Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation, 350 SCRA 113, January 23, 2001

7/21/23, 8:52 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 350
VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 113

Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
*
G.R. No. 138822. January 23, 2001.
EVANGELINE ALDAY, petitioner, vs. FGU INSURANCE

CORPORATION, respondent.
Actions; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; Words and Phrases; Estoppel by

laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned or declined to assert it; A party cannot be
considered as estopped from assailing the trial court’s jurisdiction over the
other party’s counterclaim where such issue was raised with the trial court
itself—the body where the action is pending—even before the presentation
of any evidence by the parties and definitely, way before any judgment could
be rendered by the trial court.—Before going into the substantive issues, the
Court shall first dispose of some procedural matters raised by the parties.
Petitioner claims that respondent is estopped from questioning her non-
payment of docket fees because it did not raise this particular
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
114
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
issue when it filed in its first motion—the " Motion to Strike out Answer
Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default”—with the
trial court; rather, it was only nine months after receiving petitioner’s
answer that respondent assailed the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over
petitioner’s counterclaims based on the latter’s failure to pay docket fees.
Petitioner’s position is unmeritorious. Estoppel by laches arises from the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000018975f03f1132e5fefe000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/13
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or

declined to assert it. In the case at bar, respondent cannot be considered as
estopped from assailing the trial court’s jurisdiction over petitioner’s
counterclaim since this issue was raised by respondent with the trial court
itself—the body where the action is pending—even before the presentation
of any evidence by the parties and definitely, way before any judgment
could be rendered by the trial court.
Same; Same; Same; Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the action, a party may be estopped from raising such
questions if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he
questions, belatedly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that the
judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.—Meanwhile,
respondent questions the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the appeal
filed by petitioner from the 18 September 1990 and 28 February 1991 orders
of the trial court. It is significant to note that this objection to the appellate
court’s jurisdiction is raised for the first time before this Court; respondent
never having raised this issue before the appellate court. Although the lack
of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the action, a party
may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in
the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court’s
jurisdiction in the event that that the judgment or order subsequently
rendered is adverse to him. In this case, respondent actively took part in the
proceedings before the Court of Appeals by filing its appellee’s brief with
the same. Its participation, when taken together with its failure to object to
the appellate court’s jurisdiction during the entire duration of the
proceedings before such court, demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case by such tribunal and accordingly, respondent is now
most decidedly estopped from objecting to the Court of Appeals’
assumption of jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal.
Same; Counterclaims; Words and Phrases; “Compulsory
Counterclaim,” Explained.—The basic issue for resolution in this case is
whether or not the counterclaim of petitioner is compulsory or permissive in
nature. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the
115
VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 115
regular courts of hustice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or

occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Criteria or Tests in Determining Whether a Counter-
claim is Compulsory or Permissive; “Compelling Test of Compulsoriness”;
Words and Phrases; Under the “compelling test of compulsoriness,” “a

logical relationship between the claim and the counterclaim is required, that
is, whether conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and
the court.”—In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Court capsulized the
criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows: 1. Are the issues of fact
and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same? 2. Would
res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule? 3. Will substantially the same evidence
support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendant’s counter-claim? 4. Is
there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? Another
test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is
the “compelling test of compulsoriness” which requires “a logical
relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.”
Same; Same; Docket Fees; Rule on the Payment of Filing Fees.—There
is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim.
On the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her
permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket
fees. The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laid down by the Court
in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion—1. It
is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 2. The same
rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee within
a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary
116
period 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the
filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee
but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee.
Same; Same; Same; The trial court should give the defendant a
reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglemen-tary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive counterclaim.
—The above mentioned ruling in Sun Insurance has been reiterated in the
recent case of Suson v. Court of Appeals. In Suson, the Court explained that
although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional
requirement, its nonpayment does not result in the automatic dismissal of
the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been
alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that
petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees for
her permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its
motion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim based on her failure to pay
docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with the trial court, asking
it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt
from docket fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent was in default
for its failure to answer her counterclaim. However, the trial court dismissed
petitioner’s counterclaim. Pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Sun Insurance,
the trial court should have instead given petitioner a reasonable time, but in
no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay
the filing fees for her permissive counter-claim.
Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; There is no need to file an
answer to a permissive counterclaim until the defendant shall have paid the
prescribed docket fees for only then shall the court acquire jurisdiction over
such claim.—Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have declared
respondent in default for having failed to answer her counterclaim. Insofar
as the permissive counterclaim of petitioner is concerned, there is obviously
no need to file an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed docket fees
for only then shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such claim.
Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages based
on the filing by respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicious suit
need not be answered since it is inseparable from the
117
VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 117
claims of respondent. If respondent were to answer the compulsory

counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the former pleading the
same facts raised in its complaint.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Cruz, Durian, Alday & Cruz-Matters for petitioner.
Jacinto Jimenez for respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
On 5 May 1989, respondent FGU Insurance Corporation 1 filed a

complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati alleging that
petitioner Evangeline K. Alday owed it P114,650.76, representing
unliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other
charges incurred by petitioner in2 the course of her work as an
insurance agent for respondent. Respondent also prayed 3 for
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. Petitioner
filed her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her right for
the payment of P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, profit
commissions and contingent bonuses earned from 1 July 1986 to 7
December 1986, and for accumulated premium reserves amounting
to P500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed for attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary4 damages for the
allegedly unfounded action filed by respondent. On 23 August
1989, respondent filed a “Motion to Strike Out Answer With
Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default”5
because petitioner’s answer was allegedly filed out of time.
However, the trial court denied the motion on 25 August 1989 and
similarly rejected
6 respondent’s motion for reconsideration on 12
March 1990. A few weeks later, on 11 April 1990, respondent filed a
mo-
________________
1 Branch 134.
2 Docketed as Civil Case No. 89-3816.
3 Rollo, 42-44.
4 Ibid., 53-63.
5 RTC Records, 37-39.
6 Ibid., 46, 93.
118

tion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim, contending that the trial

court never acquired jurisdiction over7 the same because of the non-
payment of docket fees by petitioner. In response, petitioner asked
the trial court to declare her counterclaim as exempt from payment
of docket fees since it is compulsory and that respondent8 be declared

in default for having failed to answer such counterclaim. 9
In its 18 September 1990 Order, the trial court granted
respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim and
consequently, denied petitioner’s motion. The court found
petitioner’s counterclaim to be merely permissive in nature and held
that petitioner’s failure to pay docket fees
10 prevented the court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the same. The trial court similarly
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on1128 February 1991.
On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial
court, finding that petitioner’s own admissions, as contained in her
answer, show that her counterclaim is merely 12 permissive. The
relevant portion of the appellate court’s decision is quoted herewith
—
Contrary to the protestations of appellant, mere reading of the allegations in

the answer a quo will readily show that her counterclaim can in no way be
compulsory. Take note of the following numbered paragraphs in her answer:
“(14) That, indeed, FGU’s cause of action which is not supported by any document
other than the self-serving ‘Statement of Account’ dated March 28, 1988 x x x
(15) That it should be noted that the cause of action of FGU is not the
enforcement of the Special Agent’s Contract but the alleged ‘cash accountabilities
which are not based on written agreement x x x.
xxxx
_______________
7 Ibid., 96-102.
8 Ibid., 110-125.
9 Judge Ignacio M. Capulong
10 Rollo, 105.
11 Fourth Division, composed of Justices Jesus M. Elbinias, ponente and
Chairman; Eugenio S. Labitoria; and Marina L. Buzon.
12 Rollo, 36-39.
119
VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 119

(19) x x x A careful analysis of FGU’s three-page complaint will show that its cause
of action is not for specific performance or enforcement of the Special Agent’s
Contract rather, it is for the payment of the alleged cash accountabilities incurred by
defendant during the period form [sic] 1975 to 1986 which claim is executory and
has not been ratified. It is the established rule that unenforceable contracts, like this
purported money claim of FGU, cannot be sued upon or enforced unless ratified,
thus it is as if they have no effect. x x x.”
To support the heading “Compulsory Counterclaim” in her answer and give

the impression that the counterclaim is compulsory appellant alleged that
“FGU has unjustifiably failed to remit to defendant despite repeated
demands in gross violation of their Special Agent’s Contract x x x.” The
reference to said contract was included purposely to mislead. While on one
hand appellant alleged that appellee’s cause of action had nothing to do with
the Special Agent’s Contract, on the other hand, she claim that FGU violated
said contract which gives rise of [sic] her cause of action. Clearly,
appellant’s cash accountabilities cannot be the offshoot of appellee’s alleged
violation of the aforesaid contract.
On 19 May 1999, 13 the appellate court denied petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration, giving rise to the present petition.
Before going into the substantive issues, the Court shall first
dispose of some procedural matters raised by the parties. Petitioner
claims that respondent is estopped from questioning her non-
payment of docket fees because it did not raise this particular issue
when it filed its first motion—the “Motion to Strike out Answer
With Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In
Default”—with the trial court; rather, it was only nine months after
receiving petitioner’s answer that respondent assailed the trial
court’s lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s
14 counterclaims based on
the latter’s failure to pay docket fees. Petitioner’s position is

unmeritorious. Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
_______________
13 Ibid., 41.
14 Ibid., 332.
120

15
abandoned or declined to assert it. In the case at bar, respondent

cannot be considered as estopped from assailing the trial court’s
jurisdiction over petitioner’s counterclaim since this issue was raised
by respondent with the trial court itself—the body where the action
is pending—even before the presentation of any evidence by the
parties and definitely, way before any judgment could be rendered
by the trial court.
Meanwhile, respondent questions the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals over the appeal filed by petitioner from the 18 September
1990 and 28 February 1991 orders of the trial court. It is significant
to note that this objection to the appellate court’s jurisdiction is
raised for the first time before this Court; respondent never having
raised this issue before the appellate court. Although the lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the action, a
party may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively
taken part in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly
objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that 16that the
judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. In this
case, respondent actively took part in the proceedings before17 the
Court of Appeals by filing its appellee’s brief with the same. Its
participation, when taken together with its failure to object to the
appellate court’s jurisdiction during the entire duration of the
proceedings before such court, demonstrates a willingness to abide
by the resolution of the case by such tribunal and accordingly,
respondent is now most decidedly estopped from objecting to the
Court 18of Appeals’ assumption of jurisdiction over petitioner’s
appeal.
The basic issue for resolution in this case is whether or not the
counterclaim of petitioner is compulsory or permissive in nature. A
_______________
15 Philippine National Construction Corporation v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 307 SCRA 218 (1999).
16 National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 522 (1999).
17 CA Records, 88-115.
18 ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, 304 SCRA 489 (1999). See also Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, 316
SCRA 523 (1999); Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 477
(1993).
121
VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 121

compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the

regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of19 third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. 20
In Valencia v. Court of Appeal, this Court capsulized the criteria

or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and
counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s

claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiffs claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim?
Another test,21 applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court

of Appeals, is the “compelling test of compulsoriness” which
requires “a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim,
that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of
the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time
by the parties and the court.”
As contained in her answer, petitioner’s counterclaims are as
follows:
(20) That defendant incorporates and repleads by reference all

the foregoing allegations as may be material to her
Counterclaim against FGU.
(21) That FGU is liable to pay the following just, valid and
legitimate claims of defendant:
______________
19 Rule 6, section 7; BA Finance v. Co, 224 SCRA 163 (1993); Javier v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 609 (1989).
20 263 SCRA 275 (1996).
21 279 SCRA 397 (1997).
122

(a) the sum of at least P104,893.45 plus maximum interest thereon

representing, among others, direct commissions, profit
commissions and contingent bonuses legally due to defendant; and
(b) the minimum amount of P500,000.00 plus the maximum allowable
interest representing defendant’s accumulated premium reserve for
1985 and previous years,
which FGU has unjustifiably failed to remit to defendant despite repeated

demands in gross violation of their Special Agent’s Contract and in
contravention of the principle of law that “every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”
(22) That as a result of the filing of this patently baseless, malicious and
unjustified Complaint, and FGU’s unlawful, illegal and vindictive
termination of their Special Agent’s Contract, defendant was unnecessarily
dragged into this litigation and to defense [sic] her side and assert her rights
and claims against FGU, she was compelled to hire the services of counsel
with whom she agreed to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fees and stands to incur litigation expenses in the amount
estimated to at least P20,000.00 and for which FGU should be assessed and
made liable to pay defendant.
(23) That considering further the malicious and unwarranted action of
defendant in filing this grossly unfounded action, defendant has suffered and
continues to suffer from serious anxiety, mental anguish, fright and
humiliation. In addition to this, defendant’s name, good reputation and
business standing in the insurance business as well as in the community
have been besmirched and for which FGU should be adjudged and made
liable to pay moral damages to defendant in the amount of P300,000.00 as
minimum.
(24) That in order to discourage the filing of groundless and malicious
suits like FGU’s Complaint, and by way of serving [as] an example for the
public good, FGU should be penalized and assessed exemplary damages in
the sum of P100,000.00 or such amount 22 as the Honorable Court may deem
warranted under the circumstances.
Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioner’s

counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium
reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required to prove
petitioner’s claims differs from that needed to establish respondent’s
_______________
22 Rollo, 61-62.
123
VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 123

demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner,

such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of
respondent’s claims is not contingent or dependent upon establishing
petitioner’s counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will
not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the
court and the parties. One would search the records in vain for a
logical connection between the parties’ claims. This conclusion is
further reinforced by petitioner’s own admissions since she declared
in her answer that respondent’s cause of action,
23 unlike her own, was
not based upon the Special Agent’s Contract. However, petitioner’s
claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a24 result of the filing by

respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.
There is no need for25 petitioner to pay docket fees for her
compulsory counterclaim. On the other hand, in order for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive 26counterclaim,
petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. The rule on
the payment of filing fees has been laid down by the Court in27 the
case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion —
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate

initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-
party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
_______________
23 Ibid., 58-59, 60.

24 Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, 294 SCRA 382 (1998); Intestate
Estate of Amado B. Dalisay v. Marasigan, 257 SCRA 509 (1996).
25 Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, supra.
26 Suson v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 284 (1997).
27 170 SCRA 274 (1989).
124

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by

the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards
a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the
same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court
or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee.
The above mentioned ruling in Sun Insurance28has been reiterated in

the recent case of Suson v. Court of Appeals. In Suson, the Court
explained that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is
a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result in the
automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid
within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming
now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and
there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted
to evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her permissive
counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its motion to
dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket
fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with the trial court,
asking it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory in nature and
therefore exempt from docket fees and, in addition, to declare that
respondent was29 in default for its failure to answer her
counterclaim. However, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s
counterclaim. Pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Sun Insurance, the
trial court should have instead given petitioner a reasonable time,
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have declared 30
respondent in default for having failed to answer her counterclaim.
Insofar as the permissive counterclaim of petitioner is concerned,
there is obviously no need to file an answer until petitioner has paid
the prescribed docket fees for only then shall the court acquire
_________________
28 Supra. See also Cabaero v. Cantos, 271 SCRA 391 (1997).

29 RTC Records, 110-125.
30 Rollo, 342-343.
125
VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 125

31
jurisdiction over such claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory

counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the filing by
respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicious suit need not be
answered since it is inseparable from the claims of respondent. If
respondent were to answer the compulsory counterclaim of
petitioner, it would merely 32result in the former pleading the same
facts raised in its complaint.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 23 December 1998 and its 19 May 1999 Resolution
are hereby MODIFIED. The compulsory counterclaim of petitioner
for damages filed in Civil Case No. 89-3816 is ordered
REINSTATED. Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Makati

(Branch 134) is ordered to require petitioner to pay the prescribed
docket fees for her permissive counterclaim (direct commissions,
profit commissions, contingent bonuses and accumulated premium
reserves), after ascertaining
33 that the applicable prescriptive period
has not yet set in.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-

Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Judgment and resolution modified. Compulsory counterclaim

reinstated.
Notes.—A counterclaim for attorney’s fees partakes of the nature

of a compulsory counterclaim. (Intestate Estate of Amado B. Dalisay
vs. Marasigan, 257 SCRA 509 [1996])
An appeal from the dismissal of the counterclaim, although not
totally unavailable, could well be ineffective, if not futile, as far as
the petitioner is concerned where no single piece of evidence has yet
been presented by it, that opportunity having been foreclosed by the
trial court, on the dismissed counterclaim which could form
_______________
31 Gegare v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 587 (1998).

32 Ballecer v. Bernardo, 18 SCRA 291 (1966); Navarro v. Bello, 102 Phil. 1019
(1958).
33 Suson v. Court of Appeals, supra.
126

People vs. Magabo
part of the records to be reviewed by the appellate court. (Santo

Tomas University Hospital vs. Surla, 294 SCRA 382 [1998])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2023 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation, 350 SCRA 113, January 23, 2001

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation, 350 SCRA 113, January 23, 2001

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation, 350 SCRA 113, January 23, 2001

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

7/21/23, 8:52 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 350

VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 113

G.R. No. 138822. January 23, 2001.

EVANGELINE ALDAY, petitioner, vs. FGU INSURANCE

Actions; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; Words and Phrases; Estoppel by

114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation

a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or

VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 115

Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation

regular courts of hustice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or

Words and Phrases; Under the “compelling test of compulsoriness,” “a

116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation

VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 117

Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation

claims of respondent. If respondent were to answer the compulsory

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

On 5 May 1989, respondent FGU Insurance Corporation 1 filed a

118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim, contending that the trial

of docket fees since it is compulsory and that respondent8 be declared

Contrary to the protestations of appellant, mere reading of the allegations in

VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 119

To support the heading “Compulsory Counterclaim” in her answer and give

On 19 May 1999, 13 the appellate court denied petitioner’s motion for

the latter’s failure to pay docket fees. Petitioner’s position is

120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

abandoned or declined to assert it. In the case at bar, respondent

15 Philippine National Construction Corporation v. National Labor Relations

VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 121

compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the

In Valencia v. Court of Appeal, this Court capsulized the criteria

2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s

Another test,21 applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court

(20) That defendant incorporates and repleads by reference all

19 Rule 6, section 7; BA Finance v. Co, 224 SCRA 163 (1993); Javier v.

122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(a) the sum of at least P104,893.45 plus maximum interest thereon

which FGU has unjustifiably failed to remit to defendant despite repeated

Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioner’s

VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 123

demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner,

not based upon the Special Agent’s Contract. However, petitioner’s

claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a24 result of the filing by

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate

23 Ibid., 58-59, 60.

124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by

The above mentioned ruling in Sun Insurance28has been reiterated in

28 Supra. See also Cabaero v. Cantos, 271 SCRA 391 (1997).

VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 125

jurisdiction over such claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory

REINSTATED. Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Makati

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-

Judgment and resolution modified. Compulsory counterclaim

Notes.—A counterclaim for attorney’s fees partakes of the nature

31 Gegare v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 587 (1998).

126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED