Ipda Journal Vol 11 - 1-12

Journal of the International Public Debate Association
Founded 2007
Volume 10, Issue 1
Editor
Christopher M. Duerringer
California State University, Long Beach
Editorial Board
Gabriel Adkins
Arkansas Tech University
Jim Evans
University of Arkansas, Monticello
Jay Hudkins
Arkansas Tech University
Michael Ingram
Whitworth University
Adam Key
Tennessee State University
Anthony McMullen
University of Central Arkansas
Patrick G. Richey
Middle Tennessee State University
Rebecca Richey
Middle Tennessee State University
Megan Smith
Bossier Parish Community College
Founded 2007
Volume 10, Issue 1
Table of Contents
Original Articles
Thoughts on the Use of Evidence in IPDA from a Legal Perspective 1
Anthony McMullin
Using Non-Advancing Competitors as Judges in IPDA Elimination Rounds 13

Rylee P. Walter
Michael T. Ingram
Alan Mikkelson
Forum
Unethical Frameworks Undermine the Educational Value of Debate 32
Matthew Lucci
Volume 10, Issue 1, pp. 1-12
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Thoughts on the Use of Evidence in IPDA

from a Legal Perspective
Anthony McMullen1
IPDA debaters often misrepresent how judges should weigh evidence in a typical round.
First, IPDA debaters sometimes insist on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This
standard is rarely appropriate anywhere outside of a criminal trial. Rather, the
appropriate standard, and one that should be embraced by IPDA debaters, is
preponderance of the evidence. Debaters may fear this standard because it requires the
use of evidence, but those fears would be alleviated by taking a much broader view of
what constitutes “evidence.” In addition, IPDA debaters should refrain from conflating
the terms “evidence,” “sources,” and “citations.” This paper examines these three
issues through the lens of the law.
Lawyers are trained to create and evaluate arguments on an advanced level. This
education gives insight into debate rounds. This insight reveals bad argumentation
practices within IPDA debate with respect to the evaluation of evidence. These bad
practices might be the result of a misunderstanding about what evidence is and how to
use it. Therefore, this brief article will cover three major problems in IPDA and how
they ought to be resolved by debaters and judges. First, this article will discuss the level
of proof necessary to win a debate and how it is often misconstrued and misapplied in
some IPDA rounds. Second, this article will discuss evidence from a legal and debate
standpoint. Finally, this article will look at the conflation of evidence, sources, and
citations in a typical IPDA round. Ultimately, the goal of this article is to reduce the
misuse of arguments regarding the level of proof necessary to win IPDA rounds while
at the same time encouraging the IPDA debater to encourage a broad concept of
“evidence” in IPDA rounds.
1
Anthony McMullen (J.D., University of Arkansas) is an assistant professor of business law and the
director of forensics at the University of Central Arkansas in Conway, AR. Correspondence to
amcmullen@uca.edu
Evidence in IPDA from a Legal Perspective 2
The Problem with “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”

In many IPDA rounds, the debater on the negative will say something similar to, “My
opponent has not shown you beyond reasonable doubt that the resolution is true,
therefore I should win the round.” There are variations of this involving some level of
doubt (such as “beyond a shadow of doubt” or “beyond all doubt”), but the crux of the
argument is that, because the judge cannot be absolutely certain that the resolution
ought to be affirmed, the negative should win the round. This argument does not belong
in a debate round.
Like many negative aspects of society, television is to blame.2 The popularity of
courtroom dramas on television have influenced how people view our judicial system.
For example, Eatley, Hueston, and Price (2018) write about a phenomenon known as
the “CSI effect,” or the idea that “televised portrayal of forensic investigations creates,
‘unreasonable expectations on the part of jurors, making it more difficult for
prosecutors to obtain convictions.’” They further explain, “Most people do not study
the law or read scholarly legal sources, but instead obtain most of their education about
the legal process from television. . . . Many of those stories and the morals and lessons
they impart inevitably create preconceptions.” Therefore, it should be no surprise that
television would also shape one’s view of what is necessary to prove one’s case.
When the American legal system is portrayed on television, it is usually in the
context of criminal law. In 2009, the American Bar Association published “The 25
Greatest Legal TV Shows.” This list included “Perry Mason” (No. 2 on the list), “Law
and Order” (No. 4), “The Practice” (No. 5), “Night Court” (No. 10), “Shark” (No. 14),
“Law and Order: Criminal Intent” (No. 17), “Murder One” (No. 18), “Matlock” (No.
19), and “Law and Order: Special Victims Unit” (No. 21). Ironically, number 20 on the
list is “Reasonable Doubts.” If it were updated today, we might add “How to Get Away
With Murder” to the list. With this exploration into criminal procedure, the phrase
“beyond a reasonable doubt” is part of American vernacular. As explained by the
Supreme Court of the United States in In re Winship (1970), beyond a reasonable doubt
is a very high standard of proof:
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our
criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the
possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the
certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society
that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn
a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.
This very high standard is required in all criminal cases. “It is that state of the case,
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the
minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction,
to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge” (Commonwealth v. Webster, 1850). The
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is intentionally designed so that if there is a risk
of an erroneous verdict, that risk will favor the accused.
2
Note the sarcasm . . . or not.
It is rare, however, that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is used outside the
criminal context. To be sure, there are exceptions. For example, some states require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt before termination of parental rights.3 Also, when a
beneficiary under a will helps procure that will, then there is a presumption that the will
was created under undue influence, and the beneficiary of the will must establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person writing the will did so of his or her own free
will. However, the author is unfamiliar with any television show that has addressed
these issues. It is unlikely that the average television viewer will see “beyond a
reasonable doubt” outside of the criminal context. Outside of criminal law and these
few examples, the bar is not supposed to be that high. Instead, most civil cases are
judged on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.4 The standard is explained in
the Corpus Juris Secundum:
The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof requires that the
factfinder determine whether a fact sought to be proved is more probable than
not, and essentially allocates the risk of error equally among the parties
involved. That standard is relied upon where the law is indifferent as between
plaintiffs and defendants but seeks to minimize the probability of error, because
the parties share the risks of an erroneous verdict in roughly equal fashion. The
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies to all the evidence in the case,
both that introduced by the plaintiff and that introduced by the defendant.
If two people get into an automobile accident and dispute the cause of the accident,
the person ultimately filing the lawsuit will only have to satisfy a court by a
preponderance of evidence that the defendant caused the accident. This is similarly the
case if the parties are litigating over the enforcement of a contact, an illegal employment
practice, or a property settlement upon a divorce.
Before getting to why “preponderance of the evidence” is preferable to “beyond a
reasonable doubt” in a debate round, one must go back to the concept of burden of
proof.
The general analysis holds, that in the scrutiny and construction of propositions,
disputants challenging the established order—the affirmative—incur a burden to prove
their case, whereas those defending the status quo—the negative—benefit from the
presumption that the present system is free from serious error. (Sproule, 1974)
An alternate definition of burden of proof is “the obligation resting upon one or
other of the parties to a controversy to establish by proofs a given proposition, before
being entitled to receive an answer from the other side” (Branham, 1991). In reviewing
the idea of burden of proof in twenty-six texts, Sproule (1974) found a common theme:
3
For those unfamiliar with “termination of parental rights,” it is exactly what it sounds like. In cases of
child abuse or neglect that has the potential to cause irreparable harm to the children, states have the
right to terminate a parent’s right to raise his or her children. This occurs in extreme cases where it is
impossible to reunite the family and the court decides that termination is necessary to provide the child
a sense of permanence.
4
In a small number of cases, proof must be by clear and convincing evidence, an intermediate standard
between preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. “Evidence is clear and
convincing if it places in the factfinder an abiding conviction that the truth of the factual contentions is
highly probable, or if it produces in the factfinding a firm belief or conviction as to the allegation
sought to be established.” (Clear-and-convincing evidence, 1996)
“the burden of proof requires the affirmative to establish a preponderance of proof in

each area of issue; the affirmative accomplishes this, initially, via a prima facie case.”
Branham (1991), relying on case law, notes, “the plaintiff is the first to begin, and if he
does nothing he fails. If he makes a prima facie case, and nothing else is done by the
other side to answer it, the defendant fails.”
If Sproule’s textual analysis is unconvincing, then one ought to look at the idea of
the prima facie case and the allocation of risk. A prima facie case is “complete and
sound ‘on its first making’ and that fulfills the burdens of proof implicit in the
proposition” (Branham, 1991). Assuming that the affirmative meets his or her prima
facie burden, the question then becomes how much refutation should one expect from
the negative to meet the burden of rejoinder? The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
would put that standard unreasonably low for a debate round. In a criminal trial, if there
is a reasonable possibility that the defendant is not guilty, then the jury has a legal
obligation to acquit the defendant. The law is adamant about not putting an exact
percentage of certainty regarding what is necessary proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
No legal scholar would put that percentage at one hundred percent, but many scholars
would say that the correct percentage is close. It is an appropriate standard for a just
society in the context of a criminal trial, but that bar is too high for an affirmative
debater.
The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard places the affirmative’s burden at
exceeding-fifty-percent certainty. While it may be preferable to accord deference to the
criminal defendant and maintain a margin of error against his or her conviction, there
is no justification for allocating more of the risk to the affirmative in a debate round.
As mentioned earlier, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard allocates the risk of
uncertainty equally. This gives both debaters an equal chance of winning the round
before coming into the room.
For resolutions of fact and resolutions of probability, 5 preponderance of the
evidence should be the “go to” weighing mechanism for judging the round in most
cases. 6 For resolutions of value and policy, debaters may use other weighing
mechanisms like cost-benefit analysis or utilitarianism, but even those weighing
mechanisms have elements of “preponderance of the evidence” baked in. For example,
when deciding between the death penalty and life imprisonment, a debater may purport
to use cost-benefit analysis to sway a judge to his or her side. However, when trying to
weigh the subjective costs of either option (a need for punishing the offender, the effect
of the given punishing on society, justice for the victim and the victim’s family), there
is still the idea that these factors more likely than not support a policy.
5
Harper (2015) argued that some resolutions do not fit the traditional debate trichotomy of fact, value,
and policy. He proposed the phrase “resolution of probability” to cover resolutions that challenge
debaters to discuss what is to happen in the future (such as “The San Antonio Spurs will win the NBA
Championship next year” or “President Trump will be reelected in 2020”).
6
Other forms of debate use the term “criteria” to describe the method the judge should use for deciding
the round. There may be some IPDA debaters, particularly those with experience in other forms of
debate, that may use the term “criteria.” The phrase “weighing mechanism” has been used enough at
least in the author’s region of IPDA that it is the preferred term here. For the purposes of this article,
“weighing mechanism” and “criteria” may be used interchangeably. However, an article discussing the
use and application of “weighing mechanism” and “criteria” might be in order.
What is Evidence?
By adopting the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, a debater needs
(*gasp*) evidence. Debaters who rely on more “rhetorical” arguments may fear this
standard because they may believe that they cannot meet this standard. They are
wrong, and their error stems from a limited understanding of what constitutes
evidence.
To be certain, this article is not advocating for IPDA to become a battle to see
who can throw out the greatest quantity of evidence. Rhetorical delivery is one of the
pillars of IPDA, and there is the expectation that its practitioners rely on Aristotle’s
modes of ethos, pathos, and logos. This fits within the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard.
Black’s Law Dictionary (2014) defines evidence as “Something (including
testimony, documents, and tangible objects) that tends to prove or disprove the
existence of an alleged fact; anything presented to the senses and offered to prove the
existence or nonexistence of a fact.” The Corpus Juris Secundum elaborates on the
broad nature of evidence:
Evidence, broadly defined, is the means from which an inference may
logically be drawn as to the existence of a fact; that which makes evident or
plain. Evidence is the demonstration of a fact; it signifies that which
demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in
issue, either on the one side or on the other. In legal acceptation, the term
‘evidence’ includes all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth
of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved. ‘Evidence’
has also been defined to mean any species of proof legally presented at the
trial of an issue, by the act of the parties and through the medium of witnesses,
records, documents, concrete objects, and the like.
Branham (1991) provides a number of examples of what should be considered
evidence, which include “examples, scientific or personal observation, statistical
analysis, or the opinions of experts.” The broad nature of evidence is also recognized
in the IPDA bylaws, which authorize the use of reference materials in preparing for
rounds. These materials explicitly include “extemporaneous speaking type files,
dictionaries, reference books, libraries, or anything else for that matter” (emphasis
added by author) (International Public Debate Association, 2015). In short, if the
information provided by a debater tends to support or negate the proposition being
debated, then it is evidence.
For a while, this author heard many IPDA rounds where debaters purported to use
“preponderance of logic” as a weighing mechanism for rounds. Rarely could a debater
explain what this meant. A Google search of the phrase “Preponderance of Logic” in
March 2019 yielded thirty-five results before getting to the warning that Google
omitted entries with those similar to the ones displayed. And none of those entries
were particularly helpful in getting a solid definition of the phrase. The best response
that the author can recall regarding the meaning of “preponderance of logic” is
“whichever side makes the most logical sense.” Logic, however, ought to already
built Aristotle’s rhetorical doctrine Hopefully, there is an element of logic already
built into the argument. Asking the judge to expressly use logic in deciding the round
seems unnecessary. The author suspects7 that “preponderance of logic” became

popular (and “preponderance of the evidence” avoided) because some debaters feared
either that they did not have enough evidence to win the round or that the judge would
otherwise reject arguments that were not strictly backed up with what would
constitute a narrow definition of evidence. With a broader view of what constitutes
evidence, however, those fears ought to be lessened, and debaters should be more
confident by the concept of the preponderance of the evidence.
All evidence, however, is not equal. Another scholarly article could be written on
the different types of evidence that could be presented in a debate round and the
relevant weight each could theoretically be given in a round, all other things being
equal. But to provide one example, a type of evidence that is often derided in debate
rounds is anecdotal evidence (evidence that comes from personal observations and
experiences). Many debaters and judges may patently reject this evidence because
they believe that the evidence is not as strong as other forms of evidence, such as
scientific study, statistical analysis, or expert opinion. This might be a valid reason to
reject the evidence in some rounds, but those reasons often have more to do with the
quality of the available evidence rather than the fact that the evidence is anecdotal. If
used properly, anecdotal evidence in the proper round can be a great tool to help the
debater win the round.
The problem with anecdotal evidence is not with the evidence itself. Rather, it is
often with how it is used. When a debater uses anecdotal evidence, that debater often
implicitly assumes that everyone has common experiences when it comes to that
evidence. By way of example (not a debate example, but hopefully the analogy will
get the point across), the author at one time had an assignment where his students
wrote papers criticizing laws that they did not like. A lot of students argued against
having seatbelt laws, and they would often support their paper by referring to a story
they once heard where someone was injured by the seatbelt. Those students would
argue that, because there is a chance of injury with seatbelts, people ought to have the
choice whether to wear them or not. These papers got low grades, not because the
evidence used was unacceptable, but because it was incredibly weak in the face of the
evidence that seatbelts save lives (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration).8
The single datum point of one accident where the seat belt operated as a hinderance
substantially outweighed by the other data points where the seat belt reduced injuries
or fatalities.9 Maybe some of those papers would have been better with an argument
that, while there is a risk of injury in a small number of cases, the driver should have
the right to make that call without government interference; but the author does not
recall an essay that made that argument effectively.
7
In speculating, the author concedes that this may make the propositions being made in this piece
weaker.
8
A citation ought to be unnecessary to note the benefits of seatbelt use, but given the complaint being
made here, at least one reader would point out the irony of a lack of citation if one were not provided
here.
9
In reviewing this article, IPDA Journal editor Chris Duerringer provided a witty comment that I
believe bears mentioning here: “Despite the common witticism, in some cases, the plural of anecdote is
data. If I don’t like a restaurant because I had a bad meal there, that’s a shame but not proof that the
restaurant is bad. If the restaurant has a one-star rating on Yelp after 700 reviews, that might be pretty
good proof that it’s a bad restaurant.”
Anecdotal evidence has a place in IPDA. IPDA values effective rhetorical

delivery. This article has already discussed logos, but one cannot forget Aristotle’s
other modes of persuasion: pathos and ethos. While IPDA debaters should not
succumb to the logical fallacies of appeal to authority and appeal to emotion, the
effective use of anecdotal evidence may be an effective tool in persuading a judge.
Debaters cannot just rely on the story itself as the argument or evidence the evidence
in support the argument. Rather, debaters must bolster the credibility of that evidence.
They must show that their stories are not isolated incidents, but examples of everyday,
shared experiences of life. Taking it one step further, if the debater can evoke a
memory or experience that the judge likely has, that experience might lead the judge
to vote his or her way. Hobbs and Arellano (2017) justify the use of pathos within
IPDA and note its many purposes: putting the judge in a state of mind to accept the
message, providing emotional warrants for the argument, providing a “catalyst to
action,” creating balance with logos and ethos, and promoting real-world persuasion.
That last justification is so important that Hobbs and Arellano’s further elaboration is
worth noting:
People are motivated by their emotions, wants, and needs. To believe that
debate should be characterized by logic alone is living in a fantasy world. The
nature of words themselves should teach us that emotions can not be separated
from logic as words have both denotative (logical) and connotative
(emotional) meanings. According to the IPDA Constitution, “The speaking
style of the top Public Debaters should be highly effective when transferred
into real world settings.”
While logos provides the judge a reason to vote for the debater, savvy debaters
should not ignore ethos (which makes the judge want to vote for the debater) or
pathos (which makes the judge feel good about voting for the debater). The author is
experienced enough that he has voted for many arguments that he did not like on an
emotional level. Regular people, however, will not always be able to turn off that
switch.
But if debaters are going to tell a story and use that as evidence, then they should
do so properly. Hobbs and Arellano (2017) rely upon Walter Fisher’s work on the
rhetorical power of narrative to provide guidelines for good storytelling in a round.10
Fisher instructs that a good story is judged “using the principles of probability and
fidelity.” The principle of probability helps determine whether the story makes sense
and should be guidance for future decision-making. The principle of fidelity helps
determine whether the story should influence us due to it being consistent with
common values. As previously stated, if anecdotal evidence is to be used, it needs to
be bolstered. The debater bolsters that evidence by relating that experience to
common experiences that common people have, then by explaining why that common
experience should help govern the decision to be made in the round.
10
The reader should go to Hobbs and Arellano’s article for full instruction. For now, listing their seven
guidelines should suffice: (1) carefully choose your words, (2) tell compelling stories, (3) pick one’s
motivations carefully, (4) avoid the logical fallacy of emotive language, (5) use a variety of
motivational appeals, (6) use pathos ethically, and (7) consider the risks involved in using personal
appeals.
This experience is used in the courtroom as well. Jurors are not expected to ignore
their own common knowledge when rendering a verdict. Rather, they are instructed
that they “have a right to consider all the evidence in the light of [their] own
observations and experience in the affairs of life” (Arkansas Supreme Court
Committee on Jury Instructions--Civil).11 So, consider the following: a person walks
out of a building and goes to his car in July. He observes that the ground is wet and
that there are several puddles on the ground. He looks up and sees several dark
clouds. He recalls hearing thunder while he was in the building. All of this is evidence
that it rained while the person was in the building. There could be other explanations
for the conditions (freak summer snow storm, busted water main, impromptu water
balloon fight), but common experience leads to the most likely conclusion that it
rained. Further, there may exist better evidence to establish what weather conditions
existed at any point in time, such as actually seeing the rain. However, based on
everyday experiences, many people would accept that the forgoing is valid evidence
that liquid precipitation fell from the sky at some point before the person exited the
building. Scientific evidence ought to be unnecessary.
Debaters should not shy away from using arguments because they are based on
common experiences and observations. The evidence does not have to be backed up
by scientific study or expert opinion to be useful. Of course, some evidence is better
than others, and part of debate (and litigation) is having better evidence than the
opposition. But if the information presented in the round helps support or oppose the
resolution, it is indeed evidence. Debaters and judges ought to have this expanded
view in mind when considering arguments in a round.
At this point, an IPDA purist might worry about the rabbit hole that leads to
evidence-dominant forms of debate (the road to CEDA or NDT, as many would
derisively say).12 This discussion of evidence in IPDA should not lead to preparing
four-by-six index cards, ready to be pulled out for the appropriate round. To be clear,
the author would hope for the opposite. By opening up the idea of what can be used as
evidence, the author hopes to move debaters away from strictly using studies and
other forms of empirical evidence. A broad concept of evidence increases the rhetor’s
toolbox. Hopefully, rounds can become less about the evidence itself and more about
how it is used in the round.
Further, debaters should be reminded that a debater should not be judged only by
the quantity of the evidence presented. A round judged by the preponderance of the
evidence is not won by the debater that presents the most evidence. The quality of that
evidence even more important; a single piece of evidence can outweigh ten pieces of
evidence if it is sufficiently strong enough. And debaters must train themselves to
bolster the evidence they present in the round (and to undermine the evidence their
opponents present in the round).
The Relationship Between Evidence, Sources, and Citations
This leads to another observation about IPDA rounds. While best practice instructs a
debater to provide a source for arguments and evidence presented in an IPDA round,
11
While this is a quote from the Arkansas instructions, the reader can be reasonably assured that courts
in most jurisdictions instruct their jurors similarly.
12
To be clear, the author considers himself to be an “IPDA purist.”
debaters will often ask a judge to reject an argument for no other reason than his or her
opponent failing to present a citation. Some judges accept this argument. This should
not be happening.
Part of the problem could be that some debaters and judges fail to distinguish
between “evidence” and “sources” or “citations.” For example, if one were to consider
a round where a debater is supporting the abolition of the death penalty, one common
argument would be the possibility that an innocent person could be wrongfully
executed. A debater and a judge should accept without need for citation that innocent
people have been executed. Similarly, the failure to provide a citation should not be the
sole reason for rejecting that piece of support.
At the same time, most debaters would acknowledge that the argument could be
better. Some may believe that the possibility of executing an innocent person is too
remote or insignificant to consider it in an argument on abolishing the death penalty.
Here, something a bit more specific and the source of that information helps bolster the
credibility of that evidence. So, if this were a debate round, one might note a 2014 study
from the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences that estimates that one in
every twenty-five people on death row are innocent and that, from 1973 to 2014, there
were 144 exonerations (Levy, 2014).
Depending on how one chooses to structure the argument, specific evidence may
be unnecessary. (If a debater has more specific evidence, he or she should still include
it.) For example, if one were to depend on a more deontological argument, one premise
might be that, even in a world where the death penalty is arguably ethical, it would be
wrong to put an innocent person in a position where he or she might be executed for a
crime he or she did not commit. One would continue by noting that, while our judicial
system is the best in the world, it is still deeply flawed. Given the flaws in that system,
one cannot rule out the likelihood that innocent people are put at risk of being executed.
These premises can be accepted without citation. Again, it is not best practice, and a
good debater will have more support to back up these premises, but these premises
ought not be rejected solely because they lack a citation.
But to get back to the example above about the number of innocent people on death
row. The evidence is not the study, nor is it a Newsweek article dated April 28, 2014
(one place where the study was reported in the media). Rather, the evidence is the fact
itself: that one in twenty-five persons on death row is innocent. The source, defined by
Merriam-Webster as “a firsthand document or primary reference work,” is the study
from the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Taking it one step further,
citation is “an act of quoting” or the quotation itself. In other words, when a debater
mentions that the information is from the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, he or she has cited a source. But the citation, while important, is not the
evidence itself.
Using this evidence, the debater can use another tool: reasoning, defined by
Merriam-Webster one way as the “drawing of inferences or conclusions through the
use of reason.” Reason itself is “a statement offered in explanation or justification” or
“a sufficient ground of explanation or of logical defense.” Whatever the evidence is
(and whatever form it takes), it is not the end; rather, it is a means to an end. A debater
uses the evidence as part of a series of premises to lead the judge either to accept a
claim or an argument. A citation bolsters the evidence and reasoning; the citation is not
the evidence or reasoning itself. The debater would use reasoning in our example to
link the evidence of innocent people at risk of execution (and hopefully other evidence)
to the premise that a just society ought not to put people in a position where they may
be executed for a crime they did not commit.
To be sure, debaters still need to be concerned about the weight and credibility of
the evidence presented in a given round. The thesis of this article is not to discourage
the use of citations. If anything, the use of citations should be encouraged. Most
debaters are not experts in criminal justice, so being able to bring on the thoughts and
theories from credible sources will enhance the credibility and strength of an argument.
That being said, the failure to cite a source, while not best practice, should not be by
itself fatal to an argument.
An unrefuted argument by a debater should be accepted by a judge unless the
argument is patently absurd. In current IPDA practice, a debater will “source press” his
or her opponent when there is no citation supporting the evidence. Sadly, the author has
seen rounds where a source press is the only response to an opponent’s argument.
However, a source press (where the debater questions the veracity of a piece of evidence
solely based on the lack of a citation) is a weak way to attempt to take out an argument.
This author finds them useful in only two scenarios. The first is when the information
appears facially flawed or where conventional wisdom would lead a reasonably
intelligent person to believe the contrary. If a reasonably educated judge hears
information that seems unfamiliar and does not seem flawed on its face, that judge
should not allow a debater to get away with just a source press to refute the argument.
The judge ought to be convinced that the information provided by the judge is
objectively incorrect for a source press to carry any weight. Even then, the debater
demanding a source should have something in addition to the source press to defeat the
evidence. If the evidence is truly flawed, then explaining the flaw may be far more
persuasive than simply asking the judge to reject it due to a lack of citation.
The second scenario where a source press might be useful is when the debater has
evidence that contradicts evidence presented by his or her opponent. At that point, the
source press is not merely a weak tool to refute an argument. Rather, it becomes a tool
to help the judge weigh the credibility of the contradictory evidence. Again, because
debaters are not experts, the source of the information gives the judge a tool to
determine which piece of evidence ought to be accepted in considering the round.
Because this article started with an analogy to the court trial, it offers another here.
The plaintiff in litigation over a contract might testify that she made an offer to enter
into a contract and that the defendant accepted said offer. If it is a situation where the
plaintiff lacks some type of record of the agreement, 13 the defendant’s attorney on
cross-examination will note that point. And yes, the failure to have some type of record
will hurt the plaintiff’s case. But the lack of writing (unless it is a type of contract that
the law requires to be in writing) does not end the defendant’s obligation to offer a
defense. The plaintiff’s testimony helps establish a prima facie case, obligating the
defendant to at least testify that no such conversation happened or that it did not happen
in the way the plaintiff described. The defendant’s testimony, though possibly as weak
13
Many (though not all) contracts can be enforced even though they are not in writing. Best practice
dictates that any contract that can be put in writing should be put in writing, but the law does not
always demand best practice.
as the plaintiff’s, is still evidence to counter the plaintiff’s recitation of the events. In
other words, the defense counsel will do more than rely on the absence of evidence to
prevail; he or she will present something (even if it is nothing more than the defendant
saying “that didn’t happen”) to counter the plaintiff’s assertion regarding the existence
of a contract.
Source presses also raise ethical concerns. Generally, when a debater presses for a
source, that debater is essentially questioning the credibility of the debater. If not
carefully presented, a source press may unfairly impugn upon the integrity of a debater.
IPDA debaters are instructed that they “should maintain credibility, honesty, integrity
and courtesy at all times during their participation and around tournaments” and that
“[t]heir delivery should be of a credible nature, including topic interpretation and
argumentation” (IPDA Ballot, 2018). Ethical and credible debating ought to include
avoiding unnecessary attacks (both implicit and explicit) on the opponent’s character.
Experience shows that explicit ad hominen attacks in a debate round are rare. Implicit
attacks, however, can be just as dangerous. And it is certainly possible that a debater’s
“source press” may be interpreted by the judge as reason to view anything the opposing
debater says skeptically. Without any additional analysis, it would be unfair for a
debater to be painted with such a broad brush.
But what does this mean?
There are a number of things IPDA debaters can do to honor the goals of the
Association. Ultimately, the onus is on debaters to make the change, as they will
ultimately influence the tolerance for good or bad argumentation practices. This means
knowing how to handle arguments and evidence in a credible manner. This begins with
not insisting on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a standard is inappropriate in
competitive debate. Much of this could be mitigated by embracing the preponderance
of the evidence standard as a weighing mechanism. Debaters should also adopt a broad
definition of what is evidence and not conflate “evidence” with “sources” or “citations.”
Citations ought to be used to bolster the credibility of evidence, but debaters should
acknowledge that the citation is not the evidence itself. These guidelines better reflect
the real-world persuasive skills IPDA purports to teach and fairly represent the use of
evidence in IPDA debate.
References
Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions--Civil. (n.d.). Arkansas
Model Jury Instructions--Civil. Retrieved from
https://govt.westlaw.com/armji/Index?transitionType=Default&contextData=
%28sc.Default%29%29
Branham, R. J. (1991). Debate and critical analysis: The harmony of conflict.
Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Citation. (n.d.). In Merriam-Webster’s collegiate dictionary. Retrieved from
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/citation
Clear-and-convincing evidence. (1996). In Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 32A).
Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295 (1850).
Eatley, G., Hueston, H. H., & Price, K. (2018). A meta-analysis of the CSI effect: The
impact of popular media on jurors' perception of forensic evidence. Politics,
Bureaucracy, and Justice, 5(2), 1-10.
Evidence. (1996). In Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 31A).
Evidence. (2014). In Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.). St. Paul, MN: Thomson
West.
Harper, C. (2015). Running Topicality on Trichotomy. Journal of the International
Public Debate Association, 7, 1-6.
Hobbs, J., & Arellano, A. (2017, May). The use of pathos in IPDA debate:
Justifications and guidelines. Journal of the International Public Debate
Association, 8, 1-9.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
International Public Debate Association. (2015, August). The constitution and bylaws
of the IPDA. Retrieved from http://www.ipdadebate.info/constitution--
bylaws.html
International Public Debate Association (2018). IPDA ballot. Retrieved from
http://www.ipdadebate.info/uploads/4/9/8/1/4981933/ipda_individual_ballot_-
_nationals_2018.pdf
Levy, P. (2014, April 28). One in 25 sentenced to death in the U.S. is innocent, study
claims. Newsweek. Retrieved from https://www.newsweek.com/one-25-
executed-us-innocent-study-claims-248889
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (n.d.). Seat belts. Retrieved March
17, 2019, from https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/seat-belts
Reasoning. (n.d.). In Merriam-Webster’s collegiate dictionary. Retrieved from
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reasoning
Source. (n.d.). In Merriam-Webster’s collegiate dictionary. Retrieved from
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/source
Sproule, J. M. (1974). The psychological burden of proof: Or, deviations from
Whately's theory of presumption in modern texts on argumentation and
debate. Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association. Chicago,
IL.
Ward, S. F. (2009). The 25 greatest legal TV shows. ABA Journal. Retrieved July 14,
2018, from
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_25_greatest_legal_tv_shows/
?icn=most_read
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Using Non-Advancing Competitors as

Judges in IPDA Elimination Rounds
Rylee P. Walter1
Michael T. Ingram2
Alan C. Mikkelson3
Tournaments of the International Public Debate Association frequently use student

competitors who do not advance to elimination rounds as judges in the same
tournament. There is a dearth of research on this practice and little formal academic
discussion on the advantages, disadvantages, and desirability of using such judges.
This essay examines relevant literature on the practice, details a 2018 survey of IPDA
competitors and coaches on five research questions, discusses implications and offers
recommendations for further study. The essay raises serious concerns about the
continued practice of using such judges.
Review of Literature
In the most general sense of the word, a judge is “a person able or qualified to give an
opinion on something” (OED 2018). Those in the forensics community know that a
judge is an especially important part of the activity—without judges, forensics could
not function. Although forensics competitors and coaches alike surely recognize the
vital role judges play, what makes a judge “qualified” is a common topic of discussion.
However, while some scholarly work exists on what might signal that a general
forensics judge is qualified, little research addresses IPDA-style debate specifically,
apart from repeated references to the desirability of lay judges. Cirlin (2007) traces the
history of college debate formats in the United States (p. 6). He notes that most National
Debate Tournament (NDT) debates are heard “by a cadre of trained judges.” He notes
1
Rylee P. Walter is a graduate student in speech communication at the University of Montana.
2
Michael T. Ingram (Ph.D.., Ohio University) is a professor of communication studies and the director
of forensics at Whitworth University in Spokane, WA. Correspondence to mingram@whitworth.edu
3
Alan Mikkelson (Ph.D., Arizona State University) is a professor of communication studies at
Whitworth University in Spokane, WA.
Non-Advancing Competitors as Judges 14
NDT and the Cross-Examination Debate Association (CEDA) tend to use only
specialized judges, which has helped foster a climate of fast talking, heavy reliance on
evidence and the de-emphasis of wit, humor and ethos. He contrasts this with IPDA
“eschewing trained judges” and notes:
The typical Public Debate tournament uses classroom students and freshman
debaters for its judging pool. There is obviously some loss of judging expertise,
but a huge rhetorical gain. You can’t speed read to a lay judge or talk debate
jargon at them. So Public Debaters tend to develop a much more oratorical style
than debaters on other U.S. debating circuits. And this was the goal of the
format. (p. 12)
Cirlin identifies a key goal of IPDA as speaking to lay judges, in part to avoid the
rhetorical pitfalls of NDT/CEDA (and perhaps other subsequent debate forms). It is
important to note Cirlin’s use of student judges as a broad term. He does not
specifically mention using defeated competitors at a tournament being used as judges.
This dearth of research becomes a more critical issue when considering the
tendency for some tournaments, including the IPDA National Championship
Tournament, to allow students who have been eliminated from the tournament to then
be entered into the judging pool. This practice raises questions about competitors’
ability to fairly evaluate their peers, primarily because of apprehensions regarding a
lack of judging experience or strong potential biases for or against certain students or
schools. Those biases may be uniquely difficult for students to break, since they are
still in a competitive role within the forensics community.
A review of current literature revealed no published work nor national
convention presentations from the National Communication Association, National
Forensics Journal, IPDA National Convention, or Journal of the IPDA specifically on
the topic of using eliminated competitors as judges at collegiate forensics tournaments,
particularly in IPDA-style debate. Research is needed, as these problems can lead to
inequity in judging, which ought to be avoided to help preserve the fairness and
integrity of IPDA debate. This article seeks to be a starting point for dialogue on this
important topic because the IPDA as an organization ought to consider the implications
of a practice that could compromise its goals.
Definitions from Cirlin (2007):
• Experienced judge (or Expert judge): a judge who is connected to a debate
program, typically as a coach, a former competitor etc. and is formally trained in
debate (p. 16).
• Lay judge: one with no prior experience coaching or competing in debate; a
minimally trained judge who is not necessarily connected to a forensics program
(p. 16 and Morris, 2005, p. 76).
• Eliminated / non-advancing competitors as judges: students who have competed,
then, once eliminated from the same tournament, are included in the judging pool.
• Student judge: are those on the debate circuit as competitors (p. 16).
• Outrounds: another name for elimination rounds
Though many attempts are made to keep debate judging neutral, it is an

inherently subjective activity. The forensics community typically believes that a judge
should examine the argumentation in the round and select a winner based primarily on
who presented the most convincing arguments, irrespective of one’s own beliefs.
McBath (1975) argued that the minimum qualifications for a debate judge include
“honesty, a sense of responsibility, and an ability to suspend judgment on the subject
matter being considered” (p. 30). Furthermore, Morris (2005) noted that, sometimes,
the best debate judge is a lay judge (p. 76). This is because lay judges are a blank slate;
they evaluate the round based on the rules provided, as opposed to preconceived notions
or personal paradigms. Moreover, lay judges have a better chance of avoiding the
“hidden agendas” and “the politics of the activity” that often color an experienced
judge’s critiques of a debate round.
Cirlin (2007) identified three types of IPDA judges. Expert Judges include
directors of forensics, graduate students and coaches and debate alumni. Student Judges
are those on the debate circuit as competitors and Lay Judges are “reasonable intelligent
human beings with no training in debate.” He identifies concerns regarding both Expert
and Student judges:
And both Expert and Student judges tend to become somewhat faddish in their
expectations. A certain style of speaking comes into vogue and the Expert and
Student judges often reward those who follow the fad and punish those who
don’t. Expert and Student judges can also be highly biased. They tend to vote
for the teams and debaters who they think ought to win, even if they are having
a bad round or are otherwise losing a debate. There can also be a lot of politics
involved in the decisions of the Expert and Student judges. They might vote
against team A and for team B because they like one program and not the other;
or because they are afraid that if team A advances it will be more likely to beat
one of their own teams later on in the competition; or because they are afraid
that if they vote against team B the judges from team B will take offence and
vote against their teams, etc., etc., etc. (p. 16)
This analysis seems to support a claim that Expert and Student judges could be tempted
to vote on the basis of politics (they like School A better than School B), or human
nature (Debater X beat my student/my teammate in Round 4 so I will vote for Debater
Y in this elimination round).
One of the most challenging aspects of the subjectivity of judging rests on the
idea that no two people will perceive the same situation in the same way, even with a
common set of norms (Adler, Rosenfield & Proctor II, 2015). In debate terms, split
ballots, or 2-1 decisions, confirm that perception influences our experiences—
otherwise, all elimination rounds would be a 3-0 consensus. It is imperative that judges
choose a winner who debated the best, paying no mind to subjective influences. Rounds
ought to be judged on probability, or the advancement of the debater who best shows
the likelihood of their idea being true (Hunsinger, Terry, & Wood, 1970). Furthermore,
Minch and Borchers (1996) extended this idea in an article geared toward collegiate
Lincoln-Douglas debate (p. 25). They reasoned that judges evaluate using a variety of
analytic frames, meaning it is difficult to create a concrete universal standard of
winning. Yet, the authors went on to contend that, even accounting for these varying
frames, it is a widely accepted notion that fair judges must “leave their own thoughts
and experiences at home.”
However, Minch and Borchers (1996) also argued that complete objectivity is
not the goal when searching for a qualified debate judge (p. 30). Good judges are ones
who weigh a round with “experience, specialized knowledge, and use of standards for
what is educationally valuable and who permit subjective standards to influence how
the decision is reached. This view assumes that the judge will consider both objective
and subjective standards.” In other words, quality judging does not consider one’s own
views, but it does allow room for some subjectivity, namely with regard to what
becomes important in weighing the round. Likewise, “No two forensic judges come
from the same mold,” which is evidenced by judges reacting with “varying degrees of
understanding/misunderstanding, emotionalism/rationalism” (Mills, 1983, p. 20). This
appears to support the IPDA’s Constitution (2015), which affirms using judges from a
variety of backgrounds so students can learn to communicate effectively in more than
one way.
Indeed, IPDA regards lay judging as a foundational principle of the activity.
One intent of using lay judges, and not solely members of the debate community, is to
prevent some of the narrowing of debate toward technical arguments, faster delivering
and narrowing of understanding found in NPDA and elsewhere. IPDA hopes that using
lay judges better prepares debaters able to speak to a wide array of judges.
Many judges have what Rowland (1984) described as paradigms, though not
necessarily the formal, scripted paradigm that seems to be commonplace in debate
formats such as CEDA or NPDA. Published or mandatory paradigms are not a
prescribed feature of IPDA, though some judges still offer paradigms, which loosely
give debaters a few qualities that that specific judge characteristically weighs or looks
for in any given round. This type of insight is given prior to the round, either out of the
judge’s own volition or when prompted by a curious student. The purpose is for
students to better understand how they will be evaluated, though those clues can lead
students to change their debate styles to adapt to each judge’s preferences. Yet, instead
of accepting that there are a wide variety of ways in which a judge might evaluate a
round and that debaters are at the mercy of each judge’s paradigm, “the critic avoids
the incommensurability problem by rising above the individual paradigm and applying
a standard derived from some higher principle” (p. 192-193). Rowland (1984)
suggested that judges ought to assess “probabilistically any argument which is defended
with both a reason and evidence that the judge perceives as supporting an argument”
(p. 187) Thus, a common paradigm ought to apply, saying that any argument that meets
those criteria is acceptable because reason and evidence promote the function of debate.
Beyond meeting those structural requirements, a judge’s subjectivity can come into
play—specifically in deciding which of those arguments are stronger, similar to Minch
and Borchers’ aforementioned suggestion.
Up until this point, the advantages and disadvantages of judging methods have
not been limited to a judge’s age. Though it is not a common practice, there can be
benefits associated with judges who are also current competitors. In an article exploring
possibilities for how to find qualified judges—an issue anyone who has organized a
tournament is familiar with—Brand (2002) commented that using varsity competitors
to judge novices in debate or IE “can help these future alums see the value and need for
becoming a judge” (p. 64). While this is not a benefit that can be directly accessed by
current competitors at the tournament, it is certainly an advantage to the greater
forensics community as whole. However, while an act such as a senior judging novices
may provide some benefits, the American Forensic Association (AFA) finds that the
negatives outweigh the positives. In the December 2017 invitation for the 2018
National Individual Events Tournament (AFA-NIET), the AFA (p. 6) states that “an
undergraduate who judges in the open division of a forensics tournament, (a division

which qualifies for AFA-NIET at-large legs), permanently forfeits his/her eligibility to
compete at the AFA-NIET District or National Tournaments.” The National Forensic
Association (NFA) concurs; NFA by-law section IV, part F (2017, p. 9) states:
Any student who judges any of the events described in section 2, “Events at the
National Championship Tournament” at an intercollegiate qualification
tournament during the NFA competitive season forfeits any remaining
competitive eligibility at the National Championship Tournament. A student
who judges at a tournament before otherwise exhausting his or her competitive
eligibility may petition the NFA Executive Council to have eligibility
reinstated.
The NFA has chosen to keep competitors and judges mutually exclusive because they
reason that a student who is currently competing should not be able to influence other
students’ competitive outcomes, especially the National Championship Tournament
qualification process. While the NFA does allow undergraduates to judge, the
organization prohibits those students from competing at national tournaments to
“protect the standard of judging” (K. Morris, personal communication, May 7, 2018).
In the Northwest Forensics Conference (NFC), a five-state region of forensic
competition in IE, IPDA, NPDA, and British Parliamentary, it is uncommon for
undergraduate students in general to be used as IPDA judges, and no tournaments put
eliminated competitors into the judging pool. Dr. Mark Porrovecchio, Director of
Forensics and longtime IPDA coach at Oregon State University, said, “Since IPDA
started in the Northwest, I cannot recall a tournament that used eliminated competitors
as judges. I know that Southern schools brought students who expected to judge. But I
do not think we ever used them" (personal communication, May 10, 2018). This is
because schools are required to cover their entries prior to the tournament or incur fees
to hire local judges. Additionally, schools are obligated at least one round past the
complete elimination of their team to ensure judges without a conflict of interest are
present. With these systems in place, the NFC is able to satisfy the judging requirements
of its tournaments without turning to students who have just been eliminated from
competition.
Furthermore, Professor Brent Northup, the current president of the NFC and
Director of Forensics at Carroll College (personal communication, May 11, 2018), said
that in BP, students will often be used as judges, but that the tournament is “either/or:”
Either students compete or they judge, but not both. He understands the concern to be
centered on bias, and tournaments wish to avoid having a debater judge a competitor
by whom he or she was eliminated earlier. Northup recommended that some sort of
judge screening/qualification or strike procedure be used if eliminated competitors were
to judge to weed out potentially biased or unqualified student judges.
Given the fact that both AFA and NFA, the country’s two largest forensics
governing bodies, preclude the use of current competitors as judges, it is imperative
that IPDA and its participants carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages
before allowing or continuing to allow the practice. Research suggests that establishing
some sort of guidelines for judge qualification is also important for fairness to the
competitors, so it would be helpful for the IPDA, and for regional forensics
conferences, to decide whether the use of eliminated competitors as judges is
permissible. The following research questions seek to provide guidance in these areas,
hopefully giving the IPDA or regional governing bodies the information to make an
informed and justifiable choice.
Research Questions
Student Survey
RQ1a: Is there a correlation between the part of the country one competes in and his or
her overall view of using eliminated students as judges?
RQ2a: What are the most common advantages and disadvantages students mentioned
(and by what percent of the population are those beliefs held)?
RQ3a: Do students who have judged in elimination rounds have generally favorable or
unfavorable views regarding the use of eliminated students as judges? Are those
different views from students who have not judged?
RQ4a: Do students who have been judged by eliminated competitors in outrounds have
generally favorable or unfavorable views regarding the use of eliminated students as
judges? Are those views different from students who have not been judged?
RQ5a: Does the number of years one has competed in IPDA have any bearing on their
general opinion toward use of eliminated students as judges?
Coaching Survey
RQ1b: Is there a correlation between the part of the country one coaches in and his or
RQ2b: What are the most common advantages and disadvantages coaches mentioned
RQ3b: Do coaches with students who have judged in elimination rounds have generally
favorable or unfavorable views regarding the use of eliminated students as judges? Are
those different views from coaches with students who have not judged?
RQ4b: Do coaches with students who have been judged by eliminated competitors in
outrounds have generally favorable or unfavorable views regarding the use of
eliminated students as judges? Are those views different from coaches with students
who have not been judged?
RQ5b: Does the number of years one has coached IPDA have any bearing on their
Methods
In an attempt to answer the above research questions, the authors designed two surveys:
one for students who currently compete in IPDA or who have competed within the last
three years, and one for current IPDA coaches. Separating coach and student responses
allowed the authors to better evaluate the feelings of both groups of people involved in
intercollegiate forensics.
The surveys included a mix of open and closed-ended questions. Both surveys
began by asking about the participants’ experience in IPDA. The student survey asked
how many years the student had competed in IPDA and gave choices of one, two, three,
four, or five plus years. The coach survey asked how many years the coach had coached
IPDA, with the options of 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, or 21+ years. Second was a standard
demographic question about the region the coach or student competes / competed in or
coaches in. There were four choices:
• Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin),
• Northeast (Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont),
• South (Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, Washington DC and West Virginia),
• West (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming).
Then, the students were asked if they had ever judged an IPDA round after being
eliminated and were able to choose “yes” or “no.” Students were then asked if they had
been ever judged by an eliminated competitor in outrounds and could choose “yes,”
“no,” or “unsure.” The coaches were asked a variation of the previous two questions,
regarding whether their students had judged after being eliminated or had been judged
by eliminated competitors. Next, both surveys asked, in general, how the participant
felt regarding the use of eliminated students as judges. This question used a Likert-
type scale; the 1 was anchored with “negative” and the 5 was anchored with “positive.”
Finally, both surveys asked open-ended questions about what the participants’ viewed
as the biggest advantages and limitations of using eliminated competitors as judges.
The survey was created with Google Forms and distributed in two ways. It was
emailed to all of the IPDA coaches who are on the contact list posted to the IPDA
website as of January 21, 2018. The email included both surveys and asked that coaches
both respond and forward the survey to their teams. Additionally, the survey was
posted to the IPDA Facebook page, as well as to personal pages. In total, 17 coaches
and 74 students responded to their respective surveys. From the South region, 33
students and 12 coaches responded. From the West region, 38 students and 5 coaches
responded. From the Midwest region, 3 students and 0 coaches responded, meaning no
substantial conclusions could be drawn regarding the Midwest. There was also an
option for the Northeast, but no students or coaches indicated this response.
Results & Discussion
This section is divided into three sub-sections: student results, coach results, and a brief
comparison of the two groups. Each sub-section provides the five research questions,
the data that responds to those questions, and a discussion of the results.
Students
RQ1a: Is there a correlation between the part of the country one competes in and his
or her overall view of using eliminated students as judges?
There was a significant difference, t (72) = 3.44, p < .001, between the South
region (M = 2.85, SD = 1.33) and the West region (M = 1.88, SD = 1.10) with respect
to student views of using eliminated students as judges.
The average response for Southern competitors was closest to a neutral view,
while the average response for Western competitors was clearly negative. The
difference in opinion could be due to the prevalence of the practice. It is much more
common for Southern tournaments to use eliminated competitors as outround judges
than it is for Western tournaments.
When comparing data from each region, is important to look to frequency to
better understand its ramifications. Of the 33 students who responded from the South,
29 had judged other students after being eliminated, and four had not judged. Similarly,
24 students had been judged by eliminated competitors in outrounds, seven were
unsure, and two had not been judged. Meanwhile, the Southern students’ mean reaction
toward the practice as a whole was neutral. On the other hand, of the 38 students who
responded from the West, 13 had judged other students after being eliminated, and 25
had not judged. Likewise, 20 students had been judged by eliminated competitors in
outrounds, eight were unsure, and 10 had not been judged. And, the Western students’
mean outlook toward the practice was definitively negative.
Knowing that it is far less common for students in the West to incur eliminated
students as their outround judges, it is interesting that just over 50% of students from
the West indicated that they had been judged by eliminated competitors, which is likely
due to attending out-of-region tournaments or a national championship tournament.
However, the most important comparison that these frequencies depict is that, in both
regions, it is more common for a student to have been judged by eliminated competitors
than to not have been judged, but Western students’ overall feelings toward the practice
were almost a full point lower than the Southern average. Because it is virtually
unheard of for the practice, and, more broadly, undergraduate judging, to occur at
Western IPDA tournaments, Western students are instead used to being evaluated by
judges whose life circumstances make them less privy to the problems associated with
the eliminated competitor judge. Stated more simply, Western students typically have
an elimination round judging pool that is more removed from the competition, meaning
Western students see a difference in being judged by an eliminated competitor versus a
more qualified judge, whereas students from the South do not see much of a difference
because it is so commonplace. Students who have been exposed to circuits where the
practice occurs but compete where it does not usually occur score the practice lower
than students who only know tournaments that use the practice. Because Western
students’ data is more objective in the sense that these students experience both types
of judging, their negative outlook leads to the conclusion that the use of eliminated
competitors as judges is disadvantageous.
RQ2a: What are the most common advantages and disadvantages students mentioned
The students’ most commonly-listed advantages of eliminated competitors as judges
can be grouped into three approximate categories. First, 50% of students (37 total)
reported the student judges having experience as being a positive aspect of allowing
eliminated competitors to be put into the judging pool. Some respondents argued that
judges who are also current competitors have a strong grasp of what IPDA should look
like. They can offer specific feedback, strategies, or critiques that may be more
technically helpful than comments from a lay judge. Moreover, one participant
commented that these types of judges can give feedback “in language and
understanding” that many other judges cannot provide. Competitors are also more
familiar with debate-specific tactics. One participant said that eliminated competitors
“are more likely to understand what they should be looking for in a debate,” while
another wrote that they ought to be well-equipped “to follow arguments, determine
winners, etc.” Finally, one student mentioned that student judges may be “more likely
to realize when evidence is reliable or not,” a helpful skill in close rounds. Cohesively,
it appears that student judges have certain experiential advantages over other judges,
particular those who are lay.
Second, 41.9% of participants (31 total) noted efficiency/convenience/helping
the tournament run smoothly to be a positive. The majority of these responses
mentioned avoiding a shortage of judges as one (if not the most salient) benefit. Smaller
programs especially may have a hard time finding enough judges to cover their entries,
and when there is a judge shortage, the tournament inevitably runs behind. Using
eliminated students as judges also means it is far more likely for outrounds to have the
desirable “panel of three [judges] rather than one, which vastly improves the quality of
the decision.” Furthermore, a few students specifically mentioned that putting students
into the judging pool provides “fresh” judges who are both not fatigued from judging
all day and do not run the risk of judging a student whom they have already judged in
that tournament.
Third, 8.1% of participants (6 total) said that the practice provides some benefit
to the student pulled to judge. Broadly, those who provided this type of comment
claimed that judging allows eliminated competitors to learn from the experience. One
student in particular lauded the unique critical thinking benefits to judging, as opposed
to simply watching, saying, “I think my success in debate can be partially attributed to
judging varsity and professional rounds once I got knocked out of a novice round.” The
same student then discussed the value of seeing a round in a different division so he or
she could best help the younger students on his or her team. A few participants
suggested that the practice provides something to occupy the time of an eliminated
competitor.
Conversely, the students’ most commonly-listed disadvantages can be grouped
into six categories. First, 64.9% participants (48 total) reported concerns with unfair
judging/potential for bias. Many participants said something as simple as “they are
biased.” One student gave a detailed response that is quite representative of others’
concerns regarding student bias:
These people got eliminated for a reason. Many of them are good debaters, but
many aren’t. Many debate with tactics contrary to the goals and values of IPDA
and judge IPDA from the perspective of another debate style. Students often are
not good at repressing their biases, especially in a competitive environment.
Students know the competitors and who may debate who if they vote a certain
way. There are deep divisions in style even within IPDA that are often looked
down upon by debaters eliminated by competitors who used that particular style.
I think it’s best for the out rounds especially to be judged by experienced people
who are as removed from competition as possible to make it a fair process.

Having eliminated competitors from rival schools judge non-eliminated
debaters is very much like having Hillary Clinton count votes in the 2020
presidential election if Trump is nominated. There’s too much at stake and I
don’t see why regular more experienced and less biased judges can’t be used.
Representing almost 67% of the student population, the sheer prevalence of bias
concerns is a point that ought to be seriously considered by leagues that allow
eliminated competitors to be put into the judging pool.
Second, 23% of students (17 total) noted an issue with revenge/power
dynamics/ rivalries. One student cited personal experience with this issue saying; “I
know student judges have been vindictive, often judging the exact people who
eliminated them from the tournament.” Another student detailed an important
hypothetical—a debater “could have just eliminated a teammate of [the judge] who
feels they should have won,” causing the judge to take retaliatory measures.
Furthermore, several students commented on the presence of interschool rivalries. One
response explained that:
Sometimes debaters will have an eliminated competitor from a rival school
serve as a judge in their out round. While the judge from a rival school would not have
been competing in the same division they are judging, they might be more inclined to
vote against the competitor from their rival school. Furthermore, teammates from
schools talk about their competitors frequently, and this could lead to situations in
which an eliminated competitor judges a debater that his/her teammates do not like,
possibly creating a greater (and unfair) burden on that competitor. Both real and
hypothetical vindictive experiences with student judges ought to be taken seriously, as
they threaten to compromise the educational value of IPDA.
Third, 17.6% of participants (13 total) noted that student judges lack good
experience. Several students felt that eliminated competitors are just not as qualified
as other judges, such as “coaches, alumni, or hired judges.” In fact, one student was
particularly concerned with using novice or JV students to judge varsity students
because they lack credible experience, so “their critiques are not/should not necessarily
be trusted.” Other students were concerned with a lack of experience in general, mostly
writing about how it is less fair to be judged by an eliminated student than someone
who has judged before, which is a particularly potent argument regarding high-stakes
outrounds.
Fourth, 6.8% of students (five total) cited logistical concerns. One student said
that eliminated students who end up judging may incur exhaustion that would prohibit
them from judging as well as someone who had not competed all day. One student
recalled multiple instances in which he or she was judged by a young debater who was
exhausted by outrounds, and as a result, the ballots that student “received from those
rounds have been of very little usefulness because of lack of information, and
incoherent comments.” On a different note, another student mentioned a net harm to
teams when students can be pulled for elimination rounds. He/she claimed that “taking
a competitor away from the team’s ability to prep remaining competitors. It’s almost as
if the team receives two hard blows, in that they lose the points from the round AND
the utility of that person during some prep time.” These logistical concerns could easily
impact a round negatively, which is unfair to the competitors who worked hard to earn
a spot in elimination rounds.
Fifth, 5.4% of students (four total) also thought that this practice introduces an
element of awkwardness/odd feelings. One respondent said that “awkward situations”
could occur as an implication of bias or revenge. Other students reported feeling odd
when they are (or could be) judged by other competitors, even from different divisions.
This presents an unfair constraint for the competitors, especially if the awkwardness
impacts one competitor more than the other (or even favors one competitor) because it
limits the debaters’ ability to argue as well as they could with more objective judges.
Lastly, 4.1% of students (three total) commented on a potential for residual
frustration at being eliminated. One student said that recently-eliminated student judges
“tend to be less interested and more frustrated.” It could be hard for some students to
put a loss out of their mind in order to focus on the round in front of them. Other
students mentioned the potential for such frustration to color the round, thus resulting
in unfair judging for the students debating.
RQ3a: Do students who have judged in elimination rounds have generally favorable or
unfavorable views regarding the use of eliminated students as judges? Are those views
different from students who have not judged?
There was a significant difference, t (75) = 2.73, p < .01, between individuals who had
served as judges (M = 2.66, SD = 1.33) and those who had not served as judges (M =
1.88, SD = 1.11) with respect to views of using eliminated students as judges.
On average, students who have judged in elimination rounds after competing
have a generally unfavorable, though close to neutral, view of the practice. These views
are different from those of students who have not served as judges, who felt more
negatively about the practice. This may imply an assumed bias because, once one has
judged, he or she is included in the practice, and thus is likely to view it more favorably
than one who has not experienced any of the benefits of judging.
RQ4a: Do students who have been judged by eliminated competitors in outrounds have
generally favorable or unfavorable views regarding the use of eliminated students as
judges? Are those views different from students who have not been judged?
There was no significant difference in views of using eliminated students as judges
between individuals who had been judged by eliminated students and those who have
not been judged by eliminated students.
While the data for comparison was not statistically significant and thus cannot
be used to draw a conclusion, the mean opinions for each group can still be taken into
account. There were 45 students who answered “yes” to being judged by eliminated
competitors, representing 60.8% of the population. The “yes” group had a mean of 2.2
on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being negative feelings toward the practice and 5 being positive
feelings. Similarly, the “no” group had a mean of 2.1, though there were only 13
students who answered “no,” representing 17.6% of the population. It should be noted,
though that there was a third answer option; 16 students (21.6% of the population)
answered that they were unsure if they had been judged. This compromised the amount
of results that could be analyzed, which could be why the data was not statistically
significant. This is especially plausible for the “no” answers, seeing as there were only
13 “no” answers. However, because the previous question about students who have
judged in elimination rounds produced statistically significant results, it may be the case
that judging others has more of an impact on students’ opinions of the practice than
being judged.
RQ5a: Does the number of years one has competed in IPDA have any bearing on their
There was no significant correlation between the views of using eliminated students as
judges and the number of years students had competed in IPDA. This is likely due to
a small sample size. Therefore, a conclusion cannot be drawn.
Coaches
RQ1b: Is there a correlation between the part of the country one coaches in and his or
There was a significant difference, t (15) = 2.92, p < .01, between the South region (M
= 3.53, SD = 1.08) and the West region (M = 1.8, SD = 1.30) with respect to coaches’
views of using eliminated students as judges.
Overall, coaches at schools in the South felt more positive about the use of
eliminated students as outround judges than coaches in the West did. The average
response for Southern coaches was closest to a positive view, while the average
response for Western coaches was clearly negative.
Although the sample size was small and fairly imbalanced regionally, there are
still trends in the frequency of the data. Of the 12 Southern coaches who participated,
all 12 had students who both had and had been judges who were eliminated competitors.
With a mean rating that was closest to a positive view, this is again likely due to
prolonged exposure to the practice. Of the five Western coaches, two had non-
advancing students who had been pulled to judged, and three had not had students
judge. Similarly, two coaches had students who had been judged, one was unsure, and
two more coaches confirmed their students had not been judged by eliminated
competitors. As an extension of the argument made in response to the student
frequencies under RQ1a, it would make sense that Southern coaches, who work in a
region that heavily uses this practice, would accept it, not being familiar with different
methods. Yet, an equal number of Western coaches had and did not have students who
have both judged after being eliminated and have been judged by competitors in
elimination rounds. Most importantly, their collective response was clearly negative.
As mentioned earlier, this suggests that the practice is questionable because coaches
with students who have access to more qualified judging find the practice more
objectionable than those for whom it is a regular feature of tournaments.
RQ2b: What are the most common advantages and disadvantages coaches mentioned
The coaches’ most commonly-listed advantages of eliminated competitors as judges
can be grouped into four approximate categories. First, 52.9% of participating coaches
(nine total) praised the use of eliminated competitors as judges because it promotes
efficiency/convenience/helping the tournament run smoothly. One coach commented
that the practice “helps fulfil the needed judging obligations, especially for early out
rounds, in which the most judges are needed.” Likewise, another coach responded by
saying “Tournaments tend to get strapped for judges as eliminated schools start to head
home. If schools that remain can provide a clean judge in the form of an eliminated
student, that may help with tournament logistics.” As the most popular benefit, it
appears that coaches are largely concerned with how to run tournaments smoothly, and
this practice is one way to do that.
Second 35.3% of coaches (six total) listed experience/knowledge as an

advantage for the practice. After describing IPDA community judges as “terrible,” one
coach argued that, “by comparison, students are in a better position to evaluate
arguments and are more likely to do so based on the flow.” Another coach said that
eliminated students “have some familiarity with the practice of debate and are not
strictly lay judges.” Clearly, many coaches think that knowing at least a little about
debate is helpful for judges, and eliminated competitors are typically quite familiar with
IPDA.
Similarly, 35.3% of participants (six total) mentioned that the practice serves as
a learning experience for student judges. One coach reported that allowing students to
write ballots “changes how they see debate rounds in general because they get an
entirely new perspective on what happens in rounds. They see what it looks like when
someone gets a comment they've received before and never truly understood.”
Moreover, another participant stated that judging gives students a “better idea for what
type of argument may help more successful debaters to distinguish themselves in the
field of competition.” It is understandable that coaches want their students to have
valuable learning experiences, and taking part in evaluating a round can certainly give
students new perspectives that they can carry into their own debating.
Lastly, 17.6% of participants (three total) said that the practice was beneficial
because it eases the burdens of preliminary round judges. One coach essentially sums
up the argument here by saying that the practice reduces the “judging burden from other
judges in the pool who have been watching rounds for many hours a day over multiple
days.” Anyone who has been to a forensics tournament, let alone judged, knows that
judging an entire tournament is taxing, so it is charitable to want to make the experience
as painless as possible.
Conversely, the coaches’ most commonly-listed disadvantages of eliminated
competitors as judges can be grouped into three approximate categories. First, 47.1%
of participants (eight total) noted a presence of bias. Most respondents who discussed
bias said something similar to the practice “open[ing] the door for potential bias.” Other
coaches were more specific about the bias; one recalled, “I have a few students tell me
that they were judged by someone they had eliminated. One time it was a student who
had debated her judge at that tournament, but the other times it was a debater faced with
a judge they had eliminated at a previous tournament.” While this coach’s students had
not incurred harm from these situations, he/she notes that “the concern is there,” and a
different coach confirmed that he or she felt those types of rounds came with negative
outcomes.
Second, 35.3% of coaches (6 total) discussed revenge/rivalries or friendships/
ethical concerns as a net negative of the practice. One coach wrote that “there is a
known bias among certain schools to systematically vote down competitors from
certain schools, whether they are friends etc. Students who feel spurned by a certain
school voting down other competitors from that school.” Likewise, another coach
questioned if students can be truly impartial when judging their competitors, seeing as
many students have either rivalries or friendships that could easily influence a decision.
The overall trend among these six coaches is that students have a hard time viewing a
round objectively when they know the competitors as peers, which is an issue unique
to the use of eliminated students as judges (as opposed to poor judging in general).
Finally, 35.3% of coaches (six total) wrote about the disadvantage of student
judges’ inexperience. One coach said, “Given that they have been eliminated, these
students are likely not the strongest IPDA debaters in the field. I think that there is a
credibility problem when a lesser debater (at least at this one tournament) is asked to
evaluate and give feedback on a student who has objectively performed better than
them.” Following a similar line of logic, another coach remarked that “a little
knowledge can be a dangerous thing--i.e., it may be easier to prepare for a judge who
knows nothing about debate, and knows they know nothing, than a judge who knows
nearly nothing but thinks they know a great deal.” At the same time, a different coach
drew a parallel to teaching. He or she argued that “Students aren't trained to be judges.
It's the same as asking a student to teach a course. They know a lot of the expectations
but they've never practiced the skills needed to be successful.” Cohesively, these
comments suggest that coaches want fair competition experiences for their students,
and many responding coaches recognize that the lack of judging experience can
compromise the educational quality of the sport for others.
RQ3b: Do coaches with students who have judged in elimination rounds have generally
favorable or unfavorable views regarding the use of eliminated students as judges? Are
those different views from coaches with students who have not judged?
The data for this question was not statistically significant; there was no difference in
opinion between coaches who do and who do not have students who have judged in
elimination rounds after competing at the same tournament. This is likely due to a small
sample size. Therefore, a conclusion cannot be drawn.
RQ4b: Do coaches with students who have been judged by eliminated competitors in
outrounds have generally favorable or unfavorable views regarding the use of
eliminated students as judges? Are those views different from coaches with students
who have not been judged?
There was no significant difference in views of using eliminated students as judges
between coaches who had students judge outrounds and those who had not had students
judge outrounds. This is likely due to a small sample size. Therefore, a conclusion
cannot be drawn.
RQ5b: Does the number of years one has coached IPDA have any bearing on their
There was no significant correlation between the coaches’ views of using eliminated
students as judges and the number of years a coach had coached IPDA. This is likely
due to a small sample size. Therefore, a conclusion cannot be drawn.
Comparing Students and Coaches
Interestingly, the region one coaches or competes in was the strongest predictor of
positive or negative feelings, with the most positive feelings coming from those in the
South and the most negative feelings coming from those in the West. This is likely due
to exposure; it is far more common for eliminated students to be put into the judging
pool at tournaments in the South than it is for tournaments in the West. Thus, these
students and coaches are used to the practice and accept it, while those who do not
usually experience it are more likely to feel negative about it.
Although the sample sizes were quite different (17 participants for coaches and
74 participants for students), it is still interesting to compare general attitudes toward
the practice of using eliminated competitors as judges in outrounds. Overall, 24.3% of
students viewed the practice as positive, compared to 47.1% of coaches; 14.9% of
students viewed the practice as neutral, compared to 23.5% of coaches; and 60.8% of
students viewed the practice as negative, compared to 29.4% of coaches. In general,
the majority of students surveyed viewed putting eliminated students into the outround
judging pool as negative, and, while it is not a true majority, the most common feeling
for coaches was positive.
Implications
While there are various advantages and disadvantages of using eliminated competitors
as judges in outrounds, the results suggest that the potential harm outweigh the benefits.
The authors find this to be true both quantitatively and qualitatively. The heart of the
issue is that students are not able to meet the goals of judging as efficiently or
objectively as a judge who is more experienced, unaffected by rivalries, or not
preoccupied with residual frustration from being eliminated from the tournament.
Particularly for students, the practice is simply undesirable, while the coaches
offered more positive feedback. Considering how just over 60% of students view
eliminated competitors being put into the judging pool as negative, it is crucial to
understand why. For nearly two-thirds of participating students, the answer is, at least
in part, due to bias. Beyond bias, the most popular answers included revenge and
inexperience. Alone, these issues are irritating to a competitor, but combined, they
make for a round that is likely to be evaluated unfairly. Coaches also share in some of
these sentiments. While the coaches surveyed were most likely to view the practice
positively, there was no majority favorite on the Likert-type scale. Furthermore, most
of the coach respondents who answered positively were from the South, a region where
the practice is common and has been for many years. In other words, this practice
seems to be part of IPDA culture in the South. As a result, Southern competitors may
not have much experience with judges who are more qualified, so their mean neutral
attitude could simply be due to familiarity.
Likewise, though coaches were keen to keep tournament efficiency in mind,
almost half of the coaches also agreed that bias is a significant issue inherent to the
practice. More specifically, 52.9% of coaches praised the use of eliminated competitors
as judges, and 47.1% listed bias a concern. This means coaches are aware that bias is
an issue with the practice, but they are choosing to prioritize tournament efficiency over
ensuring fairly judged rounds. Although everyone in the forensics community wants
efficient tournaments, considering tournament efficiency to be more important than
unbiased judging compromises the integrity of forensics.
Moreover, it is possible for proponents of using defeated student competitors to
conflate the student judge with the lay judge. Using defeated student competitors does
not automatically yield Cirlin’s benefits of the lay judge, nor set aside the difficulties
identified in the Results/Discussion section. The benefits of the lay judge stem from the
lack of formal association with a debate organization. IPDA regards lay judges as a
foundational part of the activity and Richey notes how they help keep IPDA closer to
its roots and intentions:
Lay judges help limit speed and technical jargon in the round. Lay judges tend to not
understand what is happening if the debater speaks too fast or uses word that are not
familiar to a layperson. Lay judges validate a core principle of IPDA: in order for debate
to be truly effective, it must be accessible to all and not just a select, highly educated,
sectarian few. (p. 31)
However, defeated student competitors are not the same as lay judges.
One intent of using lay judges, and not solely members of the debate
community, is to prevent some of the narrowing of debate toward technical arguments,
faster delivering and narrowing of understanding found in NPDA and other debate
forms. Lowry (2010) embraces the use of lay judges as a “beachhead” against the
excesses in other traditional debate formats (p. 3).
Lowry also values minimal interaction between judges and debaters prior to a
round:
Lastly, lay judges should be instructed to only have limited exchanges prior to
debate rounds with the competitors they are judging. Though audience analysis
is a critical element of the public speaking process, debaters who glean
information prior to a round and use it to curry favor with the judge to win the
round is the crassest abuse of the lay judge’s lack of knowledge of the process
and its ethical boundaries. Just as a litigator would be admonished to not address
a juror by their name, debate judges should equally be cautioned that some
“friendliness” with a competitor prior to a round may overstep ethical lines. (p.
4).
Yet the defeated student competitor already has a vested interest in the game and some
students may have difficulty judging outrounds in an impartial fashion. It seems like
using defeated student competitors, especially when such judges are known to one or
both debaters in the elimination round, violates this aspiration. Using non-competitors
as judges would more easily alleviate Lowry’s concern here.
Additionally, the coaches’ other major concerns mirrored the students’:
Revenge and inexperience. The fact that the top three concerns are the same for both
students and coaches sends a powerful message about the concerns and problems
associated with this practice. As an organization that values education, IPDA ought to
seriously reconsider its use of eliminated students in judging pools. Of course, one
cannot ignore the coaches’ top and students’ second most influential advantage:
tournament efficiency. Everyone involved in the forensics community is likely
sympathetic to the merit of attempting to make tournaments run as smooth as possible.
However, the efficiency of putting eliminated competitors into the judging pool is not
unique to the practice. Tournaments can absolutely function just as well without relying
on eliminated students to judge. For example, the Northwest Forensic Conference
(NFC) does not partake in the practice at its league IPDA tournaments, but elimination
rounds rarely run noticeably behind. But, beyond this regional example, the AFA and
NFA run the largest and most competitive national tournaments for intercollegiate
forensics, and both organizations are able to function smoothly without running the
risks that come along with using eliminated competitors as judges.
Directions for Future Research
First and foremost, because not all of the research questions in this study could be
answered due to a lack of statistical power, it would be interesting to see if a larger
sample would provide results, particularly for questions geared toward coaches. At the
same time, gathering a sufficient sample size is challenging given the small number of
IPDA coaches to begin with. Beyond this logistical issue, it would be interesting to
look deeper into who competitors and coaches perceive as a “qualified” IPDA judge
and what the IPDA could do with judge training or even formal recommendations in
response.
Taking a step back from the specifics of this project, it could also be valuable
to see a study on the impact of not breaking on students’ emotions and rational
processing. Students’ reactions to either not breaking at all or being eliminated after at
least one outround could offer more insight into a topic such as the one discussed in
this paper because, if a hypothetical negative reaction was substantial, there could be
further evidence of bias or even apathy if those competitors were then asked to judge.
Moreover, it could also speak to larger implications within the forensics community.
Conclusion
Beyond data that suggests that the use of eliminated competitors as outround judges is
less than ideal, there is compelling precedence from the two largest and most
competitive collegiate forensics organizations in the country. As previously mentioned,
both the AFA and NFA forbid the practice. Thus, the IPDA should follow AFA and
NFA in disallowing the use of eliminated competitors as judges (or any undergraduates
who want to keep competing). The AFA and NFA clearly recognize not only the harms
already discussed, but also the conflict of interest. In seeking to protect the integrity of
forensic competition, these organizations have banned this practice, presumably
because they understand that it dilutes the forensic experience and potentially promotes
unfair judging.
The implications of a system such as that of the AFA, NFA, or even NFC are
much more sweeping than they seem. Recall that tournament efficiency is the most
common benefit for the coaches and the second most common benefit for the students.
What that tells us is that the primary redeeming quality of this practice is efficiency.
However, knowing that tournaments can be run just as well without placing students
into the judging pool means the strongest argument for the practice disappears.
Likewise, the unique harms, such as the substantial concern about bias from both
students and coaches, can be avoided by following a system that circumvents the use
of eliminated students in outrounds as well. Of course, discontinuing the practice does
mean the advantages are eliminated as well, but many of the advantages are not unique
to judging at actual tournaments. More specifically, educational benefits from novice
students learning from judging a varsity round can be accessed through having novices
judge a practice round on their own team or flowing a varsity elimination round to
determine a winner, without actually casting a ballot. Therefore, the claim to the
pedagogical benefits of using eliminated students as judges could be captured just as
effectively outside of real elimination rounds, all while circumventing the harms.
Ultimately, we must ask ourselves this important question: if the prominent efficiency
problem that prompts the practice can be solved through other routes, does the IPDA
truly want to compromise quality of debating experience for a few non-unique benefits?
References
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International Public Debate Association. Retrieved from
http://www.ipdadebate.info/constitution--bylaws.html
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https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/judge
Lowry, M. (2010). Lay judging. Journal of the International Public Debate

Association, 4, 3-4.
McBath, J.H. (ed.). (1975). Forensics as communication. Skokie, IL: National

Textbook Co.
Mills, N.H. (1983). Judging standards in Forensics: Toward a uniform code in the 80s.
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debate. National Forensic Journal, 14(2), 25-30.
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FORUM
Editorial Note: In 2014, this journal began a Forum feature in hopes of stimulating a
productive, reflective discussion among the members of our association. As ever,
addresses to the forum are reprinted here without editorial intervention beyond copy-
editing and proof-reading.
Unethical Frameworks Undermine the

Educational Value of Debate
Matthew Lucci1
Over the years, collegiate debate has grown into an extremely competitive activity.
While coaches and institutions stress the importance of solid communication skills, the
competitive aspect of forensics is one of the largest forces in such activities. The pursuit
of victory drives programs to build their budgets, dictates their competition schedules,
and even changes their approach to the activity as a whole. The drive to win individual
debates and national titles has continuously given rise to practices that undermine the
activity as a whole and threaten the educational benefits of competitive forensics.
Competition can be a great way for students to enhance their skills. Debate provides
a hands-on method of learning that increases students’ understanding of key subjects.
In fact, forensics instruction serves as a method of teaching through intentional study
that is beneficial to college students, especially those with learning styles that pose
challenges to their instructors and require nontraditional teaching methods in order to
effectively learn complex material (Wilson and Gerber, 2008). Students are drawn to
the activity for the competitive aspect and the prospect of attaining collegiate
scholarships as early as middle school, and this competitive ambition lasts well through
college.
1
Matthew Lucci (B.S., Southern Methodist University) is an interim director of forensics at the
University of Texas at Tyler. Correspondence to mlucci@patriots.uttyler.edu.
Unethical Frameworks 33
While debate is a wonderful activity in these regards, the drive to win has led to
unfair and unethical practices within various debate communities. In NDT-CEDA,
teams attempt to “spread” their opponents out of the round by providing as many
arguments as they possibly can in a rapid manner. The purpose of such tactics is to win
the round on the technical argument that one’s opponents have not addressed all of the
arguments in the round. The desire to win has also given rise to the prominence of
critical arguments (kritiks) in collegiate forensics. In many forms of debate, frivolous
critical arguments are employed not as a means to address an important issue, but as a
means of side-stepping opposing arguments without actual debate on the topic.
Similarly, there are evolving tactics in the IPDA community that shut down real debate
by presenting unfair frameworks that disadvantage ethical debaters. This is tempting to
competitors and forensics programs because it provides an unfair and corrupt advantage
to schools that shed the pedagogical value of debate in favor of the prestige of winning
(Hobbs and Pattalung, 2008). Engaging in such unethical debate tactics weakens the
educational value of the activity.
Debate is supposed to be about education, and its growth as a collegiate activity can
be attributed to schools valuing this aspect (Burnett, et al. 2003). When properly
instructed, collegiate forensics provides a greater educational experience and forces
students to think critically about key subjects. This type of activity allows students to
experience a higher quality of education and possess a deeper understanding of the
subject matter than traditional teaching methods (Allen, et al. 1999). It is this
educational value that attracts communications departments and donors to support
debate at the collegiate level.
Unfortunately, we tend to measure the success of forensics programs not by their

ability to improve the communication skills of their students, but by their competitive
records (Mazilu, 2002). Organizations rank schools, programs, and competitors in
every format of debate. Coaches are increasingly concerned with the competitive
standing of their schools and winning titles. This leaves the very purpose of IPDA
debate behind. One of the founders of the IPDA wrote that “the Public Debate format
was created by starting with the educational goals and working backwards” (Cirlin,
2007). The nature of the IPDA format was developed to allow competitors to develop
real-world communication skills instead of complex technical jargon. Rather than
focusing upon winning championships and gaining clout in the forensics community,
IPDA was founded for the educational benefit of the student competitors. That benefit
is achieved when students engage in fair, meaningful debates, and is stifled through the
use of abusive debate tactics and teams that seek primarily to win championships.
The drive to win rounds tempts competitors to leave behind ethical debate in favor
of abusive argumentative tactics designed to increase the likelihood of victory
(Chandler and Hobbs, 1991). Not only are competitors responsible for such tactics, but
the drive for program awards tempts coaches to train their students to utilize such
methods in debate rounds. As a result, technical arguments have become quite common
in IPDA. Debaters attempt to place high burdens upon their opponents in hopes that the
judge will be convinced that the opposing debater failed to meet some established
obligation. This can be seen when competitors tell the judge that their opponents “must
prove beyond a shadow of a doubt” that a certain statement is true. Conversely, the
tactic of lowering the bar for oneself has become increasing popular among competitive
programs, with statements like “all I have to do is to cast some doubt that the affirmative
is true, and then you (the judge) have to vote negative.” Such tactics not only miss
essential debate theory, they sidestep the fundamental IPDA burden of the negative to
clash with the affirmative and refute the affirmative case while also undermining the
educational value of the debate itself by not actively engaging in the argumentation at
hand. Convincing judges to reward such dishonest debate ruins the educational value
by demonstrating that ethical debate does not win.
Ethical debate can and will get left behind if the IPDA community continues to
reward unethical framework arguments. When coaches teach their students how to side-
step affirmative advocacy through the use of unrealistic burdens, they teach their
students that taking home a trophy is the most important part of our activity. As debaters
convince lay judges that they must vote on unfounded and unfair technical arguments,
they learn that taking shortcuts in debate increases their chances of an award. Affirming
such behavior through ballots and coach instruction degrades the quality of the debates
themselves and removes the educational purpose behind our activity. As we allow our
community to become corrupted by these tactics, we allow for our pedagogy to be
undermined and lose the very reason why we as coaches claim for forensics to be
important (Richardson, 2017).
As coaches and educators, we ought to strive not to find new and innovative ways
for our students to win rounds through shady means, we ought to empower our students
with real-world communication skills predicated upon established ethical frameworks.
In sum, “we ought to value our students learning in and out of round more than any
number of plastic trophies” (Key, 2014). Until we return to focusing our efforts upon
these goals instead of chasing national titles, our students will not receive the level of
education promised to them and to the departments that support our activities, nor will
the IPDA retain an educational advantage over forms of debate that employ spreading
or kritiks as a shortcut to winning rounds.
References
Allen, M., Berkowitz, S., Hunt, S., & Louden, A. (1999). A meta-analysis of the
impact of forensics and communication education on critical thinking.
Communication Education, 18(1), 18-30.
Burnett, A., Brand, J., & Meister, M. (2003). Winning is everything: Education as
myth in forensics. The National Forensic Journal, 21(1), 12-23.
Chandler, R., & Hobbs, J. (1991). The benefits of intercollegiate policy debate
training to various professions. In D. W. Parson (Ed.), Argument in
Controversy (pp. 388-390). Annandale: Speech Communication Association.
Cirlin, A. (2007). Academic debate v. advocacy in the real world: A comparative

analysis. Journal of the International Public Debate Association, 1(1), 3-18.
Hobbs, J., & Pattalung, P. (2008). Ethics in public debate. Journal of the International
Public Debate Association, 2(1), 20-24.
Key, A. (2014). Editorial: Winning isn’t everything: redefining success through the
practice of disclosure. Journal of the International Public Debate
Association, 6(1), 10-13.
Mazilu, S. (2002). Debate- A way of training for success. Journal of the National
Parliamentary Debate Association, 7(1), 35-41.
Richardson, R. (2017). Reflections on forensic practice and civic education: What are
we teaching? What are we learning? National Forensics Journal, 35(1), 56-
59.
Wilson, M., & Gerber, L. E. (2008). How generational theory can improve teaching:
Strategies for working with the millennials. Currents in Teaching and
Learning, 1(1), 29–44.

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Journal of the International Public Debate Association

Volume 10, Issue 1

Volume 10, Issue 1

Using Non-Advancing Competitors as Judges in IPDA Elimination Rounds 13

Thoughts on the Use of Evidence in IPDA

The Problem with “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”

“the burden of proof requires the affirmative to establish a preponderance of proof in

seems unnecessary. The author suspects7 that “preponderance of logic” became

Anecdotal evidence has a place in IPDA. IPDA values effective rhetorical

Using Non-Advancing Competitors as

Tournaments of the International Public Debate Association frequently use student

Though many attempts are made to keep debate judging neutral, it is an

undergraduate who judges in the open division of a forensics tournament, (a division

who are as removed from competition as possible to make it a fair process.

Second 35.3% of coaches (six total) listed experience/knowledge as an

American Forensic Association. (2017). AFA-NIET 2018 Tournament Invitation.

Cirlin, A. (2007). Academic debate vs advocacy in the real world: A comparative

International Public Debate Association. (2015). The constitution of the

Judge. Oxford Living Dictionaries, Oxford English Dictionary. Retrieved from

Lowry, M. (2010). Lay judging. Journal of the International Public Debate

McBath, J.H. (ed.). (1975). Forensics as communication. Skokie, IL: National

Morris, K. (2005). Evaluator v. critic: Judging intercollegiate forensics. National

National Forensic Association. (2017). National Forensic Association by-laws.

Unethical Frameworks Undermine the

Unfortunately, we tend to measure the success of forensics programs not by their

Cirlin, A. (2007). Academic debate v. advocacy in the real world: A comparative

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