C 6 +-+people+v +Ferrer,+G R +no +148821,+18+july+2003
C 6 +-+people+v +Ferrer,+G R +no +148821,+18+july+2003
C 6 +-+people+v +Ferrer,+G R +no +148821,+18+july+2003
SYNOPSIS
Appellant herein was charged with the rape of his 11-year-old stepdaughter of his
common-law wife. After arraignment, he was temporarily released for medical treatment
to the custody of Ustadj Sinoding Langcoa, a trusted member of the society. During the
pre-trial, appellant and his lawyer failed to appear. Trial in absentia followed. The trial court
considered appellant as having jumped bail since he did not show up in court. Thus, the
trial court rendered a decision nding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and imposed upon him the death penalty. In his appellant's brief, appellant
assailed the decision as violative of the Constitution. He argued that the decision failed to
distinctly point out the applicable law on which it was based and that there was nothing in
the decision that would show how the court arrived at its conclusion convicting him of the
crime charged.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the trial court. The records of the case
were remanded to said court for further proceedings and for proper rendition of judgment.
The court found that the decision of the trial court failed to comply with the rudimentary
requirements of due process and the constitutional provisions that vouchsafe the same.
The ve-page decision failed to express therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it was based. After a summation of the evidence presented, which consisted only
of the prosecution's evidence, considering that the defense failed to adduce evidence in its
behalf, the trial court immediately declared, in a most sweeping manner, the guilt of the
appellant. The Court also found that the appellant was deprived of his constitutional right
to counsel.
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEEDS FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF DUE
PROCESS. — The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process
which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due
process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may
be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. . . . It may be stressed that the right to
counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself
to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active
involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his
bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the
case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing
jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel nds substance in the performance by
the lawyer of his sworn duty of delity to his client. Tersely put, it means an e cient and
truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.
3. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; COUNSEL DE OFICIO; DUTIES; CONSTRUED. —
No lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility except only for the most compelling
and cogent reasons. While Atty. Alonto and Atty. Macabanding faced the daunting task of
defending an accused who had jumped bail, this unfortunate development is not a
justi cation to excuse themselves from giving their hearts and souls to the latter's
defense. The exercise of their duties as counsel de oficio meant rendering full meaning and
reality to the constitutional precepts protecting the rights of the accused. A counsel de
oficio is expected to do his utmost. A mere pro forma appointment of a counsel de o cio
who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused merits disapprobation. The
exacting demands expected of a lawyer should be no less than stringent when one is a
counsel de oficio. He must take the case not as a burden but as an opportunity to assist in
the proper dispensation of justice. We stressed that Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication,
competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable. In said case, the defense
lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead,
they haphazardly performed their function as counsel de o cio to the detriment and
prejudice of the accused, however guilty he might have been found to be after trial.
Inevitably, we advised them to adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the
Code of Professional Responsibility; otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future
will be severely sanctioned.
DECISION
From the evidence, it appears that Mary Grace Belonio was born on July 6,
1984, at Banisilan, North Cotabato. Her father is Felix Belonio while her mother is
Felipa Pataksil Belonio. Said spouses were lawfully married to each other in 1978
and out of such union, four (4) children were born one of whom is Mary Grace
(the victim in this case). The couple were however separated and when Mary
Grace was barely one (1) year and six (6) months old, Felipa started living as a
common law wife of the accused Jerry Ferrer together with Mary Grace and her
other children in one house at Mother Catutungan, Wao, Lanao del Sur. Felipa
was a "sari-sari" item vendor and normally left home as early as 3:00 o'clock in
the morning for said business and return home at 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
Jerry Ferrer (common law husband) is a blacksmith and stay home with the child
victim Mary Grace.
In October of 1995 while the mother (Felipa) was away attending to her
business, the accused Jerry started his criminal design to have carnal knowledge
by committing rape on Mary Grace. It was Monday afternoon at 2:00 o'clock in
October 1995 that Jerry called his step-daughter Mary Grace [to] go upstairs of
their house at Catutungan, Wao, Lanao del Sur. With the use of his scythe in
intimidating the girl, Jerry started touching the girl who was resisting but was no
match to the strength of her step-father who was at the same time placing his
scythe at the neck of the girl to prevent resistance. The accused undressed the girl
by pulling the latter's short pant[s] down and her panty. The accused pushed the
girl to lie down. The accused, then pulled down his short pant[s] and took out his
penis into the girl's vagina. The girl felt the pain that day. On Friday of that same
week in the evening while his common law wife Felipa (mother of the victim) was
away, the accused succeeded in consummating the crime of rape upon Mary
Grace. The accused repeatedly did the sexual assault upon Mary Grace until in
1977, the victim got the courage to reveal the said rape to her mother that resulted
in the ling of this case. The Medical Certi cate issued by Dr. Benjamin Bajarla
following [the] medical and physical examination on the victim on December 17,
1997 showed laceration of the girl's hymen at 3:00 o'clock; 6 o'clock and 9 o'clock
positions.
It further appears from the evidence that Mary Grace was born on July 6,
1984 and [that] the crime of rape was committed upon her by the accused in 1995
and [the] subsequent year. The victim was therefore 11 years old at the time of
the commission of rape upon her.
This Court was constrained to decide this case after trial in absentia for
reason of the accused escaping from imprisonment after arraignment. From all
the foregoing evidences, the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
and its statutory expression in Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 1. Judgment; de nition and form. — Judgment is the adjudication
by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the
imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written
in the o cial language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed
by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the
law upon which it is based.
In the oft-cited William v. Kaiser, 4 5 the United States Supreme Court, through Justice
Douglas, has rightly observed that the accused needs the aid of counsel lest he be the
victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law's complexity or of his own ignorance or
bewilderment. An accused must be given the right to be represented by counsel for, unless
so represented, there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf would be
inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings.
The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. 4 6
In the end, even Atty. Alonto followed Atty. Macabanding in his uncaring, insensitive
and cavalier attitude towards an accused who had placed his life in their hands and whose
protection and defense they have sworn to do. The notices sent to both Atty. Alonto and
Atty. Macabanding on the succeeding hearings during which it should have been their turn
as defense counsels to present evidence were received by the PAO as shown by the
notations made by the process server on the back of the return of service. But, the records
glaringly show that they neither moved for postponement of these hearings nor explained
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to the court their inability to present evidence.
It may be stressed that the right to counsel must be more than just the presence of
a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections.
The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended
by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The
right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the
trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being
well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and
existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel nds substance in the
performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of delity to his client. Tersely put, it means
an e cient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation. 4 7
No lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility except only for the most
compelling and cogent reasons. While Atty. Alonto and Atty. Macabanding faced the
daunting task of defending an accused who had jumped bail, this unfortunate development
is not a justi cation to excuse themselves from giving their hearts and souls to the latter's
defense. The exercise of their duties as counsel de oficio meant rendering full meaning and
reality to the constitutional precepts protecting the rights of the accused. A counsel de
oficio is expected to do his utmost. A mere pro forma appointment of a counsel de o cio
who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused merits disapprobation. The
exacting demands expected of a lawyer should be no less than stringent when one is a
counsel de oficio. He must take the case not as a burden but as an opportunity to assist in
the proper dispensation of justice. 4 8
In People v. Sevilleno , 4 9 we have made known our displeasure over the manner by
which three PAO lawyers discharged their duties. All three displayed manifest disinterest
on the plight of their client. We stressed that Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication,
competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable. In said case, the defense
lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead,
they haphazardly performed their function as counsel de o cio to the detriment and
prejudice of the accused, however guilty he might have been found to be after trial.
Inevitably, we advised them to adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the
Code of Professional Responsibility; otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future
will be severely sanctioned.
We are making a similar advice to Atty. Alonto and Atty. Macabanding. Their
deportment evinces an apparent disregard of their delity to their oaths as lawyers and
responsibility as o cers of the court to aid in the administration and dispensation of
justice. 5 0 After all, the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense is
inviolable. If no court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive
him of that right, then neither can lawyers appointed to defend him. 5 1
As we have stressed in a number of decisions, we are not espousing a "soft, bended,
approach" to heinous crimes. Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policy that the State
should not be given the license to kill without the nal determination of this Highest
Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last, effective hedge against an erroneous
judgment of a one-judge trial court. This enlightened policy ought to continue as our
beacon light for the taking of life ends all rights, a matter of societal value that transcends
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the personal interest of a convict. The importance of this societal value should not be
blurred by the escape of a convict which is a problem of law enforcement. Neither should
we be moved alone by the outrage of the public in the multiplication of heinous crimes for
our decisions should not be directed by the changing winds of the social weather. Let us
not for a moment forget that an accused does not cease to have rights just because of his
conviction. This principle is implicit in our Constitution which recognizes that an accused,
even if he belongs to a minority of one has the right to be right, while the majority, even if
overwhelming, has no right to be wrong. 5 2
The requirement that we pass upon on automatic review a case in which capital
punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one having for its object
simply and solely the protection of the accused. Having received the supreme penalty
which the law imposes, he is entitled under that law to have the sentence and all the facts
and circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the Highest Tribunal of the land
to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such
procedure is merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the accused
can waive it. It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates
no evasion. 5 3
Ultimately, we see no other choice but to order the remand of the case to the court a
quo for continuation of the trial.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 28 November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Sur, Branch 9, Marawi City, in Criminal Case No. 2969-98, nding accused-
appellant JERRY FERRER guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is hereby
SET ASIDE. The records are hereby REMANDED to said court for further proceedings and
for the proper rendition of judgment in accordance with Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution and Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
Judge Abdulhakim Amer R. Ibrahim is hereby ADMONISHED to observe faithfully the
provisions of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and Rule 120, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended).
Atty. Moh'd Hassan Macabanding and Atty. Avecina Alonto of the Public Attorney's
O ce of Marawi City are hereby ADMONISHED for having fallen short of their
responsibility as o cers of the court and as members of the Bar and WARNED that any
similar infraction shall be dealt with most severely. aHTcDA
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., are on official leave.
Footnotes
1. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic
Act No. 7659, entitled An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,
Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, other Special Penal
Laws, and for Other Purposes, which took effect on 31 December 1993 (People v. Simon,
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G.R. No. 93028; 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555.)
2. Original Record (OR) 174-178; Rollo, 11-55 Per Judge Abdulhakim Amer R. Ibrahim.
3. OR, 1.
4. Id., 27.
5. Id., 30.
6 OR, 31-32.
7. Id., 38.
8 Id., 38-39.
9 Birth Certificate, Exhibit "A", OR, 92.
46. People v. Bermas, 365 Phil. [1999]. See also Delgado v. Court of Appeals, 229 Phil. 362
[1986].
47. People v. Bermas, supra note 46. See also People v. Nadera, Jr., 381 Phil. 484 [2000].
48. People v. Bermas, supra note 46.
49. 365 Phil. 63 [1999].
50. People v. Aranzado, G.R. Nos. 132442-44, 24 September 2001, 365 SCRA 649. See also
People v. Sta. Teresa, G.R. No. 130663, 20 March 2001, 354 SCRA 697.
51. People v. Lumague, Jr., 197 Phil. 492 [1982].
52. People v. Esparas, 329 Phil. 339 [1996].
53. People v. Esparas, Supra note 52, citing U.S. v. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532 [1910] and U.S. v.
Binayoh, 35 Phil. 23 [1916].