Case Studies: Exchange Rate Regime Choice in A Postwar Country: Iraq
Case Studies: Exchange Rate Regime Choice in A Postwar Country: Iraq
Case Studies: Exchange Rate Regime Choice in A Postwar Country: Iraq
Case Studies
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adopting managed floating and other regimes. The basis of the argu-
ment for a currency board and against managed floating is that the
former imposes the discipline that the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) needs
after years of monetary abuse. It is also argued that while a currency
board is a rather stringent system, it is an extreme measure that is
needed to deal with an extreme situation. There is no better way to curb
the temptation to monetize the deficit than a currency board, whereby
the central bank keeps a full foreign exchange cover at a fixed exchange
rate.
One argument against a currency board for Iraq is that the foreign
currency reserves needed to run the exchange rate arrangement can and
should be used more appropriately for the reconstruction of the coun-
try. Some counter-arguments can be suggested. The first is that this is a
price worth paying to achieve monetary stability and restore confidence
in the currency. The other counter-argument is that the foreign
exchange reserves required for a full cover are rather small relative to
the total cost of reconstruction. Assuming that the monetary base/GDP
ratio is 0.1 and that GDP in 2003 is $25 billion, the initial cover required
is $2.5 billion. This is a small fraction of the $100 billion or so needed to
finance reconstruction. The amount required for this purpose should be
readily available from the frozen Iraqi assets. Moreover, keeping full
reserves at the CBI gives it more credibility at a time when potential
transaction partners associate it with bankruptcy. This is not to mention
that the CBI needs to hold some reserves under other exchange rate
arrangements, albeit smaller amounts.
The arguments against a currency board for Iraq are the following: