PEDRO AGCAOILI, JR., et al., petitioners, MARIA IMELDA JOSEFA “IMEE” R.

MARCOS, co-
petitioner v. HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, et al., respondents,
COMMITTEE ON GOOD GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, co-respondent,
G.R. No. 232395, July 03, 2018, TIJAM, J.

FACTS
 House Resolution No. 882 was introduced by respondent Fariñ as, et al., directing House
Committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, pertaining to the use by the
Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte of its shares (purchased 40 mini cabs, 5 buses,
and 70 mini trucks amounting to P66,450,000) from the excise taxes on locally
manufactured virginia-type cigarettes for a purpose other than that provided for by R.A.
No. 7171.
 Invitation Letters were individually sent to petitioners Agcaoili et al., employees of the
Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, and co-petitioner Marcos, incumbent Governor
of the Province of Ilocos Norte, to attend as resource persons for the initial hearing on
H.R. No. 882. Petitioners Agcaoili et al. alleged that at the hearing, they were subjected
to threats and intimidation, that they were asked "leading and misleading questions",
that regardless of their answers, the same were similarly treated as evasive, and that
when they were not able to recall the transactions respondent Fariñas alluded to,
they were cited in contempt and ordered detained.
 Petitioners Agcaoili et al. filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondent House
Sergeant-at-Arms Lieutenant General Detabali before the CA. The CA issued a writ
of Habeas Corpus ordering Detabali to produce the bodies of the petitioners before the
court but Detabali failed to attend.
 A motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus was also filed on the ground that the CA
had no jurisdiction over the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for Provisional Release
based on petitioners' constitutional right to bail. Detabali, through the OSG, opposed the
motion. The CA issued a Resolution denying Detabali's motion to dissolve the writ
of Habeas Corpus and granting petitioners' Motion for Provisional Release upon posting
of a bond. The CA issued an Order of Release Upon Bond.
 While the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before the CA, petitioners and co-
petitioner Marcos filed the instant Omnibus Petition. During the congressional hearing,
which petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos attended, and while the present Omnibus
Petition is pending final resolution by the Court, respondent House Committee lifted
the contempt order and ordered the release of petitioners . Consequently,
petitioners were released on the same date. The CA issued a Resolution in the Habeas
Corpus Petition considering the case as closed and terminated on the ground of
mootness.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition which seeks the release of petitioners
from detention was rendered moot by their subsequent release from detention. – YES
2. Whether or not the Court can assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition then
pending before the CA. – NO
3. Whether or not the subject legislative inquiry on House Resolution No. 882 may be
enjoined by a writ of prohibition. – NO
4. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition sufficiently states a cause of action for the
issuance of a writ of Amparo. – NO
 RULING
1. The release of persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
was filed renders the petition for the issuance thereof moot and academic.
 The rule is that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not
consider questions where no actual interests are involved and thus, will not
determine a moot question as the resolution thereof will be of no practical value.
 Far compelling than the question of mootness is that the element of illegal
deprivation of freedom of movement or illegal restraint is jurisdictional in
petitions for habeas corpus. Consequently, in the absence of confinement and
custody, the courts lack the power to act on the petition for habeas corpus and the
issuance of a writ thereof must be refused.
 The writ of Habeas Corpus or the "great writ of liberty" was devised as a "speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom."
 The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal." Under the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus cannot be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public
safety requires it.
 As to what kind of restraint against which the writ is effective, case law deems any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action as sufficient. A writ of Habeas
Corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.” (Section 1, Rule 102, Rules of Court)
 Section 4, Rule 102 spells the instances when the writ of Habeas Corpus is not
allowed or when the discharge thereof is authorized: If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of
an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
 The Court, in exceptional cases, decides moot questions.
o The general rule is that mootness of the issue warrants a dismissal, except
when:
1. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved;
3. The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
4. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 
The presence of the second and fourth exceptions persuaded the Court to proceed.

2. The Court's administrative supervision over lower courts does not equate to the
power to usurp jurisdiction already acquired by lower courts.
  Jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus and the adjunct authority to issue the
writ are shared by this Court and the lower courts.

As the Habeas Corpus Petition was filed by petitioners with the CA, the latter has acquired
jurisdiction over said petition to the exclusion of all others, including this Court. This must
be so considering the basic postulate that jurisdiction once acquired by a court is not lost
upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. A departure
from this established rule is to run the risk of having conflicting decisions from courts of
concurrent jurisdiction and would unwittingly promote judicial interference and
instability.

3. Under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
 While there is no question that a writ of prohibition lies against legislative functions,
the Court finds no justification for the issuance thereof in the instant case.
 The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo
and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
 Co-petitioner Marcos failed to show that the subject legislative inquiry violates the
Constitution or that the conduct thereof was attended by grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
4. The filing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo before this Court while
the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA was still pending is improper.
 Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to
separately and directly intervene through the writ of Amparo.
 The privilege of the writ of Amparo is confined to instances of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. Even if the Court sets aside this
procedural faux pas, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos failed to show, by prima
facie evidence, entitlement to the issuance of the writ.
 In Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., the Court categorically
pronounced that the Amparo Rule is confined to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof.
 Petitioners Agcaoili et al. and co-petitioner Marcos readily admit that the instant
Omnibus Petition does not cover extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or
threats thereof. Thus, on this ground alone, their petition for the issuance of a writ
of Amparo is dismissible.
 SPOUSES ROZELLE RAYMOND MARTIN AND CLAUDINE MARGARET
SANTIAGO v. RAFFY TULFO, BEN TULFO, AND ERWIN TULFO, G.R. No. 205039,
October 21, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS
 Petitioners Raymart and Claudine Santiago arrived at the NAIA 3 and waited for the
arrival of their baggage but were eventually informed that it was offloaded and
transferred to a different flight. Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a complaint before the
Cebu Pacific complaint desk. As they were complaining, they noticed a man (later
identified as Ramon “Mon” Tulfo) taking photos of Claudine with his cellular phone.
Raymart approached him and asked what he was doing. Suddenly, Mon allegedly
punched and kicked Raymart, forcing the latter to fight back. When Claudine saw the
commotion, she approached Mon and the latter likewise allegedly kicked and pushed
her back against the counter.
 Days after the incident, respondents Raffy Tulfo et al., brothers of Mon, aired on their
TV program comments and expletives against petitioners, and threatened that they
will retaliate. Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners Santiago filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo against respondents Tulfo before the RTC.
 The RTC dismissed the petition and ordered the dissolution of the temporary protection
order (TPO) previously granted to petitioners. It held that the petition is not a proper
subject of a writ of amparo.
 Petitioners Santiago filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied for
lack of merit.
 Petitioners Santiago filed the present petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the
issuance of a writ of amparo is not limited to cases of extrajudicial killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof, and that they need not undergo the human rights
abuses such as extrajudicial killings or enforced disappearances, as is common to
landmark decisions on military and police abuses, before their right to life, liberty, and
security may be protected by a writ of amparo.

ISSUE

Whether or not the RTC's dismissal of petitioners' amparo petition was correct. – YES.

RULING

The amparo petition filed by petitioners Santiago before the RTC does not allege any case of
extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof. Their petition is
merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents' purported violation of their right to
life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or
indirect government participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls
outside the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail.

 The writ of amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC/Rule on the Writ of Amparo) is intended to
address and, thus, is presently confined to cases involving extralegal killings and/or
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
 "Extrajudicial killings," according to case law, are generally characterized as "killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings."
 "Enforced disappearances," according to Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 9851, otherwise
known as the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law,
Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity," "means the arrest, detention, or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State
or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the
intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time."
 The delimitation of our current writ of amparo to extralegal killings and/or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof, is explicit from Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC,
which reads:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
 While the first paragraph does state that the writ is a remedy to protect the right to life,
liberty, and security of the person desiring to avail of it, the same section's second
paragraph qualifies that the protection of such rights specifically pertain to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, which are more concrete cases
that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and security.
 The petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government participation. Notably, the same requirement of
government participation should also apply to extralegal killings.

The Court denied the instant petition for review on certiorari and dismissed the petition for
writ of amparo filed before the RTC.
 THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners v. RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO,
respondents, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, PUNO, C.J.

FACTS
 Respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by armed soldiers. The
soldiers suspected them of being members and supporters of the New People's Army
and were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, brother of respondents.
Raymond and Reynaldo managed to escape after 18 months of detention and torture.
 Respondents Raymond and Reynaldo initially filed an action for "Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order" to stop petitioners and/or their officers
and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic
rights on August 23, 2007, prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also
sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies
under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court.
 The Court enjoined the Secretary of National Defense and AFP Chief of Staff, their
agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the
Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) from causing the arrest of
respondents, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their
right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution.
 When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, respondents Raymond
and Reynaldo moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be
more effective and suitable to the circumstances of their enforced disappearance. The
Court granted their motion.

ISSUE
Whether or not the issuance of the writ of amparo is proper. – YES

RULING
The circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security,
and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.

While respondents Raymond and Reynaldo admit that they are no longer in detention and
are physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word" as their
"movements continue to be restricted for “fear” that people they have named in their
Judicial Affidavits and testified against are still at large and have not been held
accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the AFP and are, thus, in a
position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."

 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal

killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined
to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
 proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct
or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."
 The writ of Amparo ("protection" in Spanish) provides rapid judicial relief as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make
the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
 The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative
in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably
yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both
the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
 Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of
action, viz: The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.

 Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required.
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs
as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.

 Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court affirmed the
factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on Raymond Manalo's affidavit
and testimony. With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the
torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of
the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves,
and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in
their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other
evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks
they can identify in the places where they were detained.
 The right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In the context of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life,
liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus
can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The
 degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the
prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the
stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to
security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the
"threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule
is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the
provision.

The Court dismissed the instant petition for review.

 INFANT JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER, MA. CHRISTINA
YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner, v. ATTY. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, ATTY. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA
B. CABRERA, CELIA C. YANGCO, AND OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents, G.R. No. 193652, August 05, 2014, VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS
 Petitioner Christina Caram had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Constantino III
and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage.
Due to financial distress and initial embarrassment, she intended to have the child
adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children. When petitioner Christina gave
birth to Baby Julian, Sun and Moon shouldered all her hospital and medical expenses
and she voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment to the DSWD. The DSWD issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian as
“Legally Available for Adoption.” A local matching conference was held where Baby
Julian was “matched” with the Medina spouses.
 Petitioner Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the
DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. The DSWD,
through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to respondent DSWD Assistant
Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate had attained finality on Nov. 13,
2009, three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which
terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.
 Petitioner Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the
RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from the DSWD.
 The RTC dismissed the petition without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
action in court. The RTC held that petitioner Christina availed of the wrong remedy to
regain custody of her child, and that she should have filed a civil case for custody of her
child as laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is extreme urgency to secure
custody of a minor who has been illegally detained by another, a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary
remedy, pursuant to the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors.
 Petitioner Christina filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
 Petitioner Christina filed before the SC a petition for review on certiorari in relation to
Section 19 of the Amparo Rule, arguing that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian
is being violated or threatened by the DSWD officers’ enforcement of an illegal Deed of
Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun and Moon. She claims that she had been
“blackmailed” through the said Deed by the DSWD officers and Sun and Moon’s
representatives into surrendering her child, claiming that the certificate of availability
for adoption was invalid which respondents used as basis to misrepresent that all legal
requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with, thereby causing the
“forced separation” of the said infant from his mother.

ISSUE
Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child. – NO

RULING
The Court rejects petitioner Christina’s contentions and denies the petition.
 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and
purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot
be properly applied.
 The privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature,
regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public
official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of life.
 As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico
enumerated the elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization;
c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the
amparo petition; and,***
d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

Contrary to petitioner Christina’s position, the respondents Atty. Segui et al. never
concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as
used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
Petitioner Christina’s directly accusing the respondents Atty. Segui et al. of forcibly
separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption clearly indicates that
she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and
contesting custody over him.