EPRI TU-1021493 - CFSI Checklist
EPRI TU-1021493 - CFSI Checklist
EPRI TU-1021493 - CFSI Checklist
Fraudulent Items
A Self-Assessment Checklist
1021493
Plant Support Engineering: Counterfeit and
Fraudulent Items
A Self-Assessment Checklist
1021493
M. Tannenbaum
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The following organization prepared this report:
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
1300 West W.T. Harris Boulevard
Charlotte, North Carolina, 28262
Principal Investigator
M. Tannenbaum
This report describes research sponsored by EPRI.
The following individuals were members of the technical advisory group responsible for
producing this guidance. Having provided valuable assistance and insight, each individual is
recognized for making contributions to the development of this checklist.
Paul Saksvig Dominion
Jim Grant Duke Energy
Daryl Prisby Exelon Nuclear
Bhavesh Patel Progress Energy
William Ware Southern Company Services
Scott Cameron South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company
Mark Capallo Energy and Process Corporation
This publication is a corporate document that should be cited in the literature in the following
manner:
iii
ABSTRACT
In today’s global marketplace, an increasing percentage of our spare and replacement items (and
their contents) originates outside the United States. Enormous growth in the manufacturing
capabilities of regions such as Asia has resulted in an increase in the number of fraudulent and
counterfeit items. We frequently hear of examples such as baby formula, dog food, lead paint in
toys, etc. An increasing number of more industrial examples such as tools, structural steel,
bearings, and electronics are also being identified. Counterfeiters are using increasingly
sophisticated methods and capabilities to achieve their deceptions.
At least two suspected counterfeit or fraudulent items have been identified prior to receipt in
2010 by members of the commercial nuclear supply chain community. In June of 2010, the
director of the Division of Construction Inspection & Operational Programs of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission identified counterfeit and fraudulent items as one four key Nuclear
Regulatory Commission focus areas.
This self-assessment checklist is intended for use by licensees and their suppliers as a vehicle for
identifying areas in which opportunity to reduce the risk associated with counterfeit and
fraudulent items exists. Organizations that use the checklist can increase the probability that
counterfeit and fraudulent items will be detected prior to being accepted for use, used in
manufacturing, or installed in plant systems and equipment.
v
CONTENTS
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................1-1
1.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................1-1
1.2 Objective ..................................................................................................................1-1
1.3 Intent ........................................................................................................................1-2
1.4 Organization .............................................................................................................1-2
2 MANAGEMENT......................................................................................................................2-1
2.1 Management Awareness and Sponsorship..............................................................2-1
2.2 Notification of Customers .........................................................................................2-1
2.3 Processes and Procedures ......................................................................................2-1
4 RECEIVING ............................................................................................................................4-1
4.1 Education of Receiving Staff ....................................................................................4-1
4.2 Communication of Enhanced Verification Requirements .........................................4-1
4.3 Comparison of Received Items with Items Known to Be Authentic..........................4-1
4.4 Nameplates, Labels, and Tags.................................................................................4-2
4.5 Examination of Documentation for Signs That It May Not Be Authentic ..................4-3
5 MAINTENANCE/PRODUCTION ............................................................................................5-1
5.1 Education of Maintenance/Production Staff .............................................................5-1
5.2 Pre-Job Briefings......................................................................................................5-1
5.3 Discrepancies Between Installed and Replacement Items ......................................5-1
vii
6 SUPPLIER AUDITS AND SURVEYS.....................................................................................6-1
6.1 Education of Audit Staff............................................................................................6-1
6.2 Engineering Involvement in the Supplier Assessment Process ...............................6-1
6.3 Targeted Questions on Supplier Audit Checklists ....................................................6-1
viii
3.10 Payment Terms ................................................................................................. A-5
3.11 Safeguarding Intellectual Property .................................................................... A-5
3.12 Procurement Schedule ...................................................................................... A-5
3.13 Addressing Obsolete Items and Materials......................................................... A-5
Section 4 Receiving ......................................................................................................... A-6
4.1 Education of Receiving Staff ............................................................................. A-6
4.2 Communication of Enhanced Verification Requirements .................................. A-6
4.3 Comparison of Received Items with Items Known to Be Authentic................... A-6
4.4 Nameplates, Labels, and Tags.......................................................................... A-6
4.5 Examination of Documentation for Signs That It May Not Be Authentic ........... A-7
Section 5 Maintenance/Production .................................................................................. A-7
5.1 Education of Maintenance/Production Staff ...................................................... A-7
5.2 Pre-Job Briefings ............................................................................................... A-7
5.3 Discrepancies Between Installed and Replacement Items................................ A-7
Section 6 Supplier Audits and Surveys ............................................................................ A-7
6.1 Education of Audit Staff ..................................................................................... A-7
6.2 Engineering Involvement in the Supplier Assessment Process ........................ A-7
6.3 Targeted Questions on Supplier Audit Checklists ............................................. A-8
Section 7 Processing Returned Items.............................................................................. A-8
7.1 Customer Returns ............................................................................................. A-8
7.2 Purchase of Excess Inventory from Customers ................................................ A-8
Section 8 Disposition of Defective and Nonconforming Products .................................... A-8
8.1 Destruction of Nonconforming Items ................................................................. A-8
Section 9 Collecting and Sharing Information on Counterfeit and Fraudulent Items ....... A-9
9.1 Documenting Suspect Items.............................................................................. A-9
9.2 Access to Suspected Counterfeit or Fraudulent Item Incident Information ....... A-9
9.3 Use of Incident Data .......................................................................................... A-9
Section 10 Counterfeit and Fraudulent Item Incident Management ................................. A-9
10.1 Documented Process ........................................................................................ A-9
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1 Organization of the Checklist....................................................................................1-3
xi
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 Introduction
Counterfeit and fraudulent items have found their way into the inventories of the transportation,
aerospace, and defense industries to the extent that the U.S. government formed an interagency
task force to address the issue. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is a participant
in the task force, and in 2008 the NRC communicated their serious concerns in Information
Notice 2008-04, “Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants” [1]. The NRC continues
to vigorously pursue the issue and identified counterfeit and fraudulent items as one of four
major concerns during the Nuclear Vendor Oversight Conference in June 2010 [2].
In 2009, EPRI published 1019163, Plant Support Engineering: Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and
Substandard Items: Mitigating the Increasing Risk [3], That report contains information that can
be used by any organization to better understand the risk and causal factors associated with
counterfeit and fraudulent items, as well as guidance on actions that can be taken to decrease the
risk that counterfeit and fraudulent items will find their way into nuclear plant inventories,
equipment, and systems.
Existing guidance on how to detect counterfeit and fraudulent items during inspection upon
receipt is contained in Appendix C of EPRI NP-6629, Guidelines for the Procurement and
Receipt of Items for Nuclear Power Plants [4]. This guidance was developed in the late 1980s
and echoes similar recommendations contained in NRC Generic Letter 89-02, “Actions to
Improve the Detection of Counterfeit and Fraudulent Items” [5]. Implementing this guidance
during inspection upon receipt is an important and effective means to prevent the use of
counterfeit and fraudulent items. However, additional measures can be taken. In today’s global
economy, awareness of counterfeiting and fraud should be promoted through all levels of both
internal and external supply chains. Although roles that individuals in organizations other than
the supply chain play in preventing counterfeit and fraudulent items may be less intuitive, they
are of significant importance and should not be overlooked. This self-assessment checklist
identifies typical precautionary measures that can be implemented by various organizations.
1.2 Objective
The objective of this checklist is to provide EPRI members and their supply chain with a means
to assess existing anti-counterfeiting measures and a tool to identify opportunities to improve
anti-counterfeiting measures in existing processes and programs. Members will also be able to
share the checklist with all tiers of their suppliers to raise awareness of the counterfeiting issue
and communicate effective means to minimize risk.
1-1
1.3 Intent
This checklist is intended to be used as a vehicle to identify areas in which opportunities exist to
reduce the risk associated with counterfeit and fraudulent items. Although it may not be
reasonable to expect that an organization would currently be implementing every anti-
counterfeiting measure identified in the checklist, it is incumbent upon each organization to
evaluate the results of their self-assessment within the context of their business and their
exposure to risk and take action accordingly.
1.4 Organization
Sections 2 through 10 of this checklist are organized by organizations or functions that can play
important roles in minimizing the risk that counterfeit items will be procured, placed into usable
inventory, or installed. Each section includes questions that can be asked to determine
opportunities for improving practices, processes, and procedures to minimize exposure to
counterfeit items.
Appendix A of this document includes the right answer to each question along with a brief
explanation of how that answer demonstrates that actions are being taken to reduce risk.
1-2
Section 2 Management
Section 4 Receiving
Section 5 Maintenance/Production
Figure 1-1
Organization of the Checklist
1-3
2
MANAGEMENT
2-1
3
PURCHASING AND CONTRACTS
3-1
3.5 Requirement for Licensed Manufacturers
3.5.1 If you license manufacturers to produce items you design, do you implement strict
contractual control of contract manufacturers with respect to the quantity of items they
are permitted to produce?
3-2
3.8 Identification of At-Risk Procurements
3.8.1 Are factors such as cost per unit, country or region of origin, and type of item (engineered
product, commodity, and so forth) considered when determining if a procurement may be
an at-risk procurement?
3.8.2 Are procurements of lifting and rigging equipment subject to enhanced inspection to
verify authenticity when not purchased from a distributor authorized by the
manufacturer?
3.8.3 Are personnel safety devices (such as safety glasses and shields, hardhats, and so forth)
subject to enhanced inspection to verify authenticity when not purchased from a
distributor authorized by the manufacturer?
3.8.4 Are tools subject to enhanced inspection to verify authenticity when not purchased from a
distributor authorized by the manufacturer?
3.9.4 Are procurement staff performance and bonus incentives based entirely on cost savings?
3-3
3.11 Safeguarding Intellectual Property
Note that safeguarding intellectual property is applicable to every internal organization.
3.11.1 Are drawings, specifications, and diagrams containing information such as design and
manufacturing data transmitted to external organizations prior to executing legal
precautions such as nondisclosure agreements?
3.11.2 Are staff members trained to recognize intellectual property and prevent it from being
transmitted to external organizations without appropriate precautions?
3-4
4
RECEIVING
4-1
c) Comparison to a previously accepted item
d) Comparison to diagrams or drawings provided by engineering
e) Comparison to photos stored in information systems or otherwise readily available to
inspection personnel
4.4.2 Are received items examined to determine if obvious attempts at beautification have been
made such as:
a) There is evidence of excess painting or hand painting (touch ups).
b) Stainless steel is painted.
c) Non-ferrous metals such as copper, brass, and bronze are clean and bright, indicating
recent polishing.
d) There is evidence of wire brushing or sanding.
4.4.3 Are received items examined to determine if hand tool marks are evident on fasteners or
other assembly parts?
4.4.4 Are received items examined to determine if parts that should be similar appear to be
dissimilar (such as seven of eight bolts bearing the same markings and the eighth bearing
different markings)?
4.4.5 Are received items examined to determine if there is poor fit between assembled items?
4.4.6 Are received items examined to determine if they exhibit evidence of being handmade or
having work performed on them by hand such as:
a) Rough-cut gaskets
b) Shims and thin metal edges that appear to be cut or dressed by hand tools (filing,
hacksaw marks, deformation characteristic of tin snips or aviation shears)
4-2
4.5 Examination of Documentation for Signs That It May Not Be Authentic
4.5.1 Is documentation examined for signs that it may not be authentic such as:
a) Ink smudges consistent with printing via ink-jet printer are present.
b) Use of correction fluid or tape is evident.
c) Inconsistencies in font sizes and types are present.
d) Signatures and initials are missing or excessively faded, indicating that they have
been photocopied.
e) Signatures that are supposed to be original appear to be electronically added to the
document (for example, added as an image file).
f) The name or title of the document approver cannot be determined.
g) One or more technical values are inconsistent (for example, the chemical and physical
properties are not consistent with each other or with applicable specification
requirements).
h) One or more technical values are not consistent with applicable code or standard
requirements (for example, test results for required tests are not provided, or
documentation indicates tests that are not required or applicable were performed).
i) Certification: test results: or heat, lot, or batch numbers are identical between items
when variation would normally be expected.
j) Traceability from the documentation to the item received is unclear.
k) Documentation is not delivered as required in procurement documents.
l) Documentation is in an unusual format.
4-3
5
MAINTENANCE/PRODUCTION
This section applies to individuals in organizations that are directly involved in maintaining plant
equipment (utilities) or the production, manufacture, and packaging of items
(manufacturers/suppliers). Individuals that play hands-on roles in maintaining equipment or
manufacturing items are often the most likely to notice an atypical difference in a part or material
that could be an indication that it is not authentic.
5-1
6
SUPPLIER AUDITS AND SURVEYS
6-1
j) How does the supplier identify and dispose of items that are rejected at the receiving
dock or as the result of quality control inspections? Are measures taken to prevent
these items from being cleaned up and sold as legitimate by unscrupulous entities?
k) Does the supplier test purchased items and raw materials that are considered critical
to the design and function of the products you purchase?
l) Who can be contacted and what resources can the supplier make available in the
event that you have questions about an item they have manufactured or sold?
m) Would the supplier be willing to notify you in writing when items being provided
were not obtained from an authorized distributor?
6-2
7
PROCESSING RETURNED ITEMS
7-1
8
DISPOSITION OF DEFECTIVE AND NONCONFORMING
PRODUCTS
8-1
9
COLLECTING AND SHARING INFORMATION ON
COUNTERFEIT AND FRAUDULENT ITEMS
9-1
10
COUNTERFEIT AND FRAUDULENT ITEM INCIDENT
MANAGEMENT
10-1
11
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES
11.1 Glossary
fraudulent item Items that are intentionally misrepresented with intent to deceive.
Fraudulent items include items provided with incorrect identification or
falsified/inaccurate certification. Fraudulent items also include
manufacturing overages sold by entities that have acquired the legal right
to manufacture a specified quantity of an item (such as an integrated
circuit), but produce a larger quantity than authorized and sell the
overage as legitimate inventory.
substandard item An item that does not meet the intended product specification. It is
possible for legitimate suppliers to unknowingly provide substandard
items that were manufactured using raw materials or part-level items that
were acquired from sub-tier suppliers and, for some reason, did not meet
the applicable specifications.
suspect item Items that are suspected of being counterfeit, fraudulent, or substandard.
11-1
11.3 References
1. U. S. NRC Information Notice 2008-04, “Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power
Plants,” United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC: 2008.
2. NRC Perspective on the Vendor Inspection Program for New Reactors, Presented at Second
Workshop on Vendor Oversight for New Reactor Construction, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC: June 2010.
3. Plant Support Engineering: Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Substandard Items: Mitigating the
Increasing Risk. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: October 2009. 1019163.
4. Guidelines for the Procurement and Receipt of Items for Nuclear Power Plants. EPRI, Palo
Alto, CA: May 1990. NP-6629.
5. U.S. NRC Generic Letter 89-02, “Actions to Improve the Detection of Counterfeit and
Fraudulently Marketed Products” (Agencywide documents access and management system
(ADAMS) Accession No. ML031140060), United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC: March 1989.
6. IAEA-TECDOC-1169, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria: August 2000.
7. U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security Office of Technical
Evaluation. “Defense Industrial Base Assessment: Counterfeit Electronics.” Washington
D.C. 2010.
11.4 Bibliography
SAE Aerospace. “Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and
Disposition.” SAE Aerospace SAE AS5553. Warrendale, PA: SAE International, April 2009.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Defense Supplier Base, DOD Should Leverage
Ongoing Initiatives in Developing Its Program to Mitigate Risk of Counterfeit Parts.”
GAO-10-389, Washington D.C.: March 2010.
11-2
A
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS
Intent
The intent of this survey is to provide questions that can be used to identify opportunities that
may exist to reduce the risk of purchasing, receiving, using or unintentionally reselling
counterfeit items.
The intent is not to imply that the answers to every question must agree with the answers
included in this appendix or that the list of questions included in this document is inclusive of all
effective ways to minimize the risk associated with counterfeit and fraudulent items. Although
the answers included are based upon good practices and recommendations developed through
research on this topic, it is important to recognize that exposure to counterfeit and fraudulent
items may vary based upon an organization’s business and products.
Each organization can carefully assess their risk and determine which controls and barriers might
be most effective and practical in reducing the risk associated with counterfeit and fraudulent
items. Moreover, each organization using this report can adapt the practices as necessary to
accommodate the nuances associated with their business, products and facilities.
Appropriate Answers
Section 2 Management
A-1
2.2 Notification of Customers
2.2.1 Yes If an organization becomes aware that counterfeit or fraudulent versions of their
products (manufactured by others) are available in the marketplace, customers
should be notified so they may implement precautions against receiving and using
the non-genuine items. This action may also protect the reputation of the
organization should the counterfeit or fraudulent items fail.
2.2.2 Yes Customers (particularly those in mission-critical industries) should be notified as
soon as possible when an organization becomes aware of the possibility that they
may have inadvertently resold counterfeit or fraudulent items.
A-2
3.3 Development of Acceptance Criteria
3.3.1 Yes Acceptance criteria should be established at the front end of the procurement
process and should be based upon applicable design and technical requirements.
3.3.2 Yes Acceptance criteria for items should be established by engineering or technical
staff and should be commensurate with the importance or criticality of the items
being procured.
A-3
3.6.4 Yes Unauthorized distributors may not purchase directly from the manufacturer and
may not have access to current information from the manufacturer about known
counterfeits, changes in logos or marking, and means by which authenticity can
be verified. Authorization should be a factor considered (in addition to per unit
cost) when selecting suppliers. Risk of introducing counterfeit or fraudulent items
is greater when purchasing from unauthorized distributors.
3.6.5 Yes Procurements from entities not authorized by the manufacturer should be
recognized as at-risk procurements.
3.6.6 Yes At-risk procurements should be identified so that staff involved in the
procurement can implement enhanced testing and verification when appropriate.
3.6.7 Yes At-risk items should be subjected to enhanced testing and verification
commensurate with their importance or criticality.
A-4
3.9 Evaluating Bids and Proposals
3.9.1 Yes Data presented in the U.S. Department of Commerce survey titled “Defense
Industrial Base Assessment: Counterfeit Electronics” [7] indicate that electronic
items priced between $0.11 and $500.00 are most likely to be targeted by
counterfeiters. Low-cost, high-volume items are likely targeted as the opportunity
for sales is high, and the perceived probability of getting caught is low since low-
cost items are less likely to be subjected to verification testing and inspection.
3.9.2 No The most heavily weighted factor or factors used to evaluate bids and proposals
should be directly related to the product’s ability to perform its function. Price is
an important consideration, but it should not be used as the sole criterion.
3.9.3 Yes Low-cost, high-volume items are likely targeted as the opportunity for sales is
high, and the perceived probability of getting caught is low since low-cost items
are less likely to be subjected to verification testing and inspection.
3.9.4 No Performance incentives for buyers should not be based entirely upon savings per
unit. Although cost savings are important, incentives should be balanced with
other criteria related to acceptability and performance of the items procured.
A-5
Section 4 Receiving
A-6
4.5 Examination of Documentation for Signs That It May Not Be Authentic
4.5.1 Yes Signs that documentation is not authentic can be an indication that items are not
authentic.
Section 5 Maintenance/Production
A-7
6.3 Targeted Questions on Supplier Audit Checklists
6.3.1 Yes Including questions that address precautions that can be taken against counterfeit
and fraudulent items raises supplier awareness of the issues and can provide
insight into the types of enhanced testing and inspection that may be necessary for
items procured from the supplier.
A-8
Section 9 Collecting and Sharing Information on Counterfeit and Fraudulent
Items
A-9
10.1.3 Yes Authorities responsible for fighting counterfeiting and fraud can be frustrated
when suspect items are routinely returned to the supplier in exchange for
authentic replacements. In effect, returning counterfeit or fraudulent items may be
viewed as returning criminal evidence to the perpetrator. Therefore, the process
for addressing the receipt of suspect items should include careful consideration
for determining if the suspect items should be returned to the supplier or retained
for further investigation.
10.1.4 Yes The process should identify agencies that should be notified or informed of the
suspected counterfeit or fraudulent item.
A-10
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FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY are registered service marks of the Electric
Power Research Institute, Inc.
1021493