hierarchy challenge the
legitimacy of the status quo, wealthy groups may experience status anxiety and
may strike hard to protect their privileged position. The negative treatment of
those who are less well off may be seen as justified in such cases to protect the
status quo and the superiority of the high-wealth group (see Jetten, 2019; Mols
& Jetten, 2017).
There is some empirical support for the prediction that fearing the loss of
one’s advantaged status is associated with populist support. For example, Major,
Blodorn, and Major-Blascovich (2016) asked what accounts for the widespread
support for Donald Trump in the 2016 US elections.They found that reminding
white Americans high in ethnic identification that non-white racial groups will
outnumber whites in the United States by 2042 led to increased status threat
for the group.That is, they were more concerned about the declining status and
influence of white Americans as a group and they were more likely to report
increased support for Trump and anti-immigrant policies.
In a similar vein, we recently obtained empirical support for the notion that
the fear that one will lose social standing (in our studies this was operationalized
as the fear of losing wealth) is associated with greater opposition to immigrants
(Jetten, Mols, & Steffens, 2020). In a first study, we explored support for our
predictions in a community sample in Australia (N = 498). We found here,
correlationally, that fear of falling (operationalized as concerns about personal
future income as well as Australia’s future income) was associated with greater
opposition to immigration to Australia. We then experimentally studied the
effects of potential (Study 2, N = 294) and actual (Study 3, N = 166) down-
ward mobility among participants who were randomly allocated to a rela-
tively wealthy group in a hypothetical society. In Study 2, we found that those
allocated to a wealthier group and who learned that their position might
change in the second part of the study (i.e., a manipulation of the perme-
ability of group boundaries) experienced elevated collective angst compared to
a condition where participants had been told their position would remain the
same over the course of the study (i.e., the impermeability of group boundaries
condition). In turn, such heightened collective angst predicted higher levels of
opposition to immigration, providing evidence of mediation.
Our third study showed that collective angst was higher when wealthy
participants were confronted with actual downward mobility (varying from
stability of their status, to slight wealth loss, to more extreme wealth loss).
Furthermore, mediational analysis showed that, the greater the wealth loss, the
more collective angst participants reported and this was predictive of greater
opposition to immigration.
In a final study we aimed to model a context where a relatively wealthy
group feels that their wealth is stagnating over time while an initially poorer
group is quickly gaining wealth over time (Study 4, N = 151). Here too, we
find that fear of falling among the wealthy is associated with more opposition
to immigration, with the effect being mediated by collective angst.
We conclude from these studies that the anticipation that the economic
future looks less rosy than the present evokes collective angst amongst more
wealthy segments of society, which, in turn, fuels prejudice towards immigrants
and opposition to immigration.
In conclusion
Populism researchers have long been aware that income is a poor predictor of
populist voting (e.g., Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005), and, more importantly here,
that populist parties have a remarkable capacity to unite strange bedfellows
(Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Evans, 2005; Ford & Goodwin, 2015, Ivarsflaten,
2005; Rooduiyn, 2018), in this case the poor and the wealthy. However, as
Mudde (2007, p. 226) pointed out more than a decade ago, what remains poorly
understood is why groups with diametrically opposed socio-economic interests
would end up supporting the same party and/or leader, and it would seem fair
to argue that this has not changed signficantly. Such strange patterns are par-
ticularly difficult to explain if we rely exclusively on conventional economic
deprivation thinking. These patterns become easier to understand, though,
once we take account of the different motivations that may drive those at the
poorer end of the wealth spectrum to vote for a populist leader than those at
the wealthier end.
We have argued here and elsewhere that economic deprivation accounts may
provide a solid explanation for populist support among the “have-nots,” but not
so much for the “haves.” For the latter, it is concerns about losing their status
(i.e., status anxiety) and frustration with a ruling class that is perceived to be out
of touch with the values of ordinary working families (cultural backlash) that
might better account for their attraction to populism. It would be of interest
to explore the interplay between status anxiety and cultural backlash in greater
detail in the future to better understand why it is that populists can count on
support from the poor as well as the more affluent.
Acknowledgment
This research was supported by the Australian Research Council’s Discovery
Project funding scheme (DP170101008) and an Australian Research
Council Laureate Fellowship awarded to the first author (FL180100094).
Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed to Jolanda Jetten,
School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD 4072,
Australia.
Note
1 In this chapter we made the conscious choice to use the term “populist” in an
inclusive way, to describe parties and leaders deploying powerful anti-establish-
ment rhetoric, and proposing nativist welfare policies and radical measures to curb
immigration and multiculturalism. We feel this is justified because our aim is to
analyze the psychological processes that underlie the appeal of such parties and
proposals, rather than to contribute to debate about further refinements in classifi-
cation of different kinds of populist parties. Moreover, even though populist parties
can include both left-wing as well as right-wing parties, because of our interest in
opposition to immigration and harsh attitudes towards minorities, we focus exclu-

sively on right-wing political parties.
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Chapter 7
The agreement paradox

How pressures to agree with others
ultimately cause more societal division
Lucian Gideon Conway, III, Shannon C. Houck,
Linus Chan, Meredith A. Repke, and
James D. McFarland
Now even as we speak, there are those who are preparing to divide us, the
spin masters and negative ad peddlers who embrace the politics of any-
thing goes. Well, I say to them tonight, there’s not a liberal America and a
conservative America; there’s the United States of America. There’s not a
black America and white America and Latino America and Asian America;
there’s the United States of America.
President Barack Obama
Our nation has become too divided. Too many Americans feel like they’ve
lost hope. Crime is harming too many citizens. Racial tensions have gotten
worse, not better. This isn’t the American Dream we all want for our
children.
President Donald Trump
Societies often experience division. From the American political divide over
COVID-19 (Brownstein, 2020; Conway, 2020a; Malloy & Schwartz, 2020), to
Syria’s ongoing civil war (e.g., BBC News, 2020), to the European Union’s dis-
unity on Brexit (e.g., Hunt & Wheeler, 2017), finding common ground can
often feel like an insurmountable task. This sentiment is particularly evident
in modern-day America, where people find themselves choosing between one
of two seemingly mutually exclusive sides: Republican or Democrat, climate
change proponent or denier, refugee immigration or travel ban, COVID-19-
is-dangerous or COVID-19-is-benign. These “us versus them” divisions per-
meate politics, religion, race, and socio-economic class relations, interpersonal
relationships, and even (alternative) facts. Ironically, it seems that one of the
very few points of agreement among opposing ideologues –as exemplified
by Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump –is that America is increas-
ingly divided. And indeed, an overwhelming amount of evidence suggests
that America is a very politically divided nation, perhaps more divided than
it has been in a hundred years or more (McConnell, Margalit, Malhotra, &
Levendusky, 2018; Schaeffer, 2020).
The agreement paradox 113
Why is American society deeply divided?

Scholars have long theorized about the causes of societal polarization and
division. For example, some researchers have emphasized how pre-existing
ideological differences often cause persons to selectively favor information
consistent with their pre-existing beliefs (e.g., Plous, 1993; Rodriguez et al.,
2017), a tendency that causes heightened polarization as people intention-
ally insulate themselves from information that challenges their viewpoints.
Other research has emphasized that divisiveness emerges as a response to
conflicting goals and increasingly limited resources (Baumeister & Vohs,
2007; Jackson, 1993), and complementary work suggests that divisive views
tend to grow when stressors are present (for a summary, see van Prooijen &
Krouwel, 2019).
Both ideologically driven selection biases and resource scarcity-based stress
account for part of the current political divide in the US, but nonetheless leave
many gaps to fill.1 For example, stark ideological differences between left-wing
and right-wing groups have existed in the US for a long time, and yet these
pre-existing differences have not always been accompanied by a deep collective
feeling that America is hopelessly divided –a feeling that has seen a strong
upturn in recent years (Schaeffer, 2020).Thus, simply discussing group processes
related to ideological differences is not enough to explain this change. Further,
while it is true that average Americans’ financial status has grown worse over
the last two decades –especially for the poorer classes (see, e.g., Fitz, 2015) –it
is also true that past (and more severe economic) stressors have not appeared to
produce a sense of nation-level despair and disunity (see Allen, 2010, for one
example).
In the present chapter, we aim to help fill this gap by discussing a completely
different set of psychological processes –processes that pertain to psychological
pressures for agreement. We argue that part of what has happened in American
society is that public pressures for people to agree have actually backfired and
produced long-term division instead. We call the outcome produced by these
processes the agreement paradox.
The agreement paradox is intended to provide a framework for both
understanding the current cultural milieu and generating new research. We
present evidence consistent with this framework throughout this chapter.
However, we do not claim this evidence as conclusive proof for the historical
significance of the paradox in explaining the American situation. Rather, we
present evidence from laboratory settings in the US that suggest the processes
underlying the paradox are in evidence. Thus, our aim in this chapter is not
sweeping conclusive proof of a historical process. Our aim is rather to suggest
the agreement paradox lens may be generative for subsequent researchers to
pursue new avenues that explore the causes of cultural division –both in the
US and elsewhere.
114 Lucian Gideon Conway et al.
The agreement paradox: how pressures for agreement

produce disagreement
People in general prefer unity to disunity. Consider briefly the psychological
valence of the terms divided, torn asunder, and split apart. Now compare that to
the valence of the terms unified, coming together, and made whole. The lesson is
clear: terms involving division are generally regarded negatively, while terms
involving unity are generally regarded positively.
It is not hard to see why. Psychologists have long known that the desire to fit
in is one of the most fundamental and pervasive parts of the human experience
(see, e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Indeed, this desire is so important that it
is highly correlated with how we feel about ourselves –if we feel like we fit
in, we feel good about ourselves; if we feel excluded, we feel bad (e.g., Leary
et al., 1995). People like unity, and disagreement with others can sabotage our
feeling of social validation. Evidence for the tie between disagreement and
positive social feelings abounds in the literature. Consider, for example, that
people often overestimate the number of people who agree with them (known
as the false consensus effect), and this occurs in part because we have a desire to
feel socially validated by others (Marks & Miller, 1987). These and other biases
related to attitude similarity (see, e.g., Conway et al., 2016; Tidwell et al., 2013)
and disagreement more generally (e.g., Johnson, Gormly, & Gormly, 1973)
suggest that we meet fundamental social psychological needs in our feelings of
agreement with other people.
Thus, people feel psychological pressures for agreement, and as a result, often
one of the reactions to societal disagreement is to create public pressures for
agreement. Whether it is workplaces mandating what employees are allowed to
say (e.g., Booth & Hern, 2017), sports team policies restricting expressions of
dissent about the American flag (e.g., Korman, 2017), or the development of
implicit communication norms that restrict what is “acceptable” to talk about
(see, e.g., Conway et al., 2009, 2017), pressures that mandate agreement abound.
What are the consequences of such pressures? A long history of research
in social psychology reveals that these pressures will generally succeed at pro-
ducing compliance. Whether the pressures come from authority figures man-
dating behaviors (e.g., Burger, 2009), implicit conformity (e.g., Bond & Smith,
1996), or any myriad of other sources, research reveals that if you make it clear
to a group of people that agreement on some dimension is expected of them,
they will generally publicly agree. Indeed, it is almost axiomatic in psychology
to suggest people will engage in public expectations (see, e.g., Cialdini, 2001) –
so much so that demand characteristics in research designs (which are essentially
pressures to agree with researchers’ expectations) are commonly covered in
Methods textbooks (e.g., Pelham, 2002).
Yet, in spite of this long history of research showing the power of public
pressure to produce agreement, it would be truer to add qualifiers to our ori-
ginal statement: psychology reveals that pressures will succeed at producing
short-term, superficial agreement. As we suggest in this chapter, while agreement

pressures may artificially manufacture short-term agreement, they also sim-
ultaneously sow the seeds of later (potential) disagreement. Pressures for
agreement are like builders creating an unstable skyscraper with cracks in the
foundation. The building may appear to the casual observer to be sufficiently
stable, but with the right opposing pressure in just the right place, it will even-
tually collapse. We refer to this tension as the agreement paradox: pressures for
agreement both produce (short-term) agreement and simultaneously undermine
(long-term) agreement.
Below, we (1) first illustrate how pressures for agreement create two
different long-term psychological cracks in the foundation (reactance and
informational contamination). Then we (2) discuss some laboratory research
examples that provide practical demonstrations of the agreement paradox
relevant to the workplace, restrictive communication norms, the previous
US presidential election, and support for pro-environmental policies. We
further (3) discuss a particular type of person –the authoritarian person –
who is especially prone to desire agreement and (partially as a result) may
be especially prone to divide societies. Finally, we (4) close with a discussion
concerning what this work suggests we should actually do to build a more
lasting societal consensus.
Cracks in the foundation of consensus: reactance and

informational contamination
There are two independent reasons why pressures for agreement can create
long-term division, even though they often manufacture a short-term artificial
agreement. One of those is more emotive in nature (reactance), and the other
is more cognitive in nature (informational contamination). Although reactance
and informational contamination are overlapping constructs, each independ-
ently contributes to the erosion of artificial consensus induced through pressure
(Conway & Schaller, 2005; Conway et al., 2009, 2017).
Reactance
Perceived pressures for agreement threaten to take away people’s freedom to
choose; and a lot of research and theory shows that people resent having their
freedom taken away. This phenomenon has been explained under the rubric of
psychological reactance theory (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Dillard & Shen, 2005),
which states that when people’s freedom is taken away (e.g., if they are forced
to agree), they feel a desire to resist the pressure or undergo attitude change to
reestablish their freedom (e.g., Silvia, 2006).
Often, these effects produce immediate push-back. For example, controlling
parenting, which involves coercion and punishment, can backfire as it often
causes children to feel reactance (van Petegem, Soenens,Vansteenkiste, & Beyers,
2015). Similarly, movie ratings that limit adolescents from viewing adult movies
sometimes backfire, as those movie ratings attract adolescents to these movies
because of reactance (Varava & Quick, 2015). Pop-up ads on websites that force
web surfers to watch the ad once again take away the viewer’s freedom on the
webpage. As a result, these ads are perceived as intrusive and irritating (Edwards,
Li, & Lee, 2002).
As the reactance literature demonstrates, however, coercive pressure does
not always produce immediate non-compliant behavior. While many different
moderators have been established for the relationship between pressure and
deviant behavior (see, e.g., Grandpre, Alvaro, Burgoon, Miller, & Hall, 2003;
Laurin, Kay, & Fitzsimons, 2012; Quick & Stephenson, 2008), the important
moderators for our purposes revolve around the difference between feeling
reactance and acting upon it. Often, people have emotional reactance to pressure,
but they do not act on that emotion. For example, persons may feel particu-
larly annoyed at their boss for imposing a communication ban –they may feel
a strong desire to reestablish their freedom –but they nonetheless will comply
with the ban because they believe that it would be professionally imprudent to
be seen as engaging in deviant behavior (see Booth & Hern, 2017; Conway &
Schaller, 2005). Similarly, persons may feel reactance against political correctness
(PC) norms that dictate what they can and cannot say, but may nonetheless
comply with those norms for self-presentational reasons (see Conway et al.,
2009); or athletes may feel reactance against public norms about standing for
the national anthem, but may comply with those norms for fear of losing their
place on the team (see Korman, 2017).
This suggests the following vital point: even when reactance is not acted on
in the short term, it psychologically exists behind the scenes. It is a crack in the
foundation of the artificially manufactured agreement. Importantly, the things
that propped up the artificial agreement may change; and the reactance will
remain. The boss who enforced the policy may move on –yet the employees
will still feel very frustrated at having their freedom taken away and will still
want to reassert that freedom when they believe they can. PC norms may cause
people to comply with those norms –yet they may feel privately frustrated,
looking for the first chance to lash out and reestablish their freedom.Thus, even
when the public pressures appear to be working, reactance may nonetheless
grow like foundational cracks, and eventually undermine the very agreement
they were intended to create.
Informational contamination
Feeling pressure to agree with a particular position not only has emotional
consequences, but research grounded in attribution theory (Kelley, 1973)
suggests it also impacts cognitive judgments (e.g., for discussions, see Conway
& Repke, 2019; Conway & Schaller, 2005; Conway et al., 2009, 2017). How
people evaluate the veracity of others’ opinions depends not only on what
they say their opinions are, but also the context in which they express them
(Newtson & Czerlinsky’s, 1974).
This idea importantly interfaces with a second consequence of agreement
pressure: informational contamination. Informational contamination occurs when
the value of expressed agreement is informationally discounted because it is
viewed as the result of public pressure to agree and thus does not represent a
“real” consensus. Consider a simple example. All else being equal, if you heard a
group of people all expressing a positive opinion about Louisianans, you would
be likely to think of Louisianans more positively than you did before. However,
if you found out that, right before you entered the room, an influential professor
(who was still present) had said he was from Louisiana and expected people to
talk positively, you would discount the positive “Louisiana agreement” you heard.
You would in that case likely attribute the positive agreement to the pressure
for agreement and not to the potential reality of Louisianan goodness (see
Conway et al., 2009). The information contained in the agreement would be
contaminated by the perceived pressure for agreement that seemed to produce it.
Consistent with the informational contamination hypothesis, findings
from Eagly, Wood, and Chaiken (1978) demonstrate that perceptions of a
communicator’s true opinions are highly susceptible to perceived external
pressures, such that a communicator is viewed as more manipulative and less
sincere when they express opinions consistent with perceived external pressure.
As a result, people do not trust the subsequently expressed opinion as much in
cases where external pressures appear salient. Similarly, research suggests that
perceiving behavior as a function of overt pressure from an authority figure
leads to attributions about the constraints of obedience as opposed to a reflec-
tion of the person’s actual beliefs (Conway & Schaller, 2005; Fein, 1996; Pryor,
Rholes, Ruble, & Kriss, 1984).
As with reactance, informational contamination often occurs simultan-
eously with the emergence of apparent agreement. There is an irony here. The
very thing that produces the short-term artificial consensus –pressures for
agreement –is also the thing that makes it unsustainable in the long term. It is
like constructing a building with cracks in the foundation –sooner or later it
is destined to collapse.
Evidence consistent with the agreement paradox

Taken together, this previous research illustrates two important psychological
processes –processes that often operate behind the scenes –that can make
pressures towards agreement backfire and instead create more long-term div-
ision. Below, we discuss laboratory research examples of such pressures produ-
cing outcomes consistent with the agreement paradox across three different
domains relevant to modern American life: business (Conway et al., 2005), PC
communication norms (Conway et al., 2009, 2017), and sustainability behaviors
(Conway & Repke, 2019).
Business decisions
Often businesses feel pressure to come to a consensus (see Dong & Xu, 2016).
Very few businesses want to feel a deep sense of division within their own ranks.
One response to this desire for business unity –in the face of potential disagree-
ment –is to try and manufacture unity by pressuring people into agreement
from the top down. What is the consequence of this approach? In a set of five
studies using business scenarios, Conway and colleagues (2005) demonstrated
how a business approach that manufactures short-term agreement through
pressure can backfire.
In all the scenarios, participants imagined that they were a member of a
committee that was going to make a vital business decision for the company,
and they then witnessed agreement in favor of one of the options under con-
sideration. Researchers varied whether or not the agreement appeared to
have been manufactured by pressure from the company president: in some
conditions, the company president put pressure on the committee to choose
one option (the one ultimately agreed upon), while in another condition the
president did not do so.
Did this pressure produce backfiring? In line with an agreement paradox
approach, it depended on the likelihood that participants themselves would
feel directly influenced by the president in the scenario. No backfiring of the
pressure manipulation occurred when participants believed that they them-
selves might still be under the direct influence of the president –his prior
command was comparatively more likely in that instance to produce compli-
ance. However, just as in real-world situations where parameters often change,
in conditions where the context changed and the president who gave the ori-
ginal order was no longer in charge when the key decision was made, the
pressure from the president backfired and produced more deviance (Conway
et al., 2005).
Consistent with our discussion of how pressure backfires, mediational ana-
lyses revealed that when backfiring of pressure occurred, it occurred largely
because the pressure produced both informational contamination and react-
ance (both independent mediators; Conway et al., 2005). These were cracks in
the foundation of the artificial agreement produced by the command.
In summary, this work reveals some of the components of the agreement
paradox. All else being equal, pressure from authorities can manufacture an
artificial consensus –but the agreement is fragile. The things that prop up
artificial agreement –in this case, the continued presence of the authority
figure who gave the command –are often temporary. But the reactance and
informational contamination they create last beyond that moment, and when
the prop is removed, the agreement collapses. Thus, pressure can produce
short-term agreement, but the pressure ultimately backfires and produces
division instead.
Political correctness norms: influence on stereotype

communication and the rise of Donald Trump
Society often develops norms to restrict communication. One such set of
norms that has taken hold in modern American society has come to be called
political correctness (or PC) norms. These pervasive norms are designed with a
positive end: to reduce unwarranted negative stereotypes (see Conway et al.,
2009, 2017; Meadors, 2016). PC norms try to accomplish this clearly good goal
by placing pressure on people to avoid language that might cast specific groups
in a negative light and thus increasing civility and agreement in society (for
discussions, see Conway et al., 2009, 2017; Meadors, 2016).
However, the psychological factors involved in the agreement paradox
are independent of the potential positive or negative valence of the pressure
itself. PC norms may have a positive end goal, but as a set of norms designed
to pressure individuals to constrain their communication, they are likely to
produce reactance and informational contamination. Is it possible that PC
norms might produce the pattern of short-term agreement, but long-term division
characteristic of the agreement paradox?
Laboratory scenarios on negative group communication

Research in two domains suggests that PC norms may indeed backfire in ways
consistent with the agreement paradox. A first set of studies involves laboratory
scenarios concerning the communication of stereotypes. PC norms are dir-
ectly designed to reduce the amount of negative communication, and thus it
would be surprising to find contexts where making the norms salient actually
increased the likelihood of negative communication about groups. And yet, in
a series of three studies, Conway and colleagues (2009) demonstrated exactly
one such context where pressure to use politically correct language about a
group backfired. Specifically, participants in these studies imagined hearing
positive communication agreement emerge about a fraternity on campus. In
some conditions, participants were given cues that PC norms were in oper-
ation (e.g., presence of one of the fraternity members, presence of a professor
known for caring about PC norms), while in other conditions, no PC norm
cues were given. Participants were later asked to write out what they would say
to a friend about the fraternity in a completely different context. Consistent
with the agreement paradox framework, the presence of a cue encouraging PC
norms in one context led participants to talk more negatively about that same
group in a different context (and this effect was attenuated –especially when
the cue itself was especially obvious –when participants were asked to commu-
nicate in the same context). Further, mediational analyses revealed that, when
the backfiring effect occurred, it was driven largely by informational contam-
ination and reactance.
These studies show some of the basic features of the agreement paradox: a
norm designed to manufacture positive communication about groups may
succeed in the short term. But those norms cannot possibly be ever-present in
all situations –people may move to a new context where the norm is not in
operation. And when they do, both informational contamination and reactance
are still present, which in turn produces a backfiring for the norm. This is how
a counterintuitive finding can consistently emerge –how a norm specific-
ally designed to produce positive communication can instead produce negative
communication.
The emergence of anti-P C public figures: the case of

Donald Trump
At the outset, we discussed how public pressure creates an artificial agreement,
but it simultaneously creates cracks in the foundation of the consensus –such
that, if some alternative pressure is exerted, the structure may collapse and
produce division instead. One such pressure involves the emergence of div-
isive public figures. In the case of PC norms, for example, controversial pro-
fessor Jordan Peterson’s rise to international fame was sparked by his refusal to
conform to PC norms concerning gender-neutral pronouns. Peterson’s public
position on this issue led him to be the figurehead of the anti-neutral-pronoun
camp that opposes a Canadian anti-discrimination bill that prevents public
businesses discriminating against gender identity and gender expression (Paikin,
2016; see also Hunter, 2017).
Thus, we can see PC norm pressures leading to the cracks in the foun-
dation –in the form of support for a normatively opposed leader –even in
opposing a movement with a positive end goal (equality). We next discuss the
rise of a controversial leader who similarly had a pervasive agreement-collapsing
influence: Donald Trump.
Since the beginning of his candidacy during the election season, Trump
positioned himself to stand in opposition to PC norms. Not only did Trump
use alarming, non-normatively negative language (see, e.g., Cohen, 2016; Guo,
2015; Noble, 2015), but he explicitly talked about himself as an anti-PC can-
didate. As he said at the Republican Primary debate, “I think the big problem
this country has is being politically correct. I’ve been challenged by so many
people and I don’t, frankly, have time for total political correctness” (quoted in
Guo, 2015).
Although ideology-related factors undoubtedly contributed to Trump’s
success (see, e.g., Choma & Hanoch, 2017), polling evidence also suggests
that many people liked Trump because he stood out against agreement
pressures (Ahmadian, Azarshahi, & Paulhus, 2017; Guo, 2015). But does
Trump’s ascension reflect cracks in the foundation as a result of agreement
pressures?
One study suggests it does. Conway and colleagues (2017) measured a sample
of moderate (slightly left-leaning) American participants’ voting preferences for
Trump and Clinton during the 2016 general election season. At a general level,
they found that the more people felt a sense of general reactance to and con-
tamination by existing communication norms, the more likely they were to
support Trump over Clinton. The key effects generally held even when con-
trolling for participants’ own ideology, demonstrating that the effect of commu-
nication norm concerns went beyond liberal or conservative boundaries, but
independently predicted voting preferences for both groups.
More importantly, Conway et al. (2017) also manipulated the salience of PC
norms. In one condition, participants were reminded of the existing PC norms
and given a justification for their continued existence. In other conditions,
participants were not reminded. In line with the agreement paradox, results
clearly showed that priming PC norms made people more likely to support
the non-normative candidate: when PC norms were made salient, participants
were more likely to express a preference for Trump (but not Clinton).
Why would primng PC norms make people more likely to support the
non- normative candidate? This seems counterintuitive on the surface but
makes sense if one considers it through the lens of the agreement paradox.
Agreement pressures cause people to feel reactance and informational contam-
ination regardless of their ideology. When a non-normative candidate appears
(even one who, like Trump, is largely disliked), people feel at the very least that
this candidate is working against the pressure (and accompanying undesired
consequences). Thus, whereas they may not otherwise like Trump, priming the
restrictive PC norms reminds people of their dislike of restricted freedom, and
as a result increases their support for him. Indeed, in Conway et al. (2017),
Clinton had a sizeable lead on Trump in conditions where PC norms were
not made salient, but this lead was essentially eradicated when PC norms were
primed.
Sustainability-s upporting laws: the curious lack of

influence of scientific agreement about climate change
Another application of the agreement paradox to modern American society
involves Americans’ beliefs about the environment. Despite the extremely
high rate of consensus among expert climate scientists that climate change is
occurring and caused by human activities (97 percent; for a review and syn-
thesis of relevant literature, see Cook et al., 2016), the American public do not
report holding corresponding beliefs. Indeed, far from reflecting the emerging
scientific consensus, over the past 20 years Americans (if anything) have moved
somewhat in the opposite direction (Saad & Jones, 2016).
A number of mechanisms have been employed in an attempt to provide
insight into this discrepancy between expert and public opinion such as
political bias (see e.g., Guber, 2012; McCright & Dunlap, 2011) and selective
exposure (see e.g., Stroud, 2011). However, a recent series of studies (Conway
& Repke, 2019) suggests part of the explanation involves perceived pressure
for agreement producing reactance and informational contamination. In their
first study, Conway and Repke (2019) measured the degree of informational
contamination in participants’ assessment of the scientific consensus of climate
change. Specifically, they gave participants a brief summary of a published
study showing 97 percent scientific consensus on climate change and then
asked several questions about participants’ attributions of the consensus (e.g.,
“I believe that the 97 percent agreement exists because there is a larger polit-
ical agenda that puts pressure on scientists to conform to the views endorsed
by the agenda”). Conway and Repke (2019) then used this informational
contamination measurement to predict participants’ support for both govern-
mental and civic action regarding climate change. They found that perceived
informational contamination decreased the likelihood of supporting govern-
mental and civic action in response to climate change –and, importantly,
this effect remained even when controlling for participants’ ideology. In other
words, informational contamination about scientific consensus eroded support
for climate change-based action, even when ideologically Americans would be prone
to support such action.
Two additional studies used experimental scenarios to test both informa-
tional contamination’s and reactance’s role in the political pressure → rejection
of governmental action path. In both studies, an agreement in favor of a pro-
sustainability law emerged in a political context. The researchers manipulated
whether or not a strong political leader (Study 2) or a highly visible law (Study
3) put pressure for public agreement. In both studies, they also measured infor-
mational contamination by asking questions about the degree that an apparent
consensus for a pro-sustainability law was artificial versus genuine (e.g., “At
the assembly where everyone spoke in favor of the law, to what degree do you
think the unanimous discussion in favor of the law occurred because of the
influence of the President?”). They measured reactance by asking questions
about the degree that pressure to conform with the law made participants want
to reestablish their freedom to choose (e.g., “In the scenario, to what degree did
the President’s discussion at the meeting make you want to do the opposite of
what he said, just to show him that you could not be told what to do?”). In both
studies, political pressure to engage in specific environmental policies operated
through informational contamination and reactance to decrease support for
governmental action –an indirect path that was overwhelmingly significant
in both studies. Taken together, this set of studies suggests that part of the div-
ision in environmental sustainability attitudes in modern America isn’t just
about pre-existing ideological differences; rather it is that many Americans per-
ceive that there has been public pressure for agreement which has influenced
science –and thus they both react against that emotionally and informationally
discount that information.
Are certain types of people more prone to the

paradox? The case of authoritarianism
One of the implications of our discussion thus far is that people who are espe-
cially prone to desiring consensual agreement might be especially likely to
produce long-term division. We focus our attention on one such category of
person: authoritarians.
Authoritarians prefer rigid normative structures to a loose individualized
ethos (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt et al., 2010; Feldman, 2003; Passini, 2017).
As a result, it is not surprising that a key component of authoritarianism –
both theoretically and empirically –involves the authoritarian desire for con-
formity to a larger consensus (Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt et al., 2010; Passini,
2017). Indeed, one prominent theory of authoritarianism places it squarely at
the nexus between threat and consensus/conformity (Feldman, 2003). Thus,
from an agreement paradox lens, authoritarianism might be an important con-
struct for better understanding cultural division. Ironically, the kind of person
who generally desires cultural stability might be the kind of person to especially
polarize and divide cultures.
Are authoritarians divisive? Although prior research suggests that authori-
tarianism played a role in the election of the very divisive Donald Trump
(Choma & Hanoch, 2017; Conway & McFarland, 2019; Ludeke et al., 2018),
that work was retrospective in nature and did not tie the effect of authoritar-
ianism to informational contamination or reactance. Thus, below we present
a brief empirical demonstration of why authoritarianism might matter in our
larger discussion of the agreement paradox. In Studies 1a–d, we illustrate that
both right-and left-wing authoritarians are more likely to approve divisive
behaviors that align with their own beliefs –or oppose those that do not. In
Study 2, we provide evidence linking this heightened support/opposition to
divisive political behaviors to the two agreement paradox variables discussed
previously: informational contamination and reactance.
Studies  1a–d
Participants
One thousand and ninety- eight Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participants
completed questionnaires for two larger parent projects. The first project
(Studies 1a and 1b) pertained to authoritarianism, threat, and voting.The second
project (Studies 1c and 1d) pertained to authoritarianism and perceptions of
modern American groups. Across all studies, participants completed either a
right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) or left- wing authoritarianism (LWA)
scale, questionnaires related to their voting intent in the 2020 election, and
questionnaires related to their support of potentially divisive political behaviors.
All studies showed roughly similar patterns, and thus here for brevity we present
pooled analyses of all studies combined.
Measures
RWA/LWA
Participants in all studies were randomly assigned to complete either a 20-item
version of Altemeyer’s RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1996) or a parallel 20-item LWA
scale (Conway et al., 2018).
Divisive outcome measures

Participants in all studies completed single-item measures of their intent to
vote for Donald Trump (an especially divisive political figure) in the upcoming
2020 election, and their intent to vote for the Democratic nominee in the
upcoming 2020 election. All participants also completed a single-item measure
of a particularly divisive issue: the degree that they believed Donald Trump
should be removed from office prior to the election (data were collected both
during and after Trump’s impeachment trial). Further, a subset of participants
(N = 418) also completed a measurement of their support for another divisive
political behavior: Nancy Pelosi’s ripping up of Donald Trump’s State of the
Union speech.
Control measures
In order to separate the effects of authoritarianism from those of political
ideology (Conway, 2020b), we controlled directly for self-reported political
ideology (via a standard two-item self-identification ideology scale anchored
by liberal/Democrat and conservative/Republican). We further controlled for
biological sex assigned at birth and age.
Studies 1a–d : results and discussion

We performed both zero-order and hierarchical regressions for LWA and RWA
predicting each outcome measure. Hierarchical regressions included political
ideology, age, and sex at Block 1, and then either LWA or RWA (separately) at
Block 2. Thus, inferential tests reported for hierarchical regressions at Block
2 are for the added predictive ability of LWA/RWA, beyond ideology, age,
and sex.
Table 7.1 presents a results summary. As can be seen, we largely replicated the
results of Conway and McFarland (2019) –LWA is significantly predictive of
support for the Democratic candidate (above and beyond ideology and demo-
graphic factors), while RWA is significantly predictive of support for Trump.
This importantly shows the predictive validity of RWA and LWA in a pro-
spective (as opposed to a retrospective) fashion in the 2020 election involving a
particularly polarizing political figure.
Table 7.1 Studies 1a–d: left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) and right-wing authoritarianism

(RWA) predicting voting intent and support for divisive behavior
Zero-order Block 2 (Block 1 = age,

sex, and conservatism)
LWA RWA LWA RWA

Voting intent
Vote for Trump 2020 –0.57*** 0.66*** –0.06^ 0.13***
Vote for Democratic 0.58*** –0.60*** 0.09** –0.08*
nominee 2020
Divisive behavior support
Trump removal prior to election 0.56*** –0.60*** 0.14*** –0.13***
Support Pelosi ripping State 0.56*** –0.47*** 0.25*** –0.02
of the Union speech
Notes: Total N = 1098. LWA N = 537; RWA N = 561. N supporting Pelosi = 418
(LWA = 208; RWA = 210). All metrics = standardized betas. **p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01;
*p ≤ 0.05, ^p ≤ 0.10.
Equally as importantly, LWA was a significant predictor (again, above and

beyond ideology and the two demographic factors) of both divisive political
behaviors we measured (and especially so for the ripping up of Trump’s speech).
RWA is also a significant predictor for opposition to Trump’s removal, but is
not a significant predictor of opposition to the ripping up of Trump’s speech.
The predictive ability of authoritarianism for that particular divisive behavior
appears to be unique to the left side of the political spectrum.
Overall, however, these results support the basic contention that authoritarians
on both sides of the aisle are especially prone to division on political candidates
and behaviors that are themselves divisive. In Study 2, we attempt to tie this dir-
ectly to the agreement paradox variables discussed earlier: informational con-
tamination and reactance.
Study 2: methods, results, and discussion

Three hundred and fifty MTurk participants completed RWA/LWA, voting
intent, desire to remove Trump, and control measures that were identical to
those from Studies 1a–d.
Further, participants completed a three-item scale of psychological react-
ance to Trump that was adapted from prior research (Conway et al,. 2017). For
example:
I often feel like Donald Trump wants people to fit a particular narrow tem-
plate, and that makes me want to be exactly the opposite of what he wants
in order to show that he can’t tell us what to do.
These items formed a coherent scale and were averaged into a single reactance
score (alpha = 0.88).
Participants additionally completed a three- item scale of informational
contamination about Trump that was adapted from prior research (Conway
et al,. 2017). For example: “I distrust a lot of what Donald Trump says because
I assume it is reflective of some political agenda.” These items formed a
coherent scale and were averaged into a single informational contamination score
(alpha = 0.91).
As expected, when controlling for ideology, age, and sex, LWA was posi-
tively related to both informational contamination (partial r = 0.25, p = 0.001)
and reactance (partial r = 0.43, p < 0.001). Parallel analyses revealed that RWA
was negatively related to informational contamination as expected (partial
r = –.024, p = 0.002), but was not significantly related to reactance (partial
r = –0.07, p = 0.373). To analyze the degree that reactance and informa-
tional contamination accounted for the LWA/ RWA → divisive outcomes
relationships, we performed a series of mediational analyses according to
recommended current practices (Hayes, 2018). Specifically, we used the
PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2018; model 4) to compute normal inferential tests
of indirect effects, bootstrapped indirect effect sizes (using 5000 samples), and
bootstrapped indirect effect confidence intervals (using 5000 samples). Each
analysis tested the degree that there was an indirect effect in an LWA/RWA →
potential mediator → divisive outcome model, such that LWA/RWA affects
divisiveness through the mediator. In each case, every test also controlled for age,
biological sex assigned at birth, and self-reported political ideology.
Results are presented in Tables 7.2 (LWA) and 7.3 (RWA). As seen there,
not only do both key agreement paradox variables (informational contamin-
ation and reactance) consistently mediate the LWA → voting intent relation-
ship, they also significantly mediate the effect of LWA on the politically divisive
attempt to remove Trump from office prior to the 2020 election. For RWA, the
expected pattern emerged for informational contamination, such that high-
RWA persons showed lower informational contamination, which accounted
for their voting intent and opposition to Trump’s removal. However, no effect
of note emerged for reactance.2
These results suggest that, ironically, the kinds of people most likely to
care about consensual agreement –authoritarians –are also especially likely
to diverge on divisive behaviors. Although counterintuitive on the surface,
this makes sense from an agreement paradox lens. Persons who care about
agreement are also more sensitive to challenges to that agreement –and thus
are more prone to reactance and informational contamination. Authoritarians
are especially likely to batten down the psychological hatches when it seems
that consensus might be imposed from the outside. As a result, authoritarians’
desire for consensus might produce local, short-term consensus –but it might
lead them to actually divide society in the long term.
Table 7.2 Study 2: testing the left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) → agreement paradox

→ voting/divisiveness path
Indirect effect Indirect effect LCI Indirect effect UCI

Outcome: vote for Trump
Contamination as mediator –0.11** –0.19 –0.04
Reactance as mediator –0.07^ –0.17 –0.00
Outcome: vote for Democratic
nominee
Contamination as mediator 0.06* 0.02 0.14
Reactance as mediator .12** 0.04 0.23
Outcome: remove Trump
Contamination as mediator 0.08* 0.03 0.17
Reactance as mediator 0.20**** 0.10 0.32
Notes: N = 172; ****p < 0.0001; ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; ^p < 0.07. Effect sizes and
confidence intervals based on 5000 bootstrapped samples; p-values based on Sobel tests; all
analyses controlled for ideology, age, and biological sex assigned at birth.
LCI, lower confidence interval; UCI, upper confidence interval.
Table 7.3 Study 2: testing the right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) → agreement

paradox → voting/divisiveness path
Indirect effect Indirect effect LCI Indirect effect UCI

Outcome: vote for Trump
Contamination as mediator .15** 0.04 0.25
Reactance as mediator –.04 –0.06 0.24
Outcome: vote for Democratic
nominee
Reactance as mediator –0.02 –0.08 0.03
Outcome: remove Trump
Reactance as mediator –-0.04 –0.12 0.04
Notes: N = 178; ****p < 0.0001; ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; ^p < 0.07. Effect sizes and
confidence intervals based on 5000 bootstrapped samples; p-values based on Sobel tests; all
analyses controlled for ideology, age, and biological sex assigned at birth.
LCI, lower confidence interval; UCI, upper confidence interval.
Implications of the agreement paradox: how do we

build agreement that lasts?
LUKE: Is the dark side stronger?

YODA: No, no, no. Quicker, easier, more seductive.
Star Wars, Episode V: The Empire Strikes Back
We have presented evidence for some of the psychological processes involved

in the agreement paradox. Taken together, this evidence suggests that
attempting to manufacture agreement through pressure, like Yoda’s description
of the notorious dark side, may be quick and easy –but it might not be the
strongest way to build real and lasting consensus. Of course, this only begs the
question: what is the right way to build an agreement that lasts? If we do not
want a divided society, what does work on the agreement paradox suggest we
should do? Below, we close by offering some speculative thoughts on what the
agreement paradox suggests we should do if we do not want to live in a funda-
mentally divided society.
When discussing how agreement happens at the cultural level, researchers
have divided sources of influence into those that occur from the top down (e.g.,
the government passes a law enforcing a particular kind of behavior) versus
those that occur from the bottom up (e.g., spontaneous agreement as a result
of communication; see Conway et al., 2017; Conway & Schaller, 2007). One of
the simplest messages from work on the agreement paradox is that bottom-up
agreement is more likely to produce lasting, stable, and undivided societies than
agreement forced from the top down.
Of course, if societies always produced spontaneous, bottom-up agreement,
then this chapter would not be necessary in the first place. We recognize that
sub-groups within any society have treasured values, and those values will inev-
itably be at odds with other groups at least some of the time. The agreement
paradox model suggests several principles for how societies can build lasting
consensus on divisive issues. Here we discuss only one of those: pressure only
as much as you have to.
Pressure only as much as you have to, persuade as much as

you can
The agreement paradox model does not assume that using pressure to accom-
plish goals inevitably leads to long-term division. Rather, the foundation of
the agreement paradox approach is a recognition that agreement pressure
works to accomplish specific short-term goals –but that it has long-term
psychological costs.
Indeed, one way to achieve agreement in society is for one side to “win” the
cultural debate so that only one view becomes normative. Slavery used to be a
divisive issue in America, but it is no longer so –not because people learned to
embrace their disagreements about slavery, but because one side’s view became
widely accepted. It is not the purpose of the present chapter to make moral
judgments about which cause may or may not end up being right (though the
authors do hope we can all agree that the abolitionists were right about slavery).
But consider one possible parallel in the modern world: climate change. If
scientists are right about climate change (and we of course assume they are),
then what does the agreement paradox suggest is the best method for produ-
cing lasting agreement? What is the best method for winning a cultural debate?
Realistically speaking, most movements use both top-down pressure and

bottom-up, “grass roots” persuasion. The present approach suggests, however,
that top-down pressure should be used judiciously and with the full awareness
of its long-term psychological cost. Metaphorically bludgeoning people with
pressure, laws, authority dictates, or military force to achieve goals is sometimes
necessary; but it always comes with a cost. Thus, agreement pressure should be
treated like a powerful and expensive drug that may or may not cure a disease,
but has guaranteed terrible side effects. Decisions to strategically use it to create
large-scale public change should therefore be determined in part by the nature
of the disease (do not attempt to use something divisive in the long term on
something comparatively unimportant) and by how necessary the risks are for
a possible cure (do not attempt to use something so divisive if other and better
means might work).
Indeed, probably the most important moment from an agreement paradox
perspective occurs when one side “wins” a cultural debate in a formal sense.
Laws and leaders are often easier to change than the attitudes of a large group of
people –and if you gain a law but lose the people, your law will likely not last.
History is littered with top-down successes that ultimately failed. Prohibitionists
may have felt a lasting victory in the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment,
but the top- down nature of their victory ultimately eroded itself. Why?
Prohibitionists also maintained a characteristically dogmatic style designed to
bludgeon their opponents, sometimes aligning with organizations such as the
Ku Klux Klan and using unconstitutional methods to seek out and punish
violators (see, e.g., Verbeek, 2011). Meanwhile, the cracks in the foundation
grew –as evidenced by expressions of reactance such as lay juries attempting
to “nullify” Prohibition law by judging people who were guilty of its viola-
tion as “innocent” (Levine, 1994). Thus, the dogmatism of the Prohibitionists
was initially successful but ultimately backfired. We can never “undo” history
counterfactually and know what would have happened (see, e.g.,Tetlock, 1994).
It is possible that Prohibition was doomed to fail in any case, but the agreement
paradox lens suggests it would have had a far greater chance at success had its
proponents used a different post-success strategy.
This example is anecdotal, but it dovetails with research showing that successful
long-term revolutionaries (from George Washington to Fidel Castro) change
their approach after they win power (Suedfeld & Rank, 1976). Using the inte-
grative complexity of revolutionaries’ rhetoric, researchers showed that, while
a dogmatic approach was useful for gaining power, revolutionaries who failed
to become more moderate in their rhetoric after gaining power ultimately did
not last very long. Successful long-term revolutionaries –those who founded
movements that lasted –immediately shifted to a more moderate approach after
gaining power (Suedfeld & Rank, 1976). This is exactly what an agreement
paradox lens would suggest. Using more dogmatic pressure methods may be
necessary sometimes, but those methods should only be used sparingly –and the
moment they are no longer necessary, the winners should shift their rhetoric in
order to avoid reactance and informational contamination as much as possible.
Concluding thoughts
Many modern societies are divided. In the present chapter, we have reviewed
evidence that part of this divide might be explained by the double-edged sword
of agreement pressures –pressures that build a superficial consensus in the short
term, but that often backfire in the long term.
We recognize that many of the connections in this chapter are loosely drawn.
Indeed, we do not claim to have demonstrated the agreement paradox fully in
a societal context –such a demonstration would require longitudinal studies
carried out over multiple years. Instead, we have outlined a perspective, drawn
predictions based on that perspective, and provided evidence for some of those
predictions.This evidence largely concerns the mechanisms that would produce
backfiring of pressures for agreement –informational contamination and react-
ance. We have shown that, when people feel agreement pressure, they often
respond in ways consistent with potential backfiring. We have also shown that
the kind of people most likely to be sensitive to such pressures, authoritarians,
are most likely to diverge on ultimately divisive behaviors.Thus, we believe that
this work, while still comparatively new, provides a path forward for researchers
to explore new ways to understand political divisions.
Notes
1 We focus primarily on the United States to illustrate divided societies because the
context of the data we discuss largely occurs in the United States, and we do not
wish to imply more cross-cultural relevance than the data suggest. While we would
guess the agreement paradox framework presented here would have relevance for
most societies, that inference goes far beyond the known data. As such, the work
presented here should be construed as a useful case study in one cultural context –
to test the usefulness of the agreement paradox lens. This context is, of course, no
more or less important than any other context.
2 We also asked participants one parallel reactance question for Democratic leader-
ship and one parallel informational contamination question for Democratic leader-
ship. Consistent with Conway and McFarland’s (2019) argument that elections are
more influenced by perceptions of the incumbent, these perceptions of Democratic
leadership did not significantly mediate any of the RWA → outcome relationships
reported in Table 7.3 (all indirect effect ps > 0.10).
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Chapter 8
Converging moral views in

social networks and their
impact on protest violence
Marlon Mooijman
Although protests can be peaceful and merely aimed at expressing political

disapproval, they can also dissolve into disorder and violence. In the summer
of 2020, the tragic death of George Floyd at the hands of a police officer in
Minneapolis led to violent protests across the United States, leading dozens
of stores to be burned and multiple people to be killed (Taylor, 2020). Such
protest violence is not a rare occurrence. In 2018, large-scale anti-government
protests in France and Iran became violent, leaving hundreds of people injured
and thousands of properties damaged (Erdbrink, 2018a, 2018b; Peltien, 2019;
see also Casey, 2018). Far-r ight protesters killed a counter-protester in 2017 in
Charlottesville,Virginia, violent student protests in 2017 cost the University of
California at Berkeley millions of dollars in damages, and recurring violence
between political groups in Portland, Oregon has been described as “a clear
and present danger” to citizens (Beale & Kehrt, 2017; Hatewatch staff, 2019;
Heim, 2017). As members of the public we may feel different levels of sympathy
for these protests, but collectively they raise the question of when and why
peaceful protests give way to disorder, chaos, and violence.
Although there are many factors that shape protest violence (e.g., relative
deprivation, rational deliberations, aggressive police tactics; Chotiner, 2020;
Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013;Walker & Pettigrew, 1984), I focus on
the convergence between an individual’s moral views with the moral views
of others. I review evidence suggesting that high levels (versus low levels) of
convergence between an individual’s moral views on a social cause and the
moral views of others on this social cause fosters (versus dampens) protest vio-
lence. I ground this evidence in the emergence of online social networks (e.g.,
Twitter, Facebook) and suggest that promoting moral diversity within social
groups can help bolster nonviolent protest norms whereas promoting moral
diversity between different social groups typically does not. I also suggest that,
given people’s tendency to create social networks with high levels of viewpoint
homogeneity, promoting moral diversity within social groups can be hard but
worthwhile. The current chapter thus offers insight in how the exposure to
others’ moral views may shape (non)violent protest norms.
136 Marlon Mooijman
Moral convergence in social networks

I define moral convergence as the perception that others share their moral
views with you. For instance, people might perceive that members of their
(online) social network share their views on political and social issues, either
explicitly through their messages or through the assumption that those in
close social proximity are similar to them in thoughts, attitudes, and beliefs
(Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Nickerson,
1999; Van Boven, Dunning, & Loewenstein, 2000; Van Veelen et al., 2016; see
also Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005; Saxe, 2005). Moral convergence thus
entails the moralization of a certain topic such that people view it as a matter of
right and wrong (e.g., Mooijman, Meindl, Oyserman, Montereosso, Dehghani,
Doris, & Graham, 2018; Rozin, 1999) as well as the perception that others share
this moralized view with them (Mooijman, Hoover, Lin, Ji, & Dehghani, 2018).
Moral nonconvergence means moralizing a social or political cause but per-
ceiving that others do not share this moralized perspective; or not moralizing a
social or political cause but perceiving that others do.
This conceptualization of the convergence of people’s moralized views can
be distinguished from the mere observation of a social norm, as an individual
might moralize a political cause but perceive that few others do (Cialdini,
Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). From
a social norm perspective, the observation that others moralize a social cause
is what shapes political tolerance regarding that cause, whereas from a moral
convergence perspective the interaction between an individual’s moralization
and others’ moralization is what together shapes political tolerance. This dis-
tinction is important because the theory I put forward suggests that protest
violence increases primarily at the intersection of an individual’s moralization
and the perceived moralization that others engage in. Although people’s views
are shaped by others, this implies that simple main effects of moralization or
social norms do not capture the full picture of what shapes the emergence of
protest violence.
I focus on moral convergence because moral views are more absolute and less
subject to change than nonmoral views and foster the feeling that something
“ought” to be done to foster the goal associated with that view (e.g., protest
the government or police; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). For instance, people
might hold certain views regarding the economy or religious matters and per-
ceive that others (dis)agree with these views. Such views can be moralized
and reflect a feeling of right or wrong, but they don’t have to be moralized.
Nonmoralized views are considered a mere preference that people can change
and disagree on with others, whereas moralized views reflect the notion that
views are rigid and should be furthered at all costs, even when this means
engaging in intolerant, violent action (Zaal, Laar, Stahl, & Ellemers, 2011).
Although previous research has shown the role of interpersonal interaction in
Converging moral views in social networks 137
generating shared norms of outrage (Thomas, Smith, & McGarty, 2018; see also
Klandermans, 1984) and the unique role of moralization in predicting protest
and violence (Skitka et al., 2014;Van Zaal et al., 2011), the effect of the conver-
gence between an individual’s own moral views and the moral views of others
has received scant research attention, even though its effects on protest violence
may be pronounced.
Understanding the impact of moral convergence on protest violence is
important given the proliferation of online social networks in the 21st cen-
tury. Online social networks such as Twitter and Facebook have allowed people
to be exposed to the opinions of millions of others and violent protests are
often preceded by back-and-forth discussions on social media platforms about
moralized societal topics, such as unfairness, injustice, and racism (Manjoo,
2017). Social media platforms, in other words, are increasingly being used by
people to express their moral disapproval with social and political developments,
such as government corruption, the killing of unarmed citizens by police, or
the removal of culturally meaningful symbols and statues (Steinert-Trelkeld,
2017). Due to the scale of social networks, moralized messages that refer to
injustice and unfairness can spread to millions of others and reflect the moral
views of a given population. Social media discussions thus encode signals of
moralization such that people expose others to, and are exposed to others’,
moral views on a daily basis.
These social media dynamics shape moral convergence. Due to the pro-
liferation of social media platforms and the increasing diversity in Western
nations (Tavernise, 2018), people in the West are increasingly confronted with
the diverse moral views of others (Keating & Karklis, 2016). In response, some
people are trying to cluster themselves in digital “echo chambers” where they
are confronted primarily with those who agree with their moral views (e.g.,
ideological clustering on social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, or
Gab; Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Dehghani et al., 2016).
Some people are clustering themselves in geographical areas where they are
primarily confronted with those who agree with them (Motyl, 2016; Motyl,
Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter, & Nosek, 2014). This tendency to create social networks
with high levels of viewpoint homogeneity, especially in response to being
exposed to viewpoint diversity, suggests that (a) people at times are exposed
to viewpoint diversity in their social networks and (b) people try to create
conditions under which moral convergence tends to be relatively high. Thus,
understanding how the convergence and nonconvergence of moral views
shape protest violence has the potential to illuminate how social networks may
impact protest violence.
Below, I first discuss the role of individual moralization on violence; then
how individual moralization interacts with others’ moralization to create moral
(non)convergence and how this impacts protest violence. I, lastly, discuss future
research directions and practical implications.
138 Marlon Mooijman
Moralization and protest violence

The notion that people can engage in non-normative acts to pursue a social
or political goal has been recognized for a long time in research on collective
action, but research on what motivates intolerant, violent action is relatively
limited and still emerging (e.g., Becker & Tausch, 2015; Kunst et al., 2018).
Although there have been recent attempts to expand the definition of violence
to include speech (e.g., Sue, 2010) and the emergence of violent protests come
at a time when general political intolerance seems to be increasing (e.g., polit-
ically controversial speakers “deplatformed” and people unwilling to date each
other because of their political preferences; see Brown, 2020; Foundation for
Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), 2020), when I refer to violent action,
I mean actions that cause direct material damage to people or property. For
instance, buildings and cars set on fire; protesters shot or arrested; police officers
assaulted. Here, I ground my theorizing in the notion that, when protests are
moralized, they become issues of right and wrong (instead of mere personal
preference; Hofmann, Meindl, Mooijman, & Graham, 2018; Mooijman,
Meindl, & Graham, 2020) and moralizing a protest can override personally
held objections to using violence because the goals associated with the protest
(e.g., toppling a government, changing gun laws, punishing counter-protesters)
become more important than “keeping the peace” and sticking to nonviolent
protest norms (Skitka & Morgan, 2014; Zaal et al., 2011).
My colleagues and I tested the notion that moralization fosters violence
in an online social network setting (Mooijman, Hoover, et al., 2018). We
collected tweets relevant to the 2015 Baltimore protests. These protests, which
were triggered by the death of Freddie Gray in police custody, lasted multiple
weeks and oscillated between periods of peace and violence. Analyzing the
Baltimore protests allowed us to test whether moralized rhetoric in online
social networks is associated with street-level protest violence. Specifically, we
used 4,800 tweets that were coded by research assistants for moral content to
train a neural network—i.e., words such as disloyal, unfair, outrage, injustice, etc.
This network then predicted whether the 18 million tweets that were posted
during the Baltimore protests in cities that had a protest about the death of
Freddie Gray were “moral” or “not-moral.” Using these predicted moral tweets,
we tested whether moral rhetoric on Twitter increased on days with, compared
to without, violent protests. We also conducted an hour-level analysis between
moral rhetoric and the arrest count in the Baltimore area as reported by the
Baltimore police.
Our analyses showed that moral tweets predicted future arrest rates above
and beyond current arrest rates. Furthermore, we found evidence for a direc-
tional relationship between moralization and protest violence; as moral tweets
increased, the predicted future number of arrests also increased. This means
that, even after controlling for arrest rates during previous hours, our model
showed an association between moral tweets and the future number of arrests.
In other words, we found evidence for the idea that expressions of moralization
on social media can predict when future protests will take on the dynamics that
lead to higher rates of arrest and violence. These findings are consistent with,
and go beyond, previous work showing how people’s self-reported moral con-
viction regarding a political issue (e.g., that abortion is immoral) correlates posi-
tively with people’s self-reported endorsement of violent tactics (e.g., bombing
an abortion clinic; Skitka & Morgan, 2014; Zaal et al., 2011). These findings
thus strongly suggest that rates of moralization on online social networks are
associated with street-level violence.
Please note that an increase in moral language on a social network could
simply reflect an increase in moralization; yet, given that people use social
media to view the opinions of peers, it may also be the case that an increase in
moral language reflects moral convergence. Accordingly, most of the time we
are unable to tease individual moralization apart from moral convergence and
thus draw conclusions about the effects of moralization that are in fact effects
of moral convergence. Below I will review an emerging body of work that
suggests that conditions of moral convergence rather than individual rates of
moralization drive support for protest violence.
Moral convergence and protest violence

What happens when people are confronted with others’ moral views? Being
confronted with others’ moral views may shape people’s endorsement of vio-
lence through signaling a fit between personally held moral views and the
moral views of others. Sharing a moralized view of a protest with others means
having the power of a shared moral vision to push for change. That is, when
people share their moralized view of a protest with ingroup members, they may
endorse violence against those who “stand in the way” of the protest goal (e.g.,
government, police, counter-protesters) because they are more certain about
the moral status of the protest goal, more motivated to go along with what
others (also) believe, and perceive that they have the power of a shared moral
vision to push for meaningful change. When US Democrats perceive that the
vast majority of other US Democrats share their feelings of moral outrage about
the killing of an unarmed Black man by police, they are likely to become more
certain about the moral status of the protest goal (e.g., protesting the police
really is the moral thing to do), more motivated to go along with what others
also believe (e.g., protesting the police makes me feel like I belong), and per-
ceive that they have the power of a shared moral vision to push for meaningful
change (e.g., because we all agree we can push to change police practices).
In a recent paper (Mooijman, Atari, & Dehgani, 2020), we tested a version of
this idea using a sample of Iranian nationals during the 2018 anti-government
protests in Iran. We collected data while the 2018 Iranian anti-government
protests were happening.These anti-government protests were large and violent.
Prominent media outlets reported that tens of thousands of Iranians participated
140 Marlon Mooijman
in the protests, that police and government buildings were attacked in mul-
tiple cities, and that dozens of protesters died in the violence (Eltagouri, 2018;
Iranian Students’ News Agency, 2018; Rahimpour, 2018). These nationwide
protests provided a unique opportunity to go beyond reliance on convenient
Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) samples
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) and collect data from people engaged
in an ongoing protest. Protests initially erupted on December 28th, 2017 when
relatively small groups of people started protesting across Iran, particularly in
Mashhad—the second most populous city in Iran. The last large-scale protest
was reported on January 14th, 2018 in Tehran—Iran’s capital and most popu-
lous city—with several thousand protesters participating. We started translating
the measures into Farsi on December 30th, 2017 and started collecting data
from participants on January 6th, 2018.
We found that, the more Iranian participants (who participated in the
protests) moralized the protest (e.g., indicated that the protests were a reflec-
tion of their moral conviction) and perceived that other Iranians also moralized
the protest, the more they endorsed using violence during these protests. In
fact, individual rates of moralization positively predicted the endorsement of
violence only when participants perceived that others also moralized the pro-
test. Individual rates of moralization negatively predicted the endorsement of
violence when participants perceived that others did not moralize the pro-
test. Put differently, perceiving that others moralized the protest only positively
predicted the endorsement of violence when participants themselves moralized
the protest; perceiving that others did not moralize the protest did not predict
the endorsement of violence when participants themselves moralized the pro-
test. This suggests that neither individual rates of moralization nor social norms
solely explained the endorsement of violence. Instead, the interaction between
personal moralization and the perceived moralization that others engaged in
predicted violence: moral convergence in particular predicted the endorsement
of violence.
These findings also suggest that individual rates of moralization can nega-
tively predict violence endorsement when participants perceive that others
do not moralize the protest.These findings are consistent with the notion that
people endorse violence less when moral convergence is low because they
have become less certain about the moral status of the protest goal, unable
to go along with what others also believe (because there is a misfit between
personal moral attitudes and others’ moral attitudes), and lack the feeling
that there is the power of a shared vision to push for meaningful change.
Endorsing violence under conditions of moral nonconvergence may seem
like a fruitless or even risky strategy. Advocating violence when others do not
may lead people to be punished or socially excluded, as happened with the
US far-r ight group “Proud Boys.”This group’s endorsement of using violence
against ideological opponents such as Antifa put them on the radar of the
Southern Poverty Law Center and Justice Department, which led its leader
to resign and multiple of its members to be sentenced to jail (Moynihan &

Winston, 2018).
In addition, focusing on the unique role of moral convergence during the
Iranian anti-government protests, we measured the degree to which Iranian
participants considered the protest a reflection of their religious convictions
or their views on the economy, and the degree to which they thought other
Iranians also considered this to be the case. In contrast to moral convergence,
we found no effects of religious attitude convergence or economic attitude
convergence on the endorsement of violence after we controlled for moral
convergence. The point here is not to assume that religious views or economic
views can never be moralized and lead to violence—they certainly can. Instead,
religious convergence and economic convergence drive support for violence
during protests when they become moralized; parceling out the moral dimen-
sion of the convergence of participants’ views simply demonstrated that it may
be the moral aspect of these views that drives support for protest violence.
These findings are mirrored in a recent paper by Atari et al. (2020) that
shows the moral convergence effect directly in an online social network. The
authors analyzed the moral rhetoric and hate-speech language using a corpus
of messages from Gab—an online platform known for its far-right userbase,
having been described as a safe haven for far-r ight extremist, Neo-Nazis, and
White supremacists (Roose, 2018). They categorized the frequency of moral
language that users engaged in (e.g., mention unfairness, injustice, outrage,
purity) and found that the more similar participants were in their moral lan-
guage usage compared to the mean of the particular message group they were a
part of, the more likely it was that they engaged in non-normative hate speech
(e.g., racist language, outgroup derogation, calls for violence). This shows that
the convergence of one’s own moral views with the moral views of one’s online
social network drives support for violence targeted towards others.
So far, I have discussed largely correlational findings. However, a series of
experiments, reported in Mooijman et al. (2018, 2020) and Atari et al. (2020),
provide evidence for the causal role of moral convergence. These studies, for
instance, manipulated moral convergence by giving participants the following
description:
The Unite the Right rally (also known as the Charlottesville rally) was a
far-r ight rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, USA, from 11–12 August 2017.
The rally occurred amidst the backdrop of controversy generated by the
removal of several Confederate monuments.
Participants were informed that we were interested in their opinion about the
counter-protesters who protested against the far-right protesters. Participants
in the moral (non)convergence condition indicated to what extent they
considered it a reflection of their morals to protest these far-right protesters
and were then informed that “the majority of (versus few) people in the United
142 Marlon Mooijman
States share your particular moral values. Other people in the United States
think about this protest in a similar (versus different) manner compared to you.”
Participants then indicated to what degree they endorsed using violence against
others during these protests.
We found that people endorsed violence against far-r ight counter-protesters
in particular when they moralized gun control and perceived that their ingroup
also moralized this cause. This could be explained by their increased moral
attitude certainty, sense of identity fusion with other ingroup members, and
perceived power of a shared moral vision to push for political change on gun
control. These effects were stronger the more participants identified with the
relevant reference group (e.g., Americans), suggesting that moral convergence is
in part an interpersonal phenomenon. Although the abovementioned work on
moral convergence is relatively new, the emerging body of work thus suggests
that the convergence of one’s own moral views with the moral views of ingroup
members can increase violence—these findings suggest that when we measure
moral attitudes, language, and rhetoric in online social networks, we are often
capturing both the individual rates of moralization as well as the convergence
between individual moral views and the moral views of others.
Of course, people are not only confronted with the views of ingroup
members and at times find themselves exposed to the moral views of outgroup
members (on TV, face to face, in posts on social media). Although little research
to date has examined this question, it seems plausible that converging on moral
views with an outgroup member (e.g., a Democrat finding themselves agreeing
with a Republican) is less likely to foster violence and moral nonconvergence
is likely to foster violence because it emphasizes similarities versus differences.
In other words, perceived group membership is likely to be a boundary condi-
tion to the effect of moral convergence on political tolerance. Given the tenets
of social identity theory, moral convergence could also impact perceived group
membership categories (e.g., Democrats and Republicans could categorize
themselves in the superordinate category “Americans” as a consequence of
sharing moral values; Ellemers, 2012) but the stability of some group member-
ship categories (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity, nationality) suggests that ingroup
moral convergence increases whereas outgroup moral convergence decreases
the deterioration of nonviolent protest norms.
This line of reasoning might seem to present a paradox. Aren’t the most
radical people most likely to use violence to achieve their political goals? And
don’t they, by definition, share the fewest of their moral values with the rest of
society (Webber, Kruglanski, Molinario, & Jasko, 2020)? The key here, in my
view, is that radical fringe groups have high levels of viewpoint homogeneity
within their subgroup and actively police and censor viewpoints that deviate
from the ingroup consensus (e.g., religious cults, extreme political movements).
Without high levels of viewpoint homogeneity, small fringe groups would
quickly be subsumed in larger groups and cease to exist. Some fringe groups
are defined exclusively by their idiosyncratic and extreme views on society

(e.g., the Westboro Baptist Church). This means that, for radical fringe groups,
ingroup convergence is high and outgroup nonconvergence is high. The sim-
ultaneous salience of ingroup moral similarity and outgroup moral difference
creates the conditions under which nonviolent protest norms are most likely to
deteriorate and give way to violence. A tragic example of this dynamic is when
in 2018 a far-r ight extremist killed 11 people in a synagogue in Pittsburgh after
months of anti-semitic discussions with a small group of peers on social media
platform Gab (Roose, 2018).
Implications
These findings provide important implications for the impact of social networks
on protest norms. As morally relevant messages multiply in social networks,
perceived convergence may increase, as suggested by the findings reviewed
in this chapter. This may increase the degree to which people overcome
their objections to using violence aimed at perceived ideological opponents.
Importantly, impressions of moral convergence on online social networks can
be biased given the tendency for online social networks to function as digital
echo chambers (Barberá et al., 2015). Some estimates suggest that seven out
of ten Americans are connected to an online social network and that polit-
ical polarization has been increasing for decades (Doherty, 2014). In addition,
a host of research has demonstrated that people start to understand others’
views by anchoring on their own views and projecting these on to others
such that people tend to assume that others’ view are similar to theirs unless
they know otherwise (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989; Keysar, Lin, &
Barr, 2003; Nickerson, 1999;Van Boven, Dunning, & Loewenstein, 2000;Van
Veelen et al., 2016; see Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005; Saxe, 2005). This
suggests that online social networks such as Twitter and Facebook have the
potential to be catalysts for violence and the undermining of nonviolent
protest norms.
These findings also come at a time when some polls suggest that a minority
of US college students consider it acceptable to use violence against ideo-
logically dissimilar others (Rampell, 2017), the deplatforming of controversial
speakers on college campuses seems have increased in the last years (Fire, 2020),
and about two out of three US Democrats indicate not wanting to date a
Trump supporter (Brown, 2020). Although these societal developments allude
to a more general political intolerance rather than violence, they fit with this
chapter in so far as groups that increasingly converge on a specific set of moral
views become less and less tolerant of ideologically dissimilar others.
Indeed, in the past few years, protesters in the United States have clashed vio-
lently with police and counter-protesters on numerous occasions, whether this
was due to protests by the far-r ight or the invitation of controversial speakers
144 Marlon Mooijman
on college campuses. The findings reported in this chapter shed some light on
these social developments while also providing suggestions for counteracting
the increasing acceptability of violence. Increased support for using violence at
protests occurred primarily when people perceived that they shared moralized
views with others. This implies that decreasing the moralization of attitudes
and diluting the perception that relevant others from one’s group agree with
one’s moral position may attenuate the rise of the acceptability of violence.
Although people may try to “sort” themselves into networks with high levels
of moral convergence, the findings discussed in the current chapter imply that
combating moral convergence may be effective at decreasing the acceptability
of using violence at protests. In particular, convergence is most relevant in rela-
tion to our direct social circle, as this is where we derive most of our sense of
identity and meaning, and attempts to increase moral diversity should thus be
targeted towards people’s ingroups.
However, although moral convergence is an important determinant of
violent protest, it is by no means a sufficient condition for violent protest.
Whether violence emerges at a protest might also depend on additional
factors, such as the base rates of violent inclinations amongst the protesting
population, the likelihood of escalatory tactics deployed by the police, and the
degree to which the protest is aimed at being peaceful or not. Nonetheless,
a key decision-making problem for government officials is to predict which
protests will turn violent and how many resources should be allocated to
prevent protests from dissolving into chaos and violence. Although more
research should be done to replicate and extend the findings reviewed in this
chapter, the reviewed findings suggest that the construct of moral (non)con-
vergence can be of help.
These findings also offer a warning about the potential effects of perceived
versus actual moral homogeneity. Perceived moral homogeneity is likely to be
higher than actual homogeneity in moral views, as social media tends to act as
an echo chamber: people often use their social networks to be connected to
similarly minded others and, as such, assume that others share their viewpoints.
Future studies could, then, measure people’s actual moral views, the perceived
moral views of others, and confront people with others’ actual views. Future
research could also manipulate whether these views are coming from the
ingroup or outgroup. Based on the evidence reviewed in this chapter, it may be
that exposing people to moral diversity within their own social groups makes
them more politically tolerant and less likely to endorse violence as a means
of furthering moralized goals. Even when protests are justified and their goals
are widely shared by members of society (e.g., the killing of George Floyd in
Minneapolis in 2020), the destruction, chaos, and violence that can come in
their wake often end up undermining public support for the protest’s goals
(Feinberg, Willer, & Kovacheff, 2020; Wasow, 2020). Given the crucial role that
protests play in a democratic society, understanding and preventing the emer-
gence of violence at protests seem useful for us all.
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Chapter 9
Can the partisan divide in climate

change attitudes be bridged?
A review of experimental interventions
Jacob B. Rode and Peter H. Ditto
Despite the scientific evidence of anthropogenic climate change (Cook et al.,

2016), the American public remains politically divided on its existence, the
role humans play in causing it, and the importance of implementing policies
to mitigate it (e.g., Dunlap et al., 2016). Hornsey, Harris, et al. (2016) meta-
analyzed the literature on the correlation between demographic variables
and belief in climate change, finding that two of the biggest predictors of
downplaying the seriousness and reality of climate change were political
party and ideology. Additional recent research provides more evidence of
political polarization in climate change beliefs (Cruz, 2017), and trends over
time suggest that conservative disbelief in climate change is often resistant to
new information (Carmichael et al., 2017; Nisbet et al., 2015). As a recent
example, both conservatives and liberals were initially supportive of the Green
New Deal, a set of policies aimed at addressing climate change, but over time
conservatives grew to oppose the policy (especially those consuming con-
servative media), and liberals further endorsed it, resulting in growing atti-
tude polarization (Gustafson et al., 2019). As polling data points out, recent
increases in concern about climate change are largely confined to Democrats
(Kennedy & Hefferon, 2019). Decreasing political polarization around climate
change issues requires interventions targeted at Republicans, climate skeptics,
and the unconcerned.
Alternative climate facts
Central to the ideological polarization of climate change is the divide in
factual beliefs—liberals and conservatives disagree about the scientific evi-
dence showing that greenhouse gas emissions from human activity are driving
global warming (Leiserowitz et al., 2019). This disagreement follows a recent
trend in the politicization of facts, leading to new terms like “fake news” and
“alternative facts.” Some have dubbed this the “post-truth” era (Lewandowsky
et al., 2017).
Stark divides in factual beliefs across ideological lines may be driven by
different sources of information (via selective exposure; e.g., Stroud, 2010) or by
150 Jacob B. Rode and Peter H. Ditto
motivated reasoning where information that does not align with prior beliefs
or tribal allegiances is likely to be rejected (e.g., Ditto et al., 2019). Whatever
their source, facts play a crucial role in the partisan debate over climate change.
For many politically contested issues, factual beliefs comprise only a part of
the discussion; for example, the central debate over abortion concerns the def-
inition and value of human life, largely philosophical questions that rely on
morals and values for an answer rather than facts alone.Yet for climate change
the debate is most centrally about facts; it is not the value of a clean and healthy
environment that is generally at issue, it is the science of what is necessary to
achieve that healthy environment that is contested. In such cases, polarization
seems odd and unnecessary: provide people with the scientific consensus and
beliefs will converge. But the era of alternative facts reigns, and partisans instead
engage in heated debates around scientific evidence bearing not just on the
causes of climate change but on its very existence.
Ideological polarization, however, does not stop at whether climate change
is occurring. Differences in attitudes towards climate change may result not
only from politicized facts about climate change, but also from different
values and reactions to its consequences or solutions. For example, given that
conservatism is related to endorsing the societal status quo, the system-and
status quo-threatening consequences of climate change may be perceived dif-
ferently across political groups (Feygina et al., 2010). Additionally, common
solutions for addressing climate change involve government intervention,
conflicting with a conservative small-government worldview (e.g., Campbell
& Kay, 2014).
Addressing, mitigating, and adapting to climate change will require col-
lective action from a majority of the public. Given strong ideological polar-
ization on climate change, research must focus on engendering bipartisan
recognition of climate change and support for climate policies. Although
not exclusively faulting conservatives—many liberals lack the motivation or
behavioral urgency needed to address climate change as well—intervention
research on this topic requires a careful consideration of the central role of
political ideology.
Accordingly, this chapter serves as a review of research on experimental
interventions designed to increase belief in climate change, support for cli-
mate change policy, or willingness to behave in ways to reduce climate change.
Each section details a type of intervention (grouped by their focus on a par-
ticular construct or utilization of a similar manipulation as a way of influen-
cing outcomes) and each discusses how well the various interventions succeed
in reducing political polarization or garnering increased climate support from
conservatives, Republicans, or climate skeptics. Although there are other types
of interventions than those currently discussed, this chapter focuses on the most
commonly researched ones. The chapter ends with a summary of the most
promising interventions and recommendations for future research.
Bridging the climate change divide 151
Interventions targeting emotions

One early tactic used by those communicating climate change was to incite
a sense of fear and alarm, exemplified by Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth. The
most recent meta-analysis on fear appeals in persuasion demonstrated a robust
positive effect of fear on attitudes, especially when paired with efficacy infor-
mation (Tannenbaum et al., 2015). Fear appeals were thus easily adapted to fit
the climate change narrative. Negative affect towards global warming has been
found to be associated with both increased support for global-warming policies
and higher risk perceptions of global warming (Leiserowitz, 2006; Smith &
Leiserowitz, 2012, 2014). At the same time, others have called for climate change
communicators to focus more on positive emotions and engender optimism
by emphasizing the benefits of action (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012). Indeed,
there seems to be a positive relation between hope and climate change beliefs,
such that hope is positively related to policy support (Smith & Leiserowitz,
2014) and climate activism (Feldman & Hart, 2016). Still others argue that
targeting emotions, whether negative or positive, is not an effective strategy
to increase engagement with climate change, in part because of the hetero-
geneity of emotions and the responses climate change elicits (Chapman et al.,
2017). Given this backdrop—the history of fear appeals, calls for more opti-
mism, and arguments against using emotions—research that investigates emo-
tional responses to climate change is both widespread and disparate, targeting a
variety of types of emotions.
Negative emotions
Experimental interventions targeting negative emotions have examined both
overall negative affect and specific discrete emotions like fear or anger. Some
research shows that pessimistic, or negatively framed, messages can motivate
people to mitigate climate change (Hornsey & Fielding, 2016; Schwartz &
Loewenstein, 2017). Inducing fear specifically can garner higher perceptions
of climate change risk (Skurka et al., 2018) and increase concern about global
warming and willingness to reduce emissions (Nolan, 2010).
There is some evidence that focusing on negatively valanced emotions is
especially effective for conservatives. In an experiment focused on manipu-
lating perceptions of efficacy, Feldman and Hart (2016) found that an efficacy
message about reducing global warming increased fear for conservatives, and
fear in turn was positively related to climate change activism intentions (the
same mediation path, in contrast, was not significant for liberals or moderates).
In a similar study, fear was positively related to support for climate policies for
conservatives but not liberals (Feldman & Hart, 2018a). Hornsey, Fielding, et al.
(2016), however, did not find that a high-fear or guilt message was particularly
persuasive for climate skeptics.
Positive emotions
Several experimental manipulations have successfully increased support for cli-
mate policies via hope as a mediator (Feldman & Hart, 2016, 2018a; Nabi et al.,
2018). Additionally, providing potential solutions to global warming decreased
skepticism from before to after learning about the solutions (Feinberg &
Willer, 2011). In contrast to the majority of studies on hope, Hornsey, Fielding,
et al. (2016) found that, although an optimistic climate message increased
people’s hope, it did not lead to an increase in motivation to mitigate climate
change; in fact, the researchers observed that the optimistic message led to
lower perceptions of climate change risk. van Zomeren et al. (2019) reported
similar findings, where optimistic messages increased participants’ hope but not
intended collective action on climate change.
In contrast to the earlier findings—that fear may be particularly influential
for conservatives—Feinberg and Willer (2011) found that dire, fear-inducing
messages backfired among those high in system justification (and who tend
to be more conservative, e.g., Jost et al., 2017), and that optimistic messages
reduced global- warming skepticism for high system justifiers. In addition,
some research indicates that hope is related to both policy support and climate
activism for conservatives (Feldman & Hart, 2016, 2018a).
What works, and for whom?

The research on using emotions as a climate change intervention uses varying
methods and finds mixed results. Some studies find that fear is a potential
motivator, whereas other studies find opposite effects, suggesting that opti-
mistic and positive interventions are better at influencing climate change
attitudes. Although there is some evidence that positive interventions are
influential for conservatives, other evidence points to negative, fear-inducing
interventions as particularly effective for conservatives and skeptics (also see
Hornsey & Fielding, 2016). Importantly, it is necessary to acknowledge that
the research is largely mixed and heterogeneous.There is not a clear emotion-
based approach that is effective, either for everyone or for climate skeptics
specifically.
Psychological distance
Given the distant and abstract nature of climate change (e.g., Moser, 2010),
researchers have argued that effective interventions should make climate change
more concrete and local (Weber, 2016). Indeed, construal level theory (CLT)
suggests that distance can be perceived psychologically, rather than only phys-
ically; psychological distance “is a subjective experience that something is close
or far away from the self, here, and now” (Trope & Liberman, 2010, p. 440).
When things are perceived as closer, people tend to see them as more concrete
rather than abstract (Trope & Liberman, 2010). In correlational studies, there is
a link between psychological distance of climate change and people’s attitudes
towards it, such that people have more concern about climate change the closer
they feel to its impacts (e.g., A. S. Singh et al., 2017). In other words, these
studies find that climate change concern is positively associated with believing
that the impacts of climate change are primarily felt now (as opposed to the
distant future), occurring nearby oneself, and experienced by people similar to
oneself. Conversely, other research suggests that people facing direct physical
risk (e.g., living by the coast) only perceive an increased risk of climate change
when they directly attribute nearby events (e.g., floods) to climate change
(Brügger et al., 2015; Whitmarsh, 2008). Nevertheless, numerous experimental
studies have been conducted to determine if and when psychological distance
can be utilized as an effective way to increase concern for and action towards
climate change.
Overall, psychological distance manipulations have not been effective in
improving attitudes towards climate change, including belief (Herring et al.,
2017), negative affect (Rickard et al., 2016), or risk perceptions (Altinay, 2017;
Chu & Yang, 2018; Rickard et al., 2016;Wiest et al., 2015). Furthermore, studies
have found a lack of evidence that proximal manipulations increase support for
climate mitigation policies or projects (e.g., Brügger et al., 2016; Schuldt et al.,
2018), behavioral intentions (Altinay, 2017; Chu & Yang, 2018), or perceived
harm of sea-level rise (Mildenberger et al., 2019). Interestingly, some studies
have actually shown that framing climate change as more distant or global
(relative to local) can increase concern about climate change and sea-level rise
(Joslyn & LeClerc, 2016), and increase people’s perceptions of the severity of
climate impacts (Spence & Pidgeon, 2010). Some studies manipulate both spa-
tial and temporal distance (i.e., emphasizing how the effects of climate change
are happening sooner rather than later) to investigate the interaction effects,
although there is no clear pattern of findings (Joslyn & LeClerc, 2016; Rickard
et al., 2016). The few studies that find distance to be an effective manipulation
highlight the nuance of the phenomenon—perhaps policy support is limited
to local policies (Wiest et al., 2015), manipulations only work by indirect (not
direct) effects (Jones et al., 2017), and interventions need to be more wide-
spread and tailored rather than short one- time messages (Romero- Canyas
et al., 2019).
For conservatives, there is some evidence that manipulating distance
influences attitudes. When climate change is framed as more distant (relative
to a control condition), conservatives have less support for climate policy (Chu
& Yang, 2018; Hart & Nisbet, 2012), lower risk perceptions (Chu & Yang,
2018), and lower negative affect (Chu & Yang, 2018). Similarly, conservatives
displayed more support for policy and higher negative affect when climate
change was framed as spatially close rather than far (with a complex relation
to the timing of the impacts; Rickard et al., 2016). Most importantly, local
or proximate frames of climate change led to less political polarization in
climate change attitudes (Chu & Yang, 2018; Rickard et al., 2016), and even
eliminated political differences in behavioral intentions (Wiest et al., 2015).
Illustrating the potential effectiveness of highlighting local climate impacts
for conservatives, Romero-Canyas et al. (2019) conducted an effective field
experiment that increased perceptions of and concerns for global warming—
in a conservative region. There is some evidence that decreasing psychological
distance could be an effective way to increase conservatives’ engagement with
climate change. However, more research is needed on the interactions between
emotion, ideology, and psychological distance (e.g., Chu & Yang, 2019; Lu &
Schuldt, 2015).

Despite the theoretical promise, most research finds that decreasing the psycho-
logical distance of climate change has little effect on people’s climate change
attitudes or behavior, and can sometimes even decrease concern for climate
change. However, a few studies do find that making the impacts of climate
change closer to home can be beneficial in the right context. Some studies
also find that highlighting local effects of climate change tends to be more
effective for conservatives rather than liberals, and can reduce political polar-
ization. Perhaps the most promising intervention—a widescale field study in
a conservative region—found that television ads emphasizing local climate
effects increased belief in and concern for global warming (Romero-Canyas
et al., 2019). Importantly, psychological distance does not seem to have a direct
relation to perceptions of climate change, but rather works through various
mediators (e.g., fear, perceived relevance) and moderators (e.g., ideology).
Psychological distance is not necessarily a straightforward intervention but has
promise in specific contexts for specific audiences.
Scientific consensus
Scientists have come to a consensus about anthropogenic climate change, with
evidence that around 97% of published papers endorse its reality (Cook et al.,
2016). Initial correlational evidence demonstrated that understanding this
scientific agreement about climate change is related to both climate change
beliefs and support for climate policies (Ding et al., 2011; McCright et al.,
2013).This research is consistent with the Gateway Belief Model (GBM) which
posits that scientific consensus acts as a gateway belief for downstream attitudes
about climate change and ultimately influences policy support (van der Linden
et al., 2015).
Most studies find that a consensus message increases people’s beliefs about
the amount of scientific agreement, including both posttest-only studies (e.g.,
Bolsen & Druckman, 2018; Brewer & McKnight, 2017; Myers et al., 2015)
and pre–post studies (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2019; van der Linden et al., 2019).
Additionally, there is some evidence that conservatives have larger increases in
consensus estimates in response to a consensus message than liberals do (e.g.,
Goldberg et al., 2019; van der Linden et al., 2019).
However, evidence for an effect of a consensus message on other climate
change attitudes—like belief or policy support—is mixed. Although the GBM
does not predict a main effect of consensus information on climate change
beliefs (as a two-stage model, it predicts an indirect effect; van der Linden et al.,
2015), many studies test this direct effect on a variety of climate change atti-
tude variables. Several studies show that a consensus message is effective for
increasing people’s belief in climate change, support for policy, and support for
action on climate change (Bolsen et al., 2014; Brewer & McKnight, 2017; Cook
& Lewandowsky, 2016; Deryugina & Shurchkov, 2016; van der Linden et al.,
2019; van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Rosenthal, et al., 2017). One study found
that a consensus manipulation reduced political polarization in belief in various
attitudes about global warming (Bolsen et al., 2014).
On the other hand, several studies provide evidence that receiving consensus
information does not directly impact climate beliefs (other than perceived sci-
entific agreement). Several posttest-only experiments do not find significant
effects of consensus information on belief in climate change, policy support, or
behavioral intentions (e.g., Deryugina & Shurchkov, 2016; Dixon et al., 2017).
A few studies even suggest a potential backfire effect of consensus information,
where conservatives report less belief in climate change, less trust in scientists,
or increased psychological reactance (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Kahan
et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2019). Despite the handful of studies suggesting a poten-
tial backfire effect with conservatives, multiple studies do not provide evidence
of a backfire effect or interaction between the consensus manipulation and
political ideology (e.g., Brewer & McKnight, 2017; Dixon et al., 2017; Myers
et al., 2015).

Nearly all studies demonstrate that consensus manipulations successfully increase
participants’ levels of perceived scientific consensus about climate change.There
is some evidence that this effect is especially strong for conservatives and those
with lower initial perceptions of scientific agreement. However, the down-
stream effects of the experimental manipulation—particularly for belief in cli-
mate change and support for policy—are less clear.While there is ample support
for the GBM statistically, particularly with studies that use a pre–post design,
questions remain about its practical implications (Kahan, 2017). Additionally, it
is unclear how effective the intervention is for increasing other climate change
attitudes—especially for conservatives—like belief in climate change, policy
support, or behavioral intentions (e.g., voting).
Policy framing
In addition to measuring policy support as an outcome of interventions,
researchers have manipulated various aspects of climate policies and measured
responses. Generally, the interventions involve various emphasis frames—
messages that highlight different aspects of a policy or issue (Druckman, 2001).
Others, however, utilize source frames by attaching various political sources
to a policy or by telling participants that policies or messages are endorsed by
certain political groups (e.g., Cohen, 2003). Experimental research has applied
both emphasis and source frames to climate policies in an attempt to increase
support and reduce political polarization.
Emphasis frames
In a large survey experiment, Stokes and Warshaw (2017) revealed that people
were more supportive of a renewable energy policy when it was framed as redu-
cing air pollution, increasing jobs, and minimizing costs (compared to the same
policy with no additional information). Similarly, Aklin and Urpelainen (2013)
found that participants were more supportive of a clean energy policy when
learning about its benefits, but this increase was mitigated when participants
learned about the costs as well. Other studies find that the specific wording
of policies is important, particularly that people dislike taxes and are more
supportive of regulations framed as a “carbon offset” rather than a “carbon
tax” (e.g., Hardisty et al., 2010). Importantly, this “carbon offset” framing also
eliminated political polarization on support for regulation (Hardisty et al.,
2010), perhaps because Republicans are especially averse to policies framed
as taxes and directed towards consumers (Hardisty et al., 2019). Campbell and
Kay (2014) provide evidence that it is climate policy solutions, rather than the
problem of climate change itself, that may drive climate change attitudes. For
example, they found that Republicans were less skeptical about climate change
after learning about a free-market solution compared to a government regu-
lation solution. Given conservative aversion to large government and taxes,
conservatives may be especially influenced by the type of solution posed and
whether it involves a tax. Furthermore, disconnecting policy from climate
change—instead framing it in terms of air pollution or energy security—can
improve Republican support (Feldman & Hart, 2018b), which is in line with
polling data that finds evidence of conservative support for renewable energy
(Leiserowitz et al., 2017). Taken together, these findings show that emphasis
frames are potentially powerful for garnering conservative policy support and
point to the influence of specific wording when it comes to climate policy.
However, few of these studies measured actual behavior. Illustrating the diffi-
culty of changing actual policy support, Binder et al. (2015) provided evidence
of the effectiveness of shifting the wording of a carbon emissions policy in a
survey experiment, but failed to find the same effect in a field experiment
measuring actual voting behavior.
Source frames
Several studies have manipulated the source of a policy, or the group endorsing
the policy, and measured support for it. Most studies demonstrate that, when
Democrats endorse a climate policy, Democrats are more likely to support it,
and when Republicans endorse a climate policy, Republicans are more likely
to endorse it (Fielding et al., 2020; Van Boven et al., 2018). Ehret et al. (2018)
found similar results, although the effects among Republicans were not as strong.
However, other studies provide contrasting results.Although they manipulate the
source of an environmental message (rather than a specific policy), Bolsen et al.
(2019) and Zhou (2016) failed to find consistent effects of source frames. Zhou
(2016) did not find any significant effects of Republican-endorsed messages,
and Bolsen et al. (2019) did not find consistent effects of source frames, with
little evidence that messages from Republicans were especially persuasive for
garnering Republican policy support. Moreover, these studies find that source
frames can backfire when attached to climate messages, at times leading to more
climate skepticism and less policy support for Republicans (Bolsen et al., 2019;
Zhou, 2016). Given that the studies with effective source frames all attached
them to a specific policy (e.g., cap-and-trade), perhaps source frames are only
successful when paired with specific climate policies.

Policy framing effects vary across different experimental contexts. Although
some research suggests that policy framing can be manipulated to increase
support, other studies demonstrate the difficulty in changing attitudes or
even behavior. Two interventions seem to be the most effective for garnering
support for climate policies and reducing political polarization. First, framing a
carbon tax as a carbon offset both reduces political polarization and increases
policy support. More research is needed to investigate the opportunities and
limitations of this intervention. Second, introducing people to Republican-
endorsed climate policies can increase policy support in Republicans without
dramatically reducing Democrat support. While general climate messages
can be ineffective even when attached to a Republican source (e.g., Zhou,
2016), messages about specific policies seem to be promising in reducing pol-
itical polarization. However, most of the research on the topic is focused on
self-reported attitudes; given the difficulty of changing actual behavior rather
than attitudes (e.g., Binder et al., 2015), future research should investigate if
Republican-supported policies can actually influence behavior.
Other interventions
Health
Correlational research suggests that people generally respond positively to
information about the health benefits of mitigating climate change, even
skeptical audiences (Maibach et al., 2010). However, experimental tests pro-
vide mixed evidence. Some studies show that people have more belief in cli-
mate change and support for climate policy after learning about health risks,
as well as endorse car pollution reduction policies when they are framed as
protecting public health rather than the environment (Levine & Kline, 2017;
Walker et al., 2018). More importantly, related research found that conservatives
in particular were more supportive of climate policy and reducing air pollution
when pollution was framed as affecting health rather than the climate (Petrovic
et al., 2014).
There are just as many studies, however, that find nearly the opposite effects
of framing climate change as a health issue. Framing climate change as a health
issue did not increase support for renewable or clean energy (Hanus et al.,
2018), belief in climate change (Hart & Feldman, 2018; McCright et al., 2016),
or support for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (McCright et al., 2016).
Furthermore, providing information about the health risks of climate change
compared to the environmental risks was unsuccessful at increasing support
for policy (Bernauer & McGrath, 2016; Hart & Feldman, 2018) or political
action on climate change (Bernauer & McGrath, 2016; Levine & Kline, 2017).
As opposed to the research discussed earlier, several studies do not find a mod-
erating role of ideology, suggesting that conservatives are similarly affected by
health information as liberals (e.g., Bernauer & McGrath, 2016; Levine & Kline,
2017). The intervention might be effective, but the current state of research is
too unclear to determine when and for whom it is effective.
Morality
Much of the literature on climate change and morality stems from Moral
Foundations Theory (MFT), which suggests there are five moral domains,
or foundations, in which people root their morality: harm, fairness, ingroup,
authority, and purity (Graham et al., 2011). MFT has implications for political
polarization in that conservatives generally weigh each of the five foundations
relatively equally in their morality, whereas liberals tend to emphasize harm and
fairness (Graham et al., 2009). Put another way, liberals emphasize the individu-
alizing foundations—morality relating to the welfare of the individual—and
conservatives value the binding foundations—morality relating to the welfare
of groups.
Perhaps because of this nuance in moral beliefs, general moral manipulations
have been ineffective for both liberals and conservatives (Albertson & Busby,
2015; Severson & Coleman, 2015). Targeted interventions, however, have more
potential. Perhaps the most promising research using morality manipulations
considers the effect of varying moral messages—focusing on either liberal moral
foundations (harm, care, fairness) or conservative ones (purity, sanctity, loyalty,
authority)—on liberals and conservatives separately. For example, Feinberg and
Willer (2013) provided participants with a neutral message, a message describing
the harm of environmental degradation and need to care for the Earth (targeting
liberal morality), or a message emphasizing the need to keep the Earth pure and
sacred (targeting conservative morality). Liberals were generally unaffected by
moral messages, displaying high levels of belief in global warming across all
conditions. Conservatives, however, had more belief in global warming when
shown a pure and sacred message than the other two messages. Furthermore,
the pure and sacred message (framing the effects of climate change more in
terms of contamination than harm) reduced political polarization in global-
warming belief, and eliminated it for general environmental attitudes. Similar
manipulations—messages framed in terms of conservative morality—were also
effective in increasing conservatives’ belief in and concern for climate change
(Wolsko, 2017; Wolsko et al., 2016). Day et al. (2014) demonstrated a similar
effect—with liberals more supportive of issues framed in terms of liberal moral
foundations and vice versa for conservatives—for a variety of issues, including
concern for the environment. Although conservative moral arguments show
promise in increasing conservatives’ belief in climate change, more research is
needed on the topic due to the limited number of experimental studies.
Economy and national security

Many studies utilize information about the effects of climate change on the
economy or the national security of the US: for example, an intervention
might include information that polices to mitigate climate change will add jobs
within the US (economy) or reduce America’s reliance on foreign oil (national
security). Relative to a control condition, experimental manipulations that
emphasize various economic or national security benefits of fighting climate
change have shown promise to increase support for climate policy (Severson
& Coleman, 2015), clean energy (Aklin & Urpelainen, 2013), greenhouse gas
reductions (McCright et al., 2016), and belief in climate change (Dixon et al.,
2017). At the same time, other research—or even other conditions or variables
within the same studies—suggests that highlighting the economic or national
security aspects of climate change action is not an effective intervention (e.g.,
Albertson & Busby, 2015; McCright et al., 2016; S. P. Singh & Swanson, 2017).
Relatedly, emphasizing the economic benefits compared to the environmental
benefits of climate change has not been effective in garnering policy support
or behavioral intentions (Bernauer & McGrath, 2016; Fielding et al., 2020).
Notably, the economic and national security messages used in interventions
vary widely; for example, they are as short as one or two sentences (e.g., Aklin
& Urpelainen, 2013; Bernauer & McGrath, 2016) or as long as a few paragraphs
like a news article (e.g., Fielding et al., 2020; McCright et al., 2016).
The moderating role of ideology in response to economic and national
security interventions is also largely ambiguous. Some research provides evi-
dence for a backfire effect of national security or economic messages, where
conservatives and Republicans have lower climate change beliefs in some
conditions compared to other experimental or control conditions (S. P. Singh &

Swanson, 2017; Zhou, 2016); climate skeptics even report feeling anger towards
national security messages (Myers et al., 2012). On the other hand, studies have
shown the potential for economic messages to reduce political polarization (e.g.,
Campbell & Kay, 2014; Severson & Coleman, 2015). Specifically, Campbell and
Kay (2014) and Dixon et al. (2017) demonstrated that highlighting free-market
solutions was especially persuasive for conservatives. Moreover, Bolsen et al.
(2019) revealed that national security messages were influential for Republicans
only when they were paired with a Republican source, and induced negative
responses from Republicans when they were from a Democrat or climate sci-
entist. Although source effects may explain some of the negative results from
Aklin and Urpelainen’s (2013) national security message—which was either
from scientists or no source—they fail to explain the backfire effect in Zhou
(2016) when messages from Republicans had negative or null effects.
Economic messages are certainly not a robust or one-size-fits-all interven-
tion.The largely mixed results imply that researchers need to focus on the con-
text of when economic messages might be beneficial. In particular, rather than
general messages, specific messages that discuss how solving or fighting cli-
mate change will involve free-market solutions—instead of large government
policies—could target conservatives more specifically than a general economic
message (e.g., Campbell & Kay, 2014). Despite being varied in their effective-
ness, economic interventions do show promise for reducing political polariza-
tion on climate change.
Summary: what interventions work, and for whom?

The Earth has already warmed significantly since pre-industrial times.The next
few decades will determine the extent of this warming and the amount of adap-
tation required to deal with its tangible negative impacts. To do this, effective
collective action must be initiated soon, and the polarization-induced paralysis
that currently reigns in US politics is one of the key obstacles to overcome.
This chapter reviewed the large and growing literature on interventions
intended to spur action on global climate change by influencing belief in it,
support for policies to mitigate it, and/or willingness to behave in ways to
reduce it. In particular, many of these interventions attempted to influence
the attitudes of political conservatives and climate skeptics to reduce polar-
ization around climate change. Unfortunately, when viewed as a whole the
interventions reviewed here showed very limited effectiveness in altering cli-
mate change beliefs and behavior or reducing the polarized positions on cli-
mate change between liberals and conservatives that hamper political progress
on the issue in the US and elsewhere.
A few types of intervention did show promise: in particular, interventions
that highlighted the free-market benefits of climate change solutions, attached
a Republican source to specific climate policies, and highlighted localized
climate change effects. These studies generally found that, while liberals often
demonstrated a ceiling effect and supported climate change policies no matter the
intervention, conservatives were particularly influenced by these interventions.
These studies were either targeted specifically towards conservatives (e.g.,
emphasizing the free market or employing a Republican source) or appealed to
personal outcomes (e.g., localizing climate change consequences).
Despite the promise of these interventions, however, it is important to note
that their effects were not consistent across studies. Even among studies that
were the most targeted towards conservatives—using conservative values and
conservative sources—interventions did not dependably reduce polarization.
For example, in a sample of Republicans, Zhou (2016) did not find any sig-
nificant effects in climate policy support of an economic or national security
message, even from a Republican source. For studies that attached Republican
sources to climate policies or messages, the results are similarly inconsistent
(e.g., Bolsen et al., 2019; Ehret et al., 2018). As such, the primary conclusion of
this review of interventions points to the stability of climate change attitudes in
the face of attempts to change them and the difficulty of garnering bipartisan
support for climate policies.
There is no one-size-fits-all way to increase engagement in climate change;
every type of intervention included mixed results, with some studies showing
the effectiveness of the intervention and others demonstrating its inability to
influence attitudes. Interventions that theoretically should work often don’t
(e.g., Zhou, 2016) and polarization that is always supposed to exist sometimes
doesn’t (e.g., Severson & Coleman, 2015). Insufficient power is a problem in
some studies, but not in others.The one constant seems to be the general resist-
ance of a substantial portion of people to believe in or act on the very real and
imminent threat of human-caused global climate change.
The hyper- polarized political environment in US politics creates many
problems at many levels, but none of these problems is more pressing than the
policy paralysis it has engendered regarding action to combat global climate
change. Future research must continue to examine interventions and investigate
the potential reasons for why they do not reduce polarization as consistently
as would be expected. Bipartisan support for climate policy is not impossible
(Leiserowitz et al., 2017), but the path to reduced polarization remains unclear
during an increasingly urgent moment for climate policy.
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Index
agreement paradox 114–130 COVID-19 57, 112

air pollution 158 cultural backlash thesis 102
algorithms 63 culture war 54
alternative facts 149
anger 151 demand characteristics 114
anti-capitalist 46 democracy 46–47
anti-establishment voting 7 Democrats 58–59, 142, 149
anti-establishment parties 97 disagreement 77
anti-immigration sentiment 42 divisive behaviors 126
attitude homogeneity 84
attitude similarity: perceived 80–83; economic deprivation 98–102
actual 83–85 economic downturn 100
authoritarianism 24, 41, 60, 123; RWA/ economic prosperity 104
LWA, 124–127 economy 159
authority figures 60 educated voters 102
efficacy 151
backfiring effect 119 emotions 4, 151–152
Baltimore protests 138 emphasis frames 156
Biden, Joe 83 entitlement 105
Big Five 24, 27 epistemic needs 19–21
bipartisan 161 existential needs 19–21
bloodlust 61–62 extremism 2, 40
Brexit 101, 112
business 118 fake news 149
false consensus effect 114
Catastrophe Model 40 false news 65
Charlottesville 135, 141 far-right rally 141
civil war 112 fear 151–152
climate change 121–122, 149–161 Five-Star movement 41
climate skeptics 149 Floyd, George 135
Clinton, Hillary 83 frustration-aggression thesis 99
cognitive inflexibility 8
collective action 138 Gateway Belief Model 154
collective angst 106 global warming 151
confirmation bias 63–64 Gore, Al 151
consensus 115; artificial 117 Great Depression 99
conservatives, 54, 57, 80–85, 149, 155 Green New Deal 149
conspiracy theories 8–9 greenhouse gas emissions 149
170 Index
guilt 151 polarization hypothesis 40

gun control 142 policy framing 156–157
policy support 156
health 157–158 political correctness norms 119–121
Holocaust 99 political cynicism 42–47
homogenous communities 81 political differences: dispositional origins
hope 152 of  18–21
hybrid model 27 political divide 113
political engagement 22–27
ideological asymmetries 82–85 political issue domain: social domain 21;
ideological belief systems 22 economic domain 21
ideological differences 80–85, 113 political knowledge 25
ideology 23, 26 political parties: moderate 48
immigrants 55 political polarization 2–9, 39, 80, 85, 149;
immigration 97 two perspectives on 17–18
information bubble 62–65 political tolerance 136
informational contamination 116–117 populism 2, 38–45, 102, 107; scale, 43–45
ingroup favoritism 56–61 populist movements 98
intergroup conflict 85 preferences: social-issue 28; economic 28
interventions 151–161 pressure 116, 128–129
intolerance  7–8 prejudice 46, 55–56
Iran: anti-government protests 139–140 privileges 104
Prohibitionists 129
Ku Klux Klan 129 protest norms 143–144
protest violence 137–144
left-r ight  45 Proud Boys 140
liberals 54, 57, 80–85, 149 psychological distance 152–154
psychopathy 61
Macron, Emmanuel 48 PVV, 41, 101
middle-class voters 101
minorities 99 racism 56
moral convergence 136–137, 139–143 radicalism 38, 40–41
moral diversity 144 radical right-wing  45–46
Moral Foundations Theory 158–159 radical-r ight parties 103
moral homogeneity 144 reactance 115–116, 155
moral language 139 realistic conflict threat 100
moralization 138–139 Realistic Group Conflict Theory
motivated reasoning 8–9 60
relative deprivation theory 100
national security 159 republicans 58–59, 142, 149, 160
need for closure 25 refugee crisis 6
noblesse oblige 105 relational goals 78–88
relational verification 79
Obama, Barrack 112 revolutionaries 129
overconfidence  6–7 rigidity 28
risk perception 153
partisanship 23, 26
party leaders 83 Sanders, Bernie 83
Pelosi, Nancy 124 scarce resources 99
Pervasive Arguments Theory  39 scientific consensus 154–155
Peterson, Jordan 120 sea-level rise 153
pocketbook voting 66–68 significance loss 4
Index 171
security 19 stress 113
selective exposure 64 sustainability 121–122
self-interest  65–68 symbolic threat 100
slavery 128
social capital 78 tax cuts 66
Social Comparison Theory 39 tribalism 54
social dominance orientation 41 Trump, Donald 98, 100, 112, 120–121;
social identity 105 support  53–68
social media 63, 83, 137 Twitter 84
social networks 83–85, 136–137
social relationships 78–85 violence 140
sophistication 28 Vlaams Belang 41
source frames 157
State of the Union 124 wealth paradox 103–106
status anxiety 103–106 WEIRD samples 140
status quo 150 White supremacists 141
stereotypes 119 World Values Survey 27
strategies 85 worldview conflict 56

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The Psychology of Political Polarization

The Psychology of Political Polarization was inspired by the notion that, to

Jan-​Willem van Prooijen is Associate Professor of Psychology at Vrije

Mindfulness in Social Psychology

Belief Systems and the Perception of Reality

Current Directions in Ostracism, Social Exclusion and Rejection

New Directions in the Psychology of Close Relationships

The Psychology of Food Marketing and Overeating

Psychological Perspectives on Praise

The Social Psychology of Humor

List of contributors vii

1 The psychology of political polarization: an introduction 1

3 The political mindset of supporters of radical

4 A psychological profile of extreme Trump supporters 53

5 The impact of relational goals on political polarization 77

7 The agreement paradox: how pressures to agree with

8 Converging moral views in social networks and their

9 Can the partisan divide in climate change attitudes be

Linus Chan, Department of Psychology, University of Montana

Alain Van Hiel, Department of Developmental, Personality and Social

The psychology of political

What is political polarization?

Why study political polarization?

A second reason to study political polarization is that, in many ways, it has

Political polarization is a paradox

Political polarization is a problem

This tendency to reject science and accept conspiracy theories is rooted in

Chadly Stern examines the influence of people’s fundamental motivation

When do psychological differences

is due to their roots in different disciplines: the top-​down perspective has its

The psychological bases of political differences

psychology developed (Adorno, Frenkel-​ Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford,

individuals with strong needs to reduce insecurity and minimize uncer-

On the psychological side of the equation, researchers have focused on a

stimuli (Bakker, Schumacher, Gothreau, & Arceneaux, 2020; Osmundsen et al.,

How (and when) do psychological differences predict

constructed, leaving the dominant psychological model of political differences

partisan identities (Abramowitz, 2010; Levendusky, 2009). Finally, citizens are

Engagement and the psychological bases of partisan

authoritarianism and ideology was stronger among those higher in political

Engagement and the psychological bases of

Duckitt, J., & Bizumic, B. (2013). Multidimensionality of right-​wing authoritarian

Kalmoe, N. P. (2020). Uses and abuses of ideology in political psychology. Political

Schwartz, S. H. (2007).Value orientations: Measurement, antecedents and consequences

The political mindset of

Polarization in psychological literature

The Catastrophe Model of radicalism and extremism

Radicalization and issue position polarization

explanation. We, of course, wholeheartedly agree that radical right-​wing-​side

Populist ideology does not equal populist ideological

by Mudde (2007, p. 23): “A thin-​centered ideology that considers society to

Populism as an ideological attitude: old wine in a

(MTurk; www.mturk.com). Participants completed our study in exchange for

whereas the populism concept would predict a positive inclination towards

The new political alignments in citizens’ mind

Political cynicism on the rescue for democracy?

over 33,000 respondents –​reported that in 2017 government was distrusted

Polarization needs to be overcome, indeed

populist-​radical parties are by no means polarized moderates. Rather, radicals

De Vreese, C. H. (2005). The spiral of cynicism reconsidered. European Journal of

Jan-Willem van Prooijen is Associate Professor of Psychology at Vrije

Psychological Perspectives on Praise

The Social Psychology of Humor

is due to their roots in different disciplines: the top-down perspective has its

psychology developed (Adorno, Frenkel- Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford,

Duckitt, J., & Bizumic, B. (2013). Multidimensionality of right-wing authoritarian

explanation. We, of course, wholeheartedly agree that radical right-wing-side

by Mudde (2007, p. 23): “A thin-centered ideology that considers society to

The new political alignments in citizens’ mind

over 33,000 respondents –reported that in 2017 government was distrusted

Polarization needs to be overcome, indeed

populist-radical parties are by no means polarized moderates. Rather, radicals

Figure 4.1 Ingroup favoritism of Democrats and Republicans in their approval and disap-

Table 4.1 Are Republicans more approving of their co-partisan presidents and

were found to be more likely to click on and share cross-cutting Facebook

Material self-i nterest

The foundational nature of relational goals

Ideological differences in relational goals

populist parties thrive when relatively well-to-do voters become protective of

short-term, superficial agreement. As we suggest in this chapter, while agreement

The emergence of anti-P C public figures: the case of

Sustainability-s upporting laws: the curious lack of

Studies 1a–d : results and discussion

Table 7.1 Studies 1a–d: left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) and right-wing authoritarianism

Zero-order Block 2 (Block 1 = age,

Table 7.2 Study 2: testing the left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) → agreement paradox

Table 7.3 Study 2: testing the right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) → agreement

Realistically speaking, most movements use both top-down pressure and