'

AN INTERPRETATI ON OF WHITEHEAD S METAPHYSICS

An Interpretation of

Whitehead's Metaphysics

by WILLIAM A. CHRISTIAN

Associate Professor of Religion, Yale University

New Haven: YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1959

© z959 by Yale University Press, Inc.
Acknowledgments
Printed in the United States of America by

Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., Binghamton, N.Y.

and set in Baskerville type.

All rights reserved. This book may not be

MY STUDY of Whitehead's writings has been helped by discussions
reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form with many friends, including some of his students, and by many
(except by reviewers for the public press), silent debates with writers of books and articles on his philosophy.
without written permission from the publishers. Robert L. Calhoun, J ulian N. Hartt, Wilmon H. Sheldon, and
Library of Congress catalog card number: 59-6794 Paul Weiss read the manuscript. For their encouragement and
criticism I am deeply grateful to each of them. My wife and chil­
dren have given me constant support.
An ancestor of Part One was submitted at Yale as a doctoral dis­
sertation some years ago. An earlier version of Chapter 3 was pub­
lished in the Review of Metaphysics in i949.
I thank the publishers mentioned in the Sources and in various
footnotes for permission to use quotations. Publication of this book
has been aided by a grant from the Ford Foundation to the Yale
University Press.

WILLIAM A. CHR I S T I A N
Timo thy Dwig h t Co lleg e
Yale University
December r958
Contents

Acknowledgments v

Sources xi

i. Introduction I

Whitehead's later writings. The plan of this study. The point

of view. Some important systematic terms.

PART ONE. Actual Occasions

2. The Concreteness and Unity of an Actual Occasion 17

Introduction. Concreteness and experience. The satisfaction
of an actual occasion. Is the theory self-consistent? Conclusion:
Process and reality.

3. Novelty and Exclusiveness 48

The novelty of an actual occasion. Experiential exclusiveness.
The exclusiveness of contemporary occasions. How the present
excludes the future. How the present excludes the past. Are
immediate feelings literally transferred? The experiential
boundaries of an actual occasion.

4. Regions 77
How actual occasions are extensive. Regions of actual occasions
are definite. The extensive plenum. No two occasions have the
same region. Regions of occasions are nonoverlapping. Sum­
mary: Spatiotemporal exclusiveness.

5. Whitehead on Substance 105

What is "dead" in the tradition about substance. What is
"living" in the tradition about substance. A reformed doctrine
of substance.

6. The Problem of Social Immanence ll9

Social immanence, weak and strong. Contemporary occasions.
The future in the present. Physical transmission, efficient causa­
tion, and perception.

7. Causal Objectification 130

Simple physical feelings. Conformity of subjective form. The
function of eternal objects. Repetition and the "flow of feel­
ing."
vii
Vlll CONTENTS CON T E N TS lX

8. Influence 145 PART THREE. God and the World

Introduction. The "explanation" of influence. Whitehead on
15. God and the Categories 283
Hume.
Introduction. God as an actual entity. Conceptual valuation.
g. Pluralism and Organism 155 Satisfaction. Conclusion.
Are actual occasions genuine individuals? Are there organic
16. How God Affects the World 302
relations among actual occasions? Social transcendence and so-
A. God and Subjective Aim: The function of subjective aim.
cial immanence: The question of coherence. The question of
The derivation of subjective aim. The freedom of an actual
evidence.
occasion.

PART Two. Eternal Objects B. God and the Givenness of the Past: Givenness and the on­
tological principle. Is God the ground of givenness? The cate­
10. Objects and Events 175 gories. Relevant texts. A possible explanation.
The earlier philosophy of nature. How objects transcend C. God and Contemporaneity: The causal independence of
events. How objects are immanent in events: Ingression. Sum­ contemporaries. Unison of becoming.
mary. D. Conclusion.

I 1. Eternal Objects and Actual Entities 1 93 17. How the World Affects God 337
Introduction. Whitehead's criticism of Platonic forms. Pure How God requires the world. Are God and actual occasions
possibility. Examples of eternal objects. How eternal objects mutually exclusive? Does God abstract from actual occasions?
transcend actual entities. How eternal objects are immanent in Negative prehensions. Does God have conformal feelings? Do
actual entities: Ingression. Modes of ingression. Conceptual actual occasions alter God's satisfaction? Actual occasions and
prehensions. Why eternal objects are needed. the relevance of possibilities. Summary.

12. Qualities and Relations 221 18. God and the '\:\Torld: Transcendence and Immanence 3 64
Whitehead on universals. Criticism of qualification. Restricted The principle of relativity. How the world transcends God:
applications of qualification. Are qualities universals? Rela­ Actual occasions as subjects. How the world is immanent in
tions and universals. Particular facts of relatedness. Universals God: Actual occasions as superjects. How God transcends the
of relation. The relational function of eternal objects. Sum­ world: God as subject. How God is immanent in the world:
mary and conclusions. God as superject. How God transcends the world: God as
superject. Summary.
13. Classification 242
Introduction. Science and mathematics. The function of phi­ 19. Whitehead and Traditional Theology 382
losophy. The class theory of particulars. The concreteness and Introduction. Whitehead's criticisms: Unreflective supernat­
novelty of real individuals. The infinitude of possibility. In­ uralism. Is the existence of God irrational? Whitehead's criti­
compatibility. Conclusion. cisms: God as absolutely complete. Whitehead's criticisms: Un­

i4. Is There a Realm of Eternal Objects? qualified omnipotence. Whitehead's alternative: The attri­
258
Is there a consistent doctrine? Eternal objects in themselves. butes of God. The problem of evil. Is Whitehead a pantheist?
How eternal objects are ordered by actual entities. Is there one Is God a person? Conclusion.

ideal order of possibilities? Eternal objects and creativity. Index 415

 Sources of Citations from Whitehead's Writings,
with Abbreviations

oT The Organisation of Thought. London, Williams and

Norgate, i917.
PNK An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowl-
edge. 2d ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1925 (a few notes are added to the first edition of 1919).
TSM "Time, Space, and Material," in Aristotelian Society, Sup-
plementary Vol. 2, Problems of Science and Philosophy.
London, Williams and Norgate, 1919.
CN The Concept of Nature. Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1920.
IDIN "The Idealistic Interpretation of Einstein's Theory," in
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., Vol. 22
(1921-22). London, Williams and Norgate, 1922.
PA "The Philosophical Aspects of the Problem of Relativity,"
in ibid.
PRIN R The Principle of Relativity. Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1922.
"Uniformity and Contingency," from Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, n.s., Vol. 23 (1922-23), London,
Williams and Norgate, 1923, here cited from ESP.

SMW Science and the Modern World. New York, Macmillan,

1925.
RM Religion in the Making. New York, Macmillan, 1926.
SYMBOLISM Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect. New York, Mac­
millan, 1927.
TIME "Time," in Proceedings of the Sixth International Con-
gress of Philosophy. New York, Longmans, Green, 1927.
PR Process and Reality. New York, Macmillan, 1929.
FR The Function of Reason. Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1929.
AI Adventures of Ideas. New York, Macmillan, 1933.
MT Modes of Thought. New York, Macmillan, 1938.

xi
Xll SO U R C ES O F C I T A T I O N S
SCHILPP The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. by Paul
A. Schilpp. 2d ed., New York, Tudor Publishing Co. for
The Library of Living Philosophers, 1951.
MG "Mathematics and the Good" (lecture delivered 1939), in CHAPTER 1

ibid.
IMM "Immortality" (lecture delivered 1941) , in ibid.
ESP Essays in Science and Philosophy. New York, The Philo­ Introduction
sophical Library, 1947· (The essays reprinted here are
from various dates. Sometimes I have attached to a cita­
tion the date of the essay from which it is taken.) THIS is an analytical study of certain metaphysical theories ad­
DIAL Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead, as recorded by vanced in the later writings of Alfred North Whitehead (1861-
Lucien Price. Boston, Little, Brown, 1954· 1947). These theories compose a remarkably subtle and original
system of speculative philosophy .

1. Whitehead's later writings

Whitehead's writings fall into three main periods.1 In the first
period, while at Cambridge and at University College, London, he
devoted himself to mathematics and logic. In the second period, at
the Imperial College of Science and Technology, London, from
1914, he was concerned with the philosophy of natural science. In
the last period, as professor of philosophy at Harvard from 1924,
he turned his attention to "speculative philosophy," by which he
meant "the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary sys­
tem of general ideas in terms of which every element of our ex­
perience can be interpreted" (PR 4) .
Since this study is an interpretation of Whitehead's speculative
philosophy, it is based mainly on his later writings beginning with
Science and the Modern World (1925). We should not suppose
that Whitehead first began to think about metaphysical questions
at that time. Just as mathematical physics led him into the phi­
losophy of nature, so the problems he encountered in the phi­
losophy of nature led him into speculative philosophy. He says in
the preface to Process and Reality that he was undertaking to
"compress the material derived from years of meditation" ( PR x) .
This is easy to believe. However far back these "years of medita­
tion" may have extended, in Science and the Modern World he
r . See, in Schilpp, Victor Lowe's study of Whitehead's development, and a

complete list of his writings.

 INTRODUCTION WHI TEHE AD ' S LATER W R I T I NGS 3

enlarges the scope o f his thought and begins to philosophize i n the crete imagination which shapes the language of Process and Reality
grand manner. He then becomes occupied with the nature of in­ and, to an even greater extent, some of the other later writings,
dividuality and the connections between individuals, with pure makes an added demand on the reader. One must learn to under­
possibilities and their relation to things, and with the relation be­ stand both his poetry and his logic without confusing one with
tween God and the world. the other.
A lthough Whitehead's later writings are the main locus for this Finally, the organization and the style of Process and Reality
study, practically all his writings since 1914 have been studied are not without their faults.
with some care. Chapter 4 contrasts his earlier theory of extension For all these reasons it is not an easy book to understand. It
with his treatment in the later writings. Chapter 10 deals with the makes demands on our patience and on our perspicuity. Often
earlier theory of objects and events as background for the theory one finds clearer statements than one had hoped to find, some­
of eternal obj ects. times in unexpected and unlikely places. But continual rereading,
The most important of the later writings, and the most dif­ and collation and comparison of texts, are essential. It is easy
ficult to understand, is Process and Reality. Some philosophers enough to pluck verbal contradictions from Whitehead's pages.
would not agree that it is profound; all would agree that its mean­ It requires some effort to distinguish verbal contradictions from
ing is obscure. It is difficult not only because of the novelty of his real ones, those that lie upon the surface of his system from those
terms and the scope of his subj ect but also because of his aim at that inhere in its structure.
systematic unity. He warns his readers not to expect a conventional Some of the obscurities can be seen through if one distinguishes
discussion of traditional philosophical problems. He intends "to three sorts of discourse. In some passages Whitehead is evoking
state a condensed scheme of cosmological ideas, to develop their and describing the concrete experiences he takes as his basic data.
meaning by confrontation with the various topics of experience, This we might call presystematic language. In others he is con­
and finally to elaborate an adequate cosmology in terms of which structing and developing the concepts which compose his cat­
all particular topics find their interconnections" (PR vii) . This aim egoreal scheme. This we might call systematic language. Else­
at systematic unity, and at rigorous development of a categoreal ·
where he uses these systematic terms to interpret sense experience,
scheme, is more characteristic of Process and Reality than of any the order of nature, art, morality, or religion. Here he is applying
other later writings. It is still effective in the more philosophical his scheme, and we might call this postsystematic language. These
parts of A dven tures of Ideas. In Modes of Though t and in the phases of his exposition correspond to the three phases of an air­
last lectures his philosophical stance is more relaxed. plane flight, with which he compares speculative philosophy. It
Along with this aim at systematic unity Whitehead has another begins on the ground; it rises into the air; and it returns to earth.
goal. The language of speculative philosophy is not a purely for­ Many blunders can be avoided if we do not mistake nonsystematic
mal language, nor is it the language of science. "Philosophy is not remarks for systematic ones.
a science" (MG 68 1 ) . Speculative philosophy must offer direct il­ Such a detailed study as this would be j ustified only if White­
lumination of concrete experience. Therefore it must connect its head's writings were not only difficult but important. One's judg­
abstract categories with our concrete intuitions. So Whitehead ment about their importance depends partly on one's view of
undertakes to speak imaginatively as well as logically, to suggest metaphysics-though speculative philosophy in Whitehead's sense
as well as to state his meaning. Even his technical terms, he says, is not what metaphysics is sometimes taken to be. Just now phi­
"remain metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap" losophy is undergoing a drastic reassessment of its functions and
(PR 6) . In this way his speculative philosophy has a kinship to limitations. One result may be a new way of understanding meta­
poetry as well as to mathematics and science. This appeal to con- physical statements. R evolutions in philosophy usually force us
4 I N TR O D U C T I O N THE PLA N OF THIS ST U D Y 5
t o reconceive old problems, and w e may come t o see the point of later writings and pointed toward some of their destinations. In
metaphysical problems in a new way. But I think these problems this way I offer this study as a contribution toward discerning the
are not pointless and that they are important. shape of his thought.
Metaphysics is important for two reasons. First, and more nega­
tively, no adequate substitute has yet appeared. Neither science 2. The plan of this study
nor theology has yet learned to dispense with metaphysical cat­ For the sake of analysis I have marked out and concentrated on
egories. Certainly it is possible to avoid metaphysics by remaining
three theories which together make up the groundwork of White­
strictly within the bounds of special languages, scientific or the­
head's system. His theory of actual occasions, with which Part One
ological. The penalty for this avoidance is isolation of these dis­
is concerned, contains his I nterpretation of finite individual things
ciplines from the world of ordinary experience and from one
and their connections. Here, we might say, he is dealing with the
another, a penalty neither scientists nor theologians, on the whole,
perennial problems of substance and causality. Part Two examines
are willing to pay. Most scientists and theologians, it seems, hope
his theory of eternal obj ects or, as he also calls them, pure po­
to modify or at least to reinterpret common-sense beliefs. Second,
tentials. This is his alternative to the Platonic theory of forms and
and more positively, metaphysics is important because philosophy
to the modern conception of universals. Part Three deals with his
aims at clarification of thought, and because generality of thought
theory of God and the world, which again differs from some tradi­
is necessary for clarity. We understand a particular use of a term
tional conceptions.
more clearly when we are aware of its other possible uses, in­
In this way the scope of the study is limited. It does not deal
cluding those possible uses which have as their context a coherent
fully or even systematically with Whitehead's applications of his
categoreal scheme.
scheme, for example his interpretations of space and time, matter,
For these reasons it seems likely that philosophers will go on
mind, knowledge, personality, science, morality, aesthetic experi­
asking questions analogous to the major questions asked by Plato,
ence, and r eligion. All these topics are touched on, but none is
Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Leibniz, and Spinoza. (They will
systematically explored. I have focused on the groundwork, not the
also continue to ask questions like those asked by Kant, Kierke­
superstructure, of Whitehead's system.
gaard, and Wittgenstein.) And I suggest, though this remains to
A preliminary sketch of the three theories we shall examine,
be shown, that Whitehead's answers are acute, original, and co­
and the questions they answer, is in order.
herent enough to deserve careful attention.
A third reason for offering this study of Whitehead's specula­ a. The theory of actual occasions. Whitehead construes the
tive philosophy, in addition to the difficulty and the importance of world as a plurality of real indiv idual things ("as real as we are"),
his later writings, is that among existing studies there seems to be organically interrelated. He accepts both a plurality of real things,
room for one such as this. We have had some reasonably good and genuine connections among these real things, as facts of ex­
introductions to Whitehead's metaphysics. We have also had some perience. Speculative philosophy, he thinks, ought to devise a set
careful studies of special problems. There is a place for something of concepts in which these facts can be expressed systematically and
more advanced than the introductions and more comprehensive coherently. His theory of actual occasions is the solution he offers.
than the special studies. This is the need I have tried to meet. I Let us explore a little further the problem he sets himself.
have in mind those serious students who, though attracted by In a pluralistic theory of the world there must be a class of finite
Whitehead's generosity of spirit and incisiveness of mind, are things with many members. These things must exist concretely,
p erplexed about the structure and implications of his categoreal and each must have some irreducible self-identity and individ­
scheme. I have proj ected some paths through the thickets of his uality. There must be many real finite individuals. Further, if a
6 I N T R O D U C T I ON THE PLA N O F THI S STU D Y 7

thing is a real individual then it is in some way o ther than all of being. He means to avoid two alternative ways of dealing with
other finite individuals. Each of these things must transcend, in forms and things.
some way or other, every other such thing. Whitehead accepts this i. One rej ected alternative amounts to im1nersing forms in
requirement. "It is to be noted that every actual entity . . . is things. Things cannot be otherwise than they are. Real con­
something individual for its own sake; and thereby transcends the tingency is meaningless. Forms do not transcend the things of
rest of actuality" ( PR 1 35). So he must undertake to say how each wh ich they are forms. All that is possible is actual.
finite individual transcends other finite individuals. He needs On this view there is no room for real novelty in the world of
what I shall call a doctrine of social transcendence in order to things. Creativity must be ejther denied or relegated to a putative
make good his claim to a pluralistic philosophy. But this is only beginning of the world. The world may or may not be said to
part of the problem. originate. But there can be no genuine origination within the
In addition to the principle of pluralism, he accepts the prin­ world.
ciple of "organism." He usually speaks of his system as "the phi­ Contrary to this view, Whitehead is committed to saying the
losophy of organism." Though the sense of this phrase is not world is in process. Actuality is in process of becoming. There is
simple, it means in part that the things which make up the world origination, creativity, novelty within the world of real things.
are "organically" related. He takes a realistic view of efficient Hence there must be possibilities which are not actual. Forms
causation and perception. He holds that real things are "present must transcend things. In order to interpret the world as process
in" other real things, not connected only in an external way. Whitehead undertakes to explain how eternal obj ects transcend
Causation, direct perception, memory, and personal identity, he actual entities.
says, "are all different aspects of the doctrine of the immanence of ii. The world is not merely process. It is also reality. The second
occasions of experience" (AI 2 3 7 ) . So he must say j ust how a finite rejected alternative consists in attributing real being to forms
individual is present in other finite individuals. He needs to de­ alone. Things are construed as reflections or shadows of forms.
velop what I shall call a doctrine of social immanence. Essence is beyond existence. The world becomes appearance, not
In Par t One, then, we concentrate on Whitehead's theory of reality, and philosophy becomes an intellectual flight from the
actual occasions, taking it as a theory of the individuality and the world. Being is not "here" but "there. " Things participate in
real connectedness of finite things.· We shall look for and examine forms and derive from them a secondary kind of being, but true
his doctrine of social transcendence and his doctrine of social im­ being belongs to forms.
manence. If his system is coherent, then the natures of the socially Contrary to this view, Whitehead is committed to saying the
transcendent individuals will be such as to permit, if not require, world is real. He will not subordinate things to forms. Forms are
their immanence in other individuals. Likewise social immanence not being itself. Forms are possibilities for actualization, and ref­
will be so described that it permits, if it does not require, that the erence to some actualization is part of the meaning of their being.
related things be socially transcendent individuals. We shall ask Thus things do not participate in forms. On the contrary forms
how well the theory of actual occasions meets these tests. participate in things. All power is resident in things. This is the
"ontological principle. " It follows that Whitehead needs a theory
b . The theory of eternal o bjects. Part Two deals with White­ of how forms are immanent in things.
head's theory of forms and things, that is to say with eternal obj ects His problem about eternal objects thus arises from some of his
and actual entities. One way to understand his problem is to see basic principles. The principle of process requires the transcend­
the alternatives he wishes to avoid. He means to maintain a firm ence of eternal objects. The ontological principle requires the
distinction between possibility and actuality as irreducible modes immanence of eternal objects. Whitehead undertakes to meet
8 INTROD UCT I ON T H E P L A N OF T H IS S T U D Y 9

these requirements. The realm of eternal objects "transcends, and "chief exemplification" of the categories but is, for all that, pe­
finds exemplification in and comparison with, the actual course culiar in some striking ways.
Whitehead must show how God is a real individual actual entity,
of realisation" (sMw 211).
exemplifying the categoreal conditions of actuality. He must also
Eternal objects are thus, in their nature, abstract .. . To show how there are real connections, connections that make a dif­
be abstract is to transcend particular concrete occasions of ference, between God and actual occasions. And his theory of God
actual happening. But to transcend an actual occasion does and the world must be consistent and coherent with his theory of
not mean being disconnected from it. On the contrary, I hold actual occasions generally, and with his theory of eternal objects.
that each eternal object has its own proper connection with He must explain what the following passages, for example, mean.
each such occasion, which I term its mode of ingression into
that occasion (sMw 2 2 0-2) . The notion of God . . . is that of an actual entity im­
manent in the actual world, but transcending any finite cos­
Immanence and transcendence are the characteristics of an mic epoch-a being at once actual, eternal, immanent, and
object: as a realized determinant it is immanent; as a capac­ transcendent ( PR 143).
ity for determination it is transcendent ( PR 366-7). [The con­
text shows he has eternal objects in mind.] It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as
that God is immanent in the World.
So he needs to explain what sort of entities forms are, how they
It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that
transcend actual entities, and how they are immanent in actual the World transcends God ( PR 5 2 8 ).
entities. Also his theory of eternal objects needs to be consistent
and coherent with his theory of individuals and their connections. These problems are certainly descended from a long line of
c. God and the world. The problem with which Part Three is
ancestors in European philosophy. But it would not be quite true
to say they are old problems. Insofar as Whitehead introduces us
concerned is the relation of God to actual occasions. This problem
to relatively new modes of thought, he forces us to think whether
arises for Whitehead in the following way:
in the past we have put our questions in the right way. What
i. He holds that, in addition to the multiplicity of actual oc­
might have been the problem of the One and the Many, of sub­
casions, there is an actual entity which differs in important ways
stance and causality, of the World and the Individual, or of in­
from any actual occasion. (See PR 135.) Also he lays it down as a
ternal and external relations, turns out to be subtly different from
rule that the basic categoreal conditions of his system shall apply
each of these traditional problems.
to God as well as to actual occasions. In other words, he proposes
This study has a limited aim as well as a limited scope. It aims
that God transcends actual occasions but does not transcend the
at exposing the structure of Whitehead's system, and is in this
categories.
way analytical. It is critical in the sense that the analysis is under­
ii. God also affects actual occasions. So a doctrine of divine im­
taken with critical questions in mind, some of which become ex­
manence is needed, as well as a doctrine of divine transcendence.
plicit as the study proceeds. Assessments of certain features of the
Further, actual occasions are genuinely immanent in God, so that
system will also appear now and then. I have aimed at clearing the
they literally make a dif]'erence in God.
way for a full-scale critique of Whitehead's system. But I have
Thus we have here the basic problem of Part One over ao-ain­
�
with a difference. The problem is again how actual entitie tran­
not presented such a critique. For that, perhaps, the time is not
yet ripe.Certainly it seemed a task beyond my powers.
scend one another and how they are immanent in one another.
I have not even tried to define Whitehead's place in the history
The difference is that in this case we have an entity which is the
10 I N T R O D U C T I ON S O ME IM P O RTAN T S Y S T E M A T I C T E R M S 11

of philosophy. But I have discussed his own attitude to the phil­ of vVhitehead's metaphysics. Since the existence of a system, even
osophical tradition, in order to bring out his views more clearly. the existence of a systematic interpretation, is a likely sign of a
His interest in this theme runs through his writings. In the preface point of view, I ought to say something about the kind of interest
to one of his earlier books he says, "Now the process of understand­ which led me to this project.
ing new conceptions is essentially the process of laying the new I began to study Whitehead's writings some years ago because
ideas alongside of our pre-existing trains of thought" ( PRIN R vii). they seemed to promise some new answers to theological questions.
And as readers of Process and Reality know, in Part II he lays his I had been reading a book by a German theologian, Karl Heim's
new ideas alongside the views of older philosophers, "in particular God Transcendent) and was impressed by his plea for a new sys­
Descartes, Newton, Locke, Hume, Kant." With them, he says, "An tematic interpretation of how God transcends the world. His own
endeavour has been made to point out the exact points of agree­ interpretation was not clear to me. So I proposed to see whether
ment and of disagreement" (PR vi). Whitehead's categories might be of help.
In Part One of this study, Chapter 5 deals with his treatment of It soon appeared that one could not understand his theory of
some traditional views of substance and Chapter 8 with his treat­ God and the world without understanding his theory of actual oc­
ment of causality. In Part Two, Chapters 1 1- 1 3 include his treat­ casions and his theory of eternal objects. In particular, divine
ment of the Platonic theory of forms and some traditional views transcendence had to be seen in relation to the transcendence of
of universals, qualities, relations, and classification. In Part Three one finite individual by another, and in relation to the way eternal
I have underlined some contrasts and similarities between his doc­ objects transcend actuality. Since Whitehead leaves no room for
trine of God and some traditional views. any absolute transcendence, one had to consider modes of im­
I do not suppose we should be content with Whitehead's esti­ manence as well as modes of transcendence. So the project took
mate of his relation to earlier philosophers. But my primary aim is shape as a more comprehensive study of transcendence and im­
to bring out more sharply and clearly the logical structure of his manence in Whitehead's metaphysics.
metaphysical system, not to show its relation to the past or to Many readers will not approach Whitehead with the same in­
estimate its historical importance. Certainly we need to judge its terests I have had or with the same presuppositions. But I hope
historical importance, and this means judging its philosophical my results will be interesting and useful to any serious student of
value. Wise judgments depend on at least two conditions: first, his writings. I have tried to discover what they mean and to ex­
understanding what Whitehead has said in his writings, and sec­ plain what I have discovered. Certainly I have had a number of
ond, understanding what speculative philosophy can and cannot surprises, finding at certain crucial points that they do not mean
do. This study is a step toward meeting the first of these condi­ what I had thought they meant.
tions. Indirectly it may also contribute toward meeting the sec­
ond. 4. Some important systematic terms
Whitehead's formal statements of his basic categories are found
3 . The point of view in Part I of Process and Reality) chapter 2 ("The Categoreal
I was tempted to call this "A Commentary on Whitehead's Scheme"), though more illuminating statements are often found
Metaphysics," since my immediate aim is to elucidate the texts. elsewhere, for example in pages 2 94-305 of A dventures of Ideas.
But that would suggest something less systematic than this has His classical education and his respect for the philosophical tradi­
turned out to be. I find that from my study of the texts has come a tion should be kept in mind in order to understand his choice and
sustained and more or less articulate argument about the shape usage of terms. He says, "This nomenclature has been made up to
12 INTROD UCTION s oME I M P ORTANT S Y STE M AT I C TER M S
conform to the condition, that, as a theory develops, its technical Eternal o bjects are pure potentials. They are in fundamental
phraseology should grow out of the usages of the great masters who contrast with actual entities. In themselves they do not determine
laid its foundations" (Ar 3 0 1 ) . in what actual entities they are ingredient. This is what is meant
A ctual entities are the real things (res verae) of which the uni­ by saying that they are "pure" potentials. They are merely possible
verse is made up. An actual entity is an experiencing subject and forms of definiteness. Prehensions of eternal objects are called
is constituted by its experience. Its experience is its real internal conceptual prehensions, in contrast with prehensions of actual
constitution. entities, which are called physical prehensions.
A prehension is an operation in which an actual entity "grasps" The term actual entity applies either to God or to an actual
some other entity (actual or nonactual ) and makes that entity an occasion. God and actual occasions are alike actual entities. God
object of its experience. Whitehead relates this term to "appre­ differs from actual occasions in two important ways: (a) The data
hension" somewhat as Leibniz related "perception" to "appercep­ of the conceptual prehensions of actual occasions are abstracted
tion." A prehension is a "concrete fact of relatedness." It has a from the data of physical prehensions. Thus every actual occasion
su bject (the prehending actual entity ), an o bject or datum that is originates "physically." God's conceptual prehensions, on the
prehended, and a su bjective form . The subjective form of a pre­ other hand, are underived or primordial and constitute his pri­
hension is the particular manner in which that subject prehends mordial nature. This is his timeless "envisagement" of the multi­
that object. Subjective forms are forms of emotion, consciousness, plicity of eternal objects. God's physical prehensions are his ex­
purpose, etc. A prehension need not be conscious-indeed, most perience of concrete actual occasions and constitute his consequent
prehensions are not. nature. Whitehead means to say God is one concrete actual entity,
There are positive prehensions and negative prehensions. Nega­ not two actual entities, for either "nature" considered apart from
tive prehensions "eliminate" their data, so that these data do not the other is an abstraction. (b ) Every actual occasion is of limited
make any positive contribution to the experience of the subject. A duration. It is literally an occasion. When its concrescence has
positive prehension is generally called a feeling. been completed it "perishes" or ceases to exist as an experiencing
The "becoming" of an actual entity consists in a concrescence subject. God, however, does not "perish." He exists at all times as
(from concrescere), a "growing together" of various details of ex­ an experiencing subject. That is to say, God is everlasting.
perience into a unity. This process of concrescence is organized Creativity is ·Whitehead's term for the most fundamental char­
teleologically by the subject's subjective aim at unity of experi­ acter of actuality. Creativity is not an individual thing and has no
ence. The satisfaction of an actual entity is the "concrete" unity of status apart from actual entities. By saying creativity is "ultimate,"
experience which the concrescence achieves. The living experience Whitehead seems to mean at least two things: (a ) He means that
of an actual entity is its su bjective immediacy. any actual entity, whether God or an actual occasion, is not alto­
Prehension of one actual entity by another means the o bjec­ gether derived from something else. There is an underived element
tification of the former for the latter. The former is then said to in every actual entity.Every actual entity, not only God, is in some
have "objective" existence. It exists and functions as an object, degree self-creative or causa sui. (b ) He means that every actual
not as an experiencing subject. Whitehead employs Descartes's entity is in some degree novel. The novelty of an actual entity is
terminology and says the actual entity as objectified is that actual the uniqueness which results from its self-creativity. It is an es­
entity o bjective; the actual entity as an experiencing subject is sentially new unity of experience. Having in mind both of these
that actual entity formaliter or in its "real internal constitution." meanings, it seems fair to say that an alternative expression for
The objective existence of an actual entity is its o bjective im­ creativity might be "originality," in the fullest and most radical
mortality. sense of the word.
PART ONE

Actual Occasio;ns
 CHAPTER 2

The Concreteness and Unity of an

Actual Occasion

1. Introduction
As S P E C U LATIVE P H I L O S O P HERS survey the various sorts of en­
tities about which discourse is possible, they usually conclude that
entities of certain sorts are more important than entities of other
sorts. This judgment is reflected in the primacy of some categories
over others in the systems they construct. For example, some phi­
losophers have said there is one substance of which all other en­
tities are attributes or modes. Others have said there are many
substances (material, or mental, or of both sorts) of which other
entities (for example, relations) are accidents. Other philosophers
have said that what we regard as substances are really distortions of
a formless flux of activity.
Whitehead poses a question of this sort by asking, What is con­
crete and what is abstract ( PR 30)? What is there, from which en­
tities of other sorts are abstractions? The answer he gives is dif­
ferent from those I have mentioned. There are many concrete
things, not just one. These things are not substances, as sometimes
conceived, for one is genuinely immanent in another. And while
they are activities, the activity of each has a structure which makes
it a real individual transcending all others of its kind. In "White­
head's system these many concrete things are called "actual en­
tities." "The positive doctrine of these lectures is concerned with
the becoming, the being, and the relatedness of 'actual entities' "

(PR viii).
Part One of this study examines his theory of finite actual en­
tities, which he calls "actual occasions" ( PR 1 35) . Part Three will
examine his theory of the "primordial" actual entity, God, and
the relation of God to the world of actual occasions. More im-
17
 C O N C R E T E N ESS A N D U N I T Y C O N C RE T E N ESS A N D E X P E R I E N C E
mediatel y, Chapters 2-5 look for Whitehead's explanation o f how scheme , he speaks instead of "implication in" or of "functioning"
an actual occasion "is something individual for its own sake; and (PR 3 4, 38) .
thereby transcends the rest of actuality" (PR i 35) . Whitehead avoids the term in his categoreal scheme for the fol-
In the present chapter we consider the concreteness and internal lowing reason. He means to construct a set of categories to in­
unity of an actual occasion. Chapter 3 deals with the novelty and terpret all the items we find in our world. He wants to throw light
mutual exclusiveness of occasions as acts of experience. In Chapter on persons and animals, which we think of as having experiences,
4 we see how these features of occasions are reflected in the theory and also on plants and stones and electrons, which we do not think
of extension. Chapter 5 argues that Whitehead has in effect re­ of as having experiences. Therefore he does not want to make
vised, not rej ected, the notion of substance. These chapters are "experience," with its restricted extension in ordinary usage, a
designed to bring out the main differences between Whitehead's sys tematic category. He uses it as a presystematic term.
system and those philosophies which p icture the world either as Instead of using the term in the categoreal scheme, he takes
the manifestation of a single universal being or as a formless flux certain features of its ordinary meaning and embodies these in his
of activity. They ask, Has Whitehead made good his claim to be a categories of explanation : (a) An experience is of something. It
plural ist? has an obj ective reference. And (b) the obj ect experienced has
Then in Chapters 6-8 we turn to the other side of the theory of significance for the subj ect. The experience has a reflexive func­
actual occasions, namely the doctrine of social immanence. These tion. These features of the ordinary meaning of "experience" are
chapters ask, Do Whitehead's categories yield genuine connections expressed in the categoreal notions of "prehension" and " im­
among the many individuals? Finally in Chapter g the two sides mediacy." An actual entity is "a concrescence of prehensions"
of the theory of actual occasions are brought together. We must (PR 3 5), a process of activity in which many entities function as
ask whether they are mutually compatible and what they amount objects. The immediacy of an actual entity is introduced in the
to. For example, on Whitehead's showing, is the world of actual following categories of explanation :
occasions an "organism"?
(xxi) An entity is actual, when it has significance for itself.
By this it is meant that an actual entity functions in respect
2. Concreteness and experience to its own determination. Thus an actual entity combines self­
identity with self-diversity (PR 38) .
The fundamental feature of an actual occasion is that it is an
"act" or "occasion" of experience. Indeed, in Adventures of Ideas (xxiii) That this self-functioning i s the real internal consti­
the expression "occasion of experience" supplants "actual oc­ tution of an actual entity. It is the 'immediacy' of the actual
casion" and becomes standard usage. An actual occasion is an entity (PR 3 8) .
experiencing thing.
Some caution is needed in the use of this expression. It is notable "A is an act of experience," systematically interpreted, means
that Whitehead del iberately avoids the term "experience" in his therefore that A is a prehending entity and that its nature is de­
statement of the categories of existence, explanation, and obliga­ termined in part by its own prehending activity. It does not imply
tion that compose the categoreal scheme ( PR, Pt. I, ch. 2) . The that A is conscious of what it prehends or conscious of itself. Con­
nearest approximations are "feeling" and "satisfaction. " But both sciousness is a feature of some prehensions but not all ( PR 35, 8 3).
these terms are introduced by way of "prehension," which is freer It is therefore an open question whether Whitehead is a pan­
from the connotation of experience. Where he might have spoken psychist or not, depending on what a "psyche" is taken to be. He
of experience or awareness, at various points in the categoreal does not attribute consciousness to stones and electrons, or to the
20 CO N C R E TE N E S S A N D U N I TY
1
I
T H E S AT I S F A C T I O N OF AN O C C A S I O N
This in ternal unity of an actual occasion is essential to its being
21

actual occasions that compose them. He does attribute to these

occasions a kind of activity which, presystematic ally, he calls "ex­ a real individual. So the next step in an examination of White­
perience." He means to suggest an analogy with human and animal head's pluralism should be an analysis of this unity. One way and
1
experience, but he explains he is giving the term an extension it perhaps the best way to analyze the in ternal structure of actual oc­
does not have in ordinary usage, with the understan ding that it casions is to study the "satisfaction " of an occasion, in which its
can be given systematic interpretation in terms of the categoreal unity is achieved. That is the purpose of the rest of this chapter.
scheme. It is a useful term if the conditions of its use are under­ We shall find that the satisfaction is of crucial importance for ex­
stood. planation of the individuality of an occasion, as the following pas­
So understood, we may say that in Whitehead's system the only sages suggest:
entities that are concretely actual are those which have experi­ This satisfaction is the attainmen t of something individual
ences. The mark of an abstract entity is that it has no experiences. to the entity in question . . . . 'Satisfaction' provides the in­
In systematic language, an abstract entity is one which has no dividual element in the composition of the actual entity
significance for itself (PR 38) . ( PR 1 29).
Here w e take a first step toward explain ing how an actual oc­
In the conception of the actual entity in its phase of satis­
casion is a genuinely real individual. Actual occasions are not
faction, the en tity has attain ed its individual separation from
abstract characters or collections of abstract characters. They "are
other things . . . (PR 233).
not expressible by concepts in respect to their individual par­
ticularity" ( PR 86) . In a discussion of the "full concreteness" of an Here we begin our detailed analysis of Whitehead's system. The
occasion Whitehead says, "It is impossible to complete the descrip­ initial plunge may try the patience of the reader. For everything
tion of an actual occasion by means of concepts" (sMw 2 37) . An cannot be explained at once, yet each systematic term must be
actual occasion is a genuin ely real individual because, in the first understood in relation to others. I hope the pattern of the scheme
place, it is not abstract but concrete. It is an occasion of experience. will become increasingly clear as we proceed, so that the reader's
Another step toward explanation of the individuality of an patience will gradually be rewarded.
actual occasion may be mentioned here. The experiencing which
makes up the occasion goes on at a defin ite place and time. The 3. The satisfaction of an actual occasion
occasion has a definite extensive region . This will be studied in
some detail in Chapter 4. An occasion is an instance of experience In the categoreal scheme the term "satisfaction " is introduced in
going on at some particular "here-now." category of explanation xxv: "The final phase in the process of
concrescence, constituting an actual en tity, is one complex, fully
If nothing more could be said about an occasion, then it would
amount only to a flux of experience going on at some particular determinate feeling. This final phase is termed the 'satisfaction . '
locus. But an actual occasion is a real individual in a much I t is fully determinate (a) a s t o its genesis, (b) as t o its objective
stronger sense than this. This "experiencing going on here-now" .
?
char�cter for t e transcend�n t creativity, and (c) as to its pre­
has a structure and a specific character. hens10n-pos1t1ve or negative-of every item in its universe"
Its structure is teleolog ical. It has a "subj ective aim" at "satis­ (PR 38).
faction ." In the satisfaction the subj ective aim is achieved and the When we study Whitehead's accoun ts of the satisfaction of an
concrescence becomes concrete. Its prehensions have grown to­ occasion we become aware of an important problem of interpreta­
.
gether in to a unity of feeling. t10n. Now and then he uses expressions like the following:
22 C ON C R E TE N E S S A N D U N I T Y
SA T IS F A C T I O N A S A T T A I N M E N T
.. . an actual entity has 'perished' when i t i s complete The in terpretation o f Whitehead's theory I would suggest may
( PR 1 26) .
be stated in the following set of propositions:
Completion is the perishing of immediacy: 'It never really is'
a. The satisfaction of an actual occasion is both aimed at and
( PR 1 30) .
attained in the experience of that occasion .
[In the phase of satisfaction] T ime has stood still-if only it
could (PR 2 33) . b. The satisfaction of an actual occasion is a feeling immediate
to that occasion .
. . . with the attainmen t of the 'satisfaction, ' the immediacy
of final causation is lost, and the occasion passes into its ob­ c. The satisfaction of an actual occasion is completely unified
j ective immortality . . . (PR 448 ; see 1 2 9, 355-6). and determinate in relation to every other entity.

These and similar passages might suggest to an unwary reader d. The satisfaction of an actual occasion is not a process of
that in the process of experiencing there is no pause for a final and change.
consummatory feeling to take place before the occasion "perishes." e. The satisfaction of an actual occasion exists objectively for
� �
From this poin t of view, the satis action would no ad� any a :
_
� all occasions that supersede that occasion .
soluten ess of achievemen t to the mternal process. . Satisfact10n
would be merely a n ame for the fact that experiencing terminates I shall explain these propositions and support them, and then
and objective immortality begins. This interpretation seems to examine their mutual compatibility. In this way we can get some
light on the individuality of an actual occasion as an act of ex­
b
arrree with Whitehead's well-known emphasis on "relativity,''
"flux," "process," and "becoming" (sMw io2, AI 355, MT 1 31 ) . perience.
I shall argue that, though some passages may suggest it, this a. Satisfaction as attainment. T he problem of th e process by
interpretation is a mistake. But first we should n otice the r: ason wh ich an actual occasion comes into being is to bring a unity of
why Whitehead's philosophy, so interpreted, would seem unmtel­ feeling out of many feelings. The process is unsatisfied as long as
ligible. If the structure of an actual occasion is teleological, and if its component feelings inhibit one another. The creative urge
the realization of its aim is wholly extrinsic to the occasion , then drives on the process until it is satisfied by the fulfillment of its
we have a case of there being always j am tomorrow, n ever j am to­ potentialities of harmony and in tensity. It has an aim at satisfac­
day. For suppose the satisfaction aimed at in the process A is tion. (See the "categoreal obligations" of subjective unity, sub­
realized only in the entities which succeed A, for example, B. Then jective harmony, and subj ective intensity, PR 3 9-41 .)
the satisfaction of A will be a factor in the process of B . But this In a sense therefore the satisfaction is present in the process from
latter process aims at the satisfaction of B, which would in turn its beginning, but only in the sense that it is the ideal at which the
be realized only in C. Thus it would be true not only that the process aims and by which the process is guided. "In its self­
satisfaction of A is not realized in A but also that there would be creation the actual entity is guided by its ideal of itself as individ­
no finite entity in which the satisfaction of A is completely realized. ual satisfaction and as transcenden t creator. The enjoyment of th is
It would follow that there is always becoming, but nothing be­ ideal is the 'subj ective aim,' by reason of which the actual entity
comes; there is creativity, but nothing is created; there are rela­ is a determinate process" ( PR 1 30; see 341-2 ) . The subj ective aim is
tions, but no gen uine terms; there is causation, but no cause and a feeling of what the process may achieve, namely the satisfaction
n o effect. T he point of this criticism is understandable. We must possible to it, together with "appetition " toward the realization of
discover whether it is justifiable. this relevant ideal. This envisagemen t of and tendency toward
 C O N C R E TE N E S S A N D U N ITY U N I'f Y A N D D E T E R M I N A T E N E S S
24

satisfaction gives unity to the many feelings in the concrescenc e. obj ective identity, stated as follows i n the categoreal scheme :
The satisfaction is not, however, merely a flying goal, pursued "Th ere can be no duplication of any element in the objective
but not achieved. The process actualizes its ideal. The notion of an dat um of the 'satisfaction' of an actual entity, so far as concerns
actual entity involves "an attainmen t which is a specific satisfac­ the function of that element in the 'satisfaction' " (PR 39). White­
tion" (PR i 29). The concrescence "reaches the goal" (PR 2 5 1 ) of head explains this as follows : "The same entity, be it actual entity
satisfaction. An occasion "enjoys its decisive moment of absolute or eternal object, cannot be felt twice in the formal constitution
self-attainment as emotional un ity" (AI 2 2 7). Whatever else the of one concresence . . . . Thus objective identity requires integra­
satisfaction of an occasion may be, it is clearly something not only tion of the many feelings of one object into the one feeling of that
aimed at but attained. It is indeed, in the earlier phases of a obj ect" (PR 347 ; see category of explanation xxvi, PR 3 8-9) . The
process of experience, an ideal. But it also becomes a fact. What process must produce finally a single feeling in which every object
sort of fact is the satisfaction? felt in earlier phases will have unambiguous status (PR 344-7) . In
the satisfaction each entity felt will be felt only "once."
b. The immediacy of the satisfaction. It is clear that the satis­ Again, it is possible to deduce this requirement from the cat­
faction is a feeling. The satisfaction is "the concrete un ity of feel­ egory of subj ective intensity: "The subj ective aim, whereby there
ing" obtained by the process of integration (PR 3 2 2 ) . It is "on e is origination of conceptual feeling, is at intensity of feeling (a) in
complex unity o f feeling" (PR 3 3 7) . It i s an experience which has the immediate subj ect, and (f3) in the relevant future" (PR 4 1 ) .
" intensity" (PR i 2 9), more specifically "quantitative emotional in­ We need be concern ed only with the aim at intensity of feeling in
tensity" (PR i 77). It is "subj ective" (PR 82) and "immediately felt" the immediate subj ect. Now a condition of intensity is that feelings
(PR 2 35) . In numerous other passages the satisfaction is clearly said should not inhibit but should mutually enhance one another.
to be a feeling (PR 3 8-9, 66, 7 1 , 434; AI 2 98) . Further, the satis­ Achievement of the max imum intensity possible to an act of experi­
faction has all the components into which a feeling can be ana­ ence therefore would require a single integrative feeling in the im­
lyzed, namely a datum, a subjective form, and a subj ect.1 It is mediate subject, in which all the component feelings would be ad­
distinguished from other (partial) feelings in that it unifies all the justed to one another in a pattern of contrasts.
component feelings that have arisen in earlier stages of the process. It seems clear therefore that whatever else the satisfaction of an
The actual occasion A is the su bject of the feeling which is the actual occasion may be, it is a feeling immediate to its subj ect. It
satisfaction of A. The satisfaction of A is a feeling immediate to A is an emotional experience of some positive intensity (PR i 77) and
and enjoyed by A. This conclusion is required by the categoreal is felt by its subj ect.
conditions or "obligations" set forth in the categoreal scheme.
c. Unity and determ inateness. The unity of the satisfaction has
For example, the category of subjective unity is in terpreted to
mean that every feeling "is an episode in self-production, and is been explained, incidentally, in the discussion of proposition 2 .
referent to its aim. This aim is a certain definite unity with its The satisfaction is a single complex feeling, unifying all the com­
compan ion feelings" (PR 342) . Now a unity of feelings requires a ponent prehensions in the concrescence. We shall return to this
single integrative feeling. And if the subjective aim of A is attained point in the discussion of proposition 4 below. Here it is enough
in A, then the concrescence must result in such a feeling. to show that this feeling is completely determinate in relation to
The same requiremen t can be deduced from the category of all entities other than its subj ect.
In the earlier phases of the process, the subj ect's relation to
1 . For analysis of a feeling see P R 35, 355-6; AI 2 27, 297. On the datum other entities in ambiguous. It includes more than one feeling of
of the satisfaction see PR 359, 434. On the subjective form of the satisfaction th� same object, in somewhat the way that on a dark night one
see PR 66, 2 33-4, 359, 434. On the subject of the satisfaction see PR 227 ,
might be undecided whether a shape dimly seen is man or animal,
234-5.
 C O N C R E T E N ESS A N D U N I TY SATIS F A C T I O N A N D P R O C ES S
friend or enemy. In this sense earlier stages of the process are "in­ faction. This element of subjective form would contribute to the
complete." In these phases the individuality of an occasion is only way Y is positively felt by the subject.
"nascent" (PR 2 30) . By a process of progressive integration, how­ All the objects prehended in the feeling of satisfaction are
ever, "completion is arrived at-at least, such 'formal' completion graded in "relevance." Most of them will be felt only vaguely ( PR
as is proper to a single actual entity" (PR 248. See 44, 3 2 2-3, 327, 66)-or perhaps it would be better to say only faintly-and each
3 7 3 ; AI 247; MT 1 2 3) . In the feeling of satisfaction this process of will be prehended only in a certain perspective. But each will be
progressive integration culminates and all indeterminations have prehended in some determinate way.
"evaporated" (PR 7 1 ). "All indeterminations respecting the po­ This determinateness of satisfaction is required by the cate­
tentialities of the universe are definitely solved so far as concerns goreal scheme. The categories of subj ective unity and obj ective
the satisfaction of the subj ect in question" (PR 2 34) . There is no identity require that the . occasion achieve a completely definite and
longer any ambiguity about the relation of the occasion to other consistent character. " 'Becoming' is the transformation of inco­
entities. The categoreal obligation of objective identity is satisfied. herence into coherence" (PR 3 8) . Those same categoreal obligations
The datum of the satisfaction is a complex unity of actual en­ taken together with the fourth category of explanation, namely the
tities, eternal obj ects, and propositions, felt with corresponding principle of relativity, require further that the satisfaction be com­
complex unity of subjective form (PR 434) . In this datum every pletely determinate in relation to all other entities. The principle
item in the universe is implicated (PR 38). The actual occasion now of relativity is "that every item in its universe is involved in each
has "a determinate attitude towards every element in the uni­ concrescence" (PR 33). The satisfaction must be determinate and
verse," and in this sense (and only in this sense, it should be added) self-consistent, and it must be related to every other entity. This is
"includes the universe" (PR 7 1-2) . The feeling of satisfaction has possible only if its relation to every other entity is determinate.
a determinate reference to every other entity in the universe of The satisfaction therefore establishes the actual occasion as a
its subj ect. completely definite and self-consistent whole, with definite and
Some of the items "implicated" in the obj ective datum of the unambiguous relations to every other entity in its universe. Noth­
satisfaction are prehended negatively. That is, some entities are ing can henceforth be added to the experience of the occasion.
not positively felt, but are excluded "from positive contribution " . . . the final 'satisfaction' of an actual entity is intolerant of any
to the subj ect's own real internal constitution" (PR 66). "Feelings," addition" (PR 7 1 ) . No further adjustments within the experience of
or positive prehensions, "contribute their 'subjective forms' and the occasion are necessary or possible. With the achievement of
their 'data' to the formation of novel integral prehensions; but the satisfaction, the individual character of the occasion has been
'negative prehensions' contribute only their 'subj ective forms' " finally determined.
(PR 3 9, category of explanation xxvii; see 3 5) . The items pre­ We now have to ask about the relation of this achievement to
hended negatively in the satisfaction are nevertheless implicated "flux" and "process."
in its objective datum. Thus a negative prehension of X would
have as its "datum" not-X, and this would add to the determinate­ d. Is the satisfaction a process? A number of striking remarks in
ness of those items that are positively prehended, as Y.While the Whitehead's writings might suggest that actuality and process are
"data" of negative prehensions may thus be said to be negatively correlated in a direct and simple way. For example :
implicated in the objective datum, the subjective forms of these Nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the
prehensions make a positive contribution to the subjective form of process (sMw 1 02 ) .
the satisfaction. A negative prehension would contribute "aversion . . . w e should start from the notion o f actuality a s i n its
from X" as an element in the complex subjective form of the satis- essence a process (AI 355).
 SA T I S F A C T I O N A N D PROCESS 29
C O N CR E T E N E S S A N D U N ITY
Any feeling, including the feeling of satisfaction, i s a process in
One main doctrine, developed in these lectures, is that 'exist­
ence' (in any of its senses) cannot be abstracted from 'process' " the s ense that it is an "act." In this very general sense, every con­
crete actuality-that is to say, every act of experience-is a proc­
(MT 1 3 1 ) . ess. In this sense there is nothing in the universe which is not a
But a closer examination shows important qualifications o n "the process except abstractions. I am not denying that the satisfaction
primacy of process." The following passage is a good example : is a process in sense b .
That 'all things flow' is the first vague generalization which Senses a and b o f "process" are presystematic uses o f the term.
the unsystematized, barely analyzed, intuition of men has In these uses Whitehead is not giving the term a special meaning
produced . . . . Without doubt . . . the flux of things is derived from his systematic categoreal scheme. He also uses the
one ultimate generalization around which we must weave word "process" more systematically to mean (c) growth or internal
our philosophical system. change, or (d) change of status in relation to other things. In
At this point we have transformed the phrase 'all things sense c process is the activity that takes place with in an actual
flow, ' into the alternative phrase, 'the flux of things.' In so entity, namely the concrescence of its prehensions through various
doing, the notion of the 'flux' has been held up before our phases of integration into the unity of satisfaction. In sense d
thoughts as one primary notion for further analysis. But in process is the transition between an actual occasion and its suc­
the sentence 'all things flow, ' there are three words-and cessor. In this transition the antecedent occasion "perishes" and
we have started by isolating the last word of the three. We the new occasion becomes ( PR 228-9, 320, 326-8).
move backward to the next word 'things' and ask, What sort In both these more systematic senses the immediate feeling of
of things flow? Finally we reach the first word 'all' and ask, satisfaction is not a process. The satisfaction does not undergo
What is the meaning of the 'many' things engaged in this internal change. It is not in "becoming." It is. It is a complete
common flux, and in what sense, if any, can the word 'all' feeling. Nor does the satisfaction as an immediate feeling undergo
refer to a definitely indicated set of these many things external adventures. As an immediate feeling, the satisfaction is
(PR 3 1 7)? not itself "in flux" in either of these specific senses.
This is not to deny that the satisfaction is invo lved in process.
These qualifications need careful attention. "Flux" i s not the On the contrary, it is the outcome of the internal process of be­
only "primary notion." Whitehead's insistence on the importance coming, and it leads to the transition to the future. Thus the satis­
of process does not mean that it is all-important. faction as an immediate feeling stands between two kinds of
First we ought to distinguish different meanings of "process." process and is internally related to both. Yet it is not itself a proc­
Often it means (a) the temporal world, or the temporal passage ess of either kind.
which characterizes the actual world, or the world of finite pass­ It seems that the satisfaction represents a pause in the midst
ing things. "The actual world is a process" ( PR 33; see SMW 1 02, of the flux. The pause is not empty; it is occupied by a single com­
MT i 3 1) . Here Whitehead is simply "taking time seriously." If plete feeling. It is the "halt for attainment" (MT i 39). " . . . the
anything is in the actual world, then it is involved in a process attainment of a peculiar definiteness is the final cause which ani­
of change, but this does not imply that all actual things change mates a particular process; and its attainment halts its process . . . "
in all respects. I am not denying that the satisfaction of an actual (PR 340). It is true that Whitehead also says, "There is no halt in
occasion is "in process" in this sense. The feeling of satisfaction which the actuality is just its static self . . . " (AI 354) . The clue to
is certainly in process in the sense that it occurs in the temporal resolving this contradiction lies in the word "static." The latter
world. passage asserts that the occasion is a process in sense b. It is an
Elsewhere it means (b) activity or "life" (sMw 247, MT passim) .
 C O N C R E T E N ESS A N D U N ITY
S AT IS F A C T I O N A N D P R O C ESS 31

activity of feeling. The former passage denies that the feeling of

phase in the process of concrescence" ( PR 3 8 ; see 227-8, 323). But
satisfaction is a process in sense c. "In the conception of the actual
strictly speaking "the process itself lies in the two former phases,"
entity in its phase of satisfaction, the entity has attained its indi­
" the responsive phase" and "the supplemental stage," which are
vidual separation from other things; it has absorbed the datum, distinguished from the satisfaction ( PR 323). With the attainment
and it has not yet lost itself in the swing back to the 'decision'
of the satisfaction, the creative urge which has driven the process
whereby its appetition becomes an element in the data of other of concrescence from phase to phase is "exhausted" or "con­
entities superseding it" (PR 2 33). This pause is not an instantane­ tented," so that the internal process terminates ( PR 335, AI 248).
ous "moment," in the language of the earlier writings. It has tem­ No phase of internal change succeeds the feeling of satisfaction.
poral thickness, or duration. It is the final outcome of the concrescence.
Indeed the satisfaction contains, one might say, the whole of This does not mean that it can be understood apart from the
the temporal duration of the occasion. For the genetic process process of concrescence. In its complex subj ective form the satis­
that produces the satisfaction is not itself in physical time. If we faction embodies the history of its own becoming. The genesis and
think of "taking time" as a matter of filling up the gaps between internal history of the concrescence have left their mark upon the
the earlier and later physical boundaries of occasions, then it is final feeling (PR 354). The satisfaction, like any feeling, "bears
the satisfaction that "takes time." It is by producing their satis­ on itself the scars of its birth" ( PR 346). It is thus, but only thus,
factions that actual occasions produce the temporally extended that the internal process of concrescence is involved in the im­
world.2 mediate satisfaction. The way in which internal process or change
The feeling of satisfaction becomes and perishes. But it is not exists in the immediate satisfaction is as completed change. The
a becoming or a perishing. The satisfaction is what becomes and feeling of satisfaction involves no internal process within itself.
perishes. Though it does not exist except in the context of proc­ It is the final act of "decision."
esses of becoming and perishing, it is not itself such a process. Now let us look more closely at the relation of the satisfaction
In an important sense it is not process but reality . It is by virtue to the process of transition. The satisfaction is not the transition,
of this feeling of satisfaction, aimed at and attained, that any but it includes within itself "anticipation" of this process. The
actual occasion is a real individual, a genuine term in the universal satisfaction exists before the transition takes place. The transi­
scheme of relatedness. "Thus Concrescence is useful to convey the tion is from the occasion as internally complete by virtue of its
notion of many things acquiring complete complex unity. But it feeling of satisfaction to succeeding acts of experience.
fails to suggest the creative novelty involved. For example, it omits The crucial question here is about the meaning of "anticipa­
the notion of the individual character arising in the concrescence tion." According to the eighth categoreal obligation, "The sub­
of the aboriginal data" (AI 303). jective aim . . . is at intensity of feeling (a) in the immediate
Let us look more closely at the relation of the satisfaction to subject, and (f3) in the relevant future" (PR 4 1 ). Therefore, "one
the process of concrescence. The satisfaction of an actual occasion element in the immediate feelings of the concrescent subject is
is related to the process of concrescence as the "outcome" (sMw comprised of the anticipatory feelings of the transcendent future
247) of this process. It is that state of complete coherence of feel­ in its relation to immediate fact" ( PR 424-5) . These anticipatory
ing in which the "becoming" of the actual occasion terminates feelings express the urge to the future embodied in every actuality.
(PR 7 1). Sometimes Whitehead calls the satisfaction itself "the final
It i s true that the satisfaction i s often described as "the final phase of anticipation" (AI 248) . But this is misleading if it suggests
2. On the epochal theory of time, see CN, ch . 3; TIME; sMw 176-80; PR that the satisfaction is merely a feeling of anticipation. Anticipa­
1 05-8, 433-8; and Ch . 4 of this study. tory feeling is only one element in the com p lex feelin g of sati�-
 C O N CR E TE N E S S A N D U N I TY AND PROCESS 33
SAT IS F A C T I O N

faction. It is the forward edge of the feeling of satisfaction. This Now let u s return t o our question about the meaning o f "antici­
would be the most relevant aspect of the satisfaction in a dis­
pation" in relation to satisfaction. An actual occasion embodies
cussion of the relation of future to present, such as the context
an urge to the future, a "principle of unrest" in the words of S.
in which the above phrase occurs . Alexander (PR 42-3) . In earlier phases of the occasion this prin­
A similar ambiguity appears when he seems to distinguish be­ cipl e of unrest is embodied as appetition toward completion . of
tween satisfaction and decision, as two "stages" in an actual oc­ the internal process. In the satisfaction this principle is embodied
casion. "The final stage, the 'decision,' is how the actual entity, as anticipatory feeling of the transcendent future.
having attained its individual 'satisfaction,' thereby adds a deter­ We must note particularly that anticipatory feeling takes place
minate condition to the settlement for the future beyond itself" in the immediacy of the present subj ect, before its supersession
(PR 2 2 7 ; see 2 3 3) . For if the decision is both immediate to the by other actual occasions. Anticipatory feelings are "one element
occasion and yet in some sense "after" the satisfaction, then the in the immediate feelings of the concrescent subject" (PR 424-5 ;
satisfaction cannot be the final phase of the occasion. It is better see 4 1 , TIME 6 1 ) . The feeling of satisfaction, including its com­
to look at decision as a feature of the satisfaction than as a phase ponent anticipatory feelings, therefore takes place before the pres­
succeeding the satisfaction. This would be more in accord with ent actual occasion is superseded. Anticipatory feeling is not a
the treatment of decision elsewhere in Process and Reality. feeling in the future. It is a present feeling of the future. More
"Decision" is used in its root sense to mean a "cutting off" of exactly it is "a propositional realization of the essence of the pres­
alternatives. This is "the very meaning of actuality" (PR 68), for ent su bject, in respect to the necessities which it lays upon the
the existence of an actuality means that some "pure" possibilities future to embody it and to re-enact it so far as compatibility may
are excluded. "Immanent decision" is " the process of acquisition permit" (AI 248, my italics; see MT 2 2 8) . It is a feeling that this
of subj ective form and the integration of feelings" (PR 249) . More present actuality is as real as anything can be and must therefore
specifically it is the occasion's creative determination of the sub­ be taken account of by any future actuality.
j ective forms of its prehensions, including its "adversions" and The fact that the satisfaction includes anticipation of the future
"aversions" (PR 388, 399) . This process both shapes and is shaped is entirely consistent with the "internal completion" of an actual
by its subj ective aim functioning as final cause (PR 68-9, 343, occasion. Of course in one sense no occasion is ever complete. For
4 2 3) . "Transcendent decision" refers to those decisions beyond the process of nature is never complete. But this is not what is
the immediate occasion which have determined its data and thus meant by "formal" or " internal" completion (PR 248, 3 7 3 ; AI
govern the transition from the past to the present as its efficient 247). The distinction is between "macroscopic" and "microscopic"
cause ( PR 75, 97, 248-9, 423). completion (TIME 6 1 , PR 3 2 6-7, MT 60) .
Now the satisfaction is the culmination of the concrescence It is true that if anticipatory feelings were feelings of an actual
and thus the completion of the process of immanent decision. I future, a difficulty would arise. If A anticipated B as an individual
suggest that the following sentences from categoreal obligation occasion, then the internal completion of A would not be a fact
ix properly apply to the feeling of satisfaction : "This final deci­ until B's process of actualization were complete. In the same way
sion is the reaction of the unity of the whole to its own internal B would not be complete until C had become complete, and so
determination. This reaction is the final modification of emo­ on. The result would be that in the process of nature no actual
tion, appreciation, and purpose" ( PR 4 1-2) . And I suggest that occasion would achieve internal completion. The process of actual­
the "final stage" of decision referred to above (PR 2 2 7) is really ization of A would require a series of feelings, all internal to A,
the final valuation expressed in the subjective form of the feel­ extending indefinitely into the future. The satisfaction of A would
ing of satisfaction. then indeed be in transition. But anticipation is not feeling of an
34 C O N CR E TE N E S S A N D U N ITY SA T IS F A C T I O N A N D P R O C E S S 35
actual future. Future occasions function in the feeling only prop­ I t i s in this context that the saying "Actual entities perish, but
ositionally or hypothetically. Since they do not now actually exist do not change" (PR 52) can best be understood (PR 92, i 22; AI
they cannot be physically felt. 262) . The anticipation inherent in the present actuality involves
Indeed, the very nature of anticipatory feeling yields a reason a categoreal demand for change. The change thus demanded can­
why the satisfaction is not a process of transition. A necessary not be internal change in the present actuality. It can only be
condition of there being a future beyond the present subject is the cessation of the present act of experience, as a condition for
the perishing of the present subj ect. If what is anticipated is to its s upersession by other acts of experience.
be actualized, the present occasion including its satisfaction must The outcome of the preceding argument is as follows. The
cease to exist as an immediate experience ( PR 44, 94; AI 227, satisfaction of an actual occasion is not a process of change, al­
304-5). Anticipatory feelings require the perishing of their sub­ though it is related essentially both to internal process and to
j ects. " . . . the fact that each individual occasion is transcended transition. It is related to the process of concrescence as the out­
by the creative urge, belongs to the essential constitution of each come of that process. It is related to the process of transition by
such occasion. It is not an accident which is irrelevant to the com­ including an anticipation of that process. Once attained, the
pleted constitution of any such occasion" (AI 249; see PR 327) . It satisfaction undergoes no further change in itself. "The occasion
is in this sense that "supersession" by other occasions is part of arises from relevant objects, and perishes into the status of an ob­
the "real essence" (in Locke's sense) of a concrete entity (TIME ject for other occasions. But it enj oys its decisive moment of abso­
59). 3 lute self-attainment as emotional unity" (AI 227).
Anticipatory feelings therefore do not compromise the internal If this argument is valid, then we have gone far toward showing
completion of the satisfaction and are not evidence against the an important sense in which an actual occasion is a real or "sub­
proposition we are discussing. These feelings do not require fur­ stantial" individual thing. Whitehead clearly denies that an actual
ther internal change in the subj ect. Precisely the opposite is true. occasion is an "enduring substance," in the sense of an "unchang­
They prohibit further change in the present subject, because they ing subject of change" (PR 43). It would be true to say, however,
require the perishing of the present subj ect. This requirement that an actual occasion is an "unchanging subj ect." In the feeling
means that the satisfaction of satisfaction, an actual occasion has become an experiencing
subject which for a real duration, however brief, is unchanging .
. . . cannot be construed as a component contributing to In Essays on Tru th and Reality (Oxford, Oxford University
its own concrescence (PR i 29). Press, i 9 1 4), F. H. Bradley remarks, "As to the duration of a self,
N o actual entity can b e conscious o f its own satisfaction; for that in principle need be no more than momentary. If we keep
such knowledge would be a component in the process, and to ordinary usage a different reply would have perhaps to be
would thereby alter the satisfaction (PR i 30) . given, but the usage, so far as I can judge, does not rest on any
principle" (p. 4 1 6). If we leave out of consideration any other
. . . the final 'satisfaction' of an actual entity is intolerant requirements for selfhood than that of real duration as a com­
of any addition . . . (PR 7 1). plete subj ect, then Whitehead, if we have understood him rightly,
asserts of an actual occasion what Bradley requires for a "self. "
3 · In TIME, but not elsewhere, "supersession" i s used t o refer t o the suc­
cession of phases within a concrescence, as well as to the transition from one
To put the matter a different way, it is clear that in the actual
occasion to another. In PR, though it is not a strictly systematic term, "super­ world on Whitehead's terms "no subject experiences twice" ( PR
sede" usually refers to the process of transition (PR 68, 72, 9 1 , 1 29, 233, 327). 43). This amounts to a denial of the "traditional" doctrine of sub-
 C O N CR E TE N E S S A N D U N ITY SA TISF A C T I O N A N D O B J E C T I F I C A T I O N 37
stance. To determine whether there is left any sense in which an ent ity is that entity formaliter" (PR 8 1 ) . Obj ective existence i s not
actual occasion is a real or "substantial" individual, we must ask the experience enjoyed by an actual occasion. It is not the way
the further question, Does the complete subj ect experience even the occasion exists for itself. It is the way the occasion exists for
once? If proposition d has been adequately explained and sup­ other occasions.
ported, the answer is affirmative. Indeed, an actual occasion cannot exist as objectively immortal
until it has ceased to exist for itself. That which is obj ectively
e. Satisfaction and o bjectification. It is not the purpose of this existent is "divested of its own living immediacy" (PR ix) . "The
section to give a full discussion of "obj ectification." Later we shall immediacy of existence is then past and over" (MT 1 3 1 ) . The
have to examine that notion more closely. At this point we need attainment of objective immortality means " the ' perishing' of
only indicate how the satisfaction of an occasion exists for the absoluteness" (PR 94) . When an actual occasion exists objectively,
occasions which supersede it. it is no longer an experiencing thing. "Its own process, which is
We have noticed that the subj ective aim of an occasion is at its own internal existence, has evaporated, worn out and satisfied"
intensity in the relevant future as well as in the immediate sub­ (PR 336). It is now "dead" (PR ix) ; it exists as "dry bones" which
ject (PR 4 1 ) . The occasion "wants" to be something for future future ways of feelings will reclothe with the flesh of "a real be­
actualities and thus to transcend itself. This is in accord with the ing" (PR 1 3 1 ) .
principle of relativity, namely that "it belongs to the nature of a I t follows that when an occasion exists objectively i t i s n o longer
' being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming' " (PR 33). To actual, in the strict sense of "actuality." For "actuality" is strictly
be is to be effective (AI 1 65). It belongs to the nature of an actual correlated with "immediacy" of feeling.
occasion that it should be effective beyond itself. The way this
role is assumed is obj ectification. The actuality is the enjoyment, and this enjoyment is the
"Obj ective immortality" is the term for the way an occasion experiencing of value (RM 1 00) .
exists after it has perished (PR 44, 94) . N ow it is the satisfaction 'Feeling' i s used a s a synonym for 'actuality' (RM 1 04) .
which "embodies what the actual entity is beyond itself" (PR 3 35).
An entity is actual, when it has significance for itself. By this
Hence we may confine ourselves to asking in what way the satis­
it is meant that an actual entity functions in respect to its
faction is "obj ective" and in what way it is "immortal."
own determination. . . . this self-functioning is the real in­
Whitehead's use of "objective" seems to have been taken from
ternal constitution of an actual entity. It is the ' immediacy'
Descartes : "Hence the idea of the sun will be the sun itself exist­
of the actual entity (PR 3 8) .
ing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky, but
obj ectively, i.e., in the way in which objects are wont to exist in Thus when the satisfaction o f an occasion exists obj ectively it
the mind; and this mode of being is truly much less perfect than no longer exists as an immediate feeling. That is to say it is no
that in which things exist outside the mind, but it is not on that longer actual.
account mere nothing, as I have already said" (as quoted in SMW " Potentiality," not "actuality," is the term for the mode of exist­
1 04 n. and PR 1 1 8 from Descartes's Rep ly to O bjections I, tr. Hal­ ence denoted by "objective immortality." "The word 'obj ect' thus
dane and Ross, 2 , 1 0) . Whitehead says of this passage that it "prac­ means an entity which is a potentiality for being a component in
tically . . . expresses the doctrine of obj ectification here put for­ feeling" (PR 1 36) . This is why Whitehead speaks of the "prag­
ward" (PR 1 1 8) . The point to be noted is the contrast between matic" value of the satisfaction existing objectively ( PR 1 2 6, 1 34-5,
"objective" and "formal" existence. "I will adopt the pre-Kantian 3 36) . The satisfaction is now "an instrument for purposes" (AI
phraseology, and say that the experience enj oyed by an actual 270), namely the purposes of those occasions which supersede it.
 C ON C R E T E N E S S A N D U N I T Y I S T H E T H E OR Y SELF-CONSISTENT? 39
It exists a s material for use b y future acts o f experience. I n the namely the notion of the satisfaction of an occasion. The follow­
obj ective existence of an actual entity, "the esse of its satisfaction ing propositions have been explained and supported as an inter­
is sentiri" (PR 336). pretation of that notion.
For this reason the obj ectified satisfaction is "divisible." It is
a. The satisfaction of an actual occasion is both aimed at and
a datum for analysis and abstraction. Formerly, as an immediate
attained in the experience of that occasion.
feeling, it was a complete unity of internal relations, an indivisible
unity. Now some of its component feelings can be taken apart from b. The satisfaction of an actual occasion is a feeling immediate
the others. And this is what happens when other actual occasions to that occasion.
prehend it. They prehend only some of its feelings, abstracting
c. The satisfaction of an actual occasion is completely unified
them from the full unity of its satisfaction. Objectification in­
and determinate in relation to every other entity.
volves abstraction ( PR 345-7, 359, 3 6 1 ) .
The satisfaction o f an actual occasion, when i t has lost its im­ d. The satisfaction of an actual occasion is not a process of
mediacy, is not only obj ective but also immortal. The satisfied change.
occasion persists and retains its identity as an object throughout
its adventures in the future. The satisfaction is "fully determinate e. The satisfaction of an actual occasion exists obj ectively for
. . . as to its obj ective character for the transcendent creativity" all occasions that supersede that occasion .
(PR 38). "No entity-be it 'universal' or 'particular'-can play dis­ Now we must ask about the compatibility of these propositions.
joined roles. Self-identity requires that every entity have one con­ Two questions call for discussion. (i) The close connection be­
joined, self-consistent function, whatever be the complexity of that tween process and feeling prompts the question whether proposi­
function" (PR 89). An actual occasion A does not mean precisely tion b and proposition d are compatible. For it would seem that
the same thing for each occasion which prehends it. On the con­ all feelings are processes of change. (ii) The fact that subjective
trary, A will be prehended differently by each occasion according immediacy and obj ective immortality are mutually exclusive pred­
to its perspective standpoint. In each case, however, what will be icates leads to the question whether propositions b and e are com­
prehended will be A, under those varying limitations. patible. Otherwise the consistency of this theory of the satisfaction
The satisfaction in its obj ective existence is thus a "givenness" is fairly clear.
to which the future must conform in one way or another. It is a
"real potential" not a "pure potential." Pure potentiality is the i. Let us test the compatibility of b and d by, stating a diffi­
mode of existence of eternal obj ects. These are universals which culty. It seems that all immediate feelings are processes. For "im­
have no particular local habitation. They tell no tales about their mediacy" is defined as "self-functioning," and self-functioning
"ingression" into actuality. Real potentiality is the mode of exist­ seems to mean some kind of change within the subj ect. Thus it
ence of actual entities when they are objectively immortal. Such seems that if the satisfaction is a feeling immediate to its subj ect,
an entity has a local habitation, and in all its roles it is that actual then it must be a process of change within its subject. If the satis­
entity objectified. faction is not a process of change, it seems to lack the immediacy
of a living feeling. This difficulty is due not merely to faulty
reading of what Whitehead says but also to the fact that many
4. Is the theory self-consistent? of his statements are mystifying or misleading. But I shall argue
As a step toward finding out how an actual occasion is a real that it arises from a misinterpretation of his intention.
individual we are examining a crucial part of Whitehead's theory, We should begin with categories of explanation xx-xxiii :
 C O N C R E TE N E S S A N D U N I TY IS THE THEORY SELF-CONSISTENT? 41

But h ow is this possible if the satisfaction is a fully integrated

(xx) That to 'function' means to contribute determina­
tion to the actual entities in the nexus of some actual fee ling? For it would seem that in such a feeling the subject
world. . . . must be present in a single unambiguous sense. Self-diversity
(xxi) An entity is actual, when it has significance for itself. would seem to be a function only of earlier phases of the con­
crescence . Since the satisfaction actualizes the ideal and completes
By this it is meant that an actual entity functions in respect
the concrescence it would seem to eliminate self-diversity. It
to its own determination. Thus an actual entity combines
would thus escape the categoreal demand for further internal proc­
self-identity with self-diversity.
ess. But as a further consequence, it seems, it would fail to qualify
(xxii) That an actual entity by functioning in respect to
itself plays diverse roles in self-formation without losing as an immediate feeling. Insofar as it is not "in becoming," it
seems, it is not immediate.
its self-identity. It is self-creative; and in its process of crea­
Some escape from this paradoxical conclusion, which requires
tion transforms its diversity of roles into one coherent role.
us to say that the satisfaction is actual but not immediate, must be
Thus 'becoming' is the transformation of incoherence into
sought. One might say that the satisfaction of a given occasion
coherence, and in each particular instance ceases with this
exists as a "feeling" for those actual occasions which supersede
attainment.
it, in the sense that it is given for them as a feeling, even though
(xxiii) That this self-functioning is the real internal con­
it does not exist as a feeling in the immediacy of its subject. The
stitution of an actual entity. It is the 'immediacy' of the
satisfaction would then be a limiting case of immediacy. It would
actual entity. An actual entity is called the 'subj ect' of its
function only as an ideal in the experience of its subj ect. It would
own immediacy (PR 3 8) .
be a fact only in the experiences of other subjects. This is to re­
First note the definition o f "immediacy." The immediacy of an gard the satisfaction as a feeling only in a Pickwickian sense.
actual entity is its "self-functioning. " And self-functioning means There is another possibility. The satisfaction may be a limiting
that the entity "contributes determination" to itself, "has signifi­ case of immediacy in the sense that it falls within the series of
cance for itself," or "functions in respect to its own determina­ phases of its subj ect's experience as the last member in that series.
tion." Self-functioning involves "self-diversity," so that the actual This would be possible if in this last phase the self-diversity of the
entity "plays diverse roles in self-formation." subject functions in another way than in the earlier phases. This
We can understand how this would apply to a "partial" feeling, can be shown.
in those phases of the concrescence before the satisfaction. In any The satisfaction is not a simple feeling. On the contrary, it
_
such feeling the occasion plays diverse roles. The subj ect functions synthesizes all the component feelings of the concrescence. It
as actual and also as potential. It exists actually as an incomplete has a complex objective datum and a complex subjective form. Its
subj ect; it exists potentially as a complete subject. The complete ? bjective datum is a synthesis of the data of the component feel­
subj ect functions, in the earlier phases of the concrescence, as the mgs, while its subj ective form is a synthesis of the subj ective forms
ideal toward which the subj ective aim tends. In this sense, in a of the component feelings. Thus all the diverse roles which the
"partial" feeling, the entity "has significance for itself" and "com­ subject has had throughout the concrescence, as the subject of
bines self-identity with self-diversity." It is this diversity of ideal �
eac of the component feelings, are retained within the final syn­
and actuality which in the earlier phases makes internal process thesis. They are now in coherence with one another but the
necessary. The actual must undergo change to become the ideal. �
identity of each of the roles has been retained. Accordi g to cate­
If the satisfaction is a feeling immediate to its subj ect, it seems gory of explanation xxvi, "Each element in the genetic process
that the subj ect must play diverse roles in its satisfaction also. of an actual entity has one self-consistent function, however com-
42 C O N CRETE N E S S A N D U N ITY I S TH E THEORY S E L F - C O N SISTENT ? 43

plex, in the final satisfaction" ( PR 3 8-9 ) . In this sense self-diversity entity as described by the morphology of its satisfaction is
of the subj ect is present in the satisfaction, which thus qualifies the actual entity 'spatialized,' to use Bergson's term . . . . Its
as an instance of immediacy. The entity in its satisfaction has sig­ own process, which is its own internal existence, has evap­
nificance for itself; it functions in respect to its own determination. orated, worn out and satisfied; but its effects are all to be
The feeling of satisfaction is its final act of self-determination. described in terms of its 'satisfaction' (PR 335-6) .
In the earlier phases there is disparity between the subject as
Since these passages seem t o identify the satisfaction with the ob­
actually incomplete and the subject as ideally complete. This dis­
jective existence of the entity, and since what is only an object
parity spurs on the process of integration. But the self-diversity
cannot have subj ective immediacy, these passages seem to con­
of the subj ect in its final phase is a diversity within a realized unity.
tradict proposition b above.
In this phase, and only in this phase, self-diversity does not in­
volve a categoreal demand for further internal process of becom­ My conclusion about these passages is that Whitehead has cre­
ated a difficulty for his readers by failing to express his theory with
ing. This is to say that propositions b and d assert, that the satis­
sufficient care. For elsewhere it is generally very clear that the
faction of an occasion is a feeling immediate to that occasion and
that it is not a process of change. satisfaction is a subj ectively immediate feeling. It is true that
some qualifications mitigate the misleading impression. For in­
ii. N ow consider proposition b, which asserts that the satisfac­ stance according to the second passage the satisfaction is a "term­
tion is an immediate feeling, and proposition e, which asserts inal unity of operation" (my italics) . But the impression remains.
that it exists as an object. They seem to present a contradiction. Especially in the earlier passage there are sentences which flatly
For an actual entity which has obj ective immortality is "divested contradict what is said elsewhere about the satisfaction.
of its own living immediacy" (PR ix; see 94, AI 305, MT i 3 1) . How To see how both subjective immediacy and obj ective immortal­
then is it possible to say that the satisfaction is both subjectively ity might be predicated of the satisfaction without contradiction,
immediate and objectively immortal? let us look at some other ways of denoting these two modes of exist­
Before going further we should notice some passages where ence. One way is in terms of "privacy" and "publicity." As part
Whitehead seems to say that the satisfaction belongs only to the of the immediate experience of its subject, the satisfaction is a
obj ective existence of an occasion. For example : fact private to its subj ect. "Thus the satisfaction is the attain­
ment of the private ideal which is the final cause of the con­
The notion of 'satisfaction' is the notion of 'the entity as crescence . . . [It is] a unity of aesthetic appreciation immediately
concrete' abstracted from the 'process of concrescence'; it is
felt as private" (PR 3 2 3) . As an obj ect for analysis and abstraction,
the outcome separated from the process, thereby losing the the satisfaction is a public fact (PR 2 2 9, 443) .
actuality of the atomic entity, which is both process and out­ This distinction between privacy and publicity refers to diverse
come . . . the 'satisfaction' is the 'superject' rather than the
standpoints. From the standpoint of the subj ect, that is for the
'substance' or the 'subj ect.' . . . The 'formal' reality of the
subject, the satisfaction is an immediate experience. As such it is
actuality in question belongs to its process of concrescence a private fact. In its own immediacy of feeling the satisfaction is
and not to its 'satisfaction' ( PR i 2 9) .
accessible to no other occasion than its subj ect. (This will be dis­
This terminal unity o f operation, here called the 'satisfac­ cussed in detail in Chapter 3 .) From the standpoint of any occasion
tion,' embodies what the actual entity is beyond itself . . . . other than the subj ect, the satisfaction exists as a public fact, an
It is the actual entity as a definite, determinate, settled fact, object. It is still the satisfaction of that subj ect, but it has lost its
stubborn and with unavoidable consequences. The actual own immediacy of feeling.
44 C O N C R E TE N E S S A N D U N IT Y JS THE THEORY S E L F - C O N S ISTENT? 45
These standpoints cannot, so t o speak, overlap. The satisfaction
preh ension, and the event as in the prehension of other events"
, . .
of A is an ideal for A, and it is enjoyed by A. But it cannot be a
given fact for A. This underlies Whitehead's saying that "No _
� � � :
(sM W i 46) . It is clear that in the co text ".eve t , s eqm a1 ent t o
"actual occasion." An occasion m its subj ective immediacy as a
actual entity can be conscious of its own satisfaction; for such
� ?
private fact has intrinsic reality. It is s mething f r .itself . .In its
_
knowledge would be a component in the process, and would there­
(
by alter the satisfaction" PR i 3o) . The satisfaction of an occasion
�
obj ective immortality as a pubhc fact it has ex rmsic reality. It
_
is something for other actual occasions. I am argumg that the satis­
can be pointed to or discussed only from the standpoints of other
faction belongs both to the intrinsic reality and to the extrinsic
occasions.
reality of the occasion.
The analysis of an actual entity is only intellectual, or to Still another way of expressing the two modes of existence is in
(
speak with a wider scope, only obj ective PR 347) . terms of "subject" and "superj ect." For example :
. . . the 'satisfaction' of an entity can only be discussed in An actual entity is to be conceived both as a subject presid­
(
terms of the usefulness of that entity PR i 3o) . ing over its own immediacy of becoming, and a superj ect
which is the atomic creature exercising its function of ob­
When we consider the process under examination as com­
pleted, we are already analysing an active datum for other
(
jective immortality PR 7 1 ) .
(
creations MT i 2 3 ) . An actual entity considered in reference to the publicity of
These and similar passages do not deny that the satisfaction exists things is a 'superject' ; namely, it arises from the publicity
for its subj ect as an immediate feeling. They do assert that it can­ which it finds, and it adds itself to the publicity which it
not be an object for its own subject. It can be an obj ect only for transmits. . . . An actual entity considered in reference to
an occasion with some other standpoint. the privacy of things is a 'subj ect' ; namely, it is a moment
Viewed in this light, the assertion that the satisfaction of an (
of the genesis of self-enjoyment PR 443) .
occasion is a private fact, and the assertion that it is a public fact, Thus when the satisfaction is spoken of as "subj ective" PR 8 2 , (
are not incompatible. The statement that "there is no element i 35, 244), it i s meant that the satisfaction i s a n immediate experi­
(
in the universe capable of pure privacy" PR 324) means there ence private to the occasion. When the satisfaction is spoken of
is no actual entity whose experience does not become a public (
as the "superj ect" PR i 2 9), it is meant that the satisfaction is a
fact, as well as being a fact for itself. It asserts that every actual public fact expressing the obj ective immortality of the occasion
entity gets to be objectified for other actual entities. "The crea­ in the future beyond itself. The statement that "the 'satisfaction'
tive process is rhythmic : it swings from the publicity of many
things to the individual privacy; and it swings back from the pri­
is the 'superject' rather than the 'substance' or the 'subject' " PR (
1 2 9) is misleading because it suggests that the satisfaction is to be
vate individual to the publicity of the obj ectified individual. The identified exclusively with the obj ective existence of the occasion.
former swing is dominated by the final cause, which is the ideal; Propositions b and e are not incompatible if they refer to differ­
and the latter swing is dominated by the efficient cause which is ent modes of existence of the satisfaction, and we have noticed
(
actual" PR 2 2 9 ) . various ways in which Whitehead expresses this duality. It is in­
Another way Whitehead denotes these two modes o f existence telligible to attribute these two modes of existence to one and the
is in terms of "intrinsic reality" and "extrinsic reality," as found
same entity because of two complementary considerations.
in the following single passage : "There is thus an intrinsic and On the one hand the occasion aims at intensity of experience
an extrinsic reality of an event, namely, the event as in its own
in other actual entities as well as in itself. But it cannot contribute
 47
C O N CRETE N E S S A N D U N ITY co N C LU S I O N
fully concre te. In the
t o the experiences o f other entities without ceasing to exist i n its tem al change, it would not be compl ete or
"Indiv idualit y" in
own subj ective immediacy. Hence attainment of its satisfaction re­ following passage, taken from a section titled
the
quires the perishing of immediacy and passage into obj ective exist­ A dventures of Ideas, White head is in effect pointi ng out how
ence. The subj ective immediacy of an occasion calls for its ob­ s atisfaction is the basis for real indivi dualit y.
j ective immortality. The individ ual immed iacy of an occasio n is the final unity
On the other hand, whatever the varied roles of the occasion of subject ive form, which is the occasio n as an absolut e reality.
as an obj ect, there is a self-identity among them all. Wherever the This immed iacy is its momen t of sheer individ uality, bounde d
occasion functions as an object, it functions as that particular on either side by essentia l relativi ty. The occasio n arises from
actual occasion which came into being as an immediate subj ect relevant obj ects, and perishe s into the status of an obj ect for
and achieved its satisfaction then and there. Thus the obj ective other occasion s. But it enj oys its decisive momen t of absolut e
existence of an actual occasion points to its previous existence as self-a ttainme nt as emotion al unity. As used here the words
an immediate experience. The objective immortality of an actual 'individ ual' and 'atom' have the same meaning, that they
occasion is "the superj ect of its experiences" (PR 43, my italics) . apply to composi te things with an absolute reality which their
In these ways the two modes of existence require each other. components lack. These words properly apply to an actual
The self-functioning of the occasion, in its satisfaction as well entity in its immediacy of self-attai nment when it stands out
as in its earlier phases, has an essential reference beyond its own as for itself alone, with its own affective self-enjoyment. The
immediacy to its objective functioning. On the other hand its term 'monad' also expresse s this essential unity at the decisive
obj ective functioning has an essential reference to its self-func­ momen t, which stands between its birth and its perishin g
tioning, including its achievement of a subj ectively immediate (AI 2 2 7) .
satisfaction. An actual occasion is "something individual for its own sake." We
It thus appears that propositions b and e are not incompatible.
now turn to the question of how an occasion, by virtue of its ab­
The satisfaction of an actual occasion is an immediate feeling soluteness of realization, transcends other actual occasions.
which, when it perishes, exists as an obj ect for occasions which
succeed it.

5. Conclusion : Process and reality

Our topic has been the individuality of an actual occasion as
an act of experience. An occasion is more than a collection of
abstract characters. It is a concrete thing in the only sense in
which, in the philosophy of organism, anything is concrete, namely
as an experiencing thing. It is actual, not abstract, because it is
an act of experience. Again, an occasion is more than a mere flux
of experiencing within spatiotemporal limitations, since it has a
structure and an individual absoluteness of character we have
attempted to understand in terms of its satisfaction.
In its feeling of satisfaction the occasion has become a complete
and fully concrete thing. If an occasion were only a process of in-
 THE N OVELTY O F A N ACTUAL OCCAS I O N 49

This means that no two occasions are identical in their "real in­
ternal constitutions." They are not merely numerically diverse;
C HAPTER 3 each is different from ,all others in the structure and quality of its
immediate experience. In each occasion there is a "novel deter­
minateness of feeling" (PR 72), a "novel immediacy" (PR 207) . In
N ovel ty and Exclusiveness th is respect an occasion transcends all others. Of course different
occas ions may have specific characters in common. But an occasion
is not a mere aggregate of characters. As we have seen, it is a crea­
A G E N U I N E PLURALI S M requires a theory of real individuality. tive synthesis that fuses its data and subjective forms into a deter­
Now a real individual is a complete and fully concrete thing that minate unity of experience. The real internal constitutions of
differs from all other such things. It is this concrete and complete occas ions differ in respect to (a) their data, (b) their subjective
thing, not that. A real jndividual is a particular thing, and is thus forms, (c) their subjective aims, and consequently (d) their satis­
.
socially transcendent /In this chapter we ask how an actual oc­ ;faca.tions
No two actual occasions have the same set of data for feeling.
casion a\ an act of experience transcends the experiences of other This is clear from the fifth category of explanation: "That no two
occasions \ In the next chapter we consider the spatiotemporal ac tual entities originate from an identical universe; though the
character of actual occasions and ask how Whitehead's theory of difference between the two universes only consists in some actual
extension expresses his doctrine of social transcendence. entities, included in one and not in the other, and in the sub­
An actual occasion as an act of experience transcends other oc­ ordinate entities which each actual entity introduces into the
casions by way of its novelty and by way of its exclusivenes s. Our world" (PR 33-4) . "No two occasions can have identical actual
treatment of the novelty of an actual occasion will be brief. Most worlds" (PR 3 2 1 ) . Two occasions may have some data in common.
of this chapter deals with the exclusiveness of an actual occasion Bu �very occasion is different from every other occasion in res � ect
as an act of experience . Concerning this latter topic some im­ to the total set of data for its feeling. What is felt is different:\Jn
portant problems of interpretation arise. this respect every occasion is a novel act of experience.
b. Actual occasions differ also in their subjective forms of feel­
1. The novelty of an actual occasion ing. The novelty of an occasion is in this respect even more de­
cisive than in respect to its data for feeling. For)ven where two
Every actual occasion is a novel act of becoming. For the course occasions feel the same datum, they will not feel this datum in
of nature is a "creative advance" in which genuinely new things
become. History never repeats itself in exact detail. Whitehead's
\
the same way The "how" of fee� ing is . di �erent. "The ess.e�t � al
novelty of a feeling attaches to its sub1ective form. The m1t1al
realistic view of time leads to the consequence that every act of data, and even the nexus which is the objective datum, may have
becoming is a novel act, and in every becoming what becomes is a served other feelings with other subjects. But the subjective form
novel thing. is the immediate novelty; it is how that subject is feeling that
An actual occasion is a novel entity diverse from any entity in objective gatum" (PR 354) .
the 'many' which it unifies (PR 3 1 ) . c. Thefreason an occasion's subjective forms of feeling are novel
Every actual entity, in virtue of its novelty, transcends its
\
is that it has a novel subjective aim It aims at a specific satisfac­
tion appropriate to its actual world. And its aim at this novel ideal
universe, God included (PR 1 43) . affects the subjective forms of its feelings.
48
 50 N OVELTY A N D E X C L U S IVE N E SS E XPERIE NTIAL E X C L U S IVE N E S S
Incidentally this introduces us to one important func wm of is· o1ated from .them. This would plainly contradict ·Whitehead's . .
doc trine of obj ectification, his theory of how one actual entity is
eternal objects in Whitehead's theory of actual occasions/In the · · 1e
initial stage of a concrescence the datum for its subjective aim "present in" another. Nothing co_uld be cleare� than th � �nncip
that ac tual occasions are present m other occasions. . . This is funda-
. of
cannot be an actuality. The problem of the concrescence is to h e positive meanmg
bring a new actuality into existence. Therefore we require a cat­ roental to the philosophy of organism. T
egor� of nonactual entities to serve as data of initial subjective 0bjectification will be examined in detail in Chapters 6-8.
. datum of a subjective aim is initially an eternal object or
aims \The It is e qually clear that when one actual occasion is said to be
present in or immanent in another occasion, these statements
. . are
"pure potential" which functions as the "form of definiteness" of .
the ideal satisfaction at which the concrescence aims. Thus eternal not to be taken in any simple sense. Whitehead' s warnmg is worth
objects are needed for explanation of the teleological structure of repeating: "The philosophy of organism is mai� ly devoted to _th �
an occasion. This function of eternal objects will be examined in task of making clear the notion of ' being present m another entity.
some detail in Parts Two and Three. This phrase is here borrowed from Aristotle: it is not a fortunate
d. Finally and consequently the satisfaction of an actual oc­ phrase, and in subsequent di�cussio_n it will be replaced by the
casion is novel. The novel ideal at which the concrescence aims is term ' objectification.' The Anstotehan phrase suggests the crude
finally achieved. All its component feelings are harmonized in one notion that one actual entity is added to another simpliciter. This
integral feeling with a complex datum and a complex unity of is not what is meant" (PR 7 9-80) . We are concerned with the sense
subjective form. The concrescence has produced a novel con­ in which one actual occasion as an act of experience is not present
in another occasion. The issue is not whether or not one actual
crete actuality.
Thus we find one important sense in which an actual occasion is occasion is immanent in another. The only liv_e issue is in �h � t $
socially transcendent. Its total set of data for feeling, its subjective sense an occasion is immanent in another and m what sense it is -,
forms of feeling, its subjective aim, and its satisfaction differ from not. A notion which Whitehead's philosophy is "mainly devoted"
those of any other occasion. We have seen that an actual occasion to clarifying can scarcely be a simple notion.
is an individual in the sense of being a concrete and complete We shall be attempting to give some precise meaning to what is
thing. It is something for itself, a unified act of immediate experi­ asserted in the following passages:
ence. We can now say that an occasion is an individual in the . . . an actual event is an achievement for its own sake, a
further sense that its real internal constitution is novel. In virtue grasping of diverse entities into a value by rea_son of their
of its novelty as an act of experience an actual occasion transcends real togetherness in that pattern, to the exclusion of other
all others. entities (sMw i 47).
The essence of depth of actuality-that is of vivid experience
2. Experiential exclusiveness -is definiteness. Now to be definite always means that all the
In the rest of this chapter we shall be concerned with another elements of a complex whole contribute to some one effect, to
mode of social transcendence, namely the exclusiveness of an ac­ the exclusion of others. The creative process is a process of ex­
tual occasion as an act of experience. This we may call, for the clusion to the same extent as it is a process of inclusion (RM
sake of convenience, "experiential exclusiveness ." It is important 1 1 3) .
to make clear what will not be asserted. The individuality of an actual entity involves an exclusive
It will not be asserted that an actual occasion excludes all other limitation. This element of 'exclusive limitation' is the defi-
occasions in the sense that it is completely independent of them or
52 N OVELTY AND E X C L U S IVENE SS CO NTE M PORARY O C C A S I O N S 53
niteness essential for the synthetic unity of an actual entity
(PR 7 2 ) . 3. The exclusiveness of contemporary occasions
All forms of realization express some aspect of finitude. Such Generally it is clear that an actual occasion does not influence
a form expresses its nature as being this, and not that. In other its contemporaries�ctual occasions contemporary with � do not,
words, it expresses exclusion; and exclusion means finitude as concrete units of experience, affect the experience of A \White­
(MT 1 07). h ead expresses this mutual exclusiveness of contemporaries in
To understand "Whitehead's view, it is as important to see how an terms of causation and in terms of perception.
actual occasion is exclusive of other occasions as it is to see how Any two contemporary occasions "are not in any direct relation
an actual occasion is inclusive of other occasions. of efficient causation" (Ar 2 5 1 ) . Contemporary occasions are "caus­
The interpretation I propose is that no two actual occasions ally independent" of each other. In fact, "It is the definition of
have any immediacy of feeling in common. Among actual oc­ contemporary events that they happen in causal independence of
casions there is no sharing of immediacy yN" o two actual occasions each other" (Ar 2 5 i . See TIME 6 2 ; PR 95, 1 88, 482, 489) .
mutually enjoy any feeling. No feeling "belongs" to the subjective Likewj se there is no direct perception of contemporary oc­
immediacies of any two actual occasions at the same time. This is casiony'I n "presentational immediacy," the mode of perception in
the most general sense in which the experiences of occasions are which the contemporary world" is apprehended, the subject per­
mutually exclusive\ Further specifications of experiential ex­ ceives a contemporary \egion but not contemporary actual oc­
clusiveness can be explained in relation to contemporary, future, \
casions The "particular occasions of the contemporary world,
and past occasions respectively. each with its own individual spontaneity, are veiled from the ob­
(i t will not be denied that there is "feeling of feeling." White­ server" (Ar 2 80. See TIME 6 2 ; SYMB O LISM 1 6 ; PR 96-7, 1 88, 484,
head clearly means to assert this. What is denied is that the feeling 498; AI 2 8 1 ) .
felt is in the same mode of existence as the feeling which "feels .') Thus if P is an actual occasion contemporary with A, then P
It is suggested that the feeling felt is, when felt, in the mode of ob­ and A are causally independent of each other, and neither per­
jective immortality, and that the feeling which feels is, when it ceives the other as an individual unit of experience.2 This separa­
feels, in the mode of subjective immediacy. Thus the experience tion between the experiences of contemporary actual occasions
of a subject as felt from within is private to that subject and is not, means quite clearly that there is no sharing of immediacy, no
as immediate feeling, shared in by any other subject. It is the in­ mutual enjoyment of feeling. It seems that no two contemporary
trinsic reality of that subject. What is public is the objective exist­ occasions have the subjective immediacy of any feeling in common.
ence �r extrinsic reality or superject of an occasion. The private 2. Whitehead does not identify (a) the set of actual occasions causally
expenence of a subject will become a public or objective fact, the independent of A, with (b) the set of actual occasions prehended by A with
superject. So that no fact, if we consider its whole career, is a presentational immediacy. Set (b) constitutes the "presented duration"
pu.rely private fact. But the subjective immediacy of any feeling is (TIME 63; PR 256-7, 486-90) . The former set, namely those occasions which
pnvate and unsharable. are causally independent of A, includes the latter set. But the former set
also includes occasions which are not members of the latter set. Note that if
"
. n_
I . In � conve rsatio in 1 942 Whitehead seemed to endorse the phrase, P and M are both members of the former set, they need not be contemporary
� . � �
no sh n ng of 1m ed1 cy," as an epitomization of his view on this point.
But this mterpretat10n is proposed as an interpretation of his writings.
.
with each other, though both will be contemporary with A. This is White­
head's way of providing for alternative time systems, which he understands
the physical theory of relativity requires.
 55
54 N OVELTY AND EXCLUSIVENE SS coN TE M P O RA RY OC CA SI O N S
. . . . the immediate activity of self-creation is separate and 2 53) . Bu t the sensa and the geo me trical relations in terms of
private, so far as contemporaries are concerned (AI 252). Al

which the "no w" is "spatialized" are not contributed by the con­
temporary occasions. Th ey )are derived from the subjec t's own past
. . . . the contem.p�rary entities do not enter into the constitu­ on the region . The "ill ustrati on"
t10n o� the perc1p1ent subject by objectification through any and "projected" (PR 472 -90ionbyisitthus "subjective" (PR 1 89) . Th e
of their own feelings (PR 484; see 1 88, 489) . of th e contemporary reg "presented duration" is "objectified for
" spatialized wo rld " of the
For .the sake o f completeness we must ask whether this mutual M by M's own con diti one d
range of feeling-tones which have bee n
. . . M" (PR 488 -9).
exclus1ven.ess of contemporary occasions has to be qualified in any inherited from the cau sal pas t isofperception in the mode of pres­
way. For mstance, Whitehead there is "relevance" between
. of theirsayscausal In any case, whether there
contem . m
poraries . spite independence. Does this entational immediacy or not, theocc duration shared by conte mporary
entail. any sharing of immediacy? Relevance is said to occur in two n by its con�mporaries. It
occasions is not defined for an expasio nce of itself JContemporary
ways. is defined by the occasio n's own on erie the duration only as hypo­
·ft occasions enter into the definiti of facts about any individual oc­
� � ere is a mutual relevance between two contemporary oc­ thetical actual entities] No specificgive
as10n � m that they participate in a ,common locus, a "now" which Th is kin d of "relevance "
:
�� spa ��ally and temporally extended\For each of the occasions this casions in the locu s are directly sionn.of any contemporary by an­
��; exten �s indefinitely beyond its own basic region, which. is does not entail any direct prehen ail any sharing of immediacy .
other, and a for tiori it doe s not ent of presentational immediacy
h . -now. It is there-now as. well
. asa here-now. Thus "th ere is a
' unison of bec?mmg, · , const1tutmg positive relation of all the Some of \Vh itehead 's discussions anc e: "Presentational im­
�� . .
:as10ns m t? 1s community to any one of them. The members of
have caused some confusion. For
mediacy is our immediate per cep
inst
tion of the contemporary ex­
is commum ty share in a common immediacy; they are in 'un · ­ I
ternal world, appearing as an elementld con stitutive of our own ex­
son , as to their_ becom I. n g.. that is. to say, any pair of occasions in loses itself to be a com­
th e 1 ocus �re contemporaries" (PR 1 8 9 ). perience . In this app earance the woractudisc in the same sense as we
B � t this does not say nearly as much as it seems to sa The munity of actual things, which are thisalseem s to imp ly direct dis­
[
" osit�. ve relation" between the occasions consists only in t e fact � are" (sYM BOL ISM 2 1 ). Language like
closure of some features of contemporedia ary occasions. Usu ally White­
t at t ey are contemporaries. Neither of two such occasions pre­ more care ful. Victor
h en ds. the other as an m · · dua1 actual occasion contemporary
· dIVI head's account of presentational imm is cythaist such language is a
w1"th itseIf. F or either. occasion' wh a t is. given
. is. simply
. a locus Low e's explanation of the confusionphy of nature,
(" now "). wh ose members are in umson wit · The expression
· h it. vestige of Whitehead 's earlier philoso
; �;� �;
·
" h 1 common_ i. n:mediacy" is therefore liable to be very mis- . . . in which causality was little analyze d. A contemporary
the character­
l a �· belongs, m its context, to a series of statements intended
It. means merely that th e pair. of occas10ns . world of things was assumed as a datum,etheand by a primarily
as eqmvalents.
.
contemporarie s, m "unison of becoming. " It d oes not mean that
are istics of the sense-data were related togerencer in events . . . .
they h ave a�y mutual enjoyment of feeling. atemporal theory of their multiple inhtion to examination of
For occas10i;ts of a relatively high grade of complexity a con­ On passing from examination of percep it is the ante ced ent
experience, he adopted the view thatoccasion of experience .
te m
.is, thpora lJ'. regwn may be given
. in presentational immedia�y . That environment that is the datum for an ly contemporary oc­
e reg10n may be perce1ved as the 1ocus of sensa, and as subject Th en there is no awareness of absolute pres ent . But after
to math emat1cal . relations (PR
96-7, 1 88-90, 1 9 3-4, 472-86, 498; casions : they constitute no datum for the
 N OVE LTY A N D EXC LU SIVE N ES S c o N TE M P ORAR y O C C A S I O N S 57
that we find, as we mus t expect, that som of Wh under the first type o f relevance between . contemporaries,. namely
discussions of the contemporary world retaine lang itehead's . .
th e relations of being in unison of becommg, and of partI� 1patmg
as ordinarily used, is appropriate only if that wor e which,uag
ld is con­ · a common system of geometrical relations in the extensive con-
in
sidered as a datum (Schilpp 100- 1). tinuum. These are not "physical" relat10ns · m ' h ead' s s�nse,
· Wh1te
b. Wh itehead also speaks of another kin d of rele sinee they do not involve prehension of individual actual occas10ns.
·

contemporary occasions, an "indirect relevan vance between On this interpretation, no qualification of the expenent1a · · 1 ex-
ce"
AI 252, 280) . No two occasions have identica (PR 98-9, 484-5 ; clu. si. veness of contemporaries would be required. . .
But two neighboring contemporary occasion s l past actual worlds. � On the other hand ' the implied relations to which causal m­
worlds which are practically though not commay have past actual dependence does not apply may be relations between t?e me�ta1
the case of con temporaries remote from each pletely identical. In activities of contemporary occasions. This interpretat1?n. �nght
between th � ir pas ts will be important. In ord oth er, the difference find support in what Whitehead says about the poss1b1hty of
enc e the difference is practically negligi ble inary human experi­ telepathy. These remarks are usually ob iter dicta, and they are not
herit from what is for practical purposes a com. Such occasions in­ numerous, but they must be taken into account. For examp�e,
possible for a subject to mak e fortunate guesses mon pas t. It is thus " . we must also allow for the possibility that we can detect m
its contemporary world . abo ut the nature of 0�;selves direct aspects of the mentalities of higher o:ganism� "
Whitehead goes so far as to call this "indire (sMW 2 0 9) . He regards it as � ' �more natural" hy�ot� es1s than its
2 �0) of contemporaries. But it sho uld ct pre hen sion " (AI contrary that direct "transm1ss10n of mental . feelmg . m �y .occur
� trec tly prehended is not contempor be qui te clear that what is between noncontiguous occasions, although d1Tect transm1ss10n of
ary actu
ity. Judgments abo ut the contemporary wor ality but pas t actual­ physical feeling always occurs betwe �� contiguous occasions. He
any direc t int uition of con temporary actuld are not derived from adds, "This conclusion has some empmcal support, both fr?m .the
ma tic. 3ud. gm
ents for practical purposes. "Th e ani
ality; they are prag­ evidence for peculiar instances of telepathy, an� from th� m� tmc­
constructe d that, with rough accuracy and mal body is so tive apprehension of a tone of feeling in ordmary social mter-
importan t emphasis is thus laid upon tho in nor ma l conditions course" (PR 469; see 468).
se reg .
te�porary world which are particularly rele ions in the con� In most of the passages referring to telepathy Whitehead . has
e�1� tenc� of the enduring obj ect of wh vant for the future in mind the possibility of direct objectification of m �nta� fee.lmgs
c1p 1en t is one occasio n" (PR 99) . This indich the immediate per­ of noncontiguous past actual occasions. Mental feelmg is . said to
tem�orary act �al occasions does not imp irect relevance of con­ be transmitted by "hybrid prehension," and "a hybnd pre­
mediate experi enc e. ly any sharing of im­ hension has as its datum an antecedent occasion objectified in re­
spect to a conceptual prehension" (P� 469). In this ?assa?e, which
An oth er que stio n ari ses fro m the foll ow amplifies the earlier and more tentative statement m Science and
far a� physica l rela tions are con cern ing passag e: " . . . so
. ed, con tem porary events hap­ the Modern World, the transmission is from the past to the future.
pen m causal mdependence of each oth So these passages do not support the suggestion that mental feel­
clause, "so far �s physica l relations are er" (PR 95) . The lim iting
are s01ne relati �ns between contempor con cer ned ," suggests there ings of contemporary actual occasions are directly prehended.
.
relat10ns, to ';hich the assertion of cau arie s, other than physical The following passage, however, refers to the contemporary
.
ap�ly. It is difficul t t? det erm ine jus t sal ind ependence does not world:
to imply. Two pos s1b . 1ht. ies wh at thi s passage is meant
may be sugrrested : Perhaps in the mutual immanence of occasions . . . �he re­
i. Th e im pli ed rel atio ns
may be thos ; rel ations ind ica lations of the mental poles to each other are not subject to
ted above
 N OVELTY A N D EXCL USIVENESS 59
coN TE MP ORAR y OCCASI O N S
the same laws of perspective as are those of the physical
Measureable time and measureable space are then irrelepole van
s. b asi' s for justification the truth-relations to the past and our experi­
to their mutual connections. Thus in respect to some types oft ence of the stability of the types of order involved"
. (AI 3 1 7-i 8) .
Appearance. there may be an element of immediacy in its re­ Thus our passage may suggest an except10n to t h e m
· d'ire� tness o f
lations to the men tal side of the contemporary world. . . .
If truth-relations to contemporary reality. There may be m so�e
such be the case, some types of Appearance will have a more cas es a direct truth-relation of appearance to contempo:ary reality.
direct relation than others to contemporary Reality (AI 3
1 8) . - . There would be a direct meaning for truth. �ut direct truth-
relations do not necessarily involve direct percept10n:
At first sight this seem s to say that an actual . . . the infant feels its mother's cheerfulness as a datum, an�
hend directly men tal feelings of some contempoocca sion may pre­
rary occas ions. If feels it conformally, with that affective tone. !he d � t � m ts
so, then it conflicts with Whi tehe ad's general treat derived from the past, the immediate past. It is prec1p1t� ted
subject. So interpreted it would assert what he genemen t of the uport the present region occupied by the nexus ?f oc.cas10ns
namely that there is direct influence between cont rally denies, which constitute the complex fact of the mother s existence,
far as I can discover, no other passage makes this sugg emporaries. As
further stud y of its context leads to a different inte estion. And body and soul. For the infant, the Ap �earance i�cludes the
Th e clue to a better interpretation lies in the mea rpretation. qualification of cheerfulness. And in this respect 1t may have
pearance." In this part of A dven tures of Ideas, appe ning of "ap­ -and it often does have-to the contemporary real mother a
the contribu tion of the men tal pole of the occasion arance means truth-relation in the fullest sense of the term ' truth' (AI 3 1 6,
synt heses, and transformations, to the objective datu, its valuations, my italics).
faction (A1 2 6 8-70) . The "difference between the m of the satis­ H ere "fullest" seems to mean "most direct." Thus directness of
.
ten t of the init ial phase of the physical pole objective con­ truth-relation does not require directness of percept10n, for m · th'is
and
content of the final phase, after the integration the objective passage indirectness of perception is �xpl�citly asserted :
mental poles, con stitu tes 'appearance ' for that occaof physical and Even if this passage means there 1s direct prehens10? of c?n­
Appearance is therefore important only in orga sion" (AI 2 70) . temporary mental activity, it does not follow tha� th �re is sharmg
tality is important, and means simply the connisms where men­ of immediacy. It will be shown below that exp�nential exclusive­ _
as it appears, "the world presente d to us for temporary world ness is entirely compatible with direct prehens�on of the past by
our purpose s. It is the world in the guise of our enjoyments and the present; But if, as Whitehead genera�ly mamtams _ clearly and
an imposed activity" (AI 2 7 1 ) . a subj ect-matter for emphatically, there is no direct prehens10n of co� tempora�y oc­
In chapter 1 6 of A dven tures of Ideas, where casions then it would follow a fortiori that there 1s no sharmg of
passage occurs, Wh itehead defines truth as a the problematical immediacy. In this way an actual occasio� trans� ends its co� ­
pearance, namely "the conform ation of App qualification of ap­ temporaries. "Thus the occasion of expenenc� 1s absol� te �n
(AI 309) . And he is distinguishing between eara dire
nce to Reality " respect to its immediate self-enjoyment. How 1t deals with its
truth-relations . Now, "Withi n any type of trut ct and indirect data is to be understood without reference to any other concur­
tion aris es. . . . The Appearance of the contemh-relation a distinc­ rent occasions. Thus the occasion, in reference to its internal
its truth-relations to the past, and its trut porary regions has process, requires no contemporary process in order to exist. In .fact
porary Reality" (AI 3 1 7) . It is clear enough h-relations to contem­ this mutual independence in the internal process of self-ad3ust­
the past may be direct. But truth-relations that truth-relations to ment is the definition of contemporaneousness" { MT 206) .
"can only be estimated by an imaginativeto contemporary reality The primary reason for Whitehead's insistence on the mutual
leap, which has as its independence of contemporaries is the need to leave room for real
 61
60 N OVELTY AND EXCLU SIVENESS PRES ENT AND PAST
co ns titu tion of the present subj ect ." (AI 247-8) . Tha t is to say,
in?i�iduality. �no �her reason may be the fact that physical trans­ concrete ac­
/ miss1 c;µ tak �s time.. But the former reason is the more important what the future is for the present does not include any
&,,;,!/ one;/Wh�, m Whitehead's system, is the independence of con­ tuaJity. "ob­
\ /'.rhe future is something for the present, of course. It has ever
// te �poranes necessary for the real individuality of actual occasions? the prese nt, how ,
It is t�ue tha � each actual entity must have its own perspective . jective existence ." Its objective existence invidu al actuality of any
But this reqmrement might be met by the "principle of intensive do es not involve even obje ctive ly the indi prese nt is the neces­
future occasions\ "What is objective in the
relevan�e," as Charles Hartshorne has suggested (Phil. Rev. 4s,
Pi
4 ), without requiring the independence of contemporarie s. sity of a future of actual occasions, and sthe necess ity that these
;
}'t" he real reas ?n �hat, in Whitehead's system, the independence actual occasions conform to the condition gsinhe
of th e present occas ion. The future belon to actua
rent in the essence
the essence of pres­
0 conte �poranes is necessary is the categoreal obligation of in­ the lity of present
�ernal umty and completeness. If the concrescence is to eventuate ent fact, and has no actuality other than in Chapter 2 in
1? a co ?1plete integration of its feelings, if it is to achieve subjec­ fac t" (AI 25 1 ) . This poin t was discussed in detail be labor ed here .
�ive umty, then there must be a duration in which the concrescence connection with anticipatory feeling and need not
is closed t? further contributions of data from other individual We need only draw some conclusions. exist as
actual en �1t�. e s. In this duration integration of the primary data If for the present actual occasion no future occasions preh ension
. phase may take place, individuals, it is an obvious conclusion that no direc t
fro� th � mit1al and the complete feeling of If A is a
satisfact10n m �� be attained. If throughout the growth of the con- can take place betw een present and future occasions.e actua l oc­
crescence ad�1 �10nal data continued to enter the process, the cat­ present actual occasion and B stands for some futurentity, not as
casion, then A can prehend B only as a hypo theti cal
egoreal cond1t10n of subjective unity could not be met. This is B cann ot
the categore�l reason for the causal independence of contemporary an actua lity now having subjective immediacy. Also, it is not a pre­
prehend A at all, for B has no actua lity of its own;
actual occas10mf]
hending subj ect. lusion
As in the case of contemporary occasions a further concshari ng
4· How the present excludes the future then follows. If there is no direct prehension there is noctive im­
of immediacy. A present occasion, existi ng in its subje
W� co �e �o the relation between a present actual occasion and
oc �as10ns m. its future. Only a brief discussion of this topic is re­ mediacy, excludes the subjective immediacy of any future oc­
�uired. �h1tehead accepts Alexander's admonition that we "tak casion. There can thus be no mutu al enjoy ment of feeling.
tim : se �10u �ly" (TIME 59). And his realistic attitude to time is em�
bodied m his theory of actual occasions. 5. How the present excludes the past
A present actual occasion stands at the utmost limit of actuality.
Toward t�e future there is potentiality for what will become but The interpretation we are testing is that no two actual occasions
on
no actuality. Nothing in the future beyond the present actu�l oc­ share a common immediacy. We now have to consider the relatiour
cas �_ on has yet become. "In the present there are no individual oc­ between an actual occasion and occasions in its past. Here
casions belonging :o the future. The present contains the utmost problem is not so simpl e as in the previous cases. For Whitehead
verge of such reahzed individuality . . . . the future individual says clearly there are direct causal and perce ptual relations be­l
_ t. Th
occasions are n on-existen e sole immediate actuality is the tween the past and the prese nt. So any assertions of experientia
transcendence must be qualified with care. Our probl em is to see
3: In a fo otnote to a statement of the causal independe nce of contemp�
. on the surface of the fundamental..,.. whether some such assertions can be made.
Remembering that "the philosophy of organism is mainly de-
. h ead s ays, "Th is
raries Wh Ite · ·
E ms
. . formula for the physical continuum
" tem1an
· prmc1ple hes
" (PR 95, n . I).
 N OVELTY AND EXCL U SIVENE S S P RESENT AND PAST
voted to the task of making clear the notion of ' being present in
another entity' " (PR 7g-80 ), we ask in what senses a past occasion that is entirely compatible with this sug�est_ion. In �his cha�ter we
is not present in an occasion that is actual now. Let A be the pres­ concerned with the negative implication (which Whitehead
ent actual occasion, and let X be an :: kes explicit) of the theory of objectification, � amely �hat P ?oes
/whatever may be the sense in which X occasi on in A's past. Now
is present in A, I shall try no t belong to M subjectively, or in its own sub1ect1ve _ 1mm� d1acy.
to show that in the following senses X is not present in A: l We have seen that in the present the su b"1ect1v · � 1mme
· d1�cy of
fe eling involved in A is confined to A, since there 1s no shanng of
a. X is not present in A as "an experiencing subject here-now." immediacy by contemporary occasions. We have seen also . that A
For A, X may be 'an experiencing subject there-then," but, for does not prehend the immediate feelings of future occasions. If
. .
" ongmates and
A, X's experience belongs to a center of feeling that is not here­ noW we can show that this subjective immed 1acy
perishes with A, then it could be said that the su b"1ect1ve · im-
·

now.
ediacy of feeling involved in A originates with, is confined to,
b. Further, X is not present in A as a complete individual. For
A feels X from a perspective defined by A's status in the actual :i d perishes with the concrescence and final sa.tisfaction of �- The
world. This means that''A feels certain aspects of the experience of exPerience of A could then be said to be in this sense exclusive of,
X, but not others� and thus to transcend, the experiences of all other actua1 occasions.
·

c. No aspect of X prehended by A is present in A with the sub­

jective immediacy it had in X. The subjective immediacy of the a. X is not present in A as "an experiencing subject here-now: "
feelings in the concrescence and satisfaction of A belongs to A For A, X is an "object." Now "Two conditions must be fulfilled m
and not to X. This means that A is not a cofeeler with X of any order that an entity may function as an object in a process of �x­
of X's feelings. It also means that none of X's feelings persists periencing: (i) the entity must be antecedent, and (2 � the entity
with its own immediacy into the concrescence of A. In this literal must be experienced in virtue of its antec� den� e; it must be
given" (AI 229). The location of a past occasion is given_ for ex­
sense, there is no "transfer of feeling" from X to A. "An actual
occasion P, belonging to M's causal past, is objectified for M by a perience more or less vaguely (PR 258). Still, however vaguely the
perspective representation of its own (i.e. P's) qualities of feeling past occasion is given, it is given as a th�;e-the� and ?ot as a h�re­
and intensities of feeling. There is a quantitative and qualitative now. The "there" may be "almost here ; the , then . may be al­
vector flow of feeling from P to M; and in this way, what P is sub­ most now." In human experience, for instance, the immediate past
jectively, belongs to M objectively" (PR 486) . is roughly speaking "that portion of our past lying �etween a tenth
_
of a second and half a second ago. . . . our 1mmed1ate past is_ con­
I do not intend to deny that there is a "flow of feeling from P to stituted by that occasion, or by that group of fus�d occasi? ns,
M," or in our symbols from X to A. But the expression "flow of which enters into experience devoid of any perceptible medmm
feeling" and others like it need not be understood as involving intervening between it and the present immediate fact" (AI 233).
"sharing of immediacy." I suggest that Whitehead's theory of ob­ In spite of the absence of a "perceptible medium" betwee� X and
jectification is his more careful and precise description of how A, X is not given as an experiencing subject here-now. X is there­
there is a flow of feeling. So these expressions are to be taken not then, however recent, however near.
in a simple and literal sense but only as explained in the theory of Whitehead's realistic interpretation of influence means that
objectification. The first step toward understanding the "flow of what is given as past is also felt as present. Something comes from
feeling from P to M" is to understand how "what P is subjec­ there-then to here-now. Whatever the nature of the influence from
tively, belongs to M objectively." X upon A, however, such influence comes from there-then. i: e
Chapters 6 and 7 will give an analysis of causal objectification says that feelings are "vectors," using the term to me�� "defimte
transmission from elsewhere" (PR 1 77) . A prehension _ is referent
 N OVELTY AND E X C L U S I V E N E SS P RES ENT AN D PAST
to an external world, and in this sense will be said to have a It is a categoreal necessi ty that certain elemen ts in X's real in·
' vect�r char�cter' " (PR 28). He cites Locke-"th e mind, being ternal constit ution be eliminated from A's prehension of X (PR
furnished with a great number of the simple ideas conveyed in by . \'o
32 1 ) " . . . bjectification relegates into irrelevance, or into a sub-A¥
the senses, as_ � hey are found in ex terior th ings" (as quoted from ordinate relevance, the full constit ution of the objecti fied entity.
Essay II, xxm, _ I )-and says that the last phrase,
I Some real component in the objectifi ed entity assumes the rOle off
�
which he has
underlinycI, as� erts "the vector character of the primary feelings" being how that particular entity is a datum in the experience o
(PR 86)/"Feelmgs are "vectors'; for th feel what is there and I the su bject" (PR 97). Only in this way can the prehending subject

I
transform it into what is here" (PR 1 33). The former part of this ach ieve its own finite unity of satisfact ion. Therefore "the ante­
last statement must be emphasized at t is point: feelings "feel cedent environment is not wholly efficacio us" (AI 255); some ele­
wha � is th ��e < When the feeling in question is of a past occasion, ments in the actualit ies constitu ting this environment are elimi­
the ' there will be a there-the n. A's feelings of X therefore feel nated. Whiteh ead seems to say that all actual occasion s in the past
what is there-then.
There will thus always be a contrast for A between X, which
is. t� ere-then, and its own immediate feelings, which are un­
ambiguously here-now. In the analysis of a feeling in the con­
I' actual world of the subject are positively prehend ed (PR 66, 335,
3 66), but not all of any actual occasion is positively prehended,
or "felt." A feels some aspect or aspects of X's experience, but not
all of X's real internal constitut ion.
crescence of A, "whatever presents itself as also ante rem is a
datu� " (PR 355). �his contrast is implied by the notion of p er­ c. No aspect of X prehended by A is present in A with the
spect ives, under which A feels other occasion s (PR 104-5). subjective immediacy it had in X.
Wh.ether or not this contrast is consciously prehended is not We have now to point out, further, that those of X's feelings by
esse?- t1al. The �act remai?-� that a simple physical feeling (i.e. "a which X is objectifi ed for A are not present in A with their own
f� elmg for which the m1t1al . datum is another single actual en­ subjective immediacy. The subjective immediacy with which X's
� Ity," PR 361) is a prehens ion of "a subject diverse from the sub­ feelings are now felt belongs to A and not to X. Since X is any
J ect of the feeling which feels it" (PR 362). Nor does this nonpres­ past actual occasion, this means that all the feelings which are
ence of x. need to be qualified in respect of past mental activitie s. subjectively immediate in A originate with the concrescence of
The relat10n of anteced ence and consequence applies to mental as A and have A as their subject. X's feelings exist objectively, not as
well as to phy�ical activity (PR 468-9, AI 3 1 8). subjectively immediate.
. �hen, is one
This, The situation Whitehead describes is that the past actual world,
sense in which X is not present in A. X is not
present m A as an experie ncing subject here-now. For A, X is including X, contributes data for the new concrescence. These data
oth �r than the center of feeling which is A itself. It is a center of are objects of which A must take account. They have o bjective
feelm g therecthen. existence. Apart from some creative activity which includes them
in a novel experiential unity, they would have no share in im­
b. X is not present in A in its completeness of internal con­ mediate actuality beyond the experiences of their past subjects.
stitutio n. These objects are given a share in the immediacy of present
We have seen t� at A does not feel X as an experiencj ng subject actuality by the creative activity of the nove l concrescence, which
here-now. There is a further limitation, namely tha y'A does not "conforms" to them and absorbs them into its satisfaction.
feel X as a fully complete and concrete experiencing thing. A feels In themselves, apart from further creative activity, these data
X u�der an abstraction. That is, A feels certain of X's feelings are like the dry bones which the word of the prophet Ezekiel
� ertam aspects of � s experience, but not others . Object ificatio� reclothed with living flesh (PR 1 3 1). An entity which has become
mvolves abstractio n., . . . objectively immortal, so that it can be given as a datum, is "di-
66 N OVELTY AND EXCL USIVENESS ARE F E E LI N G S TRA N SFER RED ?
actu al o�casio n . excludes pre-
vested o f its own living immediacy" (PR ix) . Past actual occasions i. The expe rien ce of the pres ent .
. nencmg sub3e ct here-now .
have perished. They are objectified for the present via abstract hens i on o f any past occasion as an expe
characters. And "The mere objectification of actual entities by . . The experience of the prese nt actu al occasion exclu des all
eternal obj ects lacks 'immediacy.' It is 'repetition' ; and this is a
contrary to 'immediacy.' But 'process' is the rush of feelings :: ·
b certa in selec ted factors in the expe rienc
e of any past actu al

whereby second-handednes s attains subjective immediacy; in this occ asion .

ion excludes any
way, subj ective form overwhelms repetition, and transforms it · .· · • The expe rienc e of the prese nt actua l occas
111
past actu �1 occasion · from hav-
into immediately felt satisfaction; objectivity is absorbed into feeling which was a component in a .
234-5). imm ediat e actua ht � of self­
subj ectivity" (PR The relatedness of actualities "is wholly in g in the prese nt actua l occasion the
past actua l occas ion.
concerned with the appropriation of the dead by the living" enj oyment whic h that feeling had in the
v �ness o � a prese nt
Take n together, these aspec ts of the e�clusi
(PR ix) .
Feelings are vectors, "But the feeling is subj ectively rooted in g of imm� diacy . Ther e
the immediacy of the present occasion : it is what the occasion feels occasion amou nt to a denial of any sharm
nt occas ion and a past
for itself, � derived from the past and as merging into the future" is no mutu al enj oyme nt of feelin g by a prese
(PR j'.4 7)-lWhat is felt, the object of the feeling, is felt as derived; occasion. . · m · flue�ced
is
If Whit ehead wants to say that a prese nt occas ion
·

bu �he immediacy of the feeling is not derived. It originates with �

by or shares the exper ience of � past o�casio_n, e must
. say this so
the present occasio rli]T he tenth category of explanation is "That
as not to imply the shari ng of 1mme d1acy , if � 1s theor y of actua l
.
the first analysis of an actual entity, into its most concrete ele­ may be said that
occasion s is to be self-consis tent. For insta nce, it
ments, discloses it to be a concrescence of prehensions, which have
a prese nt occas ion feels a past �ccasio n as being
here-now but no �
as being an exper ienci ng sub3e c� here- no_w . The
origina ted in its process of becoming" (PR 35, my italics) . The selec ted com
_
subj ective immediacy of feelings originates with the concrescence ve or po �nt �o th e
whose completion constitutes the full subject of those feelings. ponents of the past occasion may imply or mvol _
itutio n is
A prehension "originates in the process creative of its subject" full const itutio n of the past occas ion, but the full const
not positi · · ve 1y feIt 1· n the same sense in which the select ed com­
(PR 4 1 ). A feels some aspect of X's experience as there-then, but
ponents are positively felt. Thos e past feel ngs w�
� ich the prese nt
occasion feels may be felt as having had imme diac�,
this feeling of X's past experience originates with and is subjec­ but not as
tively rooted in the concrescen ce and satisfaction of A. It is with .
not deme d
this situation in mind that Whitehead says, "All origination is having now the imme diacy they had in the past. It 1s
comp onent s
that A imme diatel y feels some feelings which were
private" (PR 472). when A feel� these
in the immediacy of X. What is assert ed is that,
feelin gs, these feelings are o bjecti fied for A an � h �nce ��
What the new actuality will b e i s partly determined by ante­ ist not
cedent condition s. The activity of the new concrescen ce must
in the imme diacy they formerly had in X, but ob3ec tively
. � ct� al­
"conform" to these conditions. That it is to be actual is wholly it loses sub3ec t1ve im-
determ ined, so to speak, by the ultimate creativity of which the ity in perishing acquires object ivity, while
new occasion is an original embodim ent. "Creativi ty" is the self­ mediacy" (PR 4 ) . 4
causatio n of the novel occasion (PR 339). 6 . Are imme diate feelings literally transferred?
We have now three complem entary senses in which a present Now if the subjec tive imme diacy of A originates with A and
actual occasion excludes and thus transcends past acts of experi­ perishes with A, then it would seem tha� A and do not sub­ �
ence: jectively "enjoy" any feeling at the same time. And it would seem,
68 N OVELTY A N D E X C L U SIVE N E S S ARE FEELI NGS TRANSFERRED? 69
further, that we must also deny that feelings are simply t:i;:ans­ and conformally appropriated as a subjective passion. I n the
ferred from X to A with retentio n of subjectiv e immediacy e
must say that none of X's feelings persists with its own immediacy
LW language appropriate to the higher stages of experience, the
primitive element is sympathy, that is, feeling the feeling
into the concresc ence of A. (
in another and feeling conformally with another PR 246) .
This denial, no doubt, sounds very strange when such passages
as the following come to mind : t- These statements seem to suggest a literal transference of im­
mediate feeling from a past occasion to a present occasion t )
There is a flow of feelin g (PR 363) . sounds as though some component feeling in the satisfaction of the
A simple physical feeling has the dual character o f being �
past occasion persists with retent on of its own immediacy into the
i\J
concrescence of the new occasio1 n this way a "part" of the im­
�
th cause's feeling re-enacted for the effect as subj ect. But
m ediate feeling which constituted the past occasion would seem
this transference of feeling effects a partial identification of
cause with effect, and not a mere representation of the cause. to "spill over" into the immediate feeling of the present occasion;
· . It is a feeling from the cause which acquires the sub­
·
or to be shot off, like a stone from a meteor, directly into the im­
j ectivity of the new effect without loss of its original sub­ m ediacy of the present occasion; or to be inserted into the im­
(
j ectivity in the cause PR 363-4) . mediacy of the present occasion as one organism is inserted while
it is yet alive into another living organism, as a goldfish into an
The determ inistic efficien t causat ion is the inflow of the undergradua te.
actual world in its own proper character of its own feelincrs Now if these passages are accepted at their face value without
with their own intensi ve strength, felt and re-enac ted by t h� careful scrutiny of their contexts, and if "transference of feeling"
(
novel concrescen t subje ct PR 3 74) . is taken in a simple and literal sense, then exclusiveness of im­
mediacy would not hold good between a past occasion and a pres­
The present moment is constituted by the influx of the other ent occasion. Some of the past occasion's feelings would persist
into that self-identity which is the continued life of the im­ with retention of their own immediacy into the concrescence of
mediate past within the immediacy of the present Ar 2 3 3 ; ( the present occasion. And to this extent the two occasions would
s e e PR i 17) . have a common enjoyment of feeling. It would then become very
difficult to take seriously Whitehead's doctrine of the perishing
� �
There is t us an anal gy between the transference of energy
and objectification of the past.
from particular occas10n to particular occasion in physical
In my opinion this interpretation mistakes Whitehead's in­
nature and the transference of affective tone, with its emo­
tention. These passages have a meaning consistent with his theory
tional energy, from one occasion to another in any human
(
personality AI 242 ) .
of obj ectification. But that meaning is not always clear. To this
extent Whitehead himself is responsible for a good deal of con­
The direct perception whereby the datum i n the immediate fusion.
subj ect is inherited from the past can thus, under an abstrac­ A more adequate interpretation of these passages will be given
tion, be conceived as the transference of throbs of emotional in Chapter 7, in connection with an analysis of causal obj ectifica­
energy, clothed in the specific forms provided by sensa PR ( tion. This interpretation will be compatible with the principle
i 18) . of the exclusiveness of immediacy. For the present I shall point
out that the literal meaning of these passages is radically incon­
The primitive form of physical experience is emotional­ sistent with some of the dominating principles of Whitehead's
blind emotion-received as felt elsewhere in another occasion system. These principles, judged by their prominence in the cate-
 N O V E LTY A N D E X C L U S IVE N E S S ARE F EELINGS TRAN SFERRED?
goreal scheme and by the clear, emphatic, and extended treat­ perish es, o r ceases t o exist i n the mode o f subj ective immediacy,
ment given them elsewhere, seem fundamental to Whitehead's and is superseded by another actual occasion (TIME passim; PR
theory of actual occasions. If therefore he intends to say there 94, 2 2 2 , 3 2 0) . It then exists in the mode of obj ective immortality
is transference of feeling in a simple literal sense, then there is a for those occasions that supersede it. Thus time is constituted by
radical inconsistency in his theory. the becoming and perishing of actual occasions in the rhythmic
process of creativity. "The ancient doctrine that 'no one crosses
a. Creativity. We have already noticed one of these principles. the same river twice' is extended. No thinker thinks twice; and,
An actual occasion is a definite embodiment of a primordial and to put the matter more generally, no subject experiences twice.
underived activity. It gets its actuality at first hand, so to speak, This is what Locke ought to have meant by his doctrine of time
not by derivation from any other entity. It is an instance of crea­ as a 'perpetual perishing' (PR 43) .
"

tivity. The process of nature thus consists of many series of discon­

Now if a fragment or part of the immediate actuality of a past tinuous acts of becoming. Whitehead also has a doctrine of con­
occasion literally and with retention of its own immediacy passes tinuity in time, which is expressed in terms of the potential

oy{h
into the concrescence of a present actual occasion, this principle divisibility of the acts of becoming. This will be discussed in
e primordial character of creativity would seem to be com­ Chapter 4. What concerns us at the moment is that while there
promised. For in this case a part of the immediate actuality of is a becoming of continuity, "there is no continuity of becoming"
one actual occasion would be derived from another And since\ (TIME 64) .
there are many actual occasions in the immediate past of the pres­
ent actual occasion, all of which might conceivably be present Supersession is not a continuous process of becoming. If we
in it by way of such "simple" transference of feeling, it becomes try to combine the notions of supersession and continuity we
very difficult to give meaning to the self-causation or self-creativ­ are at once entangled in a vicious infinite regress.
ity of the present occasion. "To be causa sui means that the proc­ For if B supersedes A , then the continuity of B requires
ess of concrescence is its own reason for the decision in respect that some earlier portion of B has superseded A antecedently
to the qualitative clothing of feelings. It is finally responsible for to the later portion of B. This argument can be repeated on
the decision by which any lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency. that earlier portion of B, however you choose that portion.
The freedom inherent in the universe is constituted by this ele­ Thus we are involved in an infinite regress. Also the super­
ment of self-causation" (PR i 35 ; see RM 1 0 1-2, AI 303). session of A has to commence at what should be the infinite
On the literal interpretation of the transference of feeling, not end of the regress. But there is no infinite en aAience super­
only the obj ective data for feeling but also the "qualitative cloth­ session cannot be regarded as the continuous unfolding of a
ing" of some feelings in the primary phase would be derived di­ continuum. I express this conclusion by the statement that
rectly and inevitably. This interpretation does scant j ustice to time is epochal. The occasion B which acquires concretion
Whitehead's principle of creative originality. The occasion "con­ so as to supersede A embodies a definite quantum of time
forms" to its past and "anticipates" its future, but within its con­ which I call the epochal character of the concrescence. The
crescence there is no activity, in the sense of "immediate func­ epochal theory of time is the foundation of the theory of

\
tioning," but its own self-creative activity. atomic organisms, and of the modern physical quantum­
theory (TIME 63-4)
b. Time. Another fundamental principle in Whitehead's phi­
losophy is that time is "epochal ." One essential feature of the Now if some feeling which was a component in the immediacy
epochal theory of time is "supersession." An actual occasion of a past occasion persists with retention of its own immediacy
 N OVELTY A N D E X C L U SIVENESS B OU ND ARIE S O F AN OCCA SIO N 73
the attain ment of the ob-
into the novel concrescence, could i t then b e said that the present ing to that which one will becom e in
occasion unambiguously or in all its "portions" supersedes the ject of the acti vity. . .
. head
past occasion? For in this case it would seem that some earlier The implic ation that interes ts us here is one which White
portion of the present occasion, its primary phase, is contemporary re eatedly makes explic it: "A feeling canno t be abstra cted from
with some portion of the past actual occasion, namely that feel­ :e
t act ual entity enterta ining it" (PR 338), namely
its subject .4
way that
ing which has persisted with retention of its own immediacy. To That is to say, the notion of a feeling is define d in such a
make sense of the epochal theory of time we must suppose that a particula r feeling has no
existen ce apart from a specific subjec t
the past, or any part of the past, exists in the present only as ob­ th at "enjo ys" or "ente rtains " it. .
.
j ective and not with its own subjective immediacy. It follows as a corollary that the mode of existen ce of feelmg
roust corresp ond to the mode of existen ce of it� subjec � . A fee ing �
c. The unity of the subject. Another fundamental principle subj ect.
exists as formal ly actual only in the immed iacy of its
that seems to exclude a simple transference of feeling is the unity Wh ere its subj ect has obj ective existen ce rather than formal a � tual­
of the experiencing subj ect. This is somewhat elliptically stated
ity, the feeling also exists obj ectively . Thus. when �
has perishe d
in the first category of obligation : "The Category of Subjective and exists objecti vely for A, any of X's feelmgs which are present
Unity. The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in A must be present obj ectively and not with that immed
iacy
in the process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason with which they were enjoyed by X.
of the incompletenes s of the phase, are compatible for integration It seems clear that this princip le entails a denial of literal trans-
by reason of the unity of their subj ect" (PR 39; see 338-44). Any ference of feeling. For if some feeling which was a component in
feeling in any phase of A has A as its subj ect. In any incomplete the immed iate experie nce of X should persist with retenti on of
phase of A, where A has not yet attained its satisfaction, A is never­ its immed iacy into . the experie nce of A, then this feeling would
theless the subject of the feelings which compose that phase. In seem to have been detach ed from its subj ect, X. For X is "an ex­
that phase A is not yet complete, but the feelings which go to make periencing subj ect there-th en," whereas it would . seem that a. detail
up that phase of activity already belong to A as their subj ect. of X's experie nce is immed iate here-now. While the subj ect of
For just as the internal process of the actual occasion is a proc­ the feeling has perishe d, it would seem if there is literal trans­
ess of self-creation or self-producti on, every feeling in that process ference of feeling that the feeling lives on. But this, on White­
is essentially "an episode in self-produc tion" (PR 342). "The feel­ head's theory of the unity of the subj ect, has been shown to be
ings are what they are in order that their subj ect may be what impossible.
it is" (PR 339) . This might be rendered: One determinant of the
nature of a feeling is the necessity that its incomplete subj ect be­
7 . The experie ntial bounda ries of an actual occasion
come complet e.
The mechanism of subj ective aim, mutual sensitivity of sub­ This chapter has shown that an actual occasion as an ac � of e�­
j ective forms, and "pre-establ ished harmony" of feelings, in terms perience transcends other occasion s in two ways. Its experie nce is
of which Whitehead tries to make this conception of the subject both novel and exclusiv e. No two actual occasion s have the same
intelligible , will not concern us here. The notion can best be real internal constitu tion. And no two actual occasion s enj oy the
understood, in terms of human experienc e, if we concentra te on subjective immedi acy of any feeling in commo n.
a phase of experience when there is an intense sense of purposefu l The assertion of social transcen dence by way of "exclusi veness
activity. In that phase of experienc e one does not feel oneself to 4. See also PR 4 1 , where this is pointed out as an implicatio n of categories
be now complete . Yet one's feelings are felt as essentially belong- of obligation i and vii taken together, and PR 355·
 BOU NDARIES OF AN OCCASION 75
74 N OVELTY A N D EXCLUSIVE NESS
side by essential relativity " (AI 2 2 7) . This last phrase suggests that
of_ im� ediacy" amounts to a denial of "foreign bodies" in the con­ we may define, after a
� t1tut10n of an a� tual occasion. An occasion is constituted by feel­ in the light of the foregoing discussionimm ediate experience of
rngs some o_f which have alien entities as their data; but all of the fashion, the limits or boundaries of the boun darie s in terms of
_ which constitute the occasion have that occasion' and only
feelrngs an actual occasion. We may defin e such oblig to anticipate
�hat occasion. as their subject. They are "subjectively rooted" th e ex perience of the occasion and are not ter. ed
the discussion of extension in the next chap daries of an actual
•

rn that occas10n. Conversely, no feeling involved in the con­

.

One way of defin ing the experiential boun

�rescence of �n a� tual occasion has immediacy or formal actuality occasion is sugge sted by the following passa ge: ". . . the con­
I� th.at occa� 10n if its subject is some other occasion. The subjec­ phases, re­
tive 1.mmediacy of an actual occasion belongs exclusively to that stitu tion of any one actual entity is analysableal into objec ts express
lated as presuppose d and presupposing. Etern
occas10n. ssor phase
I � addition to this general conclusion about experiential ex­ how the predecessor-phase is absorbed into the succe for the
clus1�eness we have discovered specific senses in which an actual without limitation of itself, but with additions necessary idual satis­
occas10n tra�scends occasions in its contemporary world, in the determination of an actual unity in the form of indiv const itutions
faction. The actual entities enter into each other 's
future, and rn the past respectively.
An �ctual occasion transcends occasions in its contemporary under limita tions imposed by incompatib ilities of feelings" (PR
225 ). This sugge sts that the boundaries of the imme
diate experi­
world m the fu�ther sense that there is no direct causal or per­ limit s at which, in
ceptual �onnect10n between it and them. This principle of the ence of an actual occasion are in general those ly
mutual mdependence of contemporary occasions leads a fortiori the creative process, abstractive select ion becomes categssoreal con­
to the _concl �sion that an occasion does not share the immediacy necessary. Within these limits, i.e. in the internal proce cessor
o
stitutive of the occasion, n abstractive select ion from prede
of feelmg enjoyed by any of its contemporaries. in­
Future occasions do not now have actuality at all . They can, phases for admission into successor phases is involved. In thisinto
m th e �a.t1_1�e of the case, only exist for the present actual occasion ternal process of feeling, predecessor phases are absorbed c­
successor phases without limitation. Beyond these limits, abstra
·

as poss1b1ht1es. In the present there is only the necessity that there

shall _ �e a future, and that the future must conform to present tive selection from processes of feeling is categoreally necessary.
cond1t10ns. � o future occasion now exists. Again, a fortiori no Within the immediate experience of an actual occas ion nothing
pre�ent occas10n shares the immediacy of feeling to be enjoyed has to be eliminated. But elimination is involved in all prehen­
by.i ts successors. The only connection is anticipation. sion of processes of feeling beyond the immediate experience of
µast actual occasions are felt by a present occasion as stubborn the given occasion .
fact. But they are f� lt as having been experiencing subjects in the Thus the anterior boundary of the immediate experience of an
past and not as bemg experiencing subjects in the present; they actual occasion would be the limit at which abstractive existence
a:e felt under selective . abstraction; and
those past feelings posi­ or potentiality ceases and non-eliminative feeling begins. The feel­
t1vel! felt �re no� felt as existing in the present with that im­ ings of antecedent actual occasions are felt under selective ab­
mediacy w1 th �h1�h they were enjoyed by their past subjects \ straction; the feelings of the given actual occasion are felt with­
.
The. SU �Jective _ out elimination of any of their conten t.
� mmediacy of a given actual occasion is thus Similarly, the contemporary boundary of the imme diate exper i-
exclusive, m definite senses, of the subjective immediacies of all
o.ther actu�l occasions: "The individual immediacy of an occa­ ence of an actual occasi on would be the limit beyond which the
s10n · · ·
. moment of
is Its sheer individuality, bounded on either present exists as passiv e poten tiality . For the presentation of the
 N OVELTY A N D E X C L USIVE NESS
contemporary world in this mode abstracts from the real indi­
vidual actualities that compose it. Within this limit, present feel­
ing is felt without elimination.
Again, the posterior boundary of the immediate experience of
an actual occasion would be the limit at which the non-elimina­
tive internal process of feeling ceases or perishes. Beyond this CHAPTER 4
limit the actual occasion has ceased to enjoy itself as a concrete
unity. It will exist for succeeding processes of feeling only under
abstractive selection, that is, in its objective immortality. Regions
In this way the individual immediacy of an actual occasion can
be said to be "bounded" by relativity, that is, by objective or ab­
stractive existence. This use of the figurative notion of experiential THE PURPOSE of this chapter is to explain and support an in­
boundaries may help to make clear the meaning of the experiential terpretation of the spatiotemporal character of actu.al o�cas ions.
exclusiveness of an actual occasion. That such boundaries should _
I shall discuss Whitehead's earlier theory of extens10n, mnden­
be drawn in such a way that they illustrate mutual exclusiveness tally, because it differs in an important way from his treatment
of immediacy in the case of any two actual occasions is the con­ of extension in the later writings.
clusion this chapter has sought to explain and support. Since our interest is in actual occasions as socially transcendent
Finally two relevant points should be mentioned, though neither individuals, our problem may be suggested by the phrase, "the
is essential to the preceding argument : extensive relation; of actual entities mutually external to ea: h
First, Whitehead's account in his later writings of the spatiotem­ .
other" (PR 440) . fThe �n . is: In what sense are t�e . spat10-
poral regions of actual occasions is in harmony with the above temporal relations between actual occasions "external"? \The last
interpretation of the experiences of actual occasions. The regions chapter dealt with the experiential exclusiveness of actu � l occa­
of actual occasions, as we shall see, though they may be contiguous, sions. This chapter deals with tb�mJ;>.Q.t<!l . ex,�h:rn1ye_11e.s�.
are nonoverlapping and thus mutually exclusive. The interpretation I shall explain and defend is as follows :
Second, I shall argue later that between God and an actual occa­
1. An actual occasion is extensive.
sion as well as between two occasions there is no sharing of im­
mediacy. 2. The region of an actual occasion is definite.
3 . The regions of actual occasions form an extensive plenum.
4. No two actual occasions have the same region.
5. The regions of any two actual occasions are nonoverlapping.

If these propositions can be adequately explained and supported,

then we shall have found a well-defined sense in which actual occa­
sions, in respect to their spatiotemporal characters, are external
to one another. This would be another mode of social transcend­
ence. An actual occasion would transcend any other occasion in
the sense that they would have no common spatiotemporal parts.
We could say that the regions of actual occasions are mutually
exclusive .
77
 :HOW O CCAS I O N S ARE EXTEN SIVE 79
REGI O NS
(PR 4 34-5. This immediately succeeds the sentence cited above).
The region ma.}! he abstracteQ. from the occasion and "divided/'
1. How actual occasions are extensive Thus the region cannot be a "reason" for the subjective unity
It is an important fact that the term "extension" is not used of the occasion as an act of experience. It is in this sense that the
in the categoreal scheme set forth in Process and Reality (Pt. I, region does not presuppose its concrescence.
ch. 2) . The first mention of extension in that book occurs in the On the other hand, a11 occasion necessarily_involves some re­
succee�ing. c� apter titled "Some Derivative Notions." The way giQD. As an act of experience it presupposes some particular re­
extens10n is mtroduced cor_responds to its place in Whitehead's g:iQn in the sense that that act of experience cannot be abstracted
theory of actual occasionsLThe extensive character of an actual from that region: "There is nothing self-contradictory in the
occasion, its region, is derivative from its character as an act of thought of many actual entities with the same abstract essence;
experienceJ but th�re can only be one actual entity with the same re�l �ssence.
Whitehead expresses the relation between actual occasions and Fo:i;- the real essence indicates '.where' the entityjs, that is to say,
their regions in various ways. It is true tha �hen attentfon is on its status in the real world . . . " (PR 94; see MT 2 2 7) . The reason
the extended character: of nature, a region is sometimes identified why an occasion has a particular region lies in the intrinsic nature
with an actual occasion\ For example, "both A and B [i.e. two con­ of that act of experience. Its extensive character is essential to it,
temporary actu �l occasions] are atomic regions in the potential not an accidental fact about it. Tpe region is its "standpoint,"
scheme of spatio-temporal extensiveness which is a datum for the here-now from which it prehends other actual entities.
both A and B" (PR 1 88) . But this is simply because contemporary In passing we should notice that the systematic scheme of exten­
occasions are �bjectified for one another only by way of spatio­ sive relations throughout the actual world, as well as the region
temporal relat10n0n other passages a region is said to be "cor­ of a particular occasion, � interpretable in terms of experience.
relative" to an actual entity: (PR 1 1 3) , and occasions are said to This systematic scheme,[the extensive continuum, is simply an
"belong" to regions (PR 1 90)\ aspect of the systematic interrelations of acts of experience. It is
only in this sense that space and time are "abstractions." Space
When, on the other hand, attention is on the occasion as an
�ct of experience, the region is said to be "the primary real phase" and time are real facts about the world. But categoreally speak­
m the concrescence (PR 1 04) or the creative act is said to "arise ing they are derivative from the natures of actual occasions as acts
from" (PR 5 2 2) a region. Again, the occasion is said to be the "en­ of experience (sMw 1 0 1)]
joyment" of the region or "quantum" (PR 434). From this it should Now we can describe the extensive character of an actual occa­
_be clear tha� an occasion is not simply identical with its region. sion more specifically. I suggest two senses in which an occasion
J It may be fair to say that the region of an occasion is its extensive is spatiotemporal or extensive:
character]
In one �assag� Whi �ehead explains that "The concrescence pre­ @. A,.n actual occasion enjoys "extendedness." It is part of the
supposes its basic reg10n, and not the region its concrescence." immediate experience of an occasion that it is "here" and "now"
This has two implications. On the one hand it means that an (sMw 98). This here-now (sMw 2 1 1) is its standpoint (PR 1 04). It
actual occasion is more than its region. The occasion as an act is not a "point" or a "point-instant" but has thickness and spread.
of experience has a unity that its region does not have. "Thus This thickness and spread are qualities of the experience of the
the subjective unity of the concrescence is irrelevant to the occasion. Extension gets its fundamental meaning from this thick­
divisibil ity ?f the �egion. In dividing the region we are ignoring J!ess and spread of experi��e. This is the first sense in which an
_
the subjective umty which is inconsistent with such division" actual occasion is extensive or spatiotemporal in character.
 So REGI ONS
H O W O CCAS I O N S ARE EXTE N S IVE
This here-now o r standpoint o r region is a four-dimensional
"volume" (PR 472 ) . The occasion "takes time" and is stretched ity is ngt the log:ical priority of a premise tCLa__Conclusnio . (iii)
out in space. Its region is "a volume of space through a duration For a similar reason the relation of one phase to another qmn.Qt
b e construed as a whole-part relation. This construction would
of time" (sMw 99) . But as a feature of the immediate experience
of the occasion the region is not divisible into spatial and temporal s��m to eliminate the dynamic character of the process. (iv) In
parts. It is a "quantum" of space-time. It� indivi§.ible unityJ_ollows an ob iter dictum Whitehead says of the concrescence, "This de­
frQJ]l the indivisibility of the immediate experience of the occa­ velopment is nothing else than the Hegelian d�velop� ent of .an
filQ!!, w"hich in turn follow� frqm_iJ;_S_!l!lfr:y of subject,iye_aiui. "The idea " (PR 254) . But there is good reason to thmk this contams
problem dominating the concrescence is the actualization of the considerable exaggeration. Only two pages earlier he had said,
quantum in solido" (PR 434; see 1 07) . As a character of the im­ "In the place of the Hegelian hierarchy of categories of thought,
mediate experience of the occasion) the region is indivisible. the philosophy of organism finds a hierarchy of categories of fee�­
The temporal thickness of the experience of the occasion means ing" (PR 2 5 2 ) . It seems risky to construe concrescence as a di­
it is not a moment but a duration. It is an epoch, or pause, in alectical process in Hegel's sense (see ESP 7, i 1 6, i 3 1 ) .
physical time (sMw i 77) . Rather, the succession of instantaneous So it seems that though genetic priority may have analogies
moments making up the time of physics is an abstraction from with other sorts of priority we must acct;.i2t.iUJL�m_e1hi.ng.j)Lits
a succession of real durations. How do the experiences of actual own kind. The categoreal explanation of concrescence is given
in the categoreal scheme. For its applicability Whitehead appeals
occasions constitute durations? to our immediate experiences (PR 3 2 ) .
The internal process of concrescence is a succession of "phases." Now as we saw in Chapter 2 the genetic process is not the whole
But story of an actual occasion. This process produces a feeling of
Thj§...�en etic passage from phase to phase i� not in pI:!Y_�ica! satisfaction which completes the concrescence.Jts feelings have
ti.1,!le: the exactly converse point of view expresses the rela­ achieved solidarity and it now "takes time." [ I}y producinKjts
tionship of concrescence to physical time. It can be put shortly satisfaction the - occasion constitutes Q!l�-�QfJh& ..sl11.ratig11s '_Vhich
by saying, that1 physical time expresses some features of the ��-�P th� t���a!ly s;xtendecL�Q!]Q. These drops of experi­
_growth, but n �t the growth of the features] . . . But the ence by succeeding one another give rise to the continuity of phys­
I genetic process is not the temporal succession: such a view ical time. But as a feature of the experience of the occasion its
._
is exactly what is denied by the epochal theory of time} Each duration is "time lived" not "time measured. 'J
phase in the genetic process presupposes the entire quantum, Th<:'._.spatial spread of the ex.J2erience of the occasion is auQCher
and so does each feeling in each phase (PR 434) . asP.ect of its extendedness. T_h_e . �'J:1ere" from which i.tprehends
Here we encounter a notion that is not easy to understand or ex­ its . . E.b._y:sical�_iLilQL_a�.-PDint. . _J:]:ie....Q£QlJ.i Oll...§tr�t<;:J1e§. �9�l1.t_jn
plain. One phase must be in some way prior to another. What space as well as iuJime ang enjoys feelings of a....l!!l!Jti.plicity .o f
sort of priority is this? Negatively, this g_enetic priority must. be data (there and there and there) fr;QnLil;s�.'filre.'' Its feelings
achieve spatial as well as temporal solidarityLThis solidarity means
�
l.
dis_tinguished from other sQI.ts of prio:rity. (i) We are not to think
of it as priority in physical time. We are not to think of phase that, as each phase is a phase of one experience "now," so each _
A occurring at time 0 1 00 and phase B occurring at 0 1 00 plus i) how­ feeling in each phase is a component of one experience "here.�)
ever small the increment may be. The iIJ,ternal process is '. '.J:>e­ As far as its immediate existence goes, a feeling is "located" not
coming," not "transitio n." (ii) Since the concrescence is a creative in a subregion of the spatial quantum but in the quantum as a
process in which decision occurs, it would seem that genetic prior- <: whole. "Each phase in the genetic process presupposes the entire
\ quantum, and so does each feeling in each phase" (PR 434) .
 RE G I O N S DEF INITE N E SS O F R E G I O N S

1� The s�.cond sense in which an actual occasion is extensive defi�Jigi.e in t,he �eXJ£illiY-�---�cJ1�m� which characterizes the
__ . .

is that, as objectified for other actual occasions, it. is in prin�iple actual world. And it is definitely limited in its spatiotemporal
i11definitely divisible. Whitehead says of the objectified occasion, extent, so that the occasion may be said to occupy a definitely
"This divisibility is what constitutes its extensiveness" (PR i o8). limi ted amount of space and a definitely limited amount of time.
When the satisfaction has completed the concrescence, the occa­ In view of certain confusions these specifications require some ex­
sion becomes an object for succeeding occasions. It is given as an planation and support.
extended fact imposing conformity on its successors. But now it a. The region of an actual occasion is definite in the sense of
no longer exists as a unified subjective experience. It is an objec­ having a definite position. A. 0. Lovejoy, in his analysis of the
tive fact or datum for analysis and a bstraction. The region as­ notion of "simple location," against which Whitehead has pro­
sociated with its satisfaction, therefore, is now divisible spatially tested, offers as one possible meaning for the term what he calls
and temporally into partes extra partes. For "the region is, after "single location." 1 We shall say that an actual occasion has single
all, divisible, although in the genetic growth it is undivided" (PR location. It is at some definite place and time in the extensive
435). sch eme. In one sense, "every actual entity in its relationship to
[From being the thickness and spread of an immediate act of other entities is . . . somewhere in the continuum" (PR i o4) .
experience, the region has now become a potentiality for division It has an unambiguous spatiotemporal position in relation to all
and subdivision by those actual occasions for which it is an objec t] other occasions.
It is this indefinitely divisible character of the given world which This is not, as it might seem to be, contradictory of Whitehead's
makes it an extensive continuum (PR i o3, 434-5). denial of simple location. For his denial has a definite and limited
An actual occasion therefore is extensive in a twofold way, cor­ meaning. He is denying that material substances, as traditionally
responding to its two successive modes of existence; in its sub­ conceived, have concrete actuality.
jective immediacy it enjoys extendedness, and in its objective To say that a bit of matter has sjmJ!_le locatiQJJ means that,
immortality it is divisible. "Thus, an act of experience has an
objective scheme of extensive order by reason of the double fact in expressing its spatio-temporal relations, it is adequate to
that its own perspective standpoint has extensive content, and that state that it is where it is, in a definite finite region of space,
the other actual entities are objectified with the retention of and throughout a definite finite region of time, apart from
their extensive relationships" (PR i o5). any essential reference of the relations of that bit of matter
Hereafter in this chapter we shall be concerned with the re­ to other regions of space and other durations of time. . . .
gions, or extensive characters, of actual occasions. I shall argue that among the primary elements of nature as
apprehended in our immediate experience, there is no ele­
ment ""..��tever which possesses this character of simple loca­
2. Regions of actual occasions are definite tion" �0 8 1 ; see 69).
The region of an actual occasion is in . i;n;inciple precisely de­ His constructive substitute for this traditional conception is a
fi.ua.ble and in this sense definite l Th t{ here-now\v:b ich is the stand- complex theory, in which two sorts of entities are carefully dis­
12oint for the occasion '!§ an experiencing syJ��ct,. and which for
..
tinguished, namely objects and events. He undertakes to interpret
other actual occasions is a "there" or there-then, bas_an ... JJll :
._
.. _ any "bit of matter," for example a pebble, as the ingredience of
a!Jlbiguous meaningl
. . .. . . . .

I. The Revolt against Dualism (Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co.,

The region is definite both in respect to position and in respect i 929), p. i65 .
to extent. That is to say, i..t is at some definite plac.e and..m....
 REGIONS DEF IN I TE N E S S O F R EG I O N S
certain obj ects i n certain events.2 Suppose now we ask whether only in the sense that upon its completion its satisfaction will be
on his theory the pebble is singly located in Lovejoy's sense. Then, a da tum for future actual entities. It is only in respect to the ob­
interpreting the pebble as a perceptual object, the answer would jective existence of other actual entities in it, and in respect to
be no. For objects are ingredient in other events besides those in _
i ts o bjective existence in other actual entities, that the occas10n
::'F
which they are "situated." or example, the, _perce12tual object is sai d to be anywhere else than at its basic regional standpoint.
i� ingredient in the experience of t!ie I�er�i pient as 'Yell as in i,ts Another instance of this misleading note may be cited: ". . .
situation. But if we ask whether, on his theory, anything is my theory involves the entire abandonment of the notion that
singly �1? cated, the answer is yes. For i:.,very . event is singly simple location is the primary way in which things are involved
.
Jg�c;:,;:i,i e dj This does not contradict Whithead's denial of simple in space-time. In a certain sense, everything is everywhere at all
location, because single location does not exhaust the meaning ti m es." This certainly sounds as though an actual occasion does
of simple location. Even events (and actual occasions) are not not have a single unambiguous position. But in this same passage
simply located in Whitehead's sense of "simple" because, though everything is said to be "everywhere at all times" only in the
they are singly located, they have "essential reference" to other sense that "every location involves an aspect of itself in every other
events. location. Thus every spatio-temporal standpoint mirrors the
I t is true that some of Whitehead's expressions seem to deny wor ld." Just what it may mean to mirror the world we shall try
that an actual occasion has a definite position. For example : to find out later. We note only that the doctrine is presented as
"a mere transcript of the obvious facts, " and that among these
. . . in the actual world there are definite atomic actualities
determining one coherent system of real divisions throughout is the fact that "you are in a certain place perceiving things,"
the region of actuality. Every actual entity in its relationship and that "your perception takes place where you are" (sMw 1 2 8) .
to other actual entities is in this sense somewhere in the con­ " . . . each actual entity includes the universe by reason of its
tinuum, and arises out of the data provided by this stand­ determinate attitude towards every element in the universe" (PR
point. But in another sense it is everywhere throughout the 7 1-2, my italics) .
continuum; for its constitution includes the obj ectifications In his earlier writings Whitehead clearly attributes single loca­
of the actual world and thereby includes the continuum; tion to events : "The chief confusion between objects and events �
also the potential objectifications of itself contribute to the is conveyed in the prej udice that an obj ect can only be in one \
real potentialities whose solidarity the continuum expresses. place at a time. That is a fundamental property of events; and )
Thus the continuum is present in every actual entity, and whenever that property appears axiomatic as holding of some l
each actual entity pervades the continuum (PR 1 04-5, my physical entity, that entity is an event" (PNK 65) . Lovejoy is correct
italics) . in pointing out that simple location, in the sense of the single
location of events, far from being denied by Whitehead, appears
But here it is clear that the actual entity is "in" the past world in his writings as "the first law of nature" (The Revolt against
only in the sense that causal influences from that world have con­ Dualism, p. 1 67) . This statement, it seems, was written without
tributed to its nature. As the passage itself hints, it is truer to say reference to Process and Reality, where the distinction between
the past world is in the new occasion than to say the new occasion events and actual occasions was made clear. With this distinction,
is in the past world. Again, the actual entity is in the future world namely that "An actual occasion is the limiting type of an event
2 . Or, in the language of his later writings, in a historic route of actual with only one member" (PR 1 1 3) , Lovejoy's dictum would apply
occasions . See AI 200- i. See Chs. 5 (on substance) and 10 (on objects and a fortiori to actual occasions.
events) below. Indeed, in Science and the Modern World where the distinc-
86 REGI O NS DEF I N ITEN ESS O F RE G I O N S
tive characteristics of actual occasions have already appeared, This assumption must not be construed either as asserting
Whitehead says: "Prehensive unification might be said to have an atomic structure of events, or as a denial of overlapping
simple location in its volume A. But this would be a mere tautol­ events. It merely asserts the ideal possibility of perfect defi­
ogy. For space and time are simple abstractions from the totality niteness as to what does or does not belong to an event which
of prehensive unifications as mutually patterned in each other" is the subject of thought, though such definiteness cannot be
(sMw 1 0 i ) . Since we are concerned with the nature of the region achieved in human knowledge (PNK 74) .
(or volume), not with its derivation, we may provisionally over­
look the tautology and regard this as a significant statement. At first sight this gives an ambiguous answer to the question
In Process and Reality it is clear that �he extensive relations whether events have definit e natural boundaries. It suggests that
of . a n actual occasion are essential to it. It cannot be anywhere precise definitions of events in spatiotemporal terms are possib le
el�n _its formal existence, and_ be the same occasion: ". . . th� by extensive abstrac tion. Thus, having defined "event-particle" inis
actual entity, in virtue of being what it is, is also where it is. It terms of abstractive sets, White head can say that an event
is somewhere because it is some actual thing with its correlated "uniquely defined by the set of event-particles which form its
actual world" (PR 93; see 1 1 3). That quantum of the extensive boundary" (PNK i 2 7) . "A boundary can only bound one event and
continuum which is the primary phase of an occasion "is con­ every event has a boundary" (PNK i 2 2) . However, the passage above
stituted by its totality of relationships and cannot move" (PR i 24) . suggests also that such precisely defined events are subjects of
'l::h us it is of the essence of an actual occasion to have single loca­ though t .
. tion. And sine� tbt reg:ign of an occ;a.sion i& simply its exten� �.Ye Now does this mean that, due to the demand of thought for
cbara,ter, to_ say that the o,casjon has single lgcation means that definite subjects of propositions, such entitie s are postulated as
th.«:! region has a definite position. hypothetical constructions, though they do not exist in nature?
b. The region of an actual occasion is definite in the sense of On this reading nature would consist of vague and indeterminate
having a definitely limited ex tent with definab le boundaries. An
wholes in passage, and any precisely definable event would be an
actual occasion has a definite position in the sense that it is singly abstraction, not a natural fact. This possibil ity, however, White­
head seems to repudiate emphatically: "Thus an event has its own
�o�ated in _ a particular spatiotemporal region.[An occasion is def­ substan tial unity of being which is not an abstract derivative
�mte also m the further sense that its region is definitely limited from logical construc tion" (PNK 7 7) .
m extent, so that in principle its boundaries are precisely de­
finabl e) It i � conce�vable that regions miwt haye a definite. iocus An alternative reading of the passage is that events as natural
and ye� an mdefimte extent. M�y we exclude this possibility? entities do have definite boundaries, thou � these boundarie_s are
It will be useful to refer to events in Whitehead's earlier writ­ not precisely discerned in perception. l.rercep tual expenence
ings. before dealing with actual occasions in his later writings. might, however, suggest the boundaries of events, so thatU the con­
An important passage may be cited in full: struction of a boundary is in reference to natural fac The ap­
a

plication of geometrical concepts to the actual world would not

Thus it is a basal assumption, essential for ratiocination re­ then be a matter of assigning conventional limitations where none
lating to perceptual experience, that there are definite en­ in fact exist. Geometrical specification would then be in theory
tities which are events; though in practice our experience capable of referring to spatiotemporal "joints" in the actual world.
d ? es !10� enable us to identify any such subject of thought, as This latter reading may be supported by reference to certain
discnmmated from analogous subjects slightly more or passages where the context clearly refers to natural facts and not to
slightly less. abstractions of thought:
·
88 REGIO NS DE F I N I TE N E S S O F R E G I O N S 89
a limited event possesses a completely defined limitation actual occasion i s the "limiting type o f an event with one mem­
of extent which is expressed for us in spatio-temporal terms ber," and an event is "a nexus of actual occasions, inter-related in
(CN 7 4). 3 some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum" (PR 1 1 3 ;
see 1 24).
A finite event occupies a limited chunk of this manifold
• • •(CN 1 00) .4 An examination of Science and the Modern World and Process
and Reality bears out this presumption.5 The standpoint of a (
It may be further supported by noticing that when Whitehead "prehensive unification" is "a volume of space through a duration (
refers to the lack of clear demarcations of events as given in per­ of time" (sMw 99). The extensive scheme is "atomized" by actual
ceptual experience, he underlines the seeming or apparent lack of occasions "determining one coherent system of real divisions
demarcation, as though sense awareness here did not give a com­ throughout the region of actuality" (PR 1 04). An actual occasion
plete account of the natural facts. Finite events "have indistinct involves a definite lapse of time and has a spatial volume for its
demarcations simply owing to lack of perceptive vividness and of p erspective standpoint (PR 1 05; see SMW 1 77, PR 472). The ex­
discriminative force" (TsM 4 7 ) fi� our experience, "Events appear tensive region of an actual occasion is "the determinate basis" pre­
:?
as indefinite entities without clear demarcations (PNK 73). Sense supposed by the concrescence (PR 434; see 1 24). "In the physical
awareness is indeterminate (CN 59) and does not enable us to dis­ world each epochal occasion is a definite limited physical event,
criminate precisely between events. "Exactness is an ideal of limited both as to space and time, but with time-duration as well
thought, and is only realised in experience by the selection of a as with its full spatial dimensions" (RM 9 1 ) .
route of approximation" (cN 59). That a region, conceived as a relatum for extensive connection,
Finally it may be supported by the consideration that the whole is of definitely limited extent is explicitly asserted. ". . . a cer­
process of extensive abstraction, as defined in the earlier writings, tain g�ennin.at�_QQµndi:g_n es.Li§.Jt!:flJitesLfor__ the riotiQn of a _ _

seems to presuppose that the events in terms of which extensive region-i.e., for tl:Le.n.u.tiQu...oLan.J:xtensive_standpoint in tb_e real
relations are described are of limited extent, and that they are potenti.alit¥ for J!CtualizatiQii. The inside of a region, its volume,
natural facts. The difficulties this entailed led Whitehead to give has a complete boundedness denied to the extensive potentiality
a very different account of extensive relations in Process and external to it. The boundedness applies both to the spatial and
Reality. But these difficulties are not our immediate concern. the temporal aspects of extension. Wherever there is ambiguity
If finite events in the earlier writings have definite spatiotem­ as to the contrast of boundedness between inside and outside, there
poral boundaries, there is a strong presumption that the regions of is no proper region" (PR 547, Corrigenda to p. 459). Bu!)JO! �11
actual occasions are of definite spatiotemporal extent also. For an the reg�-�s t���'"�re r��ta f9rs�!.f}l§,iY�..rnJ1Q�i;:tion, a.r e regions of
actu,al Q.g,:qsions. Some �'!I,e'"as we shall see, " p_ossible" regions. And
3. Whitehead's note in CN i97-8, while some of the language is ambiguous,
does not seem to invalidate this passage, to which he there refers. He with­ whether the precise definitions of regions in the theory of extensive
draws his previous limitation of infinite events to durations: "There is not connection are applicable to the regions of actual occasions is the
only a significance of the discerned events embracing the whole present dura­ question at issue. Hence passages of this latter sort cannot be used
tion, but there is a significance of a cogredient event involving its extension as evidence for our proposition.
through a whole time-system backwards and forwards." I interpret this to
If the regions of actual occasions are definitely limited in extent
mean not that the cogredient event extends throughout the time system but
that the sign ificance of the event extends throughout the time system. then both their positions and their extent are in principle specifi-
4. That is, the four-dimensional manifold of event-particles. In his ensuing 5· The regions referred to in A dventures of Ideas are in every case types
explanation, the relative positions of event-particles are defined in reference of nexus, not regions of actual occasions. See AI 254-5, 275-6, 2 8 1 , 335. In
to the "given event." general this is true of the other writings in his later period.
go REGIONS THE EXTE N S IVE P L E N U M 91

able. That Whitehead takes this possibility seriously is suggested and whose "philosophical use is nil" (oT 225; see ESP 241). I t be­
by his treatment of "indicative systems." " . . . a modern traveller comes a mere name for the material postulated to underlie elec­
sitting on the bank of the Rubicon, and meditating on his direct tromagnetic occurrences (sMw 1 39). No scientific facts require the
perceptions of actual occasions can locate, relatively to himself by acceptance of a material ether by metaphysical theory. fi5ome
spatio-temporal specifications, an event , [ e.g. Caesar crossing the medium of transmission is required, but the notion of a material
RubiconJ which inferentially and conjecturally he believes to in­ medi um is scientifically and philosophically unsatisfactory.J
clude a portion of the past history of the Rubicon as directly Whitehead would therefore substitute for the material ether an
known to him" (PR 298).[}: very actual occasion has a definite posi­ " e ther of events" (TSM 55, CN 78), wl,ijch would serve the scientific
tion in the extensive continuum and a definitely limited extent Rurposes for which the material ether was postulated ( PNK 41) and
with boundaries which are, at least theoretically, precisely de­ avoid its difficulties. "The whole complex of events" ( PNK 66), in- � �,
stead of a material ether, wQuld now furnish the continuity re� f �-,...:
.

/
finable]
qu.i:r:ed for physical transmission and fieklthe.ory . TJi�"ethrr'..'..--11QW )
'

becomes an expression for the systematic modification of 4Vents,.i

3. The extensive plenum
.

throughout space and time (cN 1 60, PRIN R 37).

Whitehead denies that there is, in a strict sense, any empty In this way he can reject the notion of empty space, and at the
space (PNK 36, PR i 1 2, MT i 86). Provisionally the earlier writings same time avoid postulation of a material ether. The result for
implement this denial with {arguments in support of an ether, his theory of actual occ:asiqns is that no two regions oLac.tuaLoc­
filling all space and serving as a medium for physical transmissioaj casions are separated by ''t:m pt�.ace ."
In support of the theory of transmission of stress through some In denying empty space he is accepting the Cartesian notion of
medium, and against the theory of action at a distance, Whitehead a spatial plenum. But Descartes's view is modified and generalized
brings forward considerations based on the wave theory of light, in terms of an extensive plenum of events in the earlier writings
the general character of Maxwell's formulae for stresses, the pre­ or of actual occasions in the later writings (ESP 239, 242). " . . .
supposition by Maxwell's formulae of a physical field, and Max­ from the standpoint of any one actual entity, the 'given' actual
well's identification of light with electromagnetic waves. These are world is a nexus of actual entities, transforming the potentiality of
cited "in addition to the somewhat vague philosophic preferences, the extensive scheme into a plenum of actual occasions" ( PR i 1 9).
based on the disconnection involved in spatial and temporal sep­ Since every event or actual occasion is a process, it may now be
aration" ( PNK 20). A further argument for the ether is based on the said that "something is always going on everywhere, even in so­
absoluteness of direction, of which the rotation of the earth is called empty space" (cN 78).
giv,,,e n as an illustration (PNK 36-7). 0Vhitehead continues to refer to empty space, or to "so-called
[His acceptance of a material ether is only provisional, however J empty space," but the expression simply means "an environment
_

This notion does not really resolve the difficulty in supposing that of faintly co-ordinated achievement" (PR 303), that is to say nexus
separated bodies do yet interact (oT 1 8 1). It is useful in science of actual occasions with extremely faint intensity and hence of
only if it is continually supplemented by ad hoc hypotheses which minimum importance. Such occasions are quite as actual as anl:,
make it impossible to test its existence (PNK 37-4 1 , OT 224-5). In others and impose conformity on their successors (PR 28, 88))
fact, all that we know of the ether "is summed up in Maxwell's When "occupied" space is distinguished from "unoccupied" space
equations, or in recent adaptations of his equations such as those (PR i 1 2, 1 41), and when in reference to the latter such terms as
due to Lorentz" (PNK 2 2) . In itself it is a mere idle concept, a "unoccupied events" are used (PNK 97, SMW 2 1 4), the contrast is
"barren virgin" (CN 78), whose "scientific use is problematical" simply between nexus of actual occasions with well-defined char-
92 REGI O N S D O O C CASION S OVERLAP? 93

acteristics and those with faint coordination among the occasions two actual entities cannot have the same real essence, they cannot
that compose them. have an identical region.
With this denial of empty space and the corresponding assertion The same conclusion follows from the notion of the actual
of a plenum of actual occasions, it seems clear that no two occasions worlds or given environments of actual occasions. In the cat­
can be separated by an interval that is vacant of actual occasions. egoreal scheme the fifth category of explanation is "that no two
It is conceivable, however, that such a plenum might be com­ ac tual entities originate from an identical universe" (PR 33-4) .
patible with the occupation by two occasions of an identical stand­ More explicitly, "�.Q_lw_pccasio12§ can hav(! iderui£aJ�c:;tu31l
poin.t, or with an overlapping of the regions basic to two occasions. 'Wltlds" (PR 32 1 ) , where "the actual world" for a given occasion
We must now consider these possibilities which have been left open. means "the nexus of actual entities in the universe correlate to "
that occasion (PR 34). Now j:he�<J.s:tuaLw:m;ld_uLagiyeQJlccasiruLis '
4. No two occasions have the same region relative to (PR 293),_ Qt:..d�fi�_d byjPR 1 02), t he _stan_d.µ!2inLQL ex� <
_

tensive region basic to that occasion _ (PR 1 2 7) . �he m.eapi_ng of (

This proposition might seem so obvious as not to require dis­ "actual world" a!ters according to the S!.9;!l_c!poil!�f:r_()!l!__�llIS:h _itjs l
cussion, since it is a commonplace that each actual occasion is defined (PR 1 02). Hence, since no two occasions can have the same
novel. But � ince o,ecasions are not stric;J;b:. id_�o.i.Uie.i:t �with_ their actual world, it seems clear that no two occasions can have the
st�ndpoints, an . occasion being.. more . than j.J.L sJ<!D.QpQilJJ, this
__
same standpoint.
proposition does not follow immediately from the principle of
novelty] 5. Regions of occasions are nonoverlapping
It seems that an analogous proposition about events would find
support in the earlier writings and thus create a presumption in The preceding considerations do not at first sight preclude the
favor of the present proposition. For instance, "The concrete event possibility that the region of one actual occasion might include or
itself is also defined by (or, analysed by) the event-particles in­ overlap the region of another. Let us take "inclusion" and "over­
hering in it, and such a set of event-particles defines only one lapping" as defined in Process and Reality :
event" (PNK 1 27; see 1 22). Definition 2 : Region A is said to ' include' region B when
We turn to the later writings and as.k wh�her_t.w!LflflY.iJ l oc­ every region connected with B is also connected with A .
ca.s.ions may have the same re_giQ.n. One argument begins with
Whitehead's discussion of the "real essence" of an actual oc­ Definition 3 : Two regions are said to 'overlap' when there
casion { The'i'abstract essence' of an occasion is merely a combina­ is a third region which they both include (PR 4 5 2) .
tion of characters, that is to say a complex eternal objec (J Since an According to Assumption 1 1 , inclusion is a case of overlapping.
eternal object is a possibility which might be realized in more It must be understood that it is not the usefulness of the defini­
than one instance, "There is nothing self-contradictory in the tions of inclusion and overlapping that is under consideration
thought of many actual entities with the same abstract essence; but here. QJ.lLJL�_tion ilL_iyhether the real standpoints of any two
there can only be one actual entity with the same real essence. For ac;tual occasions may be so related. We �sk .1yl?,c;tJ:i<:L.�1N'O n�gions
the 11_!�al essence ' indicates 'where' . the . entity is, that is to say, its basic to different ocQLsiQJlS may bflYe e.xt.e.nsive_ parts, spatial or
__

status in the real world; the abstract essence omits the particularity temporal or bQ.tb.._in,_CQllllQn .
of the status" (PR 94) . The real essence (to use Locke's term) of an To see the problem more clearly we should notice that in the
actual occasion involves a particular extensive region. Then, since earlier writings events not only may include or extend over other
 94 REGI O N S D O O C CAS I O N S OVERLAP ? 95
events; they always do include some other events and are included Now when we come to the later writings we find that [he general
by still other events. Also two events may intersect or have parts theory of extension is not developed in terms of actual occasions,
in common or overlap, these expressions all having the same mean­ nor even in terms of nexus of occasions (now his interpretation of
ing (PNK 1 0 1-2, CN 76, PRIN R 67) . Therefore a proposition analo­ events), but in terms of regions: "The term 'region' will be used
gous to proposition 5, framed in terms of events as described in for the relata which are involved in the scheme of ' extensive con­
the earlier writings, would be clearly false. nection ' " (PR 449) . This r.estatement of the theory o( extension in
These earlier writings also recognize spatiotemporal exclusion terms of regions, and not in terms of �yents or actual _Qccasions, is_
as a property of events. That is, two events may have no parts in important for our topic ] ,, . v-'fi'°'

common. Events which do not intersect are said to be "separated." 6

In its primary sense a 'tegiod means !he standpoint of an actual !10 \
Thus external relations between events in nature are provided _ g�casion. B l!L th��-is._alfil2.,..ed .us UL i1;1dud.ut!..itL.d�nQ1i!ticm.
for, as well as inclusion and overlapping. In fact every event is pa
� ti.utemp._QraLq. ..uanta xvhic:b.. are noJ . in _factl> tanJlp�oint.§_ .Qf <lc:tual
real standpoints ) In this
..

spatiotemporally external to some other events: " . . . every event occasigns, as well as quanta which are
is known as being related to other events which it does not include. more general sense a region is not necessarily "basic" to an in­
This £.act, that every event is known as possessing the quality of dividual actual occasion. S�.h¥J;1,0thetical §.tarr.d-
exclus10n, shows that exclusion is as positive a relation as in­ 12oints. 'rhey ar�-L�iQnLw.hic_h..m igb t b � _a.i;:J11,<;!li{'..�d b}'. SlS.tlJ.al oc:� ..
.. ..

clusion" (cN 1 86). cas.i.!Jns: "When we divide the satisfaction coordinately, we do not
In this way between two events any of three extensive relation­ find feelings which are separate, but f�Ji11_gs w]1_icQ.�i:njgbL_ �_e
___

ship� is possible: (a) inclusion of one event by the other; (b) over­ s.e.p.arate. In the same way, the divisions of the region are not di­
lappmg or intersection, in which case the two events have spatio­ visions which are; they are divisions which m ight be . E�c:l:L.§,l!Ch
temporal parts in common; and (c) separation (cN 1 85-6). Event mode of division yields.�en§.iYe....q_v..an.ta' : also ap_ - ' �xt�P.2.iye
A might include or overlap or exclude event B . quantum' h�Lh,�en_t.erm�!:L.L�.llt!lJiRQ.ig!' " (PR 435). Using the
We now ask about relations between actual occasions. Do all term in the derivative and more general sense, then not all regions
three. of these extensive relationships apply to the region� of actual are regions of actual occasions. It is in this more general sense that
occas10ns? Later we shall ask whether Whitehead explicitly denies the term is used in the theory of extensive connection in Process
that relations a and b apply to the regions of actual occasions. and Reality, Part IV.
Firs � ':� ask whether his later theory of extension leaves open the The notion of a hypothetical standpoint must be made clear.
poss1b1hty of a denial. Such standpoints are arrived at in two ways. When the region of
Recurring to the theory of extension in the earlier writings, we an actual occasion is divided, any of the subquanta is a region
note that it is developed in terms of events. In the earlier writings which "might" be actualized by an actual occasion. Also when
events are the relata involved in the relationship of extension (PNK the regions of two or more occasions are aggregated, the resultant
6 1 ; CN 58, 75). Hence all extensive relations have to be stated in quantum is a region which "might" be actualized by an actual
terms of events. Inclusion, overlapping, and exclusion are relations occasion.
between events. . . . suppose that P is a coordinate division of an actual oc­
6 PN�' 6 1 , 102; TSM 50;
CN75-6. All intersecting events are necessarily
casion A . Then P can be conceived as an actual occasion with
. :
..J me , but separated events may a lso be joined or, more specifically, "ad­ its own actual world forming its initial datum in its first
. ? � (PNK 1 02-3, CN 1 0 1 ) . For an alternative definition of junction see
JOmed phase of genetic origination. In fact, P is the hypothetical
CN 76. Compare the definition of adjunction with that of external connection satisfaction of a hypothetical process of concrescence with this
or contiguity in PR 453, 468. standpoint . . .
96 REGI ONS
DO OCCASIONS OVERLAP ? 97
Further, in addition to the merely potential subdivision
of a satisfaction into coordinate feelings, there is the merely suggested bY.11 the fundamental importance of "potentiality" for
potential aggregation of actual entities into a super-actuality that theory. ' :E:,�ten�_!01f is_ th�s9mW,�x__ 9LeY<;:ntL q_WLtbeir _po­
in respect to which the true actualities play the part of co­ tentialities (sMw i 79) . It is a metaphysica l assumpti?n, he says,
ordinate subdivisions. In other words, just as for some pur­ that "the real potentialities relative to all standpomts are co­
poses, one atomic actuality can be treated as though it were ordinated as diverse determinations of one extensive continuum.
many coordinate actualities, in the same way, for other pur­ This extensive continuum is one relational complex in which all
pose[s], a nexus of many actualities can be treated as though potential objectifications find their niche . . . . . This exten� ive
it were one actuality. This is what we habitually do in the continuum expresses the solidarity of all possible standpom�s
case of the span of life of a molecule, or of a piece of rock, or throughout the whole process of the world." The reality of this
of a human body (PR 439) . continuum "is the reality of what is potential, in its character of a
real component of what is actual" (PR i o 3 ; see 96, i 1 8, 1 2 3, 3 ? 7) ·
Treating these quanta as standpoints, the entities conceived as It seems that this later theory of extension is a theory of possible
actualizing them are quasi-actualities (PR 448), pseudo sub-organ­ standpoints. The extensive continuum "expresses the solidarit� of
isms or pseudo super-organisms (PR 43 i ) . They are not actual en­ all possible standpoints." The theory has referen�e and app�ica­
tities but entities which migh t be actual (PR 435) . bility to the actual world, because possible standpomts are derived
The extensive continuum, then, C2IJ,����qf.!h�--�y�t-�!llatic order­ from real standpoints. But ig its ful�neraEty t11g t_h�g}:)'._()J ex­
illg_�f (a) tll�fillcJntLQ.L
J22i �f.t!JALQ££'!�ions and (b) all hypo­ tensiv��<;:QI;mection i1>. (IJJ, -�-C<;:QJJJ\t_ QLgl;:i.tions . l:>etween poss ible
_ _

thetical standpo�nts '!IT�tJ2.x�@_c;li_yi§jgn QL. <l_gg:regatim:1 of st<J.ll�clP_oiti ts.

__

actual occasions, Qn 911�- JJJJ,ifQr:tll plan (PR i o 3 5 , 448) . Actual

-
This interpretation may be stated as follows:
occasions are basic to the theory of extension, in its more general a. All the definitions and assumptions in the general theory of
form, in the sense that they furnish real standpoints from which extensive connection are applicable to possible standpoints.
hypothetical standpoints may be derived by subdivision and ag­ b. Some of the definitions and assumptions apply to real stand­
gregation. points.
Those regions which are not regions of actual occasions are to c. Only those definitions and assumptions which are explicitly
be regarded as "hypothetical standpoints," because for Whitehead
"vacuous actuality" has no meaning (PR 43, 253, 47 i ) . There are asserted to do so, or are required to do so by Whitehead's cat­
no bare stretches of space and time. Space and time have signif­ egoreal scheme, apply to real standpoints.
icance only as characteristics of the relations of actual entities. On this view it is not required by the general theory of extension
Therefore regions have significance only as actual or hypothetical that all the relations defined in that theory apply to the regions
standpoints for actual entities. of actual occasions.
I now suggest that some extensive relations may not apply to We now ask whether Whitehead explicitly denies that some of
the regions of actual occasions which are real standpoints. Some these extensive relations apply to pairs of real standpoints. It will
types of extensive connection apply only to hypothetical stand­ be useful to note certain definitions and assumptions that bear
points. It is true that some types must apply to the regions of directly on this question.
actual occasions. But it is not necessary to the theory of extensive a. Inclusion
connection that all extensive relations should apply to them. Definition 2 . Region A is said to 'include' region B when
This interpretation of Whitehead's later theory of extension is every region connected with B is also connected with A . As
 99
9 8 REGI O N S D O O C CASION S OVERLAP ?
an alternative nomenclature, region B will be said to be If inclusion and overlapping do not apply to standpoints of
'part' of region A (PR 452). actual occasions, then the only types of extensive relations between
two real standpoints would be (d) external connection and (c)
Assumption 9. Every region includes other regions; and a mediate connection. Further, the scope of mediate connection
pair of regio�s thus included in one region are not necessarily would have to be narrowed in its application to real standpoints.
�onnecte� with each other. Such pairs can always be found, If no real standpoint includes or overlaps another, then where a
mcluded m any given region (PR 452). mediating region is a real standpoint mediating between other
b. Overlapping real standpoints, this mediating region is externally connected
Defi� ition 3 · Two regions are said to 'overlap' when there is with the regions it mediately connects.
_ which they both include
a third reg10n In support of this interpretation I offer arguments of two kinds.
(PR 452). Certain general arguments cover all types of overlapping and in­
Assumption i 1. If one region includes another region, the clusion. Certain special arguments have relevance only to specific
two regions overlap (PR 452). types of overlapping or inclusion. By the use of several such special
c. Media te conne ction arguments all types of inclusion and overlapping may be dealt
Definition 1 . Two regions are 'mediately' connected when with, and the general arguments thus reinforced.
they are both connected with a third region (PR 450). Un his statement of the theory of extension in Process and Real­
ity there is no suggestion that two regions basic to actual occasions
�ssumption 2. No region is connected with all the other re­ may overlap. On the contrary, the theory of "coordinate division"
g10ns ; and any two regions are media tely connec ted (PR 45 1). seems to exclude this possibility. Coordinate division is division of
d. Ex ternal conne ction
actual occasions objectified as extended data. A coordinate division
yields extensive quanta that are parts of the original region. But
� efiniti on 7 · Two regions are ' externally' connected when the region is not in fact divided into these parts. They are not, in
(i) they are connected, and (ii) they do not overlap (PR 453;
see also 468: � et two actual occasions be termed 'contiguous' a sense, natural factsJ "When we divide the satisfaction coordi­
when the reg10ns constituting their ' standpoints' are exter­ nately, we do not find feelings which are separate, but feelings
nally connected). which m igh t be separate. In the same way, the divisions of the
region are not divisions which are; they are divisions which m igh t
In these defini tions and assumptions Whitehead restates be" (PR 435). The parts into which a real standpoint is divided are
ex_tensive r� l� tions �hich �pplie d to events in the earlier writinthe
gs. always hypothetical standpoints (regions regarded as standpoints
H �s re�efimt10ns of mclus 10n and overlapping need not detain us. for hypothetical actual occasions), and not real standpoints (regions
His remterpretation of "separation " may be notic ed. It will be which are standpoints for actual occasions). An indefinite number
recall ed �at separated events migh t also be "joined," and that of modes of dividing the basic region are possible, yielding an in­
events which are separated and joined were said to be "adjo ined" definite number of corresponding sets of subregions or hypothet­
(PNK 1 02-3, CN 1 0 i). Then "external connection" is a redefinition ical standpoints.
of the notion formerly expressed by "adju nction." Also not all Of his earlier writings Whitehead remarks that there extension
� eparated events are joine d. By Assumption 2, the analogous case was conceived entirely in terms of subdivisions of regions. The
�s that . of regions which are not connected. But any two regions, notion of extensiveness was conceived "as purely derived from the
��clu�mg regions that are not connected, are now said to be notion of ' whole and part,' that is to say, 'extensive whole and ex­
med iately connecte d." tensive part' (PR 439). In Process and Reality, he says, another
"
 'T�
: ', ;'%

0
10 REGIO NS D O O C CA S I O N S O V E R L A P ? 101

type of extensive relationship is emphasized as well, namely "the

merely potential aggregation of actual entities into a super-actu­
ality in respect to which the true actualities play the part of co­
ordinate subdivisions" (PR 439). Thus Un the later writings, in
I external connection and mediate connection. Since every route of
transmission is a series of externally connected regions, mediating
regions are externally connected with the regions which they
mediately connect. We have then a denial of overlapping between
order to account adequately for "the extensive relations of actual the regions of actual occasions involved in any route of physical
entities mutually external to each other," "extensive connection" transmission.
rather than the relation of "extending over" is adopted as the In further support of this interpretation of the regions of actual
starting point for the theory of extension (PR 440)] occasions I offer certain special arguments. Since each of these will
In the later theory the "solidarity" of the extens ive continuum refer only to certain types of overlapping, a series of diagrams may
"embraces not only the coordinate divisions within each atomic be useful to illustrate these types:
actuality, but also exhibits the coordinate divisions of all atomic . .
.
actualities from each other in one scheme of relationship" (PR 438). 1 11 Ill IV v VI
Here there seems to be an explicit distinction between (a) the rela­
tions of subdivisions of regions basic to actual occasions and (b)
the relations between such regions themselves. And the scheme of
relations between real standpoints is said to be a "scheme of ex­
ternal extensive relationships," in contrast to "the schemes of
internal division which are in ternal to the several actual entities" - - - -
( PR 438). It seems quite clear, therefore, that the extensive rela­
tions between regions of actual occasions are always external rela­ Let A and B represent regions. Then the problem is: May any of
tions. That is to say, any two such regions are nonoverlapping and the relations indicated in diagrams i-vi hold between regions that
have no common parts. are real standpoints? In each case let represent the di­
Another argument arises from Whitehead's explanation of phys­ rection of the future from the standpoint of A. Then in types v
ical transmission, which illustrates "the physical importance of and vi, A and B will be contemporary regions. In types i-iv A and
'external connection' " (PR 468). He thinks the prevailing notion of B will not be contemporary.
continuous transmission of energy is liable to the difficulties indi­ In the chapter on "Past, Present, Future" in A dventures of
cated by Zeno's paradoxes and that it "must be replaced by the
7 Ideas (ch. 1 2), Whitehead discusses the "mutual immanence" of
notion of immediate transmission through a route of successive occasions. The point of interest for us here is that: "Evidently this
quanta of extensiveness. These quanta of extensiveness are the mutual immanence and constraint of a pair of occasions is not in
basic regions of successive contiguous occasions" (PR 468). Now general a symmetric relation. For, apart from contemporaries, one
"contiguity" is defined as follows: "Let two actual occasions be occasion will be in the future of the other" (AI 254). From this it
termed ' contiguous' when the regions constituting their ' stand­ would seem that the basic regions of the two occasions, qua tem­
points' are externally connected" (PR 468). It will be remembered poral quanta, do not overlap. This is simply an explicit statement
that external connection excludes overlapping. Thus the extensive of what is implicit in Whitehead's epochal theory of time. "Super­
relations in terms of which physical transmission is explained are session" of one occasion by another is not a continuous process
7 · See SMW i 7 7-80; PR 5 3, 1 05-7, 468. Also quantum theory inclines him
(TIME 63-4). Therefore types i, ii, iii, and iv would be excluded
to explain physical transmission in some other way. See SMW i go. See in Ch. from the extensive relationships possible between the regions of
9 below on quantum theory in Whitehead's thought. actual occasions.
1 02 REGIONS DO O C CASIONS OVERLAP? 1 03
Certain of the types indicated above may be eliminated by refer­ f atomic actual entities. These contemporary actual entities are
ence to "durations." A duration is "a locus of actual occasions, such
that ( ) any two members of the locus are contemporaries, and (/3)
a
� ivided from each other, and are not themselves divisible into
that any actual occasion, not belonging to the duration, is in the other contemporary actual entities" (PR 96) . �he contem�orary
world appears to be, b}lt in fact is noti contiqµon� except m the
causal past or causal future of some members of the duration" sense of being potentially divisible. To avoid using the argument
(PR 487) . It must be remembered that a duration is not an in­
stantaneous moment but involves a definite lapse of time. A dura­ from actual occasions as acts of experience, another passage should
tion is an "epoch" (sMw 1 77) . Since any two members of the dura­ be referred to. In a discussion of presentational immediacy, the
tion are contemporaries, that is to say "in unison of becoming" perceptive mode in which �� apprehend the contemporary "":?rld,
Whitehead gives a defimt10n of contemporaneousness: . . .
(PR 1 90), the temporal extent of duration D is identical with the
temporal extent of any actual occasion as A, which is a member namely, that actual occasions. A and B . are mutually CQntem­
p..o.r.ary, when A does not contribute to the datum for B 1 a�,§_
of D. Now Whitehead says explicitly, "No occasion can be both in does not contribute to the datum for A , eJf(:�t that b<;>t.lL.4._en.�Llt
the past and in the future, of a duration. Thus a duration forms a are �tomic regions in the potential scheme of e:)fte@Yc;!!l��� which
barrier in the world between its past and its future" (PR 49 1 ) . If no
occasion can be both in the future and in the past of a given dura­ - is � datum for both A and B" (PR 1 88) . The_ important point is
tion D, then it is impossible for any occasion, as B, to be both in that, A and B are atomic regicms, anq_presumably divided !£ZlQJ}S.
This is a real or natural fact about A and B, though it is not given
the past and in the future of an occasion, as A, which is a member directly for either one of them. It seems, then, that the regions of
of D. contemporary actual occasions are divided from each other and
Of course, as implied in the definition cited above, A lies in are not divisible into regions of other contemporary actual oc­
more than one duration. In fact, A lies in an infinite number of casions. If so, then types v and vi are excluded from the extensive
durations (PR 487-8) . No one duration includes all of A's con­ relationships possible between regions of actual occasions.
temporaries. Here is Whitehead's theory of alternative time sys­ Taken together these special arguments cover all types of over­
tems, which he adopts on the ground of relativity physics. This lapping and the more general arguments are rei.nforced '. If these
consideration strengthens the argument. For every duration de­ arguments are valid and adequate, then the reg10ns basic to any
fined by A and some of its contemporaries, according to some two actual occasions are nonoverlapping.
definite meaning of unison of becoming, it would hold that no This result does not imply that regions of actual occasions do
actual occasion can be both in the past and in the future of that not overlap other regions, nor that regions of actual occasions do
duration fThus it seems that types ii and iii are excluded from the not include other regions, nor that regions of actual occasions are
extensive relationships possible between the regions of two oc­ not included by other regions. This result is entirely compatible
casionsl The preceding argument is here reinforced with respect with Whitehead's assumption that "every region includes other
to these types. regions" (PR 45 2, Assumption 9). What is hereby asserted is that
Types v and vi, where A and B are contemporary actual oc­ liho§i:;__regions which overlap or)nclude or are included Qy.!_�g_igns
casions, remain to be dealt with. In the chapter on "The Extensive gf actual occasions are themselv�s alwayfL_fJ_Q§si b le sta_:n.Q.�9j11 ts,:J
Continuum" in Process and Reality (P. II, ch. 2), Whitehead dis­ that is to say standpoints for hypothetical actual occasions, and that
cusses "the contemporary world" : "The contemporary world as in no case are those regions real standpoints for actual occasions.
perceived by the senses is the datum for contemporary actuality, "Continuity concerns what is potential; whereas actuality is in­
and is therefore continuous-divisible but not divided. The con­ curably atomic" (PR 95) .
temporary world is in fact divided and atomic, being a multiplicity Incidentally this interpretation makes more intelligible White-
1 04 R E GI O N S

head's conception o f abstractive sets, in terms o f which h e defines

points, lines, and areas. For an abstractive set is composed of an in­ CHAPTER 5
finite number of rt:giQ11s (PR 454) . And if th��"'�"n�gigg�J:!�g to be
thought of as real sta���Lfl�J!:t\l-l�Qccasions �e sholJld im­
mediately land in coqtµ�ion. This has indeed been the destination
Whitehead on Substance
of some interpreters of Whitehead, who incautiously have trans­
ferred to actual occasions the extensive characteristics of events as
defined in the earlier writings. This is a mistake. The regions that WE HAVE B E E N examining those features of the theory of actual
are included by, and in turn include, other regions and thus con­ occasions that make up a doctrine of real individuality. As an act
stitute an indefinitely convergent series (PR 455 ) are hypothetical of experience an occasion is concrete, novel, unified, and exclusive
entities. They are possible, not real, standpoints. of the immediacies of other occasions. Derivatively, its spatiotem­
I am not competent to pronounce on the mathematical adequacy poral region is definite and exclusive. These features of White­
or usefulness of Whitehead's definitions of points, lines, and areas. head's theory implement his pluralism, his assertion that there
But the philosophical argument for his theory is not that it refers are many ultimate matters of fact.
only to experienced entities, nor even that it employs only "actual Usually in European philosophy ultimate matters of fact have
entities." Neither of these arguments would be well founded. The been called substances, and about certain doctrines of substance
philosophical argumel1t foLFhitf.hea,d's theory of__p_oints i� o.nly Whitehead has had a good deal to say. Some of his historical re­
t�at it employs a terr1L.(regi0n) ;whgse generaLm§_g11_i17g ca11 _1;?� marks are perceptive and acute. Others will strike historians as
g1yen by reference to . t]J�� s;xtrn<ie_c;L_c;:h�TI!.C.::tIT _QL Qc;:c;:<J._sipn,s of ex­ unbalanced and perhaps unjust. Since we are concerned with his
Eerience. own positive view, I shall not attempt to correct his historical
judgments. I shall lay his view alongside older ways of thinking as
6. Summary: Spatiotemporal exclusiveness he understands them. His attitude to traditional views of sub­
We have examined Whitehead's theory of extension in his later stance will serve as a clue to interpret his own scheme. It can help
writings, with a view to understanding the regions of actual oc­ us get his view of "real things" into a certain perspective and see
casions and their extensive relations. If the interpretation offered what it amounts to.
is valid, then his theory of the �xtended as;tual w9rld would -be as . It has
jects
seemed to some interpreters that Whitehead simply re­
the category of substance. It is true that some expressions in
follows: The actual world is a plenum of actual occasion�- The
re_g_ion . basic to any occasion has defiJJite� .S-IJ.<!tiDJe_rnpm;:;il pQsition �is later �ritings encourage this opinion.1 In the light of qualifica­
anQ. boundaries, and. nQ..1wo occas!Qns_have.Jl1e �qJJle _region. The tions he mtroduces elsewhere, however, and especially in view of
__

e�tensive relations betweep. the r.,egiQ.llL.QL,a.c.::t.uat_oc:c;:;,tsions . are the outcome of his own speculation, this opinion cannot be main­
l,imited to (a) §xt��conneqiC>ll and (b) me_diaJe_cggp.ec:t!gp.. A�y tained. His treatment of substance taken as a whole amounts to a
m� diating region which is a real standpoint is externally connected critique but not a rejection.
with the real standpoints it mediately connects. We shall ask what he regards as "dead" in traditional interpreta­
.tions
Thus the region of an actual occasion is exclusive of the region of substance, what he regards as "living," and then sum-
of any other occasion. No two actual occasions have any spatio­ 1. For �xample: " . . . the final contrast between a philosophy of substance
and a philosophy of organism" (PR 228). See sMW 74; PR 44, 1 2 9, 3 1 1 ; AI
temporal parts in common. In this sense an actual occasion tran­
r69-70, 356, 3 6 1 ,
scends every other occasion.
1 06 W H I T E H E AD O N S U B S T A N C E W H AT W H I T E H E AD R E J E CT S
marize his treatment o f substance. In this way w e can bring to­ (sMW 74) . I n practical activities common-sense objects, which are
gether and connect up a number of discussions which are scattered re latively clear and distinct, tend to dominate our interpretation
through his later writings. Whitehead himself does not systematize of our experience. When we think of these obj ects the notion of
these discussions. His main obj ective is the development of his enduring substances with accidental qualities seems to make sense
own categoreal scheme. (sMW 7 4, PR 1 1 9-20, MT 1 74-7) .
Again, common language has been developed out of practical
i. What is "dead" m the tradition about substance needs to deal with those facts of experience which are relatively
clear and distinct (PR 1 20, AI 209, MT 1 39) · Therefore this doctrine
In Whitehead's j udgment a certain doctrine about substance of substance has become embodied in "the common forms of lan­
has had an unfortunate influence in Western thought. The root guage" (PR 240) . In the third place, "The exclusive dominance of
of this doctrine he traces to Aristotle's definition : "A primary sub­ the substance-quality metaphysics was enormously promoted by
stance is 'neither asserted of a subject nor present in a subject' " the logical bias of the medieval period" ( PR 2 09) . For the tradi­
( PR 79) . As a logical derivative of this Aristotelian definition he tional Aristotelian analysis of propositions has been exclusively in
cites Descartes's definition: "And when we conceive of substance, terms of subj ect and predicate, and thus has fostered the concep­
we merely conceive an existent thing which requires nothing but tion of enduring substances with accidental qualities as a ruling
itself in order to exist" (as quoted from Principles of Philosophy, idea in metaphysics (PR 45, 1 2 2 , 3 1 9 ; AI 356) .
Pt. I, p. 5 1 , in PR 7 9) . The doctrine is that ultimate matters of fact Because of these facts about experience, language, and logic,
consist in : (a) a substratum that is "vacuous" and static; and (b) this doctrine of substance has often seemed the most obvious and
accidental qualities and relations external to the substratum. natural way to conceive ultimate matters of fact. Whitehead does
Whitehead scrutinizes this doctrine and rej ects it. not deny its usefulness for many practical purposes. But he thinks
Does his rej ection of this doctrine amount to a rejection of the it should not be erected into a metaphysical doctrine. "The simple
category of substance altogether? I shall argue it does not. Cer­ notion of an enduring substance sustaining persistent qualities,
tainly he thinks this doctrine has been influential in Western phi­ either essentially or accidentally, expresses a useful abstract for
losophy. Indeed he may overestimate its prevalence, if not its im­ many purposes of life. But whenever we try to use it as a funda­
portance. But, along with this objectionable doctrine, he finds in mental statement of the nature of things, it proves itself mistaken
the philosophical tradition other views of substance which he . . . For its employment in language and in logic, there is-as
adopts and absorbs into his own categoreal scheme, as we shall see.2 stated above-a sound pragmatic defence. But in metaphysics the
The tradition, like an ancient tree, has living branches as well as concept is sheer error" (PR 1 2 2). It is,..ho w time to ask why, accord-
dead ones. ing to Whitehead, this doctrine is "sheer error" in metaphysics. jrI
The reasons why this objectionable doctrine has been important
a. One element in traditional interpretations of substance which
in cosmological theory, Whitehead thinks, are as follows. First, it
he regards as "dead"-as fundamentally false in metaphysics-is
seems to fit our common-sense experience. Substance and quality
the conception of a vacuous and static substratum. For Whitehead,
so understood are among "the most natural ideas for the human
on the contrary, concrete things are experiencing things. Let us
mind. It is the way in which we think of things, and without these
ex�rp.ine his denial of "vacuous actuality," by which he means a
ways of thinking we could not get our ideas straight for daily use"
real thing devoid of subj ectivity.
2. For his acceptance of certain elements in Aristotle's and Descartes's
doctrines of substance, see on Aristotle PR 45, 8 1 , 209, 3 1 9, and on Descartes The bogily substances have, on this theory, a vacuous exist­
PR viii-ix, 28, 64, 65, 1 14, 2 1 8- 1 9. fnce. Tjiey are sheer facts, devoid of all intrinsic values. It is
 T
1 08 W H I TE H E AD ON S U B S T A N C E W H AT W H I T E H E AD R E J E CT S 1 09
i:p.,trinsically impossible to give .<my reasori why they shoajd mentally conceive it"; and then comments, "Descartes adopts the
come intQ existwce, or .§hould e11c1:y,re, or �shm;il<'l_�_a_se to position that an act of experience is the primary type of actual
exist . . Y This conception of vacuous substantial existence occasion. But in his subsequent developments he assumes that
lacks all explanatory insight u
.
mental substances endure change. Here he goes beyond his argu­
m ent. For each time he pronounces ' I ami� I exist,' . the_ actual oc­
• •

\'We shall never elaborate an explanatory metaphysics un- .

less we abolish this notion of valueless, vacuous existence ." casion, which is the ego, is different; and the ' he' which 1s common
Vacuity is the character of an abstraction, and is wrongly in­ to the two egos is an eternal object or, alternatively, the nexus of
troduced into the notion of a finally real thing, an actuality succ essive occasions" iPR u 6). We do not find. as a, . matter of fact,
(FR 24) . that the subject of immediate e:l{:i,2erience has undifferentiated en­
durance . Hence, to conform to our. ()Wll e}(Eerience of ourselyes,
In this notion of a vacuous substratum Whitehead finds the the.Jheory cl""tim e -�s epochal and "perpetually perishing" becomes
germ of materialism which, with Berkeley and Hume, he rejects. necessary .
His objection has both a rationalistic and an empirical side. The . In a subsequent passage another ground for denial of undif­
rationalistic side is suggested by the foregoing quotation. We can­ ferentiated endurance appears. This notion is inapplicable as an
not form a clear conception of any concrete actuality devoid of ultimate concept in physical analysis. Physical analysis proceeds
feeling. When the defender of the objectionable doctrine is asked, from common-sense objects to molecules, then to atoms, protons,
"What is it, if not something analogous to our experience, to and electrons. These in turn require analysis into quanta of energy
which the properties of the thing belong?" he may reply, "Stuff." associated with periodic rhythms (PR 1 2 1-2 ) . This argument
In this case the critic asks what is meant by this word, in addition against the notion of undifferentiated endurance is secondary to
to such properties as hardness which we experience. And if the de­ the argument from immediate experience (see Chapter 9 ) .
fender is driven to Locke's reply, "A something, I know not what," For these reasons Whitehead rejects the static fallacy, whether it
then the critic asks, "Why then do you talk about it?" The descent arises from Aristotle's notion of primary substances "as the static
from "stuff" to "nonsense," the critic will claim, is short and easy. foundations which received the impress of qualification,'' or from
But this line of objection is valid only if in experience we find Locke's modern version of this doctrine in his "metaphor of the
no datum that would justify belief in vacuous actuality. In this mind as an ' empty cabinet' receiving the impress of ideas" (AI 355) .
empirical side of his thought Whitehead agrees with Berkeley and t.N either ordinary experience nor physics gives warrant for belief in
Hume, both in their demand for empirical data and in their 3
unchanging subjects of change� On the contrary, "the very essence
denial that such a datum is found. of real actuality-that is, of the completely real-is process" (AI
The conception of a substratum has often involved the "static 354) . As we saw in Chapter 2, statements like this last one need
fallacy" also. Whitehead says of his philosophy, "the notion of an careful qualification. None of the needed qualifications, however,
actual entity as the unchanging subject of change is completely reintroduces the static fallacy.
abandoned" ( PR 43) . There are t�o grounds on which Whiteh_ead So far we have found that one traditional conception Whitehead
objects to belief in the existence of static substrata. One is the rejects is the notion of a static and vacuous substratum, a sub­
evidence of ordinary experience as to the nature of the experi­ stratum devoid of internal activity and devoid of internal value.
encing subject. Whitehead cites from Descartes the remark, " ' I am,
I exist,' is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I b, tAnother traditional conception he rejects is the notion that
3. "The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for real things exist in isolation, completely independent of each
any thought; and the starting point for thought is the analytic observation othet:i This seems to him a corollary of the notion of "accidental"
of components of this experience" (PR 6; see 253). qualities and relations, taken together with the subject-predicate
 1 10 W H I T E H E AD O N S U B S T A N C E W H AT W H I T E H E AD A C C E P T S 111

form o f expression. The result i s that n o "real connections" be­ \

other finite monads Whiteh ead is . obj ecting to the "arbitr
ary"
; Chap­
tween real things can be found. in trod uction of the concept of God mto cosmology (AI 1 7 1
On this view of ultimate matters of fact, "the relations between ter 15 below).
individual substances constitute metaphysical nuisances" (PR 208) . He rejects the second view, monism , on the evidenc e of ordinary
For this doctrine ex perience . Monism is "in defiance of the most obvious deliver­
entirely leaves out of account the interconnection between ances of our intuitive 'prejudi ces' " ( PR 208) . On what would com­
real things. Each substantial thing is thus conceived as com­ monly be called realistic grounds , he holds there are many ulti­
plete in itself, without any reference to any other substantial mate matters of fact, not one only.
Whitehe ad's denial of the independ ence and isolation of sub­
thing. Such an account of the ultimate atoms, or of the ulti­
mate monads, or of the ultimate subjects enjoying experience, stances is not based merely on the ground that it forces anyone
renders an interconnected world of real individuals unintel­ seeking a coherent view either to a deus ex machina or to monism.
He holds that we do in fact have direft experien ce of real con­
ligible. The universe is shivered into a multitude of discon­
nected substantial things, each thing in its own way exemplify­
[
nections between real things ( PR 1 0) The intercon nectedne ss of
ing its private bundle of abstract characters which have found real things is a basic datum in experien ce. Philosophy must ex­
a common home in its own substantial individuality . . . . plain it, not explain it away. This is the fundamental reason why
A substantial thing can acquire a quality, a credit-but real Whitehea d rej ects the doctrine of the mutual independ ence of real
things ] Just how he explains real connecti ons between real things
landed estate, never. In this way Aristotle's doctrines of Predi­
will be the topic of Chapters 6-8.
cation and of Primary Substance have issued into a doctrine
So far we have noticed two elements in tradition al interpret a­
of the conjunction of attributes and of the disj unction of
primary substances (AI 1 69-70) . tions of substance which Whitehea d rej ects : (a) the conceptio n of a
static and vacuous substratu m, and (b) the conceptio n that sub­
Some philosophers, to resolve a gratuitous and insoluble prob­ stances are self-suffici ent and independe nt of one another and
lem, have had recourse to a deus ex mach ina "who was capable of hence essentially isolated from one another. Now we must ask
rising superior to the difficultie s of metaphys ics" (sMw 2 1 7), as whether there are not some elements in traditiona l thought about
did Leibniz, or to monism. "Every respectab le philosophy of the substance which he accepts as "living" ideas. I suggest that he is
subject-predicate type is monistic" (PR 208- 9) . In these ways, and really engaged in constructin g an alternative doctrine of sub­
only in these ways, might one explain the solidarity of the world stance and that in his reconstruc tion he has been, as he says,
without acknowle dging direct connectio ns between real individ­ �
relyin on "the positive value of the philosophi cal tradition" ( PR
uals. By postulati ng his transcend ental pre-estab lished harmony ix) . The philosophy of organism, he says, is apt to emphasize just
Leibniz was able to admit real individuals and deny direct con­ those elements in the writings of earlier philosopher s which "sub­
nections among them. Monism resolves the problem more eco­ sequent systematizers have put aside" ( PR v) . But one cannot read
nomical ly by denying real individu als. Whitehead without noticing his sense of indebtedne ss to tradition
j Whitehe ad rejects the first of these views as a bogus solution . as well as his independence of mind.
f Since he himself has been accused of using the notion of God as a
cat:h-all for unsolved problem s, we should notice particul arly the
pomt of this objectio n to Leibniz . It is not that Leibniz included a 2 . What is "living" in the tradition about substance
concept of God in his cosmology, but that he gave no reasons why a. One living element, for Whitehead, in the notion of sub­
the "windows" of finite monads are open to God though not to stance is the principle of individuality. He is concerned to main-
 1 12 W H I T E H E A D O N S U B S T AN C E W H AT W H I T E H E AD A C C E P T S
-
tain the concrete unity and the social transcendence of an ultimate rived by it from some other entity./_The uprush of creative feel-
matter of fact. Preceding chapters have explored the way White­ ing is confronted with and conditioned by a g�v: n actual world,
head formulates this principle. Charles Hartshorne goes so far as but is itself original and underived. Actual ent1t1es vary m _ many
to say that "Whitehead is above all the interpreter of individ­ ways. They vary in intensity, in their subjective patt�rns, !n their
uality . . . " 4 It is not clear that individuality is his supreme con­ effectiveness. But each, in some degree however famt, is an mstance
cern, but it is clearly one of his major concerns in his later writings. of original creative activity and in this sense is self-existent ]
Insofar as he offers a genuine theory of real individuality, he is The conception of original and originative activity has been
affirming the validity and importance of a principle which has familiar in Western philosophy. In our tradition it has been at­
been, for most philosophers, an element in the notion of substance. tributed to God, to human wills, or to both. Whitehead's interpre­
b. Another living element in the notion of substance is the tation differs from that of many traditional philosophers at this
prj.nciple of self-existence. Whitehead accepts this principle also point. He extends the range of the concept and attributes crea­
and formulates it in his own way. This principle means that the tivity to all real individuals, whether subhuman, human, or super­
ground or reason for the existence _and nature of any real thing human, though these individuals vary widely in their complexity,
l� in_�gjqillo r tant se11s e, i11 itself. Whitehead's terms are "self­
intensity, and effectiveness. As a consequence, the conception
creation," "self-realization," "self-causation," "self-formation," and of substance needs to be revised so as to conform to this principle
"self-determination." of the universality of creativity. Later, in Part Three, we shall
look at the theological outcome of this principle and see how the
He explicitly recognizes that this principle belongs to the phil­ divine creativity differs from that of actual occasions.
osophical tradition: "Every philosophy recognizes, in some form
or other, this factor of self-causation, in what it takes to be ulti­ c. A third living element in the notion of substance that White­
mate actual fact" (PR 228). He is fond of using Spinoza's phrase, head accepts and interprets is the principle of permanence.
causa sui, to denote the self-creativity of every actual entity. He For Whitehead .p�.rll!aq.enf_�_j,LQ!!�Q.Ltl1e_�ft!Il� !JlQil T1taJ�bar­
also says that Descartes's argument from the nature of thinking acteristics of the world. Permanence and flux are among the "final
"assumes that this freely determined operation is thereby con­ op-p�si��-�;.-�t:;�
�d ignore either is to distort the evidence of ordi­
stitutive of an occasion in the endurance of an actual entity" (PR nary experience (PR 5 1 8). Some philosophers have begun with the
228). He thus implies that Descartes's argument logically requires intuition of permanence and developed a metaphysics of sub­
a notion of self-causation similar to his own. stance in which change and relations become problematical. Other
,.., \Yhat does Whitehead mean by self-causa�ion or self:g�ation?
,l Self-cau philosophers have started with the intuition of flux and developed
sation is not the only kind of causation that is effective in a metaphysics in which the permanent becomes a problem. But,
[_determining the nature of an actual entity. The actual entity is
conditioned by the necessity of conforming to the settled past. he concludes, the two notions "cannot be torn apart in this way;
This is efficient causation. But the way the entity subjectively and we find that a wavering balance between the two is a char­
enjoys and integrates its data is due to its own subjective aim at acteristic of the greater number of philosophers" (PR 3 1 8).
unity. This is the free "decision" of the concrescence] The con­ There are tl}r��--��Y�- i11 �y_h�JlJ1;i� t:J1_��_y�qLa.c;.t!J.a.LQc:@sjg_ns
___

crete actual entity is thus a product of both efficient and final e�presses theintuition of perm;:rr:i.ep.c:� : in the doctrine of an actual
causation. Self-determination is essential to its constitution, and occasion as epochal, having !e<JLc1Erat!()n; in the doctrine of ob­
its power of self-determination is not conferred upon it, or de- jective immortality; and in the conception of C'.r:idu1jl).g opjects.
i. The sense in which an actual occasion has real duration,
4· In Philosoph ical Essays for A lfred North Whitehead (New York, Long­ though not "endurance," has been examined in some detail in
mans, Green, 1 936), p. :l I I . Chapters 2 and 4. The question whether actual occasions are
1 14 W HITEHEAD O N SUBSTANCE A R E F O R M E D D O C T R I N E OF S U B S T A N C E 1 15
genuine terms and not mere segments of a flux turns largely on one way he gives expression to the principle of permanence in his
the question whether the satisfaction of an occasion is a process own systematic terms.
of change. I have suggested that, strictly speaking, 'the satisfaction The connection between Whitehead's view and traditional
is part of neither the process of concrescence nor the process of philosophical interpretations of enduring things comes out more
transition, but is the culmination of the former and the anticipa­ clearly when we consider the function of the "defining character­
tion of the latter. On this view, a complete subj ect has a real dura­ istic" of a historical route of occasions. In a stable environment
tion and is not merely a flu� That this duration may be very brief successive groups of actual occasions will exemplify a common
is obviously true but does not affect the principle at stake. pattern (a complex eternal obj ect), as in the life history of a table
ii. As we have seen, obj ective immortality means, first, that an or a tree. In this way Whitehead reformulates the traditional con­
actual occasion which has perished is still effective in determin­ trast between a stable essential character and varying accidental
ing the future; and second, that the self-identity of the occasion, qualities. "A society has an essential character, whereby it is the
though not its immediacy, is retained. In all its objectifications society that it is, and it has also accidental qualities which vary
in the future, the occasion will play a self-consistent role. In this as circumstances alter. Thus a society, as a complete existence and
doctrine Whitehead expresses two aspects of what the principle as retaining the same metaphysical status, enjoys a history express­
of permanence has usually meant, namely that present matters ing its changing reactions to changing circumstances" (AI 262) .
of fact will "matter" or have weight in the future, and that in In a footnote to this passage Whitehead says, "This notion of
the future present matters of fact will be themselves and nothing 'society' has analogies to Descartes' notion of 'substance.' " On
else. this analogy the nonessential or accidental qualities of an endur­
iii. In his conception of enduring objects Whitehead expresses ing thing would be those elements in the individual members
the kind of permanence we ordinarily attribute to common-sense of the society which, relative to some subj ect or other, are
obj ects like stones, trees, animals, and human beings (PR 50-2, negligibly relevant to the defining characteristic. As Whitehead
1 5 1-63; AI 258-67). This kind of permanence is important: "Our says, "The notion of 'defining characteristic' is allied to the Aris­
lives are dominated by enduring things" (AI 36 1). As one element totelian notion 'substantial form' " (PR 5 1 ; the text has "nation").
in traditional philosophical accounts of enduring things, how­ In these ways the principles of real individuality, self-existence,
ever, he finds the notion of "undifferentiated endurance." For and permanence, which have been elements in traditional inter­
this he can find no warrant in experience, as we have seen. So he pretations of substance, find expression in Whitehead's philosophy.
thinks a more discriminating and adequate account of enduring This reinforces the suggestion that he does not flatly reject the
things must be given. "Tge re.al actual .J.gJD.gs that �ndu r� ar� al! notion of substance but revises it. He dissects it, on the basis of
societies. The):'. are not actual occasions. It is the mistake that has a fresh reading of experience, into those elements which are
thwarted European metaphysics from the time of the Greeks, "dead" and those which are "living." Those elements that he
namely, to confuse societies with the completely real things which accepts are put in a new perspective and developed in relatively
are the actual occasions" (AI 262). novel ways. Now we are ready to sum up and characterize his
Thus electrons and protons ( PR 498), chairs, tables, rocks, treatment of the notion of substance.
planets, and animal bodies (PR 98, 1 66-7) are all "corpuscular soci­
eties. " Minds, souls, and persons are likewise to be understood
3 . A reformed doctrine of substance
as being composed of societies of actual occasions. Our immediate
concern is not to decide whether this theory of enduring things The "error" in metaphysics to which Whitehead points, in his
is adequate to the facts of experience, but merely to point out critique of traditional conceptions, "does not consist in the em-
1 16 W H ITEHEAD ON S UBSTAN CE A RE F O R M E D D O CTRI N E O F S U B S T A N C E

ployment of the word 'substance'; but in tpe em12loymeg_Lof the B ergson, James, Alexander, and Dewey. Plainly, with these phi­
notion_ of an actual eritity whichJs characterized by essential quali­ losophers Whitehead has much in common (sMw xi, 72, 1 99-200,
ti��, and.r,�ma�ns_ numericaJly�()!l� arr!,i dst tJ!_� ch™es of acci_dent<!l 205-6; TIME 59; PR vii, 42-3, 3 1 9, 489; ESP 1 16).
r�lations and of accidental gualities" (PR 1 22). He has no obj ection It is equally important to notice how, in these and other pas­
to using the word if .it can be dissociated from this error. Some­ sages, he diverges from them. His objections to their interpreta­
.
times he does so us � it ; ' 'An 'actual entity' is a res vera in the ti ons of reality, though sometimes implicit rather than explicit,
Cartesian sense of that term; it is a Cartesian 'substance,' and not are nevertheless clear. For example :
an Aristotelian 'primary substance' " (PR viii-ix. See SMW i 74-5; The notions of 'process' and 'existence' presuppose each other
PR 29, 1 1 6, 339). In general he refrains from using it because of ( MT 1 3 1).
the doctrine it is likely to connote.
His hesitation to use the word "substance" is relatively unim Process and individuality require each other. I n separation
portant. The real question is whether and to what extent he gives all meaning evaporates ( MT 1 33).
to such terms as "actual entity" meanings which "substance" has Apart from Time there i s n o meaning for purpose, hope,
stood for and included. The following passage is explicit and fear, energy. If there be no historic process, then everything
clear. Referring to Descartes's doctrine of real things and to is what it is, namely, a mere fact. Life and motion are lost.
Locke's stress on "power," Whitehead says, "The notion of 'sub­ Apart from Space, there is no consummation. �_pace expresses
stance' is transfarmed into that of 'actual entity'; and the notion the halt for attaiDJn�nt. !t _fil'__JD.b olizei_the co_m})k�it:y Qf_jm-
__ _

of 'power' is transformed into the principle that the reasons for mediate realization. I t is the fact of accomplishment. Time
things are always to be found in the composite nature of definite and Space express the universe as including the essence of
actual entities" (PR 28, my italics) . One of his criticisms of Locke transition, and the success of achievement. '[he . tra11sition_is
is that "Locke is never tired of disparaging the notion of 'sub­ r�al, and the achievement is real. The difficulty is for language
stance' ; but he gives no hint of alternative categories which he to express one of them without explaining away the other
would employ to analyse the notion of an 'actual entity' and of ( MT 1 39-40).
'reality' " (PR 2 2 2 ; the text has "analysis") . This clearly implies
The implicit criticism is that philosophers of process have left
that some of the meanings of "substance" are essential for an
out a doctrine of real individuals. They have not done full justice
adequate account of reality. If the objectionable doctrine is given
to our experience of the world. A notion of real individuals, in
up, as Whitehead thinks it ought to be, then a "reformed" doctrine
which ends are not only aimed at but attained, is necessary to make
of substance must be offered in its place.
�
T is is the point of his criticism of certain philosophers who
.
the notion of process itself intelligible .
In Whitehead's philosophy, I suggest, process is not a sub­
.
ehmmate mstead of reinterpreting the category of substance. We
need to take account of his criticism of philosophies of pure flux stitute for the category of substance. Prehensions are not sub­
-and not merely of his criticism of traditional doctrines of sub­ stitutes for subj ects which prehend and are prehended. Creativity
stance-in order to put his own view in the right perspective. is not pure flux. It is the originative activity that takes place in
On Whitehead's view the world is a process. ;�When we get a the concrescences of concrete and socially transcendent individuals.
s �nse of the ongoingness of nature, its restlessness and its produc­ Nature is the never ending process in which real individual things
t10n of novelty, continually eluding the conceptual nets we set to come into being, attain their satisfactions, perish, and condition
ensnare it, then we have a fundamental clue to the nature of real­ the future beyond themselves. They thus constitute those endur­
y)
it In the present century this view has been made familiar by ing objects which dominate our common experience of the world.
1 18 W H ITE H E AD ON SUBSTAN CE

Some interpreters o f Whitehead have connected his system so

closely with other philosophies of process that the individuality
and exclusiveness of actual occasions has been obscured. This
CHAPTER 6
study may help to correct this unbalanced estimate of the out­
come of his speculation. He differs from these other philosophers
precisely because he accepts the necessity of a reformed doctrine
The Problem of Social Immanence
of substance.
Finally, he thinks that even the common-sense view of substance
must be retained and applied, though with due regard for its
1. Social immanence, weak and strong
limitations. It is an abstraction which, for practical purposes,
is not only useful but necessary. The following passage, where W H I T E H EAD accepts a problem posed by our experience of the
this concession is repeated, admirably summarizes Whitehead's world. The world we experience is a world of many things. And
attitude to substance : we experience these things not in isolation but in connection with
one another. The business of speculative philosophy is to express
I suggest that there can be no doubt, but that this general
adequately and systematically such facts of common experience.
notion expresses large, all-pervading truths about the world
He therefore undertakes, in constructing his theory of actual
around us. The only question is as to how fundamental these
occasions, to state both a doctrine of social transcendence and a
truths may be. In other words, we have to ask what large
doctrine of social immanence. To carry out his intention he needs
features of the Universe cannot be expressed in these terms.
to show j ust how "every actual entity, including God, is something
We have also to ask whether we cannot find some other set
individual for its own sake; and thereby transcends the rest of
of notions which will explain the importance of this common­
actuality" (PR 1 35). He also needs to show j ust how real things
sense notion, and will also explain its relations to those other
are present in, and thus organically related to, other real things.
features ignored by the commonsense notion (MT 1 76-7;
Preceding chapters have analyzed his doctrine of social tran­
see Chapter 1 2 below) .
scendence. We now turn to his doctrine of social immanence,
his doctrine ()f the continuity of nature which "balances and
lguits the doctrine of the abwlute individuality: of each occasion
of experience" (AI 2 35). His account of how one occasion is pres­
ent in another is given in terms of "obj ectification." Obj ectifica­
tion is the way an actual occasion transcends itself (PR 347) and
enters the experience of other occasions. Thus self-transcendence
issues in social immanence.
Because some important categories have already been explained,
my comments on Whitehead's doctrine of social immanence need
not be as extended as the discussions in the preceding chapters.
If the conclusions drawn from those discussions are well founded,
then objectification does not in any case involve the sharing of
immediacy or the overlapping of regions. One actual occasion
is not present in another occasion in either of these ways. In add i-
ug
 ·1·"'
' '

1 20 THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL IM MANENCE C O N T E M P OR ARY O C C AS I O N S . 121

tion t o this negative result, certain positive meanings for social causal present of such an occasion (A) is geometrically defined in
immanence have already emerged, especially in Chapter 3 . terms of straight lines proj ected indefinitely outward from a geo­
I shall first restate certain weak meanings of "being present metrical "seat" in A's basic region. This part of A's causal present
in." These weak modes of social immanence characterize the rela­ is the "spatialized world. " It is the region where sense obj ects are
tions of contemporary actual occasions and anticipation of the perceived in the mode of presentational immediacy by higher
future by a present occasion. I shall show that these weak mean­ organisms.
ings of "being present in" depend on a strong meaning given The notion of "proj ection" is explained as follows. A inherits
in "causal objectification," the way the past is immanent in the a datum from its past actual world. This datum includes sensa
present. Reference to Whitehead's treatment of certain special and geometrical relations exemplified in past occasions. A enj oys
problems, namely physical transmission, efficient causation, and these sensa and geometrical relations "now." And since the sensa
perception will help to show that 11 causal .objectification is the are implicated in the geometrical relations they are enjoyed not
crux of his doctrine of social immanence. ) In the next chapter merely "now" but "there-now." Thus A experiences a contempo­
I examine in detail the way in which causal objectification takes rary region of spatially related sensa (PR, Pt. IV, chs. 4-5).
place. The essential fact is that what is proj ected by the present occa­
sion has been derived from its past and modified by the antecedent
2 . Contemporary occasions phases of its experience. There is no need for any direct connec­
tion between A and its contemporaries to explain A's experience
We saw in Chapter 3 that an actual occasion does not prehend
of a contemporary region. The geometrization of the contem­
its contemporaries in their concrete individual actuality. Con­
porary locus, as well as the sensa that illustrate it, depends on
temporary actual occasions are causally independent of one an­
the influence of the past and on the creative activity of the present
other. This means that one contemporary occasion is not present
occasion itself. As Whitehead points out, this supposes the possi­
in another in any strong or primary sense. We discovered two
bility of defining points and straight lines purely in terms of
weak senses in which one contemporary occasion is present in
extensive connection, without reference to physical happenings
another, and I shall now restate and comment on these.
(PR 1 94).
a. A kind of mutual relevance between two contemporary actual Three comments on this account of regional feeling are in
occasions is constituted by their participation in a common dura­ order.
tion or "locus of becoming." For any occasion there is a "now" i. It gives us a genuine sense in which contemporary actual
beyond its own basic region, which is here-now. This is a "regional occasions are mutually immanent. The contemporary world is
feeling" (PR 482) of its contemporary world. objectified as an extended region, a potentiality for becoming.
For actual occasions in "empty space," that is occasions of very The datum for this feeling is "becoming going on out there. "
faintly coordinated intensity, the "now" that is not "here" is de­ And there i s i n fact becoming going o n out there. I n this sense
fined only negatively and vaguely. It is that region from which (and only in this sense) this is a "physical" (PR 4 8 2 ) feeling of the
there is no causal influence upon the given occasion and to which contemporary world.
this occasion will make no causal contribution. There-now is that ii. Though this account yields a genuine sense of immanence,
region which is neither in the causal past nor in the causal future yet it is a weak sense. The actual division of the contemporary
of the occasion. This is " bare" regional feeling (PR 48 2). region into the standpoints occupied by actual occasions is not
For the occasions that niake up enduring physical objects there given in regional feeling. Only possible, or hypothetical, stand­
is more definition of the contemporary world. One part of the points are given. "Our direct perception of the contemporary
1 22 THE PROBLEM OF S O C IAL IM MANEN CE
T T H E F U T URE I N T H E P RE S E N T

worl� is thus re�uced to extension, defining (i) our own geo­ In ne ither case are contemporary actual occas ions felt direc tly
metrical perspectives, and (ii) possibilities of mutual perspectives as individuals. (iii) This indirect relationshipmode between contem­
poraries is, like regional feeling, a secon dary tion ofofthe social im­
f�r o the� contemporary entities inter se, and (iii) possibilities of past in
_ _ ' (PR 96). Much less are the actual experiences of con­
divmon manence. It depends on the direc t objectifica
temp �rary occasions given. Contemporary actual occasions are the present. l
not .due � �ly felt in their concrete actuality. This general regional We have exam ined two sense s in whic h a contemporary actua ary
feelmg . is the whole of our direct physical feeling of the con­ occasion is present in another, the only modes of conte mpor
temporary world" (PR 482). imman ence Whitehead admi ts. They are genuineconte modes of im­
iii. Even t� is weak �ense of immanence between contemporaries manenc e [it is untrue that on Whitehead 's view mporaries
other
are completely isolat ed and thus transcend each "being prese absol utely.
depends for Its meanmg on causal objectification. It is therefore nt
a secondary mode of social immanence. In the case of "bare" re­ It is true however that these are weak senses of on causal ob­
gional feeling, the contemporary world is defined only in relation in ," and that they depend for their intell igibil ity
to the caus �l past and the causal future. In the case of higher jectification. J
grade occas10ns, where there are "strain-feelings" (PR 472-99), Does Whitehead 's account of relations between contemporary
the sensa and geometrical relations which further define the con­ actualities do justic e to the solidarity of the world as we exper ience
t �mpora� world are i�herited from the past by causal objectifica­ it? This is a question I shall not answer. But I sugge st that a cer­
tion. So 1t seems that/the objectification of the past in the present tain looseness in the relations of contemporary actua finite re­
lities is
in­
_
must be the primary mode of social immanence] quired in any philosophical system which stresses both
dividuality and the reality of proce ss.
b. In addition to this direct regional feeling of the contem­
porary world we found an indirect connection between contem­ 3. The futur e in the prese nt
porary occasions by way of common pasts. lContemporary actual im­
_ have more or less common pasts. The community of
occ �s10ns In Chap ter 3 we found that futur e actual occas ions are on"
their past actual worlds will vary inversely with their \�emoteness'' manent in a present occasion only by way of the "anti cipati
of the future by the present. An exam ination of "anticipati on"
fro � each other. In many cases this community is negligible.
But m �of�r as they �re affected by the same environment they will yielded a dual sense of the immanence of the futur e in the prese nt.
have similar experiences and characteristics] Therefore, and be­ I shall restat e and add brief comm ents on that result
.
cau �e o � the fortunate structure of the animal body, an occasion's a. The future is present in the occasion now actual as the ob­
· appet
pr �1ect10n of data derived from its own past will often adjust it ject of ition. A� actual occasion embodies a creative urge
toward the future beyond itself. This reg,uires . that the occ(lsi on
to important features of the contemporary world. itutes � one
Here ag�in three comments are in order. (i) This indirect be transcended by other occasio_p.s yet to co�e and const
relev�nce yields a genuine sense of social immanence. Indirect might say, a categoreal reason for the perishin� of the pres�nt
r ��at10ns are not unreal, though they differ from direct relations. occasion. Yet no future actual occasions are now actua l. The
(n) Th �u �? a genuine se� s � this is also a weak sense of "being ground of this "bare " anticipation of future concrescences lies
present . m. The reason 1t 1s weak differs from the reason the in the present actual occasion itself.
sense yielded by regional feeling is weak. In that case contem­ b. The futur e is prese nt in the occasi on now-actual in a further
porar� actual occasions were related directly but not as individuals. sense. The character of future actual ities is now being partly de­
In this case they are related as individuals but only indirectly. termined by the activity of the present occasion. Any future actual-
 l TRA N S M I SS I O N , CAU SATI O N , PERCE P T I O N
1 24 THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL IM MANENCE
We are thus narrowing the focus of our problem to the ques­
ities must conform t o what now becomes actual. The urge to be
tion, In what positive sense is a past occasion present in an occa­
transcended by future occasions carries with it the urge that the
sion now actual? Before dealing directly with this I shall show
present occasion shall become a potential for these future be­
it is crucial not only for social immanence in general but also
comings. The present occasion thus anticipates its own obj ective
for certain special problems in Whitehead's philosophy.
immortality and in this sense transcends itself. The ground of
this further specification of anticipation lies again in the occasion
4. Physical transmission, efficient causation, and perception
now actual.
Two brief comments are in order. (i) Anticipation yields only a. When Whitehead interprets physical transmission he is ap­
a weak sense of immanence. The future is immanent in the pres­ plying his philosophical scheme to the facts of experience. In
ent only as a potentiality for becoming, to which the present activ­ this case the fact is a well-founded s cientific concept. The obj ect
ity is contributing limitations. This might well seem an even is to show the adequacy of the scheme. The interpretation turns
weaker sense of immanence than the senses in which contem­ on the conception of the actual world as a "medium" (PR 1 76-8,
poraries are mutually immanent. 183-4, 345, 435). There is "mediate obj ectification" of one occa­
(ii) Explanation of the immanence of the future in the present sion in another.
involves causal objectification, the immanence of the past in the To understand Whitehead's conception of the world as a me­
present. Indeed one might prefer to construe anticipation not dium four of his philosophical ideas are important:
as a way in which the future is immanent in the present but as
i. His rejection of materialism, that is of "vacuous actuality."
a feeling that in the future what is now actual will be immanent
in what is then actual. ii. His assertion that there is no "empty space." This follows
from i and from his rej ection of the Newtonian notion of abso­
From this rapid survey certain results are clear. First, [.:.Ve have lute space.
not yet found any direct connections between individual actual
iii. His rejection of a material ether. This follows from i and
occasions. In none of these instances does the individual nature
from the scientific uselessness of the notion.
of one occasion directly affect, contribute to, or participate in the
individual nature of another actual occasio n] These relations are iv. His assertion that real extensive regions are atomic quanta.
not the kind which in an organic pluralism must somewhere be Of this, the epochal theory of time is one expression. This follows
found. They give us only weak senses of social immanence. from the individuality of actual occasions .
Second, such connectedness as exists in these cases requires for
It follows from i that physical energy, along with all other
its intelligibility the immanence of the past in th'e present. This
physical concepts, is to be interpreted in terms of experience.
does not mean that these instances are negligible. They do add
�
I
"Physical energy" becomes then an abstraction from "emotional
somethin g to the doctrine of social immanence. There is some
intenfilty" (PR 1 77-9, AI 238, MT 23 1-2).
direct feeling of the contemporary world. There are indirect con­
I t follows from i i that the physical �nfluence of one actual thing
nections with individual contemporary occasions. And there is
on another nonc;ontiguous . actual thing :i;p.ust be via a me_diJJ m .
anticipation of the future. But the "reason" for such connected­
It follows from iii that th�§ m�dium must be conceived in ter!Ils
ness as exists in these cases lies either in the activity of the present
of experience. Instead of a material ether, the medium for physical
occasion itself or in its inheritance from the past. In the relation
transmission is to be conceived as an "ether of events." And events
between past and present occasions therefore lies thei< crux of the
. ), are historic routes of actual occasions, which are acts of experience.
f!roblem of social immanen ce.;' . .. . . .
 't I-i E P R O B L E M O :F S O C: I A t. I M M A N E N C E TRAN S M I S S I O N , C A U SAT I O N , P E R C E P T I O N 1 27
It follows from iv that the flow o f energy i s not i n the strict it is always possible to work oneself into a state of complete con­
sense a continuous function, though Whitehead explains how the ten tment with an ultimate irrationality. The popular positivistic
flow of energy appears as a continuous function, in terms of the phi losophy adopts this attitude" (MT 202-3, my italics) . What is
potential divisibility of the atomic regions.(T he medium of trans­ required is a reason, in J:_erms of the natures of real thin__g_�, !!2!­
mission is really made up of discontinuous acts of experience the fact that a particular succession of eyents��2r data ta�es place
__

located in externally connected (contiguous) spatiotemporal re­ in a ..£.articular way. Whitehead therefore undertakes to interpret
gions] Transmission is therefore via successive and contiguous causation realistically, as involving substantial things dynamically
actual occasions. "Energy passes from particular occasion to partic­ related as "causes" and "effects. "
ular occasion" (AI 238). Also a definite quantum of energy (emo­ I n the second place he opposes a n externalistic view o f causa­
tional intensity) is involved in each instance. tion. On that view causation is a transference of accidental quali­
It seems clear that this interpretation of physical transmission ties between things which are essentially isolated from each other.
involves in a crucial way the objectification of a past actual occa­ On this view there is no re<lj;on in the natures of the things for
sion for a present occasion. The crucial question is_ hg':Y_ tra�s ­ /
the transfer of the quality 'The mere notion of transferring a
�erence of feeling takes _tlace bet�e�11-�ri imm�dJ<!!t;lY p(lst _c:icca­ quality is entirely unintelligible. Suppose that two occurrences
sion anQ._�he P.resent occasion which SUJ?ersecies it. may be in fact detached so that one of them is comprehensible
without reference to the other. Then all notion of causation be­
b. Whitehead's interpretation of efficient causation also in­ tween them, or of conditioning, becomes unintelligible. There
volves in a crucial way the immanence of the immediate past in is-with this supposition-no reason why the possession of any
the present. This may be shown by contrasting his interpretation quality by one of them should in any way influence the possession
with certain treatments of causation which he opposes. of that quality, or of any other quality, by the other" (MT 226 )\
In the first place he opposes the phenomenalistic view that Here we are reminded of his polemic against those traditional
causation is exhaustively interpretable in terms of mere succes­ interpretations of substance which negate the possibility of real
sions of data. He does not obj ect to this interpretation so far as connections. If each of two real things can be fully understood
the purpose of natural science is concerned. For that purpose apart from the other, then neither can serve as a vera causa or
mathematically correlated successions of data are adequate. If "real reason" for the transfer of the quality.
"nature" is taken in abstraction from "life" then we have "merely If Whitehead is to be consistent in his rejection of these alter­
a formula for succession" (MT 202). Natural science does, and native views of causation, h� is obliged to construct a "mech.__� '
indeed must, make this abstraction. "Science can find no indi­ in terms of which causation as a real relation between_ real things
vidual enjoyment in nature : Science can find no aim in nature : may be made intelligible. And he does in fact hold th;it the fl}nC­
Science can find no creativity in nature; it finds mere rules of tionings that make up the ' 'real internal constitution.s" oL.rux;_a:;_
succession. These negations are true of N atural Science. They sions constitute such a mecbanisID. Later we shall examine this
are inherent in its methodology" ( MT 2 1 1 ) . mechanism in some detail. We are interested here only in point­
[W hile a phenomenalistic view of causation may be adequate ing out that by setting out to construct such an explanatory
for the purpose of natural science, it is inadequate for an under­ mechanism he differentiates his view of causation from the views
standing of the concrete processes of the real world. For this pur­ he rejects.
pose one cannot be content with "rules of succession. If one :] He differs from the phenomenalistic view by taking causation
stops here, then "there is an absence of understandab le causation as a dynamic process relating real things. He differs from the
to give a reason for that formula for that succession. Of course " externalistic" view by holding that the internal natures of the
 THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL IM MANENCE TRA N S M I S S I O N , C A U S A T I O N , P E RC E P T I O N 1 29
real things can furnish an intelligible explanation of the process He is logically able to do so because he rejects the view that pre­
which takes place between them. On the phenomenalistic view sentational immediacy is "the primary fact of perception" (PR
no explanatory mechanism in terms of the real functionings of 263 ), much less the sole fact of perception. "The confinement of
real things need be constructed. On the externalistic view no our prehension of other actual entities to the mediation of pri­
such mechanism can be constructed. Whitehead holds that such vate sensations is pure myth" (PR 2 14). On his view causal efficacy
a mechanism can and must be constructed. is �n additional, and even the primary, mode of perception. On
Since efficient causation is in question here, the mechanism this ground he offers a realistic theory of perception.
must be relational between a past actual occasion and a present Now perception in the mode of causal efficacy is but another
actual occasion. For "efficient causation expresses the transition name for the process by which the past becomes objectified in
from actual entity to actual entity" (PR 228). It must show how the present. "A pure physical prehension is how an occasion in
the past actua! .world is present in, and exerts power on, the pres­ its immediacy of being absorbs another occasion which has passed
ent occasion. fHis account of causal objectification is necessary to i�to �he objective immortality of its not-being. It is how the past
his explanation of efficient causation.1 lives m the present. It is causation. It is memory. It is perception
c. The objectification of the past in the present is crucial for of derivation. It is emotional conformation to a given situation,
his treatment of perception also. an emotional continuity of past with present" (Ar 305. See PR 361 ,
According to Whitehead perception takes place in two modes. 365; AI 237). Perception in its simplest form, direct physical feel­
In the mode of presentational immediacy the contemporary world ing devoid of consciousness, is not a unique relation in nature. It
is presented as described above. In the mode of causal efficacy is identical with the process of efficient causation. Hence the ob­
past actual occasions are felt directly as concrete actualities. One jectification of the past in the present is crucial for Whitehead's
theory of perception.
�ay of indicating the importance of this latter mode of perception As a result of the foregoing discussion we can now concentrate
1s to ask, as a hypothetical question, what Whitehead's theory of our inquiry and give it a sharper focus. The validity of White­
perception would amount to in its absence. head's account of the immanence of contemporaries and of the
If presentational immediacy were the only mode of perception, future in the present, and his treatment of these special problems,
then Whitehead's theory would be purely and simply phenomenal­ has been shown to depend on a single issue. In what way are past
istic. The percipient would be restricted to purely private data. actual occasions present in the experience of a novel concrescence?
No datum would give information of any concretely actual thing
other than the percipient subject itself. In his theory of knowl­
edge Whitehead would then have no cause for quarrel with
Hume, as he explicitly recognizes: "Hume's polemic respecting
causation is, in fact, one prolonged, convincing argument that
pure presentational immediacy does not disclose any causal in­
fluence . . . " (PR 1 88, my italics). Actual things other than the
subject could be known only by inference. But he finds this sort
of inference meaningless apart from some direct perception of
an external world. vVe should therefore be reduced to Santayana's
"solipsism of the present moment" (SYMBOLISM 28-9, PR 240) .
There can be no doubt that Whitehead rejects this conclusion.
 SIMPLE PHYSICAL FEELINGS
fore we must distinguish between the sense in which the past is
active in the process of objectification and the sense in which the
present is active. The activity of the past can only mean (i) past
C HAPTER 7 activity, for example the activity of X before X perished, or (ii)
the "real conditioning" of the present by the past. The latter
sense is the only one in which the past is active now, and the only
Causal Obj ectification sense which concerns us at this point.
By saying that the past conditions the present, Whitehead means
only that as objectively immortal the past is stubborn fact. This
1 . Simple physical feelings is a function of X. But this is not "activity" in the usual meaning
of the term. His own term for what we usually call activity is self­
I N T H I S n 1 s c u s s 1 0N of how objectification of the past in the functioning, or subjectively immediate activity. And he usually
present takes place, let us take the case of two contiguous occa­ uses the word "activity" to refer to immediate actuality. It is only
sions. Of these let one be "immediately past" in relation to the in order to discriminate the functioning of past actualities (real
other. Let the past occasion be called X, and let the present occa­ potentiality) from that of eternal objects (pure potentials) and
sion be called A. of the contemporary world (passive potentiality) that Whitehead
Now the objectification of X in A is effected by a prehension. speaks, for instance, of the function of past actual occasions as
Let us assume this prehension is a "simple physical feeling" (PR "provocation" (AI 226). He means only that there is an effective
36 1-5). For "all our physical relationships [i.e. all our relation­ antecedent limitation on what the present can become. Past actual
ships to other actual entities] are made up of such simple physical occasions function only as objects. They have "objective efficacy"
feelings, as their atomic bricks" (PR 362). So we shall focus our (PR 341).
discussion on the simple case in which A prehends X via a simple The immediate activity involved in objectification is the activ­
physical feeling. Whitehead's categoreal analysis of a prehension ity of the subject. It is the subject's feelings which "absorb" (PR
is: "That every prehension consists of three factors: (a) the 'sub­ 82) or "transform" ( PR 23 5) the object. "The occasion as subject
ject' which is prehending, namely the actual entity in which that has a ' concern' for the object. And the 'concern' at once places
prehension is a concrete element; (b) the 'datum' which is pre­ the object as a componen t in the experience of the su bject, with
hended; (c) the ' subjective form' which is how that subject pre­ an affective tone drawn from this object and directed towards it"
hends that datum" (PR 3 5 , category of explanation xi). Let us ex­ (Ar 226, my italics). What effects the objectification is the subject's
amine the function of each of these factors in the simple physical feeling of the object.
feeling in question.
a. The su bject of this feeling is the present actual occasion, A. b. The datum of this feeling is the past actual occasion, X.
A is "the actual entity in which that prehension is a concrete ele­ Now when X functions as a datum or object it is not functioning
ment." The feeling is A's feeling of X. Thus the feeling which in the mode of subjective immediacy. Nevertheless this is a func­
effects the objectification of X in A is properly speaking an activ­ tion of X. X in this case is not, in any sense of the word, a function
ity of A. It is in A that this feeling has immediacy or concrete of A. "Thus an object must be a thing received, and must not be
actuality. The fact that the activity which effects the objectification either a mode of reception or a thing generated in that occasion"
is an activity of A, the subject of the feeling, is important. (AI 229).
Whitehead at times refers to the "activity" of the past. There- What Whitehead calls the "initial datum" for A is that actual
130
 C A U S A L O B J E C T I F I C AT I O N SI M PLE PHYSICAL FEELINGS 133
occasion there-then. But A's subjective aim requires that some there-then but not here-now." I t i s now experienced as an object.
aspects of the initial datum be eliminated by negative prehensions But it is experienced as having been what is was, namely a subject.
( PR 3 2 1 ). What remains to be positively felt is the "objective It is a subject existing objectively. What is felt by A in A's simple
datum." In a simple physical feeling the initial datum is positively physical feeling are "the objectified experiences of the past" (PR
felt with respect to only one of its feelings. The rest of its feelings 1 76, my italics). "In our experience, as in distinct analysis, physical
are eliminated. feelings are always derived from some antecedent experient. Occa­
sion B prehends occasion A as an antecedent subject experiencing
Thus in a simple physical feeling there are two actual en­ a sensum with emotional intensity" (PR 479).
tities concerned. One of them is the subject of that feeling, Likewise, any feeling by which X is objectified for A is given
and the other is the initial datum of the feeling. A second as having been subjectively immediate there-then. Thus Xp is
feeling is also concerned, namely, the o bjective datum of the an objectified feeling, and the fact that it is objectified does not
simple physical feeling. This second feeling is the ' objectifica­ derogate from the fact that it is a feeling. The objective datum
tion' of its subject for the subject of the simple physical feel­ of the simple physical feeling we are discussing is X-feeling-M­
ing. The initial datum is objectified as being the subject of there-then. "The feeling as enjoyed by the past occasion is present
the feeling which is the objective datum: the objectification in the new occasion as datum felt" (Ar 2 3 6 , my italics) . The point
is the ' perspective' of the initial datum (PR 36 1 ). of this discussion is that the two italicized phrases are to be given
Let us say that Xp is the objective datum of the simple physical equal emphasis.
feeling we are discussing. This distinction between the two modes of existence of feelings
It is not the case that A first feels positively the whole content helps to put in their proper perspective many passages in which
of X's experience, and then eliminates some aspects of X from a "simple" or literal transference of feeling seems to be asserted.
feeling. Elimination is a primitive and integral factor in the pre­ We can now see that while there is "feeling of feeling," the feel­
hension (PR 338, 353). Objectification involves abstraction. The ing felt exists objectively. It is that feeling subjectively immediate
question then arises, Why refer to an initial datum at all? How there-then, not subjectively immediate here-now.
can this reference be significant?
Whitehead's point is that the objective datum is not an un­ c. The su bjective form of this feeling is how that subject pre­
attached feeling, without a local habitation and a name. What hends that datum. It is the way A feels Xp . One might say that
is felt here is one of X's feelings. The fact that it is one of X's the subjective form is the adverb ial characteristic of a feeling. It
feelings is integral to what is felt. No feeling can be abstracted is the how of feeling. Thus in the feeling Ap, A may feel Xp more
from its subject, and no feeling can be given unless its subject or less intensely, with "aversion" or "adversion," and so on. More
is given. The feeling would be meaningless apart from its subject, complex feelings in higher organisms may feel their data con­
namely X. Thus for A the objective datum is not some indeter­ sciously. Consciousness is a subjective form to be found in some
minate p. For A the objective datum is Xp . but not all feelings (PR 406).
It is important to notice that objectification does not affect In our discussion of the individuality of actual occasions we
the content of an objectified entity, save by selective abstraction. saw how the subjective forms of feelings are partially determined
The difference between X in its subjective immediacy and X in by the subjective aim, the organizing principle of the concrescence.
its objective immortality is not in content but in mode of exist­ Here as elsewhere social transcendence is balanced by social im­
ence. "\\Th at X was then, X is now, except that X is now no longer manence. The subjective forms of feelings are only partially de­
immediate but objective. Thus for A, X is "an experiencing entity termined by the subjective aim. The data of feelings also have
1 34 C A U S A L O B J E C T I F I CA T I O N
T
I C O N F ORMITY O F S U B J E CTIVE F OR M 1 35
a part in determining their subjective forms. In the case of the subjective form of the immediate p�st �ccasion a.n� th� sub­
simple physical feeling we are discussing, the subjective form of jective form of its primary prehensi� n m t� e ongmat.10n. of
Ap is determined in part by A's subjective aim and in part by the the new occasion . . . . I will term this doctrme of contmmty,
objective datum Xp. the Doctrine of Conformation of Feeling (AI 235).
The categoreal conditions for the subjective form of Ap are The point to notice is that White��ad groun_ds the continuity
then as follows: of nature, or social immanence, explicitly and directly on the con­
i. In the simple physical feeling Ap, A must feel in such a way, formity of subjective form. He illustr�t� s the doctrin�. by the �ase
or with such a subjective form, that this feeling is compatible of an angry man, who enjoys the emot10n of anger both ?bJeC­
for integration with all of A's other feelings, so that the con­
crescence shall issue in a completely unified feeling of satisfac­ tively, as belonging to the past, and also form.all� as contmue �
tion. in the present. This continuation is the _ contmmty. of . nature
(AI 236). He is pointing to the confo �auon of subJ_ective form
ii. In the simple physical feeling Ap, A must feel in such a way to datum as the critical piece of "machmery" by which the past
that Ap is "conformal" to its datum. Ap is a feeling of Xp, and is objectified in the present. In a discussion of L�cke's view of
this fact must be relevant to the way in which Xp is felt. The sub­ perception he says, "Locke's principle a�ounts to this: That there
jective form must "conform" to the datum. are many actual existents, and that m some sense one .actual
Thus there are two sets of limitations or determining conditions existent repeats itself in another actual exis �ent, so . that i� the
on the origination of Ap with respect to its subjective form. One analysis of the latter existent a component determmed _to the
set of determining conditions is internal to A; the other set is ex­ former existent is discoverab le. The philosophy of orgamsm ex­
ternal to A. The two sets of determinants limit each other. A presses this principle by its doctrines of ' prehensi?n' and of ' ?b­
physical prehension of a datum can modify the subjective aim jectification' " (PR 2 1 i ) . I suggest it is A's subjective form whi�h
(PR 4 i 6). The subjective aim is the ground for the selection of is the discoverable component "determined to" X. More specif­
data to be felt (PR 4i). The two sets togeth er completely determine ically, it is the subjective form of Ap which is determined t� X :
( PR 338) the subjective form of Ap. The subjective form of Ap
It is therefore of utmost importance to see how the subjective
is partly but by no means entirely the result of external com­ form of a feeling is determined to or conforms to its datum '. First
pulsion. It is a product of efficient and final causation. we ask what it is to which the subjective form of the simple
physical feeling conforms. Then we shall ask what it means to
2 . Conformity of subjective form conform.
Now we are ready to give our enquiry an even sharper focus. a. What is conformed to? At times Whitehead seems to say that
We have seen that the crux of the problem of social immanence what is conformed to is the objective datum as a whole:
lies in the meaning of causal objectification. That the notion of
conformity of subjective form is the core of Whitehead's theory In the conformal feelings the how of feeling reproduces
of causal objectification, and hence the crucial feature of his what is felt (PR 249).
doctrine of social immanence, is suggested by the following: . . . the subjective form, amid its own original ele� e� ts,
Another point emerges in this explanation, namely, the always involves reproduction of the pattern of the objective
doctrine of the continuity of nature. This doctrine balances datum (PR 357).
and limits the doctrine of the absolute individuality of each In the case we are discussing, the subjective form of Ap would on
occasion of experience. There is a continuity between the this showing conform to Xp.
 C A U S A L O B J E C T I F I CA T I O N C O N F O R M I TY O F S U B J E C T I V E F OR M

Some important qualifications, however, must be taken into following passages, where A is a past occasion and B is the present
account: occasion, make this clear:
This doctrine of conformation only holds for the qualita­ In the first stage of B's physical feeling, the subjective form
of B's feeling is conformed to the subjective form of A 's feel­
tive side of the content of the objective datum (AI 326 ). ing . (PR 446).
. .

Only the qualitative components of an actuality in the datum Occasion B prehends occasion A as an antecedent subject
can pass into the subjective form (AI 327). experiencing a sensum with emotional intensity. Also B's
Certain elements in the objective datum are not "qualitative" subjective form of emotion is conformed to A 's subjective
and hence are not conformed to by the subjective form of the form. Thus there is a vector transmission of emotional feel­
subject's feeling. There are "two exceptions" to the doctrine of ing of a sensum from A to B. In this way B feels the sensum
conformation, and both arise when "abstraction has reached its as derived from A and feels it with an emotional form also
extreme limit" (AI 326) . These are (i) bare mathematical forms, derived from A . This is the most primitive form of the feel­
and (ii) the bare notion of an individual actuality "abstracted ing of causal efficacy ( PR 479-80).
from the mode of its initial indication" so that it is entertained In our symbols the subjective form of Ap conforms to the sub­
as a bare "It" (AI 327. See CN 8; PR 295-300, 391-405). These ele­ jective form of Xp. This then is a further specification of what
ments can be entertained in thought as objects, but only when is conformed to.
abstracted from the qualitative elements in the concrete datum.
They cannot therefore function as elements of subjective forms. b. What does it mean to conform? In a number of passages
Incidentally, Whitehead's explanation of the fallacy in certain Whitehead speaks of the "continuity" of the subjective form of
trad�tional doctrines of substance is relevant here. This fallacy the past occasion and the subjective form of the new occasion.
consists, as we saw in Chapter 5, in thinking of real individuals The new occasion is said to have the "same" subjective form
as h �ving � substratum devoid of process of any sort (static) and as the past occasion (AI 236). There is thus an "identity of sub­
?evo1 � of immediacy (vacuous). This fallacy, Whitehead thinks, jective form inherited conformally from one occasion to the other"
IS a failure to recognize that these nonqualitative elements in the (AI 239).
dat�m are abstractions . This is what he calls elsewhere the fallacy Some caution is needed in interpreting the "identity" of sub­
.
of , misplace d concretenes s" (sMw 72; PR i 1 , 27). He thinks that jective form which "continuity" implies. There is an important
two ancient sources of the fallacy are Plato's attribution of real sense in which the subjective form of a feeling is peculiar to that
be�ng to ideas, ?verlooki?g the abstractness of pure form, and feeling. In the "categories of existence" subjective forms are listed
Aristotle ,s doctrine of primary substance, which overlooked the as "private matters of fact" (PR 32). This is explained further
abstractness of bare individuality (AI 340, 354-6; MT 92-3, 1 1 1-13, in a later passage: "The essential novelty of a feeling attaches to
1 26). its subjective form. The initial data, and even the nexus which
Wh�t is. conformed to, then, is only the q ualitative element in is the objective datum, may have served other feelings with other
the obJ � Ct1ve dat� m. � ow the qualitative element in the objective subjects. But the subjective form is the immediate novelty; it
datu� i� the subjective form of the feeling felt. In our case the is how that subject is feeling that objective datum. There is no
qualitative element in the objective datum of Ap is the subjective tearing this subjective form from the novelty of this concrescence"
form of Xp. What the subjective form of the present feeling con­ (PR 354; see 356). This clearly implies that no two feelings can
forms to, then, is the su bjective form of the o bjective datum. The have the same subjective form, and that the continuity of sub-
 C A U S A L O B J E C T I F I CAT I O N t' fi: E F tJ N ci:'t o N OF E T E R N A L 6 B J :E C: t s 1 39

jective form implied in "conformation" cannot be, strictly speak­ As we do so it must be kept in mind that we have touched on,
ing, an "identity" of subjective form. The subjective form of the and are continuing to deal with, only one part of the meaning of
past feeling cannot, strictly speaking, be the same as the subjec­ conformation. Another part of its meaning will remain to be dealt
tive form of the present feeling. with in the next chapter.
Suppose then we interpret this continuity as a succession of
similar subjective forms. Let the subjective form of Ap be de­ 3. The function of eternal objects
noted by sf(Ap) and the subjective form of Xp by sf(Xp) . Then Some theory of universals seems to be required. The immediate
we might say that in the series sf(Xp), sf(Ap) there is continuity feelings that constitute X do not in their immediacy persist into
in that sf(Ap) is like or similar to sf(Xp) . the concrescence of A. X and A transcend each other in the sense
For example if sf(Xp) is some kind of "redly," then sf(Ap) will that there is no sharing of immediacy. There is no overlapping of
be some kind of redly. Just what kind of redly the latter will be X and A as immediate actualities. The common element required
depends on both the subjective aim of A and the objective datum for the significance of Whitehead's theory of conformity, therefore,
of Ap. This initial subjective form will be modified in the supple­ must be something other than an immediate individual actuality.
mentary phases of the concrescence, perhaps for example into No actual occasion can happen twice. But this is just what the
"angrily." But we are concerned only with the initial phase of common element must do. It must happen first in X and again in
the concrescence. A. It must be such that it can be a factor in X and also a factor in
Now it is evident that in this interpretation we have reintro­ A, which supersedes and transcends X.
duced the notion of identity. Redly qualifies both the subjective Whitehead calls such elements "eternal objects." Eternal ob­
form of the past and the subjective form of the present. In this jects are categoreally defined as "Pure Potentials for the Specific
respect sf(Ap) is "the same as" sf(Xp) . Though each of these sub­ Determination of Fact, or Forms of Definiteness" (PR 32). The
jective forms is more than redly, since each is particular to its sub­ function of eternal objects with which we are concerned is ex­
ject, yet there is an identical element common to both. plained as follows:
If we interpret Whitehead's statements about the "identity" of
subjective forms in this way, then we can still do justice to their A simple physical feeling enjoys a characteristic which has
particularity. If we are to say that one subjective form is "derived been variously described as 're-enaction,' 'reproduction,' and
from" (PR 479-80) or conforms to another, then they cannot be 'conformation.' This characteristic can be more accurately
numerically identical. Their identity must be interpreted as pos­ explained in terms of the eternal objects involved. There are
session of a common character or, in Whitehead's categories, the eternal objects determinant of the definiteness of the objec­
ingredience of the same eternal object in the subjective forms of tive datum which is the 'cause,' and eternal objects deter­
both the feelings. minant of the definiteness of the subjective form belonging
This is indeed Whitehead's explanation. He says, "If we ab­ to the 'effect.' When there is re-enaction there is one eternal
stract the form from the feeling, we are left with an eternal object object with two-way functioning, namely, as partial deter­
as the remnant of subjective form" (PR 354). The "same thing" minant of the objective datum, and as partial determinant of
(sMw 220) which occurs both in X and in A is an eternal object. the subjective form. In this two-way role, the eternal object is
We are hereby introduced to the important function of eternal functioning relationally between the initial data on the one
objects in objectification. To this topic we turn in the following hand and the concrescent subject on the other. It is playing
section, anticipating the more extended discussion of the theory one self-consistent role in obedience to the category of objec­
of eternal objects in Part Two. tive identity (PR 364; see 9 1 , 97, 249, 445-6).
1 40 C A U S A L O B J E C T I F I CA T I O N RE P E TI T I O N A N D " F L O W OF F E E L I N G " 141
Several observations about this "relational function" of eternal
objects need to be made. In the first place, eternal objects are not 4 . Repetition and the "flow o f feeling"
physical causes. They do not add any physical effectiveness to the If the account of the conformity of subjective form given above
process of transition. In itself an eternal object "is neutral .as to is correct, then what happens in the case of the simple physical
the fact of its physical ingression in any particular actual entity of feeling Ap is as follows.
the temporal world" (PR 70). It is merely a "form of definiten �ss" The immediately past actual occasion X, as it existed in its own
of feeling. And according to Whitehead's categories of explanat10n, subjective immediacy, included the feeling Xp as a compo� ent of
a formal description cannot serve as a "reason" for any particular its satisfaction. Let the subjective · form of Xp be described as
fact in nature. This is required by the ontological principle, which "redly." Then the eternal object "red" is a form of �he defini� e­
means that "actual entities are the only reasons" (PR 37). Only ness of sf(Xp) . Now, that is to say for A, X has perished. X m­
actual entities are physical causes. . cluding Xp no longer exists in its subjective immediacy. X is now
Therefore Whitehead's "explanation" of identities, causat10n, existing objectively as an initial datum for the new concrescence
and permanence by reference to eternal objects is not alternative that is A-in-becoming.
to an explanation of these facts by reference to actual entities. He By virtue of the selectivity of the new concrescence, X is ob­
does not in this way have two theories of social immanence. There jectively given for one of the primary feelings of A, name!y Ap,
is a single theory of social immanence, in which both actual oc­ under the aspect of Xp. Thus in Ap, A prehends X-feelmg-M­
casions and eternal objects have their own functions, neither cat­ there-then-redly. Xp is the objective datum of Ap.
egory being replaceable by the other. Explanation in terms of Now the subjective form of Ap will be like the subjective form
eternal objects is not something in addition to the theory of ob­ of Xp, so that redly is "repeated" or "reproduced" in the new
jectification. Rather it is a necessary part of that theory. "The feeling Ap. Since X and A are mutually exclusive in their respec­
organic philosophy does not hold that the ' particular existents' tive subjective immediacies, repetition cannot mean that sf(Xp)
are prehended apart from universals; on the contrary, it holds that persists into A in a simple or literal sense. Xp with its subjective
they are prehended by the mediation of universals. In other words, form cannot be abstracted from its subject X which has perished
each actuality is prehended by means of some element of its own and is objectively immortal.
definiteness. This is the doctrine of the 'objectification' of actual Repetition can only mean therefore that a form of definiteness
entities" (PR 230). of sf(Xp) now comes to be a form of definiteness of sf(Ap) . The
Whitehead needs eternal objects in order to give an account of eternal object "red" is the element of identity which makes it
objectification. Why is this the case? Here we are asking for what significant to say that sf(Ap) is like sf(Xp) . Strictly speaking, there­
we might call a categoreal reason. Why do his principles require fore, what is repeated in A is not sf(Xp) but the form of definite­
him to bring in eternal objects to explain objectification? The ness "red," which was a form of definiteness of sf(Xp) and is now
basic reason, I suggest, lies in his strong theory of finite individ­ a form of definiteness of sf(Ap) . The subjective form of Xp was a
uals. To achieve its concrete unity of satisfaction an actual oc­ redly and the subjective form of Ap is a redly. It is only in this
casion must exclude the immediacies of other actualities. There­ sense that the subjective form of Ap can be said to be "the same
fore "transfer of feeling" cannot be explained as literal persistence as" the subjective form of Xp.
of immediate feeling. It must be explained as "repetition" by the The function of eternal objects in objectification enables us to
present occasion of a subjective form of feeling in the past oc­ understand Whitehead's alternative to a literal "flow of feeling."
casion, the identical element involved being an eternal object. We can now understand how causal objectification is more pre­
cisely described in terms of "repetition," "reproduction," "re-
 C A U S A L O B J E C T I F I C AT I O N

enaction," o r "re-creation" than in terms which imply s�me �er­

T
! RE P E T I T I O N A N D " F L O W O F F E E L I N G " i 43
the novel concrescent subject. But this re-enaction has a mere
sistence or spilling-over of immediacy from one occas10n mto character of conformation to pattern (PR 374).1
another. . The subject "reproduces" the objective datum by producing a
As a matter of fact the former set of terms and equivalent ex- feeling of the datum with a conformal subjective form.
pressions dominates Whitehead's discussions of social immanence. In an earlier discussion of those expressions suggesting a simple
On this as on other topics his discussions are of two sorts . . I � some flow of feeling, I urged that a literal reading would result in
he develops his categoreal scheme in. i �s own . terms, aimm� �t radical inconsistency between Whitehead's theory of objectifica­
logical rigor and discursive clarity. This is especially c.harac.tenstic tion and other fundamental principles of his philosophy . An in­
of Parts III and IV of Process and Reality . In other discuss10ns he terpretation of causal objectification has now been given which
applies the categoreal scheme to facts o � e�pe.rience in la�guage avoids the inconsistency entailed by the literal interpretation. This
that is more vivid and evocative. Thus he is aimmg both at ngorous strengthens the suggestion that these expressions need not be taken
exposition of the categoreal scheme and at. the use of this schei_n e to in a literal way. Insofar as they suggest that causal objectification
interpret our experience. One of the mam problems abo� t mter­ takes place by an overlapping of immediacies, they are misleading.
preting Whiteh ead is to do full jus.tice to both these an�s and It should be repeated that most expressions like "flow of feel­
modes of express ion withou t confusmg them. But I submit t�at ing" do not, when taken in their contexts, make this suggestion at
in his more careful and sustained expositions of the me��ams� all. Some are describing in vivid and metaphorical language a
of causal objectification he regularly uses the language of repeti­ situation described more precisely elsewhere in systematic terms.
tion." Some such passages may be cited: Sometimes Whitehead is describing what the fact of inheritance
is felt to be, the macroscopic fact as there for analysis, not how the
In the organic philosophy the notion of repetition is funda­ situation is to be analyzed in terms of the final realities, actual oc­
mental. The doctrine of objectification is an endeavor �o :x­ casions. Sometimes the difficulty lies in merely verbal confusions.
press how what is settled in actuali�y is repeated under limita­ For example, a feeling in the sense of a present immediacy becomes
tions, so as to be 'given' for immediacy (PR 208). confused with a feeling in the sense of a past immediate feeling
existing objectively. What is important is that we can locate such
Apart from inhibitions or additions, weak: nings or in� ens.ifi­ confusions, and that in spite of them a fair account of Whitehead's
cations due to the history of its product10n, the subjective theory of objectification, consistent with his theory of individuality,
form o f a physical feeling is re-enaction of the subjective form can be given.2
of the feeling felt. Thus the cause passes on its feeling to � e We can now implement a suggestion made in Chapter 3 about
reproduced by the new subject as its own, an� yet as m­ the relations of contemporary mentalities. The question was
separable from the cause. There is a flow of . feeh1: g. � ut t�e whether Whitehead means to say there are direct prehensions of
re-enaction is not perfect . . . The cause is objectively m contemporary mental activity. It was suggested that he does not.
the constitution of the effect, in virtue of being the feeler of But even if he does it need not compromise the exclusiveness of
the feeling reproduced in the effect w ith partial e q uivalence
1. See S M W 147, 1 86, 2 1 2 ; PR 1 96, 202-8, 234-5, 375, 380; AI 248-9.
of su bjective form (PR 362-3, my italics).
2. To mention one application, the transmission of physical energy is
interpreted in terms of re-enaction of subjective form. "Thus having regard
The deterministic efficient causation is the inflow of the to the 're-enaction' which is characteristic of the subjective form of a simple
actual world in its own proper character of its own feelings, physical feeling, we have-in the case of the simpler actual entities-an ex­
with their own intensive strength, felt and re-enacted by ample of the transference of energy in the physical world" (PR 375-6).
1 44 C A U S A L O B J E C T I F I CA T I O N

contemporary occasions. We have shown that in causal objectifica­

tion there are "direct" connections that do not involve sharing of
immediacy. Presumably, prehension of the past by the present is CHAPTER 8
as direct a connection as prehension of contemporary mentality
would be. Hence even if there were direct prehensions of con­
temporary mentalities, no sharing of immediacy need be involved. Influence
The tentative result of our analysis of causal objectification
turns out to be different from, and more complicated than, the
view that an immediate feeling persists as such into a new con­ 1. Introduction
crescence. Nevertheless, such metaphorical expressions as "flow of
feeling," "transference of throbs of emotional energy," and the WE H AVE B E E N examining Whitehead's account of how one
like contain an important additional truth about objectification. actual occasion is "present in" another. This is his doctrine of
Our discussion of what it means to conform is not yet complete. social immanence, which balances and complements his doctrine
It was suggested above that a part of the meaning of conformal of social transcendence. We have seen that causal objectification is
is "similar to," interpreted as a relation involving partial identity crucial for the intelligibility of social immanence, and that the
between its terms. It is obvious that something is yet lacking. To core of the theory of causal objectification is the notion of con­
say that sf(Ap) conforms to sf(Xp) is to say more than that sf(Ap) formity of subjective form.
is like sf(Xp) . What has been left out is the element of efficacity As part of the meaning of conformation we found an explanatory
or "power" or "real conditioning," which for Whitehead is in­ mechanism describing how a feeling is repeated or reproduced in
trinsic to the relation between X and A. There is o b ligation that a subsequent occasion. But there seems to be more to conformation
sf(Ap) shall be like sf(Xp) . The past is causally efficacious; it exists than this mechanism of repetition. It seems to leave out something
for A not as pure potentiality but as real potentiality . It is this Whitehead wants to say, namely that the novel feeling must re­
element in the meaning of conform that the metaphorical expres­ peat its datum. It seems to leave out the power, or influence, or
sions cited above add to the mere notion of repetition. The trans­ causal efficacy of the past occasion on the new concrescence. The
ference of feeling "is the cumulation of the universe and not a efficacy of the antecedent occasion seems to be put by Whitehead
stage-play about it" (PR 363). as an assertion added to his account of repetition. It does not
There can be no doubt that Whitehead means to say that in a seem to be a part of the mechanism of repetition itself.
temporal series there is something more than a succession of oc­ Whitehead takes our common experience of causal efficacy as
casions with similar characters. He certainly means that similarity one of the fundamental facts which philosophy must interpret.
of character is an obligation imposed by antecedent occasions "The notion of causation arose because mankind lives amid ex­
upon occasions that supersede them. This is precisely the point at periences in the mode of causal efficacy" (PR 266). We influence,
which he takes issue with Hume and phenomenalism generally. and are influenced by, other things. These experiences must be
But so far we have not found anything that specifically adds ef­ explained, and not explained away. Our next question therefore
ficacy to the mechanism of repetition described above. It seems is, In what sense does Whitehead undertake to explain these ex­
that Whitehead provides no special mechanism for causal obliga­ periences of causal efficacy? More particularly, how does he relate
tion in addition to the mechanism of repetition. In what way then the fact of influence to the explanatory mechanism of repetition?
has he an answer to Hume? Is some additional mechanism necessary for the intelligibility of
power or influence? One way we may give this question a sharper
1 45
 I N F L U E N CE THE " E X P L A N AT I O N " O F I N F L U E N CE

point, and at the same time relate Whitehead's thought to some that "in whatever mode, a percept is a percept." Indeed, the
of its antecedents, is to ask how he sees the difference between his notion of two "modes of perception" (presentational immediacy
treatment of influence and Hume's. and causal efficacy) has its dangers as well as its good uses.
Stace's interpretation seems to have been encouraged also by
those expressions like "flow of feeling" which seem to suggest a
2. The "explanation" of influence literal transference of feeling. I have argued that, taken in this
I shall first discuss what I believe to be a mistaken interpreta­ way, these passages would run counter to some of the fundamental
tion of Whitehead's reply to Hume. Then I shall state his criti­ principles of the categoreal scheme. And I urge that most of them
cisms of Hume's treatment of causality. It should then be fairly do not bear this interpretation when examined in their contexts
clear how he explains, and how he does not explain, the fact of and in the light of Whitehead's more rigorous expositions of causal
influence. objectification.
W. T. Stace in The Nature of the World (Princeton University Against Stace's interpretation I call attention to certain features
Press, 1 9 40) takes up "Whitehead's example of the man who says, of the following passage:
"The flash made me blink" (PR 266). According to Stace, White­ The former mode {causal efficacy] produces percepta which
head argues against Hume "that there is a percept of 'making' in are vague, not to be controlled, heavy with emotion: it pro­
the mode of causal efficacy" (p. 73) . Stace comments, "But in what­ duces the sense of derivation from an immediate past, and of
ever mode, a percept is a percept. It is the perceiving of a datum. passage to an immediate future; a sense of emotional feeling,
Hence if Hume made any mistake in his analysis of the complex belonging to oneself in the past, passing into oneself in the
of data, it was only that he left out one datum, that of making. present, and passing from oneself in the present towards one­
The principle will in any case be the same. Either on Whitehead's self in the future; a sense of influx of influence from other
interpretation or on Hume's what we have is a number of data vaguer presences in the past, localized and yet evading local
following, or accompanying, one another. The flash making the definition, such influence modifying, enhancing, inhibiting,
man blink will be, after all, nothing but a bare succession of data." diverting, the stream of feeling which we are receiving, unify­
This interpretation holds that Whitehead, in order to answer ing, enjoying, and transmitting. This is our general sense of
Hume, attempts to point out an additional datum, namely "mak­ existence, as one item among others, in an efficacious actual
ing," which is of the same logical order as "flash" and "blink." His world (PR 2 7 1 ).
answer to Hume would consist in the addition of another bit of
conceptual mechanism to the mechanism of repetition we ex­ In the first place, this is a phenomenological account of experi­
amined above. ence. This is experience as given for philosophical analysis not
I think this interpretation is mistaken, but it is a mistake for experience as interpreted by philosophical analysis. This is what
which Whitehead is partly to blame. It may well be that in Sym­ philosophers must "explain." Whitehead does not introduce in
b o lism he did feel that the causal meaning of experience had to this passage his own systematic categories of explanation.
be validated in some such way.1 Even in some of his writings after In the second place, notice how the data of these feelings are
Sym b o lism there seem to be vestiges of an assumption that power described. They are feelings of "derivation," of "passage," of "in­
itself could be caught in a conceptual net. Expressions like "per­ fluence." These feelings are felt in a certain situation. What is
cepta in the mode of causal efficacy" (PR 271) might well suggest felt is an activity going on in that situation, an activity which re­
i. See Lowe's remarks on Whitehead's treatment of causal efficacy in
lates the entities ("items") in the situation in a dynamic way.
Sym bolism (Schilpp 1 00).
These data are not data in the same sense in which clearly and
 "T.
.\ .,

I N F L U E N CE T H E " E X P L A N AT I O N " O F I N F L U E N C E 1 49
I
distinctly presented contemporary sensa are data. These are data It may well be that Whitehead's language, referring to what is
of a different sort. They are activities, not static entities. This is the given in the experience of causal efficacy as a "percept," has been
important difference between what is felt in presentational im­ misleading. For it seems clear enough that (i) not only does he
mediacy and what is felt in causal efficacy. And if the term "per­ agree with Hume "that in the mode of presentational immediacy
cepta" leads the reader to assimilate the "data" of causal feelings there is no percept of the flash making the man blink" but also
to the data of presentational immediacy, then this term is func� (ii) when he describes the man's experience of causal efficacy, he
tioning in a misleading way. It should be understood as implicitly does not point to anything at all we would ordinarily call a "per­
defined in Whitehead's description. cept."
It is true that the activity felt is relational between certain terms. A better clue to the relation in his philosophy between power
Thus these terms (for example, "oneself in the past" and "oneself or efficacy on the one hand and the mechanism of repetition on the
in the present") are part of the datum of the feeling. The point to be other is furnished by the following passage from William James,
noticed is that they are felt as terms of the relational activity. The Some Pro b lems of Philosophy : 2
important distinction is not between data which are clear and dis­
tinct and data which are vague, but between entities given in con­ Our outcome so far seems therefore to be only this, that the
temporary space (geometrically related sensa) and the transitional attempt to treat 'cause,' for conceptual purposes, as a separable
activity apprehended in causal feelings. This activity is not itself link . . . has led to the denial of efficient causation, and to
an entity in the sense in which the data of presentational feelings the substitution for it of the bare descriptive notion of uni­
are entities. The "making" is not a percept in the sense in which form sequence among events. . . . Meanwhile the concrete
the flash and the blink are percepts. perceptual flux, taken just as it comes, offers in our own
I suggest that Whitehead's reply to Hume does not consist in activity-situations perfectly comprehensible instances of causal
pointing out a "datum," in the sense of an entitative element in agency. The transitive causation in them does not, it is true,
an analytical description, which would validate the causal meaning stick out as a separate piece of fact for conception to fix
of our experience. To regard the "making" as an additional com­ upon. Rather does a whole subsequent field grow continu­
ponent of the same logical order as "flash" and "blink" is to mis­ ously out of a whole antecedent field because it seems to yield
take Whitehead's intention. new being of the nature called for, while the feeling of
It is true that he says of the man who blinks, "According to the causality-at-work flavors the entire concrete sequence as salt
philosophy of organism, the man also experiences another per­ flavors the water in which it is dissolved (pp. 2 1 7- 1 8).
cept in the mode of causal efficacy" (PR 265). And this lends support I suggest that for Whitehead also, "power" is not for conceptual
to Stace's interpretation if, but only if, "in whatever mode, a per­ purposes a "separable link." It does not "stick out as a separate
cept is a percept." This is precisely the question. The "making" piece of fact for conception to fix upon." If so, it would have to
is certainly not a percept in the same sense as the flash of light, be expressed as an additional part of his analytical description. But
the feeling of eye-closure, and the instant of darkness. For when Whitehead does not do this. It seems rather that he regards
Whitehead in the next sentence goes on to explain the man's "per­ "causality-at-work" as "flavoring" the sequence sf(Xp)-sf(Ap) .
cept in the mode of causal efficacy," he says, "He feels that the ex­ Are we to conclude then that, since in his mature theory of
periences of the eye in the matter of the flash are causal of the actual occasions Whitehead has provided no special mechanism for
blink. The man himself will have no doubt of it." What the man
2 . New York, Longmans, Green, 1 9 1 1 . Reprinted by permission of Paul R.
feels is put as a proposition about the flash and the blink, not as Reynolds & Son, 599 Fifth Ave., New York 1 7, N.Y. See Whitehead's comment
an object of the same order as the flash and the blink. on J ames' anti-intellectualism in PR vii.
 INFLUENCE W H ITEHEAD ON HUME
the fact of efficacy, in addition to the mechanism of repetition, his which underlies his description of experience. This cosmology
assertion of causal efficacy has not been made good? In my judg­ makes it impossible for him to express in theory the fact he ac­
ment this would mistake his whole approach to the problem. He cepted in practice. In practice Hume accepted causal efficacy as a
is aware of its complexity more than this interpretation would fact. But he implicitly regarded the subject of experience as a
suppose. substance, in the traditional sense, from which view it follows
Whitehead's account of causal efficacy is not an attempt to that impressions are "mere private attributes of the mind" (SYM­
demonstrate real connections. It is not his business logically to BOLISM 32). It is then impossible to give theoretical recognition to
derive the effect from the cause. It is compatible with his account real connections between the subject and other things in its world.
to say that no explanatory mechanism is adequate to the fact of This illustrates the principle that "the relevance of evidence is
influence or power. After all has been said about reproduction of dictated by theory. For you cannot prove a theory by evidence
feeling, there comes a point where he does not attempt, concep­ which that theory dismisses as irrelevant" (AI 284).
tually, to bridge the gap between cause and effect, between the This criticism of Hume is double-edged. On one side it recom­
past subject and the present subject. The obligation to repeat this mends that a common fact of experience be taken more seriously.
form of definiteness is simply an empirically acknowledged fact, On the other side it recommends a reconstruction of theory. The
not an additional bit of explanatory mechanism. point of the reconstruction of theory is not to produce a sub­
The use of a theoretical explanation of influence, on White­ stitute for experience. It is rather to produce a theoretical struc­
head's view, is not to deduce causal efficacy but only to describe a ture which makes room for all the facts of experience and relates
context within which it is logically possible to acknowledge a fact them in a systematic way. Whitehead's own theory of actual oc­
of experience. The explanatory mechanism may describe the way casions, and in particular the mechanism explanatory of causal
in which the influence of one actual occasion on another takes objectification, is not designed as a substitute for experience. It
place. Its use is to relate the fact of causal efficacy to other facts is designed to make room for the empirically acknowledged fact
such as experiences of subjective unity, purposive action, individ­ of influence and to relate it to the general structure of experience.
uality, and so on. In this sense it defines how influence is possible. Whitehead also charges that in his treatment of "memory,"
It is not intended to demonstrate that influence does take place. "repetition," and "habit" Hume does not abide by his own prin­
The efficacy of X in the concrescence of A is added not as a part ciples. His discussion of causality is made plausible by his admis­
of the explanatory mechanism but as the assertion on empirical sion of repetition of past impressions. But "At this point of his
grounds that it is so. argument, Hume seems to have overlooked the difficulty that
'repetition' stands with regard to ' impressions' in exactly the same
3. Whitehead on Hume position as does ' cause and effect.' Hume has confused a ' repeti­
tion of impressions' with an ' impression of repetitions of impres­
Whitehead's principal criticism of Hume's treatment of cau­ sions' " (PR 204). To justify this use of "repetition" some "impres­
sality is: "Thus Hume's demand that causation be describable as sion of repetition" must be found. Hume's answer, that he admits
an element in experience is . . . entirely justifiable. The point memory, is hardly satisfactory because he interprets memory en­
of the criticisms of Hume's procedure is that we have direct intui­ tirely in terms of "force and vivacity." But this interpretation of
tion of inheritance and memory: thus the only problem is, so to memory, says Whitehead, "omits the vital character of memory,
describe the general character of experience that these intuitions namely, that it is memory . In fact the whole notion of repetition
may be included. It is here that Hume fails" (PR 253). Hume fails is lost by the ' force and vivacity' doctrine . . . the repetition
to do justice to our intuitions because of the implicit cosmology character, which he ascribes to simple ideas, and which is the
 I N F LUE N C E
whole point of memory, finds no place in his explanation" (PR
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i
W H IT E H E A D O N H U M E

Metaphysics is nothing but the descriptio n of the generaliti es

1 53

205; see AI 236-7). In the same way Whitehead criticizes Hume's which apply to all the details of practice" (PR i g) .
employment of the notion of habit. "It is difficult to understand In what sense, then, is belief in causality "rational" ? It is not
why Hume exempts 'habit' from the same criticism as that applied rational, we conclude, if rationality means conceptual demonstra­
to the notion of ' cause.' We have no ' impression' of 'habit,' just as tion, or complete analytical description, of causal efficacy. To this
we have no 'impression' of 'cause.' Cause, repetition, habit are extent Whitehead agrees with Hume. Whether causal efficacy is
all in the same boat" (PR 2 1 3). For example, in the case of the real is a question of empirical fact not of logical demonstration.
man who says the flash made him blink, one of Hume's explana­ Whitehead says Hume is justified in asking for evidence, evidence
tions, according to Whitehead, is that "what the man really felt in immediate experience. On the other hand, belief in causality is
was his hab it of blinking after flashes. The word 'association' ex­ rational in the sense that we have an explanatory mechanism which
plains it all according to Hume. But how can a ' habit' be felt, makes room for the empirically acknowledged fact of causal ef­
when a 'cause' cannot be felt? Is there any presentational im­ ficacy and which serves to relate this fact, so acknowledged, to the
mediacy in the feeling of a 'habit'? Hume by a sleight of hand general structure of the subject-object situation. Influence is thus
confuses a ' habit of feeling blinks after flashes' with a 'feeling of related to individuality; the basis of social immanence is related
the habit of feeling blinks after flashes' " (PR 266). to the basis of social transcendence in an intelligible way; and a
This criticism of the self-consistency of Hume's analysis of ex­ generally coherent and self-consistent, and in this sense "rational,"
perience does not in itself constitute an answer to Hume's skeptical description of the world of experience is arrived at. But the prob­
query about causation. Whitehead's answer to this query consists lem of rationality in this instance is not logically to deduce causal
in an appeal to experience. Do we not experience real transitions efficacy. It is rather "so to describe the general character of ex­
from past to present? And should we not find some way to give an perience" that the "direct intuition of inheritance and memory
adequate account of this experience? . . . may be included" (PR 253) .
At this point it becomes a fair question whether Whitehead's
answer to Hume, since he does not implement transfer of feeling
with any specific mechanism other than repetition, does not itself This concludes our examination of the structure of Whitehead's
amount to an "appeal to practice" (PR 203). The answer is yes, if doctrine of social immanence within the immediate context of
an appeal to practice is simply a recognition that causal connec­ his theory of actual occasions. In Parts Two and Three we shall
tion is not formally demonstrated or deduced. The answer is no, enlarge our perspective on this topic.
however, if an appeal to practice means either (i) "appealing to There is an important point at which our account of the struc­
'practice' away from the critical examination of our sources of in­ ture of the doctrine must remain incomplete until Part Three.
formation" (PR 2 3 1 ) or (ii) refusal to give recognition in meta­ The problem left over is as follows. Whitehead takes it as a fact
physics to what is acknowledged in practice. Whitehead's mecha­ of common experience that the past is given for the present as a
nism of repetition is the way he gives critical recognition in real condition imposing the obligation of conformity. But how is it
metaphysics to what is acknowledged as a stubborn fact. "What­ possible, categoreally speaking, that the past, which has perished,
ever is found in 'practice' must lie within the scope of the meta­ is given for the present? In an answer to this question I shall sug­
physical description. When the description fails to include the gest a "reason" for causal efficacy. But it will not be a reason in
'practice,' the metaphysics is inadequate and requires revision. the sense of a logical demonstration that causal efficacy does in
There can be no appeal to practice to supplement metaphysics, so fact take place, and in this respect it will not qualify the main
long as we remain contented with our metaphysical doctrines. conclusion of this chapter.
1 54 INFLUENCE
In the next chapter, within a larger framework, I shall sum­
marize the doctrine of social immanence and consider some of its
I
!

conseq uences. I shall ask how Whitehead's account of immanence C HAPTER 9

affects the shape of his theory of actual occasions as a whole. For
example, in the light of our conclusions about objectification, in
what sense is Whitehead's philosophy a "philosophy of organism"? Pluralism and Organism
More particularly, in what sense are the connections among actual
occasions "organic" connections?
1. Are actual occasions genuine individuals?
H ow W E L L does the theory of actual occasions express the fact
that there are many real things? Does Whitehead's cosmology
amount to a genuine pluralism? It asserts a multiplicity of actual
occasions. So the crucial question is how well an actual occasion
qualifies as a real individual thing, transcending all other such
things. This calls for a recapitulation of the conclusions of Chap­
ters 2-5.
The conclusions supported by the arguments of those chapters
are as follows:
a. An actual occasion is concrete. It is more than a collection of
abstract characters. It has significance for itself. It is actual.
b. An actual occasion has unity and completeness. It is more
than a flux of experience. It has a structure and a consummation.
There is a completeness of internal unity, aimed at in the con­
crescence and achieved in the satisfaction. In this sense an actual
occasion is individuum.
c. An actual occasion is socially transcendent, that is to say:
i. As an act of experience, an actual occasion is a novel unity,
not repeated in the advance of nature. Every actual occasion is
unique in character.
Also, as an act of experience an actual occasion is exclusive of
any other occasion in the fundamental sense that no two occasions
have any immediacy of feeling in common. No occasion includes,
as a functioning part of its own immediacy, any other experiencing
subject or any feeling belonging to another subject in the latter's
own subjective immediacy. "Feeling of feeling" does not involve
any common immediacy, because the feeling felt is objectified.
The feeling felt exists, for the feeler, not in the mode of subjective
1 55
 P L URALIS M A N D ORGAN ISM AR E O C C A S I O N S I N D I V I D U A L S ?
immediacy but in the mode of objective immortality. There is We have seen that it is by virtue of their subjective aims that
no sharing of immediacy. In addition to this general exclusiveness actual occasions have subjective unity. So the conception of a sub­
of immediacy, contemporary occasions are causally independent, jective aim is essential to, and indeed c�uci�l for, Whitehead's
and for any present occasion future occasions are hypothetical only. acco�1nt of real individuals. Its importance m his system can hardly
In these ways an occasion excludes, or leaves out of its constitu­ be overestimated.
tion, all other occasions. Some interpreters have objected to his the.ory of the . un �ty of t� e
ii. As extended, an actual occasion occupies a novel spatio­ subject. They have argued that an explanat10n of subjective umt.y
tem poral region. The regions of occasions are nonoverlapping and in terms of aim at satisfaction is insufficient. They urge that his
thus mutually exclusive. The only types of extensive connection theory of feeling is itself unintelligible except on a more ortho�ox
that are possible between two regions of actual occasions are ex­ conception of the subject of experience, namely "the assumption
ternal and mediate connection. And real mediating regions are of a subject or experient as condition of its experiences and self-
externally connected with the real regions they mediately connect. " 2
identical throughout th e concrescent process.
The novelty and exclusiveness of the region of an actual oc­ Whitehead could, in fact, give an interpretation of this predi­
casion reflect its novelty and exclusiveness as an act of experience. cate. For Whitehead the subject is a "condition of its experiences,"
The experiential boundaries of an occasion are reflected in the as defined in categoreal obligations i and vii (PR 3 9, 40-1). And
definiteness of regions in position and extent. The mutual ex­ the subject is "self-identical throughout the concrescent proces� ,"
clusiveness of immediate unities of experience is reflected in the in the sense that what is aimed at in the initial phase of the m ­
mutual exclusiveness of regions. For we do not have here two ternal process is fully realized in the satisfaction. Another im­
coordinate types of actuality, namely feelings and regions, which portant consideration is that the internal �rocess is epochal� .so
condition one another. Rather we have a single basic type of that there is no "transition" within the subject. But these cnt1cs
actuality, namely relational feelings. Extension, and with it the seem to mean something else. They seem to mean that the subject
notions of space, time, and regions, is derivative by abstraction must exist before it has its experiences and that it must be unaf­
from the nature of feelings. Therefore the novelty and exclusive­ fected by its experiences. And it is certainly true that Whitehead
ness of an actual occasion as an act of experience is the basic fact does not accept this theory of the subject of experience.
on which the social transcendence of occasions depends. The But there is an important question about the ground of the m­ .
value of the conclusions of Chapter 4 about Whitehead's theory of ternal unity of an actual occasion: How does the subjective aim
extension is that they are what, on his theory of actual occasions, originate? Whence comes the original idea which the concrescence
one would expect them to be. Thus they give some support, in­ adopts as its ideal? Since it is a novel idea, it cannot come from
directly, to the conclusions of Chapters 2 and 3 . 1 the past actual world. Nor can it come from the coi:temporary
I suggest that these conclusions, if they are well founded, justify world, because the concrescence. is independent of its contem­
our saying that an actual occasion is a real individual. If we add poraries. It cannot come from the future, which is not actual. Yet
to these the conclusions of Chapter 5, then it is reasonable to say a prehension of this idea is basic to the process of concrescence.
that an actual occasion is a substantial individual, if the proper At this point it becomes evident that Whitehead's theory of
qualifications are understood. But other questions have to be actual occasions, the temporal actualities which make up the
raised. world, leads us beyond itself. We have already seen that eternal
I. As a matter of fact, as this study proceeded I arrived at the conclusions
objects are necessary to explain the datum of the novel subjective
about the nonoverlapping of regions and the exclusiveness of immediacies 2. David L. Miller and George V. Gentry, The Philosophy of A. N. White­
more or less independently. head (Minneapolis, Burgess Publishing Co., 1 938), p. 1 28.
 P L U R A L I S M A N D O R GA N I S M
T ARE T H E R E O R G A N I C R E L AT I O N S ? 1 59
aim of an actual occasion. And we shall see that Whitehead's ex­ of organism" (PR 37). Properly speaking therefore it is not a cate­
planation of the ground of the subjective aim requires a refer­ gory of explanation. In relation to the categoreal scheme it is an
ence to God, the nontemporal actual entity. Since he aims at explicandum. But it is employed in a few passages in Process and
coherence, which means that "fundamental notions shall not seem Reality with the purpose of interpreting the outcome of the
capable of abstraction from each other" (PR 5), this is as it should scheme, and in these passages it takes on a relatively systematic
be .. But we must ask in Part Three whether, by the functions he meaning. These passages belong to a level of discourse, in con­
ass1g�s to God, he compromises the real individuality of actual trast with more precise and rigorous expositions of his categories,
occas10ns and thereby the genuineness of his pluralism. Will it where Whitehead is building bridges between the language of
turn out in the end that actual occasions have the status of "ap­ the categoreal scheme and ordinary language.
pearances" rather than "realities"? This is a question for which The principal point of these passages is to make a distinction
we are not yet ready. among "the organisms of the world."
These organisms are of two types: one type consists of the
2 . Are there organic relations among actual occasions? individual actual entities; the other type consists of nexus
We might agree, provisionally, that Whitehead's claim to be a of actual entities ( PR 439).
pluralist has been made good in his theory of actual occasions. In the philosophy of organism . . . the notion of ' organism'
Now we look at another side of that theory. Is it a fair conclusion has two meanings . . . namely, the microscopic meaning and
that there are real connections among actual occasions? Does the macroscopic meaning. The microscopic meaning is con­
White�ead's th.eory of _actual occasions express a genuinely organic cerned with the formal constitution of an actual occasion,
pluralism? This reqmres a summary and interpretation of the considered as a process of realizing an individual unity of
conclusions of Chapters 6-8. experience. The macroscopic meaning is concerned with the
. Firstb etween
tions
we ought to see that this is a question about the rela­
actual occasions, not about the internal constitution
givenness of the actual world, considered as the stubborn fact
which at once limits and provides opportunity for the actual
of an occasion. Thinking of the internal unities of actual occasions occasion (PR 1 96-7).
we might well agree that on Whitehead's showing the world is "a
system _of organis �s" (TIME 60). But this does not imply that the This distinction is correlated with the distinction between · the
world is an orgamsm. Are the internally organic actual occasions internal process of concrescence and the external process of transi­
organically related to one another? Is the immanence of one oc­ tion ( PR 326-7).
casion in another an organic relation? The importance of this distinction is that it yields two mean­
S_ome analysis of Whitehead's use of the term "organism" is ings of "organic relations," which we should not confuse. In the
plamly needed. In the first place it is remarkable that, though microscopic meaning of organism, organic relations are w ithin a
�e �sually speaks of his philosophy as "the philosophy of organ­ concrescence among prehensions which have the same subject .
ism (e.g. PR v), he makes little use of the term otherwise. Else­ In the macroscopic meaning of organism, organic relations are
between different actual entities. \Ve are concerned with relations
�here i_t occurs mainly in allusions to biological organisms and of the latter sort and therefore with the kind of organism that
1 � used m a presystematic way. It does not appear in the index of
either Process and Reality or A dventures of Ideas. is a nexus. When Whitehead says that "the community of actual
In the categoreal scheme itself the term "organism" occurs only things is an organism" (PR 327) he is saying only that the world
once, and then only incidentally in the phrase "the philosophy is a nexus of actual entities.
 1 60 P LURALIS M AND ORGAN ISM
T ARE T lt E R E O R GA N I C R E L AT I O N S ?
Now a nexus is categoreally explained as "a set of actual entities by the physical feeling ApX. Convers ely ex �resse.d, in ApX � he
in the unity of the relatedness constituted by their prehensions past occasion X is objectifi ed for A. Then m t� 1s mode of im-
of each other, or-what is the same thing conversely expressed­ manence X is present in A o bjective ly and effec : ively. . .
constituted by their objectifications in each other" (PR 35, category i. X is present in A o bjective ly. The past occ�s10�, w� 1ch �x1s :ed
of explanation xiv). All the things which ordinary experience "then" in its subjective immediacy, "now" exists m its ob1ect1ve
finds in nature, and the world itself in any stage of its process, are immortality. It has perished subjectively. It exists for � as the
nexus. Now the sense in which a nexus is a unity can only be dis­ datum of the physical feeling ApX. It is that actual occas10n s �b­
covered by analysis of the relations among its members, "their jectively immediate there-then. But it is not subjectively im-
objectifications in each other." And this bring us back to the mediate here-now.
problem of social immanence. Thus it is clear that the term ii. X is present in A effective ly. X makes a difference to A.. An
"organism" in its macroscopic meaning is an explicandum. explanation of how X is effective by way of ApX may be given
This does not mean that Whitehead's use of the term is point­ in the following stages:
less. It only means that his point is carried by a metaphor, to (a) ApX makes a difference to A. A's experience is o �her than
emphasize the real connections among the things which make up it would have been had there been no such past occasion as X,
the world. One way of putting his general point is in terms of the or if X had been different in some respect from what it was.
contrast between internal and external relations. With Bradley (b) ApX makes an essential, not an "accident�l," di�erei:c.e to
he would deny that there are any absolutely external relations. A. This is to be understood in the context of Whitehead s cnt1que
This denial is embodied in the principle of relativity. At the same of the traditional doctrine of substance. It is a consequence of his
time he urges against Bradley that just as relations modify the denial of an "unchanging subject of change," a substratum un­
relata so also the relata modify the relations (AI 2 0 i ). Also he affected by particular experiences. An a� tual occasion i� co � ­
avoids Bradley's conclusion that even internal relations are "not stituted by its concrescence, so that ApX 1s a com pone� : in A s
true in the end" (Essays in Truth and Reality, p. 3 1 2) . He avoids "real internal constitution." There is a "mutual sens1tiv1ty . of
this conclusion by embodying in his theories of actual occasions, feelings" (PR 338) so that ApX will affect and be affected .by .all
of eternal objects, and of God and the world, a doctrine of tran­ the other feelings that compose the concrescence of A. Subjective
scendence as well as a doctrine of immanence. unity is a categoreal condition of concrescence.
To explain how "the community of actual things is an organ­ (c) ApX makes an essential difference to A more specifically .
ism" we should develop in summary fashion an account of the by making A in some respect like X. The subjective for� of ApX
modes of immanence of actual occasions. Then we can ask how will conform to the subjective form of one of X's feelmgs. The
these relations resemble "organic" relations in the ordinary sense same form of definiteness which was immediately actualized in
of the word. the subjective form of X's feeling will now be immediately .actual­
ized in the subjective form of ApX. There is thus repet1t10n, or
a. The primary mode of social immanence: Causal o bjectifica­ re-enaction, or reproduction, or re-creation, of X's feelin?' i.n the
tion. The immanence of a past actual occasion in its immediate concrescence of A. In this way A becomes like X. This 1s the
successor yields the strongest sense of "being present in" to be essential difference ApX makes to A.
found in Whitehead's theory of actual occasions. It is also the (d) X is the reason for the difference ApX make� to A. X's
primary mode of social immanence, since the other modes depend achievement of satisfaction, its "absoluteness" of attamment, de­
on it for their intelligibility. Let A be a present actual occasion termines what the future must conform to. The new concrescence
and X an immediately past actual occasion. Then A prehends X cannot choose whether or not it shall conform to X. A has to deal
 P LURALISM AND ORGAN I S M
l
I AR E T H E R E O R GA N I C R E L AT I O N S ?

with X as a stubborn fact, given for its experience. Just how it of the nexus. O n this region A projects sensa derived from its past.
shall conform to X is not completely determined. But in some Thus B is directly present in A only as an undiscriminated com­
way or other it must conform to X. Also the importance of X ponent of the region there-now. It is giv�n for. A only in t�e mode
for A will vary according to the intensity of X's satisfaction and of "passive potentiality" (PR 96). Only m this way does it enter
the general nature of A's environment. In some degree and in directly into the concrescence of A. This is indeed a weak sense
some way X is efficacious for A. of immane nce.
(e) Expressions like "flow of feeling" and "transference of Since A and B have more or less commo n pasts, there is an in-
feeling" may now be used to describe this relation between X direct relevance between them. This again yields only a weak
and A. They are not to be understood in a simple or literal way sense in which B is present in A.
as meaning that X shares the immediacy of A or that A shares the c. Second ary m odes of social imman ence : A nticipa tion . Since
immediacy of X. They are not substitutes for the explanatory future occasio ns are not now actual they cannot be effectiv ely
mechanism of conformity of subjective form. They belong to a present in A. Also there can be no question of sharing immediacy.
mode of discourse in which Whitehead is interpreting his scheme, A cannot now share the immediacy of M which is not yet actual.
not to his more precise and rigorous explication of the scheme. The question is, again, how to give meaning to the o bjective real-
Yet they add something to a statement of causal objectification. ity of M in A.
They properly convey, in an imaginative mode, the quality and Amoncr the feelings which compose A's satisfaction are anticipa-
the over-all effect of the process of transition. tory feelings. A anticipates that some actual occasions will super­
The mutual immanence of contemporary occasions, and the sede it and that these occasions will conform to it when they be­
immanence of future occasions in the present, yield senses of "be­ come actual. M is present in A only as a possible value for this
ing present in" which are relatively weak compared with causal variabl e. Only in this weak sense is the future immanent in the
objectification. In these cases an actual occasion is present ob­ present.
jectively, but not effectively, in another. Also these are secondary We have been summarizing Whitehead's doctrine of social im­
modes of immanence, not in the sense that they are entirely deriva­ manence in preparation for asking how the relations between
tive from causal objectification but in the sense that they are actual occasions are organic. Our next step is to think of some
dependent on it. relations which might be called organic, and ask whether the rela­
b. Secondary modes of social immanence: Presentational o b­ tions between actual occasions approximate or resemble these in
jectification. Let A and B be two actual occasions in "unison of
any way. At least three biological analogies might be considered.
becoming." Since they are causally independent B is not effec­ i. Two actual occasions are related to each other as two parts
tively present in A. Further, since A does not prehend B directly of a cell are related to each other.
as a concrete individual, a fortiori A does not share B's immediacy. ii. One actual occasion is related to another as a cell is related
Hence B is present in A only o bjectively. The problem is to give to the larger organism in which it functions.
some meaning to the objective existence of B in A.
In presentational objectification (PR 9 1 ) the feeling in A which iii. Two actual occasions are related to each other as two cells
enacts the objectification is a transmuted feeling (PR 355). Its in a larger organism are related to each other.
datum is a nexus of contemporary occasions. This nexus, of which Here we have three natural senses in which things might be said
B is a member, is directly given only as an extended region. The to be organically related. In the light of Whitehead's doctrine of
conditions of concrescence require elimination of all other features
 P LURALISM AND ORGAN ISM ARE T H E R E O R G A N I C R E L AT I O N S ?

social immanence are actual occasions related i n any o f these ways? analogy are possible. One is that God is the "organism" of which
i. We ordinarily suppose that among the parts of a cell there actual occasions are the cell-like parts. Consideration of this in­
are real and effective connections within any duration which forms terpretation will be left until Part Three.
a cross-section of its history, as well as between the successive dura­ The other interpretation of this biological analogy is that the
tions which make up that history. Now it is clearly Whitehead's world is the "organism" of which actual occasions are cell-like
view that the experience of an actual occasion is a functional unity parts. As we have seen, Whitehead does say "The community of
within a given duration. Because of the subj ective aim there are actual things is an organism. " He immediately adds, "but it is
real and effective connections among the prehensions which com­ not a static organism. It is an incompletion in process of produc­
pose the concrescence. So this analogy with the parts of a cell tion" (PR 327). This qualification is crucial. For it reintroduces
would hold for the prehensions which make up an individual the consideration which ruled out the first of our biological
actual occasion. analogies. The force of this qualification is not simply a reminder
The relations between actual occasions, however, are certainly that organisms are living and growing things and hence not static.
not organic in this sense. The only effective connections between For sometimes we think of a living body as functioning as a whole
occasions occur in causal objectification. This mode of immanence, in each of its durations. If we think of a multicellular organism
since it involves the perishing of the past and the exclusiveness in this way, then the world as Whitehead construes it would lack
of immediacies, cannot be thought of as a functional unity of something which ordinary organisms would have. Since contem­
parts within a single duration. The relation is temporal and porary actual occasions are causally independent, the world does
asymmetrical. Therefore if relations between actual occasions are not function as a whole within the durations that make up its
organic they must be so in some other sense. history. Contemporary actual occasions are not related to each
ii. \Ve ask then whether two actual occasions are organically other as two cells that function in a larger living body. The world
related as a part of a cell is related to the cell as a whole. Again is not an "organism" in this sense. Influence occurs only in "tem­
it seems clear that this is not the case. Analysis of an actual occa­ poral strings."
sion cannot reveal any other actual occasion, functioning in its In a somewhat weaker sense, however, this last biological anal-
own subjective immediacy, as a part of the given occasion. This ogy does have an application to Whitehead's view of the world
is precluded by the exclusiveness of the immediacies of actual as a nexus. Influence occurs only in temporal strings, but the
occasions, reflected in the exclusiveness of their regions. Yet if different strings, that is to say historical routes of occasions, m­
the whole-part analogy in sense ii were applied to relations be­ teract with one another. This may be explained as follows :
tween actual occasions, this is j ust what we should find. Hence it 4
Route A : A1 - A2 - A3 - A
seems that relations between actual occasions are not organic in
this sense. One actual occasion is not related to another as a part
of a cell is related to the cell as a whole. Whitehead makes this Route B : B - B
1� 3 --- B -B
4

clear in the following passage : "The philosophy of organism is Let the A's and B's stand for actual occasions, and let the move­
a cell-theory of actuality. Each ultimate unit of fact is a cell-com­ ment of time be from left to right. Then there is no direct in­
plex, not analysable into components with equivalent complete­ fluence between A 1 and B1, or between A2 and B2, and so on. But
ness of actuality" (PR 334). any occasion, for example Bs, is conditioned directly or indirectly
iii. Finally we ask whether the relation between two actual by all of the occasions in its past actual world. Thus BS is in­
occasions is like the relation between two cells which function as fluenced by B1 and by B2• But it is also influenced by A1 and A2•
parts of a multicellular organism . Two interpretations of this This will be true for any actual occasion. It grows out of a past
 1 66 P LURALISM AND ORGAN ISM
T THE QUESTION OF COHERENCE
composed o f many interconnected historical routes. A ny actual if his writings have to b e interpreted i n other ways, then p:ob­
occasion in the past actual world of a concrescence directly or in­ lems about the consistency and compatibility of these doctrmes
directly, or both ( PR 435), influences and is thus immanent in that would arise.
concrescence ( PR 345-7, 468-70). This interconnectedness of his­ For example, if the satisfaction of an actual occasio� has t� be
torical routes of actual occasions makes the world a nexus and, interpreted in such a way that it is not a concrete, 1mmed1ate,
in a weak sense, an "organism." complete feeling having a real duration, then the theory of real
This analogy between the world as a nexus and an ordinary individuals, on which social transcendence depends, would break
organism is enfeebled even further by two other considerations. down. Again, if causal objectification has to be interpreted so that
First, ordinarily speaking an organism has an environment, from it involves transference of feelings from one occasion to another
which it is distinguished by spatiotemporal boundaries and with in a simple or literal sense, then the crucial mode of social tran­
which it interacts. By definition the world has no environment in scendence, namely experiential exclusiveness, would be ruled out.
this sense. Second, ordinarily speaking an organism has a unifying Insofar as his writings encourage these interpretations, then either
structure which persists throughout its history. But the world as what Whitehead says is in this respect misleading or his theory
a nexus, on Whitehead's view, has no such structure so far as we of actual occasions does not fulfill his promise of doing justice to
know. His doctrine of "cosmic epochs" leaves open the possibility the experience of many real things.
that no single dominant society persists through all epochs as the These alternative interpretation s have been critically examined.
order of nature (PR 1 28, 1 39, 146, 1 7 1). Reasons have been given for believing they are not justified. If
W e may conclude that Whitehead's name for his system, " the they are not, then Whitehead's doctrines of social transcendenc e
philosophy of organism," is by no means inappropriate, since an and social immanence are essentially compatible with each other
actual occasion is an "organism" in a strong sense of the word as aspects of an organic pluralism.
and since, in various intelligible senses, actual occasions are "or­ We may go further. Not only are these doctrines compatible
ganically" related to other occasions. But it would be a mistake with each other; they require each other in certain ways. The satis­
to infer from his use of the name that the w orld is conceived as faction of an actual occasion points to its origins and to its results.
an organism except in the weak sense explained above. The state­ Now, as subj ectively immediate, it is neither its origins nor its
ment that an actual entity is in a sense "everywhere" throughout results. It is itself, concrete and complete. But it points to its past
the extensive continuum (PR 1 04) is an assertion of universal social and to its future effectiveness. Its transcendence of past individ­
immanence. But when distinctions between strong and weak uals must issue in self-transcenden ce, which is its immanence in
senses of social immanence are taken into account, this assertion future individuals. In these ways an account of the individuality
becomes considerably less impressive. The reason is that in White­ of an occasion, from which its social transcendence follows, re­
head's theory of actual occasions the themes of individuality, quires an account of the immanence of other occasions in it, and
transcendence, and plurality are in fact as important as the themes its own immanence in its successors.
of influence, immanence, and organism. On the other hand, the process of causal objectification requires
reference to socially transcendent individuals. On one side, the
3. Social transcendence and social immanence : The question conformal feeling points to its object which is a past individual,
of coherence objectified. On the other side the conformal feeling points t � th�
individuality of the prehending subject. In these ways the md1-
Whitehead's doctrines of social transcendence and social im­ vidual subject of the feeling and the individual obj ect of the feel­
manence, if they are understood in the senses defined in this ing are involved in the conformal feeling itself.
study, are self-consistent and compatible with each other. But Thus the fact of social transcendence points to the fact of social
1 68
T THE QUESTION OF EVIDENCE 1 69
P L U R A L I S M A N D ORGAN I S M
immanence. The fact of social immanence points to the fact of experience rather than on the abstractions of physics, and it is
social transcendence. This "pointing" is what Whitehead means to the "given groundwork of immediate experience" that a cosmo­
by "significance." And significance is grounded in the process by logical theory must refer for its final evidence.
which many individuals contribute to the becoming of a new in­ Whitehead has offered an interpretation of quantum phenom­
dividual in the course of nature. Then this new individual in turn ena in his theory of "primates" in Science and the Modern World.
passes on its contribution to its successors. This is the rhythm of But the general facts about nature to which both the field theory
creativity, which Whitehead intends his theory of actual occa­ and the quantum theory point, namely the continuity and the
sions to analyze. atomicity of nature, are not themselves new discoveries: "These
contrasted aspects of nature, continuity and atomicity, have a
long history in European thought, reaching back to the origin
4. The question of evidence of science among the Greeks" (AI 2 38) . This suggests that these
On what facts, as evidence, does Whitehead base his theory of general facts about nature emerge at a prescientific or at least a
actual occasions? Speculative philosophy, he says, is like the flight pretechnical level of experience. Whitehead's attitude to the phe­
of an airplane. It leaves the ground for its flight of conceptual nomena specifically referred to in quantum theory is paralleled
construction and then returns to the ground for application of by his attitude to the phenomena on which biological theories
its constructions. We ask, From what field of facts does White­ are based. Both quantum phenomena and biological phenomena
head logically "take off"? seem to point to more or less discrete unities in nature. Any ade­
Two possibilities suggest themselves: scientific facts and facts of quate cosmology must be capable of interpreting these physical
immediate experience. It is clear that Whitehead appeals to facts and biological facts. 3 But he does not seem to offer these scientific
of both sorts, for example to quantum phenomena and to our ex­ facts as direct evidence for the cosmology in terms of which he
perience of, in William James' phrase, "drops of perception" (PR interprets them.
1 05). But it is very doubtful whether these two sorts of facts have This does not exclude the possibility that physical theories may
for Whitehead equal evidential value. On the contrary, quantum have suggested to Whitehead some of the outlines of his philos­
phenomena seem to be on a level distinctly secondary to the facts ophy. In one passage, after a discussion of the bearing of psycho­
of immediate experience. logical and physiological facts on his philosophy, he says it is
This is the inference to be drawn from his general view of the equally possible to arrive at the organic conception of nature from
relation of physics to concrete experience. In one of the earliest the fundamental notions of modern physics. And "by reason of
of his philosophical writings he strikes a characteristic note: " . . . my own studies in mathematics and mathematical physics, I did
both science and metaphysics start from the same giv�n ground­ in fact arrive at my convictions in this way" (sMw 2 1 3) . But we
wo�k of. im� ediate experience, and in the main proceed in op­ are not asking how, in the course of his intellectual history, he
posite direct10ns on their diverse tasks" (oT 1 i 3- 1 4) . Throughout happened to arrive at his theories.4 We are asking on what facts
his writings the ultimate facts appealed to are the concrete experi­ as evidence he logically bases his theory of individuality. I suggest
ences from which the abstractions of physics are derived. No doubt
the well-founded generalizations of physics point to important 3. "This quantum-theory also has analogues in recent neurology" (PR 365).
He may have had in mind the "all-or-none" law of nerve impulse.
facts about nature. Any cosmological theory must take account 4. Victor Lowe remarks: "It is natural to include the quantum theory
of s�ch facts and must be capable of interpreting any particular among influences on him; I think, however, that in fact this was to him a
physical theory, such as the quantum theory, which seems to be supporting illustration rather than a formative influence in the creation of
well founded. But cosmological theory is to be based on concrete his atomic pluralism" (Schilpp 90).
 P L U R A L I S M A N D ORGAN I S M
T THE QUESTION O F EVIDENCE
that quantum phenomena in physics are not of primary impor­ taken human experience as a n example upon which to found the
tance in this connection. generalized description required for metaphysics" (PR 1 7 2).5
Indeed, one might make out a case for the view that his dis­ Is this burden of evidence too heavy for human experience to
satisfaction with traditional scientific interpretations of space and bear? A critical treatment of this question would take us much
time is at least as important as quantum theory in shaping his too far afield. One basic consideration is whether and to what
theory of actual occasions (sMw go, PR 1 05-8). Certainly this dis­ extent there is continuity between the structure of nature and
satisfaction was one of the main motives for his earlier philosophy the structure of human experience. Whitehead himself sees the
of nature. The deficiencies of traditional theories of space and alternatives for speculative philosophy in the following way:
time, and quantum theory, both lead him in the same direction.
An occasion of experience which includes a human mental­
But he does not seem to offer either as direct evidence for the
existence of actual occasions as the final individual realities. ity is an extreme instance, at one end of the scale, of those
In fact he recognizes very clearly that there is no physical evi­ happenings which constitute nature. As yet this discussion
has fixed attention upon this extreme. But any doctrine which
dence that quanta of energy are irreducible. He describes the in­
creasing abstractness of the basic concepts of physics. Successively, refuses to place human experience outside nature, must find
the locus of concrete substantiality has been removed from the in descriptions of human experience factors which also enter
common-sense obj ect (as the stone) to the molecule, then to the into the descriptions of less specialized natural occurrences.
atom, then to the protons and electrons, then to "the mysterious If there be no such factors, then the doctrine of human ex­
perience as a fact within nature is mere bluff, founded upon
quanta of energy." Further, "these quanta seem to dissolve into
the vibrations of light" (PR 1 2 1-2). His own conclusion from this vague phrases whose sole merit is a comforting familiarity.
gradual attenuation of concreteness in the history of modern We should either admit dualism, at least as a provisional
physics is that "In physics, there is an abstraction. The science doctrine, or we should point out the identical elements con­
necting human experience with physical science (AI 237).
ignores what anything is in itself" (sMw 2 1 3) . Now "The mere
phrase that ' physical science is an abstraction,' is a confession of In addition to these questions about the evidence on which
philosophic failure. It is the business of rational thought to de­ Whitehead bases his theory of actual occasions, other questions
scribe the more concrete fact from which that abstraction is deriv­ need to be asked, though they take us beyond the limits of this
a b le" (AI 2 39, my italics) . The moral is that Whitehead does not study. They concern the adequacy of the theory of actual occa­
offer the concepts of modern physics as direct evidence for his sions. Is it capable of interpreting all the kinds of real things we
own theory of concrete individuals. encounter in experience? Does it do justice to all the facts?
This result increases the evidential burden which his appeal For example is the theory too strong for what we encounter in
to immediate human experience must bear. But this is clearly our experience of sticks and stones? Are these things really made
where he lays the burden. His doctrines of individuality and of up of units of experience?
influence are both generalizations from human experience. White­ Again, is it strong enough to do justice to our own existence
head has said this so clearly and so frequently that there seems as conscious persons? Do we have more unity and continuity of
no reasonable excuse for announcing it as a skeleton discovered experience than Whitehead's categories allow? Do we have a
in his closet. This sort of generalization is of the essence of his capacity for summing up our experience which we cannot in-
philosophical procedure. "In describing the capacities, realized AI
5· See SMW 1 2 3-3 1, 1 56-7, uo; PR 105, 266-8, 3 1 0- u ; 99, 237, 239, 242,
or unrealized, of an actual occasion, we have, with Locke, tacitly 284; MT 2 3 1- 2 .
 P L URALISM AND ORGAN ISM

terpret in his systematic terms? Is there a kind of self-transcendence

within immediate experience, as well as self-transcendence by
PART T W O
way of objective immortality? Is there within our experience a
literal flow of feeling? Are we individuals in a way which his
theory does not enable us to express clearly and adequately?
Eternal Objects
A reasoned answer would require both a phenomenology of
human self-consciousness and an analysis of Whitehead's discus­
sions of personal existence including his theory of "societies." It
would also require consideration of what m igh t be said about
personal existence in the language of the categoreal scheme, con­
sistent with Whitehead's principles, going beyond what he has
said in his writings.
 CHAPTER 10

Obj ects and Events

i. The earlier philosophy of nature

B E F ORE E XA M I N I N G the theory of eternal obj ects in Whitehead's
later writings, let us look at an earlier stage of his thought for the
sake of historical perspective. In his writings on the philosophy
of nature between 1 9 1 5 and 1 925 his basic constructive categories
were "objects" and "events. " Since "objects" are the ancestors of
eternal obj ects and "events" are the ancestors of actual entities,
some attention to these earlier notions will help us to understand
the later ones.
In the earlier writings Whitehead set out to give an account of
"the data of science." He thought the traditional categories for
describing nature, namely the concepts of "Time (flowing equably
in measurable lapses) and of Space (timeless, void of activity,
euclidean), and of Material in space (such as matter, ether, or
electricity)" ( PNK 1) did not fit the facts. So he began, in his re­
construction, with the concept of events. He thought that in terms
of events, extended unities, he could do j ustice to the connected­
ness of nature, to which the traditional concepts were inadequate.
The notion of an event as an extended unity was probably
suggested to Whitehead by biological organisms. But it is im­
portant to notice that his argument against the traditional con­
cepts is not a vitalistic argument. He argues that these concepts
are inadequate to the facts physics deals with. This argument,
which originates as early as his essay, "La theorie relationniste de
l'espace" (completed in 1 9 1 4), and continues throughout the
earlier writings, is that "The concept of unities, functioning and
with spatio-temporal extensions, cannot be extruded from phys­
ical concepts" ( PNK 3, my italics; see 66) .
The corresponding concept of o bjects is first introduced in a
1 75
 O B J E CTS AND EVENTS H O W O B J E C TS TRAN S C E N D E V E N T S

discussion o f congruence. Measurements require judgments of space and time" and that "primarily an object i s not in space
constancy, and "a judgment of constancy is recognition" (PNK or in time" (PNK 6 3, 65) . These strong statements need to be quali­
56). An obj ect is what is recognized in recognition. Obj ects are fied, as we shall see later. We shall find it is more accurate to say
"recognita." "Obj ects convey the permanences recognized in an object is "in a sense" (cN 78) out of space and time than to
events, and are recognized as self-identical amid different circum­ say an obj ect is "strictly speaking" out of space and time.
stances; that is to say, the same obj ect is recognized as related to For the obj ects dealt with in the earlier writings ("natural ob­
diverse events" (PNK 62-3). The main types of objects Whitehead jects") are also, in a sense, in space and time. They "require" space
' and time (PNK 202). Therefore a better way of putting the differ­
discusses are (a) sense obj ects, for example "the colour red of a
definite shade" (PNK 83) ; (b) perceptual obj ects, for example a ence between obj ects and events is to say they differ in the kinds
chair; and (c) scientific objects, for example electrons. of relations they have to space and time (sMw 1 2 1 ) . With this
It is not necessary to recapitulate Whitehead's early philosophy preliminary warning we can go on to some specific ways in which
of nature. To lay a foundation for understanding his theory of objects transcend events.
eternal obj ects we confine ourselves to the main differences be­ a. Events are extended; o bjects are not extended. An event has
tween obj ects and events and to the "ingression" of objects in temporal thickness (duration) and spatial spread. Within its unity
events. We may speak of the differences between obj ects and events are temporal and spatial "parts." It takes up space, and it is in
as modes of transcendence and ask first how objects transcend "passage. " Objects on the contrary do not take up space and they
events. Then we can discuss ingression as the way objects are do not pass.
immanent in events. Here we should pause to consider the notion of passage in
Whitehead's early writings. Let us discriminate two possible senses
of passage : (i) an entity passes when it ceases to be or, in his
2. How objects transcend events later terminology, "perishes" ; and (ii) an entity passes when it
The most important ways in which obj ects transcend events changes or undergoes alteration.
are in respect to space and time. Before stating these a note of Now in sense i events pass and obj ects do not. But the con­
caution is needed. It would not be true to say simply that events trast in respect to sense ii is not so clear, and that on two counts.
are in space and time and obj ects are not. This would be mis­ In the first place "events never change" (PNK 62). Though events
leading about both events and obj ects. happen, nothing happens within an event except other events,
It would be wrong to think of events as "in" space and time which themselves become and cease to be but do not change. In
if this meant that space and time have some kind of existence these earlier writings Whitehead has no adequate way of dis­
antecedent to and independent of events. For space and time are tinguishing between "external process" and "internal process."
not containers into which events fit. On the contrary, "Events In the second place, obj ects of a certain peculiar sort, namely
(in a sense) are space and time, namely, space and time are ab­ rhythms (for example a tune), require minimum durations and
stractions from events" ( PNK 63). seem to have a kind of internal process (PNK, ch. 1 8) . Thus we
Likewise it would be wrong to think of objects as simply "out" have the paradox that though no event has inner change yet
of space and time. On this point some of Whitehead's own state­ some objects do. It is for this reason that Whitehead is so plainly
ments are liable to be misleading, as he acknowledges (PNK 202 ) . unhappy about calling rhythms objects.
For example he says that objects "are only derivatively i n space This suggests a question. How, without some conception of
and time by reason of their relations to events" (PNK 63; see TSM internal process, can he explicate the temporal thickness which
56) . Again, he says that "strictly speaking" objects are "without distinguishes a real duration from an instantaneous moment?
 O B J E CTS AND EVENTS H O W O B J E C T S T RA N S C E N D E V E N T S

When he says that events are "lived through" (PNK 63), is he still curs once and only once. It occurs a t some place and only a t that
consistently maintaining his program of excluding "mind" from place. An obj ect, for example a stone or redness, can on the con­
nature? Or is he implicitly projecting into the experienced event trary be at more than one time and at more than one place at
the internal process that really belongs to the "percipient obj ect" the same time. The "permanence" conveyed by objects is not
which is outside nature? endurance or continuation but repetition. "Here it is again." 2
Does not Whitehead need, even within the limited inquiry c. No two events coincide; o bjects coincide. Every event has
undertaken in the early writings, some conception of internal one and only one location in space and time. Also no two events
process with which to explicate "becomingness"? (See PNK 202.) have the same location. It would be a contradiction to speak of
Later when he introduces the conception of internal process in two events with the same spatiotemporal boundaries. But two
nature, namely the concrescence of actual occasions, a theory of or more objects may exist at the same time and place. This is to
enduring objects can be developed. Then a more subtle and satis­ say, as we shall see, that two or more obj ects may be ingredient
factory account of ryhthms can be given. Then it is possible to in the same event. "For example, for any one percipient event,
distinguish among: (i) entities which begin, develop internally, the situation of a sense-obj ect of sight is apt also to be the situa­
and pass but do not change (actual occasions) ; (ii) entities which tions of [other] sense-objects of sight, of touch, of smell, and of
do not begin, develop, change, or pass (eternal objects) ; and (iii) sound" ( cN 1 54).
entities which begin, change, and pass (enduring objects) . In the above ways objects differ from events in relation to space
I t is true that Whitehead's introduction of new categories, as and time. Objects are nonextended, have multiple location, and
he moves from the earlier to the later writings, results from an coincide. Events on the contrary are extended, have single loca­
extension of the scope of his inquiry. He moves from a philosophy tion, and do not coincide. Now we move on to other ways in which
of nature, concerned only with the data of science, to construction obj ects differ from or transcend events.
of a scheme which can be used to interpret all the items and modes d. Events are "lived through"; o bjects are recognized. Entities
of experience. It seems true also that obscurities and deficiencies of the two types enter experience in different ways. Experience
in his philosophy of nature were a stimulus to extending the of events involves a sense of passage. Events are the "develop­
scope of his inquiry. ment" (PNK 63) of our physical experience. On the other hand,
Returning to the immediate question, we notice that objects "Obj ects enter into experience by way of the intellectuality of
have no spatial or temporal parts.1 They are not extended. White­ recognition" (PNK 64). In this distinction between living through
head acknowledges it is more difficult to think of an obj ect (for events and recognizing objects lies the germ of the later distinc­
example a chair) as not having spatial parts than to think of it tion between physical and conceptual prehensions. Recognition
as not having temporal parts. This is because ordinary language is awareness of something which has recurred or might recur.
obscures the distinction between the chair as an obj ect and the Objects are recognized, not lived through (PNK 63).
events in which it is situated. The event in which the leg of the e. O bjects are comparab le; events are incompara b le. I t is true
chair is situated is a part of the event in which the chair is sit­ that we speak of the comparison of events. "But it is not the events
uated. But the leg is one object and the chair is another obj ect. which are compared. For each event is essentially unique and in­
b. Events have single location; o bjects have mu ltiple location. comparable. What are compared are the obj ects and relations of
Here I am using "location" in a more ordinary sense than White­ objects situated in events" (cN 1 2 5 . See TSM 5 1 ; CN 1 44, 1 89) . For
head does (PNK ch. 1 4, CN 1 60-3), and as in Chapter 4 above I example, when we note "red there-now and red there-then," we
take the expression "single location" from Lovejoy. An event oc- are noting two different sets of spatiotemporal relations of the
1 . See PNK 65-6, 9 1-2 ; TSM 56; CN i 25; PRIN R 37· 2. See PNK 62-3, 65, 82; CN 1 25, 1 43-5, 1 69.
 T
1 80 O B JECTS AND EVENTS H O W O B J E CT S TRAN S C E N D E V E N T S

same object. The spatiotemporal relations are external t o the O n the other hand, the spatiotemporal relations o f an obj ect
essence of the obj ect (PNK 64), for the same obj ect can be situated are indeterminate _ a s far as its essence is concerned. "Whenever
in many events. There is a sense in which we are comparing two the concept of possibility can apply to a natural element, that
events (PNK 64) . But they are then events which have lost their element is an obj ect . . . It has in fact certain relations to other
quality of passage (cN 1 25) . They are not being lived through. natural elements; but it might (being the same object) have had
Properly speaking it is not events we are then comparing but other relations" (PNK 64) . In the later writings, as we shall see,
different sets of relations of an obj ect. the scope of "possibility" will b.e widened to include "ideality,"
In his later writings Whitehead can speak of "objectified" that is to say the obj ects of "logical, emotional, aesthetic and moral
events. But the notion of obj ectification has not yet been de­ apprehensions" ( PRIN R 20) as well as the "natural obj ects" ( PNK
veloped, because the events which are the data of science have 202) with which the early writings are concerned.
no experiential content (subj ective immediacy) to become ob­ h. Events are concrete; o bjects are abstract. First we must notice
j ectified. some qualifications on the "concreteness" of events in the early
f. Events are continuous; o bjects are "atomic." There are three writings :
senses in which events are continuous. Events and transitions be­ i. What is fully or unqualifiedly concrete is "fact" or "factual­
tween events are experienced as continuous ( PNK 74, CN 59) . There ity." This is not one fact among others, nor even the sum of "fac­
are no minimal events : "The continuity of nature arises from tors"; "it is rather the concreteness (or, embeddedness) of factors,
extension. Every event extends over other events, and every event and the concreteness of an inexhaustible relatedness among in­
is extended over by other events" ( cN 59; see TSM 55) . And finally exhaustible relata" (PRIN R 1 5 ; see IDIN 1 3 3, CN ch. 1 ) .
there are no empty spaces or times (see Chapter 4) . ii. Nature, with which science i s concerned, i s not identical
The "atomicity" of objects is not the kind of concrete unity with fact or factuality. Sci ence makes an abstraction when it re­
that is later attributed to actual occasions. Nor does it mean that stricts its attention to nature. ",N ature is an abstraction from some­
objects are separated from each other in space and time. It means thing more concrete than itself which must also include imagina­
rather that they are recognized according to an "all-or-none" law. tion, thought, and emotion" ( PRIN R 63; see PNK 2 0 1 , PRIN R 2 1 , CN
An obj ect "is always wholly itself" ( PNK 9 1 ) . An obj ect has no 66) . The contrast between events and objects is a contrast within
parts. This property follows directly and simply from the fact nature. Hence the paradoxical expression, "our lowest, most con­
that "the essence of an obj ect does not depend on its relations" crete, type of abstractions whereby we express the diversification
(PNK 64), that is, its spatiotemporal relations in any particular sit­ of fact must be regarded as 'events,' meaning thereby a partial
uation. factor of fact which retains process" ( PA 2 2 3) . Events are "the con­
g. "A ctuality" applies to events; "possibility" applies to o bjects. crete facts of nature " ( cN 1 67, my italics. See PNK 4; PRIN R 2 1 , 63) .
In the early writings "actuality" means determinateness of spatio­ I n experience w e do not begin with isolated and detached en­
temporal relations. The relations of an event belong to the essence tities. The factors we experience in sense awareness and thought 4
of the event. An event is "that happening there-then," and the are "embedded." They belong to contexts. It would follow that
particular there-then is essential to the event. "An actual event an entity is concrete to the degree that, when it is experienced,
is thus divested of all possibility" (PNK 6 1 ) . s its embeddedness is experienced. Those factors which can be en­
tertained apart from their embeddedness in fact are in that degree
3· The implied contrast is with "imaginary events" or "imaginations of
abstract.
e�ents." These would be objects or, in terms of the later writings, proposi­
tions. On the actuality of events in the early writings see also PRIN R 63, ESP Obj ects, then, are the "abstract elements of the world . . .
(1923 � 1 34-8. In the later writings he adds "subjective immediacy" to the
meanmg of "actuality.'' 4. Thought is "the refinement of awareness" (
PRIN R 1 5).
 O B J E C T S A N D E V E N TS H O W O B J E CT S TRAN S C E N D E V E N T S
which are devoid of becomingness and extension," in contrast t o some one place and time. The comparability o f objects de­
with the "more concrete elements (events) which retain becoming­ pends on their multiple location and on their coincidence. The
ness and extension" (PRIN R 37). Obj ects are detachable from the atomicity of objects means that being unextended they have no
contexts in which they are found. They are not embedded the parts. The category of possibility has already been introduced
way events are. They can be considered apart from the events in in defining the spatiotemporal relations of objects. And the ab­
which we find them. Thus "red, " "three," "the Tower of London" stractness of obj ects means that they can be considered apart from
(PRIN R 1 7), and "the sun, the earth, Cleopatra's N eedle, or a hu­ their embeddedness in some particular spatiotemporal context.
man body," and molecules and electrons are all abstractions. "The Finally we should notice some senses of "out of space and time"
concrete facts are the events themselves" (cN 1 7 1 ) . which Whitehead has not asserted of objects.
A warning about "abstraction" i s i n order. It would b e a mis­ a. An entity might be said to be out of space and time if there
take to think of abstractions, in Whitehead's early writings, as is no place and time at which it exists. Whitehead has not said
entities having no existence, or having their existence only "in that obj ects are out of space and time in this sense. Events are
the mind" or in a realm apart from nature. An abstract entity is singly located and obj ects are multiply located, but he has not
rather something discriminated or "prescinded from" its back­ said that objects are un located.
ground of fact (PRIN R 1 4) . We are, for the purposes of thinking, b. An entity might be said to be out of space and time if it
taking that factor out of its real context in fact. The entity is really exists at all times and places in the same way. As we shall see when
in nature. we come to discuss ingression and situation, Whitehead certainly
I have already explained to you that to be an abstraction does not mean that objects exist at all times and places in the
does not mean that an entity is nothing. It merely means same way in which they exist at some times and places. An obj ect
that its existence is only one factor of a more concrete ele­ is not omnipresent in this absolute sense.
. . .
ment of nature. So an electron is abstract because you can­ c . An entity might be said to be out of space and time if it
not wipe out the whole structure of events and yet retain the could be understood without any reference to space and time.
electron in existence. In the same way the grin on the cat is In this case we might say that its essence does not involve any refer­
abstract; and the molecule is really in the event in the same ence to space and time. Whitehead does not say that obj ects are
sense as the grin is really on the cat's face (cN 1 7 1 ; see 1 73). out of space and time in this sense. On the contrary, though the
essence of an obj ect does not involve a reference to this or that
To summarize, objects transcend events primarily by having place or time, yet it does involve reference to space and time in a
different relations to space and time. Events are extended proc­ general way. An object is not absolutely independent of space
esses; objects are unextended. An event is only at a single place and time.
and time; an obj ect may be at more than one place and time. No Obj ects thus are in a sense out of space and time, but only in
two events can be at the same place and time; two or more objects a sense. We have not found that objects are absolutely, or even
may be at the same place and time. In other words obj ects are "strictly speaking," out of space and time. We have found that
not space-bound and time-bound the way events are. Obj ects are objects have other relations to the extended and passing realm
externally related (but not unrelated) to space and time. This of nature than do events. Indeed, as Whitehead says in one of
is the primary way in which they transcend events, for events are his later ( 1 925) notes in The Principles of Natural Knowledge,
internally related to space and time. "natural objects req uire space and time, so that space and time
The other ways in which obj ects transcend events can be related belong to their relational essence without which they cannot be
to this primary mode. Recognition is awareness of what is not tied themselves" (PNK 202, my italics) . The distinction between "indi-
 O B J E CTS AND EVENTS I N G RE S S I O N
vidual essence" and "relational essence" alluded to here ( sMw sense object (blue) and events. He says, "I will use the term 'in­
2 22-3) was not made explicit in the earlier writings. But it is im­ gression into nature' for this systematic correlation of the blue
plicit throughout, and it underlies the doctrine of the ingression with nature" (cN i 52). It appears again that ingression is a name
of objects in events, to which we now turn. This is Whitehead's for a relationship, not for an action. Similarly, and perhaps more
explanation of how objects are immanent in events. clearly, "The apparent world discloses itself to us as the ingression
of sense-objects amid events. In this statement the term ' ingres­
3· How objects are immanent in events : Ingression sion' is used for the complex relationship of those abstract ele­
ments of the world, such as sense-objects, which are devoid of be­
When Whitehead speaks of "the ingression of an object into comingness and extension, to those other more concrete elements
an event" (cN i 44), the "plain" meaning of his language is that an (events) which retain becomingness and extension" (PRIN R 37).
. ct enters an
Obje event from somewhere outsid e that event. "In­ Again, of the relation of sense objects to events he says, "I have
gress ion" suggests (a) that objects move, and (b) that an object suggested the term ' ingression' for this many-termed relation" (ESP
com�s from somew here, from some antecedent locus, perhaps from [1 923] 1 39). He speaks of "the ingression of sense-objects amid
outsid e the whole flux of events, but at least from outside the events" as "a character of nature" (ESP 1 42 ; see 1 44-5). Finally,
particular event into which it "ingresses." nowhere does Whitehead say that an object "ingresses" into an
By .this time w � should have been well warned that the "plain" event. Indeed, he nowhere uses the word "ingress" either as a
mean mgs of White head's terms are not always his meanings. So verb or as a noun. These facts about his usage are evidence that
we should exami ne ingress ion with some care. Let us look first ingression means a relation, not an action, and that the term is
at the way the term is introduced in his writings. generated not from a verb but from the relational adjective "in­
As far as I can tell, this term is first used in The Concep t of gredient." He adopts "ingression" simply as a more economical
Nature and is introd uced in the following manne r. In the way of saying "being an ingredient in." Insofar as ingression sug­
first
c�apter Whitehead refers to "entities which are not parts of fact gests entry from an antecedent locus, Whitehead has made trouble
r1.e .. not �V�nts] though they are ingred ients in it" (cN 1 4, my for his readers.
italics) . S1m1larly he speaks of "ingre dient characters" of events Before he introduced the term "ingression" he had referred to
(�N 82). Finally in the chapte r on "Objects" he introd uces objects as "characteristics" of events: "A reference to objects is
ingres­
s10n more formally: "An object is an ingredient in the character only a way of specifying the character of an event" (PNK 73) ; "An
of so�e event : In fac t the charac ter of an event is nothing but object is a characteristic of an event" (PNK 1 95). Now he says, "An
th� objects which .
are mgred ient in it and the ways in which those object is an ingredient in the character of some event. In fact the
object s �ake their ingression into the event" (cN 1 43-4) . character of an event is nothing but the objects which are in­
Does It not appear that "being an ingred ient" is a more ac­ gredient in it and the ways in which these objects make their
urat
� � expression of White head's meaning than "ingression" ? But ingression into the event" (cN 1 43-4. See PNK 1 89; CN So; 1 89) .
if we mterpret these as equivalent expressions , as they seem to be, We might think of an event as a "that" happening there-then.
�� en we �ust take "ingression" not as the name of an action (like The "that" is a complex of objects. An object belonging to this
'JO�rney ) but as the name of a timeless relatio n, namely "being complex is thus an ingredient in the character of the event, and
an mgred ient." in this sense an ingredient in the event.
�his suggestion finds support in other passages where ingression This sort of language needs to be guarded. It is natural to name
is. discussed. For example, later in the same chapter of The Con­ events after the objects prominently situated in them. It is also
cept of Natu re Whitehead is discu ssing the relati ons misleading to do so. The trouble is that we then have no way
between a
 O B J E CTS AND EVENTS I N G RE S S I O N
sense ingredient through out nature ; tho ugh its ingression
of distinguishing the objects from the event. And Whitehead ion of our in-
thinks that an adequate interpretation of nature requires this may be quantitatively irrelevant in the express
distinction. div idu al experiences (cN 145 ).
His problem is to distinguish the spatiotemporal "parts" of eed, "the object in its
the event from the components of its character. The green of the For example, the elec tron has a "field." Indcts] may be conceived
leaf is not related to the shape of the leaf, or to the leaf itself, in completeness [in the case of scientific obje s of the characters of all
the same way as one spatial part of the leaf is related to another as a specific set of correlated modificationifica tions attain to a cer­
part, or as the existence of the leaf during one half-second is re­ events, with the property that thes e modch belo ng to the stream
lated to its existence during the next half-second. Different sorts tain focal property for those events whie waves as they roll on to
of relations are involved. The problem is how to make this clear. of its situations" (cN 1 90). Sim ilarly, "Th antic; and our dinner
"_I ngredie� t" and "ingression" are used to distinguish (a) the rela­ the Cornish coast tell us of a gale in midk-Atl dining room"
t10n of objects to the event as a whole from (b) the relations of its witnesses to the ingression of the coo into the
_
spat10temporal parts to each other. (cN 1 46). room in the same
� hitehead's �arliest account of the relation of objects to events It is clear that the cook is not in the dining ing
.is m way she is in the kitchen . Another way ofobje putt the point is in
terms of "situation." He says, "The notion of the situation of cts. The dinner here
an object is logically indefinable being one of the ultimate data terms of the "significance " of events and
sign ifies the cook ther e.
?f science . . . (PNK 1 65). In The Concept of Nature he formally
"
Now we may ask whether being an ingredie nt in events is an
mtroduces "situation" in the following way: so: "Nature is such
essential property of objects. It would seem without the ingression
. . . ingression takes a peculiar form in the case of some that ther e can be no even ts and no objects 202) . And we may ask
events; in a sense, it is a more concentrated form. For ex­ of objects into events" (cN 1 44; see PNK addition to the general
a11:1ple, the electron has a certain position in space and a cer­ further whether all objects are situated? In have the relation of
tam shape. . . . and the cook is in the kitchen. I will call this relation of ingression, does every obje ctial way to som e events)?
special form of ingression the 'relation of situation'; also, by situation (which relates the object in a spec rly suggest that all ob­
a double use of the word 'situation,' I will call the event in In general Whitehead' s discussions clea nce of an obje ct to
which an object is situated 'the situation of the object' (cN jects are situ ated . It seems that it is of the eesse exion of obje cts
1 46-7). be situated som ew here . For example, "Thareconn ated in events"
with space requ ires eluc idation. Obj ects e ositu
Thus, situation is treated as a special form of the relation of in­ (cN 1 60). It is entirely clear isthat all sens bjects are situated.
gression. tion, it is green
"When we perceive gree n, it not green inl isola we see it some­
According to this usage an object is ingredient in events in
whic� it . is not situated. Indeed every object seems to be in­ somewhere at some time . . . . it is essentia that epoch of our bod ily
gredient m every event, though in many events its ingredience will where in space related to our eyes at a certain unts of perceptu al
life" (PRIN R 24-5; see CN 1 5) . And in the acco
be very unimportant: o bjec ts it is cons tantly imp lied that they
hav e situ ations. For ex­
ample, "A perceptual object is a physical objectessio when (i) its situa­
.itsAn object is ingredient throughout its neighborhood, and n of any of its
.
neighborhood is indefinite. Also the modification of events tion is an active conditioning even t for the ingr e event can be the
by ingression is susceptible of quantitative differences. Finally component sense-objects, and (ii) the saminde finite num ber of
therefore we are driven to admit that each object is in some situation of the perceptual object for an
 1 89
1 88 O B J E C T S A N D E V E N TS I N G RE S S I O N
" to de­
possible percipient events" (cN 15 6). Indeed in The Princip le of eludin g terms like "character, " "qual ity," and "adj ective
Indee d he needs
Relativity and in " Uniformity and Contingency" the relation of scribe the way obj ects are imma nent in event s.
se they are
a perceptual object to its situation is a "stronger" relation than to use them , in order to introduce "ingression ," becau
what we ex­
that of sense objects to their situations. "A perceptual object is a fam iliar and-up to a point-enable us to analyze
us into difficu lties when
true Aristotelian adj ective of some event which is its situation" peri ence. But he think s these terms get
e. There ­
� ESP [ 1 2 3] _145). Scientific o bjects are also situated. For example,
� we try to give a clear and system atic accou nt of natur
s" for
' The s1tuat10n of an electron in any small duration may be defined fore he elects to substi tute "obj ects ingred ient in event
"qual ities [or characters] of event s" as his basic conce pt.
as that event which has the quantitative character which is the
itself
charge of the electron" (cN 1 5 9) . Put another way, the field of an As we have notice d, however, his new termi nology is not
ularly
electron is divisible into the "occupied events" and the "unoc­ faultl ess. It brings its own misleading conno tation s, partic
the phrase "ingre ssion into event s." 6 I t is mislea ding insofa
r as it
? �
c pie events." And "The occupied event corresponds to the
locus. This
(
s1tuat10n of a physical object" PNK 96). Thus it seems clear that suggests that object s enter an event from an antece dent
correc ted by
� �
s nse objec s, perceptual objects, . and scientific obj ects are all particular conno tation of "ingre ssion" has to be
cter­
situated. It is not essential that an obj ect be situated in this event reference to the more conve ntiona l termin ology of "chara
agains t mislea ding sugge stions .
or in that event. It is essential that it be situated in some event or istic," and so on. No terms are proof
into natur e thoug h
other.5 There is a sense in which obj ects do "enter "
e.7
?
It woul be possible to look at obj ects generally as "qualities" not, strictly speaking, into events . In nature new events becom
tive
�
of events mste d of as "ingredient in" events, but this would sug­ In a new event certai n object s will be ingred ient. In this deriva
" natur e. I now see blue,
gest that an object has no reference to entities other than the event sense, object s might be said to "enter
natur e.
it qualifies. Whitehead wishes to avoid this suggestion and there­ though I did not see blue a mome nt ago. Blue has entere d
has
fore prefers to speak of ingression instead of qualification. The An event in which blue is ingred ient has becom e. But blue
before
relat _ on between an object and events is not a simple two-termed not "enter ed" the event, becau se the event did not exist
� the blue, nor did the blue exist before the event . The blue is in
relat10n, as of quality to substance, but a many-termed relation.
ss relatin g
: �
'The overs mp lification involved in the Aristotelian concept of and with the event. "Thu s nature is alway s a newne
_
quahty-subJect , has obscured the analysis of ingression" PNK ( (
object s which are neithe r new nor old" PNK 98).
204. See PNK 60, 84; CN 1 5 1 ; PA 2 1 9; TSM 5 2 ; and Chapter 1 2 The notion of "entry" might also be defended on the score that
I
below) . objects are transm itted from the past to the presen t. The blue
the
Thus Whitehead is willing to use conventional language in- did see a mome nt ago I now see again. Thus one might say
blue has come into the presen t event from the past event. But
5 · Fig�res, patterns, and rhythms (PNK 1 90-200) all seem to be situated,
. plainly this will not cover all cases of ingres sion. Somet imes I see
though m different modes. On different modes of situation, see CN 1 60.
blue when I did not see blue a mome nt before . These sugges tions
of
therefore do not free White head's terminology from the taint
The following passage needs comment: "The things recognised are what
I call 'objects.' In this general sense of the term the relation of extension erable
being misleading, though he has certain ly made a consid
is i tself an object. In practice however I restrict the term to those objects
_ .
which can m some sense or other be said to have a situation in an event· effort to be clear.
n �m�ly, in the phrase 'There it is again' I restrict the 'there' to be the in: 6. Note in the passage from cN 143-4 above: " . . . the ways
in which
d1cauon of � sp : cial event which is the situation of the object" (cN 1 89).
. these objects make their ingression into the event."
Here ex:e �s10n I� sa1� to be an "object" in a more general sense of the ed doc­
7. But in his early writings Whitehead does not have a develop
�erm. It is mgred1ent m nature but not situated "in an event." There is no d doctrine of individu ality.
trine of novelty, because he has no develope
mstance in which it appears in a more concen trated form.
 I 90 O B J E C T S AN D E VE N T S I9I
S U M M AR Y

4. Summary "atomic" property of objects which contrasts with the c �ntinuity �£

_
events. An object is either situated in an event or It IS not. It is
It is now time to summarize Whitehead's doctrines, in the early either there-then or not there-then for any finite there-then. In a
writings, of how objects are immanent in events and how they given event the object is either situated "as a whole," in this non­
transcend events. spatial sense of "whole," or it is not situated in that e:ent.
Where do obj ects exist? The right answer is not "nowhere. "
Now we ask, Can any object be anywhere at any time? Here we
Obj ects are not "out o f space and time" i n the sense that they exist
move from the immanence of objects to the transcendence of ob­
nowhere . The right answer is "in events." Objects exist nowhere
jects. The answer is "yes, as far as obj ects themselves . are con­
but in events, and there are no obj ects which are not ingredient in
cerned." Objects are at certain times and places. But their natures
events. Indeed, by significance, every object exists in every event.
do not require that they be at any of those times and plac es at
Against the idealists Whitehead insists that objects are "there" to _
which they are. An object must be somewhere, but there is . no
be recognized. Obj ects are really in events. Nor is the right answer
particular event where the object must be, as far as the object
" everywhere." This is too simple. An obj ect is not ingredient in
itself is concerned. An obj ect is relatively (though not absolutely)
all events in the same sense and in the same way. The significance
independent of events.
of an obj ect will not be the same for all events and will differ in
This Whitehead would say is the foundation of emp1nc1sm.
importa nce according to the event considered. Further, in addi­
"Red" or "chair" is j ust where and only where we find it, and
tion to its varying significance throughout nature, the obj ect is
we find it not by inspecting "red" or "chair" but only by looking
"situated" in some events and not in others.
around us. It is the business of science to discover and describe
Indeed, when we ask, where do objects exist? we are likely to precisely the conditions under which objects of various sorts are
mean, Where are obj ects situated? And the answer to this more found.
specific question is not "nowhere" or "everywhere" nor simply But there is no "realm" of obj ects, in the sense of some extra-
"in events" but rather "here and there." Any object will exist in natural locus outside space and time, from which objects might
this sense at some wheres and not at others. Objects are situated be said to "enter" events. There is no "where," other than events,
in certain events, where they happen to be found, and not in and there is no "when," other than events, in which obj ects exist.
others. So objects transcend events, not by having a different "w ere" �
Similarly we ask, When do obj ects exist? In general the answer and a different "when" from those of events, and not by havmg a
is not "never." Nor is the right answer "always." The general different kind of "where" and "when," but rather by having a
answer, again, is "in events." And when we ask more specifically, different set of relations to "wheres" and "whens."
When are obj ects situated? the answer is clearly "now and then." Anyone who comes to Whitehead's early writings expecting a
Objects exist in events when they happen to be found. Thus ob­ Platonic philosophy of science is likely to invest his objects with
j ects are ingredient in, and in this sense present at, particular ideal and ethereal qualities. On closer inspection they lose these
where-whens. This is one sense in which objects are in space and qualities and are seen as natural entities. There is no doubt that
time. objects transcend events. But "transcendence" here does not mean
N ow we ask, How are objects in events? One relevant answer either "unrelatedness" or "absence." Objects are not only related
would be "as a who l e." Obj ects do not have spatiotemporal "parts" to events but present in events in specifiable ways :
and are not included (in a spatiotemporal sense) in events. An a. Objects are not "nowhere." They are present at particular
obj ect is ingredient "as a whole" in an event. It cannot be in­ where-whens, though unlike events they are multiply located and
gredient " in part" for it has no spatiotemporal parts. This is the may be at other where-whens as well.
 . . '!If'

O B J E CTS AND EVENTS

b. Obj ects "pervade" the events i n which they are present,
though unlike events they do not exclude other objects from being
present in these events. CHAPTER 1 1

c. Obj ects have spatiotemp oral relations with one another,

though only mediately or derivatively by way of their situations in
events. Eternal Obj ects and Actual Entities
The immanence of objects in events in these ways balances and
complem ents the way in which obj ects transcen d events.
To be abstract is to transcend particular concrete occasions of actual
happening. But to transcend an actual occasion does not mean being
disconnected from it (sMW 2 2 1 ) .

1. Introduction
As WE M O V E from Whitehead's earlier writings to the later ones
we find that while he does not withdraw from his maj or positions,
he goes beyond them. He is now painting on a larger canvas. He is
devising a system of concepts to interpret all of the items of ex­
perience, no longer restricting himself to "the data of science. "
It will not be a surprise t o find that i n the larger setting eternal
objects have functions which obj ects did not have. We shall also
find continuity between the earlier and the later theories.
Whitehead's formal or categoreal definitions of eternal objects
are :
[Category of existence v] Eternal Obj ects, or Pure Potentials
for the Specific Determination of Fact, or Forms of Definite­
ness (PR 3 2 ) .
[Category of explanation vii] That an eternal object can be
described only in terms of its potentiality for 'ingression' into
the becoming of actual entities; and that its analysis only
discloses other eternal obj ects. It is a pure potential. The
term 'ingression' refers to the particular mode in which the
potentiality of an eternal obj ect is realized in a particular
actual entity, contributing to the definiteness of that actual
entity (PR 34) .
Whitehead coins the term "eternal obj ect" to avoid certain con­
notations attached to terms in current usage. One such term is
1 93
 1 94 E T E R N AL O B J E C T S A N D A C T U A L E N T I T I E S I N T RO D U C T I O N 1 95
"universal" (sMw 2 2 1 ) . Chapters 1 2 and 1 3 will examine the ways third fact, namely eternality, which is different from both change
in which Whitehead's theory of eternal objects diverges from and endurance. "The mountain endures. . . . A colour is eternal.
what he takes to be the traditional theory of universals. "Form," It haunts time like a spirit. It comes and it goes. But where it
"idea, " and "essence" ("as used by the Critical Realists"), all comes, it is the same colour. It neither survives nor does it live"
suggest meanings different from what he intends. "Accordingly, by (sMw 1 2 1) . Eternal obj ects, then, are objects which neither change
way of employing a term devoid of misleading suggestions, I use nor endure.
the phrase 'eternal obj ect' for what in the preceding paragraph of Some observations about Whitehead's usage of the phrase "eter­
this section I have termed a 'Platonic form' " ( PR 70) . nal objects" and its equivalents will prepare the way for further
The choice o f the term i s not haphazard, for eternal objects are explanation of his meaning. In Science and the Modern World
clearly lineal descendant s of o bjects as conceived in the earlier ( 1 925) and in Time ( 1 92 6), "eternal objects" is used systematically.
writings. Eternal objects are abstract and unextended , have mul­ In Religion in the Making ( 1 926) "eternal obj ects" does not occur.
tiple ingression, and coincide, contrasting with the concretenes s, Some equivalent expressions used there are : forms, ideal forms,
extendedne ss, single location, and noncoincid ence of actual en­ abstract forms, ideal forms of possibility, ideals, possibilities. In
tities, as obj ects contrasted in these ways with events.1 Further­ Symbolism ( 1 927) "eternal objects" does not occur and exact
more, just as obj ects and events were Whitehead's fundamenta l equivalents are rare. They include : abstractions, abstract at­
constructiv e categories in his earlier philosophy of science, so tributes, qualities and relations, forms. In The Function of Rea­
eternal objects and actual entities are the "fundamen tal types of son ( 1 929) "eternal obj ects" does not occur. Equivalents, rarely
entities" in his later cosmology (PR 37).2 used, are: forms, forms of experience, forms of realization, forms
In the later writings the unqualifie d term "obj ect" takes on a of definiteness. In Process and Reality ( 1 929) "eternal obj ects" is
more general meaning. It is no longer the name for entities of a used systematically and is always the standard term. In those parts
single categoreal type, as it was earlier. Even then Whitehea d had of the book which apply the categoreal scheme to special problems
found it difficult to manage objects of all sorts within a single and relate it to other philosophical systems, equivalents occur.
category. Now it becomes a functional term. In general anything is Some of these (in addition to those contained in the categoreal
an object when it is the datum of a prehensio n (PR 89, 327). Thus definitions) are : forms, abstract forms, possibilities, potentialities
entities of various categoreal types may and do function as ob­ of definiteness, abstract potentialities. Such equivalents occur more
j ects. "There are four main types of obj ects, namely 'eternal ob­ frequently in Part II than elsewhere. In those parts of the book
j ects,' 'propositi ons,' 'objectifie d' actual entities and nexus" (PR where Whitehead is rigorously developing and explaining his
82). An "endurin g object" is a nexus with a certain complica ted scheme, equivalents occur rarely, for example chapter 9 in Part
sort of structur e (PR 50) . II, and Part III generally.
In Whitehe ad's earliest use of "eternal object" (sMw 1 2 2) he In A dventures of Ideas ( 1 933) "eternal objects" occurs only a
explains the sense of "eternal ." In order to analyze nature, he half dozen times, all but one of these occurrences being concen­
says, we have to take account of change, and we have to take ac­ trated in three pages (3 1 2-1 4) . Equivalents are : ideas, ideals, ideal
count of enduran ce. In addition, we have to take account of a possibilities, abstractions, abstract possibilities, modes of possibil­
1 . Unlike events, however, actual entities can be compared. For actual
ity. In Modes of Thought ( 1 938) "eternal obj ects" does not occur.
entities are real individuals, as events are not, and retain their identity Equivalents are : forms, forms of potentiality, forms of composition
even in objectification. Also actual entities are "atomic," as events are not. (of transition, etc.), eternal forms, possibilities, abstractions, po­
They are minimal events; no actual entity includes another. tential forms, and other variants. In the last lectures (" Mathe­
2. See PR 33, 2 39, 287, but notice a qualification in MT 95-6. matics and the Good" and "Immortality"), and in the essays pub-
 1 96 ETERNAL OBJECTS AND ACTUAL ENTITIES C R I T I C I S M OF P L AT O N I C F O R M S
lished in Essays i n Science and Philosophy, " eternal obj ects" does says, that the view h e selects for criticism i s not the whole Plato.
not occur. Equivalents such as "forms" and "possibilities" are Our own concern is not with the historical adequacy of White­
rare. head's remarks but with the light they throw on his theory of
In summary: eternal objects.
a. "Eternal obj ects" is standard usage in, but only in, Science His criticism centers on the view, which does in fact appear in
and the Modern World, Time, and Process and Reality. the dialogues and by a long tradition has been identified with
b. "Eternal objects" occurs elsewhere only in A dventures of Plato, that the forms are perfect and self-sustaining. According to
Ideas. this view forms exist in a realm separate from the realm of things
c . Whitehead has no standard equivalent for "eternal objects," and are independent of the things that become and perish. They
though many equivalents occur. have real being, exempt from becoming. They are therefore "per­
d. "Eternal objects" supplants all equivalents in the more fect." They have no necessary reference beyond themselves. They
rigorous 3 statements of Whitehead's scheme. are the standard of being, to which things in the world of becom­
ing may approximate in greater or lesser degree. Things are real
2 . Whitehead's criticism of Platonic forms to the degree that they imitate the changelessness and self-sufficient
The categoreal definitions of eternal objects suggest that, at perfection of forms. Things are thus shadows of forms. This ascrip­
least as a first approach, they can be understood as possibilities tion of "perfection" to forms is, in Whitehead's j udgment, the
(PR 2 2 6) . So understood, the contrast between actual entities and "error" which "haunted Plato in respect to his Ideas" ( IMM 696.
eternal objects is a restatement of a contrast which had occupied See PR 3 1 8- 1 9; AI 354; MT 92-5, 1 09-1 3, 1 2 6, 1 3 8).
Whitehead's mind throughout his philosophical reflections, namely One way of putting Whitehead's objection is to say that this
the contrast between actuality and possibility.4 Platonic view absorbs actuality into possibility. Actuality evap­
His m � i � � ntention is to keep a firm contrast between actuality orates from the world of things. This world becomes infected with
and poss1b1hty, and to maintain both as fundamental and final unreality. Whitehead holds on the contrary that nothing is more
categories of thought. He is resistant therefore to any philosophical real than temporal individuals. The ontological principle and the
tendency to absorb either of these categories in the other. It is in principle of process run counter to the Platonic view. For this
connection with this philosophical resolution that his criticism of view the locus of being is "there." For Whitehead the locus of
the Pl�tonic theory of forms is best understood. being is "here." Therefore he rejects "the feeble Platonic doc­
Wh.itehead's admiration for Plato's imaginative power, his faith trine of 'imitation' " ( rMM 686). It leads to a "vicious separation"
. of permanence from flux. "Such philosophies must include the
m rat10nal harmony, and his speculative boldness is plain enough
(PR 63, 1 42-7 ; FR 7, 2 9; AI 1 87-98). And he is aware of the differ­ notion of 'illusion' as a fundamental principle-the notion of
ence between the Plato of the Phaedo and the Repub lic and the 'mere appearance.' This is the final platonic problem" ( PR 526).
Plato of the Philebus and the Sophist (Ar 354; MT 1 2 6, 1 3 2-3 ; DIAL ·whitehead blames this otherworldliness of Plato, as we might
2 1 7) . H � � ays he is indebted to the writings of A. E. Taylor (PR ix, call it, on his fascination with mathematical ideas. "Plato in the
. _
_ mterpretation earlier period of his thought, deceived by the beauty of mathe­
6 8 ; AI vm) for his of Plato. So he knows, as he often
matics intelligible in unchanging perfection, conceived of a super­
3· What Whitehea says of Modes of Though t applies to most of his writing
� world of ideas, forever perfect and forever interwoven" (Ar 354) .
after Process and Reality except a few chapters in A dven tures of Ideas: "In these
lectures I have not entered upon systematic metaphysical cosmology" (MT 2 3 1 ) .
Whitehead's own view of mathematics is "that mathematics is
4· For a very early expression of this contrast see OT 1 88. For late expres­
concerned with certain forms of process issuing into forms which
. are components for further process." So he offers "a belated re-
s10ns see MT 95-6, 1 36.
 E T E R N A L O B J E C T S A N D A C T U A L E N T IT I E S CR I T I C I S M O F P LA T O N I C F OR M S 1 99
minder to Plato that his eternal mathemat ical forms are essentially b. Things are actualities. The particular things which exist in
referent to process" ( MT 1 2 6) . space and time are the final realities. They are real individuals.
Whatever the cause, the result was unfortun ate for both cosmol- Their involvement in process, both in the internal process of con­
ogy and theology : crescence and in the external process of transition, does not mean
involvement in unreality. They are not mere imitations of forms.
When Plato is faced with the problem of expressing the rela­
c. Thus it is truer to say that forms participate in (are in­
tionship of God to the World, and of the relation to the
gredient in) things (PR 30, 63, 48 1 ) , than to say that things par­
World of those Ideas which it is in God's nature to contem­
ticipate in forms.
plate, Plato's answer is invariably framed in terms of mere
d. In a sense therefore actuality is primary over possibility. This
dramatic imitation. When Plato turns to the World, after
considering God as giving life and motion to the ideas by the may be illustrated from the following passage : "The explanatory
purpose of philosophy is often misunderstood. Its business is to
inclusion of them in the divine nature, he can find only
second-rate substitutes and never the originals. For Plato there explain the emergence of the more abstract things from the more
is a derivative second-rate God of the World, who is a mere concrete things. . . . In other words, philosophy is explanatory
of abstract10n, and not of concreteness. It is by reason of their
Icon, that is to say an image. Also when he looks for the ideas,
he can only find, in the World, imitations. Thus the World, instinctive grasp of this ultimate truth that, in spite of much associa­
for Plato, includes only the image of God, and imitations of tion with arbitrary fancifulness and atavistic mysticism, types of
his ideas, and never God and his ideas (AI 2 1 5) . Platonic philosophy retain their abiding appeal; they seek the
forms in the facts" (PR 30) . We begin with the concrete, with ac­
For Whitehead has committed himself t o a realistic view o f the tuality (PR 2 2 3, 32 1 ) . Possibilities are abstractions from actuality.
world of process. He refuses therefore to identify permanence with The correction of the Platonic view of forms would consist, we
reality and process with unreality. Instead he holds, as we saw in might say, of underlining "in the facts" in the last sentence of the
Part One, that particular processes of concrescence and satisfac­ above passage. Where Plato made forms primary over things, White­
tion are reality. This is clearly Whitehead's platform and pro­ head makes actuality primary over possibility.
gram. On this basis he must regard the outcome of Plato's theory e. Yet, in participating in things, forms do not lose their char­
of forms as an unfortunate and erroneous theory of reality.5 acter as potentials. They continue to transcend things by their
We might therefore construe Whitehead's contrast between ac­ suggestions of alternatives avoided (PR 2 2 5-6) . This thing might
tuality and possibility as a correction of Plato's contrast between have had other forms. What is red might have been green. And
things and forms, and as a substitute for the contrast between other things may have this form. Other things may also be red.
Being and becoming. This construction may be developed in the Thus actuality does not "absorb" possibility. Possibility still tran­
following way: scends actuality. For any situation there are possibilities which
a. Forms are possibilities. A form defines how something might are not actual. There are always unactualized possibilities.
be actual. It is a form of definiteness of actuality. Thus its very f. N either forms nor things have Being, in the sense of self­
meaning contains an essential reference to actuality, though to sufficient perfection. Whitehead's principle of relativity 6 is a clear
actuality generally. An eternal object is "a form for realization" rej ection of this concept of Being. Instead, "it belongs to the
(FR 2 6) . nature of a 'being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming' " ( PR
5. We must ask, i n Part Three, whether Whitehead's theory o f God and 33). Every possibility is a possibility of actualization. Every ac-
the world reintroduces the notion of an "eminent reality," which he here
6. Which Whitehead himself connects with the Plato of the Sophist (see
rejects.
Al 230, 254).
 200 E T E R N A L O B J E C T S A N D A C T U A L E N T I T IE S
P U R E P O S S I B I L I TY 201
tuality i s a concrescence of many other entities into a novel unity
Sox will win the pennant this year. But i t i s not really possible for
and in turn becomes an element in other actualities. .
the Orioles to win the pennant. For even if they won all their re­
In this way, for Whitehead, the contrast between actuality and
maining games, and their leading opponents lost all theirs, still
possibility supplants the Platonic contrast between Being and be­
the Orioles would not win the pennant." Thus "a possibility"
coming, and corrects the Platonic contrast between forms and
might mean (c) a real possibility in contrast with a hypothetic� !
things. (i) Forms are possibilities, not Being. (ii) Actuality is proc­ .
possibility, that is, a state of affairs which t� e ci�cumstances permz � .
ess, not Being. Thus he avoids not only Plato's attribution of per­
It is a real possibility that the Red Sox will wm the pennant this
fection to form, and the consequent absorption of actuality into
year. It is not a real possibility, under the circumstances, that the
possibility, but also Spinoza's absorption of possibility into ac­
Orioles will win the pennant this year.
tuality. Actuality is ever incomplete and beyond it are unrealized
Now Whitehead wants to distinguish among these various mean­
possibilities. In one way or in the other, in Plato's way or Spinoza's,
ings of possibility so as to avoid confusions. He does so as follows :
the contrast between actuality and possibility would be weakened
a. Eternal o bjects are "pure potentials. " They are "pure" pos­
or destroyed. This contrast Whitehead means to maintain and
sibilities in that they do not refer to or describe any particular
strengthen. There are always unactualized possibilities. And ac­
state of affairs, actual or hypothetical. An eternal obj ect is a
tuality-temporal, finite, concrete, individual being-is real being,
"mere" potentiality ( PR 2 80) . They are completely "indeterminate"
not a mere imitation or reflection of pure form.7
as to their realization in some state of affairs or other. They ex­
press a "general potentiality" (PR 1 0 i-2) unrestricted by an� par­
3. Pure possi bility ticular state of affairs. There is no reference to any particular
actuality, though they contain a reference to actuality in general.
I suggested that the notion of possibility is the key to an under­
They are "possibles. "
standing of Whitehead's theory of eternal objects ( PR 226 ) . But .
b. Propositions are "impure potentials" (PR 3 3) . They describe
here as elsewhere he finds current usage inadequate for his pur­
hypothetical states of affairs. They are thus not "pure" possibil­
poses. It would be misleading to translate "an eternal obj ect"
ities. Nor are they "pure" actualities. They are "hybrid" or "im­
simply as "a possibility."
pure" entities, for the statement of a proposition in�o �v�� refer­
This is because the latter term is vague, and "the vagueness of
ence both to particular actualities and to pure possibilities ( PR
philosophical terminology" (AI 2 94) is why Whitehead develops
35, ch. g in Pt. II, and ch. 4 in Pt. III) .
his own categoreal scheme. "A possibility" might mean (a) a gen­
c. Real potentiality is the limited, "natural" (sY1�rn OLISM 36)
eral or abstract form. For example, "red" or "four" or "being first
potentiality, relative to some particular state of affairs or actual
in a series." Or it might mean (b) a hypothetical state of affairs,
world, which is permitted by the circumstances of that a� t � al
that is, the possibility that some form is or will be realized in a
world. The hypothetical state of affairs expressed in a propo� itl �n
particular time and place. For example, "The Red Sox will win .
is really possible if, relative to a given subject which entertams it,
the pennant this year," or "The Orioles will win the pennant this
this state of affairs is compatible with the subject's past actual
year." B oth statements describe possible states of affairs. Here a
world ( PR 34, i o i-2, 340) . The past actual wor � d of a concres� ent
distinction is necessary. We say, "It is really possible that the Red
subj ect determines what is really possible, r� l� tive to that s � bJ ect.
7. Whitehead's theory of actuality and possibility, as here construed, Thus under the circumstances, the proposit10n expressed m the
is a rejection of "the principle of plenitude" as interpreted by Arthur 0.
Lovejoy. See The Great Chain of Being (Harvard University Press, 1 953),
�
state ent that the Orioles will win the pennant this year is not
a real possibility.
P· 5 4 · . .
At present we are particularly concerned with pure potentials,
 E T E R N A L O B J E C T S AND A C T U A L E N T I T I E S H O W E T E R N A L O B J E CT S T R A N S C E N D
202
d . The "eternal obj ects designated by the words 'any' and 'just
and that is to say with eternal objects. To throw light on White­
head's theory of pure possibility I shall first cite some examples of
(
that' " PR 2 45).
e. Patterns (PR i 15, 356-8) and relations (PR 295, MT i oo, Chap-
eternal objects mentioned in his writings. Then I shall discuss
how eternal objects transcend and are immanent in, actual entities. ter i 2 below) .
f. The abstract essence of an actual occasion (PR 93).
(
g. General principles , as color PR 295) .
4. Examples of eternal objects h . Forms of imperfecti on. Speaking o f the notion of perfection
Whitehead does not give a comprehensive and exhaustive clas­ he says, "its naive attachment to the realm of forms is entirely
sification of eternal objects anywhere in his later writings. The without justification . How about the form of mud, and the forms
distinction he makes most use of is between eternal obj ects of the of evil, and other forms of imperfecti on? In the house of forms,
subj ective species and eternal objects of the objective species PR ( there are many mansions" (MT 94) . (I do not think this echo of the
445-8). But while no doubt any eternal obj ect belongs to one or Parmen ides is to be taken as ironical. His main point is that a
the other of these classes, his writings suggest, but do not develop, form is not more "perfect" than a thing.)
other modes of classification. I shall not myself attempt to give a i. Grades of generic abstraction, for example: scarlet, red, color,
firm and clear classification of all the types of eternal objects. But sense datum, manner of connectedness of diverse sense data PR (
we may notice a passage in which several examples of eternal ob­ 202 ) .
This list, I repeat, i s not a systematic account of the realm o f
j ects are suggested: "These 'eternal objects' are Locke's ideas as
explained in his Essay (I, I, i ), where he writes : ' . . . men have in eternal obj ects. Indeed, i n Chapters i 3 and i 4 w e shall explore a
reason why a systematization of types of eternal obj ects would be
� �
hei mind several ideas, such as those expressed by the words,
. whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, impossible. As we shall see, "the variation in the grades of ideas
(
army, drunkenness," and others' " PR 8 2 ) . Whitehead adds that
is endless" (IMM 692). Nor is it a comprehensive account. A more
comprehensive account might be constructed by adding entities
�
in other assages Locke mentions "ideas" of a quite different sort,
which Whitehead would no doubt call eternal objects but are not
not to be mterpreted as eternal objects.
explicitly so called in his writings, for example Truth, Beauty,
� � ?
N ext I pre ent a v ry rou hly ordered inventory of those types
Adventure, Art, and Peace as discussed in the last part of A dven­
of eternal objects which Whitehead explicitly mentions as such. I
list them without attempting to decide at every point how they (
tures of Ideas, which are there called qualities AI 367). But "in the
house of forms, there are many mansions, " and it would be im­
are to be related to one another.
(
a. "Sensa" PR i oo, i 14), for example green and blue (sMw 36, possible to give a completely comprehensive list of types of eternal
objects. My obj ect is only to mention some of the entities White­
?
2 3 3 ; AI 3 2 2) and efinite shades of colors (sMw 2 3 2 ; PR i 3 2-3, 202).
�· (
Eternal objects of the subj ective species PR 445-8), that is, head explicitly calls eternal obj ects, so the reader may have some
examples in mind, and to indicate roughly the range of the term.
umversals of quality (Chapter i 2 below) . Sensa functioning as
(
qualities of emotion, for example redness PR 447) . Qualities of
( (
shapes AI 49, 3 2 6), of intensity PR 446) . Belief-character PR 4o8), ( 5. How eternal obj ects transcend actual entities
(
"lovecl" and "coldly esteemed" PR 2 2 6), bad temper PR 1 00),
.
(
(
happmess AI 50) . A subj ective form in abstraction from its feel­
Three preliminary considerations are in order. The first is that
ing is a complex eternal obj ect PR 356) .( the kind of transcendence we are now considering is a relation be­
tween entities of different categoreal types. In this way it is unlike
c. Eternal objects of the obj ective species, that is mathematical
forms in the strict modem sense of mathematics PR 445-8; AI ( the transcendence of one actual occasion by another, and unlike
(
3 2 6), for example triplicity AI 3 2 2).
the transcendence of actual occasions by God. In those cases tran-
 ETERNAL O B J E CT S AND ACTUAL E NTITIES HOW ETERNAL O B J ECTS TRANSCEND
scendence i s a relation between entities o f the same categoreal i. This i s to say, for one thing, that eternal objects do not come
type. Here, on the contrary, as with objects and events in Chapter into being or pass out of being. "The eternal obj ects are the same
i o, we are concerned with entities of different categoreal types. for all actual entities" (PR 34) . Throughout the course of nature
We ask how any and every entity of one type transcends any and there are no changes in the membership of the multiplicity of eter­
every entity of the other categoreal type. nal obj ects. No new members of the multiplicity are gained, and
Second, "actual entities" refers to God as well as to actual oc­ none are lost. A "novel form" (PR 356) would mean a form hitherto
casions. For it is clear that eternal obj ects are categoreally tran­ unrealized in actuality, not a novel possibility added to the in­
scendent of God as well as of actual occasions. Whitehead says, finite multiplicity of eternal obj ects. It is "an old form in a new
function" ( PR 2 84) . "There are no novel eternal obj ects" (PR 33).
The forms belong no more to God than to any one actual
ii. In the second place this means that any eternal obj ect is un­
occasion (RM 1 5 7) .
affected, in itself, by its "adventures" (PR 92) in the actual world.
Now a n eternal object, i n itself, abstracts from all determinat e Eternal objects have their being as possibilities for realization in
actual entities, including even God (PR 392). the world of passage (MT 95) . But the "individual essence" (sMw
He says "even God" because, while any actual occasion will pre­ 2 2 2 , PR 2 5 1 ) of an eternal object is not affected by its realization,
hend only some, not all, eternal objects (PR 69, 3 35), God prehends or lack of realization, in any particular actual entity.
all eternal obj ects in his primordial nature. Even so, the being of In these senses eternal objects are timeless. Actual entities, on
eternal objects does not depend on the existence of God. the contrary, are temporal in both of these senses. New actual
In the third place, we must remember that for Whitehead there entities are always coming into being.8 In the second place, every
is no absolute transcendence. The various modes of reality, or actual entity (including God) is affected by the passage of nature
categories of existence, require each other (MT 95-6) . There is no (transition), and its being is constituted by its becoming (con­
absolutely independent existence ( IMM 6 96) . In the next section crescence) (PR 34-5) . Thus process is external to eternal objects
we shall see how eternal objects are immanent in actual entities. but internal to actual entities.
Here and throughout Whitehead's system transcendence and im­ In a striking sentence Whitehead says, "Every actual entity is ' in
manence are not mutually exclusive categories. If M transcends N, time' so far as its physical pole is concerned, and is 'out of time'
it does not follow that M is not immanent in N. Instead, in any of so far as its mental pole is concerned. It is the union of two worlds,
their applications one of these relations limits and balances the namely the temporal world, and the world of autonomous valua­
other. tion" (PR 3 80) . This "out of time" is misleading unless it is quali­
There are three ways in which eternal obj ects transcend actual fied. For the valuations of the mental pole of an actual occasion
entities. Eternal obj ects are timeless, indeterminate as to their occur at a certain time and place. They are the conceptual feelings
realization, and abstract. Actual entities are temporal, determinate, of that subject there-then. These valuations are "out of time"
and concrete. only in the sense that the data of these feelings, eternal obj ects, are
timeless in the ways explained above. God's conceptual pre­
a. Eternal o bjects are timeless; actual entities are temporal. hensions are timeless in a stronger sense, as we shall see in Part
"Eternality," as we have seen, does not mean endurance (sMw Three.
1 2 1 , i 47-8) . Though eternal obj ects express a kind of "perma­
�ence" (PR 44), the kind of permanence they express is not per­
8. There is one actual entity which is always in being, namely God, by
virtue of his primordial nature. Yet God is always in process of concrescence,
sistence through a duration of time, but timelessnes s (PR 64, 5 1 4;
by virtue of his consequent nature. In this way God "combines the actuality
MT 64; IMM 688) . What does this mean? of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential" (PR 64).
206 E T E R N A L O B J E C T S AND A C T UA L E N T IT IE S H O W ETER N A L O B J E C T S T R A N S C E N D

b . Eternal o bjects are indeterminate; actual entities are deter­ RM 1 56 ; PR 48, 300, 3 9 2 , 42 1 ; A1 49; MT 9 1 , 1 35-6) . Thus Whitehead
minate. Here the indetermination of an eternal object means in­ continues and develops a theme introduced in his earlier writings,
determination as to its ingressions. "In the essence of each eternal where the abstractness of obj ects is contrasted with the concrete­
obj ect there stands an indeterminateness which expresses its indif­ ness of events.
ferent patience for any mode of ingression into any actual oc­ Abstraction, as a process of thought, is a dis joining (MT 1 7 1 )
casion" (sMw 240) . It does not mean indeterminateness of its "in­ of entities which are in fact joined. It thus contrasts with the
dividual essence." For an eternal object does have a "definite process of concrescence, in which entities are brought into a novel
self-identity" (PR 2 5 1 ) . What is indeterminate about an eternal ob­ togetherness and become concrete (sMw 244, AI 303) . An abstrac­
j ect is not its "individual essence" but its realization in the actual tion is an entity considered apart from some of the roles or func­
world. In this respect an eternal obj ect is wholly indeterminate. tions it has in the actual world. Since it is not possible, in a finite
"An eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but and conditioned act of experience, to prehend all of the func­
in itself, as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its phys­ tions of any entity in nature, thought essentially involves abstrac­
ical ingression in any particular actual entity of the temporal tion.
world" (PR 70) . This is to say that, given any actual entity A and Now as soon as we abstract we "necessarily introduce the notion
any eternal obj ect R, there is no necessity in the nature of R that of potentiality" (MT 1 36) . We are considering what migh t be apart
it should be a form of definiteness of the physical actuality of A, and what m igh t be together. A pure potential, an eternal object,
and there is no necessity in the nature of R that it should not be is an entity reached at a certain extreme of abstraction, namely
a form of definiteness of the physical actuality of A. An eternal abstraction from its realization in any particular actual entity.
object is a capacity for being realized in any actual entity. In this Even so, this is not complete abstraction (PR 392).
its transcendence of actuality, as a pure potential, consists (PR A complete abstraction would be an entity considered apart
366-7) . "Its analysis only discloses other eternal objects" (PR 34) . from all of the functions it has in the actual world. Complete ab­
" . . . an eternal obj ect refers only to the purely general any straction would mean ignoring all of the relations of the entity
among the undetermined actual entities. In itself an eternal ob­ to other entities. Thus a completely abstract entity, in this sense,
j ect evades any selection among actualities or epochs. You cannot would be an entity existing in absolute independence of any other
know what is red by merely thinking of redness. You can only entity. If the possibility of complete abstraction is admitted, then
find red things by adventuring amid physical experiences in this absolute transcendence is asserted. An entity which could be con­
actual world. This doctrine is the ultimate ground of empiricism; sidered apart from any relation to any other entity or entities
namely, that eternal objects tell no tales as to their ingressions" would be absolutely transcendent.
(PR 39 1 ; see 1 74-5, 3 92-3, 444) . But Whitehead denies the possibility of complete abstraction
In contrast, actual entities are determinate. As we have seen, the and of absolute transcendence : "It follows from the fourth cate­
result of the process of concrescence is a fully determinate satis­ gory of explanation [i.e. the principle of relativity] that the notion
faction. Determinateness is of the essence of actuality; indeter­ of 'complete abstraction' is self-contradictory. For you cannot
minateness as to physical realization is of the essence of pure abstract the universe from any entity, actual or non-actual, so as
potentiality. to consider that entity in complete isolation" (PR 42. See PR 3 2 1 ;
MT 90-7, 1 68-70; IMM 685) . How then is it possible to consider
c. Eternal o bjects are a bstract; actual entities are concrete. We eternal objects "in themselves"? It is possible because, while the
saw in Chapter 2 how actual entities are concrete. Eternal objects notion of an eternal object abstracts from the ingression of the
on the contrary are abstract. "Abstraction" is the title of the eternal object in particular actual entities, it does not abstract
chapter on eternal objects in Science and the Modern World (see from its general relation to actual entities. It is a possible form
208 E T E R N A L O B J E C T S AND A C T U A L E N T I T I E S H O W E T E R N A L O B J E CT S ARE I M M A N E N T
of definiteness of actuality. This is the eternal object as a pure correction. 10 This correction i s facilitated by Whitehead's frequent
potential. Consideration of an eternal obj ect in itself therefore use of equivalents which do not carry these connotations. The
is not a complete abstraction but an incomplete one, and is thus most important of these are "realization" and "functioning." 11
in harmony with Whitehead's principle of relativity. These terms are employed more systematically than other equiv­
In these ways eternal objects transcend actual entities. These alents in rigorous expositions of the categories.
are ways of describing the fundamental contrast between actual­ Recurring to category of explanation vii, for example, "The
ity and pure potentiality in Whitehead's metaphysics. Now we term 'ingression' refers to the particular mode in which the poten­
turn to the complementary relationship of immanence and ask tiality of an eternal object is realized in a particular actual entity,
how eternal obj ects are immanent in actual entities. This is the contributing to the definiteness of that actual entity" (PR 34, my
" ingression" or "realization" of eternal obj ects. italics. See SMW 2 40, 246-7 ; AI 3 1 2 ; MT 1 2 2 , 1 38, 2 2 9) . Thus the
ingression of an eternal obj ect is its realization in some actual entity
6. How eternal obj ects are immanent in actual entities : or entities. It is the realization of a pure potential. Similarly, from
Ingression category of explanation xxiv, "The functioning of an eternal ob­
One point Whitehead wishes to make against the Platonic theory ject in the self-creation of an actual entity is the 'ingression' of the
of forms is that eternal obj ects are really immanent in the tem­ eternal object in the actual entity" ( PR 3 8) . This needs to be taken
poral world, as well as transcendent of it. When Plato "looks for in conj unction with category of explanation xx, as follows: "That
the ideas, he can only find, in the World, imitations" (AI 2 1 5) . to 'function' means to contribute determination to the actual en­
Whitehead's alternative principle i s the Translucency o f Realiza­ tities in the nexus of some actual world" (PR 38). The "function­
tion. "By this I mean that any eternal object is just itself in what­ ing" of an eternal obj ect and its "ingression" are equivalent ex­
ever mode of realisation it is involved. There can be no distortion pressions (PR 2 49, 2 5 1 , 445) .
of the individual essence without thereby producing a different "Ingression" is Whitehead's way of saying that eternal objects
eternal object" ( sMw 2 40) . Therefore it is better to say that eternal are immanent in or present in or elements in (sMw 1 00) actual
objects "participate" in actual entities than that actual entities entities. The complete analysis of an actual entity would reveal
participate in eternal obj ects ( PR 63, 48 1 , 496) . The "exemplifica­ eternal objects among the entities of various types that are present
tion" of an eternal object in an actual entity needs to be under­ in its real internal constitution. This is the general meaning of
stood with this translucency of realization in mind.9 He does not "ingression. " But there are different m odes of ingression, 12 and
mean that something like the eternal object is in the actual entity. to these we now turn.
And he does not mean that the actual entity is like the eternal 1 0. A few other expressions with dynamic connotations occur in the
obj ect. He means that the eternal object itself, j ust itself, is in the later writings. For example : an eternal object is "a determinant of the
actual entity as a "form of definiteness." datum" of a physical feeling (PR 249; see 364). "Determinant" here clearly
For this relation " ingression" is the standard term. It applies means no more than "being a form of definiteness of," as the latter passage
and categoreal obligation iv (PR 39-40) suggest. The expression that a form
to the immanence of eternal obj ects in actual entities, as in the has an "activity" (MT 1 38) is to be understood in the same way. See below
earlier writings it applied to the immanence of obj ects in events. on the "functioning" of an eternal object.
The dynamic connotation of pre-existence and entry still needs 1 1 . For other equivalents see the references above on "participation,"
"exemplification," and "illustration." See also on "inclusion" SMW 238-9.
9· See PR 63, 444, 472; AI 3 1 3; MT 94. See also, on the "illustration" of An eternal object is "included" as an element in an actual entity. This is
eternal objects by actual entities, PR 38, 2 84, 295; AI 269. For the odd reverse close to saying it is an ingredient in the actual entity.
expression, an actuality illustrated by eternal objects, see PR 447, AI 3 1 3, i 2 . Or modes of inclusion (sMw 238-9), modes of realization (sMw 240,
MT 75· 246-7), modes of functioning (PR 249, 445).
 I

l
, ,

2 10 E T E R N A L O B J E C T S A N D A C T U A L E N T ITIE S C O N CEPTUAL PREHENSIONS 211

j ective species may have dative ingression or conceptual ingression

7 . Modes of ingression but not subjective ingression (PR 445-8).
Whitehead gives two lists of modes of ingression. The earlier Do we need to add to this list another mode of ingression,
one is: "Hence, to sum up, there are four modes of functioning namely "negative ingression"? Certainly there are negative pre­
whereby an eternal obj ect has ingression into the constitution of hensions of eternal obj ects. Indeed every actual occasion (though
an actual entity: (i) as dative ingression, (ii) in conformal physical not God) has some negative prehensions of eternal objects. Do
feeling, (iii) in conceptual feeling, (iv) in comparative feeling" these prehensions constitute another mode in which eternal ob­
(PR 249) . The later one is simpler: "An eternal object can only jects have ingression in actual entities? Speaking generally of an
function in the concrescence of an actual entity in one of three eternal object, Whitehead says, "Its own nature as an entity re­
ways : (i) it can be an element in the definiteness of some objectified quires ingression-positive or negative-in every detailed actual­
nexus, or of some single actual entity, which is the datum of a ity; but its nature does not disclose the private details of any
feeling; (ii) it can be an element in the definiteness of the subjec­ actuality" (PR 444). He does not develop this incidental sugges­
tive form of some feeling; or (iii) it can be an element in the tion of an additional mode of ingression. And the suggestion is
datum of a conceptual, or propositional, feeling. All other modes weakened by the point of the following passage : " Only a selection
of ingression arise from integrations which presuppose these of eternal objects are 'felt' by a given subject, and these eternal
modes" ( PR 445). objects are then said to have 'ingression' in that subj ect." This
The later list is simpler and clearer for two reasons. In the first seems to imply that negatively prehended eternal objects do not
place, ingression "in conformal feeling" (249 ii) simply means have ingression. He adds, "those eternal obj ects which are not
that one and the same eternal obj ect is ingredient both in the felt are not therefore negligible. " The importance of negatively
datum of a physical feeling (as 249 i or 445 i) and in the subjec­ prehended eternal objects consists in the fact that "each negative
tive form of that feeling. Thus 249 i and 249 ii overlap. With this prehension has its own subj ective form, however trivial and faint"
"relational" functioning in mind, the sentence introducing the (PR 66; see 35).
later list should say: "in one or more of three ways." In the sec­ Formally speaking, it is possible to regard a negatively pre­
ond place, the distinction between 249 iii and 249 iv is not needed. hended eternal object as having conceptual ingression. It is the
The distinction between conceptual feelings and comparative feel­ datum of a conceptual feeling. The difficulty is that this datum
ings (for example, feelings of propositions) is important in a has a very peculiar status. Hence there is j ustification for either
genetic analysis of the concrescence. But the eternal objects that treating negative prehensions of eternal obj ects as instances of in­
are felt function in the same mode, and for this 445 iii is sufficient. gression, or not. In either case there seems no good reason for in­
Let us then take the later list of modes and adopt a more eco­ troducing into our list a fourth mode of ingression.
nomical set of terms to express them. We might speak of: (i) dative
ingression, (ii) subj ective ingression,13 and (iii) conceptual in­
8. Conceptual prehensions
gression. Eternal obj ects of the subjective species may have in­
gression in any of these three modes. Eternal obj ects of the ob- The major contrast among the modes of ingression is between
the two modes of physical ingression (dative ingression and sub­
13. In PR 249 "subjective ingression" includes 249 ii, 249 iii, and 249 iv.
jective ingression) on the one hand, and conceptual ingression on
But there is something to be said for using it to mean ingression in the
subjective forms of feelings in contrast to ingression in the data of feelings,
the other. In this section we consider eternal objects as data of
whether the data be of physical or conceptual feelings. Whitehead himself conceptual prehensions. In the next chapter we study the physical
does not use the phrase systematically. ingression of eternal objects.
212 ETERNAL O B J ECTS AND ACTUAL E N TITIES CON CEPTUAL PRE H E N S I O N S
Pure conceptual prehensions (PR 2 80; see 49) are the simplest is obj ectified by one o f its own conceptual feelings" (PR 375-6) .
forms of mental experience. We leave to one side the "higher Now from a hybrid physical feeling there will arise, in accord
phases of experience," including propositional feelings, physical with the category of conceptual valuation, a pure conceptual feeling
purposes, intellectual feelings, conscious perceptions, and judg­ having as its datum the eternal obj ect which was the datum of the
ments (PR 39 1 -428) . These are phases by which the physical ex­ obj ectified conceptual feeling. "A hybrid physical feeling orig­
perience and the conceptual experience of an actual entity are inates for its subject a conceptual feeling with the same datum
synthesized into its satisfaction. Whitehead's treatment of these as that of the conceptual feeling of the antecedent subject" (PR
topics is extremely subtle and suggestive. But our attention must 377). In this way eternal objects which had only conceptual in­
be focused on his theory of eternal obj ects more directly and more gression in the past, and not physical ingression, may enter the
strictly. We limit ourselves to those instances of mentality where new concrescence by way of its mental pole.
the data are eternal obj ects, that is to pure conceptual prehen­ Conceptual reversion is important because "novelty in the phys­
sions. These prehensions are so simple that consciousness is not ical world, and error in authentic perceptive feeling, arise by con­
necessarily involved in their subjective forms (PR 35) . ceptual functioning, according to the category of reversion" (PR
The first point to notice is the origination of these prehensions 4 1 0) . It is by reversion that the subject prehends eternal obj ects
in the process of concrescence. We begin with categories of obliga­ which have neither physical nor conceptual ingression in its past
tion iv and v : actual world. But it turns out that reversion is only a provisional
explanation of the origination of novelty. Whitehead's fuller ex­
(iv) The Category of Conceptual Valuation. From each phys­
planation of novelty requires his conception of God, which we
ical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual
study in Part Three.
feeling whose datum is the eternal object determinant of the
According to this more complete explanation, pure conceptual
definiteness of the actual entity, or of the nexus, physically
prehensions originate in every case from prehensions of actual
felt.
entities. But they are by no means simply faint copies of physical
(v) The Category of Conceptual Reversion. There is sec­ feelings. Mentality does not merely record or reflect what has been
ondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which physically realized. On the contrary, mentality prehends possi­
are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the bilities which in the past actual world had been only conceptually
eternal objects forming the data in the first phase of the entertained. Further, by way of hybrid physical feelings of God,
mental pole. The diversity is a relevant diversity determined mentality introduces possibilities which were neither physically
by the subj ective aim (PR 39-40; see 378-82) . realized nor conceptually entertained in the past actual world.
Mentality is in this way the "organ of novelty" (FR 2 6) .
These categories define the two "phases of conceptual ongma­ W e should now look more closely a t the way eternal obj ects
tion" (PR 378) in the concrescence of an actual entity. In these function as data of pure conceptual prehensions. This should make
ways "physical feelings give rise to conceptual feelings, and con­ it clearer how mental operations-even in their simplest forms­
ceptual feelings give rise to other conceptual feelings" (PR 376). differ from the operations which constitute physical experience.
There are two sorts of physical prehensions from which conceptual The contrast before us is between "unrestricted" (physical) in­
prehensions are derived: pure physical feelings and hybrid phys­ gression and "restricted" (conceptual) ingression (PR 445) . Other­
ical feelings. "In a 'pure physical feeling' the actual entity which wise expressed it is between the "complete ingredience" or "com­
is the datum is objectified by one of its own physical feelings. . . . plete inclusion" (sMw 2 37) and the "abrupt realisation" (sMw
In a 'hybrid physical feeling' the actual entity forming the datum 246) of eternal obj ects in actual entities. In unrestricted ingression
214 ETERNAL O B J E CTS A N D ACTUAL E N TITIE S WHY ETERNAL O B JECT S ARE N EEDED
eternal obj ects are functioning as forms of definiteness of data function o f the datum i n the concrescence. N egation enters into
of physical feelings (dative ingression), or as forms of definite­ feeling as a property of the datum itself. The datum of a negative
ness of subj ective forms of feeling (subjective ingression) . Un­ conceptual prehension is not "felt." The datum of a conceptual
restricted ingression is the full physical realization of eternal ob­ feeling is positively felt as not physically realized. Mental experi­
jects, obj ectively or subjectively. ence is "the experience of forms of definiteness in respect to their
Restricted or conceptual ingression, on the other hand, is · disconnection from any particular physical experience, but with
ingression "with mere potentiality withholding the immediate abstract evaluation of what they can contribute to such experi­
realization of its function of conferring definiteness" (PR 445) . ence" (FR 2 6) .
Restricted ingression therefore involves a kind o f negation. "Con­
ceptual feeling is the feeling of an unqualified negation; that is g. Why eternal objects are needed
to say, it is the feeling of a definite eternal obj ect with the definite
This becomes two questions, to be answered in succession : (a)
extrusion of any particular realization" (PR 372). The eternal
How do Whitehead's other categories require eternal objects? (b)
object is felt as not physically realized, that is to say as a pure
Why does he adopt a set of categories which includes eternal ob­
potentiality. It is felt as a potentiality for realization. It is some­
jects? The first question has to do with the coherence of White­
thing which migh t be a form of definiteness of the datum of a phys­
head's system; the second with the facts which his categories are
ical prehension or of the subjective form of a prehension. But in
devised to interpret. The first question calls for reasons internal
conceptual ingression it is felt in the generality of its potentiality
to the categoreal scheme; the second for reasons external to the
and as not physically realized.
categoreal scheme.
As a datum of a conceptual prehension then, an eternal object
has a role different from that of an eternal object prehended, in a a. The fundamental categories of the scheme are actual entities
"physical purpose" ( PR 406), as physically realized in a given actual and eternal obj ects. It will be sufficient therefore to show how
entity. This role also contrasts with that of an eternal object in actual entities require eternal objects. To begin with, how do
a "proposition," where it is a potential form of definiteness of actual occasions require eternal obj ects? In two ways, I suggest.
some particular nexus of actual entities. A proposition is an "im­ Eternal objects are required to explain (i) the novelty and indi­
pure potential" (PR 32, 2 87). A pure conceptual prehension might viduality of actual occasions, and (ii) the influence of actual occa­
have as its datum, for example, "red nowhere in particular. " A s10ns.
propositional feeling might have as its datum, for example, "that i. In Part One we saw how the subj ective aim of an occasion
might be red." Thus, while conceptual feeling is the feeling of is essential for its real individuality. The aim at a unity of experi­
an "unqualified" negation, a propositional feeling "involves (as ence, which informs each concrescence, might be called White­
one side of a contrast) a qualified negative determined to some head's principle of individuation. It is the necessary and sufficient
definite situation" ( PR 372) . condition of the emergence of a novel real individual out of a
The negation involved i n conceptual feelings must not b e con­ given world of settled facts.
fused with the negation involved in negative prehensions. A nega­ The subjective aim grows out of the initial conceptual aim,
tive prehension "holds its datum as inoperative" in the con­ which has as its datum a possibility not realized in the actual
crescence in which the prehension occurs (PR 35) . The datum of world. The presentation of this novel possibility might be called
a conceptual feeling (a positive conceptual prehension) is not the formal condition of individuality. The appetition of the con­
"withheld" but has a positive function in the concrescence. The crescence for its realization might be called the material condi­
negation involved in conceptual feelings is not a negation of the tion of individuality.
216 ETERNAL O B J ECTS AND ACTUAL E N TITIES W H Y E T E R N A L O B J E CT S ARE N E E D E D
Every actual occasion is self-creative. Its appetition for some ii. W e saw i n Part One that the crucial explanatory mechanism
novel realization is an instance of creativity. It must conform to in Whitehead's theory of influence was conformity of subjective
a given world, but it must do so in its own way. It determines it­ form. It was argued that, on his principles, transition from the
self internally. The novel possibility becomes the focus of this past to the present has to be interpreted in terms of the repetition
internal activity of the concrescence. Responded to with creative or reproduction of subj ective forms of feeling. Some form of def­
appetition, it catalyzes the many feelings of the concrescence into initeness of feeling in the antecedent is repeated, or a feeling hav­
a unity of experience. ing this form of definiteness is reproduced, in the consequent
Now this possibility, as we shall see in detail in Part Three, is actual occasion. In this way Whitehead's theory of influence re­
"derived" from God. In God's conceptual experience it is en­ quires the existence of entities which can be multiply located, as
visaged with his own subjective form of appetition. But if the actual occasions cannot. Their function, as he puts it, is rela­
new occasion is to be a real individual, the possibility must be tional. Further, since there are no a priori restrictions on the in­
capable of being prehended with a novel subjective form, partic­ fluence one actual occasion may have on another, any such entity
ular to the new concrescence itself. For if it could be prehended must be such that it m igh t, abstractly speaking, be realized in
only with the divine subjective form of appetition, then no room any instance of transition. Such entities therefore must be time­
would remain for the self-creative activity of the concrescence. less in their mode of existence and indeterminate as to their phys­
The occasion would then sink to the status of a mode of infinite ical realization. That is to say they must be pure potentials.
Being. We have seen, still further, that Whitehead's claim to real con­
This means that to maintain the principle of creativity, the nections among his real individuals rests crucially on his theory
datum of the initial aim must be something objective to God as of influence. On his own showing, the mutual immanence of con­
well as to the concrescence.14 In other words, there must be the temporaries and the immanence of the present in the future re­
possibility of disconnection between the datum and any subjective quire the influence of the past on the present. Thus we might
form of feeling, including the subjective form of God's primordial generalize and say that his theory of social immanence, as well
appetition. Now this is to say precisely that the datum of the initial as his theory of social transcendence, requires for its intelligibility
aim must be a pure potential, indeterminate as to its realization. the existence of eternal obj ects.
This is why Whitehead says that eternal objects "belong no more Some philosophers have suggested that Whitehead's system
to God than to any one occasion" (RM i 57). might be reformed in such a way as to make eternal objects un­
God does not create eternal obj ects any more than he creates necessary. This proposal is no doubt generated by the feeling
actual occasions-and for the same reason, namely the principle that eternal obj ects are more "strange" or "queer" than White­
of creativity. There must be room in every concrescence for the head's other categories of existence. It is felt, perhaps, that it is
self-creativity of the actual entity, however faint in intensity, more difficult to identify eternal objects in experience than to
however negligible in importance that actual entity may be. And identify actual occasions and nexus, for example. Thus if eternal
creativity requires a multiplicity of pure potentials, indeter­ objects could be eliminated the system would be more plausible.
minate as to the subjective forms with which they are prehended. We do not need to examine the obj ections to eternal objects
In this way the theory of actual occasions as real, socially tran­ that underlie this proposal. It is by no means clear that eternal
scendent individuals requires the existence of entities of another objects are more strange to common exp e rience than, for example,
sort, namely pure potentials or eternal obj ects. actual occasions are. It might also be remarked that Whitehead's
1 4 . This is the point at which Platonic realism diverges from Platonic speculative system is designed not as a simple description of com­
(I should say neoplatonic) idealism. The former leaves open the possibility mon experience but as an instrument for analyzing it. But the
of pluralism. The latter tends to monism. main point which follows from the preceding discussion is that,
218 E TER N A L O B J E C T S A N D A C T U A L E N T I T I E S W HY E T E R N A L O B J E C T S ARE N E E D E D 219

if it is thought possible to eliminate eternal obj ects from White­ lem is, so to describe the general character of experience that these
head's system, then what he means by actual occasions has not intuitions may be included" (PR 253).
been understood. Now why is it that he adopts a system of concepts
iii. Process is real.
to which the category of eternal objects is necessary, in the ways
we have seen? If "changeless order is conceived as the final perfection," so that
"the historic universe is degraded to a status of partial reality,
b. As Whitehead develops, explains, and defends his system issuing into the notion of mere appearance," then "the most evi­
he appeals at a number of points to direct experience. This appeal dent characteristic of our experience has been dismissed into a
reflects his conception of speculative philosophy. Its function is subordinate role in metaphysical construction" ( MT 1 09) .
to frame a set of ideas "in terms of which every element of our
experience can be interpreted" (PR 4) . So the "ultimate appeal" iv. Aims are effective.
of any speculative system must be "to the general consciousness "The conduct of human affairs is entirely dominated by our recog­
of what in practice we experience" ( PR 25). The reasons external nition of foresight determining purpose, and purpose issuing in
to his system by which it would have to be justified are simply conduct . . . The evidence is so overwhelming, the belief so un­
the features of experience . questioning, the evidence of language so decisive, that it is difficult
Whitehead does not claim that his system can b e validated by to know where to begin in demonstrating it" (FR 9- 1 0) .
appeal to some one crucial set of facts. On the contrary, "the
relevance of evidence is dictated by theory. For you cannot prove Things, connections, process, and aims are among the most
a theory by evidence which that theory dismisses as irrelevant" familiar and important features of the world we experience. White­
(AI 2 84) . Much less would it be reasonable to suppose that the head's purpose is to devise a system of categories which will do
theory of eternal obj ects, abstracted from its place in Whitehead's justice to these and other facts of experience.
system, could be proved or disproved in this manner. It is possible to trace from each of these "facts" a thread of
It would be impossible to list all those features of experience Whitehead's thought leading toward the theory of eternal objects.
to which Whitehead appeals in his writings. It is possible to select These threads of thought become interwoven with many others
certain "facts" to which he appeals more often than to others, into the fabric of his system. Short of a justification of the system
generally because he thinks they are slighted or explained away as a whole, tracing these connections will take us as far as we can
by other philosophers, and to suggest some connections between expect to go toward identifying some external reasons why eternal
these facts of experience and the theory of eternal obj ects. I offer objects are needed.
four such facts : i. To express in a metaphysical system the fact of a multiplicity
of things, categories of definiteness and distinctness are required.
i . There are many real things. A thing is this and not that. It is distinct from another thing in
this or that respect. Thus there are forms or characters or qualities
Monism is "in defiance of the most obvious deliverance of our in respect to which things differ from each other. This line of
intuitive 'prejudices ' " (PR 208) . thought leads toward the conception of eternal objects as forms
of definiteness.
ii. These many real things are really connected with one an­ ii. To express real connections between real things mediating
other. entities are required. To think of these mediating entities as b e­
The point of Whitehead's criticisms of Hume was "that we have ing themselves "things" would lead to a fruitless regress of rela­
direct intuition of inheritance and memory: thus the only prob- tions. They must not take the place of the influence or power one
2 20 ETERNAL O B JECTS AND ACTUAL E NTITIES

thing exerts o n another, o r the presence o f one thing i n another.

This is the very fact which needs to be explained, not explained
C HAPTER 12
away. They must rather characterize the continuity which the in­
fluence effects. They must be forms of definiteness both of the
cause and of the effect. Thus we would be led toward the concep­
tion of eternal obj ects as relational. Qualities and Relations
iii. Process requires novelty. Something becomes which did not
exist before. If this fact of novelty is subj ect to rational analysis,15
then the form of definiteness of the novel thing cannot be an i. Whitehead on universals
isolated and unrelated "meaning." Though previously unrealized, S c A T T E R E D through Whitehead's later writings are many critical
it must be capable of determinate relations with other forms. remarks about traditional views of universals. From these remarks
This line of thought leads toward the conception of eternal ob­ I propose to reconstruct the theory of universals he has in mind
j ects as pure potentials. and is opposing, in order to bring out more clearly his own alter­
iv. If aims are effective, then something not yet actual, an en­ native.
visaged possibility, has a function in the present. There is final First I shall cite a passage which sets forth in a clear way his
causation. To explain final causation mental operations of some general approach to the traditional theory. Then I shall state the
sort are required. Thus we might be led to a doctrine of conceptual main doctrines which compose that theory, together with his alter­
prehensions, with pure potentials as their data. native doctrines. This will give us a framework within which we
In such ways it is possible to see how Whitehead might appeal may discuss, in the rest of this chapter, his treatment of qualities
to facts external to his system to support the theory of eternal and relations. First, then, the general point of view:
objects. Our main concern has been with those internal reasons
in terms of which the coherence of his system would have to be The antithetical terms 'universals' and 'particulars' are the
defended. usual words employed to denote respectively entities which
In the two succeeding chapters we shall again take Whitehead's nearly, though not quite [Note g: "For example, prehensions
own advice as we did in Part One, "laying the new ideas aloncr­ and subj ective forms are also 'particulars' "], correspond to
side of our pre-existing trains of thought" (PRIN R vii) . In the e ; the entities here termed 'eternal objects,' and 'actual entities. '
chapters we shall lay his theory of eternal obj ects alongside the . . . The notion of a universal is of that which can enter
traditional theory of universals, as he understands it. This will into the description of many particulars; whereas the notion
enable us to see how he interprets qualities, relations, and the of a particular is that it is described by universals, and does
principle of classification. not itself enter into the description of any other particular.
According to the doctrine of relativity which is the basis of
15. See Whitehead's remarks on Bergson in PR vii, AI 287, ESP u6.
the metaphysical system of the present lectures, both these
notions involve a misconception. An actual entity cannot
be described, even inadequately, by universals ; because other
actual entities do enter into the description of any one actual
entity. Thus every so-called 'universal' is particular in the
sense of being j ust what it is, diverse from everything else;
and every so-called 'particular' is universal in the sense of
221
 222 Q U A L I TI E S A N D R E LATI O N S C R IT I C I S M O F Q U A L I F ICAT I O N 223
entering into the constitu tions o f other actual entities (PR Here again Whitehead does not disagree with the theory of uni­
76; see PNK 2o i , PR 2 39) . versals. Like universals, eternal obj ects are "abstract." "These
�
I ta e the �ain doctrines of the traditional theory of universals,
transcendent entities have been termed 'universals.' I prefer to
use the term 'eternal obj ects,' in order to disengage myself from
of which Whitehead is critical, to be the following:
presuppositions which cling to the former term owing to its pro­
a. Universals and particulars are entities of different categoreal longed philosophical history. Eternal objects are thus, in their
types. nature, abstract. By 'abstract' I mean that what an eternal object
b. Universals do not determine their instances in particulars. is in itself-that is to say, its essence-is comprehensible without
reference to some one particular occasion of experience" (sMW
These two doctrines do not require extended explanation. White­ 22 i ) .
h �ad does no � disagree with them, and his own way of stating them
will be explamed briefly below. c. Eternal objects are forms of definiteness of particular facts of
qualitative experience and of particular facts of relatedness. Their
c . No other particulars enter into the description of a given
. functions are modal and relational.
particu lar. Hence qualities and relations are universals, predicated
.
of particulars as their logical subjects. Whitehead's view will be explained in detail in this chapter.
Whitehead's criticisms of the traditional theory center on this d. The multiplicity of eternal objects includes mathematical
doctrine. Most of this chapter will be devoted to these criticisms ideas as well as qualitative predicates, and permits the "min­
and to his alternative doctrine. gling" of forms in novel real individuals.
d. The main use of universals is to classify partic ulars
into This doctrine will be explained in Chapter i 3 .
genera and speci es.
!his doctrine and Whitehead's criticisms of it will be discussed Within this framework we can turn our attention to doctrine c
of the traditional view of universals. A close connection with the
m Chapt er i 3 .
topic of Chapter 5 will be apparent. We shall center on the view
�
I ake the m � in doctr ines of the theory of eternal objec ts,
Whit e­ of qualities and relations Whitehead is opposing, and on his own
head s altern ative to the tradit ional theory, to be the follow interpretation of the facts to which the traditional view refers.
ing:
a. Eternal objec ts and actua l entiti es belong to differ
ent cat­
egori es of exist ence. 2 . Criticism of qualification
Whit ehead make s it clear that among the categ ories Whitehead's criticism of the traditional view of qualities begins
of existe nce
the fundament al contrast is betwe en eternal objec in his earlier writings. On that view qualities are solely or pri­
ts and actua l
e �� lties : "Amo ng these eight categories of existe nce, marily predicates of substances, as their logical subjects. Predica­
actua l en­
t1t1es and etern al obj ects stand out with a certai n extre tion is thus a simple two-termed relation between a primary sub­
me finali ty"
(PR 3 3) . Thes e are two mutu ally exclu sive classe s of stance and a universal quality. For example, "The grass is green"
entiti es (PR
2 39) . In this respe ct his own theory paral lels the tradit predicates a universal quality of a particular substance. In the
ional view.
traditional theory of substance this two-termed relation of predica­
b: Etern al obj ects do not deter mine their ingre ssion
. s in actua l tion is taken as the standard relationship between universals and
ent1t 1es.
particulars.
 2 24 QUALITIES AND RE LATION S R E S T R I C T E D A P P L I C AT I O N S 225
We may remember that in his earlier writings Whitehead took subj ect matter o f science, t o "reality" a s the subj ect matter of
"obj ects" and "events" as entities of fundamentally different types, metaphysics, and in the later writings his criticism of qualification
because if obj ects were regarded as qualities of events, he said, is continued, with an important difference. Now he has developed
one got into difficulties. The standard theory was not adequate to a doctrine of real individuals, in his theory of actual occasions. It
describe "the apparent world," that is to say "nature," with which is no longer enough to admit multiple relations. These relations
he was concerned in those writings. must be construed now as real connections between real in­
He held that a full account of the appearance of green in a par­ dividuals.
ticular situation would refer not only to the green and to its situa­ It is not enough to admit that in our experience of nature there
tion but also to the percipient event (i.e. "the bodily life of the are many-termed relations, if these relations are then th� ught of
observer") and to the whole of nature in that duration. " Under merely as qualities of a subj ect. Leibniz, for example, retamed the
the obsession of the logical theory of universals and concrete par­ Cartesian view "that the final real entities are substances support­
ticulars the percipient event was suppressed, and the relation of ing qualities." Thus, while he admitted many-termed relations,
green to its situation represented as universal qualifying par­ his "perspectives," he did so "only on the condition that the! a�e
ticular" ( PRIN R 2 7) . This traditional theory therefore oversimpli­ purely qualities of the organising monads." Hence for Le1bmz
fies a complex situation. " . . . in the apparent world, that is to say, "there was no concrete reality of internal relations" among con­
in the world of nature disclosed by sense-awareness, no example of crete individuals (sMw 2 1 6- 1 7) . The result of "describing �he
the simple two-termed relationship of a universal signifying its par­ world in terms of subj ect and predicate, substance and quality,
ticular is to be found" (PRIN R 2 6) . There are multiple relations in particular and universal . . . always does violence to that im­
nature, of which the relation of situation between sense obj ects mediate experience which we express in our actions, our hopes, our
and events is one example, which the standard interpretation of sympathies, our purposes, and which we enjoy in spit � of our l �ck
qualities obscured (cN 1 8 [cp. PR 2 0] , 1 50- 1 ; PA 2 1 7) . This criticism of phrases for its verbal analysis. We find ourselves m a buzzmg
was closely connected with what he had to say about the "simple­ world, amid a democracy of fellow creatures; whereas, under some
minded theory that an obj ect is at one place at any definite time, disguise or other, orthodox philosophy can only introduce us to
and is in no sense anywhere else" ( cN 1 45). This is the fallacy solitary substances, each enjoying an illusory experience : 'O Bo �­
which he calls, in Science and the Modern World, "simple loca­ tom, thou art changed! what do I see on thee?' " ( PR 7 8-9) . This
tion." For "simple location" is also a simple two-termed relation criticism runs throughout the later writings (Ar 1 6 9-70, 355-6,
between a universal and a particular. In this case the particular is 36 1 ; MT I O I ; MG 678) .
not a substance but a place.
For this reason Whitehead decides not to describe obj ects as
3. Restricted applications of qualification
qualities of events. This language, because of its association with
the traditional theory of universals, would suggest that an object If Whitehead thinks the traditional notion of qualification is too
has no inherent reference to entities other than the event it is simple, he should give some account in his own terms of those
qualifying. Whitehead on the contrary wants to say that a sense "abstract" features of experience to which this notion does apply.
obj ect situated in an event is significant of other obj ects, for ex­ He does so in two ways. The first is his doctrine of "Aristotelian
ample the "conveyance" of perceptual obj ects by sense objects adj ectives, " later developed into the Category of Transmutation.
( PNK 88), and significant of events other than its situation, for ex­ The second is his doctrine of the privacy of enjoyment.
ample the percipient event. a. The doctrine of Aristotelian adj ectives in the earlier writings
Then he moves from his earlier concern with "nature," as the is Whitehead's way of recognizing that "after all the search for
 Q U A L I T I E S A N D R E L AT I O N S R E S T R I C T E D AP P L I C AT I O N S 227

universals to qualify events i n the simple two-termed manner does t o say, it i s a mistake t o regard the two-termed relation o f per­
represent a j ustifiable demand. We want to know what any par­ ceptual objects to their situation events as the standard relation
ticular event A is in itself apart from its reference to other events" of objects to events.
(PRIN R 2 8) . Those characters which function as Aristotelian ad­ In Whitehead's later writings this doctrine of perceptual ob­
j ectives are perceptual obj ects, like a man or a chair. These objects j ects as "adj ectives" is developed into the Category of Transmuta­
are "signified" by sense obj ects. They are the "controls of in­ tion. His formal statement is :
gression." When . . . one and the same conceptual feeling is derived
impartially by a prehending subject from its analogous, sim­
The grass exhibits itself as green, the bell exhibits itself as
ple, physical feelings of various actual entities in its actual
tolling, the sugar as tasting, the stone as touchable ( ESP
world, then, in a subsequent phase . . . the prehending sub­
[ 1 9 2 3] 1 46) .
j ect may transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into
N ow an Aristotelian adj ective marks a breakdown of the reign a characteristic of some nexus containing those prehended
of relativity; it is j ust an adjective of the event which it actual entities among its members, or of some part of that
qualifies. And this relation of adj ective to subj ect requires no nexus . . . .
reference to anything else. Accordingly, a perceptual object It is evident that the complete datum of the transmuted
is neutral as regards events, other than those which it qualifies. feeling is a contrast, namely, 'the nexus, as one, in contrast
It is thus sharply distinguished from a sense-obj ect, whose with the eternal obj ect.' This type of contrast is one of the
ingression involves all sorts of events in all sorts of ways meanings of the notion 'qualification of physical substance by
(ESP 1 47). quality' (PR 40) .

Two comments need to be made on this doctrine of perceptual As in the earlier writings his theory of perceptual obj ects was his
obj ects as Aristotelian adj ectives. First we should notice it is the explanation of our common-sense experience of "things," so here
o bject, not the event, which is "neutral" as regards other events. "Our usual way of consciously prehending the world is by these
Whitehead is not contradicting his doctrine that any event re­ transmuted physical feelings" ( PR 387).
quires reference to other events. His point is that perceptual ob­ His explanation amounts to saying that some organisms sum
j ects have another kind of relation to events than sense obj ects do. up and "transmute" their feelings of many actual entities into a
Whereas sense obj ects in their ingression involve not only the feeling of one actuality qualified by a universal (eternal obj ect) .
situation event and the percipient event but all the events which He compares transmutation with Leibniz' doctrine of "confused"
make u � the whole of nature in that duration, perceptual objects perception ( PR 40, 384) . The point of interest is that this summing
have a simpler relation to their situations. up involves an abstraction "from the multiplicity of members" of
Second, he does not suggest that perceptual obj ects and their the nexus ( PR 98). There is here "the merely potential aggregation
relations to events be taken as fundamental either for the phi­ of actual entities into a super-actuality in respect to which the
losop�y of science or for metaphysics. Physical obj ects (i.e. non­ true actualities play the part of coordinate subdivision." For some
delus1ve perceptual objects) are important because of their "high purposes "a nexus of many actualities can be treated as though it
perceptive power," and attention to them "is the first condition for were one actuality. This is what we habitually do in the case of the
the survival of complex living organisms." But "the scholastic span of life of a molecule, or of a piece of rock, or of a human
philosophy of nature" makes the mistake of looking on sense ob­ body" ( PR 439) .
j ects "as mere attributes of the physical objects" (cN 1 56) . That is This is a "simplification" (AI 2 7 3) of experience. The fact that
 Q U A L I T I E S A N D R E LA T I O N S ARE Q U A L I T I E S U N I V E R SA L S ? 229

i t takes place i s " a real fact o f nature" (AI 272) . But what is
4 . Are qualities universals?
qualified, when we say "The stone is gray," is not a real individ­
ual but an aggregate of real individuals. And while the grayness Like "substance," "causality; " and "organism," the term "qual­
of the stone appears as a simple qualification, complete analysis ity" is for Whitehead an exp licandum. It is not one of his own
of the fact would require reference to the individual actual oc­ systematic categories of explanation. It needs interpretation, or
casions which compose the nexus, and their objectifications in rather reinterpretation, in terms of his categoreal scheme, because
one another. of the traditional doctrine with which it has been associated in
philosophical discourse.
b. The second restricted application Whitehead gives the tradi­ On the traditional view qualities may be attached to a par­
tional notion of qualification is in his doctrine of the private en­ ticular substance without affecting its substratum. Qualities are
joyment of qualities. Subj ective forms are "private matters of thus adjectival, and their attachments to particular substances are
fact" (PR 3 2 ) . Now if the subjective form of a feeling is taken in accidental. Since their attachments to particulars are accidental,
abstraction from its obj ective datum (PR 356-8), then an eternal a quality cannot connect one particular with another. Thus on the
obj ect which is an element in the definiteness of that subj ective traditional view qualities are nonrelational.
form can be regarded as a "quality" of the subject which enjoys In contrast, for Whitehead qualities are modal and relational.
that feeling. In his system actual entities are the ultimate particulars which
have qualities. And since actual entities are acts of experience,
The fundamental example of the notion 'quality inhering in
qualities must be interpreted as modes of feeling. Qualities are
particular substance' is afforded by 'subj ective form inhering
actual or possible "hows" of feeling. "It is held that every qualita­
in feeling' (PR 354; the text reads "is particular substance").
tive factor in the Universe is primarily a qualification of subj ective
An eternal object considered in reference to the privacy of form, so that the infinite variety of qualities involves the possibility
things is a 'quality' or 'characteristic'; namely, in its own of an infinite variety of subj ective forms exemplifying those qual­
nature, as exemplified in any actuality, it constitutes an ele­ ities" (AI 325).
ment in the private definiteness of that actuality. It refers As modes of feeling, qualities are relational in two ways. In the
itself publicly; but it is enjoyed privately (PR 444; see 480) . first place the subj ective form of a feeling enters the real internal
constitution of the subj ect. A quality in this sense has an internal
Here again we are dealing with an abstraction from fact. The relation to the subj ect of the feeling. In the second place the sub­
feeling has been abstracted from its obj ective datum in the actual j ective form of a physical feeling conforms to its datum. Thus the
world beyond the subj ect. And the subj ective form has itself been quality expresses a real connection between the subject and its
conditioned by this actual world, to which the subject has had to actual world. In my feeling of the datum which includes "angry
conform. "The theory of prehensions is founded upon the doc­ feeling there," the quality of anger mediates to me the angry man
trine that there are no concrete facts which are merely public, or I confront and introduces him as a concrete actuality into my ex­
merely private" (PR 444). perience. Thus on Whitehead's view qualities are relational as well
In these two ways Whitehead recognizes and gives an account of as modal.
the practical importance of the substance-quality theory. At the One way of construing the main intent of his criticism of the
same time he rej ects the notion of a quality simply inhering in a traditional doctrine is to take it as a denial that qualities are uni­
particular substance as a fundamental category in science and versals. The "blues," the "sweets," the "j oys" we experience are
meta p hysics. subj ective forms of feeling in partkular subj ects, ourselves or
 Q U A L I T I E S A N D R E L AT I O N S

others. Now the subj ective form o f a feeling i s not a universal. It

1 RE L AT I O N S A N D U N I V E R S A L S
functions, the functions o f the subj ective forms from which they
is how that subj ect feels that datum. No two feelings can have the are abstracted. They are possible forms of modal and relational
same subj ective form. The primary point about qualities is that feeling.
they are qualifications of subj ective forms of feelings. Thus in order to remedy the deficiencies of the traditional
But if we construe Whitehead's treatment of quality in this way th � ory Whitehead offers a choice of categories for the interpreta­
we must add that while qualities are not universals there are uni­ tion of a quality. (a) Feelings have subjective forms, and we ex­
versals of quality. Otherwise this construction would be very mis­ perience the subj ective forms of feelings in other subjects as well
leading. There are forms of definiteness of subj ective forms of. as our own. (b) There are forms of definiteness ingredient in the
feeling. In this secondary and derivative sense a quality is not a subjective forms of feelings. These are eternal objects.
subj ective form but an eternal object. Two feelings cannot have Though this choice is open there is still an advantage, in con­
the same subjective form. But their subj ective forms may include struing the main intent of Whitehead's treatment of universals,
some common form of definiteness. In this sense two subj ects can to saying that qualities are not universals though there are uni­
feel in the same way. Two feelings can have the same universal of versals of quality. This brings out more sharply his basic criticism
quality. that in the traditional theory universals of quality tend to sup­
Indeed insofar as Whitehead gives to "quality" any standard plant those particular and relational qualitative experiences that
meaning in his exposition of the categoreal scheme, a quality is an are the most insistent and stubborn facts of life.
eternal obj ect (PR 444; AI 325, 3 2 7 ; MT 2 3 1 ) . More specifically, a
quality is an eternal obj ect of the "subj ective species" : "A mem­
ber of the subj ective species is, in its primary character, an ele­ 5. Relations and universals
ment in the definiteness of the subj ective form of a. feeling. It is a Similarly we might construe Whitehead's treatment of relations
determinate way in which a feeling can feel. It is an emotion, or as a denial that relations are universals (see AI 2 0 1 ) . Again this is
an intensity, or an adversion, or an aversion, or a pleasure, or a only a way of interpreting the main intent of his criticism of the
pain" (PR 446) . A quality in this sense is something abstracted traditional theory. He is not denying there are universals of rela­
from subjective forms of feeling. It is a "form of quality" ( MT 1 00) . tion any more than he denies there are universals of quality. His
In this derivative sense qualities are possible forms of feeling. This main protest is that, j ust as universals of quality were allowed to
is Whitehead's reinterpretation of the notion that qualities are supplant or obscure particular facts of qualitative feeling, so uni­
universals. versals of relation have been allowed to replace or to obscure par­
But even in this secondary sense qualities are not adj ectival and ticular facts of relatedness. In both cases he is protesting against a
accidental in relation to the actual entities they qualify. These confusion of fact with form.
universals of quality are still not universals in the traditional From doctrine c of the traditional theory of universals, namely
sense. They are ingredient in the actual entities they qualify and that no other particular enters into the constitution of any given
characterize their operations, their processes of feeling. They are particular, it would follow that all relations are universals. For on
thus adverbial or modal, not adjectival, in their functions, except that theory a particular may be understood without reference to
in the restricted applications of the traditional doctrine explained any other particular. "The 'particular' is thus conceived as being
above. And since the operations of actual entities include real just its individual self with no necessary relevance to any other
connections with other actual entities, namely physical prehen­ particular" (PR 79) . Then each of two related particulars can be
sions, these universals of quality function relationally as well as understood apart from the other, and the relation between them
modally. Eternal obj ects of the subjective species reflect, in their can be understood apart from both. A relation which can be
 P A RT I C U LA R F A C T S O F RE L A T E D N E S S 233
QUALITIES AND RELATIONS
among other things, exemplifies the abstract universal 'between­
understood without reference to certain particulars is a universal.
ness' " (Ar 2 96).
Thus the traditional theory implies that all relations are uni­
We noticed how in his treatment of quality Whitehead offers
versals. This consequence illustrates Whitehead's view that with
two categories, "subjective form" and "eternal object," in order to
the doctrine of "the individual independence of real facts," "the
avoid confusing facts and forms. Here again, in his treatment of
relations between individual substances constitute metaphysical
relation, the categoreal scheme offers a way of saying what "the
nuisances" (PR 208) .
vagueness of philosophical terminology" has made it impossible
One result is to assimilate relations to qualities. "Being the
to say clearly. The traditional theory has obscured the real con­
friend of John," to the extent that this can be understood apart
nections between real individuals. Several categories are expressly
from the character of John, approximates the meaning of "being
designed to refer to particular facts of relatedness of various
friendly" (cf. MT 8 1 ) . And this is in fact one of Whitehead's charges
kinds.
against the traditional view. In the preface to Process and Reality
he says, "Descartes retained in his metaphysical doctrine the Aris­
totelian dominance of the category of 'quality' over that of 'related­ 6 . Particular facts of relatedness
ness. ' " Whereas, Whitehead says, "In these lectures 'relatedness'
Prehensions are of fundamental importance. They are "Con­
is dominant over 'quality' " (PR ix) . This does not mean a rej ec­
tion of the category of quality. It means, as we have seen, that c:� te Facts of Relatedness" (PR 32) . Actual entities prehend en­
qualities are relational. And it means that relations are not qual­ t1t1es of all the categoreal types. And all prehensions are "real, in­
dividual, and particular" (PR 30) . They constitute a network of
ities in the sense in which, on the traditional view, they tend to be.
real connectedness between an actual entity and all other entities.
Whitehead's clearest discussion of the traditional view of rela­
They cannot be abstracted from their subj ects or from their data.
tions is found in A dventures of I deas, in a passage discussing "the
A prehension is this actual entity feeling that entity. In a primary
vagueness of philosophical terminology" (Ar 2 94) . As one example
way, prehensions are the particular facts of relatedness which give
of this vagueness he takes "the terms expressive of the connected­
unity and continuity to the world.
ness of things " : "For this topic, the reigning philosophical term is
Nexus is the term for a set of actual entitie� with a complex pat­
the word Relation . . . . I t is generally held that relations are uni­
tern of relatedness. Category of explanation xiv is : "That a nexus
versals, so that A can have the same relation to B as C has to D .
is a set of actual entities in the unity of the relatedness constituted
For example 'loving,' 'believing,' 'between,' 'greater than,' are re­
by their prehensions of each other, or-what is the same thing con­
lations. There can be no obj ection to this doctrine . For it is a
versely expressed-constituted by their objectifications in each
mere definition. Universals which require two or more particulars
othe � " (PR 35; see 350-3) . Since a nexus is defined in terms of pre­
for their illustration need some term to indicate them, and Rela­
hens10ns, nexus are "real individual facts of the togetherness of
tion is the word chosen" (Ar 2 95-6) . Thus it is clear that he is not
actual entities which are real, individual, and particular, in the
denying that there are universals of relation. He continues, "But
same sense in which actual entities and the prehensions are real,
with this meaning to the term, a relation cannot signify the actual
individual, and particular" ( PR 2 9-30) . It is worth noting further
connectedness of the actual individual things which constitute the
that "The ultimate facts of immediate actual experience are actual
actual course of history. For example, N ew York lies between
entities, prehensions, and nexus. All else is, for our experience,
Boston and Philadelphia. But the connectedness of the three
derivative abstraction" (PR 30) .
towns is a real particular fact on the earth's surface involving a
Contrasts are "Modes of Synthesis of Entities in one Prehension"
particular part of the eastern seaboard of the United States. I t is
not the universal 'between. ' It is a complex actual fact which,
(PR 33) . Contrasts are particular facts of relatedness. But they are
234 Q U A L I T I E S A N D R E LA T I O N S U NIVERSALS OF RELATION
o f a less primary sort than prehensions, or even than nexus. In o f relations has obscured. It has tended t o resolve particular facts
general, a "real synthesis of two component elements in the ob­ of relatedness into universals of relation.
j ective datum of a feeling must be infected with the individual
particularities of each of the relata. . . . A contrast cannot be 7. Universals of relation
abstracted from the contrasted relata" ( PR 348-9). For example
Whitehead's aim is not to rule out universals of relation but
take a contrast of two eternal obj ects, that is to say a synthesis of
only to distinguish them clearly from · particular facts of related­
two eternal objects in one prehension : "The contrast between blue
ness. Here again he wishes to avoid con fusing forms with facts.
and red cannot be repeated as that contrast between any other pair
As with "quality," so also "relation" is not a term he employs in
of colours, or any pair of sounds, or between a colour and a sound.
the construction of his metaphysical scheme. It requires interpreta­
. . . Certain abstractions from that contrast, certain values in­
tion in terms of that scheme.
herent in it, can also be got from other contrasts. But they are
o ther contrasts, and not that contrast; and the abstractions are not His own account of what I have been calling universals of rela-
'contrasts' of the same categoreal type" ( PR 349). In other words, tion is as follows :
a contrast has a unity of its own, an "individual definiteness," and A relation is a genus of contrasts (PR 350).
in this sense it is "particular," a particular fact of relatedness. This
What are ordinarily termed 'relations' are abstractions from
is as true of multiple contrasts as of dual contrasts : "A multiple
contrasts. A relation can be found in many contrasts; and
contrast is analysable into component dual contrasts. But a mul­
when it is so found, it is said to relate the things contrasted
tiple contrast is not a mere aggregation of dual contrasts. It is
(PR 349) ·
one contrast, over and above its component contrasts" (PR 349).
A contrast is a "mode of synthesis," and any contrast is just that For example "between" is a relation in this sense. When "be­
mode of synthesis and not another. There is a further sense in tween" is abstracted from the real connectedness of Boston, New
which a contrast is a particular fact of relatedness. A "realized York, and Philadelphia (AI 295-6), it applies also to the real con­
contrast" (PR 352) is particular with the particularity of the pre­ nectedness of Boston, Springfield, and Albany. It is a genus of con­
hension to whose datum the contrast belongs. trasts or, to put it another way, an abstraction from contrasts.1 The
We might say that a contrast between actual occasions, realized relation is not itself a contrast. Hence it is not particular in the
in some prehension, would be particular in a stronger sense than a sense in which contrasts are particular. Nor is it a nexus. It is not
contrast between eternal obj ects. It would be "infected" with the the real connectedness of Boston, N ew York, and Philadelphia. I t
concrete particularity of its relata, namely the contrasted actual is a universal or, i n Whitehead's terms, a n eternal object (PR 2 9 5 ) .
occasions. It would be the contrast of those occasions there and Whitehead fully agrees with Bradley that relations, so con-
there. But this would be a nexus, and while in one sense a nexus
1. A "genus of contrasts" is to be distinguished from a "generic contrast."
is a contrast Whitehead says he will avoid this application of the The latter is a contrast and hence particular, as explained above for all
term ( PR 349) . contrasts. A generic contrast is a contrast between entities of different cate­
In summary, there are prehensions by actual entities of other goreal types, as for example between a nexus and a proposition (as in "in­
entities; there are sets of actual entities which prehend one another tellectual feeling," PR 407), between a nexus and an eternal object (as in
(nexus) ; and there are syntheses of entities in the data of prehen­ a "physical purpose," PR 42 1 ), or between an actual entity and a proposi­
tion (as in a "coordinate division," PR 437). The data of comparative feel­
sions (contrasts) . In these ways Whitehead would describe the par­
ings are generic contrasts (PR 406). Generic contrasts, unlike other sorts of
·ticular facts of relatedness we find in experience. It is these par­ contrasts, are "proper entities." Other sorts of contrasts, and "multiplicities,"
ticular facts of relatedness, he thinks, which the traditional theory are not proper entities (PR 45).
 I
I
I

Q U A L I'l' I l'. S A N D R E L A T I O N S E T E R N A L O B J E C T S A S R E L AT I O N A L 237

sidered, do not relate. Bradley saw the consequences of the tradi­ where the ingression o f objects i s said t o "signify" events (ESP
tional theory of substance, for on that theory "the relations be­ [ 1 9 2 3] 1 44-6) .
tween individual substances constitute metaphysical nuisances : In his later writings Whitehead describes this function in vari­
there is no place for them. Accordingly-in defiance of the most ous ways. Eternal obj ects are said to "interpret" (sMw 2 1 0) events
obvious deliverance of our intuitive 'prejudices'-every respect­ to other events. They "convey" other subj ects. "They are here in
able philosophy of the subject-predicate type is monistic" (PR the perceiver; but, as perceived by him, they convey for him some­
208-9) . Bradley was right in asking for "an underlying unity and thing of the total flux which lies beyond himself" (sMw 2 1 0) . They
an inclusive whole" (AI 2 96) . Unlike Bradley Whitehead holds that "introduce" (PR 93) one actual entity into another. They "con­
there are real facts of relatedness which connect real individuals, nect" (PR 97) different actual entities. An eternal object can "ef­
and he undertakes to give an account of them. He thinks the fect" (TIME 60), or be an "agent" in (PR 445-7), the objectification
"underlying unity," which Bradley rightly asked for, does not have of one actual entity for another. All these terms-mediate, in­
to be the Absolute. The trouble with Bradley was that in de­ terpret, convey, introduce, connect, agent-are used to describe
scribing internal relations he used language shaped by the tradi­ the relational function of eternal obj ects.
tional categories and hence appropriate to external relations (AI I t should be noticed at once that the suggestion of activity in
201). the connotations of these terms is misleading and needs correc­
Bradley's discussions o f relations are confused by his failure tion. According to the ontological principle, "actual entities are
to distinguish between relations and contrasts. A relation is the only reasons" (PR 37) . This means that actual entities are the
a genus of contrasts. He is then distressed-or would have only agents. It would be contrary to this principle to suggest that
been distressed if he had not been consoled by the notion of eternal objects are the reasons why actual entities are mediated,
'mereness' as in 'mere appearance'-to find that a relation interpreted, conveyed, introduced, or connected with each other.
will not do the work of a contrast. It fails to contrast. Thus Here as elsewhere, though by no means everywhere, Whitehead's
Bradley's argument proves that relations, among other things, language is concrete and vivid, metaphorical rather than abstract.
are 'mere'; that is to say, are indiscretions of the absolute, He wishes to convey the sense of activity and concreteness. So he
apings of reality without self-consistency (PR 349-50; see 69) . sacrifices exactness for suggestiveness. Part of the justification for
this is that elsewhere he has said what he means in other ways, and
In this way Whitehead gives an account, in his own categories, that no one way of saying it is perfectly adequate to the facts.
of universals of relation. His main concern however is to point Nevertheless it is important to notice that, as in the case of expres­
out that a relation, in this sense, will not do the work of a contrast sions like "flow of feeling," some of his ways of stating a doctrine
or of any other particular fact of relatedness. are less metaphorical, more rigorous and precise, than others. He
is not content with being suggestive, as a poet might be. His is a
8. The relational function of eternal obj ects philosophical aim, and we are justified in holding him to it. His
more exact descriptions of the "function" of eternal obj ects are
Although eternal objects cannot do the work of actual entities in terms of "ingression," "abstraction," and "possibility." The
or prehensions or nexus or contrasts, yet they have their own work immediate point is that expressions imputing activity to eternal
to do, work which cannot be done by entities of other categoreal obj ects must be corrected by the principle that the agent in ob­
types. One function of eternal objects is their "relational" func­ j ectification is the subject of the feeling, the feeler of the datum.
tion in obj ectification. This doctrine is a development from the It is important to distinguish two senses, a weak and a strong,
doctrine of the "significance" of objects in the earlier writings, in which an eternal obj ect may function relationally. Whitehead
 QUALITIES AND RELATIONS S U M M AR Y A N D C O N C L U S I O N S 239

does not make this distinction explicit, though it lies immediately tions i n conformal physical feeling. In this case the eternal obj ect
beneath the surface of what he says. An eternal obj ect has dative has dative ingression and subjective ingression in the same feeling.
ingression (PR 2 49) when it is "an element in the definiteness of "In the conformal feelings the how of feeling reproduces what is
some objectified nexus, or of some single actual entity, which is felt. Some conformation is necessary as a basis of vector transition,
the datum of a feeling" (PR 445) . I shall say that an eternal object whereby the past is synthesized with the present. The one eternal
which has only dative ingression in some feeling is relational in a object in its two-way function, as a determinant of the datum and
weak sense. When the same eternal obj ect is also an element in as a determinant of the subj ective form, is thus relational" (PR
the definiteness of the subjective form of a conformal feeling, then 249; see 446-7, 479-80; AI 3 1 4- 1 6, 3 2 6-7) . For example, a feeling
I shall say it is relational in a strong sense. in the initial phase of a concrescence has for its datum an angry
The eternal object which has only dative ingression is an in­ feeling in some other subj ect, and it feels this angry feeling angrily.
gredient in the new concrescence only as a form of definiteness of Thus the eternal obj ect defines, or partially defines, both the sub­
the datum. This is an essential function in objectification, where jective form of the past feeling, which is now a datum, and the
the problem is to make some abstraction from the totality of the subj ective form of the present feeling, which feels that datum.
given world. Otherwise the new concrescence would be over­ Only eternal obj ects of the subjective species may have this two­
whelmed by this totality and no new instance of creativity could way function.
occur. Unless there were forms of definiteness of the datum, ab­ The conclusion from this discussion is that, whether in the
straction would not be possible. Eternal objects define the joints in weak or the strong sense, the relational functioning of eternal
the given world along which it may be cut into manageable sizes obj ects does not supplant the functions of prehensions, nexus, and
and shapes for the construction of a new actuality. They "con­ contrasts. Eternal objects do not take the place of particular facts
stitute the forms of the obj ectifications of actual entities for each of relatedness. On the contrary they are relational only by way of
other" ( PR 9 1 ) . But if they have only this function, then they being abstract forms of definiteness of the data and subjective
relate the subj ect to the obj ect in only a weak sense. forms of concrete and particular physical feelings. The primary
Some eternal objects function relationally only in this weak facts of relatedness are prehensions by actual entities of other ac­
sense.2 These are eternal objects of the "obj ective species." An tual entities.
eternal obj ect of this species is a "bare mathematical form." "Such
forms by their very natures cannot qualify subjective form. For 9. Summary and conclusions
example, there is not a square-ness of emotion. Thus, except in an
Whitehead's constructive proposals about qualities and relations
indirect fashion-such as the qualitative feelings of smoothness of
may be summed up in the following way:
a sphere, of spikeyness of a square, of amplitude of a volume-,
the doctrine of conformation does not apply to mathematical pat­ a. Qualities are modal and relational.
tern. Here pure mathematics in its strictest modern sense is in
i. An actual entity is a unity of qualitative feelings (prehen­
question" (AI 3 2 6 . See PR 97, 445-6 ; AI 3 2 2 ) .
sions) subj ectively enjoyed. The subj ective forms of these feelings
A n eternal object i s relational i n the strong sense when i t func-
are affected by the other actual entities which the subj ect feels. In
2 . The relational functioning of eternal objects in transmuted feelings turn these feelings, with their subj ective forms, are felt by and
and presentational immediacy (SYMBOLISM 22, 50; PR 97-8, 446-7; AI 3 1 4-2 3) affect other actual entities.
might be treated as a still weaker sense of "relational." But it has been ex­
plained in Part One how contemporary actual occasions are and are not ii. Some eternal objects (those of the subjective species) are
"related." forms of definiteness of the subjective forms of feeling and hence
 Q U A L ITIES AND RE LATIO N S S U M M A RY A N D C O N C L U S I O N S

may b e said t o b e "qualities," or universals of quality, meaning Running through Whitehead's distinctions and underlined in
that they are forms of qualitative feeling. his emphases, the main thrust and weight of his thought on this
topic is toward the primacy of actuality, concreteness, and con­
b. Relations are particular and real. crete experience. The central theme is a protest that the meta­
i. There are particular facts of relatedness, namely prehensions, physical assumptions of the traditional theory lead to the substitu­
nexus, and contrasts, which connect actual entities with other tion of universals for particular qualitative facts and particular
entities. facts of relatedness.
Finally let us recur to one of Whitehead's epigrammatic re­
ii. Some eternal objects (genera of contrasts) may be said to be marks for a closing comment: "Descartes retained in his meta­
"relations," or universals of relation, meaning that they are forms physical doctrine the Aristotelian dominance of the category of
of definiteness of particular facts of relatedness. 'quality' over that of 'relatedness.' In these lectures 'relatedness' is
One of Whitehead's intentions, in his theory of qualities and dominant over 'quality' ( PR ix) . On the traditional theory qual­
relations, is to avoid confusing forms with facts. What do we mean ities tend to be regarded as "inhering" in substances or as being
by "quality"? by "relation"? Do we mean something concrete? privately enjoyed by substances, without any relational function.
something abstract? Do we mean by "a quality" a particular fact? Relations on the other hand tend to be construed as universals.
Do we mean a universal? Do we mean by "a relation" a particular They then cease to relate particulars to other particulars and tend
fact of relatedness? Or do we mean an abstract form which may to function as qualities. Thus there is dominance of quality over
be exemplified in many concrete facts of relatedness? We ought to relatedness.
be able to say what we mean without ambiguity and confusion. A On Whitehead's theory, since qualities have a relational func­
better set of categories is needed than the traditional ones, a tion and since relations are more rigorously distinguished from
scheme by means of which clearer distinctions can be made. private qualities, relatedness is dominant over quality. This latter
Even more fundamental than this proposal for avoiding am­ dominance, however, does not mean that qualities are merely
biguity is an appeal for what we might call the primacy of ac­ relational. Along with their relational character, namely their
tuality. The traditional theory of universals has not done justice function in obj ectification, qualities are privately enjoyed in the
to concrete facts. It has allowed abstractions to supplant them. experiences of actual entities. Therefore Whitehead might well
Instead we must begin with concrete experiences. And if we can­ have added that the meaning of "dominance" in the first sentence
not describe these experiences adequately in traditional language is not the same as in the second sentence. For the traditional cat­
then we must reshape language as an instrument for our purpose. egories exclude real relatedness of individual things, whereas his
This is the major movement of Whitehead's thought as he re­ categories do not exclude private and subjective enjoyment of
flects on traditional ways of thinking about qualities and relations. qualitative experience.
Certainly there are universals, implicit in experience and sug­
gested by experience. But these universals are themselves possible
forms of experience. Universals of quality are adverbial forms of
feeling. Universals of relation are forms of syntheses in the data
of feelings. The kind of being universals have is potentiality. They
are possible forms of definiteness of actual entities. Certainly uni­
versals transcend actuality. But they transcend actuality as pos­
sibility, not as some more perfect kind of being.
 SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS 243

neglect of certain features of the world which require other modes

of analysis. This criticism parallels his treatment of traditional
C H A P TER 13 doctrines of substance, quality, and relation. They express im­
portant features of the world we experience but are misleading if
taken as guiding principles in metaphysics. They are incapable of
adequate generality.
Classification
2 . Science and mathematics
1 . Introduction For one thing, the principle of classification obscures the im-
portance of applying mathematical ideas to the facts of nature :
W E H A V E B E E N reconstructing a theory of universals which, in
Whitehead's judgment, has been both historically important and Classification is a halfway house between the immediate con­
philosophically inadequate. Now we examine another part of his creteness of the individual thing and the complete abstraction
critique of that theory. One of its doctrines is that the main use of of mathematical notions . . . . Classification is necessary. But
universals is to classify particulars into species and genera. In this unless you can progress from classification to mathematics,
chapter we study Whitehead's criticisms of this doctrine and the your reasoning will not take you very far (sMw 4 1-2) .
alternative he proposes in his theory of eternal obj ects. Aristotelian Logic, by its neglect of mathematical notions,
In his later writings we find many critical remarks about the has done almost as much harm as good for the advancement
place of classification in Aristotelian logic. For example : "The of science. We can never get away from the questions : -How
logical instrument which Aristotle used for the analysis of actual much,-In what proportions,-and In what pattern of ar­
fact into more abstract elements was that of classification into rangement with other things (AI 1 96; see 1 50, 1 9 1 , 1 94, and
species and genera. This instrument has its overwhelmingly im­ MT 1 93-4) .
portant application for science in its preparatory stages. But its
use in metaphysical description distorts the true vision of the From the history of science Whitehead concludes that as mathe­
metaphysical situation." The passage continues : "The use of the matics has become more abstract it has become more useful for
term 'universal' is intimately connected with this Aristotelian analyzing nature (sMw 46) . Indeed, he says, "The paradox is now
analysis : the term has been broadened of late; but still it suggests fully established that the utmost abstractions are the true weapons
that classificatory analysis. For this reason I have avoided it" (sMw with which to control our thought of concrete fact" (sMw 47) .
2 3 6-7) . So his criticism of classificatory analysis is part of his Among the mathematical ideas that the principle of classifica­
critique of the traditional theory of universals. The connection is tion has overshadowed are "the complex possibilities of multiple
that the traditional theory tends to treat all universals as "qualita­ relationship within a system" (AI 1 50) . Here we have to do not
tive predicates" (AI 1 96), and this naturally suggests a classificatory with mathematical ideas in the narrower sense such as number and
analysis. quantity but with "patterns of connectedness," which "the gen­
Whitehead does not deny that classification is necessary for prac­ eral science of mathematics" investigates (AI 1 96-7). To under­
tical purposes and for the early stages of scientific inquiry (sMw stand some particular thing we must ask about it, "In what pat­
236-7, AI 1 83-4, MT 2 1 5, IMM 69 1 ) . His point is rather that clas­ tern of arrangement with other things?"
sification ,results in an incomplete analysis and hence is misleading The importance of pattern is stressed in a passage where White­
as a fundamental metaphysical principle. It obscures and leads to head marks four stages in the development of a science. The first
242
2 44 CLASSIFICATION THE F U N CTION O F PHILOSOPHY 24 5

i s the choice o f the types o f things composing its subj ect matter. draws them upon challenge. For example, ordinary physical bodies
The second is the stage of classification. It is an essential stage. suggest solidity. But solids turn into liquids, and liquids into
"But every science strives to get beyond it." The third stage in­ gases. And from the gas the solid can again be recovered" (AI 265) .
troduces questions of "number, quantity, and measurement." The Sharp-cut scientific classification "hides the truth that the differ­
fourth stage "is the introduction of the notion of pattern" ( MT ent modes of natural existence shade off into each other" (MT
1 94) . For example, to know the properties of a mixture of carbon 2 1 5) . It obscures "the aspect of continuity between these different
atoms and hydrogen atoms, we want to know not only the num­ modes. There are border-line cases, which bridge the gaps. Often
ber of atoms of each sort but also how much free oxygen, how much the border-line cases are unstable, and pass quickly. But span of
free carbon, how much carbon monoxide, and how much carbon existence is merely relative to our habits of human life" (MT 2 1 6) .
dioxide. And there will be "an enormous number" of alternative A science which hopes to . be adequate to nature cannot afford to
chemical patterns. Further, "there are an indefinite number of make the principle of classification its final method of analysis.
regional patterns for the distribution of the chemical substances. It must become mathematical by concerning itself with exact
. . . Thus beyond all questions of quantity, there lie questions measurement and with patterns.
of pattern, which are essential for the understanding of nature.
. . . Indeed quantity itself is nothing other than analogy of func­ 3. The function of philosophy
tions within analogous patterns" ( MT 1 95)· Now mathematics is
Philosophy even more than science must avoid making classifica­
"the most powerful technique for the understanding of patterns"
tion its fundamental mode of analysis. The reason is that phi­
(MG 678) . And analysis of types of pattern is becoming the central
losophy seeks larger generalizations than science does. It constructs
function of mathematics. Thus, in urging that a science must
schemes in terms of which all the items of experience can be in­
pass on from the "halfway house" of classification to the "complete
terpreted. It aims at "full comprehensiven ess" (AI 1 84) . "The
abstraction of mathematical notions" (sMw 4 1 ), Whitehead is em­
emphasis of philosophy is upon generalizations which almost fail
phasizing the importance of patt<;rn for the understanding of
to classify by reason of their universal application" (AI 1 83) . In
nature.
this way the subj ect matter of metaphysics lends itself to treat­
A pattern is a "mode of togetherness" ( MT 1 96) . A science con­
ment by the principle of classification even less than the subj ect
cerned with patterns is thus in contrast with Aristotle's science of
matter of science does.
"mutually exclusive classification" (AI 1 76) . Then we might say
In an important passage Whitehead speaks of the method of
that on Whitehead's view it is more important to find out how
philosophy as descriptive generalization, "an ascent from a partic­
things are together than to find out how they are separate. For the
ular fact, or from a species, to the genus exemplified" (AI 3 0 1 ) .
pattern of their relations will include the differences of status and
The converse process, he goes on to say, is impossible . . It is not
function which suggest classifications.
possible to. descend from a genus to a species or to a particular
The principle of exclusive classification, "the fixity of species
fact. His reason is that "facts and species are the product of the
and genera" and "the unqualified definiteness of their distinction
mingling of genera."
from each other," is an implicit presupposition in much of the
"learned literature" of science (IMM 69 1 ) . But it results in an No genus in its own essence indicates the other genera with
oversimplified view of nature. It is certainly true that there are which it is compatible. For example, the notion of a back­
"gaps" in nature. Nature has its "surprises" (PR 1 45)· But it is bone does not indicate the notions of suckling the young or
also true that there are unsuspected continuities in nature : "Na­ of swimming in water. . . . A species is a potential mingling
ture suggests for our observation gaps, and then as it were with- of genera, and an individual instance involves, among other
 T H E C L A S S T H E O R Y OF P A R T I C U LARS 247
C LASSIF ICATION
things, a n actual mingling o f many species. A syllogism is own outlook why philosophy cannot be content with classifica­
a scheme for demonstrating ways of mingling. tion. Science can limit itself to abstractions, whereas philosophy
Thus the business of Logic is not the analysis of generalities is the criticism of abstractions by reference to the total concrete
but their mingling. situation. Science does not and indeed cannot give an ade­
quate account of real individuality. Philosophy can and must.
The point to notice is that philosophy is concerned with gen­ In order to do so it must find more ample and adequate methods
eralities in a certain way . It ascends to the genus. But it is not of analysis than the principle of classification.
content to contemplate the genus, or to analyze it in and for it­
self. " Philosophy is the ascent to the generalities with the view of
understanding their possib ilities of com b ination. The discovery 4. The class theory of particulars
of new generalities thus adds to the fruitfulness of those already There is, indeed, a philosophical theory which purports to dis­
known. It lifts into view new possibilities of combination" (AI pense with real individuals and claims to be content with classes
302, my italics) . This is another way of saying that philosophy of universal qualities. Rejecting-Whitehead would say correctly
must be concerned with patterns or "modes of togetherness." -the notion of a substratum, a "something-I-know-not-what" in
In his reply to John Dewey (ESP 1 2 9) Whitehead quotes the which qualities inhere, it proposes that a particular is a class of
following passage from Plato's Soph ist (252D, 253) : qualities and nothing else. According to Hume, "We have there­
Stranger. Now since we have agreed that the classes or fore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of
genera also commingle with one another, or do not com­ particular qualities" ( Treatise, Selby-Bigge ed., p. 1 6) . White­
mingle, in the same way, must he not possess some science and head thinks that this proposal cannot be carried out and that its
proceed by the processes of reason [heJ who is to show cor­ failure is further evidence of the limitations of the principle of
rectly which of the classes harmonize with which, and which classification.
reject one another, and also if he is to show whether there We may notice in passing that Whitehead himself, in his earliest
are some elements extending through all and ho lding them writings about science and nature, had a theory of "perceptual
together so that they can m ingle, and again, when they sep­ objects" which was similar in some respects to the class theory of par­
arate, whether there are oth er universal causes of separation. ticulars. For example, "Three simultaneous sense-obj ects [of sight,
of sound, and of touchJ which are also spatially coincident, are com­
Theaetetus. Certainly he needs science, and perhaps the bined by thought into the perception of one cat." (oT 1 42 ; see
greatest of sciences (brackets and italics are Whitehead's) . 1 2 9, TSM 53, PNK 88) . Fairly soon, however, he gave up this theory.
With this belongs a sentence from "Indication, Classes, N um­ In a note added in the second edition ( 1 925) of The Principles
bers, Validation" : "This memoir illustrates a conception of the of Natural Knowledge he says that his discussion in the first edi­
scope of Logic which was obscured by the dominant Aristotelian tion ( 1 9 1 9) "is confused by a wavering between the 'class-theory'
theory. The concept was adumbrated by Plato, when in The of perceptual objects and the 'control-theory' of physical objects,
Sophist (252D, 253) he points out the importance of a science of and by the confusion between perceptual and physical objects.
the mingling of forms" (ESP [ 1 934] 3 2 8) . I do not hold the class-theory now in any form, and was endeavour­
Now for Whitehead all "mingling" or "real togetherness" is ing in this book to get away from it" (PNK 204; see CN 1 5 3-8, ESP
togetherness in the formal constitutions of actual entities. The con­ [ 1 9 2 3] 1 46-7) .

.
�
crete th ng� i � which abstract generalities are combined are experi­ This early theory of perceptual obj ects, later rej ected, was not
itself a strict equivalent of the " 'class theory' of particular sub-
encmg md1v1duals. Here is a reason more specific to Whitehead's
 '
C LASSIF ICATION THE CLASS THEORY O F PARTICU LARS 249

stances" (PR 348) . For in his early writings all objects are abstract in virtue of rnere logical disjunc tion. The 'class,' thus ap­
in distinction frorn events which are concrete. Hence a class theory pealed to, is a rnere multip licity. But in the prevale nt dis­
of perceptual o bjects would not function as a theory of concrete cussion of classes, there are illegitim ate transiti ons to the no­
particulars. In the second place, his earlier writings propose a tions of a 'nexus' and of a 'propos ition.' The appeal to a class
theory about "nature," not about reality. He offers there a phi­ to perform the services of a proper entity is exactly analogous
losophy of science, not a metaphysics, whereas the class theory of to an appeal to an imaginary terrier to kill a real rat (PR
particular substances is sornetirnes employed as (though not gen­ 348) .
erally proposed as) a metaphysical theory.
Whitehead thinks this is an illegitimate use of the notion of a An abstract unity cannot serve the purpose s for which a con­
class. He obj ects that a class cannot be employed as a substitute crete unity is required.
for a particular, for example as the subject of a proposition. For Here as at other points there is confusi on because of "the vague-
this purpose it would be necessary to attribute to a class a kind ness of philosop hical termino logy" (AI 2 94) . The notion of a class
of unity it does not have. is employ ed in an ambigu ous way. Therefore "illegit imate transi­
This objection is introduced in a discussion of the category of tions" occur. To clear up the ambigu ity Whiteh ead offers a choice
objective diversity, namely that "there can be no 'coalescence' of of categori es : There are multipl icities; there are nexus; there are
diverse elements in the objective datum of an actual entity, so proposition s.
far as concerns the functions of those elements in that satisfaction" Whiteh ead suppose s that ordinarily in current philoso phical
(PR 344) . The real individuals which are prehended in the satis­ discussio n a class is a multip licity, that is, no diversity of status
faction of an actual entity have "real diversity of status," for "each is assigned to its rnernbers. His categoreal explanation is : "Every
particular component imposes its own particularity on its status. " stateme nt about a particular multipl icity can be expresse d as a
In a real unity, that i s t o say i n the unified experience o f sorne statemen t referent either (a) to all its rnernbers severally, or (b)
actual entity, every component has its own place and function, a to an indefinit e some of its rnernbers severally, or (c) as a denial
place and function duplicated by no other component. "A real of one of these stateme nts" (PR 36) . But a multipl icity is not a
unity cannot provide sharn diversities of status for its diverse com­ "proper entity" ( PR 45) . It cannot serve as the subj ect of a prop­
ponents" (PR 348) . osition. But this is what a particular, on the traditional theory,
The very rnark of a class or collection, in contrast with a con­ rnust do. Hence the proposal to treat a particular sub stance as a
crete particular, is the absence of diversity of status on the part multiplic ity would defeat itself.
of its components. The rnernbers of a class are all rnernbers in the Now there are other types of entities, nexus and propositi ons,
sarne sense and in the sarne way. This is to say that a class is not which need to be distingu ished frorn multipl icities. A nexus or a
a concrete but an abstract unity. proposition rnay be "closely allied to sorne multipl icity, i.e., sys­
tematically allied to each rnernber of sorne multiplicity" (PR 36) .
The prohibition of sharn diversities of status sweeps away Therefore unless these differen t types of entities are clearly dis­
the 'class theory' of particular substances, which was waver­
. tinguish ed there is danger of overlooking the differenc es and attrib­
ingly suggested by Locke (II, XXIII, 1 ), was rnore ernphat­ uting to a multiplic ity sorne of the propertie s of a nexus or a
ically endorsed by Hurne (Treatise, Part I, Sect. 6), and has proposition. The rnain difference is that nexus and propositio ns
been adopted by Hume's followers. For the essence of a class have a unity that multiplic ities do not have. A nexus "is a set of
is that it assigns no diversity of function to the rnernbers of actual entities in the unity of the relatedne ss constitut ed by their
its extension. The rnernbers of a class are diverse rnernbers prehensions of each other." And a propositi on " is the unity of
 C L A S S I F I CATI O N C O N C R E T E N E S S A N D N O VE LTY

certain actual entities in their potentiality for forming a nexus, 5. The concreteness and novelty of real individuals
with its potential relatedness partially defined by certain eternal
obj ects whi �h have the unity of one complex eternal object" (PR Whitehead obj ects to construing particular substances as classes
?5-6). I � either case particular actual entities are presupposed of qualities. He also holds that real individuals cannot be ade­
m certam systematic relationships, actual or potential, to each quately described as mem bers of classes or instances of kinds. An
? �
ot �r. This m ans that the components of a nexus or of a prop­ individual is something more than a member of a species. The
os1t1on have diverse functions in the unity of the entity. principle of classification is inadequate to account for real indi­
Whitehead's point, then, is that a class, understood as a mul­ viduals. A principle of synthesis is needed.
� � � �
tipl ci y, can ot erform the function of a nexus or a proposition. This principle is "creativity," Creativity " is that ultimate prin­
A similar pomt 1s made in a discussion of "multiple contrasts" : ciple by which the many, which are the universe disj unctively,
"This doctrine that a multiple contrast cannot be conceived as a become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunc­
mere disjunction of dual contrasts is the basis of the doctrine of tively" ( PR 3 1 ). In the concrescence of an actual entity there is a
emergent evolution. I t is the doctrine of real unities being more grasping of many diverse entities into a real togetherness. There
than a mere collective disj unction of component elements. This is a concretion of forms of definiteness. "The organism is a unit
�
doctrin has the same ground as the obj ection to the class-theory of emergent value, a real fusion of the characters of eternal ob­
of particular substances. The doctrine is a commonplace of art" j ects, emerging for its own sake" (sMw 1 5 2) . In a real individual
(PR 349) . A fortiori a multiplicity cannot take the place of a partic­ there is a mingling of forms, a fusion of diverse eternal obj ects.
ular substance, that is to say a concrete individual. The proposal The mingling of forms in the concrete unity of real individuals
to treat particular things as c lasses of qualities cannot be carried supersedes the exclusiveness of forms suggested by classification.
out, since it is necessary to attribute to a particular thing a kind The question is what mode of analysis brings us nearest to concrete
of unity which a class does not have. For example, Hume's own reality. On Whitehead's view the fundamental way to explain the
acknowledgment of a "principle of union" among ideas "is in­ difference between individuals is not to say that they exemplify mu­
consistent with the phrase 'nothing but a collection,' which at the tually exclusive forms, but that the same forms have different modes
beginning of the quotation settles so simply the notion of 'sub­ of ingression in the concrete individuals. In metaphysics particulars
stance' " (PR 2 0 1 ) . are not to be taken as members of different species but as concrete
Therefore when a particular is said to b e nothing but a class individuals. They present different syntheses of the relevant forms.
of qualities it may be asked what is meant by a class. For example The fundamental principle is the existence of a creative process
suppose that the particular denoted by "that man" is said to con­ by which the "many" become "one."
sist of a class of perceived qualities (color, shape, texture, etc.) . If this is true there must be a sense in which each individual
. .
Then_ if a class 1s construed as a multiplicity the theory is im­ is unique, and we have seen in Part One how this is the case. Every
plausible. For the qualities plainly have diversities of status and actual occasion is a novel unity. It has a unique spatiotemporal
function within a unity. Some account of the unity should be region, and its region is an abstraction from its character as an
�
produ ed. Whitehead's categories offer the possibility of describ­ act of experience. In its experience it aims at a unique possibility.
mg this macroscopic particular as a nexus of individual actual This possibility is not a class or a species or a genus. It is the ideal
occasions. for that concrescence and determines how actual entities and
eternal objects may mingle in its experience. That is to say the
subjective aim of an occasion is a "form of composition" (MT
1 2 9) . It defines a pattern, or mode of togetherness, relevant to the
 1'

252 C L A S S I F I C AT I O N THE INF IN ITUDE O F POSSIBILITY 253

situation i n which the concrescence arises. I t defines h o w the con­ the relation o f this feature o f eternal obj ects t o the principle of
crescence may become concrete. This principle of individuality, crea tivi ty.
in Whitehead's metaphysics, supersedes in importance the prin­ Whitehead is deeply impressed with what we might call the
ciple of classification. immensity of the domain of possibility. For example, he speaks
of the inadequate grasp in "medieval philosophy, and mdeed _
6 . The infinit ude of possib ility modern philosophy" of "the fecundity of nature and of the cor­
responding fecundity of thought" (FR 35), and says, "T � ere a�e
Now we are ready to approach the theory of eternal objects more ideas in heaven and on earth than were thought of m their
more directly. We have been examining his criticisms of the prin­ philosophy" (FR 36) . In another place where he is discu� si�g t� e
ciple of classification as a mode of analysis in metaphysics. He gradations of generality of ideas he says, "Thus the vanat10n m
thinks it is inadequate to express concrete unities. In recurring the grades of ideas is endless, and it is not to be understood as a
to his own theory of concrete unity and real individuals we have single line of increasing generality. This variation may be con­
touched on a feature of eternal objects at which we need to look ceived as a spread involving an infinitude of dimensions. We can
more directly. only conceive a finite fragment of this spread of grades" ( IMM
Let us begin with those lines from Plato's Sophist which White­ 692) . Particularly interesting in this connection is an incident re­
head italicizes for emphasis. The philosopher should show whether lated by Lucien Price and dated in 1 93 9 : "Suddenly he stood and
there are "some elements extending through all and holding them spoke with passionate intensity, ' Here we are with our finite be­
together so that they can mingle, and again, when they separate, ings and physical senses in the presence of a universe whose possi­
whether there are other universal causes of separation ." This bilities are infinite, and even though we may not apprehend them,
suggests that if we take "the classes or genera" in themselves, they those infinite possibilities are actualities.' He remained standing
are neither mingled nor separated. They may mingle, or they a moment, absorbed in his own thought . . .'' (mAL 1 3 3-4) .
may separate. Their mingling depends on "some elements extend­ It is because of " the infinitude of possibility" (IMM 69 1 ) that
ing through all and holding them together." At least this is a forms are, we might say, always "patient" of new facts. For any
possibility the philosopher is to explore and decide. Again, he is situation in the course of nature, a novel " form of composition"
to decide whether their separation depends on "other universal is available. Something new can always come out of past achieve­
causes." Whitehead seems to be impressed with the suggestion ments. Yet no new possibilities need to come into being as possi­
that the forms in themselves are neither mingled nor separated bilities. "There are no novel eternal obj ects" (PR 33). New situa­
but are capable of either mingling or separating. tions affect the relevance but not the being of eternal objects.
In the next chapter I shall argue in detail that Whitehead has There are and always will be enough ideas to go around. This
adopted this suggestion and embodied it in his theory of eternal infinitude of possibility is required by the principle of creativity.
obj ects. Here I want to show its bearing on classification. Eternal Because the domain of eternal objects is all-inclusive it has no
objects taken in themselves are in "isolation" (sMw 2 30) . As far fixed order or structure. It is the entire multiplicity of possibili­
as they themselves are concerned they may be together in any way ties including all possible orders or structures. " 'Order' is a mere
at all or in no way. They may exclude each other in any way at generic term : there can only be some definite specific 'order,'
all or in no way. This is to say they are "pure" possibilities. We not merely 'order' in the vague . . . . There is not just one ideal
should notice an implication of this view, namely the boundless 'order' which all actual entities should attain and fail to attain"
and unstructured infinity of the "realm" of eternal objects, and (PR 1 2 8) . In this way also the domain of eternal objects is "patient"
254 C L A S S I F I C AT I O N I N C O M P A T I B I L IT Y 2 55

o f creativity. Cosmic epochs with various types of order come into entity occurring during the earlier day, and the other during
existence and pass out of existence. There can be no "final order" the later day. Thus inconsistency is relative to the abstrac­
such that "beyond it there can be no progress" ( PR 1 69) . Thus the tion involved ( MT 76) .
infinitude of possibility in both senses of infinitude, in bound­
lessness of extent and in absence of fixed order, is the counterpart Exclusions of possibilities are decided by the natures of actual­
or, one might better say, the expression of the principle of crea­ ities. "Such exclusions belong to the finitude of circumstance"
tivity. In contrast with the mutual exclusiveness of forms pre­ ( MT 75) .
supposed by classification, eternal objects may mingle, in infinitely Whitehead's point is that a mutually exclusive classification,
many ways, in novel occasions of experience. for example that no elephants have wings, refers to a certain state
of the world. It happens that there are no winged elephants. With
7. Incompatibility the creative advance of nature new combinations become real
possibilities. Exclusiveness among forms must be stated by con­
This does not mean that there are no incompatibilities among tradictory propositions, and a proposition, in Whitehead's sys­
forms. On the contrary, "Considering the Ideas by themselves, tem, has for its logical subjects some set of actual entities (PR 35-6) .
Plato points out that any selections are either compatible for joint I f a proposition p predicates some eternal object of a certain set
exemplification, or are incompatible. It thus follows, as he notes, of actual entities, then the negation of p is an assertion that those
that the determinations of compatibilities and incompatibilities actual entities do not have that form of definiteness. This is an­
are the key to coherent thought, and to the understanding of the other way of saying that "In the nature of things there are no
world. . . . The Aristotelian Logic is only a specialized deriva­ ultimate exclusions, expressive in logical terms. "
tive from this general notion" (AI 1 8 8) . But this passage is mis­ The categoreal basis for the mutual exclusiveness o f forms lies in
leading if it suggests that the incompatibilities are decided by the categoreal obligations of objective identity and objective diver­
eternal objects themselves. The phrase "for joint exemplification" sity, which govern the concrescences of actual entities (PR 344-5).
needs strengthening by reference to other passages; for example : Real individuals are possible only if out of the concrescence there
"Whatever is realized in any one occasion of experience neces­ comes unambiguous character. A real individual must be th is and
sarily excludes the unbounded welter of contrary possibilities. not that. All contrasts must be decided. "For every actuality is de­
There are always 'others' which might have been and are not" void of a shadow of ambiguity" (PR 340) . This intolerance of ambi­
(AI 356; see 3 34, MT 7 2 , ESP [ 1 932] 1 1 8). Note the phrase "in any guity, as an obligation within each individual concrescence, deter­
one occasion of experience." There are incompatibilities and ex­ mines that forms are compatible or incompatible. The given
clusions. An entity cannot both "be" and "not be." The point situation, in conjunction with the subjective aim of the con­
to notice is that the incompatibilities and exclusions of forms are crescence, determines what is compatible or incompatible for that
not laid up in heaven: concrescence. The subj ective aim in response to the actual world
In the nature of things there are no ultimate exclusions, determines how, in a given actuality, forms may mingle and how
expressive in logical terms. For if we extend the stretch of they may not. We might say it is a matter of fact, rather than a
our attention throughout the passage of time, two entities matter of logic, which determines both the necessity for and the
which are inconsistent for occurrence on this planet during nature of exclusions. "In the nature of things there are no ultimate
a certain day in the long past and are inconsistent during exclusions expressive in logical terms" ( MT 76).
another day in more recent past-these two entities may be It follows that incompatibilities of forms are relative to actual
consistent when we embrace the whole period involved, one entities. It follows further that an adequate theory of forms must
 C L A S S I F I C AT I O N CONCLUSION 25 7
allow for new combinations of forms, in novel individuals which view have emerged to be laid alongside the traditional one. These
"escape" from the exclusions relative to their past actual worlds. features of the theory of eternal obj ects may be restated as follows :
"Now process is the way by which the universe escapes from the a. The domain of eternal obj ects includes mathematical ideas
exclusions of inconsistency" (MT 75; see ESP 1 1 8) . An adequate as well as universals of quality.
theory of forms must recognize the mingling of forms as well as
their exclusiveness. And it follows that the principle of classifica­ b. Among these mathematical ideas are patterns or "forms of
tion is subordinate to the principle of individuality, since classes composition." Thus there can be mingling of forms in novel indi­
are derivative from individual decisions. viduals.
In Part One we saw how the real individuality of an actual occa­ c. The exclusiveness of forms reflects and is relative to the ex­
sion, as a novel concretion of experience, required exclusiveness. clusiveness of real individual actualities.
Its subj ective aim excludes alternate possibilities. Its experience
excludes the subj ective immediacies of other actual occasions. d. The domain of eternal objects is infinite, being all-inclusive
Derivatively, its spatiotemporal region excludes the regions of and in itself unordered, so that it is open to, or patient of, crea­
other actual occasions. We might now say that Whitehead points tivity.
to the existence of mutually exclusive individuals, not to an ex­ This final proposition needs to be substantiated, explored, and re­
clusiveness intrinsic to forms themselves, as the real principle of lated to other features of Whitehead's system. This will be the
"division." The exclusiveness of forms is required by, derivative aim of the following chapter.
from, and relative to the exclusiveness of real individuals. Instead
of a fixed order of mutually exclusive forms, Whitehead's theory
of eternal objects proposes an infinitude of possibility, patient of
creative acts of becoming in which novel patterns of inclusion and
exclusion are realized. Thus " 'order' in the actual world intro­
duces a derivative 'order' among eternal obj ects" (PR 1 32). This,
according to the ontological principle "that actual entities are
the only reasons" (PR 37), is what should be expected.

8. Conclusion
We have examined Whitehead's criticism of the doctrine of
classification which belongs to the traditional theory of universals.
That doctrine is that universals are qualitative predicates, the
chief use of which is to classify particulars into species and genera.
Whitehead grants the importance and the necessity of classifica­
tion for practical purposes and for science. We have explored his
reasons for rejecting this doctrine as a sufficient principle of logic
and as a fundamental principle in metaphysics.
In the course of his criticism certain features of his alternative
 I S THERE A CONSISTENT DO CTRINE ? 259

O n the contrary, "The realm o f forms i s the realm o f potentiality"

(MT 95). But it does seem clear that he became discontented with
C H A P TER 14 this term. And this must mean there is some important sense in
which eternal objects are not a realm.
The term "realm" might suggest : (a) a collection of entities
severally different from the entities belonging to comparable
I s There a Realm of Eternal Obj ects?
collections; and (b) some fixed and necessary order among the
members of the collection, so that these entities could not exist
except in this order. Since the latter of these senses presupposes
1 . Is there a consistent doctrine? the former, whereas the former does not require the latter, we
I N Science and the Modern World ( 1 925) Whitehead speaks often may call the former the weak sense and the latter the strong sense
of "the realm of eternal objects" or "the realm of possibilities" of the term.
(chs. 1 0- 1 1 passim, esp. 2 24) . In Religion in the Making ( 1 92 6) Now from chapter 1 0 of Science and the Modern World it
he continues to use equivalent expressions such as "realm of would appear that eternal obj ects are a realm in sense b, the
forms" (go, 98, 1 1 9, 1 54, 1 60), though the term "eternal objects" stronger sense of the term. Whitehead says there : "Accordingly
does not itself occur. there is a general fact of systematic mutual relatedness which is
In Sym b olism ( 1 927) and The Function of Reason ( 1 9 2 9) there inherent in the character of possibility. The realm of eternal ob­
is no reference to a "realm" of forms or ideas or eternal obj ects. j ects is properly described as a 'realm,' because each eternal ob­
This is not very significant, since in neither of these two small j ect has its status in this general systematic complex of mutual
books does Whitehead introduce his own categories of existence relatedness" (sMw 2 24) . But in Process and Reality he says quite
in a systematic way. It is more significant that nowhere in Process clearly that eternal obj ects do not have any "systematic mutual
and Reality ( 1 92 9) does he speak of a "realm" of eternal obj ects relatedness," and thus are not a realm in the strong sense of the
or forms. Where he might have been expected to refer to the term. They are a "multiplicity" (PR 46, 69) . And according to
"realm" of eternal objects, he refers to the "multiplicity" of category of existence vii multiplicities are "Pure Disjunctions of
eternal objects (e.g. PR 46) or to "all" eternal obj ects (e.g. PR 48) . Diverse Entities" ( PR 33).
Finally in A dventure of Ideas ( 1 933), Modes of Though t ( 1 938), Category of explanation xvi is :
and the last lectures (" Mathematics and the Good" and "Immortal­ That a multiplicity consists of many entities, and its unity
ity") he mentions a "realm" of forms mainly as a doctrine of is constituted by the fact that all its constituent entities sev­
Plato requiring criticism and revision ( MT 93-5, 1 38) . erally satisfy at least one condition which no other entity
It seems clear that after 1 92 6 Whitehead was reluctant, to say satisfies.
the least, to give the notion of a realm of eternal obj ects any im­ Every statement about a particular multiplicity can be ex­
portant constructive function in his system. It would not be fair pressed as a statement referent either (a) to all its members
to conclude that there is no sense in which eternal obj ects are a severally, or (b) to an indefinite some of its members severally,
realm. For in the course of his criticism of Plato he says, "We must or (c) as a denial of one of these statements (PR 36; see 44,
admit that in some sense or other, we inevitably presuppose this 348) .
realm of forms, in abstraction from passage, loss, and gain" (MT
93). But he would revise the Platonic conception. The realm of Eternal obj ects, considered in themselves, are a "barren, inefficient
forms is not the realm of being, in some eminent sense of "being." disjunction of abstract potentialities" ( PR 64) . "There is not, how-
258
260 A REALM OF ETERNAL OBJ ECTS? IS T H E R E A C O N S I S T E N T D O CTR I N E ?

ever, one entity which i s merely the class of all eternal objects. "possibilities" would not then b e possible. The realm of possi­
For if we conceive any class of eternal obj ects, there are additional bility would then itself determine what might or might not be
eternal objects which presuppose that class but do not belong to actual. And it is j ust this that Whitehead is denying in Modes of
it . . . . A multiplicity is a type of complex thing which has the Though t. He is in effect asserting that pure possibilities are not
unity derivative from some qualification which participates in a realm in the strong sense of that term, but a multiplicity.2
each of its components severally; but a multiplicity has no unity How then can we explain the apparent conflict between Science
derivative merely from its various components" (PR 73).1 Another and the Modern World, which asserts eternal obj ects are a realm
way of putting the point is to say that if we take eternal objects in the strong sense of the term, and the later assertions that they
apart from the actual entities in which they are ingredient, they are not? Two considerations about Science and the Modern World
have no real togetherness. "The ontological principle can be ex­ are in order. The first is that Whitehead does not give there a
pressed as : All real togetherness is togetherness in the formal con­ comprehensive exposition of his cosmology. There he is present­
stitution of an actuality" ( PR 48; see 2 88) . Eternal objects taken ing for the first time, and only one at a time, some of his novel
in themselves are a multiplicity. philosophical categories. Everything cannot be explained at once.
The same doctrine is found in A dventures of Ideas and Modes The second consideration is that even in Science and the Modern
of Though t. Whitehead speaks of an "unbounded welter" of possi­ World there are clear indications that the doctrine of a realm of
bilities (AI 356). His treatment of the notion of inconsistency makes eternal objects requires qualification. These indications occur at
the point particularly clear. Speaking of "the exclusions of incon­ two points. One is the principle of the "isolation" of eternal ob­
sistency" he says, "Such exclusions belong to the finitude of cir­ jects. The other concerns th e relation of eternal obj ects to God.
cumstance" ( MT 75). "In the nature of things there are no ulti­ The relationships which form the structure of the realm of
mate exclusions, expressive [i.e. expressible J in logical terms. . . . possibility "do not involve the individual essences of the eternal
Thus inconsistency is relative to the abstraction involved" (MT objects; they involve any eternal obj ects as relata, subject to the
76). That is to say exclusion is a function of fact not of potentiality. proviso that these relata have the requisite relational essences.
And this implies the absence, from the welter of possibilities, of . . . This principle is the principle of the Iso lation of Eternal
a general fixed structure intrinsic to the possibilities themselves. O bjects in the realm of possibility. The eternal obj ects are isolated,
For if there were some such order in which every possibility had because their relationships as possibilities are expressible without
its status, then any o ther such order would be excluded. Some reference to their respective individual essences" ( sMw 230). I take
this to mean that the realm of eternal obj ects is a scheme of possi­
I. In Process and R eality two different uses of "class" must be noted. (a)

In this passage Whitehead means by a class something different from a

ble orders of eternal obj ects, not a single fixed order of eternal
multiplicity. He means a "complex thing" with an inner structure intrinsic objects. As far as its "individual essence" is concerned, an eternal
to its components. Thus it would be possible to talk about the thing as obj ect does not imply or require any other eternal obj ect. It has
a whole, or about some part of the thing, meaning by "whole" and "part" no single fixed place in the realm of possibility. It exists in isola­
something more than all or some of the components of the thing taken tion.
severally. Here he is making a concession to current usage. For this sense
of "class" he would substitute "nexus." 2. Compare George Santayana in The Realm of Essence: "No essence,
(b ) A very different meaning of class appears later in Process and Reality. accordingly, can imply any other in the sense of excluding from the realm
Here Whitehead iden tifies a class with a multiplicity: "For the essence of of essence the opposite of the essence implied, or any different complement.
a class is that it assigns no diversity of function to the members of its From itself an essence may exclude anything; in fact it excludes everything
extension. The members of a class are diverse members in virtue of mere not itself; but when a thing or a thought is said to preclude another, this
logical disj unction. The 'class,' thus appealed to, is a mere multiplicity" happens only by virtue of adventitious laws of nature" (New York, Charles
(PR 348; see 1 37, ESP [ 1 9 34] 3 1 4- 1 6, Princip ia Mathematica I 62-3, 1 87). Scribner's Sons, 1 927, p. 82).
 ES
A REALM OF ETERNAL OBJECTS? E T E R N A L O B J E C T S I N T H E M S E LV
syst ema tic . com plex _of �ut� al
Whitehead' s very first reference to the conception o f God he Process and Rea lity . Th e "ge ner al
obj ect has its stat� s, _ 1s a l �m1ta­
will later elaborate and defend is to "an underlying eternal energy rela tedn ess, " in whi ch each eternal
and is not mtrms1c t� It : 1i:i­
_
in whose nature there stands an envisagement of the realm of all tion on the real m of eternal obj ects
eternal obj ects" (sMw 1 48 ) . But the passage most relevant to the
issue at hand comes in chapter 1 1, where he is presenting an argu­
sofar as eter nal obj ects have any ord
to them . It is der ivat ive from and
er, this order is not mtn ns1c
dep end ent on God . ater � ��
ther , eve n in the pnmordia
ment for the existence of God. He begins with the fact that there shal l find reas on to que stio n whe �
and necessary o�der . ut first
are particular, finite, ordered actualities. To explain this some visi on, eternal obj ects hav e a fixe d
ry of eternal ob3 ects m them-
limitation on possibility, not supplied by "the general meta­ we sho uld exp lore Wh iteh ead 's theo
physical situation," is needed. That is to say neither the "general selves.
activity" (i.e. creativity) nor "the realm of eternal obj ects" nor
both together could by themselves explain this fact. "So far as 2. Eternal obj ects in them selv es
the general metaphysical situation is concerned, there might have obje cts con stitu te � realm
Con sidered in them selves, eternal
been an indiscriminate modal pluralism apart from logical or a mu ltip licit y. There IS some
only in the weak sens e. They are
which no mem bers of c �m­
other limitation." To explain the fact we must suppose "a limita­
tion of antecedent selection" (sMW 248). Hence he introduces the
property common to eternal obje cts
para ble mul tipl iciti es have. It is sim
ply that a� eternal ob3 ec �
conception of God as the principle of limitation. tenc e. It is not an actu a
is an inst anc e of a cert ain mod e of exis
This clearly implies that apart from God an "indiscriminate or a sub ject ive form , �r a
enti ty, or a preh ensi on, or a nex us,
modal pluralism" is possible. Apart from the existence of God tras t. It belongs to a differ-
prop osit ion, or a mul tipl icity , or a con
there would be no order of possibilities, and thus no realm of
ent "cat egory of exis tenc e." . .
eternal obj ects in the strong sense of the term. Just as, without a m of eter nal obje cts
.
is d1st mct fr�m :o� parable
So the real
principle of limitation, there could be no finite and ordered of exis tenc e �s d1st mct from
realms only in the way one category
actualities, so also without such a principle there could be no such real m� is not a separa­
othe rs. The separati on betw een two
value. Therefore there is a "second way of limitation," namely the separation betw een the
tion betw een two actu aliti es, like
"an antecedent limitation among values, introducing contraries, inct ion betw een two mod es
Uni ted Stat es and Canada . It is a dist
grades, and oppositions" (sMw 249). The ordering of possibilities .
of exist ence (see AI 3 1 4) . . ,
of actuality and value depends on the principle of limitation. If this poin t som e brie f rem arks abo ut Wh iteh ead s onto logy
At betw een
we consider eternal objects in themselves, apart from God, they · order. (a) He makes no systematic distinctions .
have no logical order and no "contraries, grades, and oppositions."
are m
"ex isten ce" and "be ing. " All enti ties
exis t, and any t �
1 � g we t h"mk
.
They are a realm only in the weak sense of that term. ific fun ctio �� of ent1 �1es .of d1ff �r­
of is an enti ty ( PR 206) . The spec
Now this is the same doctrine we find in Process and Reality, al enti ties, are 1 �d1ca�ed m
ent categoreal kind s, incl udin g actu
namely that it is "the divine element in the world, by which the
the eigh t cate gori es of exis tenc e (PR 32-.
3 ) and. explamed 1? the
barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities obtains ce is not itsel f the ul �1ma te
categories of explana tion . (b) Exi sten
primordially the efficient conjunction of ideal realization" (PR Category of the Ulti mat e.
category or, as Wh iteh ead puts it, the
64) . If therefore we suppose that chapter 10 of Science and the Exis tenc e has to be expl aine d :
Modern World should be taken with the qualification made ex­ involved
plicit in chapter 1 1, it describes eternal obj ects as they exist in the · "ty, ' 'many, ' 'one ' ' are the ultimate notions
'C reat 1v1
· · ,•
term s ' thm g, , 'b emg
primordial vision of God. It is then possible to resolve the ap­ in the mea ning of the synonomous the
e the Cate gory of
parent conflict between its doctrine and the clear teaching of 'ent ity.' These thre e notions complet
 A R E A L M O F E T E R N A L O B J E C TS ? E T E R N A L O B J E CT S IN T H E M S E LV E S
Ulti mate and are pres uppo sed in all the mor
e spec ial cate­ "the notion o f 'complete abstraction' 1 s self-contradictory" (PR
gori es (PR 3 1 ) .
. . . 'pote ntia lity for proc ess' is the mea
42).
. .
But he is not ruling out discourse which omits only some rela-
ning of the more
gene ral [i.e. mor e gene ral than "actu ality tions to the actual world. We might call this sort of discourse
"] term 'enti ty' or
.
'thi ng' . . (PR 68; see 33, 43, 3 2 1 , and
Ar 304) . relative abstraction. In the following passage this distinction be­
This is why, in the categorea l sche me,
there are categ ories of ex­
tween complete and relative abstraction is made reas �nab y �lear, !
isten ce but exis tenc e is not a cate gory and is applied to eternal obj ects : "Now �n ete�nal 0 �3ect, m Itself,
of explanat ion. .
Now we ask how it is poss ible to cons abstracts from all determinate actual ent1t1es, mcludmg even God.
ider eternal obj ects in It is merely referent to any such entities, in the absolutely general
them selve s, that is to say in abst racti on
following passages pose a pro blem .
from actu al enti ties. The .
sense of any . . . Thus the endeavour to understand eternal
.
�
objects in complete abstract on fro � the actual '�o�ld results m
.
The onto logic al prin ciple decl ares that reducing them to mere und1fferent1ated nonentities , (PR 392).
every deci sion is re­
fera ble to one or mor e actu al entit ies, beca This passage says (a) that it is meaningf� l to speak of eternal
use in separation
fro m actual enti ties ther e is noth ing,
mer ely non enti ty­ ?
obj ects in themselves, and (b) that to do so is to a � tra� t from all
'Th e rest is silence' (PR 68) . particular actual entities but not from actual ent1t 1es m general.
.
Fina lly, the reforme d subj ectiv ist prin ciple Legitimate abstraction leaves out some of the relat10n s of eternal
mus t be repe ated : . .
that apart from the expe rien ces of subj obj ects to actual entities, namely those relat10ns which connect
ects ther e is noth ing,
noth ing, noth ing, bare noth ingn ess (PR them with particular actual entities. But it does �ot leave out all
2 54) . .
of the relations of eternal obj ects to actual entities. Even at the
'Ac tual ity' means noth ing else than this extreme of abstraction the reference of eternal obj ects to "any
ultim ate entry into
the concrete , in abst ract ion from whic such entities" is retained.
h ther e is mer e non ­
enti ty. In othe r wor ds, abst ract ion from In Mo des of Though t Whitehead says that in those lectures
the noti on of 'entry
into the concrete ' is a self-contradictor
y noti on, sinc e it asks "The very notion of 'multiplicity' itself has been co�strued as
us to conceive a thin g as not a thin .
g (PR 3 2 1 ; see 42, AI 2 54) . abstraction from the forms of process whereby data acqmre a umty
. In thes e pass ages the insi sten ce of issue into a novel datum" (MT i 33). This tells us how it is possible
on conc rete ness is so strong that
!
It see�s to ru e out abstract ion alto geth
er. If we took them literally
to think of eternal obj ects as a multiplicity. It is possible because
we might re3e ct the poss ibili ty of sayi the notion of a multiplicity is itself suggested by, and is an ab­
ng anything at all abo ut
eternal obje cts in them selves. But straction from, the actual world. There are many things around
this reje ctio n wou ld plai nly
run cou nter to Wh iteh ead 's own prac us. As we experience them, they function in a complicated net­
tice . How then shou ld "sep ­
aration, " "apa rt from, " and "abs trac work of relations, and they are of different kinds. Suppose now,
tion " be und erst ood in thes e
passages ? selecting some one of the kinds, we ignore the network of rela­
Wh iteh ead is saying, I suggest, that tions among the things of this kind. We would then be contem­
ther e cann ot be anything
abso lute ly separate d from actual enti
ties, tota lly apart from the
�
plating a multiplicity. "The very di�ers ty � f ete:nal obj ects h ��
exp erie nces of subj ects , in com plet e for its reason their diversity of funct10nmg m thzs actual world
abstract ion from "en try into
the con cret e." He is ruli ng out disc (PR 3 92 ) . . .
our se abo ut enti ties which .
hav e no relation to the actual world. We have not yet done justice to a note which recurs m White-
Complet e abstraction would
mean leav ing out all rela tion s to the head's treatment of this subj ect, namely his hesitation at includ­
actual world. And, he says,
ing multiplicities in the categories of existence. For example,
 A REALM OF ETERNAL O B J E CTS? H O W E T E R N A L O B J E C T S ARE O R D E RE D
"Thu s the many eternal objec ts conc eived i n their
bare isola ted The general principle which applies here i s that " 'order' in
multiplic ity lack any ex isten t char acter" (PR 530, my
italic s; see the actual world introduces a derivative 'order' among eternal
392) . Here is a paradox: Though mult iplic ities
are one of the obj ects" (PR i 3 2 ) . First consider how actual occasions introduce
catego ries of exist ence they do not really exist
. We may supp ose order among eternal obj ects. Guided by its subj ective aim, an
Whi tehead 's diffic ulty runs as follows : All state
men ts abou t a actual occasion achieves a certain order among its feelings as it
multiplic ity can be expr essed as state men ts
�
of the mult ipl ci �y severally. A re these state
abou t the mem bers proceeds toward satisfaction. In the feeling of � atisfaction t is �
men ts then really order has become completely determinate. Certam aspects of its
abou t the mulu phci. ty? Do we really have an
entity) if all we can actual world will be included and other aspects excluded from
say abou t it mus t be said abou t its mem bers?
This amb iguit y is the synthesis of feelings. Hence some eternal obj ects will become
the reaso n he says that mult iplic ities are not
"proper entit ies. " more important than others in the concrescence and satisfaction.
"Wh enev er the word 'enti ty' i s used, it i s
t o b e assum ed, unle ss Some will be subordinate to others. Some will be of negligible
otherwise state d, that it refers to an entity of
one of the six kind s
�
[ .e. the fi�st six cat �gori es of exist ence : actu
al entit ies, preh en­
importance. Thus there will be a certain ordering of eternal ob­
j ects, reflecting the pattern of feelings in the concrescence and
s10n s, nexu s, subj. ectiv e form s, eternal obje
cts, prop ositi ons] , and satisfaction of the occasion (PR 69) .
not to a mul �iplic ity. . . . Enti ties of the first
six kind s, and gene ric Now this ordering of eternal objects is an actual occasion's con­
cont rasts , will be calle d 'prop er entit ies' "
(PR 45 ; see 342) . tribution to its future. Together with other actual occasions, X
Thi s is an awkward expe dien t, beca use
the state men t of the constitutes the actual world for some future concrescence M. Let
categ ories of exist ence seem s to pres uppo se
a univocal mea ning for us consider the totality of the orderings of eternal obj ects deriva­
"exist ence " and for "ent ity. " It refle cts,
how ever , Whi tehe ad's tive from the occasions of M's actual world. Does this totality of
state of m ind abou t mul tipli citie s, inclu ding
. . the mul tipli city of orderings transform the multiplicity of eternal objects in �o a
et ernal obje cts. Can it be thought of? The diversity of its mem bers
. realm in the strong sense? Has the multiplicity of eternal objects
still refle cts the diversity of the character
istics of actu al enti ties. taken on a single fixed order of relationships?
It is not a com plet e abst ract ion. But it is
an extreme abstracti on. In two ways the orderings of eternal obj ects derivative from
Beyond this � bst_ractio n cann ot go. Beyond
this lies non enti ty. actual occasions fall short of transforming the multiplicity of
The qu �st10n 1s, Can abstract ion go this fa
. r? Doe s diversity have eternal objects into a realm. In the first place, these orderings are
a �y mea m �� w1th o ut som e patt ern of interrelations among
diverse enti ties? Thi. s is . the incomplete. In any actual occasion "All the [already consti tuted]
the ques tion that trou bles Whi tehe ad and .
actual entities are positively prehended, but only a select10n of
le� ds him to say that mul tipli citie s are
not prop er enti ties. Cer­ the eternal obj ects" (PR 3 35) . Again, at the end of a passage stress­
tamly the atte mpt to thin k of eternal obje
cts as a mer e mul ti­ ing the connection between "decision" and "givenness" Whitehead
plici ty takes us to a certa in limi t of thou ght.
adds, "Conversely, where there is no decision involving exclusion,
there is no givenness. For example, the total multiplicity of Platonic
3 . How eternal obj ects are ordered by actu forms is not 'given.' But in respect of each actual entity, there
al enti ties
is givenness of such forms" (PR 69; see 46) . In X only a selection of
Tur nin g from con siderati on of eternal
obje cts in themselves, eternal obj ects was positively prehended. Therefore the entire
transc ende nt of actu al enti ties, we now cons
of eternal obje cts in actu aliti es. Still aski ng
ider the imm anen ce multiplicity of eternal objects will not be ordered for M ? Y �he
if there is a realm of .
eternal o ?j ects , we thin k of them less satisfaction of X. And even if we add those ordermgs denvat1ve
abstractly and ask abo ut from all the other actual occasions in M's actual world, some
the ordering of them when they are ingredie
nt in actu al enti ties. eternal obj ects will not be included. For some eternal objects
 A REALM O F ETERNAL O B J E CTS? H O W E T E R N A L O B J E C T S ARE O R D E R E D 269

will not have been realized anywhere i n M's actual world. In i n the datum, a s well a s those which are. A s a n example White­
this way the ordering of eternal obj ects by the decisions of actual head cites Hume's admission of an exception to the derivation of
occasions falls short of transforming the multiplicity of eternal "simple ideas" from "simple impressions, " namely the possibility
obj ects into a realm. Any such ordering is incomplete because of imagining a particular shade of blue one has never seen (PR
some eternal obj ects are not included in that order. 1 3 2-3) . Again, he suggests that the possibility of a victory by
In the second place, the orderings of eternal obj ects derivative Napoleon at Waterloo, though excluded by actuality, is yet rele­
from actual occasions are relative. This is another way in which vant to our actual world (PR 2 8 2 ) .
these orderings fall short of transforming the multiplicity of Though some eternal obj ects are neither physically nor con­
eternal objects into a realm. The order among eternal obj ects ceptually realized in the past actual world of a new concrescence,
derivative from X is relative to X in the sense that it is effectively all eternal objects are effectively relevant to the concrescence.
(PR 64) or positively (IMM 685) relevant only for those other occa­ Whitehead's proximate explanation of this is the category of
sions for which X is given. Thus it would not be effectively relevant "conceptual reversion" (PR 40) . His ultimate explanation is that
for X's antecedents, and it would be effectively relevant for X's each concrescence in its initial phase prehends God as well as
contemporaries only indirectly. the occasions composing its past actual world. And God's nature
This relativity of the orderings derivative from actual occasions includes as its mental pole an envisagement of the entire mul­
has been implicit in our discussion of the previous point. For the tiplicity of eternal objects. "The primordial created fact is the
meaning of "actual world" is relative to particular concrescences unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of
(PR 34) . Hence it was necessary to speak of M's actual world. The eternal obj ects. This is the 'primordial nature of God' ( PR 46 ;
"

totality of orderings of eternal objects derivative from the occa­ see 48, 248) . So we have to consider the consequences of this
sions of M's actual world is relative to M. Only M has precisely divine envisagement, as well as the orderings of eternal objects
that actual world. Hence only for M is the ordering of eternal derivative from the decisions of actual occasions.
obj ects derivative from that actual world effectively relevant. This divine envisagement of the entire multiplicity of eternal
In these two ways the orderings of eternal objects derivative obj ects transforms this multiplicity into something more like a
from the decisions of actual occasions fall short of organizing realm in the strong sense of the term.
eternal objects into a realm with a single determinate order of This is the ultimate, basic, adjustment of the togetherness of
relationships. These orderings are incomplete, and they are rela­ eternal objects on which creative order depends ( PR 48) .
tive.
Whitehead calls the order of eternal objects derivative from an This final entity is the divine element in the world, by which
actual world the "obj ective lure" for the concrescence arising from the barren inefficient disj unction of abstract potentialities ob­
that actual world. "The 'obj ective lure' is that discrimination tains primordially the efficient conjunction of ideal realiza­
among eternal objects introduced into the universe by the real tion . . . . By reason of the actuality of this primordial valua­
internal constitutions of the actual occasions forming the datum tion of pure potentials, each eternal obj ect has a definite,
of the concrescence under review" ( PR 2 8 1 ) . The obj ective lure effective relevance to each concrescent process. Apart from
�or a particular concrescence is "the gradation of eternal obj ects" such orderings, there would be a complete disjunction of
m rel evance to the data for that concrescence. It is a particular eternal objects unrealized in the temporal world (PR 64; see
_
ordermg of eternal obj ects. Eternal obj ects are "constituents" of 73, 392, 5 2 2 ) .
the objective lure when they are "germane to the data" ( PR i 3 1 ) . Unlike the orderings derivative from actual occasions, the together­
The obj ective lure includes eternal objects not physically realized ness of eternal objects derivative from God's primordial vision is
 A REALM OF ETERNAL OBJ ECTS? IS T H ERE O N E I D E A L O R D E R ?
absolute and complete. It i s absolute i n the sense that i t i s not rela­
tive only to some actual occasions but is effectively relevant to all
�
j ects derivative from these actual worlds wi l differ in "richness"
_
as well as in pattern : "The degree of order m the datum is meas­
actual occasions. It is complete in the sense that no eternal obj ects )
ured by the degree of richness of the objective lure" (PR 1 3 6 . The
are omitted. order of possibilities constituted by the actual world of one con­
Furthermore the orderings of eternal obj ects derivative from crescence will include more eternal objects, more subtly related
actual occasions depend on the order derivative from God. For to each other in many complex ways, than the order relevant to
the ordering of the feelings of an actual occasion, from which the another concrescence.
ordering of eternal obj ects is derivative, is itself a function of the In the creative advance of nature, new "possibilities" are opened
subj ective aim of the occasion, which is in turn dependent on God.
Thus the ordering of eternal objects derivative from God is not
up. A form of definiteness prehended timelessly by o has a<? � .
general relevance to actuality. It exists as a pure poss � b1hty. At
only absolute and complete but primordial. .
some time and place, that is for some actual occas10n, It may be­
Though the temporal orderings of eternal obj ects depend in­ come a real possibility. The added relevance of eternal obj ects for
directly on God, they nevertheless add something to the order of a concrescence resulting from the decisions of past occasions makes
eternal objects derivative from God. "There will be additional the difference between pure possibility and real possibility. The
ground of relevance for select eternal objects by reason of their emergence of new actualities makes some pure possibilities "really"
ingression into derivate actual entities belonging to the actual possible. Thus actual occasions, as they lay dow� conditions for
(
world of the concrescent occasion in question" PR 46) . These _
their successors, add their orderings of eternal objects to the time­
temporal orderings do not alter or negate the timeless togetherness less ordering of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God.
of eternal obj ects in the primordial nature of God. Whitehead This brings us to the heart of our problem.
speaks of "the inevitable ordering of things, conceptually realized
in the nature of God" and says, "This function of God is analogous
to the remorseless working of things in Greek and in Buddhist 4. Is there one ideal order of possibilities?
(
thought" PR 373). If God's valuation of eternal objects is time­ If the ordering of eternal objects is relative to individual actual
less, it cannot be affected by what occurs in time. But clearly these occasions, so that the order of eternal objects relevant to M is dif­
temporal orderings must make some difference. ferent from that relevant to N, where M and N are any two actual
The way they make a difference is by adding to the relevance of occasions, then how can we speak of an order of eternal objects?
certain possibilities for succeeding occasions. Thus the eternal We would seem to have, rather, as many orderings of eternal ob­
obj ect "blue" would have some relevance for any actual occasion,
by virtue of its inclusion in God's primordial vision. But it would
?
j ects as there are actual occasions. This, indeed, is the c�se. " ' r­
der' is a mere generic term : there can only be some defimte specific
have added relevance for an actual occasion in whose actual world 'order,' not merely 'order' in the vague . . . . There is not j ust one
blue things were important. The general relevance of all eternal ideal 'order' which all actual entities should attain and fail to at­
obj ects to a concrescence depends on the primordial nature of tain. In each case there is an ideal peculiar to each particular actual
God. A special relevance of some eternal objects is added by the entity, and arising from the dominant components in its phase of
character of the actual world. In this way the pattern of relevance (
'givenness' " PR 1 2 8; see 64) . There is not j ust one ideal ord�r of
of eternal obj ects changes with the creative advance of nature, al­
though the timeless ordering of eternal obj ects in God's primordial
�
possibilities which all actual entities approxi�ate. oes this re­
··
quire us to rethink the significance of the pn �ord1 �l nat �re °.f
vision does not change. God? It calls into question, it seems, the sense m which this pn­
Since the actual worlds of different concrescences differ in the mordial envisagement transforms the multiplicity of eternal ob­
degree of order they have achieved, the orderings of eternal ob- jects into a realm .
 A REALM O F ETERNAL O B J E CTS? IS THERE O N E IDEAL ORDER?
Whitehead tells u s that "eternal obj ects, as in God's primordial All the ideal opposites are envisaged i n the primordial nature
nature, constitute the Platonic world of ideas." But in what sense of God. He includes in his primordial vision all possibilities. He
is this a "world" ? Immediately after this sentence he adds, "There envisages the entire multiplicity of eternal obj ects. His conceptual
is not, however, one entity which is merely the class of all eternal experience is "infinite, devoid of all negative prehensions" PR (
obj ects. For if we conceive any class of eternal objects, there are 524) . He does not choose between incompatible ideals but enter­
additional eternal obj ects which presuppose that class but do not tains them all. His primordial nature is the urge to the realization
(
belong to it" PR 73). And this suggests that, even as envisaged in of all possibilities. "It has within it no components which are
the primordial nature of God, there is not one final and necessary (
standards of comparison" PR 75).
order of eternal obj ects. For if there were such an order, then this If, i n the primordial nature o f God, there were some eternal ob­
would itself be a complex eternal object, and then there would be ject which included all others and thus defined an ideal order of
an eternal obj ect which included all other eternal objects. Just possibilities, then this eternal obj ect would have been created by
this, it seems, Whitehead is denying. Some passages from A dven­ God. For among eternal obj ects in themselves there is no such
tures of Ideas will help to make this clear: entity, as we have seen. Eternal obj ects in themselves are a mul­
tiplicity. Hence this peculiar eternal obj ect would have come into
There are perfections beyond perfections. All realization is
existence only by virtue of God's primordial vision. But this is
finite, and there is no perfection which is the infinitude of all
(
perfections Ar 330).
impossible. "He does not create eternal obj ects; for his nature re­
quires them in the same degree that they require him" PR 392 ; (
There is no totality which is the harmony of all perfections. see RM i 57) .
Whatever is realized in any one occasion of experience neces­ Thus there are no possibilities in the vision of God which are
sarily excludes the unbounded welter of contrary possibilities. not members of the multiplicity of eternal objects taken in them­
There are always 'others,' which might have been and are not selves. No eternal obj ect escapes the status of membership in the
(AI 356) . multiplicity. Hence there is no eternal obj ect which sums up or
dominates the possibilities envisioned in the primordial nature
This principle of intrinsic incompatibility has an important
. of God. With in this realm of eternal obj ects, we might say, there
bearmg upon our conception of the nature of God. The con­
cept of impossibility such that God himself cannot surmount is no sovereign.
Consequently even in the divine envisagement eternal obj ects
it, has been for centuries quite familiar to theologians. Indeed,
are not a realm in the stronger sense of the term. There is not
apart from it there would be difficulty in conceiving any
determinate divine nature. But curiously enough, so far as I one fixed and necessary order of eternal objects. There is not one

� � �f
kn w, thi notion f ncompatibility has never been applied and only one way in which all things m ust happen. There is not
even a pre-existing concept in the mind of God of how all things
to ideals m the D1vme realization. We must conceive the
Divine Eros as the active entertainment of all ideals, with the will happen. There is not even an ideal pattern of how all things
urge to their finite realization, each in its due season. Thus a may happen.3 There is not as it were a heavenly city, an ideal
cosmos conceptually realized in the mind of God, which the
process must be inherent in God's nature, whereby his infinity
(
is acquiring realization Ar 357). earthly city, the totality of temporal events, approximates. The
3 . Does it follow that, in the absence of any such ideal order, God cannot
�
Partic ula ly in the last of these passages he seems to be saying
that, be said to be disappointed by the particular order in which things do
not only m thems elves but also as object s of the divine envisa happen? Certainly Whitehead would say that God is not defeated by any
ge­
ment , eternal objec ts have no final and necessary order. particular order of happenings. To this point we return in Part Three.
 A REALM OF ETERNAL OBJECTS? IS THERE O N E IDEAL ORDER? 275
realm of eternal objects is not a model, which the actual world "the eternal order which is the final absolute wisdom" (PR 527 ),
might imitate or resemble. In short, "There is not just one ideal to "the unity of ideal inherent in the universe" (MT 39; see 1 42),
'order' which all actual entities should attain and fail to attain" and such passages as: "The basic elements in the World of Fa': t
( PR 1 2 8). are finite activities; the basic character of the World of Value is
But certainly there is some sense in which the primordial en­ its timeless coordination of the infinitude of possibility for realiza­
visagement of God orders eternal objects. Eternal objects as en­ tion" ( IMM 695-6; see 686-7, 692-3). Though the overtones of
visaged by God certainly have a status and function which in these passages suggest the concrete unity of God's nature, pri­
themselves they do not have. I suggest that the primordial nature mordial and consequent, their main point of reference is God's
of God orders eternal objects in the sense, and only in the sense, primordial appetition for the realization of all possibilities and i�
that in God's envisagement eternal objects are together. "In what consequence the togetherness of eternal objects. Because ? f this
sense can unrealized abstract form be relevant? . . . 'Relevance' togetherness "there is an order in the relevance of eternal objects �o
must express some real fact of togetherness among forms. The the process of creation" (PR 522; see 425). What needs to be kept m
ontological principle can be expressed as: All real togetherness is mind is that "order" in this sentence is a relative term. For any
togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality. . . . Such particular instance of becoming, all eternal objects are �rdered i�
a primordial superject of creativity achieves, in its unity of satis­ relevance to that concrescence, because all are together m the pri­
faction, the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal objects. mordial vision of God. Likewise when Whitehead speaks of "the
This is the ultimate, basic adjustment of the togetherness of eter­ graduated order of appetitions constituting the primordial nature
nal objects on which creative order depends" (PR 48). Because of God" (PR 3 1 5), this should not be understood as a single fixed
God values (i.e. has appetition for the realization of) each pos­ and necessary order of eternal objects.
sibility in the multiplicity of eternal objects, all eternal objects For any novel occasion, the whole multiplicity of eternal objects
become relevant to each other. Thus we have the "general scheme will be graded in relevance. They will be graded because the en­
of relatedness of eternal objects" described in chapter io of Sci­ vironment of the occasion has laid down basic conditions to which
ence and the Modern World. its concrescence must conform. These conditions pose real alterna­
This general scheme of relatedness is not, in one sense, ari order tives, and the necessity of decision and exclusion. Real possibility
of eternal objects. It is not a teleological arrangement of eternal thus limits pure possibility and determines conditions of relevance.
objects into a single hierarchy. It is rather a matrix for those or­ For that occasion the divine appetitions, by which unrealized pos­
derings effected by particular actual occasions in the course of sibilities become relevant for it, will have a certain graded order
nature. To say that there is a general scheme of relatedness among of relevance. For any other actual occasion, the divine appetitions
eternal objects is only to say that all relations are possible (sMw will have a different order of relevance. Any particular ordering
229-30). If some certain eternal object were actualized, then all of primordial appetitions in God is relative to a particular inst�n� e
other eternal objects would be relevant in some way or other. It of becoming. God in his primordial nature excludes no poss1b1l­
does not mean that if some certain eternal object were actualized, ities and for this very reason does not order possibilities, in the
then there is some particular way in which it would be necessary strong sense of "order." But he presents the entire multiplicity of
for all other eternal objects to be relevant. The primordial nature eternal objects together, so that for any particular instance of be­
of God is not an organizing principle in the sense of instituting an coming all pure possibilities will be ordered. In the pr�mordial
ideal order among possibilities. It is rather "the reservoir of po­ nature of God, taken in abstraction from acts of becommg, and
tentiality" (MT i 28). hence in abstraction also from his consequent nature, eternal ob­
In this light we should understand Whitehead's references to jects have togetherness but not gradations of importance.
 A REALM O F ETERNAL OBJ ECTS? ETERNAL OB JECTS AND CREATIVITY 2 77

Therefore i t i s truer t o say that God envisages possibilities of b. As envisaged in the primordial nature of God, eternal obj ects
order than that God envisages an order of possibilities. For his are still not a realm in the strong sense of the word. Even as data
aim is not at some one order of things but at maximum intensity for God's conceptual prehensions, eternal objects are not related
of feeling. " 'Order' and 'novelty' are but the instruments of his in any single fixed order. In the primordial vision they are a realm
subjective aim which is the intensification of 'formal immediacy' "
only in the sense that they have a general togetherness ; their in­
( PR 1 35) · Whitehead's God, like Leibniz', envisages all possible dividual essences are only externally related. In the divine vision
worlds. Unlike the God of Leibniz' system, Whitehead's God does there is no dominant or all-inclusive eternal object to which God
not choose any of the possible worlds. Rather, he values them all, subordinates all others. It follows that there is no one fixed order
even though they are not compossible. Thus God's primordial of possibilities in relation to which the ordering of all actualities
vision does not determine what world there shall be. God is not could be determined.
antecedent to nature, or before all creation. He is with all creation c. Relative to any particular instance of becoming there is an
(PR 5 2 1 ) . The function of his primordial nature is to hold the ordering of eternal objects into degrees and modes of relevance.
possible worlds together by his appetition for them all, so that all In the past actual world of the new concrescence certain pos­
are relevant, in one way or another, to any particular actual world sibilities have been realized. Others have not. This matter of fact
which occurs in the course of nature. determines an order of real possibility for the new concrescence,
From the lack of a final and necessary order of eternal objects in within the domain of possibility in general. The actual world has
the primordial nature of God it follows that there is no final given an added relevance to certain eternal objects, which would
order of nature. otherwise have only the general relevance derivative from the pri­
mordial nature of God. To this order of real possibility the new
The immanence of God gives reason for the belief that pure concrescence must conform. In turn, by its integration of feeling in
chaos is intrinsically impossible. At the other end of the its satisfaction, it bequeaths to the future its own ordering of pos­
scale, the immensity of the world negatives the belief that sibility.
any state of order can be so established that beyond it there We shall see in Part Three how God, in his consequent nature,
can be no progress. This belief in a final order, popular in prehends and coordinates into his own satisfaction the orderings
religious and philosophical thought, seems to be due to the of possibility achieved by actual occasions. But these orderings of
prevalent fallacy that all types of seriality necessarily involve eternal obj ects are relative and temporal-not necessary and eter­
terminal instances. It follows that Tennyson's phrase, ' . . . nal. It is still the case that there is no one fixed order of eternal
that far-off divine event To which the whole creation moves,' obj ects. It is still true that in this sense eternal obj ects are not a
presents a fallacious conception of the universe ( PR 1 69; see realm.
1 39• AI 3 75) .
Beyond any state of things there are unrealized possibilities with
5. Eternal objects and creativity
a claim on realization. No set of actualities can so exhaust the
realm of possibility that nothing new could become. Creativity Now we are in position to ask another question about the co­
transcends any (though not all) of its instances. herence of Whitehead's system. Toward the end of Chapter 1 1 we
A recapitulation of the interpretation of eternal obj ects this considered how the theory of eternal objects is required by the
chapter has explained and supported is now in order: theory of actual occasions. Now we can ask how the theory of an
a. In themselves, eternal objects have no fixed order. They do infinite and unordered multiplicity of eternal obj ects on the one
not constitute a realm in the strong sense of the term. They are a t.iand, and the principle of creativity on the other, require each
multiplicity. other.
 A R E A L M O F E T E R N A L O B J E CT S ? E T E R N A L O B J E CT S A N D C R E A T I V I T Y

First we ask how the theory of an infinite and unordered mul­ ing ways : (a) The necessary order o f possibility i s eternally and
tiplicity of eternal objects logically requires the principle of exhaustively actualized in an order constituted by one or many
creativity. Since according to the ontological principle actual en­ actualities, so that there are no unactualized possibilities and no
tities are the only reasons, we must rephrase our question. How actualities ever come into being; or (b) some actualities come into
does the primordial appetition for the actualization of all eternal being, but they do so in accord with the eternally fixed order of
objects require creativity? A further refinement is necessary. For possibilities which eternally determines what actualities shall be­
creativity is not an entity. Creativity is the unending production of come.
finite and novel actual entities. So the question becomes : How The first of these theories, like the systems of Spinoza and Mc­
does this primordial appetition require an infinite multiplicity of Taggart, construes actuality as necessary existence. The realm of
finite and novel actual entities? possibility, one might say, is exhausted. The second, like the meta­
If there is to be actualization of an infinite and unordered realm physics of Leibniz, admits a certain kind of contingency of exist­
of possibilities, as envisaged in the primordial nature of God, ence. The realm of possibility is ordered, prior to any actualiza­
then : tion, but not exhausted. But it is a very mild kind of contingency
a. There must be an infinite multiplicity of actualities. This indeed.
can be shown as follows. Any finite actuality orders possibility in In either of these cases the principle of creativity is rej ected.
its own constitution. And any finite set of actualities, taken to­ For creativity means the unending production of novel actualities
gether as a nexus, constitutes a more complex ordering of the by a process of self-creation. Against (a) the principle of creativity
realm of possibility. But no order of possibilities exhausts the requires a theory of unactualized possibilities, so as to give mean­
realm of eternal obj ects, for it is an unordered realm. Hence, for ing to novelty. Against both (a) and (b) the principle of creativity
the actualization of eternal objects an infinite multiplicity of requires a looseness of relationship within possibility, the absence
actualities is required. Also : of a single fixed order of possibilities, so as to give meaning to the
b. There must be unending production of novel actualities. radical contingency involved in self-creation.
For this infinite multiplicity of actualities cannot exist at once. In It appears then that the theory of a single fixed order of pos­
that case the realm of possibilities would be exhausted and no sibilities makes the principle of creativity logically impossible. For
unactualized possibilities would remain. But this would be con­ it leads to a theory of actuality which excludes novelty or self­
trary to the theory of eternal objects as an inexhaustible domain creation or both. From this it then follows that the principle of
of possibility. creativity requires that possibilities be inexhaustible and un­
In this way Whitehead's theory of eternal objects requires crea­ ordered. This is to say that the principle of creativity requires the
tivity. The entertainment in the primordial nature of God of all theory of eternal obj ects.
possibilities with appetition for their realization requires a theory Therefore it seems that the theory of eternal obj ects and the
of actuality which has room for the unending creative activity of principle of creativity require each other and that in this respect
novel becomings. '\Vhitehead's system is coherent. It would follow that, to the extent
Second we ask how, conversely, the principle of creativity re­ that the theory of actual occasions (as examined in Part One) re­
quires the theory of eternal obj ects. Unending production of novel quires and is required by the principle of creativity, that theory is
actualities by radical self-causation is logically possible only if the coherent with the theory of eternal obj ects.
realm of eternal objects is inexhaustible and intrinsically unor­
dered. Suppose on the contrary a single fixed order of possibilities.
Then actuality would have to be construed in one of the follow-
PART THREE

God and the World

 C H A P TE R 15

God and the Cate gories

1 . Introduction
I N W H I T E H E A n ' s writings before 1 92 5 I find only two remarks
which might contain anticipations of his theory of God and the
world. The first comes in the conclusion of his presidential address
to the Mathematical Association in 1 9 1 6. The essence of education,
he says, is that it be religious. This means it should inculcate duty
and reverence. And, he continues, "the foundation of reverence is
this perception, that the present holds within itself the complete
sum of existence, backwards and forwards, that whole amplitude
of time, which is eternity" (oT 2 8 ; see 6) . This might suggest that
even at this stage his relational theory of space and time had for
him an overtone of religious significance.
The second remark occurs at a point in The Concept of Nature
where he is discussing the relation of mind to space and time. In
the context he is directly concerned only with finite minds. But to
make his point about finite awareness he introduces the idea of an
"imaginary being, " "whose awareness, conceived as his private
possession, suffers no transition, although the terminus of his
awareness is our own transient nature." Such a being might con­
template "all nature as an immediate fact" (cN 67, 69; see PA 2 2 1 ,
ESP 1 35) · He makes it clear that he is introducing a purely hypo­
thetical idea merely for the sake of throwing light on our finite
awareness of nature. This imaginary being has no function in his
early philosophy of nature.
Whitehead's first explicit proposal of a doctrine of God comes
in Science and the Modern World, in the chapter so titled. In
Religion in the Making he relates his conception to some historical
alternatives in religious thought. In the first four parts of Process
and Reality his discussion of God is concerned primarily though
2 83
 I NTRODUCTION
G O D A N D T H E CAT E G O R I E S
marks are i n order o n the relation o f religious intuitions t o White­
not exclusively with the primordial nature o f God (PR 47, 5 2 3),
head's systematic categories.
and for the mo� t part is incidental to the development of his theory
a. His system has no doubt been shaped in some degree by his
of actual occas10ns. In Part V the conception of God is discussed
_ own religious background and experience. But an adequate treat­
briefly though more directly. The Function of Reason has little to
ment of this genetic question would require a more intimate and
contribute to Whitehead's doctrine of God. Though A dven tures
extensive knowledge of his personal history than his writings af­
o z Ide �s and Modes of Though t contain no extended systematic
ford us.
d1s � us� 10ns of the subj ect, there are important passages in both.
b. He accepts religious intuitions as part of the evidence to be
Tlus is also true of the lecture on "Immortality" and the Dia­
considered in constructing a metaphysical system (RM 5 8-67, PR
logues.
2 3 ) . They are by no means the whole evidence. Aesthetic, scien­
As this brief survey might suggest, Whitehead's theory of God
_ tific, and practical experiences have to be interpreted also. Indeed
and the world is stated much less fully and systematically than his
religious and moral intuitions are "somewhat exceptional ele­
theory of actual occasions, and somewhat less so than his theory of
ments in our conscious experience" (PR 52 i ) .
eternal obj ects. The incompleteness of the theory and the location
c . Metaphysics cannot b e content with those imaginative repre­
�f the principal lacunae will appear as we proceed. Its main out­ sentations which directly reflect religious intuitions. These ideas
l � nes are reasonably clear, but at several points we have to con­
play an essential part in religious life. "But if we attend to the
sider what formulations Whitehead's general principles suggest.
_ general principles which regulate all endeavours after clear state­
In this respect Part Three is more interpretative than Parts One
ment of truth, we must be prepared to amplify, recast, generalize,
�
and Two, wh ch were not altogether free from this necessity. Even
_ and adapt, so as to absorb into one system all sources of experi­
so, my object is to make clear what Whitehead's principles require,
ence" (RM i 4g). Speculative philosophy must construct a scheme
not to construct an alternative theory.
of ideas which transcends ordinary formulations of experience in
�
Wh tehead's language poses another problem of interpretation.
logical rigor, coherence, and generality. It must absorb into the
Sometimes when we hope for rigorous statements of his theory of
system whatever truths about experience religious intuitions may
God and the world we find, as we have found elsewhere in his
apprehend. Most of Part Three will be occupied with Whitehead's
writings, metaphors and cryptic sayings. This reliance on con­
doctrine of God and the world as a feature of his metaphysical
cret � and evocat ive language is not a lapse from philosophy. As
_ scheme.
Whitehead sees it, speculative philosophy must (a) evoke the con­
_ d. It is then possible to apply this system of general concepts to
crete experiences with which it begins, (b) construct a logical and
the problems of religious thought. For example, in Part V of
� oherent categoreal scheme, and (c) use the abstract categories to Process and Reality he says, "Apart from reference to existing reli­
mter�r� t th � concr: te experiences. Part of the philosopher's re­
- is to bndge the gap between his own systematic terms gions as they are, or as they ought to be, we must investigate dis­
spons1b1hty
passionately what the metaphysical principles, here developed,
and tho se more familiar terms in which concrete experiences are
_ _ require on these points [i.e. the points at which the historic reli­
ordmanly expressed. Also he ought to relate his terms to tradi­
gious conceptions conflict with one another] , as to the nature of
tional philoso ?hical language. On this view of philosophy we can­
God" (PR 5 2 1 ) .
not expe� t a sim � le u se of language. The problem is to know just
_ I t remains to indicate the topics o f the succeeding chapters in
how Whitehead Is usmg language in a given passage. This sort of
Part Three. In the present chapter I examine the relation of
problem is somewhat more acute when we come to his doctrine
Whitehead's conception of God to the basic categories of his sys­
of G � d bec� use his systematic formulation is less complete.
tem. Chapter i 6 asks how God affects the actual occasions which
W Ith this conception of philosophy in mind, four brief re-
 GOD AND THE CATEGORIES G O D A S AN A C T U A L E N T ITY
make up the world. Chapter 1 7 asks the opposite question, how the ciples of the system. In effect, if not in the intenti o? of those
world affects God. Chapter 1 8 sums up Whitehead's theory of philoso phers, their categories fail to apply to God. Whiteh ead, ?n
God and the world, employing for this purpose the categories of the contrary, propose s to treat the concep t of God as the chief
transcendence and immanence. Finally Chapter 1 9 presents his exempl ification of the categor ies of his system. We must ask
critique of traditional theology and comments on its significance. whethe r he has carried out this intenti on success fully.
One way of putting the questio n is to ask. whet� er Go� "exists"
2. God as an actual entity in a categoreally different sense from that m which fimte actual­
ities exist. Whiteh ead holds, contrary to Descart es, that "God's
The first though not the only philosophical question about existen ce is not generically differen t from that of other actual
Whitehead's conception of God is whether it is consistent and entities , except that he is 'primor dial' in a sense to . be gradually
coherent with the first principles of his system. He invites this explained" (PR 1 1 6). God and actual occasions are alike actual en-
question when he charges Descartes and Leibniz with introducing tities. Actual entities
the concept of God in arbitrary ways. For example, referring to
Descartes's conception of bodily substances, he says, "Descartes differ among themsel ves : God is an actual entity, and so is
tells us that they are sustained by God, but fails to give any reason the most trivial puff of existenc e in far-off empty _spac � . . But,
why God should care to do so" (FR 24) . Again, he criticizes the though there are gradations of importance, _and d1vers�ues of
artificial way in which Descartes made God a requirement of his functio n, yet in the princip les which actuality exempl ifies all
theory of knowledge (PR 78, 2 1 9). Similarly, Leibniz mitigated the are on the same level (PR 2 8) .
mutual isolation of the monads by introducing the concept of
The presumption that there i s only ? ne genus of act� al en­
God: "But no reason can be given why the supreme monad, God,
tities constitutes an ideal of cosmological theory to which the
philosophy of organism endeavours to conform : The descr� p­
is exempted for [fromJ the common fate of isolation. Monads, ac­
cording to this doctrine, are windowless for each other. Why have
tion of the generic character of an actual entity should m­
they windows toward God, and Why has God windows toward
clude God, as well as the lowliest actual occasion, though
them?" (AI i 1 1 ) . Of this use of the concept of God Whitehead
there is a specific difference between the nature of God and
says, "It is a device very repugnant to a consistent rationality. The
that of any occasion (PR i 6 8 ; see i 35) .
very possibility of knowledge should not be an accident of God's
goodness; it should depend on the interwoven natures of things. We may ask therefore whether in effect as � e� l as in White? ead's
After all, God's knowledge has equally to be explained" (PR 2 8 9; intention all that is said about actual entities generally m the
see SMW 2 1 7, PR 78). His objection is not to making God necessary categoreal scheme does apply to God as well as to actual oc� asions.
for knowledge. I t is rather that Descartes and Leibniz have not Whitehead certainly applies to God many of the categories that
shown how the nature of God is interwoven with the natures of apply to actual occasions. God is a unity of conceptual and ph�s­
other beings. ical experience (PR 54) . He is concrescence (PR 47, 54, i 34) , satis­
At the beginning of his discussion of God in the final part of faction (PR 48, i 35) , and superj ect (PR i 35, 5 3 2 ; MT � 2 8 � . He has
Process and Reality he says, "In the first place, God is not to be subjective aim (RM 100 ; PR i 34-5, 5 2 2, 524) and sub1ec: 1ve fo�ms
treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to of feeling (PR 50, i 34, 5 2 2) . He exists formally, as an im� ediate
save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification" (PR 52 i ; see actuality, and he exists obj ectively for other actual entities - �PR
SMW i 3o, AI 2 1 6) . Here he points to the root of the errors he has 47, 377-8) . In all these ways God appears to be an exemplification
been indicating and resolves to avoid them. The root of these er­ of the categories defining actual entities.
rors consists in making God an exception to the fundamental prin- It is equally certain that there are important differences be-
 G O D A N D T H E CAT E G O R I E S CONCEPTUAL VALUATlON
tween God and actual occasions. The fundamental difference is tity follows not from the categoreal scheme but from the nature
(
that God is primordial PR 1 1 6) . Every other actual entity origi­ of the world.
nates at some time and emerges into being from some definite Now we are ready to examine Whitehead's cl� im. As we survey
past actual world. God originates at no time. In the concrescence the categoreal scheme two major problems anse about the ap­
of other actual entities, physical experience is genetically prior to plication of the categories to God. They c? ncern conceptual valua­
conceptual experience. Actual occasions originate from the phys­ tion and the satisfaction of an actual enuty.
ical pole of their experience (but see PR 343) . In the concrescence
of God conceptual experience is genetically prior to physical ex­
perience. Thus God "originates" from the mental pole of his 3. Conc eptua l valua tion
(
experience PR 54) . God's prehensions of the multiplicity of eter­ Cate goreal oblig ation iv, the category of co �ceptu : �
al alu tion,
1s the denv at10� of
nal objects are not conditioned by his prehensions of actual en­ is as follows : "From each physi cal feelin g there
terna objec t
l
tities. This envisagement of pure possibilities is nontemporal and a pure ly conc eptua l feeling whos e datum is the �
y, or of th_e
thus primordial. "The given course of history presupposes his deter mina nt of the defin itene ss of the actua l enut
seems that this
primordial nature, but his primordial nature does not presup­ nexu s, physi cally felt" (PR 3 9-40 ; see 379- 80) . I t
pose it" ( PR 70; see 1 1 , 1 34). category does not apply to God in the same way as . �o actua l oc­
ongmate from
From this fundamental difference between God and actual oc­ casion s. For God' s conce ptual prehe nsion s do not
ordia l and timel ess. Ther e­
casions it follows that (a) his conceptual experience is unlimited, his physi cal exper ience . They are prim
ies in the fact that
as we saw in Chapters 1 3 and 1 4, since it is not restricted by the fore, "God diffe rs from other actua l entit _
ncep tual feelm gs,
exclusions of actuality. (b) It follows also that God is everlasting. Hum e's princ iple, of the deriv ate character of c �
t not God have
He does not perish, as all other actual entities do. For primordial does not hold for him" (PR 1 34; see 378) . But migh
(
means "not before all creation, but w ith all creation" PR 5 2 1 ) . both unde rived and deriv ed conc eptua l feelin gs, while actua l oc­
In this way the
In his "consequent" nature he prehends every other actual entity casio ns have only derived conce ptual feelings?
. I do n � t be­
throughout the course of nature. category of conce ptual valua tion might still_ appl�
t10n. But 1t de­
The difference between God and actual occasions does not lieve this is a fair reading of Whit ehead 's mten
ng his theory clear er.
amount to a categoreal difference, however, and this explains why serves some atten tion for the sake of maki
that fro �
there is no explicit reference to God in the categoreal scheme. Appl ied to God, categoreal obligation iv woul d mean .
God is not specifically mentioned in any of the categories of exist­ each of God' s phys ical feelings some pure ly conc �
eptua l eelm g is
l occas 10n, new
ence, the categories of explanation, or the categoreal obligations. derived. N ow since God prehends every actua
ce. It wo � ld
Instead, the conception of God is systematically introduced in the physi cal preh ensio ns conti nually enter his concr escen
these �hys1c al
following chapter titled "Some Derivative Notions," along with follow that new conce ptual feelings, derived from
the conceptions of personal and social order and the extensive feelin gs, arise in his experience . But how is this poss � �
ble, if Go 's
_ ord1al
e? In his pnm
continuum. The reason for omitting mention of God from the primordial conce ptual exper ience is comp let.
N o n �w ete�nal
categoreal scheme is that the scheme gives a rigorous statement of natur e there are prehensions of all etern al objec ts. _
is it possi ble
the generic traits of actual entities. And in Whitehead's intention objec ts can arise in the cours e of natur e. Then how
God is an actual entity, not a being outside the range of the for God to have new conce ptual prehe nsion s?
actua l oc­
categoreal scheme. Categoreally speaking, the conception of God The diffic ulty may be put as follows. Supp ose some
. Then from
like the conception of the extensive continuum is a "derivative casion A in whic h an eternal objec t R is ingre dient
conce ptual pre-
notion." The existence of a primordial and everlasting actual en- his preh ensio n of A, God woul d derive a pure
 2 90 G O D A N D T H E CAT E G O R I E S CON CEPTUAL VALUATION
hension o f R. B u t God has a primordial prehension o f R. S o God called 'universal' i s particular i n the sense of being just what it
would have at least two pure conceptual prehensions of R. is, diverse from everything else" (PR 76 ; see SMW 2 2 2). But we
This result conflicts with a principle of economy that is im­ might also hold, against Whitehead, that novel pure potentials
plicit in the conception of organic unity. This Whiteheadian come into being in the course of nature. These novel potentials
version of Occam's Razor lies just below the surface of the cat­ would be apprehended by God when and only when novel actual
egoreal scheme and becomes explicit at several points. I t is most situations occur. The domain of pure possibility, for God, would
explicit in categoreal obligation ii, the category of objective be a growing domain. Thus his conceptual experience would be
identity: "There can be no duplication of any element in the ob­ always incomplete.
j ective datum of the 'satisfaction' of an actual entity, so far as The contrast with Whitehead's view would be as follows. He
concerns the function of that element in the 'satisfaction' " (PR holds that in the advance of nature some pure possibilities become
3 9; see also categories of explanation vi and xxvi) . This principle effectively relevant which were only barely relevant before. Pure
of economy would seem to apply also to the case we are consider­ possibilities become real possibilities. But pure possibilities do not
ing. For it is not clear how the function of the derived feeling of come into being. They are eternal obj ects. On the alternative
R would differ from the function of the underived feeling of R in view pure possibilities come into being which were not in being
the divine experience. They would seem to have only a sham before.
diversity (PR 348) . b. Another version of the theory that God's conceptual experi­
Certainly God must have conceptual valuations, and there must ence is incomplete is suggested by Charles Hartshorne. On this
be a conceptual valuation relevant to the ingredience of R in A. view there are no specific pure possibilities. There are only dimen­
To this extent the category of conceptual valuation applies to God sions of potentiality. Possibility is not a multiplicity but a con­
as well as to actual occasions. But this is provided for without any tinuum. Actualization is the specification of what is unspecific, the
derivation of conceptual feelings from physical feelings. When determination of what is indeterminate. On this version God's
God prehends A, his aim at unity produces a propositional feel­ conceptual experience is always incomplete in the sense that its
ing to integrate his prehension of A and his primordial prehension data are always incompletely specified, though always becoming
of R. The proposition felt has A as its logical subj ect and R as its more specific in the course of nature.
predicative pattern (PR 393). Later genetic phases in the divine It is true that on Whitehead's view the process of actualization
concrescence integrate this propositional feeling with others into includes a kind of specification, as we shall see in the next chapter.
the divine satisfaction. But in this process there seems no need for But in any particular process of actualization what becomes more
a derived conceptual feeling of R. Since God timelessly envisages specific is not a pure possibility but a real possibility or, more
all pure possibilities he does not need to derive any purely con­ exactly, a proposition. Eternal objects are timelessly specific. An
ceptual feelings from his physical experience. eternal object is "just what it is, diverse from everything else"
To bring out the features of Whitehead's theory more distinctly (PR 76) . Thus the data of God's pure conceptual experience do not
let us consider some alternative views. Suppose that God's con­ become more specific and therefore his conceptual experience is
ceptual experience, as well as his physical experience, were always not in this sense incomplete.
incomplete. On this theory God's pure conceptual experience On either of these versions of the theory that God's conceptual
could be affected by his physical experience. Two versions of this experience is essentially incomplete, God's physical experience
theory might be distinguished. would affect his pure conceptual experience. On the first version
a. We might hold with Whitehead (and Santayana) that there his physical experiences produce new data for his pure conceptual
are specific, or "particular," pure potentials. "Thus every so- feelings. On the second version his physical experiences specify
 G O D A N D T H E CATE G O R I E S C O N C E P T U A L V A L U A T I ON 2 93

what was unspecific i n the data (or perhaps w e should say the If categoreal obligat ions iv and vi do not apply fully to God,
datum) of his pure conceptual experience . But neither of these how are we to reconc ile this fact with the claim that God is the
views would be consistent with Whitehead's theory of eternal (
"chief exemp lificati on" of "metaphysical princip les" PR 52 1 )
?
obj ects and his conception of God. One might say that these categories are not meant to be state­
The completeness of God's primordial nature seems to prevent ments of metaphysical princip les in a strict sense of "metaphys­
the category of conceptual valuation from applying to God in the ical." The inclusi on of the category of concep tual reversion in the
�
wa it � pplies to actual occasions. For the same reason categoreal scheme would count in favor of this sugges tion. On this view God
obhgat10n v, the category of conceptual reversion, is inapplicable does not need to exemplify all the categories in order to exemp lify
� ?
to od. T is states : "There is secondary origination of conceptual metaphysical princip les . Indeed someti mes it seems that White
from some "metap hys­
­
f � elmgs with data which are partially identical with, and partially head does not obj ect to exemp ting God
diverse from, the eternal obj ects forming the data in the first '.
ical princip les" (in a weaker sense of "metaphysical ' ) but �nly to
phas e: of the mental pole. The diversity is a relevant diversity de­ exempting him "from all the metaphysical catego nes which ap­
(
termmed by the subjective aim" PR 40) . This explains how an plied to the individ ual things in this temporal world" (AI 2 1 6,
�ct � al occasion can prehend eternal objects that are not ingredient my italics) .
m its actual world. Clearly it is not designed to apply to God. Anothe r suggest ion is to apply the category of concep tual valua-
Later, when he has introduced hybrid physical feelings of God, it tion to God by constru ing "deriva tion" ambigu ously. \;\Te might
� �
turn � ut that even s applied to actual occasions it was only a say that in actual occasio ns the concres cence produces a pure con­
prov1s10nal explanat10n. "Thus, a more fundamental account ceptua l feeling by abstrac tion from the physical datum , and that
� rnst as: ribe the reverted conceptual feeling in a temporal sub- in God the concre scence connec ts a (primo rdial) concep tual feel­
3 ect to its conceptual feeling derived, according to Category IV, ing with the physica l datum. In all cases the concres cence then
�
from the hybri physic � ! feeling of the relevancies conceptually
.
procee ds by produc ing propos itional feelings to integrate con­
�
or ered rn God s expenence . In this way . . . a more complete ceptua l and physical feeling s. With this interpr etation of deriva­
rat10nal explanation is attained. The category of reversion is then tion, the category of transm utation might also be applied to God
a bolished" _ ( PR 3 8 2 ) . If this category is not even a necessary condi­ as an accoun t of how he prehends all the patterns of order in the
_
t10n of fimte concrescences, its inapplicability to God raises no actual world, but without the suppression of individ ual par­
problem. ticular ities that attends transm utation in actual occasio ns. But
A more important consequence concerns categoreal obligation this constru ction of derivation is certain ly not suggest ed by the
.
� ?
v1, he cate ory of transmutation, which presupposes �ategoreal
.
category as stated.
obhgat10n iv ( PR 40) . This is designed to explain how finite A better suggest ion is that categoreal obligat ion iv might be
mentalities simplify physical experience. "The irrelevant multi­ restated . It might say there is concep tual valuati on of every phys­
plicity of detail is eliminated, and emphasis is laid on the ele­ ical feeling . Then it might be a consequ ence or "derivative no­
ments of systematic order in the actual world" (PR 3 8 8 ; see 38 2-9, tion" PR 46 title) that actual occasio ns derive purely concep tual
(
AI 2 7 3-8) . God does prehend all patterns of order in the actual feelings from physica l feelings . This would leave the way open for
world. But we shall see in Chapter 1 7 how he does not need to saying that, as a consequ ence of his comple te primordial valua­
eliminate from his data in order to prehend the actual world into tion, God does not derive purely conceptual feelings from phys-
a unity of experience . So here too, as in the case of the category ical feelings .
of conceptual valuation, God is exempt from some of the condi­ It is plain that the pure conceptu al feelings of actual occasion s
tions that limit finite experiences, and for the same reason . have to be "explai ned" in a sense in which God's pure concept ual
2 94 G O D A N D T H E CATE G O R I E S S A T IS F A C T I O N 2 95

feelings d o not. God's conceptual feelings have n o "origin" i n the phase? It is easy to see that these questions are closely related, but
sense that those of actual occasions do. This difference between they must be dealt with one at a time.
"the primordial actual entity" and "the temporal actual entities" a. The unity of God's satisfaction. The satisfactio� of an actu�l
( PR 1 02) is repeatedly emphasized in Whitehead's discussions of entity is the realization of its subjective aim at umty of exp �n­
actual entities. The categoreal scheme ought to allow for this dif­ ence. The feeling of satisfaction unifies the many feelings. which
ference more carefully than it does. The line between those state­ have arisen in the concrescence. It is an integral feeling. How
ments that properly apply to all actual entities without exception, can God have such a unified feeling when novel physical pre­
and those statements that apply only to actual occasions or only to hensions are continually being added to his experience?
God, needs to be drawn more clearly and firmly. But this could To this, as to some other problems about the significance of
be done without altering the basic structure of the system. God in his system, Whitehead has not given much explicit att n­ �
tion. An answer might be constructed in somewhat the following
4. Satisfaction way: .
.
i. Suppose as God's satisfaction a single continuous feeln�g. It
The second major problem about the application of the cat­
has no temporal origination, nor does it ever cease. It continues
egories to God concerns the feeling of satisfaction. The problem
throughout the course of nature.
about God's conceptual valuations arose because of the complete­ .
ii. The data of this feeling, "at any time," are (a) the entire
ness of his primordial experience. This problem arises because of
multiplicity of eternal objects and (b) all those actual occasions
the incompleteness of his consequent experience. which, at that time, have come into being.
Category of explanation xxv is as follows : "The final phase in iii. The subjective form of this feeling is derived uniformly,
the process of concrescence, constituting an actual entity, is one though not exclusively, from God's timeless and unchangeable
complex, fully determinate feeling. This final phase is termed the
subjective aim.
'satisfaction.' It is fully determinate (a) as to its genesis, (b) as to . .
The divine satisfaction would then be a continuous feeling
its objective character for the transcendent creativity, and (c) as to with a constant subjective form and changing data, though not all
its prehension-positive or negative-of every item in its uni­ the data change. It would be one complex integral feeling. We
verse" ( PR 38) . Does this category properly apply to God as well
could say that God is always satisfied, meaning "at any time," or
as to actual occasions? Whitehead certainly means to say God "relative to any finite standpoint.'' His physical prehensions would
has a satisfaction (PR 48, 1 34, 1 35) . But at least three questions · contribute their subjective forms as well as their data to his satis­
naturally arise.
faction (PR 39) . But since these subjective forms are unified by
One question is about (a) the unity of God's satisfaction. The God's unconditioned subj ective aim (PR 49-50, 5 2 3), there would
satisfaction is a unified feeling. God's satisfaction would be a
be no disharmonies to mar the unity of the divine satisfaction.
unification of his primordial nature and his consequent nature.
But since God is always in concrescence, how can his experience b. The determinateness of God's satisfaction. In the feeling of
have such a unity? Another question is about (b) the determ inate­ satisfaction all indetermination has "evaporated" (PR 7 1 ) . The
n ess of God's satisfaction. How can God's satisfaction be "fully relation of the subj ect to every other entity is entirely determinate.
determinate" as to its data, since his physical experience is of a But how is this possible in the case of God? If the data of his phys­
changing world? A third question is about (c) the finality of God's ical prehensions are always changing, how can his satisfaction be
satisfaction. The satisfaction is the "final phase" in the process of fully determinate?
concrescence. But if God is everlasting, how can he have a final The satisfaction of an actual occasion can be determinate be-
2 96 GOD A N D T H E CAT E G O R I E S SATISFACTION 2 97

cause the actual occasion i s i n the strict sense unchanging. I t ing new actualizations. But it remains true that, whether for God
.
perishes but does not change. During its internal process it is or for an actual occasion, only those entities can be physically
.
_ expenence
closed against further additions to its data, so that its � �
prehended which, relative to a fini �e sta? dp int, are t en actual.
may become unified and determinate. It is for this reason that We may say then that God's satisfact10n 1s always mcomplet �
contemporary actual occasions must be causally independent. At in two senses. It is incomplete in that it always includes appetl­
the end of this definite duration it must perish. This is the essence tions for unrealized possibilities. And it is incomplete in that
new data are ever being prehended into it, with the creative ad­
of the epochal theory of time.
. vance of nature. In this way we might say that God is always in­
In the case of God this condition for determinateness of expen­
ence does not hold. Actual occasions perish but do not change. completely actualized. Nevertheless his prehensions of actual cca­�
God changes but does not perish. Thus we confront a challenging sions, as well as his prehensions of eternal objects, are at all times
question. Unlike that provoked by traditional theology, which fully determinate. In this sense his satisfaction is always complet . �
forces us to ask : How can an utterly unchanging being have any This interpretation reconciles internal process m Go with �
real knowledge of the changing world?, the question Whitehead's determinateness of satisfaction by assuming a systematic rela­
view provokes is : How can a constantly changing being have a tionship between God's experience and the changing world . And
.
fully determinate experience of the changing world? this implies that there is a reflection within his own expenence
The answer to this question begins to appear when we consider
. of the epochal character of actual occasions. It means, to ap ro­ �
the categoreal explanation of determinateness of satisfaction. The priate from another context some words of James which Wh te­
.
_
�
feeling of satisfaction is fully determinate as to its prehension of head quotes with approval, that God's expenence of the changmg
every item "in its universe" (PR 38). Now if we understood by world "grows literally by buds or drops of perception" (PR 1 05).
"universe" a static totality of actual things, and if we asked how a
changing being could have a determinate experience of the uni­
c. The finality of God's satisfaction. How can we say that G d's�
satisfaction is the "final phase" of his concrescence? God aims
verse so understood, we should indeed have an insoluble puzzle on
our hands. But this interpretation of "universe" is precisely what not at some finite obj ective but at the realization of all possi­
Whitehead's principle of process excludes (PR 3 2 7) . It denies the bilities whatever. So it would seem that, since there will always be
existence of a fully actual totality. The existence of unactualized unrealized possibilities, God must be always unsatisfied. How can
possibilities and the becoming of novel actualities is a categoreal there be any final phase in his experience?
necessity. "Universe" like "actual world" has meaning relative to This question must be answered in two stages. First let us
finite standpoints in the creative advance of nature (PR 42, 354) . recur to the distinction between the two kinds of process (PR
The universe now, for any meaning of "now," is not what it was 320, 326-7), for they suggest two different senses of "finality."
and not what it will be. The process of concrescence goes on within the immediacy o he ��
actual entity. It is internal process. In the process of trans1t10n
We can then say that God's prehension of every item in the uni­
the influence of the actual entity passes beyond itself and affects
verse, relative to any finite standpoint, is fully determinate. Rela­
other actual entities. The actual entity becomes objectively im­
tive to any standpoint, he prehends possibilities as possibilities
mortal in another.
and actualities as actualities. It is true that God apprehends an
Consider first the process of transition. In the case of actual
indeterminate, because unactualized, future. But so do actual
occasions, transition requires perishing. The satisfaction must
occasions, and in both cases there is prehension of determinate
be final in the sense that the occasion has no immediate experi­
possibilities for that future. It is further true that God, unlike
ence after its own satisfaction. Becoming objectively immortal
actual occasions, is everlasting so that he is continually prehend-
 G O D A N D T H E CATE G O R I E S SATISFACTIO N 2 99

means ceasing t o have subj ective immediacy. The satisfaction Another sense of finality becomes prominent as we turn from
must be the end or terminus of the internal process of the occa­ the process of transition to the process of concrescence. This is
sion. Considering the process of transition, then, we may say that a: process of growth. Many prehensions, physical and conceptual,

the satisfaction of an actual occasion is temporally final. With are shaped by the immanent teleology of the subjective aim into
the satisfaction the occasion comes to an end in time. a unity of experience. This process begins with an initial phase
Now it is clear that God's satisfaction cannot be final in this of conformation to the given world. It continues, through inter­
sense. In his case, and in his case alone, obj ectification does not mediate phases of conceptual elaboration\ including comparative
require perishing. Is God in this respect an exception to White­ feelings, until all these feelings are brought together in the feel­
head's categories as stated in the categoreal scheme? Does the cate­ ing of satisfaction.
goreal scheme require that all actual entities perish? When we consider the satisfaction from within the concrescence,
The only explicit assertion about perishing in the categoreal its primary significance is teleological. It is the goal and the
scheme occurs in a subordinate sentence in category of explana­ achievement of subj ective aim. In the case of actual occasions
tion xxii, which is : "That an actual entity by functioning in re­ the satisfaction is also a terminus. This is because the subj ective
spect to itself plays diverse roles in self-formation without losing aim is at intensity in both the immediate subj ect and the relevant
its self-identity. It is self-creative; and in its process of creation future (PR 4 1 ), and because the perishing of an actual occasion
transforms its diversity of roles into one coherent role. Thus is a condition of the becoming of future occasions. Therefore the
'becoming' is the transformation of incoherence into coherence, satisfaction is the temporal end or finis of the occasion. Its ter­
and in each particular instance ceases with this attainment" (PR minal character is entailed by the finiteness of actual occasions.
3 8 ; see 5 1 7) . Two alternative interpretations, each consistent with But from the standpoint of the internal process the satisfaction
Whitehead's doctrine of God, are possible : (i) The phrase "in is primarily the internal end or telos of the concrescence.
each particular instance" might be taken as restricting the final Now we can explain how God's satisfaction is the "final phase"
clause of the last sentence to actual occasions. Thus "becoming" of his concrescence. In an actual occasion the satisfaction is both
applies to God and to actual occasions; "cessation" applies only the telos and the finis of the concrescence. It is the goal achieved
to "particular instances, " that is to actual occasions. (ii) The con­ by the concrescence and it is also the temporal end of the con­
sequent nature of God is made up of many particular instances crescence. In God on the contrary the satisfaction is telos but not
of becoming, since every actual occasion makes a particular con­ finis. God aims at and achieves satisfaction but he does not perish.
tribution to God's unending satisfaction. The reaction of God Only in this way can God's concrescence have a final phase.
to an actual occasion is thus a particular instance of God's con­ We now have to ask, as a second stage in dealing with our ques­
tinual becoming. Each of these internal processes (particular in­ tion, how God can achieve a telos. The problem is not how appeti­
stances) of becoming begins with God's prehension of an actual tion for unrealized possibilities can be a component in a satis­
occasion and ceases with the absorption of this datum into his faction. Such appetition is not distinctive of God. An actual occa­
satisfaction. sion also includes such appetition, as anticipatory feeling, in its
Either interpretation is consistent with Whitehead's doctrine satisfaction. Every actual entity, whether God or an actual occa­
that God does not perish as actual occasions do. Unlike the satis­ sion, must synthesize given facts and unrealized possibilities.
factions of actual occasions, God's satisfaction cannot be tem­ The problem is rather how, in relation to the multiplicity of
porally final, for God does not come to an end in time. It can actual situations in nature, God has a satisfaction. It is possible
be final only in some other sense. to think of God as having specific satisfactions corresponding to
300 GOD AND THE CATEGORIES CONCLUSION 30 1
these actual situations. B u t then God would have a s many satis­ ful. Further support for this conclusion and further discussion
factions as there are actual occasions. We return thus to our of its implications will be forthcoming in later chapters.
earlier question about the unity of God's satisfaction. It is not enough to see whether all that is said of actual entities
In the course of nature the data of God's physical prehensions in the categoreal scheme can be reasonably interpreted as apply­
vary. Later we shall see how the subjective forms of these pre­ ing to God as well as to actual occasions. As we trace Whitehead's
hensions also vary, in conformity with their data. Now these sub­ elaboration of the categoreal scheme and reflect on the outcome
j ective forms are conditioned not only by their data but also by in his theory of God and the world, two important questions about
God's subj ective aim which arises from his primordial appetition the coherence of his system need to be raised.
and therefore is always the same throughout the course of nature The first is whether his conception of God is a decorative but
( PR 5 2 3) . Thus while the data of his physical prehensions vary dispensable addition to his cosmology. Is it a burden of which
discontinuously, as novel epochal acts of experience come into the system might well be relieved without essential damage to its
being, the subj ective forms of these feelings vary continuously. structure? Do Whitehead's principles require his conception of
Moreover, relative to any finite standpoint his physical prehen­ God? More specifically, do any of the functions of actual occa­
sions are synthesized with his primordial conceptual prehensions sions supplant or supersede or render superfluous, instead of
into his satisfaction. Thus God's experience has a constant aim supplementing, any of the essential functions of God?
and structure which gives it unity and continuity through time. The second of these questions is whether Whitehead's system
For this reason the satisfaction into which God absorbs his pre­ leads to an absorption of the world in God. By being the chief
hensions of the multiplicity of actual occasions is not itself a exemplification of the categories, does God's e.x istence reduce the
multiplicity but a unity of feeling. I t is one continuous satis­ existence of actual occasions to virtual unimportance and ineffec­
faction. It is not a timeless feeling, as pure abstract forms are tiveness? Does Whitehead's system in effect amount to a doctrine
"timeless." It is not timelessly one, determinate, and final. It is of realities and Reality, even if not a doctrine of Appearance and
a living experience. But it is always one, determinate, and final. Reality? More specifically, do any of the specific functions of God
It is indeed unchangeab ly one, determinate, and final. The chang­ supplant or supersede, instead of supplementing, any of the essen­
ing course of nature, though it affects God's experience in ways tial functions of actual occasions?
we shall examine in Chapter 1 7, cannot change the categoreal The next step toward finding some answers to these questions
structure of God's satisfaction. is to see in what ways, on Whitehead's principles, God affects the
world.
5. Conclusion
A careful inspection of the categoreal scheme fails to reveal
other problems about its application to Whitehead's conception
of God. In the first category of existence and in the first category
of explanation "actual entity" and "actual occasion" are used as
though they were interchangeable, contrary to later rules of usage.
But this is only an inelegance in use of terms. I conclude tqat
Whitehead's attempt to state a set of first principles which apply
both to God and to actual occasions has been reasonably success-
 G O D A N D S U B J E C T IV E A I M 303
the physical data to be felt in patterns and converting oppositions
CHAPTER 16
into contrasts. Furthermore the subjective forms of these concep­
tual feelings are congruent with one another, in accord with cate­
goreal obligation vii: " The Category of Su bjective Ha�mony. The
valuations of conceptual feelings are mutually determmed by the
How God Affects the World adaptation of those feelings to. be contrasted elements congruent
with the subjective aim" (PR 40- I ) .
Thus there is a "pre-established harmony" among the data and
I N T H I S C HA P T E R I propose to discuss three questions about the
subjective forms of the feelings in an incompl� te phase ?f th�
influence of God in the formation of actual occasions. These genetic process (PR 4 I , 338, 342, 353, 389) . But ' pre-established
questions concern the influence of God on: (A) the subjective aim is misleading. The harmony is not established before the co�­
of an actual occasion; (B) the data of its physical feelings; and (C) crescence begins. It is due to the activity of the concrescence It­
the relation between contemporary actual occasions. self. For this reason Whitehead's adoption of this phrase from
A. G o D A N D S U B J E C T I V E A 1 M Leibniz, for whom it meant an eternally established harmony of
external relations, is unfortunate.
1 . The function of subjective aim The explanation of this harmony is that throughout the con­
Before we look at the influe nce of God on the subjective aim crescence the subject is at work, interpreting its data so as to
of an actual occasion we ought to recall the function of the sub­ achieve final satisfaction. Now obviously this subject at work in
jective aim in the formation of an occasi on. We may say that the the incomplete phases is itself incompl�te. The s.ubj ��.t is co�:
subjective aim is the imma nent ground of final causat ion. "In pleted only in its satisfaction. How then IS the sU�JeCt I�herent
its self-creation the actua l entity is guide d by its ideal of itself in "the process of its production" (PR 342) ? f)Vhitehead s ans_wer
as indiv idual satisfaction and as transcendent creator. The enjoy is that fro_m _the very beginning of the concrescence �her� IS a
ment of this ideal is the ' subjective aim,' by reason of which the­ feeling with a unique and crucial function. This feelmg is the
actual entity is a determinate process" (PR I 3o) . ' subjective aim.·' .�· .
To explain how a subjective aim functions, let us begin with This aim at subjective intensity provokes, so :o speak, th � o�Ig­
the first categoreal obligation : " Th e Category of Su bjective Unity ination of conceptual feelings (PR 4 1 ), it determmes the sub� ect �ve
The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the. forms of conceptual feelings, and it conditi.ons the. subjective
process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the forms of conformal physical feelings. Thus it functions . as t� e
incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for integration by ontological ground or "reason" for the harmony of f�elmgs .m
reason of the unity of their subject" (PR 3 9) . In any incomplete incomplete phases of the concrescenc.e (�R 36�7, � 7 3) · S mee �� 1ty
phase the concrescence has not yet attained the unity of is a condition of intensity, the subJeCtive aim Is an appet1tion
factio n. Yet in such a phase, for example the initial one, the satis­ for unity of satisfaction. It thus gives a dynamic, teleol�gical unity
ings are comp atible for integration . Those initial data that feel­are
to the whole process which constitutes an actual occasion. .
not comp atible are eliminated by negative prehensions. Here we should pause to reflect on the impo:ta�ce o � th �s no­
Further, the data that are positively prehended are felt in such tion in the theory of actual occasions. The subjective a11:i 1s the
a way that they can become components of the satisfaction . Con­ ground of the internal unity of an occasion. Further, the mternal
ceptu al feelings of eternal objects and propositions arise, enabl unity of an occasion is essential to its being a complete �nd . con­
ing crete thing, that is to say a real individual. Internal umty is es-
302
 H O W G O D A F F E CTS THE W O RLD GOD AND S U B J E CTIVE AIM

sential also to the novelty and exclusiveness of an occasion and in the process of this concrescence? On Whitehead's principles this
h �nce to . its social transcendence. Thus Whitehead's pluralism, is a reasonable question. Although the creativity of a concrescence
his doctrm � that t� ere are many individual and socially tran­ can have no reason other than itself, the specific fact that this
scendent thmgs, logically depends on the notion of the subjective ideal not that is aimed at is a condition for which a reason may
aim of an actual occasion. be asked.
Let us consider "the initial phase of the 'subjective aim' " (PR
2 . The derivation of subjective qim 104), also called "the basic conceptual aim" (PR 343), the "initial
subjective aim" (PR 1 64, 375), and the "initial aim" (PR 374). This
Now e are ready to ask whether the subjective aim of an occa­ is a conceptual feeling of some eternal object with a subjective
. is_ �
s10n itself subject to explanation . Would it be reasonable to form of appetition. What Whitehead says of propositional feel­
ask how an actual occasion comes to have a subjective aim? Here ings in another context may be applied to this eternal object:
we must recur to the ontological principle, which is stated in "this particular possibility has been picked out, held up, and
category of explanation xviii: "That every condition to which clothed with emotion" (PR 428). It is the origin of this particular
�he process f bec?ming conforms in any particular instance, has datum that is not self-explanatory. Speaking of the initial aim
its reason ei�ther m the character of some actual entity in the Whitehead says, "But the origination of the novel conceptual
actual world of that concrescence, or in the character of the subject prehension has, more especially, to be accounted for" (PR 48).
wh �ch is in pro: ess of concrescence. . . . It follows that any con­ Accounting for the origination of the initial aim means find­
_
d1t10n t? be satisfied by one actual entity in its process expresses ing some actual entity which has suggested, so to speak, the novel
a fact either about the 'real internal constit utions' of some other possibility. Whitehead denies that ideas float into actuality from
actual entities, or about the 'subjective aim' ' conditioning that a realm of pure being. On the contrary, in the ontological prin­
pro�ess : · (PR 36 7). We ask, Can this principle be applied to the ciple he is "extending and rigidly applying Hume's principle,
subjective aim . �itself? The that ideas of reflection are derived from actual facts" (PR 64).
subjective aim is a ground. Is it also
grounded? Whitehead's answer is that: "This subjective aim is Thus the datum of the initial aim must be "somewhere." "Every­
bo �h an exampl e and a limitation of the ontological princip le. thing must be somewhere; and here ' somewhere' means 'some
It is an example, m _ that the princip le is here applied to the im­ actual entity' " (PR 73). So our question becomes, From what
mediac _ y of concrescent fact. The subject comple tes itself during actual entity is this novel possibility derived?
the process of concrescence by a self-cri ticism of its own incom­ Clearly this datum cannot be derived from any contemporary
plete phases. In another sense the subjective aim limits the on­ or future actual occasion. Nor can it be derived from any ante­
t� log!cal principle by its own autonomy" (PR 373). The subjective cedent occasion. The new concrescence must conform to its past
� 1� is an examp le of the ontological princip le in the sense that actual world. But it must do so in its own way. It must determine
It is the reason for the internal unity of the concrescence, as we its perspective on the past and it must respond with its own sub­
have seen. But it is a l�� iting case of the ontological princip le. jective forms of feelings. Now �t is, _pt£Q§�!Y.Jl!LS..l!l?j�!=�!y� _ aJm
For the s�lf-creative . c Iv1ty of !he CQQ.J�.t.e§!;;.mc.e th, a t so"d�t�r:gJiQe�-it:Lu.bj_ecJificatiom of the
�� of t!!�I)._£res�.9-,�� !Lfil.!.£�ession
o f.the ultima te creat1v ity of. th£.._unjy�rse, fgr, w.hlc;Q. no explana­ p_i!§.t and co 11f�.:rL.!!QI�ItY.�Q!Li�s _§ypje c#xe Jqrws 9£ Jeeling (AI
.
tion can be g:iyen . .In the former sense we can answer the � 327-8). Hence it would seem that the datum of its initial aim
q estion,
Why are there actual occasions? In the latter sense we cannot. cannot itself be derived from the past. The problem of the con­
. ButWhat
aims.
suppo�e we ask a more restricted question about subjective crescence is to produce a novel actuality.
IS the "reaso n" why this subjective aim is operative It seems that to explain the origination of the initial aim there
 HOW GOD AFFE CTS THE W O R LD GOD AND S U B J E CT IVE AI M
must be an actual entity which is not an actual occasion. In fact itself as the first phase of the individual subjective aim in the
Whitehead answers our question in the only way his principles new process of actuality" (AI 256; see PR 522, AI 270). This is what
permit. He says : Whitehead means by the divine "persuasion. "

g�
Though we have found how the datum o f the initial aim is
. . . the initial stage of its aim is an endowment which the
derived, we have not yet found out how it is determined. ;E:!<?,� is ( ' '\-l (")
subj ect inherit s from the inevita ble ordering of things, con­
Y
.·

cept ually realize d in the nature of God. The immed iacy of i_t; Jl;iat the concrescence derives this possibility al!<l nm.,.taa t trmn (_ . · ···..

"
the concre scent subj ect is constit uted by its living aim at its its prehension of God? Construing the datum of the initial aim
own self-constitution. Thus the initial stage of the aim is as an objective datum abstracted from an initial datum, namely
rooted in the nature of God, and its comple tion depend s on God's conceptual experience as a whole, what determines the
the self-ca usation of the subjec t-superj ect (PR 373). particular abstraction that occurs?
Certainly the primordial nature of God cannot be a sufficient
In this sense God is the princip le of concre tion; namely, he reason for a finite aim at this possibility and not that. I.� _his
is that actual entity from which each temporal concre scence primordial nature (!od does n o�lat...acru.al
receive s that initial aim from which its self-cau sation starts oc�ns, andJ1e does not exclude any pQ�ibilities fl:oJILbi.Lliro_e ­
(PR 374; see 1 04, 1 64, 434, 527) . kss enyisagement. Nor is the past actual world sufficient reason
for th. e aim at th is possibility. Th9u,gJLth�_!l:ft!!�L�9!1Q_n�rrn :ws
The derivation of the initial aim from God takes place in the the.. range of real 12o�il>ility, iLd�pl�Js;ly._ �pedfy,..what.
following way. In its initial phase the concrescence includes a s)J.all come out of the situation it �1,�S .
"hybrid physical prehension" of God, which means that God is So we are tempted to think of the occasion as selecting or pick­
objectified for the concrescence by one of his conceptual feelings ing out the datum of its initial aim from among the possibilities
(PR 376-7). That is, the objective datum of this hybrid prehension envisaged by God. The determination would be made by the
is God's prehension of some eternal obj ect. Now "A hybrid phys­ novel concrescence itself. But this cannot be the case. We shall
ical prehension originates for its subj ect a conceptual feeling with see how the concrescence does have self-determination in certain
the same datum as that of the conceptual feeling of the antecedent rJi
ways, but this cannot be one of those ways. Fo �y selection from
subj ect" (PR 377). This derivation of a pure conceptual feeling among God's feelings by decision of the concrescence itself would
from the hybrid physical feeling is in accord with the category presuppose its initial aim] The datum of the initial aim is its
of conceptual valuation ( PR 39-40). The derived conceptual feel­ principle of selection. Therefore it would not make sense, on
ing is the initial aim of the new concrescence. It sets the pattern Whitehead's principles, to say that the concrescence has any real
for the unification of the concrescence. alternatives to the possibility which becomes the datum of its
Now the occasion's hybrid physical feeling of God, like all initial aim. At this point there seems to be no room for freedom
physical feelings, is a conformal feeling. Its subjective form con­ on the part of the concrescence. We have to look further for a
forms to and "reproduces" God's own subj ective form of feeling. sufficient reason why this possibility becomes the datum of the
So the initial aim derived from this conformal hybrid prehension initial aim.
"reproduces" not only the datum but also the valuation of God's So far we have left something out of ac.coilll t , namely th�£QJ1-
conceptual feeling (PR 343, 377). In this way God not only makes sequent nature of God The:; concrete existence of God �rn;;lu des __

a novel possibility theoretically available but also evokes appeti­ n_ot only his conceptual prehensions of eternal objects bn.Lalso
tion for that possibility in the new concrescence. This evocation his physical prehensions of actual occasions. In the case of any
by God of the novel appetition is "the supreme Eros incarnating novel concrescence God has prehended the actual occasions which
 H O W G O D AFFE CTS THE WORLD GOD AND S U B J E CTIVE AIM
compose its past actual world. Now God's aim is at maximum of God in reaction to that temporal situation. In this way there
i �tensity of experience fq_i: himself and for the w�rld. So .th� re­ is a ki.nd of contingency in the determination of the datum of the
acJion of the world _U,12Q!L�Q.sl r_tS_l!JJs in �n Q!:Q�tigg. ot p�;s i­ initial aim, though the new concrescence itself does not contribute
bjlities in the d!yin_� ex_R�rie:g�§ in relevance to the novel con· to that determination.
crescence. And it s�-�m�lb.i!tJgr a:rn� giv�u.��t�of col!ditiorts ' ther.e A further question about the derivation of the datum of the
will be a �Uicu�ai:.,p-2§.§ihl!i ty wlii<:;l:dLu;t11;;iJi�d.WoJJLd produce initial aim is, In what sense is this datum novel? On this ques­
m.aximym. mtensitx_pf sati�f.'!:.£t:i.Qn. If the past had been other than tion the relevant texts are not very explicit. It seems clear enough
it was, then some other initial aim would have been "supplied" that the datum must ht! novel in some sense. Whitehead speaks
(PR I 64) by God. As things are, tlti§ is..t.hs; possibility witb ..which of "conceptual novelties" (PR 245) and seems to refer to the data
the s �� ective aim of the concrescence must begm. Only this of certain conceptual prehensions and not merely to novel pre­
. hensions. These are "new forms" (PR 387, 427), or rather "old"
f'.ossibihty can be the datum of the initial aim. This interpreta­
tion seems called for by the following passages: (eternal?) forms in new functions (PR 2 84) . So we may ask of the
The initial stage of its aim is an endowment which the sub­ function of an eternal object as datum of an initial aim, In what
ject inherits from the inevitable ordering of things, con­ sense is this a new function? Must this datum be an eternal object
ceptually realized in the nature of God. . . . This function that has not been realized in the past actual world?
of God is_analogous to the remors<;;k11� work ing �£ct;'i;;�� -� Passages like the following have to be taken into account: "Thus
Greek and in Buddhist tholJ.g_h,t. The initial aim is the \est a single occasion is alive when the subjective aim which deter­
for that impasse. But if the best be bad, then the ruthless­ mines its process of concrescence has introduced a novelty of def­
ness of God can be personifie d as Ate, the goddess of mis­ initeness not to be found in the inherited data of its primary
chief. The chaff is burnt (PR 373) . phase. The novelty is introduced conceptually and disturbs the
inherited ' responsive' adjustment of subjective forms. It alters the
. . . G0d and the actual world join tly constitute th�. char­ 'values,' in the artist's sense of that term" (PR 1 59 ; see 245, 2 80,
acter of the creativity for the initial phase of the nov�l con- . 2 84) . Now it might be argued that this passage implies some occa­
crescence . The subject, thus constitute d, is the autonomous sions are not "alive" in this particular sense. This interpretation
mas �er ?f its own concrescence into subject-superject (PR 374, might find support from another context where he seems to say
my Italics; see 1 04, I 64, 434) . that ideas introduced into an occasion by "novel conceptual pre­
It is important to notice that the datum of the initial aim is hensions" may he "old or new" (AI 249) . I do not think this in­
not predetermined, either from eternity or from a previous time. terpretation is warranted. In the context of the passage quoted
There is no one fixed order of eternal objects. Therefore no Whitehead is describing various types of "societies" in the order
eternal object is eternally destined to be the datum of the initial of nature. In particular he is distinguishing between living and
aim of this novel concrescence. Nor is the course of nature a neces­ nonliving societies (PR 1 54-64) . His general point is that life con­
sary order of things. As we have seen, the datµm_oi..tlli:.juitial sists in originality, and that in some societies the originality of
�im ?f a :uew: <;onc,;r�nce is._ C.Q.D!ii1iQ.U.ed.J2u t_t1_0 L�Uffa;:_iently de­ their component actual occasions is macroscopically negligible.
termmed by the past ac,;tlli!Lw:orld. Therefore_ we might well say In this passage he is explaining how an occasion has originality.
that the completi. on of the determination of this datum is effected So I do not think he means to say that some occasions are not
� t the con�r �scence of the novel occasion , though not by it. It alive. If this is a fair reading of the passage, then the subjective
IS effected JOmtly by the creative self-determinations of immedi­ aim of every occasion introduces an eternal object "not to be
ately past actual occasions and by the creative self-determination found in the inherited data of its primary phase."
3 10 H OW G O D AFFECTS THE WORLD T H E F R E E D O M O F AN A C T U A L O C CAS I O N

There are four ways i n which the eternal object might have afctual occasions 12gically requir es pis doctri:g�_gt_Q9d . Thc:;.Sl!J:>:
,
been realized in the past actual world: (a) as the datum of the j ective aim of an occasion , og �l!-E-�tYz.j_t_§ i!t<!iY!c:l,t!<l.lity
__

and · its social transce ndence all_�e nd, re.q.uires .. aILexpla na tion.
initial aim of some past actual occasion; (b) as the datum of a
supplementary conceptual feeling; (c) as a form of definiteness A�d the only explanation availab le on White head's princi ples
of the datum of a physical feeling; ( d) as a form of definiteness . is one requir ing his. doctrine Qf.,_G9_d. His doctrin e of God is in
of a subj ective form of feeling. Might the datum of the initial this way requir ed by the theory of actual occasio ns, and is not
aim of the new concrescence have functioned in one or more of a merely decorative additio n to that theory.
these ways in the past actual world?
It would certainly seem that the first of these functions is ex­ 3. The freedo m of an actual occasion
cluded by Whitehead's theory of actual occasions. It seems that
the eternal obj ect which is the datum of an initial aim must not Now we must ask some questions about other logical conse­
have functioned as the datum of an initial aim in the past. The quence s of this derivation of subj ective aim from God. Do its
novelty of the datum in this sense of novelty seems necessary for implica tions underm ine Whiteh ead's plurali sm? Does this func­
the novelty of an actual occasion. At least it is difficult to see how tion of God suppla nt or superse de the self-creative activity of the
the subj ective aim of an occasion can be novel unless the datum finite actual entity? Is there still room for freedom in the forma­
of its initial aim is novel in th is sense. And the novelty of an actual tion of the actual occasion ?
occasion as a concrete existent depends on the novelty of its sub­ Certainly God "qualifi es" (PR 344) an actual occasion in a radical
j ective aim, as we have seen. way. In an important passage Whiteh ead speaks of actual occa­
I t is not altogether clear whether Whitehead's theory of actual sions as "derivative" actuali ties (PR 46) in contrast with God, who
occasions excludes (b), (c), and (d) as well as (a) . If his principles is the only "non-derivative actuality" ( PR 48) . He even goes so far
do require that the eternal obj ect must not have functioned in as to say, referring to the derivation of subj ective aim, "In this
the past world in any of these ways, then the datum of the initial sense, God can be termed the creator of each temporal actual
aim would have to be novel in a radical sense. It could have func­ entity." It is true that he immed iately adds "But the phrase is apt
tioned in the experiences of past occasions only as a datum of to be mislead ing by its suggest ion that the ultimat e creativ ity of
negative conceptual prehensions. Considering the complexity and the universe is to be ascribe d to God's volitio n" (PR 343-4; see
multiplicity of past occasions, and hence the vast number of real­ 5 1 9, AI 303). But considering how the internal unity of an occa­
ized eternal objects that would no longer qualify as data of initial sion is depend ent on God, we ought to re-exam ine his emphat ic
aims, an inexhaustible infinity of potential data would have to denials that God has "emine nt reality" (PR 1 1 , 1 1 6) .
be available. But this is precisely the case, since the multiplicity The need for this re-exam ination i s enforce d by his remark
of eternal objects is inexhaustibly infinite. So the demand for about the last part of Process and Reality : "In this part, the ap­
radical novelty in the data of initial aims would be consistent proxima tion to Bradley is evident . Indeed, if this cosmology be
with Whitehead's theory of eternal objects. And since God en­ deemed successf ul, it becomes natural at this point to ask whether
visages the entire multiplicity of eternal obj ects, the derivation the type of thought involve d be not a transformation of some main
of radically novel initial aims would be consistent with White­ doctrin es of Absolut e Idealism onto a realistic basis" (PR viii) .
head's theory of God. The source of supply would be more than It is not clear just what "main doctrine s" of absolute idealism
adequate to the demand. Whiteh ead had in mind. Also he is not always the best j udge of
An important general conclusion about Whitehead's philosophy the relation of his philosophy to other systems. But we certainly
follows from the foregoing discussion. I t is that �ls theor1 . 2f want to know how the relation of God to actual occasion s is like
312 H O W G O D AFFECTS THE W ORLD THE FREEDO M OF AN ACTUAL O C C A S I O N
the relation of the Absolute to "finite centres" of experience. It of a feeling is novel, since the occasion is novel (PR 354) . The
becomes natural to ask whether the doctrine of God compromises degree of originality in the subjective forms of feelings will vary
the real individuality of actual occasions, and in particular whether ( PR 374-5). But in no case is there bare conformity. In every case
the derivation of subjective aim from God has this effect. there is some originality. The subjective form of a feeling re­
The" p.rinc:;mk QLc:;g<!.th:ity JJ1eans th�t 110 ;:i,c:;JriJ!!!Lc:; tity is com­ flects the creative self-causation of the concrescence.
pl�teh:-"!!e�Imi11£9:�!>�,QJ;J1�_i!SJ1E:1Le!Hitie.� . . Other actual entities This general principle applies to the conceptual feelings de­
condition but do not completely determine what shall bec:;ome rived from hybrid feelings, and by clear implication to the initial
in a new concrescence. "The creativity is not an external agency aim derived from the hybrid physical feeling of God.
with its own ulterior purposes. All actual entities share with God A hybrid physical feeling originates for its subject a con­
this characteristic of self-causation. For this reason every actual ceptual feeling with the same datum as that of the conceptual
entity also shares with God the characteristic of transcending all feeling of the antecedent subject. But the two conceptual
other actua,l entities, including God" (PR 339). According to this feelings in the two subjects respectively may have different
principle/even God does not completely determine the con­ subjective forms.
crescence of an actual occasion, though he is "the aboriginal con­ There is an autonomy in the formation of the subjective
dition which qualifies its action" (PR 344)\We are asking whether forms of conceptual feelings, conditioned only by the unity
the derivation of subjective aim is consistent with this principle of the subject as expressed in categoreal conditions I, VII,
of creativity. Hence we need to know how the self-causation of an and VIII. These conditions for unity correlate the sympa­
actual occasion affects its subjective aim. thetic subjective form of the hybrid feeling with the auton­
I ��st t44t the novel concrescence acts with creative freedom.
..
omous subjective form of the derivative conceptual feeling
O! self-determination in three W.fl:)'.S_; .(a) i;;�the �;�����y �£ the with the same subject (PR 377).
subjective form of its initial aim; (b) in its specification of its
subjective aim; and (c) in its concrete actualization of its aim. In other words the _c:onc�Q!.uaL(lill!_}!! the n��� �C9E:�E�S-�nce (the
Than�s to ?od, t�e conc�escence includes a !l_ossibility which ' ' deri_yative con�uaL(�d!:ng'') 'Yi:!! gg!,.h,<;t:�:'.� !_h� lil:E1c�-g1]:)j�stive
form as God's conceJ2!.l.J!(l ��-eli!J-g. Th�ecific difference l?!:�'Yeen
.. ..

may give umty to Its experience of many data/l'he valuation of

this relevant possibility, the progressive clarification of the ideal the two subjective forqi.§_ wiJlJ2�-9:!!.e _tQ_ili�Jreegom2!J:h�-E1<:>yel
aim, and the realization of this aim in a concrete feeling of satis­ i;:;oncremce_. The subjective form of the initial aim is not a mere
faction-all this belongs not to God but to the self-creative activ­ reproduction of the subjective form of God's conceptual feeling.
ity of the novel occasion\ "Thus an originality in the temporal Though it is "partly dictated by the qualitative element in the
world is conditioned, though not determined, by an initial sub­ objective content" (AI 326, my italics), it is partly determined
jective aim supplied by the ground of all order and of all orig­ also by the actual occasion itself.
inality" (PR i 64) . T_hL9.nI�J2IQQ}em about this application of the principle of
autonomy of subjective form is: lIOJ'Y £i!Il"'thG..ec.t _suhj ive,_form of
a. A u tonomy of su bjective form. It seems clear enough, in the initial aim be conditiQns; ,b.�_Jh d, e rnbject whert I19 pi;ior unity
general, that Whitehead's categories require autonomy in the of �j�_tJ::.�ists?. Whitehead says that "self-determination is
subjective forms of feelings. The category of subjective harmony always imaginative in its origin" (PR 374). But the initial aim is
posits a "mutual sensitivity of feelings," so that the "subjective the origin of imagination. 1{9w can the subject affe!'._Lth�,. sub�
form of a feeling is affected by the totality of the actual occasion" jective form of that feeliu�.\Vhid;i�_iLtt§..el f ths:.__.b.asiii �QLth.e. -uniq1
( PR 292; see 40-1 , 359, 420). It follows that the subjective form of the subject?
 HO W GOD AFFECTS THE WORLD THE FREEDOM OF AN ACTUAL OCCASION
Tb_is difficulty arises from construing the initial aim Cl,S though
__ It starts with conditioned alternatives, and by successive deci­
it �ere genetically prio:r: �2..the other f_eelings in the..Jrrim:uy phase sions is reduced to coherence. The doctrine of responsibility
of the concrescence. This is not the case. It arises w ith the other is entirely concerned with this modification (PR 342).
th� m1t1al
�;y
feel�n�s . in �he prim phase of th�d concr;sc�Q��·:-·in --this phase
It [i.e. the temporal entity] derives from God its basic con­
aim both mfluences anqjs influenced by other _!�elings.
Its datum determines the abstractions of objective data from the ceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeter­
initial datum. On the other hand its own subjective form is in­ minations awaiting its own decisions (PR 343; see 373, 37 5 ,
fluenced by the other feelings, so that its datum is felt in a way 390, 4 1 6).
appropriate_ to that concrescence. Thus Here is another way in which the complete actual occasion is a
there is a mutual con­
ditioning of feelings. result of self-causation. I_t arises with a relevantj.Qeal. XL��lli�ir.i.s
Of course there is a more general problem about Whitehead's for the concrescence to decide wh:g, m_°"���a.!!y, th.i� _iQ�i:tl _

notion of genetic priority . _A geneti{.;al� e.arlier phase i�- n-llLtem­ means in the particular context of its 12h�ic�L�£�fj,f}lf.� ,)1gr:�­
porally prior to a later phase in the concresc�nce. CQnsjdered in no�. This is the "immanent deci§l2-1!'.'. _of th�--�-<?E..S:!��..<=_�ll_c e.
re�x�nce J&.J?hy�j-�?..l Jime we.. JY:QlJJsl..haYJ: .to.J>a}' . that tbQI!gh Jhe The initial aim is vague in the sense that the relations of its
concrescence "takes time" iJ.�e ':;;tLQ.nce." In putting for­ datum to other possibilities and to the physical data are not com­
ward a notion of priority different from logical priority and also pletely determinate. It includes indeterminations which the con­
_
differen t from priority in ph ysical time, Whitehead has to appeal crescence must determine. The concrescence aims at "that sort
to our immediate intuitio ns.{But the intelligibility of this notion of thing." As the process goes on the aim becomes more specific
of �en: tic priority is a larger problem ,� The autonomy of the so that it is finally "this thing and no other." tt is as though som_e­
subjective form of the initial aim is a feature of Whitehead's gen­ on� . started out to be a doctor, t1!._en had to decide what sort of __

eral theory of experiencing subjects . doctor he would be, a11d. ended up being just this sort of doctQr
b. Specification of subjective aim. The second way an actual and no other.
_ An interpretation of this process of "progressive definition"
occa�10n h �s free �om . vis-a:vis God is by what I shall call its speci­ should begin by distinguishing (i) the pure conceptual feeling
fication of Its subjective aim. The datum of the initial aim is de­ with which the subjective aim begins from (ii) the subjective aim
rived from God's primordial envisagement and becomes the ideal proper. The pure conceptual feelings is derived, in accord with
for _ the concrescent subject. As the concrescence proceeds its ideal the category of conceptual valuation, from the hybrid physical
�f i�sel � beco� es, in a certain sense, more specific. Some passages feeling of God. Its datum is an eternal object, a pure potential.
md1catmg this function of the concrescence are in order: In the first phase of the subjective aim, namely the initial aim,
Process is the growth and attainment of a final end. The this pure potential is felt as an ideal for that concrescence. So
progressive definition of the final end is the efficacious condi­ the datum of the subjective aim proper is a proposition, an im­
tio� fo� its attainment. The determinate unity of an actual pure potential felt as a real possibility for actualization. The idea
entity is bound together by the final causation towards an becomes an effectively relevant ideal. Since the subjective aim is
ideal progressively defined by its progressive relation to the thus a propositional feeling we should look at certain general
determinations and indeterminations of the datum (PR features of such feelings.
227-8). A propositional feeling results from integration of a physical
�his ?asic con: eptual feeling [i.e. the conceptual aim] suffers feeling with a conceptual feeling. The physical feeling is indica­
_ m the successive phases of the concrescence.
s1mphficat10n tive of the logical subject (or subjects) of the proposition felt.
 T H E F R E E D O M O F AN A C T U A L O C C A S I O N
HOW GOD AFFECTS THE WORLD
The d�t � m of th� conceptual feeling becomes the predicate of this is now part o f the new predicative pattern. In a still later phase
this new predicative pattern will have its own relations to other
�ropos1t10� and is called the "predicative pattern" of the proposi­ possibiliti es spelled out.
tional feelmg. If the predicative pattern is derived from the in­
�icative _feeling,_ th�n the resulting propositional feeling is a In this way the predicative pattern of the subjective aim be-
perc �pt1ve feelmg. If on the contrary the predicative pattern comes both more complex and more specific. This modification
(PR 343, 4 1 6) of the subjec tive aim may also be regard ed as
a
is. den��d from s �me other physical feeling, then the resulting
_ "simplificatio n" (PR 342) of the initial aim. It is an ordering of
�roposit � onal feelmg is an "imaginative feeling." In an imagina­ relevant possib ilities by way of subordinations, contrasts, and
uv� feelmg the relevant eternal object is predicated of an actual
entity from whic� it has not been derived (PR 39 1-405). eliminations of alternatives (MT 207-8) . But ppII is not a simpler
N_ ow we ca? mterpret the subjective aim as a propositional eternal object than ppI. On the contrary the predicative pattern
feelmg. In this case the indicative feeling is the self-feelino- (PR of the "subjective end" (PR 342) of a genetically later phase is
more complex than that of an earlier one. It represents a highe r
? 8, AI 248) of the immediate concrescence. Thus the logica i" sub­ mode of abstraction from possibi lity (sMw 233-4).
ject ?f the pro �osition felt is the concrescent subject itself. The
predicate of this proposition is initially the datum of the initial This process of specifi cation of the initial conceptual datum is
aim. And since this eternal object is not derived from the indica­ an activity of the concrescence itself. The concrescent subject
tive fee!ing, th e subjective aim is an imaginative feeling, not a works out (or we might say ela b orates) the meaning of its own
_ So the subjective aim is an imaginative prop­
perc�eptive fe �lmg. idea. It progressively decides (PR 423) what it would mean to real­
_s1t10nal feelmg. Its d tum is a proposition whose logical subject ize that ideal in its physical situation. The eternal object does
? � _
is the concresc_ent sub! ect Itself and whose predicate is, initially, not logically require the particular elaboration it receives or, in­
the eternal object derived from God as explained above. deed, any elaboration at all. ppI does not entail ppII, and ppII
Now the subjective aim undergoes development (PR 254, 287) does not entail ppIII . This is because eternal objects in them­
and has "phases" (PR 75), as does the concrescence as a whole. In selves are a multip licity, as we have seen, and have no single fixed
any phase the proposition felt functions as a "lure for feeling" pattern of relatedness. They have modes of togetherness only
(PR 427). Thus the subjective aim initiates and sustains the final when ingred ient in actual entitie s. The actual occasion works
causation immanent in the concrescence. "Each new phase in the out its own (relative and incomplete) ordering of the multi­
concresce?ce means the retreat of mere propositional unity before plicity of eternal object s. In doing so it is conditioned but not
th � growmg gr�sp of real unity of feeling. Each successive prop­ completely determined by the past actual world , to which it must
_ conform, and by God, who suppli es the datum of its initial aim.
?s1t10na_l p� as � , is a lure to the creation of feelings which promote In the determination of a subjective aim the spontaneity of self­
its realization (PR 343). Finally the concrescence achieves its
satisfaction, which completes the internal process. causation is involved (AI 328) .
. Let us a�k how the predicative pattern of the subjective aim c . A ctualization of su bjectiv e aim. An actual occasio n's valua­
m a ge�eucal�y _ l�ter phase (ppII) differs from the predicative
pattern m the m1t1al phase (ppI). In this way we can discover how tion and specification of its aim do not exhaust the meaning of
the subjective aim is progressively defined as the concrescence its freedom. It also actualizes its aim. Indeed we should look at
proceeds. The basic difference between these two eternal objects valuation and specification as features of a more inclus ive process
is th� t ppII includes ppI in a pattern of relatedness. In ppII some of actualization . The valuation of the initial aim in an appetition
relat10ns between ppI and other eternal objects are articulated for enjoyment of satisfaction, and specification of the aim is in­
and made determinate. How ppI is related to other possibilities strumental to attaining this enjoyment.
 HOW GOD AFFECTS THE WORLD THE GIVE N N E S S OF THE PAST
So far in this discussion of the freedom of an occasion we have o f God's primordial vision, nor o f both taken together. This fact
been concerned primarily with its conceptual experience. We is the consequence of a "self-creative" (PR 3 8) act in which the
should remember that actualization involves physical experience concrescence actualizes its aim.
also. The datum of an occasion's initial aim is relevant to its phys­
ical situation. It elaborates this aim under the stimulus and con­ At the beginning of this section we asked whether the deriva­
trol of its physical experience of other actual entities. And it tion of subj ective aim from God compromised the real individual­
realizes this aim by producing a concrete unity of physical and ity of actual occasions and thus subverted Whitehead's pluralism.
conceptual feelings. We have now seen that though an occasion depends on God in
Indeed if, as I suggest, ths; subjective aim is a propositional f§.�l� a crucial way it still has the freedom of self-causation. Over and
ing, ,then the aim itself has a physical component (the indicative above what God does, something remains to be done which even
feeling) as weJJ as a conceptual component (the predicative pat­ God cannot do. God cannot enact or even completely determine
tern) . Its datum is a proposition wl}gsk logic;al subject is th� con­ the occasion's valuation, specification, and actualization of its
crescence itself. This presupposes the peculiar operation White­ initial aim. This remains to be done by, and only by, the actual
head calls "self-functioning" or "immediacy" (PR 38). The "in­ occasion itself. "Thus the initial stage of the aim is rooted in the
trinsic reality" of an event, he says, consists in "the event as in nature of God, and its completion depends on the self-causation
its own prehension" (sMw 1 46) . I take this to mean, in part, that of the subj ect-superj ect" (PR 373). It is true that "an originality
in a later phase of a concrescence there are feelings that have an in the temporal world is conditioned, though not determined, by
earlier phase of the concrescence as their datum. Such feelings an initial subj ective aim supplied by the ground of all order and
might be regarded as a limiting case of physical feelings, the of all originality" (PR 1 64) . But to say that the occasion is not
actual entity felt being the concrescence itself. And the function "determined" by God (or by anything else) is another way of
of this self-feeling might be compared with efficient causation . saying that "Spontaneity, originality of decision, belongs to the
The latter occurs in the transition from one actual occasion to essence of each actual occasion" (AI 3 3 2 ) .
another. But w ith in the internal process a sort of physic�.Lself­
c;:ausation goes on. This self-feeling is part of the process by which, B. Gon AND THE G IVE N N E S S OF THE P AST
we might say, the occasion builds up the structure of its own
4. Givenness and the ontological principle
feelings. Its feeling of one phase of the structure provides an in­
�icative feeling, and this is integrated with a predicative pattern We saw in Part One how the transition from past to present
mto the specific aim which guides the construction of a later is the crux of Whitehead's doctrine of social immanence. For this
phase. transition the givenness of the past for the present is essential. It
Finally by this process of progressive integration the occasion is because of the stubborn factual character of the past that the
becomes a concrete actuality. It becomes what it aims at. Then new concrescence is obliged to conform to it and re-enact it.
� t must be taken account of and conformed to by its successors Is it reasonable to ask for an ontological ground or reason for
m the course of nature. It becomes a determinate fact and func­ this givenness of the past? We recall the ontological principle :
tions as an efficient cause in the formation of future concrescences. "That every condition to which the process of becoming conforms
The conditions an occasion must satisfy are given by the past in any particular instance, has its reason either in the character
actual world. The possibility it may realize is given by God. But of some actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence, or
the fact that it becomes at all, and that it becomes what it aims in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence"
at, is not a necessary consequence of the past actual world, nor (PR 36-7). And we ask whether this principle properly applies to
320 H O W GOD AFFECTS THE WORLD THE G IVE N N E S S O F THE PAST 32 1
r
the givenness o f the past. Now i t might well seem paradoxical to ask why, of all possible worlds, it is this world that is actual(.__" N o
search for a "reason" for the givenness of the past, or for any reason, internal to history, can be assigned why that flux of forms� 1
givenness whatever. It is the nature of givenness, it seems, not to rather than another flux, should have been illustrated" ( PR 74) J
be penetrable by reason. What is given is stu b born fact. By defini­ It is reasonable, however, to ask how X is related to the other
tion, what is given does not permit reasons for its existence. Hence actual entities which make up that actual world. And it is reason­
one might conclude that the ontological principle does not prop­ able to ask for a reason for the character of the datum itself, if we
erly apply to the givenness of the past. mean by a "reason" some internal determination. What is given
This obj ection fails to take account of a distinction which is "incapable of rationalization beyond the fact that within it
emerged in our discussion of causal efficacy, the distinction be­ every component which is determinable is internally determined"
tween explanation in the sense of logical demonstration of facts (PR 75). What is determinable is the character of the datum, and
and explanation as categoreal analysis of facts. Whitehead thinks the character of this initial datum for A has been determined by
that stubborn facts cannot be explained in the former sense, but the process of decision internal to X. In this way the ontological
that they need to be explained in the latter sense. He does not principle applies to the character of the datum.
begin by saying that the past must be given for the present, for Now I suggest it is also reasonable on Whitehead's principles
such and such reasons, and then conclude that therefore it is given. to ask, How is it that what was decided in the past is given now
Instead he begins by accepting what seems to him the obvious for the present experience? This would apply the ontological
fact that the past is given now. The_q_1J�ti9n J..h�n to be asked and principle not only to the character of the datum given for A but
answered is, &JJL is it passibk: that !h.e..p.a&.i�.giv_euu_ ow? This also to the fact that this datum is now given for A. And this means
question, I suggest, is in accord with Whitehead's principles. looking for some actual entity as the reason why X is now given for
One of his basic principles, suggested by the relational char­ A. The importance of this question will appear as we look for its
acter of experience, is " that there are no brute, self-contained answer.
matters of fact, capable of being understood apart from interpreta­ It migh� seem natural to suppose that the past occasion X is
tion as an element in a system" (PR 2 i ) . There is stub born fact in itself the ontological ground for the fact that it is now given for
the sense that no particular matter of fact can be logically de­ A. But this answer cannot be the right one. X is indeed the rea­
duced from abstract principles. But the ideal of philosophy is a son for the character of the initial datum. It is the reason for what
complete account of facts in their relations. Hence a philosopher is given. The immediate satisfaction of X is "a creative determina­
cannot admit any particular matter of fact which is self-contained, tion, by which the objectifications of the entity beyond itself are
entirely unconnected with other particular matters of fact. There settled" ( PR 1 30) .
are always connections and the philosopher's business is to seek But X can hardly be the reason for the fact that the datum is
them out. But the connections are between stubborn facts. To now given for A. Because X has now perished and is no longer
give a reason for the givenness of the past is not to prove that the actual, whereas the only "reasons" according to the ontological
p �st is given now. It is instead to show how it is that the past is principle are actual entities. This is not a merely verbal objection.
given now. According to the ontological principle, "any condition to be
Let us take the case of a simple physical feeling and consider satisfied by one actual entity in its process expresses a fact either
what questions may reasonably be asked about its datum. Let the about the 'real internal constitutions' of some other actual en­
subj ect of the feeling be a concrescent occasion A, and let its tities, or about the 'subj ective aim' conditioning that process"
initial datum be a past occasion X which is part of A's actual (PR 3 7) . Past actual occasions do not now exist in their real in­
world. Now it is not reasonable, on "\Vhitehead's principles, to ternal constitutions. They are no longer subjectively immediate;
•
322 HOW GOD AFFECTS THE W O RLD THE GIVE N N E S S O F THE PAST
they are objectively immortal. Therefore they cannot serve as (PR 28). When viewed abstractly in his primordial nature God is
reasons for the fact that they are now given. This seems an in­ "deficient in actuality" (PR 50), or "deficiently actual" (PR 5 2 1).
evitable consequence of the perishing of actual occasions, taken (The primordial nature of God is not said to be devoid of actual­
together with the exclusiveness of immediacy discussed in Chapter ity. See also PR 48, 530.) But in his consequent nature he is "fully
3. It is only as the reason for the character of the datum that X actual" (PR 524). Properly speaking, God is a concrete unity of
functions as "part-creator of the transcendent world" (PR 1 30). physical and conceptual prehensions from which his primordial
What is yet to be explained in terms of the ontological principle is nature and his consequent nature are abstractions.
how a datum of this character is now given for A. . Further, God is actual now, foJ any meaning of "now." He is
Certainly it is not possible that the present concrescence is the "in unison of becoming with every other creative act" (PR 523 ),
ground of the givenness of the past. The occasion for which the and is thus "everlasting." His existence as a concrete actuality is
data are given cannot be the reason why the data are given. The not timeless, in the sense of being out of relation to temporal
essential nature of a datum is that it is given for the subject, not process. H� exists formally or immediately (which is to say ac­
produced by the subject or dependent on the subject for its exist­ tually) at all times (PR 524-5). Therefore at any tifl?.e, that is t()
ence. At this point Whitehead's realism is clear: "Two conditions s.ay with respect to any particular com;;r���enc�. it is categoreall}! .
?1ust be fulfilled in order that an entity may function as an object p9ssible for God to function as an Q..ntQlogkaJ ground of §.QIDe
m a process of experiencing: ( 1 ) the entity must be antecedent, CQndition to which this concrescenc� confonp.s.
and (2) the entity must be experienced in virtue of its antecedence; Further, relative to any concrescence, the actual occasions con­
it must be given. Thus an object must be a thing received, and stituting the past actual world of that concrescence are objectively
must not be either a mode of reception or a thing generated in immortal in God (PR 1 34). Thus the consequent nature of God
that occasion. . . . The process creates itself, but it does not is, in a sense, cumulative.1 It is enriched by the successive achieve­
create the objects which it receives as factors in its own nature" ments of actual occasions in the course of nature. So aE:Y_.�!­
(AI 229-30). occ;asion X will have been physical!}!" piebeoded b� God and .wJH
It seems then that the reason for the givenness of the past is be objectively immortal in God's immediate ex,perience. .J\s �
not to be found in the nature of past actual occasions, nor in the coI].sequence, tbe actualit� of God relative to A will include the
nature of the novel concrescence. Since future and contemporary r_e sult of God's prehension of X.
actual occasions are obviously not relevant to the question, it Finally, God is not only a subject but also a superject like all
seems that no actual occasion can be the ground of the givenness other actual entities. As a subject God is self-creative, a con­
of a datum for a novel concrescence. crescence of immediate feeling. As a superject God functions as
an object for other subjects. "The ' superjective' nature of God
is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction
5 · Is God the ground of givenness? The categories qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal in­
The only remaining actual entity which might function as the stances" (PR 1 35. See 47-8, 377, 532; MT 1 28). The novel con­
ontol?gi�al ground of the givenness of the past is God. I suggest crescence A will prehend God's satisfaction as now actual.
that It is categoreally possible to assign this function to God. For these reasons it seems categoreally possible for God to be
Later we must ask whether Whitehead does in fact assign this the ontological ground of the givenness of the past. One general
function to God. i . It is not cumulative in the sense that successive actual occasions re­
God is actual, and thus fulfills the requirement that "actual tain, in the consequent nature of God, their own formal immediacy. Hence
entities are the only reasons" (PR 37). "God is an actual entity" problems of temporal cumulation are avoided. See Chapter 1 7.
 324 HOW GOD AFFECTS THE W O RLD T H E GIVE N N E S S O F THE PAST
remark about this possible function o f God needs t o be made be­ environment" (PR 28). Here we are told that God does function as
fore we examine the relevant texts to see whether Whitehead does an ontological ground. We might well infer that in one respect,
assign it to God. namely "for reasons of highest absoluteness," God is relevant to
Among the functions of God in Whitehead's system we might any condition of a concrescence, including the givenness of its
distinguish "metaphysical" from "religious" functions. A reli­ past, as ontological ground of that condition. But this meaning is
gious function of God presupposes a conscious religious interest not made explicit (see PR 75, 2 48-9) .
on the part of some subj ect. God would be the obj ect of religious The passage in which Whitehead comes nearest to saying that
contemplation or devotion. But most actual occasions do not have God is the ground of givenness appears in Modes of Though t and
any conscious interests among their subj ective forms of feeling. A should be given in full:
metaphysical function would not require any conscious interest,
Finally [this follows a discussion of Time and Space] , there
such as a religious interest, in actual occasions. It would be a way
is Deity, which is that factor in the universe whereby there
of operating relative to all actual occasions without exception.
is importance, value, and ideal beyond the actual. It is by
N ow if God is the ontological ground of givenness, this would
reference of the spatial immediacies to the ideals of Deity
be a metaphysical not a religious function of God. Just as the
subj ective aim of every actual occasion needs to be accounted for,
that the sense of worth beyond ourselves arises. The unity
of a transcendent universe, and the multiplicity of realized
so the givenness of the past for every actual occasion would need
actualities, both enter into our experience by this sense of
to be accounted for. Just as the derivation of subj ective aim from
Deity. Apart from this sense of transcendent worth, the other­
God would be a metaphysical function involving primarily his
ness of reality would not enter into our consciousness. There
primordial nature, so God's function as ground of the givenness of
must be value beyond ourselves. Otherwise every thing ex­
the past would be a metaphysical function involving primarily his
perienced would be merely a barren detail in our own sol­
consequent nature. Now it is time to look at the relevant texts.
ipsist mode of existence. We owe to the sense of Deity the
obviousness of the many actualities of the world, and the
6. Is God the ground of givenness? Relevant texts obviousness of the unity of the world for the preservation of
the values realized and for the transition to ideals beyond
We have to ask whether Whitehead does in fact assign this
realized fact ( MT 1 40) .
function to God. The answer is not clear. In his more detailed and
rigorous discussions of causal objectification there is scarcely a The main problem about this passage is its reference to conscious
hint that he is even aware of the problem. Nor is there in those experience. If we could generalize to the experiences of all tem­
passages any explicit introduction of God as the ground of given­ poral actual entities, including nonconscious experiences, we might
ness. conclude that the "otherness of reality" always enters into ex­
The positive indications on which we have to rely occur mainly perience "by the sense of Deity." And since past occasions are the
in passages where Whitehead is interpreting his scheme and re­ only "actualities of the world" that are directly prehended as such,
lating it to experience, rather than in his more rigorous exposi­ we might conclude that past occasions are given for a subj ect by
tions of the categoreal scheme. For example, we have the general reason of its prehension of God. But again this is not made explicit
assertion that "the reasons for things are always to be found in (see MT 70) .
the composite nature of definite actual entities-in the nature of A similar note is struck in the following passage : "The uni­
God for reasons of the highest absoluteness, and in the nature of verse is at once the multiplicity of res verae and the solidarity of
temporal actual entities for reasons which refer to a particular res verae. The solidarity is itself the efficiency of the macroscopic
 H O W G O D AFFECTS THE WORLD THE GIVE N N E S S OF THE PAST
res vera, embodying the principle o f unbounded permanence ac­
quiring novelty through flux. The multiplicity is composed of 7 . How God might b e the ground o f givenness
microscopic res verae, each embodying the principle of bounded Suppose this functio n should be assigne d to God. Then we
flux acquiring 'everlasting' permanence" (PR 254) . The "macro­ would need an explana tion of j ust how God is the ontological
scopic res vera " is God. The point of interest is that the solidarity ground of the givenne ss of the past. Such an explana tion might
of the universe, including presumably its continuity in time, is begin as follows :
due to the efficiency of God. This might well be by way of his a. In the initial phase of A there is a prehens ion of X. In this
being the ground of the givenness of the past for a present con­ prehens ion X is objectifi ed by one of its own prehens ions Xp.
crescence. Once again, this interpretation goes beyond the ex­ Thus Xp is the objectiv e datum of A's prehens ion.
plicit meaning of the passage.2 b. Relativ e to the concres cence of A, X has perished and is no
We have been asking whether Whitehead points to God as the longer a subj ectively immedi ate actualit y. Hence objectifi cation
reason for the givenness of the past. The most relevant passages of X by way of some such abstrac tion as Xp is possible . But this
have been adduced, but the evidence is certainly less clear, de­ perishing of X also poses our problem about the givennes s of X
tailed, and ample than we might reasonably hope for, considering for A.
the importance of the question. No passage gives an affirmative c . God in his consequ ent nature prehends X. Let us call this
answer in a clear and explicit way. But some passages do seem to prehension GpX.
point toward an affirmative answer.3 d. God, unlike X, does not perish but is in unison of becomin g

1
Further, without this explanation of the givenness of the past with A.
"'\Vhitehead's system is incomplete. This is so in the following way. So far our path has been fairly clear. Now it become s more
A crucial feature of the theory of actual occasions is causal ob­ obscure . A possible next step would be : .
j ectification. Now causal obj ectification is meaningless unless the e. In the initial phase of A there is, in addition to A's pre-
past is given as stubborn fact. But t� givenness of the R�§� can­ hension of Xp, a physical feeling of God in which God is ob­
n9t be explained, in the sense2eguired by the ontolo_g!cal prin­ j ectified by his prehens ion of X. The obj ective datum of this
ciJ2!e by reference to past occasions .or .�Q. the novel concr�scence
•. �
feeling is thus GpX. This is a. co � formal feel ng and its subj ective
.i tself. �o actual entity which might serve as an exElanation" except form will conform to the subj ective form of its datum GpX. .
God, remains. Thus if this function is not assigned to God, then In this way the givenness of X for A, which is a conditio n of S
"'\Vhitehead's theory of actual occasions is incomplete. I take his A's prehens ion of Xp, would be explain ed by reference to A s pre- '. )
failure to make this point clear as evidence of the unfinished hension of GpX. This seems a reasona bly adequa te explana t10n of
character of the system set forth in his writings. the sort we need. But let us conside r a further possibi lity.
f. In God's experie nce X persists with retenti on of its own sub­
jective immed iacy. Hence in prehen ding GpX, A is �rehend i�g X
2 . Whitehead's doctrine of an "impartial nexus" seems at first to have
a similar bearing. A nexus remains for succeeding occasions what it was for
the original percipient of the nexus. This impartial nexus requires God for as now-act ual. X-in-Go d is therefore the ground of its own given-
its explanation. On closer examination of relevant texts it seems that God ness for A.
is the ground of the unity of the nexus as given for the succeeding occasions,
Against f there are several objectio ns :
not for the givenness as such of the nexus. But the bearing of these texts
on our problem is not perfectly clear. See PR 35 1-3, 383-90.
i. I t would run counter to Whiteh ead's general theory of ob­
3 · In a conversation with Whitehead in 1 942 I understood him to as­ j ectificat ion, which seems to require loss of subject ive immedi acy
sent to the suggestion that God is the ontological ground of the givenness in the objecti fied actual entity.
of the past. ii. In describ ing God's prehen sions of actual occasio ns White-
 H O W G O D AFFE CTS THE W ORLD THE GIVE N N ESS O F THE PAST
head seems t o imply that the general theory o f obj ectification ment o f objectification, a pplying t o God a s well a s t o actual
applies to these prehensions. For example : "Each actuality in the occas10ns.
temporal world has its reception into God's nature. The cor­ iii. If we accept f there would be a serious problem about the
responding element in God's nature is not temporal actuality, but unity of God's satisfaction. In God's experience actual occasions
is the transmutation of that temporal actuality into a living, ever­ must be obj ects to which he responds with his own subj ective
present fact." This seems to mean that what is "in God" is not X forms of feeling, so as to achieve his own subjective aim in his
in X's own subjective immediacy, but a "corresponding element." satisfaction. To make room for God's own self-creative activity,
X has made its particular and distinctive contribution to the data which puts the stamp of his own unity on his experience, it seems
and subj ective form of God's own immediate satisfaction. X is that actual occasions must be prehended as o bjectified subjects.5
thus objectively immortal in God. Continuing with the passage iv. If we accepted f we would "prove too much." In that case
j ust cited: "An enduring personality in the temporal world is a not only X but all of X's predecessors would be subj ectively im­
route of occasions in which the successors with some peculiar mediate in God. This would leave us with a problem about tem­
completeness sum up their predecessors. The correlate fact in poral cumulation in God's nature.
God's nature is an even more complete unity of life in a chain of v. If f is true, then what is the sense of saying that X has
elements for which succession does not mean loss of immediate perished? If X persists in God with retention of its own subjective
unison. This element in God's nature inherits from the temporal immediacy, then is there any genuine sense in which X has
counterpart according to the same principle as in the temporal perished? Would any real consequences of the doctrine of perish­
world the future inherits from the past" (PR 53 1-2 ) . What is in ing, of which Whitehead makes so much (ESP 1 1 7), remain?
God is not the route of occasions which composes the society with For these reasons, some of which will be amplified in the fol­
personal order. What is in God is a "correlate fact," a chain of lowing chapter, it seems that we must reject f and fall back
corresponding elements. What is in God is a "counterpart," which upon e as an explanation of how God might be the ground of
inherits from the temporal world according to the same principle the givenness of the past.
as, in the temporal world, the future inherits from the past. I t might be thought that the resultant theory would amount to
I t is true that X is in God more completely than it is in A. As occasionalism. This would not be true. On an occasionalist theory
we shall see in the following chapter, God's feeling of X is non­ the function of X is only to be an occasion for an exercise of
eliminative. God prehends all of X and not merely some aspect of divine causality. This theory, on the contrary, would assert that
it. Obj ectification of actual occasions for God does not mean X is more than an instance of divine causality. X itself is a real
abstraction.4 Still, Whitehead seems to say, obj ectification for causal agent. Its causal efficacy for A has been initiated by its real
God entails loss of immediacy in the obj ectified entity. Thus internal constitution as a self-creative act of becoming. God con­
though X is completely in God, without eliminations from its forms to and sustains the influence initiated by X. Hence a full
complete satisfaction, it is in God o bjective, not formaliter; it is account of the ontological reason for the influence of X on A,
objectively immortal, not subj ectively immediate. Though his
language is not always clear on this point (PR 5 1 7, 5 2 5), White­ 5. This objection is similar to the argument from the principle of

head seems to accept loss of immediacy as a categoreal require- creativity advanced in Chapter 3 against a literal interpretation of the
"flow of feeling." It is different from the argument from the unity of the
+ Judging from the categoreal scheme, objectification does not cate­ subject advanced there. That argument introduced the abstractive char­
goreallyrequire abstraction. This requirement arises from the nature of acter of the physical prehensions of actual occasions. But God does not
temporal actual entities. abstract, at least not in the same sense.
 330 H OW G O D AFFECTS THE W ORLI> 331
GOD A N D C O NTEMP ORANE ITY
taking account both of what is given and that it is given, would for the mutual independence of contemporary actual occasions is
have to refer both to X and to God. To refer to either alone that otherwise there could be no unified satisfaction and hence no
would abstract from the concrete situation. completion of the concrescence. There must be a duration when
the concrescence is closed to further physical data, so that the mul­
c . GOD AND C O N TE M P ORANE I T Y tiplicity of physical data in its initial phase may be inwardly
8 . The causa l indep enden ce of contemporaries absorbed into a unity of feeling.
Char les Harts horne has sugge sted that God influe c. This condition would have to apply, it seems, to the sub-
occas ions by effecting a mutu al immanence of conte
nces actual ject's prehensions of God as well as to its prehensions o other �
mporary oc­ actual occasions. Otherwise the process of concrescence might go
casio ns. Thus , though apart from God conte mpor
aries woul d be on and on, and never be satisfied and perish.
causa lly indep ende nt, this indep ende nce is overc .
influ ence upon them . He argue s that Whit ehead
ome by God' s d. Hence we must suppose that God as prehended by A is od �
God impli es a "cosm ic prese nt," which is "the de
's doctr ine of as conditioned by A's actual world but not by A's �onte mpor�r � es .
facto totali ty .
In its initial phase, A prehends God's specific satisfaction ansmg
of actua l entiti es as prese nt in the divin e imme diacy
." And from out of A's actual world. But in this initial phase A's contem­
this it woul d follow , Hart shorn e think s, that conte
mporary actua l poraries have not yet become and hence could not have been
occas ions are not causally indep ende nt of each other
. "Sinc e they prehended by God.
are all imma nent in God, and he in turn imma
must they not be imm anen t in each other ?" In
nent in them e. Thus the lack of spatial separation between A and God s �
deducti on he argues as follows : "For, since God is
supp ort of thi � not sufficient reason for holding that A prehends God as condi­
not spatially tioned by A's contemporary B. Therefore lack of spatial separa­
separated from things, it seem s no defin ite lapse
of time can occur tion is insufficient to establish even an indirect immanence of
eithe r betw een his prehension of them or their
can be no trans missi on with the veloc ity of light
s of him. There contemporaries via God. Incidentally, the fact that light has a
to the divin e observer, or from the divin e proc
from an even t uniform, ·finite velocity is not the categoreal reason for the cau � al
ess itself to the independence of contemporaries. This physical fact must be m­
creatu rely even ts" (Schi lpp 545) .
The follo wing comm ents are in orde r: terpreted in terms of the categories but is not itself a cat �gore �l
a. Is it supp osed that actua l entit ies "as prese condition in the system. yYhitehead interprets space and time m
nt in the divin e terms of the experiences of actual occasions, not the other way
imm ediac y" retai n their own imm ediacy? If so,
then on the abov e around. Spatial separation is a reflection or consequence of a
argu men t cont emporari es wou ld be imm anen
t in one anot her plurality of individual acts of experience.
in a strong and direc t way. Agai nst this supp .
ositio n there are f. One might say there is a divine present w1tho ut say �ng there
.

serio us obj ectio ns, some of whic h have been _

prese nted . I suggest is a cosmic present. God is in unison of becommg with every
that actua l occa sions are o bject ively immortal
in God , as data for
� is own imm ediat e unity of satisfactio n. If so,
the only kind of
actual occasion. God always has a present. The content of that
imm anen ce betw een cont emporari es Hart shorn present is relative to the creative advance of nature. But if there
e's argu men t coul d is mutual exclusiveness of immediacy between God and actual
estab lish wou ld be an indir ect imm anen ce, unlik
e the direc t im­ occasions, then at no time is there a single immediate experience
man ence of an actua l occas ion in its succe ssors
. which literally includes all other immediate experiences. In this
b. Even this mild er versi on of the mutu al
imm anen ce of con­ sense there is no cosmic present. God's present is not the present
temporaries enco unters a diffic ulty arisi ng from
the categ ories of of any or all of the actual occasions to which it is relative.
subj ectiv e unity and subj ectiv e harmony. The
categoreal reason N ow I shall state a different and, I think, more adequate m-
332 HOW G O D AFFECTS THE WORLD GOD AND C O N TE M P ORANEITY 333
terpretation o f the temporal relations o f God and actual occasions. God i s like actual occasions. God as a superj ect effective for A is
For any concrescent occasion A, God is obj ectified as a specific God as conditioned by A's p dst. God is in unison of becoming
satisfaction, which results from God's prehensions of all the oc­ with A. But God as in unison of becoming with A is not causally
casions in A's past actual world. This unity of satisfaction which effective for A. In this sense God and his contemporaries, as well
A prehends does not include God's prehension of any contem­ as actual occasions and their contemporaries, are mutually in­
porary of A, as B, because B has not yet become. B like A is in dependent.
process of concrescence and has not yet attained its satisfaction.
Hence B cannot be obj ectified for God any more than it can be
obj ectified for A. God does not prehend B until B has attained g. Unison of becoming
its satisfaction. Therefore A does not prehend God as conditioned The fact that God is in unison of becoming with every actual
by B . occasion does not require that any actual occasion should prehend
God will prehend B when B has become. Thus for some later God as being in unison of becoming with itself. We. now ask �he
occasion M, God will be obj ectified as conditioned by A and by further question : Is God prehended by actual occas10ns as bemg
B as well as by the past actual worlds of A and B . But God so in unison of becoming with them? If so, how? It seems that such
considered has himself not yet become. The occasions A and B a prehension could not be a direct causal obj ectificatio � of ?od
have not yet been absorbed into the experience of his satisfaction. as contemporary. How else might God be prehended as m umson
I t follows that neither can be indirectly immanent in the other of becoming with A? .
We might say in the first place that A prehends the inclusive
by way of an obj ectification in God. So the causal independence of .
contemporary occasions is not overcome by the influence of God. quality of God's subjective aim. This quality will be an element
Actual occasions are data for God's physical prehensions. They in the subj ective forms of God's prehensions which are data for
are given for God. But they are not given until they have b ecome. A in A's initial phase. In this way -there is conveyed to A �h : ��g­
They are not data for God's prehensions until they have achieved aestion of God's transcenden ce of any finite set of poss1b1ht1es
their satisfactions and thereby added new obj ective determina­ � nd any finite state of affairs. God includes (by envisagement� �ll
tions to the course of nature. This is the inevitable consequence pure possibilities and (by physical prehension ) all th?se actuah � 1es
of Whitehead's epochal theory of time, which is itself a con­ which, relative to A, have become. As an element m the sub1 ec­
sequence of his theory of a multiplicity of real temporal in­ tive form of God's feeling, this quality of inclusivene ss must be
dividuals. conformed to by the subj ective form of A's prehension of God.
In this way Whitehead's principle of the mutual independence This does not amount to a direct awareness of God as in unison
of contemporaries has to be extended so as to apply to God as well of becoming with A. A nearer approximation to such an aw�re­
as to actual occasions. Since God is everlasting, there will be no ness may occur in higher phases of experience. In a r� ute � f high
.
actual occasion which will not be causally obj ectified for God, and grade occasions there may be a judgment that God is m umson of
for which God will not be causally objectified. In this respect becoming with the finite subj ect. Let us revert to A's relation to
God is unlike actual occasions. For in the case of any actual oc­ B . B is not causally objectified for A. Yet the experience of A de­
casion there are other actual occasions, namely its contemporaries, fines for it a "now" which extends beyond its own basic region
which do not influence it and are not influenced by it. and makes a there-now significant. The potentiality of contem­
It would remain true, however, that no actual entity, including porary occasions, the contemporary world as a locus of becoming,
God, influences another until it has achieved a definite and spe­ is given as a· part of A's experience. -
cific satisfaction. It must b ecome before it is given. In this respect Reflection on the meaning and ground of "significance" may
 334 H O W G O D AFFECTS T H E WORLD C ON CLUSIO N 335

now arise. What i s the ontological ground o f the "potential for any situation the ideal possibil i ty of a novel unity of experi­
scheme of spatio-temporal extensiveness which is a datum for ence. This novel unity of experience, as we saw in Chapter 4,
both A and B" (PR 1 88)? The inclusiveness of God's subj ective determines a unique extensive region, shared by no other actual
.
aim, directly prehended as a quality of his experience, would occasion. The unity and exclusiveness of the experience of an
suggest that God is in unison of becoming with the j udging sub­ occasion are reflected in the definiteness and exclusiveness of its
·
j ect and that he is the ontological ground of the fact that "the basic region. And since its unity of experience depends on its
real potentialities relative to all standpoints are coordinated as subj ective aim, and since in turn its subjective aim depends on
diverse determinations of one extensive continuum" (PR 1 03). In God, the definiteness and exclusiveness of its region depend on
this way, from the inclusiveness of God's subj ective aim and from God. In this way the order of the extended world requires White­
the given fact of "becoming going on there-now," there might head's doctrine of God.
issue the j udgment that divine becoming is going on now. Again, the continuity of the world in time requires the doctrine
of God. The past which has perished can be given for the present
D . C O N C LU S I O N and impose conformity on it, because God is the ontological
ground of ,its givenness. This givenness of the past for the present,
There is a significant parallel between the two salient features and the conformity of the present to the past, is the basis in ex­
of the theory of actual occasions, namely the individuality and perience for the continuity of time. The temporal contiguity of
the influence of actual occasions. The real individuality of oc­ standpoints of actual occasions is an abstract aspect of the in­
casions is the basis for the doctrine of social transcendence. Causal fluence of actual occasions on their successors. And since the in­
obj ectification is the basis for the doctrine of social immanence. fluence of actual occasions requires God for its explanation, the
And in both cases the doctrine of God is required for an adequate temporal continuity of the extended world requires the doctrine
explanation. of God.
The individuality of an actual occasion depends on its sub­ In this way not only the categoreal conditions of acts of ex­
j ective aim. And the existence of an initial aim requires explana­ perience but also the ord�r and continuity of the extended world,
tion under the ontological principle. Whitehead's explanation is which are derivative from these categoreal conditions, require
that the initial aim is derived from God. In this way his theory these functions of God. Thus in Whitehead's system God is an
of finite individuality, and with it his doctrine of social tran­ explanation of the solidarity of the world. "The universe is at
scendence, requires his doctrine of God. once the multiplicity of res verae and the solidarity of res verae.
Causal obj ectification depends for its meaning on the givenness The solidarity is itself the efficiency of the macroscopic res vera,
now of the past which has perished. This givenness of the past, embodying the principle of unbounded permanence acquiring
like the existence of an initial aim, requires explanation under novelty through flux" (PR 254).
the ontological principle. The only explanation open to White­ Finally, two general conclusions about Whitehead's conception
head is that God is the ground of the givenness of the past. In this of God seem reasonably well established if the interpretation of­
way his theory of influence, and with it his doctrine of social im­ fered above is a fair one. (a) His theory of actual occasions re­
manence, requires his doctrine of God. quires his doctrine of God, if we accept his own principles of
At this point we can see how God makes possible an extensive explanation. It seems therefore that his conception of God is not
continuum. The existence of God makes possible an order and a an interpretation of his metaphysical system, formulated after the
con tinuity of regions of actual occasions. Since his primordial system had been constructed, for religious or other purposes
nature is an envisagement of all possibilities, he makes available (though I would not deny that a religious interest may have in-
 H O W G O D AFFECTS THE WORLD
fluenced the construction o f the . s ystem itself) . I suggest that the
conception of God is a part of the structure of the system. (b) The
influence of God on the world leaves room for and is thus con­ C HAPTER 17
sistent with the freedom and creativity of actual occasions. The
functions we may fairly attribute to God, on the basis of relevant
texts and the categoreal scheme, do not nullify or supplant the
real individuality and the influence of actual occasions. How the World Affects God

1 . How God requires the world

I N THIS CHAPTER we come to a feature of Whitehead's theory
that sets it off more sharply from traditional theology. This fea­
ture might well have been anticipated since it follows from the
principle that God is the chief exemplification of the categories.
If every actual entity is affected by other entities, then God must
be affected by the world. But we shall see that God is not affected
by the world in the same way an actual occasion is affected by
other occasions, and emphatically not in the same way actual oc­
casions are affected by God.
First we notice how the existence of God requires the existence
of many actual occasions. Then, in most of the chapter, we shall
explore the ways actual occasions influence God's experience­
and the ways they do not.
In God's experience, as in the experience of an actual occasion,
conceptual prehensions and physical prehensions are integrated
by a subj ective aim into satisfaction. Physical prehensions are es­
sential to his concrete actuality for without them God would have
no satisfaction. But his physical prehensions are of actual oc­
casions. So if there were no actual occasions God would have no
physical prehensions and as a consequence would be deficient in
actuality (PR 50, 5 2 1 ). "The completion of God's nature into a ful­
ness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the
world in God" (PR 5 2 3 ) . In this way the existence of God as an
actual entity requires the existence of the world of actual occasions .
We may go a step further. God's satisfaction requires not merely
the existence of a world other than himself but, more specifically,
the existence of many real finite individuals other than himself. A
multiplicity of actual occasions is required for God's satisfaction.
337
 H O W THE W O RLD AFFE CTS GOD M UTUAL E X C L U S IVENESS 33 9

This may b e shown a s follows : (a) The primordial nature o f God at other points in this study, he offers a categoreal not a "meta­
is an envisagement of the unbounded multiplicity of eternal ob­ physical" explanation (sMW 2 4 9-50) of the existence of a world
j ects. God aims at the actualization of all pure possibilities. (b) of many finite things.
Any actualization is finite, since the creative process involves de­ A further qualification must be kept in mind. This is not a
cisions which exclude alternative possibilities. Therefore, for any complete explanation of the particular actual occasions which do
particular actualization, some of the possibilities envisaged by come into being. For as we saw in the preceding chapter God does
God are incompatible for joint realization. (c) It follows that not completely determine any actual occasion, though he condi­
there cannot be any one real individual in which all eternal ob­ tions the becoming of every occasion in crucial ways. An actual
j ects are physically realized. Hence more than one real individual occasion "is internally determined and is externally free' (PR 4 1 ) .
other than himself is necessary for God's satisfaction. (d) Indeed For this reason, i f we were to construct an analogy between White­
there must be an infinite multiplicity of finite real individuals. head's system and Spinoza's, we would have to construe actual
For any finite set of finite actualities would exclude and fail to occasions not as modes of God but as modes of creativity (sMw
realize some pure possibilities. Therefore an infinite multiplicity 248; PR 1 1 4, 1 25) .
of actual occasions is required for God's satisfaction. "This prin­
ciple of intrinsic incompatibility has an important bearing upon
2 . Are God and actual occasions mutually exclusive?
our conception of the nature of God . . . . We must conceive the
Divine Eros as the active entertainment of all ideals, with the So far as we have seen that actual occasions make an essential
urge to their finite realization, each in its due season. Thus a contribution to the divine concrescence and satisfaction. Now we
process must be inherent in God's nature, whereby his infinity is ask more specifically how this contribution is made. God requires
acquiring realization" (AI 357) . actual occasions as data for his physical prehensions, without
This conclusion is important because it illustrates Whitehead's which his satisfaction would not be possible. How do actual oc­
aim at coherence in the development of his scheme. " 'Coherence,' casions affect God by way of these prehensions? First we ask ·
as here employed, means that the fundamental ideas, in terms of whether in his prehensions of actual occasions he shares their sub­
which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in j ective immediacy. Considered as acts of experience, are God and
isolation they are meaningless" (PR 5) . In particular it means that an actual occasion mutually exclusive?
the nature of God gives a "reason" of a sort why there are many It seems perfectly clear that the data of God's physical prehen­
finite real individuals. On this point he contrasts his philosophy sions are o bjectified actual occasions. "The completion of God's
with Spinoza's system of which he says, "The gap in the system is nature into a fulness of physical feeling is derived from the ob­
the arbitrary introduction of the 'modes' " ( PR 1 0) . In his own j ectification of the world in God. He shares with every new crea­
system the multiplicity of finite real individuals is required for tion its actual world; and the concrescent creature is obj ectified in
the satisfaction of God's subjective aim. God as a novel element in God's objectification of that actual
We must avoid supposing this amounts to a deduction of the world" (PR 5 2 3 ; see 1 34-5, 1 64 n) . In this way God's prehensions of
existence of many finite things. This is not an explanation of the actual occasions exemplify the categoreal conditions of prehen­
world in that sense. He does not undertake to prove pluralism by sions, and thus the conditions of immanence generally ( PR 34, 38,
demonstrating the existence of many finite things. On the con­ 79-80) . Now it was argued in Part One that the objectification of
trary, the existence of many finite things is one of the facts of one occasion in another does not entail any sharing of immediacy,
experience with which he begins to philosophize. He accepts it as and that the experiences of the two occasions are mutually ex­
an empirical fact. To recur to a distinction that has been useful clusive. The objectified occasion does not persist with its own
340 H O W T H E W O R LD AFFE CTS GOD M UTUAL EXCLUSIVENESS 34 1
in the
subj ective immediacy into the new concrescence. I s this true of vance with the retent ion of mutu al imme diacy is what
the obj ectification of occasions in God also? Whitehead means to previous sectio n is mean t by the term 'everla sting' " �PR5 24-� ).
retam
apply the categories of explanation and obligation to God as well The word "mutu al" might sugge st that actual occas10ns
uent nature of
as to actual occasions. Do the differences between God and actual their immediacy when object ified in the conseq
ture
occasions require us to hold that there is sharing of immediacy God. The third passage is as follows : "Thu s the cons : qu : nt ?�
dual
between God and actual occasions, though not among actual oc­ of God is comp osed of a multi plicity of eleme nts with md1v1
casions? First we examine a number of texts that bear on this self-rea lization " (PR 53 1)
.
. .
on these passages are m order . (a) The um­
"

question. Then we shall look at the implications of some funda­ Sever al comm ents
God's
mental principles. son of imme diacy" referred to in the first two passages is
When Whitehead discusses God's prehensions of actual oc­ passage makes clear. (b) In the
own imme diacy, as the secon d
casions, and their prehensions of God, he uses much the same next sectio n of this chapt er some light will be throw n on �he
thud
language as when he discusses causal objectification within the referenc e of the secon d passage to "abstr action ." (c) In the
e of
temporal world. The fundamental distinction between formal and passag e it might have been better to say the conse quent natur
obj ective existence is applied to God (PR 47-8), and the im­ God "unifi es" a multi plicity of eleme nts. These eleme nts, act � al
their own im­
manence of God in other actual entities is identified with his ob­ occasions dd have indivi dual self-re alizati on in
is not
j ective immortality. "This function of creatures, that they con­ mediate ;xperie nces. But God's own imme dia � e :x.perien ce _
o:cas10� s
stitute the shifting character of creativity, is here termed the a multi plicity but a unity, in which the mulu ph� 1ty of
'obj ective immortality' of actual entities. Thus God has objective occas1 0ns retam t � en
is objec tified . (d) The sugge stion that act� al
ge might
immortality in respect to his primordial nature and his conse­ immediacy when obj ectifie d in God, which these pass �
�
quent nature" (PR 47; see 378). Hybrid physical feelings effect perm it, is not consis tent with some fundamenta l prmo
ples or
" the obj ectification of God in a temporal subj ect" (PR 377). God is with the plain meani ngs of other texts.
(PR 1 35). The immanence "o b tain
"superjective" as well as "subj ective" Some of these texts are as follows. Actua l occasi ons
adequ ate representation in the divine natur e. Such repres .
of God in actual occasions is his obj ective existence in actual oc­ en tat �ons
casions. It is not God in his own subj ective immediacy. compose the 'conse quent nature' of God" (PR
1 �- 1 9, my Ital �cs) .
c1 ted
In turn, as we have seen above, actual occasions are objectified This passage is partic ularly releva nt t� the _nd pas � age .
th
in God. This clearly means, in most cases, that the objectified ac­ above , to which it may serve as a correc tive. Agam , God s ph Xs1cal
tual occasions have lost their subj ective immediacy. Three prob­ exper ience is "initia lly derive d from the temporal_ worl
� (PR
lematical passages need to be noticed. The first occurs in the first ves into Its umty the
524, my italics) . The nature of God "recei
chapter of Part V of Process and Reality, a chapter composed al­ scatter ed effecti veness of realize d activit ies, trans/ armed by the
supremacy of its own ideals " (IMM 697-8 , my italics ).
most entirely of presystematic discourse: "There is a unison of Anoth er
becoming among things in the present. Why should there not be important passage should be given in full:
novelty without loss of this direct unison of immediacy among
things? In the temporal world, it is the empirical fact that process Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into
entails loss : the past is present under an abstraction. But there is God's nature. The corresponding element in God's nature
no reason, of any ultimate metaphysical generality, why this is not temporal actuality, but is the transmutation of that
should be the whole story" (PR 5 1 7) . The second passage comes in temporal actuality into a living, ever-pres : nt fact. An en­
the following chapter, in a discussion of the consequent nature of during personality in the temporal world 1s a _ route of oc­
God: "In it there is no loss, no obstruction. The world is felt in a casions in which the successors with some peculiar complete­
unison of immediacy. The property of combining creative ad- ness sum up their predecessors. The correlate fact in God's
342 H O W T H E W O RLD AFFE CTS G O D M UTUAL E X C L U S IVENESS 343

nature i s an even more complete unity o f life i n a chain of Now if the feelings experienced by actual occasions literally
elements for which succession does not mean loss of im­ persisted, in their own subjective immediacy, into the divine
mediate unison. This element in God's nature inherits from concrescence, then this would seem to negate God's freedom. For
the temporal counterpart according to the same principle then not only the data but also the "qualitative clothing" of some
as in the temporal world the future inherits from the past. of his feelings would not be determined by himself. Whitehead's
Thus in the sense in which the present occasion is the person principles seem to require that God determines the subj ective
now) and yet with his own past, so the counterpart in God is forms of his own feelings. The experiences of actual occasions,
that person in God (PR 5 3 1 -2 . See RM 1 55, 1 57 ; PR 1 64 n, including the subj ective forms of their feelings, are data for God's
3 36-7). own feelings. How the subj ect feels its data must be decided
finally by the subj ect itself.
It appears from these passages that when actual occasions are b. Time. Actual occasions become and perish. This is the
prehended into the consequent nature of God they do not retain categoreal explanation of the epochal character of time. There­
their own immediacies. They obtain "adequate representation" in fore an occasion cannot literally and simply persist in the ex­
God's experience. They are "transmuted." The "living, ever­ perience of a succeeding occasion. Now God does not perish but
present fact, " the "even more complete unity of life," is not the is everlasting, in unison of becoming with every occasion. Does
collective immediacies of the individual actual occasions. It is the God's everlastingness disqualify this argument from applying to
everlasting subj ectively immediate experience of God. The "cor­ God's prehensions of actual occasions? I suggest it does not.
relate fact" in God's nature "inherits from the temporal counter­ Though God does not perish, Whitehead clearly means that
part according to the same principle as in the temporal world the actual occasions do. N ow if actual occasions do not perish sub­
future inherits from the past." This means, if causal objectification j ectively (PR 44) when objectified but retain their own immediacy
in the temporal world has been interpreted correctly, that actual in God, then it seems they would never perish subjectively. For
occasions do not persist into God's experience with their own sub­ there is no condid on within God's experience that would there­
j ective immediacy. They are objectively immortal in God's own after require them to perish. But if actual occasions persisted
subj ectively immediate experience. everlastingly in God with retention of their own subjective im­
In Chapter 3 certain arguments from Whitehead's categories mediacy, what meaning could be given to "perishing"? As a
were offered against interpreting causal obj ectification as literal consequence, what meaning could be given to Whitehead's reit­
transfer of feeling. We now ask whether these arguments apply to erated expression, taken from Locke, that time is a "perpetual
the objectification of actual occasions in God. If they do, they will perishing" (PR 43, 94)? His realistic view of time seems to require
add weight to the latter set of passages discussed above. that actual occasions perish subj ectively and become objectively
a. Creativity. If God is an actual entity then he must be, at immortal in God's experience as well as in the temporal world.
least as much as an actual occasion, causa sui or self-creative. "To c. The unity of the su bject. The first categoreal obligation
be causa sui means that the process of concrescence is its own rea­ clearly implies that every feeling in the concrescence of an actual
son for the decision in respect to the qualitative clothing of feel­ entity has that actual entity as its subj ect (PR 39). If this applies
ings" (PR 1 35) . The way an actual entity exercises its creative to God as well as to actual occasions, then it follows that no feel­
freedom is by determining the quality of its responses to its en­ ing in the divine concrescence has any actual occasion as its sub­
vironment. This is the way it "functions in respect to its own j ect. This would mean that no occasion literally persists in God
determination" (PR 3 8) . It has the final decision about the sub­ with retention of its own subj ective immediacy.
j ective forms of its own feelings. It is true that actual occasions always abstract from the data
 H O W THE W ORLD AFFE CTS G O D AB STRACTION 345
344
they objectify, whereas w e shall see that God does not. That gives loss, but on its finer side is an element to be woven im­
this argument additional strength when applied to actual oc­ mortally into the rhythm of mortal things (RM i 55, my
casions, as in Chapter 3. But the general consequences of the italics) .
category of subj ective unity seem sufficient to rule out literal The consequent nature of God is his j udgment on the world.
transfer of feeling from an actual occasion to God. In the case of He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own
God, no less than in the case of actual occasions, privacy of ex­ life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses noth ing
perience is essential to unity of experience. And unity of experi­ that can be saved (PR 525, my italics) .
ence is a necessary condition of an actual entity, temporal or
This might mean that God's prehensions are selective, so that
divine.
something in the occasion he prehends is left out of his pre­
I suggest that when actual occasions are prehended by God they
hension. On this interpretation God would prehend every occa­
lose their own immediacy of feeling. Their feelings are not lit­
sion but he would not prehend all of every occasion.
erally transferred into God's experience. The divine immediacy
Other passages convey an opposite suggestion, namely that
and the immediacy of an actual occasion are mutually exclusive
God's prehensions do not eliminate anything from their data.
in the sense explained in Part One. Both the weight of the evi­
For example : "The perfection of God's subj ective aim, derived
dence from relevant texts and the implications of fundamental
from the completeness of his primordial nature, issues into the
principles support this interpretation.
character of his consequent nature. In it there is no loss, no ob­
It is true that a contrary view may be suggested by some pas­
struction" (PR 524) . Again, in the temporal world "objectification
sages. Here as elsewhere in this study I do not argue that White­
involves elimination," for "In the temporal world, it is the em­
head is always self-consistent in his elucidation of the categoreal
pirical fact that process entails loss; the past is present under
scheme, or that he never uses misleading expressions. I would
an abstraction. But there is no reason, of any ultimate meta­
suggest, however, that the misleading expressions usually occur
physical generality, why this should be the whole story" ( PR 5 1 7) .
when he is applying the scheme to experience and therefore must
This suggests that i n God's prehensions o f actual occasions there
risk the ambiguities of ordinary language.
is no abstraction.
3 . Does God abstract from actual occasions? Clearly some distinction is necessary in order to do j ustice to
these texts. Let us ask another question : Does God have any nega­
N egative prehensions
tive prehensions? This will put us on the way to the distinction
This question is closely connected with the preceding one. It we need. The categoreal explanation of negative prehensions is :
asks further how actual occasions are data for God's physical pre­ "That there are two species of prehensions : (a) 'positive prehen­
hensions. Here we find an important difference between the way sions' which are termed 'feelings,' and (b) 'negative prehensions'
God prehends actual occasions and the way actual occasions pre­ which are said to 'eliminate from feeling.' Negative prehensions
hend one another. also have subj ective forms. A negative prehension holds its datum
Some of the passages cited above suggest that God's physical as inoperative in the progressive concrescence of prehensions con­
prehensions abstract from their data. Two other such passages stituting the unity of the subject" (PR 35, category of explanation
may be cited : xii) . Whitehead interprets this by taking an example of aesthetic
enj oyment, a kind of experience to which he often appeals for
Every fact is what it is, a fact of pleasure, of j oy, of pain, or
interpretation of his philosophical categories.
of suffering. In its union with God that fact is not a total
 H O W THE W ORLD AFFECTS GOD AB STRACTION 347

Consider a good picture. It expresses a unity o f mutual rele­ tions from his data. He has no absolute aversions (PR 48), though
vance. It resents the suggestion of addition. No extra patch he prehends and values the aversions and adversions in the sub­
of scarlet can be placed in it without wrecking its unity. j ective forms of actual occasions. Unlike actual occasions, God
The point is that the subj ective unity of feeling and the never takes "the easy road of Anaesthesia by which discordant
objective unity of mutual relevance express respectively a factors are dismissed into irrelevance" (AI 379).
relation of exclusion to the world beyond. There is a com­ To God all the feelings of actual occasions are relevant, accept­
pletion which rej ects alternatives. Mere omission is character­ able, and important. He does not compete with any actual occa­
istic of confusion. Rejection belongs to intelligible pattern sion for satisfaction. "God's role is not the combat of productive
(ESP (1 937] 1 30) . force with productive force, of destructive force with destructive
force; it lies in the patient operation of the overpowering rational­
Negative prehension is more like rej ection than om1ss10n be­ ity of his conceptual harmonization" (PR 525-6) . God's satisfac­
cause a negative prehension, like a positive prehension, has a tion does not require elimination of any feeling experienced by
subj ective form. And this subjective form affects the total com­ any actual occasion. On the contrary, every feeling in every actual
plex of feeling, even though the datum of the prehension is occasion makes its positive contribution to his satisfaction. God's
"eliminated " from feeling. satisfaction does not require negative prehensions.
It is clear that there is always some negative prehension when We now notice further that the categoreal scheme does not
one actual occasion prehends another. In the temporal world itself require that all actual entities have negative prehensions.
"objectification involves elimination" (PR 5 1 7) . Some of the feel­ It defines negative prehensions, in category of explanation xii
ings belonging to the datum must be rej ected for the sake of the (PR 35) . But none of the categoreal obligations requires that every
unity of the subject. By this elimination the initial datum be­ actual entity should have them. It is a derivative fact, not a cate­
comes the objective datum. goreal condition, th at actual occasions do have negative prehen­
This is necessary because the new subject cannot assimilate all sions. Therefore to say that God has no negative prehensions
the content of its datum into its own unity of feeling. It aims at would not conflict with the categoreal scheme. Here as elsewhere
a particular synthesis of feelings. From its finite standpoint, de­ the categoreal scheme leaves room for differences between God
fined by its specific aim, it cannot handle all the experiences its and actual occasions.
predecessors had. Hence some of these feelings must be excluded. Finally we ask whether Whitehead says that God has no nega­
"This fact of the elimination by reason of synthesis is sometimes tive prehensions. He makes it quite clear that there are no nega­
termed the perspective of the actual world from the standpoint tive prehensions in God's conceptual experience. He says of the
of that concrescence" (PR 3 2 1 ; see 2 2 5, 2 5 1 , 484) . primordial nature : "It is therefore infinite, devoid of all negative
When we turn from actual occasions to God, we find this rea­ prehensions" (PR 524; see 46, 48) . When we come to God's phys­
son for negative prehensions does not apply. God does not have a ical experience the evidence from relevant texts is meager. · There
limited perspective. Or, we might say, God shares all finite per­ is no passage that tells us in so many words that the consequent
spectives. The primordial nature of God "arises out of no actual nature of God does not include negative prehensions. This con­
world" (PR 75) . This makes it possible that God as consequent clusion does seem to be implied by some of the passages cited
"shares with every new creation its actual world." He is "in unison above (PR 5 1 7, 5 2 4) . In a similar passage he says that the revolts
of becoming with every other creative act" (PR 523). of destructive evil, purely self-regarding, "are dismissed into their
Since his subj ective aim is not constricted by a finite stand­ triviality of merely individual fac ts; and yet the good they did
point, the subj ective forms of his feelings do not require elimina- achieve in individual joy, in individual sorrow, in the introduc-
 H O W THE W ORLD AFFE CTS GOD DOES GOD HAVE C O N F ORMAL FEELINGS ? 349
tion o f needed contrast, i s yet saved by its relation t o the com­ They do not persist into God's experience with their own sub­
pleted whole. The image-and it is but an image-the image jective immediacy. They have counterparts (PR 5 3 1 ) in God's own
under which this operative growth of God's nature is best con­ complex unity of experience. A ll of their feelings are adequately
ceived, is that of a tender care that nothing be lost" ( PR 525). represented.
And it is not clear how God could have a negative prehension
of an actual occasion without having along with it a negative c. "In its union with God" a fact "on its finer side is an ele­
prehension of some eternal object. ment to be woven immortally into the rhythm of mortal things"
The weight of the evidence, in my j udgment, indicates that (RM 1 55 ) .
God's consequent nature does not include any negative prehen­ From the perspective of some actual occasion a certain fact may
sions, though he prehends positively the negative prehensions be trivial or destructive. Hence the occasion must rej ect it. God
of actual occasions. Shortly I shall offer an interpretation, con­ is able to accept the fact for what it is. This potentiality for being
sistent with this conclusion, of certain problematical texts. But accepted by God, and thereby making a contribution to exist­
for this interpretation, and for an adequate answer to our initial ence, is "the finer side" of the fact. God accepts the whole of the
question whether God abstracts from his data, we need a certain fact.
distinction for which we are now prepared.
We might distinguish between two senses of "abstraction" : (a) d. God "loses nothing that can be saved" (PR 5 2 5) .
abstraction as elimination by negative prehensions of part of the Actual occasions perish. They cease t o exist i n the mode o f sub­
initial datum; and (b) abstraction simply as objectification, pre­ j ective immediacy. Their subj ective immediacy cannot be "saved"
hension of an actual entity as an obj ect, understood as entailing as such. They can be saved only by becoming objectified. By be­
loss of immediacy in the obj ectified entity as explained in Part coming objectified for God all the feelings of an actual occasion
One. We might then say that God's physical prehensions ab­ can be saved. Apart from God some of these feelings would be
stract from actual occasions in sense b but not in sense a. But lost.
Whitehead does not himself employ "abstraction" in sense b
It seems fair to conclude that this interpretation is reasonably
but only in sense a. Therefore it might be better to put our dis­
consistent with the categoreal scheme and with the relevant texts.
tinction another way. (A) Both for God and for actual occasions
And I suggest that it does more j ustice to the evidence than the
obj ectification means loss of immediacy in the obj ectified entity.
(B) For actual occasions, but not for God, objectification also in­
opposite view would do. God does not abstract from actual occa­
volves abstraction (sense a) . God's physical prehensions obj ectify,
sions in the sense of eliminating some of their feelings from his
initial data. None of the feelings experienced by actual occasions
but do not eliminate from, their data.
persists in God with retention of its subj ective immediacy. But
With this distinction we may now interpret certain prob­
all of the feelings experienced by actual occasions become obj ec­
lematical passages.
tively immortal in God's experience.
a . An actual occasion "contributes such elements as it can to
a realization in God" (PR 1 34) . 4. Does God have conformal feelings?
Its contribution is finite. It can contribute only what it has
To this point we have focused on the data of God's physical
achieved. But all that it has achieved is prehended by God.
prehensions. Now we ask about the subj ective forms of God's
b. Actual occasions "obtain adequate representation in the physical feelings. The question is : Do they conform to their
divine nature" (PR 1 8- 1 9) . data?
 H O W THE W ORLD AFFECTS GOD DOES GOD HAVE C O N F ORMAL FEELINGS? 35 1
N otice how this contrasts with the question whether actual has considerable importance for interpretation of Whitehead's
occasions persist into God with their own immediacy. There we theory of God and the world.
asked whether God had a share in determining the subj ective I t is possible that Whitehead has overstated his point. Certainly
forms of his own feelings. Here we sail on an opposite tack. We God's subj ective aim is wholly derivative from his primordial
ask whether actual occasions have a share in determining the nature. But is it not an exaggeration to say that the subjective
subj ective forms of God's feelings. forms of his physical prehensions are "wholly derivative" from
This problem arises in the following way. Whitehead tells us his primordial nature? Would it be more exact to say they are
that actual occasions affect God's experience. But he does not tell "completely in harmony with" his primordial valuations? This
us fully and clearly how their influence is effective. Now when may be compared with a sentence where, speaking of actual en­
we ask what the mechanism of influence on God might be, the tities generally, the subjective form of a prehension is said to be
most natural suggestion is the mechanism of conformity of su'Q­ "determined" by the subj ective aim ( PR 2 9) . Since actual occa­
j ective form in terms of which causal obj ectification in the tem­ sions certainly have conformal feelings, this must be understood
poral world is explained. As we saw in Chapter 7, the prehending as "partly determined. " Perhaps neither passage means to rule
subj ect (the effect) is obliged, categoreally speaking, to repeat in out conformation.
its own immediacy a subj ective form of feeling encountered in Yet God's experience is plainly so different from the experi­
its datum (the cause) . In this way the subjective forms of the past ences of actual occasions that further exploration is needed. We
occasion condition, but do not fully determine, the subjective should look more generally at what Whitehead's categories re­
forms of the new concrescence. quire about the subj ective forms of God's physical prehensions.
May this explanation of influence be applied also to the way Let us interpret conformal feeling as in Chapter 7. And let us
actual occasions affect God? The following passage might suggest suppose provisionally that God's physical feelings are conformal.
a negative answer: "This prehension into God of each creature Then God's prehension of an actual occasion would differ from
is directed with the subj ective aim, and clothed with the subjec­ the prehension of one occasion by another in two intimately con­
tive form, wholly derivative from his all-inclusive primordial nected ways. Let us say that in God's feeling there is (a) perfect
valuation" ( PR 5 2 3) . This sounds as though God's subj ective conformation and (b) perfect supplementation.
forms are wholly determined by his primordial nature. If so,
no room would remain for any effective conditioning of his sub­ a. We have seen that God does not eliminate from his physical
jective forms by the actual occasions he prehends. It would be data any of their component feelings. God has no negative pre­
impossible to say of God's physical prehensions that "the sub­ hensions. This would mean that God conforms to all of the feel­
j ective form of a prehension is partly dictated by the qualita­ ings of actual occasions in the creative advance of nature. All
tive element in the objective content of that prehension" (AI their feelings are re-enacted in his own immediacy and absorbed
326). into his own satisfaction. His conformation is all-inclusive.
This produces a problem. If the subj ective forms of God's We would have to add now that his conformation is not only
physical feelings do not conform to their data, then how can we all-inclusive but perfect. He conforms to every feeling, and he
say that actual occasions are given for God? Part of the meaning conforms perfectly to each feeling. He not only feels all the feel­
of givenness is the imposition of conformity. What is given must ings of actual occasions; he feels each feeling fully. There is per­
be conformed to in some way or other. If actual occasions are fect conformation.
not given for God, then it seems that the world of actual occa­ When one actual occasion prehends another it eliminates some
sions does not really affect God's experience . Thus our question of the feelings composing the datum. Also it conforms imperfectly
 H O W THE W ORLD A F F E CTS GOD D O E S GOD HAVE C O N FORMAL F E E L I N G S ? 353
352
t o those feelings i n the datum that are positively felt. The new This unlimited valuation of possibilities means that God will
subject repeats or re-enacts the subj ective forms of the obj ect. have unlimited hospitality to those actualizations which do, as a
"But the re-enaction is not perfect. The categoreal demands of matter of fact, occur in the process of nature. His hospitality will
the concrescence require adj ustments of the pattern of emo­ be unlimited, in the two ways mentioned above.
tional intensities . . . . [There is] partial equivalence of subjec­ First, God will feel all feelings and eliminate none. Whatever
tive form" (PR 363). An actual occasion has to compromise be­ possibilities are as a matter of fact realized, God wanted (so to
tween actuality and ideality. It has an ideal of itself, its conceptual speak) those possibilities actualized somehow, somewhere. N ow
aim. But it also includes " 'given' components which exclude the they are realized, and God's prehension of all the feelings of each
attainment of the full ideal" (PR 1 28). This is why the initial aim actual occasion is thus in harmony with his primordial appeti­
needs specification, as explained in Chapter 1 6. The concrescence tion.
has to specify and limit its aim to what it may achieve in the given Second, God's re-enaction of these feelings will be without dis­
situation. This is one side, so to speak, of its compromise. tortion and without exaggeration or diminution of intensity.
The other side of its compromise consists in elimination from Whatever the feeling may be, he can feel it for j ust what it is.
and imperfect conformation to its datum. Even if A positively N o feeling need be distorted or depreciated to enter into his
prehends X's feeling of some datum, A may not be able to enter­ satisfaction. His full realization of what was felt and how it was
tain this feeling with the intensity it had in X. If A's repetition felt will not threaten the unity of his experience. In his conse­
had an intensity equal to X's feeling, then X might be unas­ quent nature " there is no loss, no obstruction" (PR 524). His re­
similable into A's satisfaction. What is true of intensities in the action to each feeling can be fully appropriate. His subj ective
datum is true also of qualitative patterns (PR 356) in the datum. forms can be perfectly adequate to their data. God's conforma­
Only by playing down certain intensities in the datum and tion to his physical data ; unlike the conformation of actual occa­
simplifying its qualitative pattern can A achieve a satisfaction sions, is perfect. In this way God is the "chief exemplification "
of its own. (PR 5 2 1 ) of the conformity of subj ective form.
This imperfect conformation of an occasion to the subjective
forms of its datum is like the imperfect sympathy one human be­ b. This doctrine of unlimited divine hospitality and perfect
ing may have with another. The full intensity of N's pain or conformation would stand alongside a companion doctrine, which
pleasure may be too much for M to bear. The full richness of we may call the doctrine of unlimited divine supplementation.
N's emotional response may be too complex for M to appreciate. The subj ective forms of God's physical prehensions are perfectly
The qualities and intensities of N 's feeling thus pose a threat to supplemented in his satisfaction by the subjective forms of his
M's integrity of experience, a threat against which M may defend prehensions of alternative possibilities. This is another respect
himself by some mode of aversion or depreciation. In this way M in which God is the chief exemplification of the categories.
may compete with N for satisfaction. It is a general principle "That mental functioning introduces
In God's experience this is not so. His aim is at the actualization into realization subj ective forms conformal to relevant alterna­
of all possibilities, not at some definite and limited outcome. tives excluded from the completeness of physical realization" (AI
3 3 3 ; see PR 2 80-7, 367) . This principle holds for both actual occa­
The primordial created fact is the unconditioned conceptual sions and God (PR 4 96 ) . But the importance of mentality varies
valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects (PR 46) . widely from subj ect to subject, and in many subj ects the addition
There is not j ust one 'ideal' order (PR 1 2 8 . See RM 1 52-4; PR of contrasting alternatives is negligible. The extreme case at the
48, 50, 75, 1 60-1, 52 1-2). lower limit is " pure conformation." "Such pure conformation
·
354 H O W T H E W ORLD AFFE CTS GOD DOES GOD HAVE C O N F ORMAL F E E L I N GS ? 355

involves the exclusion o f all the contraries involved i n the lure, feature of Whitehead's account of causal objectification within
with their various grades of proximity and remoteness" (PR 2 85) . the temporal world was the o b ligation on an actual occasion to
For practical purposes we assume pure conformation in the life repeat the subj ective form of its datum. This was his interpreta­
history of a stone. This would be "undifferentiated endurance" tion of the efficacity of actual occasions. The datum imposes the
with complete absence of mentality, an assumption reflected in obligation to conform. We found this feature added not as an
the traditional doctrine of material substance. Whitehead adds additional part of the analytical mechanism of repetition but as
that we have no direct evidence of undifferentiated endurance an assertion of the dynamically efficient character of the process
(PR 2 85) . " Pure" (or we might say "mere" or "bare") conforma­ of transition.
tion is at the (hypothetical) opposite extreme from what I have Suppose we should say that actual occasions impose on God an
called " perfect" conformation. obligation to conformity, that actual occasions make God repeat
In any actual occasion this enrichment of physical experience their subj ective forms. How could this be interpreted? We would
by mentality will be limited. Only part of the totality of con­ have to say that this obligation is not a limitation on God
trasts that define the actual datum will be felt. Not all eternal in j ust the same way it is a limitation on actual occasions.
objects will be effectively felt. Hence some contrasts will not be The actual world limits an actual occasion in two senses. (i)
experienced. This is not the case with God's experience. Since The facts that confront its initial aim are results of "transcendent
he envisages all eternal objects, all possible contrasts will be felt, decision," not its own "immanent decision" (PR 248-9). The con­
and with maximal intensity. God's experience is therefore at the crescence has no choice but to begin with these given facts. This
opposite extreme from the hypothetical case of pure conformation. is one way in which the data limit the occasion. (ii) Some of these
All the contraries in the "objective lure" ( PR 2 8 1 ) are felt. None facts are unwelcome to the concrescence. Hence it must eliminate
are excluded. God's supplementation of his physical data is un­ from its initial datum and conform imperfectly to its obj ective
limited or, we might better say, perfect. datum. The data include obstructions to its satisfaction and thus
This perfect supplementation of physical data by mentality limit its satisfaction in a stronger sense of limitation.
enables God's hospitality and his conformation to be perfect. The obligation to conformity limits God's physical experience
Every achievement of actuality can find its place in a meaningful in the first sense but not in the second and stronger sense of limita­
pattern. Thus it can add something to the complex unity of God's tion. The facts that confront God's subj ective aim result from
satisfaction and hence to the richness of actuality. In God's ex­ transcendent decision. An actual occasion does something God
perience, " The wisdom of subj ective aim prehends every actuality cannot do. It adds a creative determination to the world and thus
for what it can be in such a perfected system . . . . the good they imposes a limitation on God's experience. God has no choice but
did achieve in individual joy, in individual sorrow, in the in­ to begin his physical experience with these facts.
troduction of needed contrast, is yet saved by its relation to the But we cannot say that God does not "want" these facts to be
completed whole" (PR 525). given. For the decisions of actual occasions are conditioned by
In this way God, and God alone, can enter fully into every initial aims derived from God himself. Certainly God is not com­
perspective and value fully every finite achievement. His con­ pletely "satisfied" by the decision of any one occasion, or indeed
formation is perfect because his power of supplementation is un­ by the decisions of any finite set of actual occasions. But the
limited. In both respects he is the chief exemplification of the satisfaction of his aim is not obstructed by any of the data he
categories. He does perfectly what actual occasions do imperfectly. prehends. His hospitality is perfect and his satisfaction requires
no eliminations or imperfections of conformation. In this sense
With this provisional explanation of how God might have con­ the obligation to conformity is not a limitation on God's sati$­
formal feelings let us turn to another side of our problem. One faction.
 H OW THE WORLD AFFE CTS GOD DOES GOD ' S SATISFACT I O N ALTER? 3 57
Finally w e may sum u p i n three stages an answer t o the ques­ FR 1 9-2 5, 2 8 ; ESP 1 1 8-1 9) . And suppose the intensity of God's
tion with which we began, Does God have conformal feelings? satisfaction varied directly with the aggregate intensity of finite
(i) If there were no actual occasions God would have no physical satisfactions in the course of nature. Then it would follow that
feelings. We might say that actual occasions evoke God's phys­ as entropy progressed the intensity of God's satisfaction would
ical feelings. (ii) God "repeats" or "re-enacts" or "reproduces" diminish.
in his physical feelings the subj ective forms he finds in the experi­ w·ould it follow, further, that as the intensity of God's satis­
ences of actual occasions. Indeed his power of unlimited con­ faction diminished, the intensity of actual occasions would in
ceptual supplementation enables him to re-enact them perfectly. turn diminish? If so there would be a reciprocal effect, accelerat­
(iii) An obligation to re-enaction is imposed on God by the deci­ ing the process of entropy. This is suggested by the fact that, in
sions of actual occasions. But this is not a restrictive limitation the derivation of initial aim from God, the subject's feeling con­
on his satisfaction. forms to God's subj ective form of feeling.
We need not confine the problem to macroscopic changes in
nature. For the aggregate intensity of actual occasions in some
5. Do actual occasions alter God's satisfaction?
epoch depends on the intensities of the particular occasions in
Let us recapitulate two main points already settled. First, that epoch. If the intensity of God's satisfaction is affected by the
actual occasions contribute data for God's physical feelings. Phys­ aggregate intensity of occasions in some epoch, then it is affected
ical feelings are essential to God's satisfaction. Thus actual occa­ by each individual satisfaction in some way or other. And this
sions are necessary to the constitution of God as an actual entity. is the premise we need to consider. Does an actual occasion alter
Second, actual occasions evoke appropriate subjective forms of the intensity of God's satisfaction? An answer to this question
feeling in God. The subj ective forms of God's feelings conform to might be affirmative or negative. Let us consider the consequences
the achievements of actual occasions. In this way actual occasions of each answer.
affect the qualitative pattern of God's experience. They affect a. Suppose the intensity o f an actual occasion does alter the
both the quality of his component physical feelings and the quali­ intensity of the divine satisfaction. Then God's satisfaction would
tative pattern of his satisfaction. In some degree every actual occa­ remain constant in intensity if, but only if, the aggregate intensity
sion affects the total quality of God's experience. of finite satisfactions remained constant. Is there any principle
The how of God's feeling of satisfaction includes two elements, in Whitehead's system which would guarantee this condition? I
the qualitative pattern and the intensity of his feeling (see PR know of no such principle. If this condition were not guaranteed
356-7) . We ask now whether actual occasions affect the intensity in some way, then the consequences of entropy pointed out above
of God's satisfaction, as well as its qualitative pattern. Does the would be a real possibility. Does Whitehead's system countenance
intensity of the divine satisfaction vary with variations in the this possibility?
intensities of actual occasions in the course of nature? Or is there b. Suppose on the contrary that the intensity of an actual occa­
some factor of compensation in the divine nature which operates sion does not alter the divine intensity. This is not an unreason­
to keep the intensity of God's satisfaction constant, whatever the able supposition. For God's satisfaction is an integral feeling, to
course of nature may be? which both his physical feelings and his conceptual feelings con­
Let us take the case of some large-scale change in nature. Sup­ tribute. His conceptual feelings supplement his physical feelings
pose entropy operated to diminish the aggregate intensity of the as we have seen. And the intensities of these supplementary feel­
actual occasions in some cosmic epoch (PR 1 39-4 1) . Whitehead ings might compensate for variations in the aggregate intensity of
seems to think this is happening in our own epoch (RM 1 60; finite satisfactions. In the "supplemental stage" that succeeds the
 'l
i

H O W THE W ORLD AFFECTS G O D DOES GOD ' S SAT ISFACTION ALTER ? 359
stage o f "pure reception " in a concresce nce, "In the language of aim is achiev ed in a satisfaction, then the satisfaction must have
physical science, the 'scalar' form overwhel ms the original 'vector' absolute intensity. . .
So I sugges t that the qualita tive pattern of God s s �t1sfact1 0�
form : the origins becom e subordinate to the individua l experi­ ,
ence. The vector form is not lost, but is submerged as the founda­ varies with the advanc e of nature , accord ing to the specific quali­
tion of the scalar superstru cture" (PR 323). The influx of con­ ties and intensi ties of finite satisfac tions, but that the intensi ty of
ceptual feelings gives the experienc e its own particular emotional God's satisfac tion is invaria nt. By the introdu ction of significant
characte r including, presuma bly, its final intensity . contrasts he avoids, in his own satisfac tion, all those inhibit ions
Gran ted then (i) some physical feelings, and granted (ii) un­ (AI 329) which limit the intensi ties of actual occasions. It would
limit ed supplem entation by propositi ons and other contrasts emo­ follow that the progress of entropy-even though disastrous for
tionally felt, then the intensity of God's satisfacti on would be in­ human life and, more genera lly, ordered societie s of actual occa­
depende nt of the intensiti es of the occasion s he prehends. It sions-would not alter the intensi ty of God's satisfac tion.
would not be a simple function of the intensiti es of his physical �
Suppos e on the other hand an evoluti onary process in. t e op­
data. posite direction, a produc tion of individ uals and soc1et1e s of
Therefore it would not be diminish ed or increased by large­ greater comple xity and intensity than those .we n ?w know. hen !
scale changes in the course of nature. The physical running down the aggregate intensity of the actual occas10ns m the umvers e
of the universe in a particul ar epoch, resulting in fainter and might increase . Still this would not increase the intensity of God's
fainter intensit ies of finite satisfact ions, would not diminis h God's satisfact ion. For "all realizat ion is finite" (AI 330) and the exclude d
intensity . It might be the case that "The universe is laying the alternatives are still infinite.
foundat ion of a new type [of order], where our present theories This conclus ion bears on a questio n which has sometim es em­
of order will appear as trivial" (ESP [1 932] u 8-1 9). Whethe r or barrasse d evolutionary philoso phers. If reality is an evolutionary
not more complex types of order do emerge in the future, the process with a cumula tive effect, and if past ti �e is .infi� ite, th� n
possib ilities of new types of order would add intensity to God's it would seem that the universe must be now mfimte m density
experi ence of his physic al data. or intensity of actualit y. How then is further progres s possible ?
Which of these two supposi tions should we make, as an inter­ In Whiteh ead's system negativ e prehens ions make it possible
pretation of Whiteh ead's theory? Should we suppose that an actual to interpre t such principl es as the conservation of energy in the
occasio n alters the intensi ty of God's satisfac tion, or that it does temporal world. The intensity. of a . � ew concres cence 1s . not . a
n ot? The second seems more in accord with Whiteh ead's prin­ simple sum or product of the mtens1t 1es of the past. For It will
.
ciples. The only point in favor of the first is that actual occasio ns exclude some aspects of the past by negative prehens ions. Thus
are clearly meant to affect God. But this is satisfied by the other the process of transitio n from one occasion to its successo r need
effects we have noticed . Actual occasio ns contrib ute data for God's not result in cumula tion of intensit ies.
feelings and affect the qualita tive pattern of his feeling . But we have concluded that God has no negative prehens ions.
I ? £avor � f the second suppos ition is the following passage and So the question still has point in referenc e to the consequ ent
. .
its 1mphca t10n : "Each occasion exhibits its measur e of creative nature of God. If more and more actuality is achieved as time
empha sis in propor tion to its measur e of subj ective intensi ty. goes by, and if all is included in God and nothing is ever lost,
The absolu te standard of such intensi ty is that of the primord ial then does God get "bigger and bigger"? Is the consequ ent nature
nature of God, which is . neither great nor small because it arises of God cumulat ive? The answer to this question may be given
out of no actual world" (PR 75; see 1 35, 1 60). I take this to mean in two parts. .
that God's primordial aim is at absolu te intens ity. And if a. The first part of the answer leads back to the theory of ob-
this
 H O W THE W ORLD AFFE CTS GOD THE RELEVA N C E O F P O S S I B ILITIES
jectification. The objectification o f actual occasions i n God, must bear some fruitful relation t o its actual world. The possi­
effected by God's physical prehensions, does not mean "that one
actual entity is added to another simp liciter" (PR 80) . By now this
bility it prehends must be in an effective sense possible n th s � �
world. "The objectification of God in a temporal sub� ect IS
should be abundantly clear. Actual occasions are not present in effected by the hybrid feelings with God's conceptual feelmgs as
God with their own subj ective immediacy. They are the objects data. Those of God's feelings which are positively prehended are
of God's prehensions, and they exist in God only in the mode those with some compatibility of contrast, or of identity, with
of obj ective immortality. They condition but they do not com­ physical feelings transmitted from the temporal �orld" (PR 3 77 ) .
pletely determine the subj ective forms of God's physical feel­ .
This means that the effective relevance of the primordial nature
ings. The intensity of any one of God's physical feelings is not of God for an actual occasion depends on the actual w.orld of that
a simple function of the intensity of its datum. Therefore, in occasion. Let us ask further how this is so. ·

the first place, an increase in the aggregate intensity of a cosmic

epoch need not result in an increase in the aggregate intensity
�
Like any other actual entity God is a concresc �nce o c?ncept� al
and physical feelings. His primordial n � ture is con! oir;i ed with
of God's physical feelings. his consequent nature in a unity of experience. Funct10� mg as �n
b. The second part of the answer depends on the interpreta­ initial datum for an actual occasion A, God is a umfied satis­
tion offered above. The intensity of God's satisfaction is not a faction, of which his conceptual and physical feelings are com-
simple product of the intensities of his physical feelings. Indeed,
ponents. .
it is not altered by any changes in the temporal world. Therefore
Now compare A with an antecedent occas10n X. In two com­
there can be no cumulation of intensity in the divine nature.
plementary ways A's experience of God will differ from X's ex­
perience of God. In the first place X has laid down conditions to
6. Actual occasions and the relevance of possibilities which the concrescence of A must conform. The actual world of
A is thus different from the actual world of X, and as a result of
So far we have concentrated on the consequent nature of God
this difference in actual worlds A prehends God from another
which "evolves in its relationship to the evolving world without
derogation to the eternal completion of its primordial conceptual
�
perspective than that of X. In �he secon place, this differenc e
,
of perspective is matched by a differe�ce m th � c �ntent of God s
nature" (PR i g) . But there is a sense in which even the primordial
own experience. The divine satisfact10n funct10nmg as a datum
nature of God changes in its relationship to the changing world
for A includes a component prehension of X that was absent from
of actual occasions.
the divine satisfaction functioning as a datum for X. Thus A's
God's vision of pure possibilities is eternally complete. There
experience of God differs from X's experience of God in respect
are no new eternal objects. Pure possibilities do not b ecome. But
to its perspective and its datum.
in the course of nature possibilities become relevant which were As a consequence, ideal possibilities in God's conceptual ex­
not relevant before (MT 1 30). More exactly, since all eternal ob­
j ects are relevant in some way or other to every concrescence,
perience which were not effectively relevant for
_
� will be effe�­
tively relevant for A. For God's �wn experience 1� a systematic
possibilities become effectively relevant that were not so before. unity. The changing content of his physical experie�ce effects a
There are ideas whose hour has not yet come. They must wait shift in the patterning of the relevance of eternal objects.
for an actual world than can harbor them. Now the reason for this difference in the relevance of eternal
This is because a novel concrescence must conform to its actual objects is the achievement of X. It is the s � lf-creative �ctivity
world. Within this world it must achieve its satisfaction. There­ of X that has made the difference, by presentmg a cond1t10n _ for
fore the initial aim it derives from the primordial nature of God
the new concrescence and by affecting the data and the qualita-
 TRAN S C E N D E N C E AND I M M A N E N C E THE PRIN C I P LE O F RE LATIVITY
the postulate o f rationality. Reason cannot deal with anything prise o f speculative philosophy a s such. This humility sprang
out of all relation to experience. Absolute transcendence of ex­ from a healthy sense of human finitude, and kept him relatively
perience cannot be rationally conceived. "Faith in reason is the free from that pride of intellect from which some rationalistic
trust that the ultimate natures of things lie together in a harmony philosophers have suffered. He seems to have thought that reality
which excludes mere arbitrariness" (sMw 26. See 3 9 ; RM 24; PR transcended not only his own system but any possible system of
1 4, 6 7 ; AI 1 37) . metaphysics.2
The principle o f relativity with its consequent denial o f abso­ This humility about the enterprise of speculative philosophy
lute transcendence is as true of God as of actual occasions. God comes out in Whitehead's warnings against philosophical dog­
is a "potential" for every finite becoming and every actual occa­ matism. Any speculative scheme is but an imperfect account of
sion is a potential for the divine becoming. God is not absolutely the universe. No set of categories brings out all the aspects of
transcendent of the world or of any particular actual occasion. actuality exactly and completely (RM 1 45)· "Metaphysical cate­
How serious is this denial of an absolutely transcendent deity, gories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tenta­
and what does it entail? tive formulations of the ultimate generalities" (PR 1 2) . Philosophy
Certainly it does not imply there are no specific differences can advance, but a final formulation of first principles is not to be
between God and actual occasions. Indeed we have had to ask hoped for. "The proper test is not that of finality, but of progress"
whether or not these differences were so great that some categories (PR 2 1 ) .
fail to apply to God. This was the problem of Chapter 15. Denial These warnings against dogmatic rationalism give n o encour­
of absolute transcendence leaves untouched some very strong agement to intellectual timidity. They are consistent with that
senses of the "transcendence" of God, as we shall see. In the lec­ speculative boldness Whitehead advocated and exemplified. They
ture on immortality he says, "Of course we are unable to con­ are not designed to discourage speculation. They are designed to
ceive the experience of the Supreme Unity of Existence" (IMM encourage criticism of the results of speculation. His sense of the
698) . limits of reason should not be overlooked in evaluating his denial
Further, suppose this denial i s understood-as i t s e ems to be of absolute transcendence.
by Whitehead-as a consequence of the aim at "metaphysical The principle of relativity has another important consequence.
rationalization" (RM 70) . Then it remains a reasonable question It entails rej ection of absolute immanence as well as absolute tran­
whether even stronger senses of transcendence than we find in scendence. "M is absolutely immanent in N," where M and N
his system might be compatible with this aim, if it were carried are actualities, might mean that M is included by N and · in: no
out in some other way. Rej ection of absolute transcendence leaves sense excluded by N. For example one might say the world has
a good deal of room for theological debate.
expression of my reaction to these chapters is but a slight loss. The progress
Finally another sort of question is left open. Is the impulse to of philosophy does not primarily involve reactions of agreement or dissent.
metaphysical rationalization itself subject to any judgment from It essentially consists in the enlargement of thought, whereby contradictions
beyond itself? As a matter of fact Whitehead's own rationalism and agreements are transformed into partial aspects of wider points of view.
is not unqualified, though it is very strong. I do not have in mind Thus my own reaction to this book should consist in devoting many years
to rewriting my previous works. Unfortunately this is impossible" (Schilpp
just now his genuine humility about his own system, though this
664).
is clear enough.1 I am pointing to his humility about the enter- 2. In conversation in 1 942 I was suggesting some possible inconsistencies
i. It is nowhere clearer than in his letter to Professor Schilpp in 1 9 4 1 , in his writings. His reply was: "Yes, we must be systematic. Of course, when
when he w a s eighty years old, remarking on his inability t o reply to the we are perfectly systematic we may be quite sure we have left out the funda­
essays in The Library of Living Philosophers : "The absence of any direct mental principle of reality. Nevertheless we must be systematic."
 TRA N S C E N D E N C E A N D I M M A N E N C E HOW THE W ORLD TRA N S C E N D S G O D
no existence except as a part or aspect of God, or that God has determine the nature of the actual world to which it must con­
no existence except as a part or aspect of the world. form. And in a special and crucial way it is conditioned by God.
But this possibility is ruled out. M cannot be absolutely im­ For its conceptual aim, which initiates its unity, is d�rived from
manent in N because no actual entity is merely something for God. In spite of this conditioning, the concre�cence Is not com­
some other actual entity or entities. An actual entity is also some­ pletely determined by its actual world even mcludI. �g �od. It
thing for itself. It is an element in the concrescences of other is an instance of conditioned freedom. Its freedom v1s-a-vis God
actual entities, to be sure. But the converse is also true. Other is expressed in three ways: (i) in the aut�n?1?Y of the subjecti: e
actual entities are elements in its own concrescence. In this way form with which it responds to the possibility that becomes its
the principle of relativity calls for a principle of real individual­ subjective aim; (ii) in its specification of its subjectiv� ai1? in re�a­
ity according to which "every actual entity, including God, is tion to its given environment; and (iii) in its actuah.zat10?- of its
something individual for its own sake; and thereby transcends the aim in concrete experience, terminating in its satisfact10n. In
rest of actuality" (PR I 35) · It is with this consequence in mind these ways the actual occasion does what even Go� � annot do for
that Whitehead says, "This principle of relativity is the axiom it; it expresses the originative principle of creativity. For the� e
by which the ontological principle is rescued from issuing in an reasons, to say actual occasions are "derivative" from God is. mis­
extreme monism" (PR 2 24; see SMW 38). leading.
Thus the principle of relativity applied to actual entities re­ b. In the second place an actual occasion transcends God by
quires both transcendence of others and immanence in others. excluding from its experience the subjective immediacy of ?od's
An actual entity is both a subject and a superject. As a subject experience. The subjective immediacy of the concrescence is ex­
it transcends all other actual entities. As a superject it is self­ clusive of the subjective immediacy of God. Even from God there
transcendent; it transcends its own subjective experience by be­ is no literal flow of feeling into the new concrescence. As a sub­
coming immanent in other actual entities. In the ·remainder of ject, the experience of the actual occasi�n is privat.e. "�n a� tual
this chapter I shall sum up the ways in which the world of actual entity considered in reference to the privacy of thmgs is a sub­
occasions transcends God and is immanent in God, and the ways ject' " (PR 443) .
in which God transcends the world and is immanent in the world: The categoreal necessity of this exclusiveness f? llows fr?m t? e
aim at unity of experience. If the concrescence is . t? a� hieve . its
2. How the world transcends God: Actual occasions own internal unity of satisfaction, other actual enuu:s �ncludn� g
as subjects God must be objectified for it. They can be present i� it .only. m
their objective immortality, not in their own . subj �ctive Im­
Once more we ask, Does Whitehead's doctrine of God com­ mediacy. So this second mode of transcendence is logi�ally con­
promise the real individuality of actual occasions? Is the influence nected with the first mode. For if God's own prehens10ns were
of God on actual occasions so potent and so intimate as to reduce present in the new concrescence with their own subjective im­
actual occasions, in effect, to modes of the divine existence? We mediacy there would be no room for the free self-determination
have seen how an actual occasion transcends other actual occa­ of the concrescence. Other actualities, including God, must be
sions. Are there also important ways in which an actual occasion o bjects for the new concrescence if it is to function creatively as
transcends God? In preceding chapters we noticed two important a su bject. Privacy of experience is required for the freedom of
and related ways in which an actual occasion transcends God. actual occasions.
a. An actual occasion transcends God by being self-creative. In these ways, in its freedom and in its privacy, a� actual oc­
Its concrescence is conditioned by other actual occasions, which casion transcends God. For these reasons actual occas10ns cannot
 TRANSCENDE N CE A N D I M M A N E N C E HOW G O D TRAN SCENDS THE W ORLD 37 1

b e interpreted a s organic parts o f God. The universe cannot be occasions. Indirectly, by their effect on the consequent nature of
construed as a divine organism, if this means that actual occasions God, actual occasions affect the relevance of the possibilities en­
are parts of God in the way the internal experiences of an actual visaged in God's primordial nature.
entity are components of its own unity of satisfaction. Even Finally it must be remembered that without the immanence of
though God conditions actual occasions in the very important actual occasions in God's experience God would be abstract and
ways explained in Chapter 1 6, a genuine meaning remains for the deficient in actuality. His physical prehensions, by which actual
real individuality of finite actual entities. occasions become immanent in God, are necessary to his being as
a concrete actual entity.

3. How the world is immanent in God : Actual occasions

as superjects 4. How God transcends the world: God as subject
Actuality involves self-transcendence. Any actual entity tran­ Like any other actual entity God is an experiencing subject,
scends itself. In addition to being something for itself (a subject), "something individual for its own sake." He is a unity of experi­
it becomes something for other actual entities (a superj ect) . Its ence, from which his primordial nature and his consequent na­
self-transcendence consists in its immanence in other actualities. ture are abstractions. He is one being, not two. We ask how God
Here we are concerned with the immanence of actual occasions in as an experiencing subject transcends the world. We find that it is
God. We may say an actual occasion is present in God obj ectively, by virtue of the freedom, the privacy, and the perfection of his
completely, and effectively. experience.
a. Actual occasions are present in God o bjectively, not in their a. Like all actual entities God is self-creative. He is an embodi­
own subj ective immediacy. Objectification means the perishing (
ment or "creature" of creativity. He is causa sui PR 1 35), an act
of i �mediacy. They are objectified data for God's physical pre­ of self-realization. It is true of God, as of actual occasions, that
hens10ns and as such they enter into the complex datum of God's " 'decided' conditions are never such as to banish freedom" PR (
subj ectively immediate satisfaction. 435) . Actual occasions supply data for God's feelings, to which the
b. Though actual occasions are present in God's experience as subj ective forms of his feelings conform. But they do not de­
objects, not as experiencing subj ects, they are completely present termine his subj ective aim, and therefore do not determine how
in God's experience. God's subj ective aim does not require elim­ his subj ective forms conform to their data. Actual occasions condi­
inat ons from h s ph �sical data. Thus all of the feelings composing
� � tion but do not determine God's experience. In this way the
the mtegral sat1sfact10n of the occasion are present objectively in freedom of God's experience exemplifies the categories that apply
God's experience. All that the actual occasion achieved is felt by to actual entities.
God. The immanence of actual occasions in God is complete, Further, in this respect as in others God is the chief exemplifica­
though obj ective. tion of the categories. This is because his subjective aim, which
c. Actual occasions are effectively present in God's experience. determines the subj ective forms of his feelings, is primordial,
The subj ective forms of God's physical prehensions conform per­ (
wholly derivative PR 523) from his primordial nature. And his
fectly to their data. Thus the character of the actual occasion af­ (
primordial nature is unconditioned PR 46) by any actual world.
fects the quality of God's physical prehensions and consequently "His unity of conceptual operations is a free creative act, un­
the qualitative pattern-though not the intensity-of his satisfac­ trammelled by reference to any particular course of things" PR (
tion. God's consequent nature thus varies with the creative ad­ 5 2 2 ; see 47, 378). Therefore God is free to supplement his phys­
vance of nature in accord with the finite achievements of actual ical feelings from an infinite range of conceptual valuations, as
 H O W G O D TRA N S C E N D S THE W ORLD 373
37 2 TRAN SCENDENCE AND IM MANENCE
occasion. N o eliminat ions from the initial data, whether con­
w e have seen. I n these ways God's freedom contrasts with the
ceptual or physical, are necessary for the unity of his satisfacti on.
limited though genuine freedom of actual occasions. God's free­
Hence God has no negative prehensio ns. Both in his primordial
dom is freedom at a maximum.
nature and in his consequ ent nature he is nonexcl usive. His ap­
b. Another way God's experience transcends actual occasions is
petition for possibili ties and his hospital ity to facts are both un­
by its privacy . Of God no less than of actual occasions it is true that
limited.
"Prehensions have public careers, but they are born privately"
In this way God transcends actual occasion s. For they must
(PR �44). No actual occasion shares God's own subj ective im­
elimina te some facts and possibili ties from their experien ce to
mediacy. However crucial, inescapable, and decisive the influence
achieve a unified satisfact ion. For example , an actual occasion does
of G �d in the _world may be, his subj ective immediacy of experi­
not experie nce the individ ual actualit ies of its contem poraries
�
ence is sm ethmg God does not and cannot share with any other
and successo rs. Also it selects only certain aspects of past actualit y
a� tual entity. He enters into the composition of other actual en­
. for positive prehens ion. Again, some pure potentia ls will be pre­
.
� �
titles, as hey nter into the composition of his experience, only
hended only negatively .
by ob3 ect1ficat10n. In this respect God exemplifies the categories.
God transce nds these finite limitati ons. His experie nce is in­
W� ask : further, whether in this respect God is the ch ief ex­
finite in scope. It is true that, relative to some standpo int, God
� �
mphfic t10n of the categories. Is God's experience even more
has not then experien ced those actualit ies which will come into
.
�
maccess1ble to an actu I occasion than are the privacies of other
being in the future. But he eternall y experie nces all pure po­
actual occas10ns? Certamly this would seem to be so. But it is so
not because God has a different mode of existence from that of tentials, includin g those specially relevant to the future becomi ngs.
And since he is everlast ing he will, in the future relative to that
�
act al occasions, but because the content of his experience is
standpo int, experie nce the actualit ies of those becomings. He
umque. If we had no categories at all with which to indicate
God's mode of existence within himself, we could form no con­ experie nces every actuali ty in its own time. Thus his experie nce
ception of his bei?g. Qua privacy God's experience is no more, include s every other entity as a datum for feeling ; possibi lities are
felt as possibil ities, actualit ies are felt as actualit ies. Nothin g is
� �
and no less, ac ess1ble o actual occasions than are the experiences
exclude d. His satisfac tion is "a Harmony of Harmonies" (Ar 3 8 1 ),
� �
of other o cas : ons. Pn ·acy and publicity, subj ective immediacy
. a unificat ion of experie nce achieve d out of an infinite diversit y of
and ob3ect1:e immortality, are modes of existence. In this respect
the categories do not seem to admit of more or less. But we now facts and possibi lities as data for feeling .
turn to the way God's experience differs from the experiences of ii. The perfect ion of God's experie nce applies to the subject ive
actual occasions in content. forms of his feelings as well as to their data. His response to the
data is perfect in quality, and his satisfac tion is perfect in intensi ty.
c. God as an experiencing subj ect differs from all other ex­
No greater adequa cy or intensi ty of feeling is conceiv able.
perie cing subj :cts in the perfection of his experience. His experi­
� The perfect ion of the quality of God's respon se consist s in the
�
en e is perfect m scope, in q uality of response, and in intensity.
fact that he experi ences every datum with perfect adequa cy. An
� �
I . God ranscen s actual occasions by the perfection of the
actual occasio n respon ds imperfectly to its data. It cannot feel
�
scop � �� his e penence, which is infinitely inclusive of fact and
anothe r actuali ty with comple te sympa thy, so to speak. For the
poss1b1hty. His conceptual experience excludes none of the un­
sake of its own unity it must exclud e some aspects of the datum .
bounde � ��ltiplic ity of eternal objects. He prehends and values
. What remain s is an abstrac tion from the full actuali ty of the past
all poss1b1ht1es. His physical experience excludes nothing in the to
. . occasio n. Some of the qualiti es of its feelings are not respon ded
domam of fimte actuality. He prehends all actual occasions, and is imperf ect.
and re-enacted. Th e conformation
he prehends all the components of the satisfaction of every actual
374 TRAN S C E N D E N C E AND I M MA N E N CE HOW GOD TRA N S C E N DS THE W ORLD 375
God on the contrary can accept and value the achievement of physical feelings and by its limited capacity for conceptual sup­
each actual occasion for j ust what it is, without distortion or de­ plementation of physical feeling. Since the scope of God' � p ys­ �1
preciation. His response is appropriate to the full richness of ical feelings is not thus limited, and since he is capable of unlimited
quality achieved in the occasion. His re-enaction of the feelings conceptual supplementation, his intensity as well as the scope
of actual occasions is in this way perfect. and quality of his experience is perfect. In this respect also he
This perfection of quality is made possible by the infinite scope transcends actual occasions.
of God's conceptual experience. Perfect conformation is possible To avoid misundersta nding we should notice certain senses in
because unlimited supplementation is available. God aims at which God's experience is not "perfect" as well as these senses in
the realization of all possibilities, each in its own time whenever which it is perfect. (a) God's experience is not perfect in the sense
that might be. Hence God can never be disappointed, so to speak, of being absolutely complete. God is complete in the sense that
by whatever happens now, for any temporal "now." Whatever he is always satisfied, relative to any standpoint i � th � cou_rse of
happens can be supplemented by contrasts derived from his con­ nature. Though new prehensions are added to his bem � , m t e �
ceptual experience, so as to lead to satisfaction. Here as elsewhere course of nature, they cannot increase or decrease the mtens1ty
it is clear that the perfection of God's experience arises from the of his satisfaction . He is a complete unity of experience relative
unity of his primordial with his consequent nature. to any "now" in the course of nature. But he is never complete in
iii. God's experience is perfect in its intensity, as well as in its an absolute sense, so that no new experiences could be added to
scope and quality. His subjective aim is at maximum realization. his being. He always has appetition for unrealized possibilitie s.
H e values all eternal obj ects as possibilities for realization. This It follows (b) that God is not absolutely independe � t of th�
aim is unconditioned by any particular situation and transcends happenings of the world. The qualitative pa � tern of his experi­
all limited obj ectives. No negative prehension, which would di­ ence is affected by the qualities of actual occas10ns. And the struc­
minish the intensity of the aim, is included in the primordial ture of his satisfaction is affected by the intensities of actual oc­
nature of God. God's subj ective aim is unconditioned and un­ casions, determining the degree and kind of supplem �ntatio �
limited. "The absolute standard of such [subjectiveJ intensity is necessary for his satisfaction . In these ways God's experience is
that of the primordial nature of God, which is neither great nor affected by the course of nature and therefore is not absolutely
small because it arises out of no actual world" (PR 75) . independent of the world.
This aim i s achieved i n God's satisfaction. I n this unified feel­ .
Thourrh God is neither absolutely complete nor absolutely m-
ing an unimaginable complexity and diversity of data is felt with � �
depende t, this does not detract from his per ection if "perfec­
perfect qualitative adequacy and ordered into a harmony of con­ tion" is construed in Whitehead's way. In his system absolute
trasts. Since it is perfect in scope and in adequacy of quality it is completene ss and absolute independen ce are categoreall� i �­
also perfect in intensity. No inhibitions (AI 3 2 9-30) diminish its possible. Hence to lack these attributes is not to lack any sigmf-
intensity. Just as the intensity of God's subj ective aim is not condi­ icant perfection.
tioned by any particular happenings in the world, so the intensity . .
God is relatively independen t of the world, however. His exist-
of his satisfaction is not diminished or increased by particular ence, and the perfection of his experience in scope, quality, and
happenings in the world. It is not affected by the varying in­ intensity, do not depend on any particula� pattern of �ve.nts. No
tensities of actual occasions in the course of nature. matter what actual occasions come into existence, God 1s m these
An actual occasion must aim at a limited obj ective. It can be­ �
respects unchangeabl e. His relative indepen ence of the world
come only what its actual world permits it to become. The in­ follows from God's primordial character and 1s part of the mean­
tensity of its satisfaction is restricted by the limited scope of its ing of his transcenden ce of the world.
 TRAN SCENDE N CE A N D 1M MANENCE H O W GOD IS I M MANENT IN THE W ORLD 37 7
If God did not exist, then only those forms of definiteness which
5. How God i s immanent i n the world: God had been realized in the past actual world would be available for
as superject a present concrescence. God makes novel possibilities available.
Like actual occasions God exists not only as subj ect but also as God is also the structural condition of order in the world. As
superj ect. He has objective immortality as well as subjective im­ prehended by some actual occasion, God is a determinate being.
mediacy. He transcends himself, and his self-transcendence is his He is determined in part by his prehensions of the past actual
immanence in actual occasions. I shall summarize briefly three world of that occasion. God, so determined, is the initial datum of
features of God's function in the concrescences of actual occasions. the hybrid physical feeling from which the initial conceptual aim
a. The immanence of God in actual occasions is his o bjective is derived. Because of the determinate nature of this initial datum,
existence. He is present in their experience as an object, not with the obj ective datum of the feeling, namely one of God's own con­
his own subj ective immediacy. Actual occasions prehend God as ceptual prehensions, will yield a possibility which is effectively
being an actual entity with his own subjective immediacy. But for relevant to that actual world. It will be a real possibility and not
them his experience is obj ectified. I t is prehended from their own merely a pure possibility. The realm of eternal objects, though
standpoints into their own subj ectively immediate experiences. unordered in itself, has thus been ordered relative to the new
Furthermore, since for actual occasions obj ectification means ab­ concrescence by God's physical prehensions of the past actual
straction, actual occasions prehend God abstractively. They can world. Hence the novel actual occasion will bear some determinate
� ring God i � to their experience only if they eliminate, by nega­ relation to that world. Speaking of the spatiotemporal quantum or
standpoint of a concrescence Whitehead says, "The quantum is
tive prehens10ns, some aspects of his concrete unity. This is true
of one actual occasion's experience of another. It is all the more that standpoint in the extensive continuum which is consonant
true of an actual occasion's experience of God, because of the with the subj ective aim in its original derivation from God. Here
infinite scope and complexity of God's experience. 'God' is that actuality in the world, in virtue of which there is
physical 'law' " (PR 434) . 3 Here again the concrete unity of God's
b. God is immanent in the world as the source of initial con­
ceptual aim. This is one specific way in which God is objectified
conceptual and physical experience is evident.
for every actual occasion. He presents a possibility and evokes an It may be added that while God is the necessary structural
�
appet tion. " Go � 's immanence in the world in respect to his pri­ condition of novelty and order in the world, he is not the suf­
ficient condition. The creativity of the new concrescence and the
mo�"dl �l nature 1s an urge towards the future based upon an ap­
petite m the present" ( PR 47) . But it would be a mistake to sup­ particular achievements of the past are also necessary conditions
pose this is a function of only the primordial nature of God. For of a world characterized by novelty and order.
the feeling by which the novel possibility is mediated to the con­ c. If the interpretation in Chapter 1 6 of what Whitehead's
crescence is a hybrid physical feeling of God (PR 343) . This re­ principles require is correct, then God is also immanent in the
world as the ground of the givenness of the past. In a way not
minds us that the two natures of God are abstract aspects of a
concrete unity of experience. altogether clear God is essential for the continuity and solidarity
The macroscopic effect of this function of God is that novelty of the world. Some implications of this mode of divine immanence
and order are possible. God is immanent in the world as the will be noted in the following section.
nec �ssary str� ctural condition of novelty and order. "Apart from 3. See PR 315 on prehension of God as ground for nonstatistical j udg­
the mtervent10n of God, there could be nothing new in the world, ments of probability.

and no order in the world" (PR 377). He is the structural condition

of novelty because he is the reservoir of unrealized potentiality.
 TRAN S C E N D E N C E AND I M MANENCE con ' s TRAN S C E N D E N C E IN POWER 37 9

always and everywhere effective. Throughout all cosmic epochs

6 . How God transcends the world: God a s superject
and for every act of becoming, God is the source of subj ective aim
The immanence of God in the world of actual occasions is his and the ground of the givenness of the past.
obj ective immortality in actual occasions. Now Whitehead's the­ b. God transcends actual occasions also by the initiatory quality
ory of obj ectification is his account of influence or power. Thus of his power. Here the uniqueness and the activity of his role in
an account of the obj ective immortality of God in actual occasions the becoming of an actual occasion must be stressed. An actual
is in effect an account of the influence or power of God in the occasion influences another by laying down conditions to which
process of nature. the succeeding occasion must conform. It exerts efficient causa­
All actual entities have power. But when we compare the in­ tion. It demands repetition. It poses a problem. God on the con­
fluence of actual occasions with the influence of God we find trary elicits novelty. He presents a novel possibility and by the
some striking contrasts. From these contrasts we derive another intensity of his appetition evokes a responding intensity of novel
set of modes of divine transcendence. In an earlier section we feeling in the concrescence. He poses and evokes a solution to the
dealt with what we may call God's transcendence in b eing, problem set by the past.
namely the ways in which God existing in himself, as subj ect, I am aware of the need for caution in the description of this
transcends actual occasions. Here we may speak of God's tran­ mode of divine transcendence. The self-creativity of the con­
scendence in power, namely the ways in which God existing for crescence must be allowed for. Also the indispens ability of a given
other actualities, as superject, transcends actual occasions. I shall actual world, achieved by the past, must be recognized. But when
mention three modes of God's transcendence in power and show one considers the contrast between the kind of power exerted on
how, on Whitehead's principles, divine power transcends the the concrescence by the actual occasions of the given world, and
powers of actual occasions in degree and in kind. the kind of power exerted on the concrescence by God, then it is
a. God transcends actual occasions by the universal ex tension of not inappropriate for Whitehead to say that in a sense God can be
his influence. His power transcends the powers of actual occasions termed "the creator of each temporal actual entity" (PR 343) . He
by its omnipresence. He is effectively present throughout nature. rightly adds qualifications to allow for the self-creativity of the
He is "with all creation" and is obj ectified for every concrescence. concrescence, and to avoid confusion with traditional conceptions
The scope of his power is unrestricted. of divine creation. But it would be fair to say that in Whitehead's
The power of an actual occasion is on the contrary limited in system this function of God has a place analogous to doctrines of
scope. An occasion has no influence on its past actual world or on divine creation in other systems (cf. Augustine, City of God XII,
its contemporary world, but only on those occasions which suc­ 25) . The way this mode of divine activity transcends the activity
ceed it. Its influence is also limited in space as well as in time. of an actual occasion deserves careful consideration. God does
Generally speaking it will be stronger in its own neighborhood what no temporal actuality can do, either for another actuality or
and weaker in more remote regions. Its power is restricted by the for itself. He evokes novel actuality into being.
limitations of its standpoint. Does the traditional analysis of causation throw light on this
God's power transcends these limitations. There are no spatio­ mode of divine power? Some analogies are possible. God's evoca­
temporal limitations on the extent of his influence. God has no tion of novel actuality is like efficient causation in that God's
temporal origin and he does not perish; he is everlasting. And concrete unity is a given fact, to which the new concrescence must
no actuality anywhere, however faint and trivial, escapes his in­ conform. It is like formal causation in that a form of definiteness
fluence. Nor is any occasion more remote from his influence than is presented for realization. And it is like final causation in that
any other. God exists everywhere and always, and his existence is the novel possibility becomes an obj ect of appetition for the con-
 TRA N S C E N D E N C E A N D I M MA N E N C E S U M M ARY
crescence itself. But i t would b e misleading to identify this act of d. God (as subjec t) transce nds the world b y virtue o f his free­
divine power with any of the traditional modes of causation. It dom and his privacy.
combines elements of each but is different from all. In this act the e. God transcends the world also by virtue of his perfection.
divine actuality elicits and evokes the self-creativity of the con­
crescence itself. His perfection in being (as subj ect) lies in the scope, the
c. If the divine evocation of novel actuality is Whitehead's quality, and the intensity of his experience.
equivalent for the traditional doctrine of creation, God's function His perfection in power (as superj ect) lies in the unlimited
as ground of givenness might be called Whitehead's equivalent of extension of his power, his initiation of novel becomings, and
the doctrine of divine preservation. In his everlasting nature God his preservation of temporal achievements.
preserves the achievements of the past, which has perished, and
thus gives continuity and solidarity to the world. God is the Finally it may be remarke d that Whiteh ead's theory of God and
ground of the effective influence of temporal actualities as well as the world has proved to be reasona bly consiste nt and coheren t.
the ground of their novel individuality. The function s of actual occasion s supplem ent, and do not sup­
In this function also the power of God transcends the power of plant or supersed e, the function s of God. The converse is true
ctual occa � ions. As we have seen, an actual occasion decides by also. God does not negate or inhibit or compete with actual oc­
�
its own achievement of satisfaction what shall be given for future casions. On the contrary God evokes them into being and sustains
becomings. But since it perishes it cannot be, in the future, the their achievem ents.
ground of its givenness then. There is thus a limit to its power to
enforce its own givenness.
The power of God is not limited in this way. God is everlasting.
And since his prehensions of the temporal actualities have entered
into the composition of his everlasting satisfaction, he can be the
ontological ground of their continuing influence on future be­
comings. In this sense he preserves the world in being, and in do­
ing so transcends the temporal actual entities in power. Again
God does what no temporal actuality can do.

7. Summary
The results of this chapter may be stated as follows :
a. Actual occasions (as subj ects) transcend God by virtue of their
freedom and their privacy.
b. Actual occasions (as superj ects) are immanent in God ob­
j ectively, completely, and effectively.
c . God (as superj ect) is immanent in the world objectively and
effectively.
 UNR EFL ECT IVE S UPE RNA TUR AL I S M
ect" as Pric e says, un­
all clear that h e had " finis hed with the subj
in it.
less this mea ns only that he stop ped read ing
ition al theo logy are scatt ered , un­
His criti cal rem arks on trad
CHAPTER 19 e they are inci dent al to
syste mat ic, and rela tivel y und evel oped , sinc
ir prin cipa l targ ets are :
the deve lopm ent of his own theo ry. The
assu mpt ion that God is
(a) unre flect ive supe rnat ural ism; (b) the
Whitehead and Traditional Theology the assu mpt ion that God
wholly unaffect ed by the worl d; and (c)
aini ng thes e criti cism s
is the sole dete rmin er of the world. In expl
accu racy of his historical
I shal l not raise que stions abou t the
of his own theory. The se
1 . Introduction inte rpre tatio ns. Our inte rest is in analysis
osop hica l and theo logi cal
I N T H I S C HA PTER I shall assemble and discuss Whitehead's scat­ criti cism s reve al som e of his own phil
for som e que stion s abou t
tered criticisms of traditional theology, and raise some questions assu mpt ions and give us a back grou nd
about the outcome of his own theory of God and the world. his posi tive doctrine s.
Now and then one finds appreciative comments on traditional
supernaturalism
the olog� . For example he regards "the medieval insistence on the
. 2. Wh iteh ead' s criti cism s : Unr eflec tive
�at10 �ahty of God" as one historical source of our modern faith to explaining natu re by
m sCience (sMw 1 7- 1 8 ; see 86, AI 1 45-6). In A dventures of Ideas
We begi n with Wh iteh ead' s obje ctio n
reference to a divi ne "fiat " ( PR 1 46, 5 1 9;
AI 1 54) . Part of his ob­
he proposes a constructive program for modern Protestant the­ es to desc ribe the divi ne
j ectio n is to the use of personal cate gori
ology (ch. 1 0, "The New Reformation"). And his own indebted­ disc usse d in secti on 9 be­
bein g. Thi s part of his obj ectio n will be
ne ss to the past, most of all to Plato, is amply evident and ex­ his obje ctio n, his criti cism
� . .
p 1Citly acknowledged. " Plato's God is a God of this world . . . . low . Her e we cons ider anot her part of
of unr eflec tive supernat ural ism.
S u1:ce then our concept of this world has enlarged to that of the act of will . His obje c-
By a " fiat" he mea ns an unco ndit ione d
� iptio n of . . . arbi trary
umverse. I have envisioned a union of Plato's God with a God f
tion is thus dire cted agai nst "the ascr
the universe" (DIAL 2 1 8 [dated i 943] ) . Notice also a remark th t . Exp lana tion of natu re, or
power to the natu re of God" (IMM 697)
follows a brief recital of the life of Christ: "Can there be any e to an arbitrary supe r­
of a part icul ar fact of natu re, by referenc
doubt that the power of Christianity lies in its revelation in act' ing. It does not real ly
of that which Plato � ivined in theory?" (AI 2 1 4) . natural act is unre flect ive and unil lum inat
explain wha t is to be explaine d.
E �en Plato comes m for occasional criticism, however, and most ions as such . He is ob-
He is not obje ctin g to thei stic expl anat
of his comments on traditional Jewish and Christian theology are ch fail to conn ect spec ific
j ectin g to unre flect ive explanat ions , whi
unfavorable. In many cases they are hostile . The most severe com­ ific fact s or featu res of
feat ures of the natu re of God with the spec
�ents are in the Dialogues, for example the following o b iter the world to be explaine d. The y fail
to say how the exis tenc e
d � ctu m : "I consider Christian theology to be one of the great obj ectio n to expl anat ion
disasters of the human race" (DIAL 1 74) . According to Price , Wh I't e _ and activ ity of God expl ain the facts . His
criti cism of unre flect ive or
. by divi ne fiat is ther efor e part of his
h ead rea d " a great many books on theology" in a period of several lain nature. "My point is
"easy" app eals to the supernatural to exp
ye �rs at C �mbridge "early in their wedded life." "When he had from our conv ictio n of the
fimshed with the subj ect," Price says, "for he had finished with it that any summary conclusion jum ping
the easy assu mpt ion that
; exis tenc e of such an orde r of natu re to
he called i� a Cambridge bookseller and asked what he would giv e une xp lain ed way, is to
for the lot (DIAL 1 5 1 ) . Judging from his later writings, it is not at ther e is an ulti mat e real ity whi ch, in som
382
 W H ITE HEA D A N D TRA DIT ION AL T H E O L O GY
IS G O D ' S EXISTENCE IRRATI O N A L ?
be app eale d to for the removal of perplexi
ty, cons titut es the grea t
refu sal of rati ona lity to asse rt its rights" for the existence o f God. The world o f finite things i s a n "ap­
(sMw 1 2 9-30 , my itali cs).
A simi lar poin t app ears in his criti cism
of Leib niz 1 and Ber kele y
�
parent irrational limitation" of the ntrinsicall� bo u n_dle � s do � ain
_
for mak ing "an app eal to a Deu s ex mac
h ina who was capa ble of
of possibility. Idealistic philosoph1 �s take this llmitatl
.
�� , a� a
risin g superior to the diffi cult ies of proof of illusion" and "look for reality be�md the scene. vyh1t : �
metaphysic s" (sMw 2 1 7;
"De us" for "De ux" ) . The faul t of head rejects idealism and accepts "the reality of actual � ccas10ns.
thes e phil osop hers is thei r
fai lure to app ly to God the fund ame He also accepts the need for some rational e�plan� t�on of the
ntal categories of thei r sys­ _ [1deahst1c] alt rna­
ad h o c explanat ion. Phil os­
tem s. App eal to God then beco mes existence of a temporal world. "If we reject this :
oph ers shou ld not be con tent with this tive [which places reality] behind the scene, we m � st provide a
sort of explanation, sinc e
"me taphysics requ ires that the rela tion ground for limitation which stands among the attributes of the
ship s of God to the World
shou ld lie beyo nd the acci den ts of will substantial activity" (sMw 249) .
, and that they be foun ded .
upo n the nece ssiti es of the natu re of God
and of the natu re of the
It is crucially important to understand just what km of " ex­ �
Wo rld" (AI 2 1 5) . planation" of the temporal world can and must e g1ven, on � _ .
His crit icism of the "Sem itic" con cept Whitehead's view. He accepts the necessity of a prmc1ple of
of God (which he con ­
tras ts with the "Easter n Asia tic" and
the "Pa nthe istic " con cept s) limitation." "Some particular how is necessary, and some par­
is mor e seve re. It "lea ves God com
plet ely outs ide metaphysical ticularisation in the what of matter of fact is necessary" (sMw
rati ona liza tion . . . . He is und enia 249) . If we accept the reality of the tempo:al world, then we must
bly useful, beca use anything
baffling can be ascribed to his dire ct decr be willing to explain how it is that there is such a worl , and �he
�
ee" (RM 70) . Late r on the
earl y Christian theo logians decided general way in which particular matters of fact come mto exist­
for the dire ct immanence of
God in the wor ld. But they faile d to ence.
exploit their discovery by
con stru ctin g a coherent metaphysical At the same time he is rej ecting the rationalistic deman_d that
theory, beca use of an un­
fort una te pres upp osit ion. "Th e natu the existence of a temporal world, and perhaps even the ex1sten�e
re of God was exem pted
from all the metaphysical categories
whi ch app lied to the indi vid­ of this temporal world, be shown to be logically necessary. For � f
ual thin gs in this tern por al wor ld" ( the world of nature were a product of logical necessity, then It
AI 2 i 6) . Their conception of
G od was "a sub lim atio n from its ould lose that character of givenness and "apparent irrationality"
barbaric orig in. " To be con tent
with the inco her enc e that resu lts from
this view of God is to lack
� at we started out to explain. Instead of explaining the reality
fait h in reas on. "Fa ith in reas on is
the trus t that th e ulti mat e na­ of the temporal world we would have explained it away. T_hat th:
ture s of things lie toge ther in a har
mony which exc lud es mer e
�
temporal world exists is a act. �� e problem of spe : ulat1ve phi­
arb itrarine ss. It is the faith that at
the base of things we shal l not .
�
losophy is not to deduce this fact by abstract reason , ut to con­
find mer e arbi trary mys tery " (sMw 2 struct a set of cateo-ories which will describe the cond1t10ns under
6) .
which it occurs. "How is it that a world of finite things exists?"
Whitehead accepts the demand of reason for a categoreal e�p lana­
3 . Is the exis tenc e of God irra tion al? �
tion of the temporal world. He rejects the demand or a meta­
Th is is an app rop riat e plac e for com physical" explanation of the temporal wo:·ld. "!n this a:gument
men t on Wh iteh ead 's wel l­
known remark that the exis tenc e the point to notice is, that what is metaph�s1cally mdetermmate has
of God is "the ulti mat e irra­
tion alit y" (sMw 2 49) . In the con text nevertheless to be categorically determmate. . . . The general
he is pre sent ing an argu men t
I.
principle of empiricism depends upon �he doctrine that there is a
PR AI
See also on Leib niz 289, 1 70-1 . For a similar criticism of Desc
FR 2 4, PR 289. On Plato artes principle of concretion which is not discoverable by abstract rea-
see AI
see
2 15.
son" (sMw 2 50) . ·
 W H ITEHEAD A N D TRADITI ONAL THEOLO GY G OD AS A B S O LUTELY C O M P LETE

)(
( !t
then
ex1ste nce
_
�allows th�t i f God i s the principle o f limitation,,, "His
is the u �t1mate i_rrationali ty" (sMw 249). For jl. f the
functwn of reason IS to begm with facts and to understan d their
70). In the words o f Descarte s, God was "absolut ely self-susta in­
ing" (RM i o6). God's existence required "no relations to anything
beyond himself" (AI 2 1 7) .
�
categoreal condit ons, then reason is possible only because de­
_ ate facts
This last phrase carries the main point of the doctrine White­
termm exist. The real possibili ty of reaso�ing depends on head is attacking . For there is a sense in which, in his own system,
the ex�_ stence of nat i:re. This is to say that reasonin g depends on the satisfactio n of every actual entity is "complet e." Also God is
_
, the existenc e of a pnnopl e of limitatio n which orders the bound­ complete in a way actual occasions are not. For God's primordial
( less domain of pure possibil ity. "No reason can be given for the vision includes every eternal object and his physical experien ce
( nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality" includes every actual occasion, and this boundles s reach of con­
t (sMw 250) .\ ceptual and physical experien ce is continua lly unified in an ever­
I � saying that the �xist ence of God is the ultimate irrationa lity, lasting satisfactio n. Even so this is not an absolute completi on, for
Whitehe ad is _ not saymg _ . . the being of God requires eternal objects, and God's satisfacti on
It is irrationa l to believe that God exists.
O� the contrary, the existence of a principle of limitatio n is im­ requires the producti on of novel actualitie s in the course of na­
plied by the reali�y � f the tempora l world. He is not saying that ture. God is intrinsic ally related to a boundle ss multipli city of
no reaso n for belief m the existenc e of God can be given. He is things beyond himself. Actual entities achieve internal completi on
only sa� mg _ tha � no reason can be given for "the nature of God." but are not absolutely complete.
Nor is he saymg that God himself is irration al in the sense that Whitehe ad seems to think this doctrine of the absolute com­
contrad ictory predica tes must be applied to the divine being. On pleteness of God was encouraged, if not originated , by the the­
the contrary, Whiteh ead underta kes to present a consiste nt and ology of Plato and Aristotle .2 It has since become part of the
coheren t concept ion of the nature of God and his relation to the Wes tern theologic al tradition , though it is inconsiste nt with other
world. features of that tradition.
� or i � he sayi ng that God is irration al in the sense that God acts
_
The direct conseque nce of this doctrine in early Christian the­
arbitrar ily. �h1teh ead is not himself lapsing into the unreflec tive ology was that "the World was not necessary to God" (AI 2 1 7) .
supern� turali � m h � criticize s. On the contrar y, the functio n of The indirect consequen ces of the doctrine may b e put as follows,
�
Go d with w 1ch his ar?m � ent is concern ed is the altogether im­
.
though Whitehea d does not systematiz e them in this way. If the
pai_ t1al funct10 n of a prmop le of limitat ion. world is not necessary to God, then one of the following proposi­
� �
hitehe�d s saying only that we have no pure and self-evi dent tions is true :
rat10na l pnnc1p les from which the existen ce of God ' as th e pnn · a. The world is real and God is related to the world by uncondi-
. _

. 1 e o f l imitatio
c1p ' n, could be deduce d. Our belief in the existen ce tioned acts of will.
of God is ir_ration al only in the weak sense that it is logically based b. The world is unreal.
on the reality of the given temporal world, accepte d as a fact. c . The world is real and is absolutely separated from God.
We have noticed Whitehead's criticism of the first of these
views. We need not dwell on his criticism of the second. "The pre­
4· Whitehead's criticisms : God as absolutely complete supposition of the supreme reality as devoid of change" has the
A second criticism is leveled against the doctrine that God is result that "the historic universe is degraded to a status of partial
absolutely c �mplete and self-sufficient. This doctrine belongs to a reality, issuing into the notion of mere appearance" (MT 1 09; see
�ore reftect1_ve ph �se of traditional theology. For the early Chris­ 2. See MT 1 1 1 - 1 2 . On Plato, AI 2 1 5-7, IMM 684. On Aristotle's unmoved
tian theologians, , He was internally complete" (AI 2 1 7; see RM mover, PR 5 1 9.
 W H ITEHEAD A N D TRADITIONAL THEOLOGY U N QUALIFIED O M N IP OTE N C E
PR 526) . This view dismisses "the most evident characteristic of ��
though h e does not organiz e them i n this way-are.: (a) that o 's
our experience. " "We live in a world of turmoil" (MT 1 09 . ) power is coercive power; (b) that God is respons ible for evil m
If the third proposition were true there would be a gulf be­ the world; and (c) that human effort become s insignifi cant.
tween God and the world. And "The worst of a gulf is, that it is a. On this assumpt ion God become s " the supreme agency of
very difficult to know what is happening on the further side of it. (
compuls ion" AI 2 1 3 ) The glorifica tion of God then becomes the
.

This has been the fate of the God of traditional theology. It is glorifica tion of power, a note Whitehe ad finds in Psalm 24 and
only by drawing the long bow of mysticism that evidences for his (
regards as barbaric and morally dangerous RM 55). In contrast,
(
existence can be collected from our temporal World" AI 2 1 7 . ) he says, the power of the life of Christ "lies in its absence of force"
Thus Descartes's argument for the existence of God fails, "be­ (RM 57).
cause he abstracts God from the historic universe. Thus the con­ Closely connecte d with this obj ection i s the charge that the God
clusion depends upon meaningless phrases respecting the un­ (
of tradition al theology is a divine tyrant sMW 266; RM 55, 7 4-5),
known" (MT 1 55; see RM 1 0 7 ) . So serious obj ections lie against o r despot (AI 2 1 8; DIAL 1 76, 1 98, 277), o r dictator (MT 68). These
each of the indirect consequences of the doctrine that God is epithets cover two· distinguisha ble and logically indepen dent lines
absolutely complete. of criticism . One is against arbitrary use of power. The tyrant acts
Instead of the major direct consequence of this doctrine, namely from whims or passiona te compuls ions, not from a rational pur­
that the world is not necessary to God, Whitehead advances the pose arising from a rational nature. This line leads back to the
principle of relativity. There is no entity, not even God, "which criticism of unreflec tive supernaturalism and the notion of a
(
requires nothing but itself in order to exist" RM i o8; see IMM divine fiat. The second line of criticism these epithets express is
)
687 . Some of the concerns that lead him to advance this principle the one we are presently examining, namely the obj ection to con­
and apply it in theology are : (a) his concern to give full value to ceiving the power of God as coercive power, excluding the freedom
our experience of a world of many changing things, and of the of temporal things. Thus even if God's activity were conceive d as
connectedness of these things; and (b) his concern for rationality rational, not arbitrary, the present line of criticism would not be
and his faith in reason. affected.
b. A second conseque nce is that God becomes responsi ble for
5. Whitehead's criticisms : Unqualified omnipotence evil:

The third of Whitehead's criticisms is aimed at the assumption If this conception be adhered to, there can be no alternative
that God is absolutely omnipotent. By "unqualified omnipotence" except to discern in Him the origin of all evil as well as of all
(AI 2 1 7) he means the property of being the only ultimate agent good (sMw 250-1).
or determiner of things and events. He is obj ecting to the doctrine If the theory of complete determinism, by reason of the
of God as "the one supreme reality, omnipotently disposing a necessity of conformation with the nature of God, holds true,
(
wholly derivative world" AI 2 1 3 ; see RM 68). By medieval and then the evil in the world is in conformity with the nature
modern philosophers, "He has been conceived as the foundation (
of God RM 95; see 99).
of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity" (sMw
)
250 . Thus the real target of this criticism is the view that God is In the Dialogues Whitehead expresses his disgust and horror at
omnificent, that all effective agency in the universe is to be this consequence of the traditional doctrine, especially when God
ascribed to God. (
is conceived also as a personal will DIAL 1 76, 1 89, 1 98).
For Whitehead the main consequences of this assumption- c. A third consequence is that human effort becomes insignif-
 39 1
390 W H ITEHEAD A N D TRADITIO N A L THE O L O GY TH E ATT RIB UTE S OF GOD
and the
the immuta bil ity, the power,
icant. If the objectionable assumption is true, then man is "help­ We sha ll con sider the un ity,
less to cooperate" with God (sMw 1 05) . In this respect, Whitehead goo dne ss of God .
says, Augustinian theology and scientific mechanism have much in
not ice t�?se fea tur es of Go d's
common. Neither can give a genuine meaning to human freedom. a. · The uni ty of Go d. First we en­
egoreal con dit 10� s for all act ual
On neither �iew is human initiative and activity meaningful. uni ty tha t follow from the cat l o ­
. . . is like the um ty of an .act u � �
�h.is. assumption is mcompatible with "our experience of respon­ titi es. In the se ways his uni ty ty is
cer tain ways in which his um
sibility, of approbation or of disapprobation, of self-approval or cas ion . Th en we sha ll not ice
n.
of sel�-reproach, of freedom, of emphasis . This element in experi­ unl ike that of an act ual occasio
is not sim ple in the tradit ion al
ence is too large to be put aside merely as misconstruction" ( PR 74) . i. Th e uni ty of an act ual ent ity ny
ent ity is a con c.rescence of . ma
Because of t? ese consequences Whitehead rej ects the assump­ theological sen se. An act ual f
. sion s int o an mtegral fee �mg �
t10n that God is "unqualifiedly omnipotent." He turns to a sug­ physical and con cep tua l prehen hen s10n s is
. . of the com pon ent pre
gestion he finds m Plato's later dialogues, namely "that the divine satisfac tion . Th e mu ltiplici ty ny,
n. Th e sati sfac tio� is . a harmo
element in the world is to be conceived as a persuasive agency not ann ull ed by thi s int egratio ms of
. The �ata a� d sub jec tive for .
and not as a coercive agency" (AI 2 1 3) . He thinks Plato wavered not a sim ple uni ty of feeling com ple x um ty.
syn the size d mto a
between this view and the assumption of unqualified omnipotence the com pon ent fee lings are
ual occasio ns.
Th is is as tru e of Go d as of act
ent ity is a living uni ty of feel-
(AI 1 89-90, 2 1 3) . His own development of Plato's suggestion needs
to be explored later. It means that God is not "omnipotent" (AI ii. In the sec ond place an act ual an
of self-ide nti ty tha t belo�gs to
1 89). God's action is conditioned by actual states of affairs of ing . It doe s not have the kind ual ity me ans
categoreal sch em e act
which ? od is not the sole cause. "There is a general tendency in abs tra ct form. According to the e
means an operation wit� �eflexiv
the umverse to produce worth-while things, and moments come sign ificance for self . Experience rom
dis tinguishes concrete ent itie s �
when we can work with it and it can work through us. But that sign ific anc e, and this is what act ual occ as10 ns.
true of Go d as of
tendency i � the universe to produce worth-while things is by no abs tract ones. This also is as
means ommpotent. Other forces work against it" (DIAL 370; see RM Go d is a com ple x and living
un ity . . .
son , tho ugh an act ual ent ity is com ple x it is
6 1 -2) . It would follow from this alternative view that God's action iii. For thi s rea cres­
t Wh iteh ead speaks of a con
is not coercive, that God is not responsible for evil, and that not "comp osit e." It is tru e tha
ion " (PR 2 2 3, MT 1 2 8) . Bu t he : the
e
human freedom and responsibility are significant. But "omnif­ cen ce as a process of "composit . m the
act ual ent ity is not com pos ite
icence" may be a better name than "omnipotence" for the at­ ter m has a diff ere nt sen se. An have
dis cre te elem ent s. It .does no �
tribute Whitehead is unwilling to assign to God. sen se of being an aggregate of
the term . It is co!11 p osit e only
m the
parts in the ord inary sense of
many pre hen s10n� . . .
sense of being a concrescence of :
6. Whitehead's alternative : The attributes of God gory of exp� anat �on is important
For this que stio n the ten th cate .
al ent ity, mt o its m�st concr� te
In earlier chapters we construed Whitehead's treatments of sub­ "T hat the firs t analysis of a n actu
crescence of prehen s10n s, w� ic�
stance and of universals as revisions of traditional formulations of elem ent s, disc lose s it to be a con s is
bec om ing . All furthe: .analysi
those categories. It is possible to construe his critique of traditional have ori gin ate d in its process of not
35) . ? ther a� tua l e� titi es do
theology as a revision also. Let us look at his own doctrine of God an analysi s of pre hen sion s" ( PR edi acy . � are
hey
the ir ?wn .imm
and lay it alongside traditional doctrines. In particular let us ask persist into the concrescence wit� re
s10n s. Lik ewi se eternal obj ects. �
how some of the attributes traditionally assigned to God would obj ecti fied as dat a for its prehen s
its experience . Th ese oth er ent itie
be interpreted in the language of his own systematic categories. ingre die nt in but not parts of
 3 92 WH ITE HE AD A N D TR AD ITI ON AL
TH EO LO G Y THE ATTR I B U TE S OF GOD 393
are not pa�ts of the concrescent actual
of prehenszo ns. ent ity. It is a concrescence tive prehensions. God's unity is a unity without exclusions, and in
This �s as true of God as of an ual this sense it may be said to be a perfect unity. In this way it dif­
pre�ens10ns are parts of God woact uld
occasi on . To say that God's fers from the unity of an actual occasion.
?e simply wrong to say that the actual occ be mi sleading. Bu t it would Finally we should notice that the unity of God differs in mode
3ects God .?rehends are par ts of Go asi ons and eternal ob- from that of an "enduring object," and in particular from that of
et�rnal ob3 ects and ctual occasions d. Go d is ' 'compose d" no t of a human person as interpreted in Whitehead's system (PR 50-2,
�
ob3ects and prehens10ns of actual occasi bu t of pre hensions of eternal 1 63-7). The unity of a human person is indeed a composite unity.
on s. Its parts are the actual occasions that are members �f a complex
. Go
im
d'� freedom and privacy req
mediate s � bj e'= tive existence anduiralle a distinction between his society. The society is in fact "divided" by the discrete actual
ences � mu l �1ph· c1ty of other entitie other entities. He experi­ occasions that compose it. This is not true of God. He is not a
and wills ��mgs other than him sel f. s and thus, so to speak, kn ows society but a single actual entity with a unity of satisfactio� .
act � al ent itie s. But there is nothing Als o he is affected by oth er Hence his unity differs from the unity of a human person not m
in Go d exc ept his ow degree but in kind.
perience. Eternal objects and actual n ex­
God. occ asi on s are no t par ts of This categoreal contrast in Whitehead's system between the
iv. �h?ugh an actu l ent is in unity of God and the unity of a human person is particularly im­
compositwn and a um� ty ofitycom po
a certain sen se a process of portant for his relation to traditional theology. !�a.ditional �he­
siti
added �hat it is its own composer. An on, it would have to be ology has been vitally concerned about the poss1b1hty of assign­
det e�m n1:ed and externally fre e." actual entity is "in ternally ing to God such attributes as mind, thought, will, purpose, love,
term_mat10 n. In other words it is an It contrib utes to its own de­ personality, etc. The clearest and most direct application of these
also is as tru e of God as of an actual instance of creativity. This terms, in ordinary discourse, is to human persons. May they be
In the above ways the un ity of Godoccasi on . predicated of the divine being unambiguously? symbolically?
_ is like the un ity of an actual analogically? To decide these questions it seems that we ought to
�c�aswn and exemplifies the categoreal con dit ion s of actual en­
tities. God is � living and self-creat be able to say, in o ther categories, how God is like and how he
composed of discrete and alien pa ive un ity , com plex bu t not differs from human persons. Whitehead's categories make this
rts . logically possible. Later we shall explore his tr: atment of t�e
. In
m
oth er ways God is un lik e actual occ
t� e scope of his experience and asions. He is unlike them question whether God is a "person." Here . we notice only .that m
plexity. He prehends tim elessly all hen ce in the degree of its com­ his own systematic terms the unity of God is categoreally different
hends fully all the actual occasion ete rna l objec �s, and he pre­ from the unity of a human person, remembering that while in
nature. �e may say therefore tha s tha t ari se in the course of this sense God is beyond personality he is not beyond the reach
complex ity. Th e ues tion then nat t his exp erience is of infi nit e of all categories whatever. Of course objections to the adequacy
. 9
of his exper�ence is not a different ura lly ari ses wh eth er the un ity of Whitehead's account of personality, as well as to his account of
actual occas10n . mo de of un ity from that of an God, are still in order.
To ieve its unity an actual occ
. dataach _ ly. It mu asion mu st prehe som e of Having in mind the traditional denial of
Its st exclude som e aspects of itsnd
negative b. God and extension.
some pu re possib ilit ies . We have world and composition in God, this may be an appropriate place to ask about
the c�se. Because of he s op e of see n ho w wi th Go d thi s is t the relation of God to space and time. It is not altogether clear
experience um. fies an mfi � : his tim eless subjective aim, no what a systematic development of Whitehead's principles would
mt e mu ltiplic ity of da ta witho ut an his require on this point. But I shall make several suggestions that
y nega-
 3 95
394 WHITEHEAD A N D TRADITIONAL THEOLOGY TH E AT TR IBU TE S OF GO D
. ph. cat10n . , nam ely that God has no spatiotemporal parts .
bear on the problem. I suggest first that physical time and space port ant im o f G o d' so also the regions of
0n s a re no t pa rts
s is entirely consistent wi t�
are not in God. Then I suggest certain senses in which God is not Just as act ua 1 occ as1
·

in physical time and space and certain senses in which God is in occasions are not parts of Gods10 : AnFdorthithe region of an occasion is
physical time and space. W hitehead's theory of exten ncn.e as n act of experi. ence.
i. How physical time and space are not in God. an abstraction from its existe ysi. cal tim �
e an d space. .
. · . Ho w Go d is no t in ph
First consider God's relation to physical time. I suggest that n
. . actual occas10n , an actua1
though physical time is in the world, physical time is not in God. Th.ou g� ?hys1ca� um.e is no tainceran tain tim e it has no t yet come
as1 0n is m ph ysi cal t � m e At
This is for the same reason that physical time is not in the con­ occ . sh e d . Th us . it has temporal
·

ng . At a lat er um e.

it ha s pen
crescence of an actual occasion. For physical time transition or into bei between th e p y ast and the
"passage" is required, and this is a relation between one actual boundaries marking transitionssen
present, and b etw �en the pre � : �:i
t and the p y � �uture.poBu t
entity that perishes and another that comes into being. In God
there is a process of concrescence but no process of transition. God God is no t in physical .um� m rt ia
. . �
.
�s way ForrlGo
d eve
d has no tem
asting. Unl ike actual
ral
or end . He is pn m ? l a n
is always in concrescence and always satisfied, but there is no beginning b em . g or Perish There was no
occas10ns he d oes not come mtreo w1
·

transition from one genetic phase of his experience to another · 11 b e no t1" me whe n
God is not.
·

such that one phase perishes before the other becomes. In God's tim e wh en Go d wa s no t an d the
. cal space 1s no t in an actual occasion,
.
experience there are durations but not transitions. Hence there Sim ilar ly, tho ug h ph ysi . l space Its experience ha s
still an actual occas10n is moun
· · ·
physica . es . Though a11 of its experi-
is no physical time within God's experience.
·

Second, I suggest that physical space is in the world but not in spatial as well as tempora1 b eredari ne ss " o f. a con temporary worl d
s on "h ere , " the "th
God. This is so for a reason that also applies to the previous point enc e goe
to . lf is. s1gmficant . Th is is tru e ev en though
itse
·

al
.

about time. It is because God does not have any region or ex­ spatially ext ern " rn the structure and character
tensive standpoint which might include finite and externally con­ the occasion doe.s �.ot d"u7� t1y dwisce Go d's experience th is is no t
nected regions. In passing it is worth noting that the concepts of of what in .fac t is there. Noite for reg
.10n de fi mn · g h 1" s "h ere ' " his
e. Sm ee he h as no fin .
extension and regions do not appear in the categoreal scheme but the cas . l boundan. es m the wa y actual occasions
tia
experience ha s no spa
are treated as "derivative notions." Thus the categoreal scheme ysi. cal spac� .
leaves room for an actual entity without a region. Suppose we do. In this sense God is no t i_ncalphspace and um e.
should say God does have a region analogous to that of an actual iii. How God is in physi ce are
.
no t G od , and though
m
Th ou g h p h ys ica l tim e and spa ce,
occasion, as explained in Chapter 4. How might this be iriter­
there are senses m w�1ch G.odh Go
. . is not in physical time and spa tim e.
preted? d is in physical space an d
Since God's unity as an actual entity forbids our treating his there are three senses m wh1c. cal prehensions are necessary for his
as follow. s: (a) Physi .
region as a simple aggregate of finite regions, our only recourse Th ey are .h�y. H"is b em g as an act ua l entit. y is not independent of.
is to identify God's region with the extensive continuum. White­ actua . rehends actual occasions in thenont
head does not seem to make this identification. The extensive events m space and um e. (b) He � pre ends the "real essence" and He
spa tio tem po ral con tex ts. He ,, occasi on .
continuum is the relational unity of the regions of actual oc­
casions considered as potentially divisible. Since God is the su­ merely the "abstra':t e.�sen
t only its d: ite ss . t nex
�� �: � � ,3� of an actualositi
also its "p on," wh ere
preme ground of order he is an essential condition of there being prehen ds no us of actual entities"
. . ,, tus in a
an extensive continuum. But the continuum itself is constituted "pos1t10n me. ans " relauve sta pe .
rie nc e i"s conditioned by space and
8). In t h is way G 0 d's ex
by actual occasions, not by God. ( PR 3
ual occas10ns m the contexts of
tim e. (c) Go d is prehended by act
· •

The denial that physical space and time are in God has an im-
 W HIT EHE AD AND TRA DIT ION AL T H E O L THE ATTRIBUTES O F GOD 397
OG Y
the1 r resp ecti ve actu al wo:lds. As
. _ prehen ded His subjective aim is immutably constant because it is inde­
?ccas 10 °:, God 1� th � t umty of feel ings whichbyresu
a cert ain actu al
pendent of the changing course of nature.
mtegra t10n of his prim ord ial nat lts from the
ure with his pre hen sion s of the Unlike other actual entities God does not perish. He is ever­
�ast actu al world of tha t actu al occasion. lasting. Nothing could happen that would entail the final com­
_ In this way the obj ec­
t1fic at_10n s of God for tem poral subj ects are
conditioned by space pletion and perishing of God. God is always in concrescence
and tim e.
and always satisfied. Thus it would be fair to say that the struc­
1:_
her: may we say of God , as we said
of an actu al occa sion , that ture of God's experience, as a concrescence of conceptual and
he e r:1 oys ext end edn ess" ? Cer
_ tain ly we wou ld have to construe physical feelings into satisfaction, is immutable.
this diff ere ntly than in an actu
" spr e� d" that qua lify an occasio n's k
al occ asio n · Th e "th i" c ness " an
d Finally, it is true that, unlike other actual entities, the content
experie nce have som e defi nite of his satisfaction is continually changing in its qualitative pat­
mea nm g bec aus e of the experie ntia
l bou nda ries of the occasion . tern, as he initiates and responds to novel actual occasions. But
But G o d' s exp erie nce has no suc
·

h bou nda ries exc ept toward the this change in God's experience is not a change for the better
futu re. N o actu alit y is in Go d's
_ not "pa st" in the sen se tha t it exi sted or for the worse. Changes ·originating in the world do not make
whe n God did . And no actu ality is spa tial ly rem God more perfect or less perfect. He is immutable in the per­
?
I ave arg? ed tha t the categoreal ote from God .
con diti ons of con cres cen ce fection, as well as in the structure, of his experience. His subjec­
�
ent a1 exc lusi ven ess of imm edi
acy bet wee n God and an actu tive aim at maximum intensity is always achieved in his satis­
occ as10 n. But the obj ecti fica tion al
_ of an occasion for Go d is com­ faction.
pl ete, not abs trac tive . For this
_ reason it is not meaningful to at­ Thus though on Whitehead's theory God is not absolutely
trib � te to G?d a fini te reg io �
. as a stan dpo int for his exp erie nce . complete, absolutely self-sufficient, and absolutely simple, yet
He IS not lim ited by a fim te per spe ctiv e. He pre
hends every there are intelligible and important senses in which he is one
her e-now, but he has no here-no
w of his own . Hence we might and immutable. He is immutable in the character of his aim,
say tha t God enj oys the ext end
edn ess of the occasio ns he pre the structure of his experience, and the perfection of his experi­
hends but not his own imm edi ­
ate exp erie nce as ext end ed. In ence.
even stronger sense than is tru an
e of an actual occasion, Go d is
d. The power of God. Whitehead rej ects the doctrine of the
com ple x but not com pos ite.
absolute omnipotence of God. The freedom of God, like that of
'! he
imm uta b ility of Go d. Sin ce
;xperien
c.
Go d is a living uni ty of every other actual entity, is conditioned. But the conditions on
ce he doe s not hav e the pur e God's activity are construed not as restraints but as occasions for
self-ide ntity of a tim eles s
.
N_ �
orm . or doe s e have the und
iffe ren tiat ed end ura nce attr ibu activity. What is it that God cannot do?
m clas sica l phy sics to a ma teri ted
al par ticl e. His imm uta bili ty
can ­ i. God cannot make compatible an intrinsic incompatib ility.
not be con stru ed in eith er of the
se ways. Relative to any given situation, some pure possibilities envisaged
Unhk� .
_
oth er actu al ent itie s his subj ecti
ve aim is not affe cted by God are incompatible for joint realization (AI 357). But God
by con d1t 10n s ext ern al to him self No eve ·
nt x n the cou rse o f na- can and does hold all eternal objects in view, with appetition
t ure , no ma tter how ma ssiv e in ·
imp ort anc e' cou ld affect h1"s aim for each to be actualized in its due time and place. He is thus
· ·
�
.
.
.
a t mt ens 1ty. m� e It is .
a pri mo rdi al app etition, it can
.
not be the timeless lure for the creative process of nature, which is "the
aug me nte d, d1m m1s hed , or diverted by tem por
al hap pen ings way by which the universe escapes from the exclusions of incon­
Con seq uen tly no event cou ld
and th e perfect conformity
change the unl imi ted hos pita lit
of his resp ons e to fini te bec om
; sistency" (MT 75).
ii. God cannot supplant the freedom of actual occasions. But
ings.
 W H ITEHEAD A N D TRAOITIONAL T H E O L O G Y THE ATTR I B U TES O F GOD 399

as the ground of order he can and does ensure to every occasion compose the existences to be found in nature" (AI 1 42). One im­
an aim relevant to its actual world. He makes anarchic freedom portant consequence is that "since the_ laws of �at�re depend
impossible. Further, he "persuades" the self-creative activity of on the individual characters of the thmgs constitutmg nature,
the concrescence toward the maximum satisfaction its actual world as the things change, then correspondingly the laws will change .
permits. . . . Thus the conception of the Universe as evolving subjec t to
iii. God cannot prevent the perish ing of actual occasions. But fixed eternal laws regulating all behaviour should be abandoned"
he can and does give every occasion an objective immortality in (AI 1 43; see PR 1 39) . This view of the order of natur e is consistent
his own everlasting experience. And as the ground of the given­ with the primacy of creativity, the unbou nded and unstructured
ness of the past he makes possible its objective immortality in character of the multi plicity of eternal objects, and the all-em­
future actual occasions. bracing scope of God's primordial envisagement, as we saw in
iv. God cannot annul the past. He cannot make the past not to Chapter 1 4. .
have been what it was. But from any actual world he can and does It follows that questions about whether certam events �ave
evoke a novel and constructive outcome. By his presentation of a occurred, or might occur, are empirical questions. Such questwns
novel and relevant aim, he transforms the past world from being cannot be finally settled by appeals to any eternally established
an obstruction into a condition of novel creative achievement. In laws of nature, though judgments of proba bility must take full
this way God can never be defeated by the course of nature. account of the laws of nature in a given epoch. In particular,
Properly understood therefore we might say that in White­ tl;ieological questions about particular "acts of God" have to be
head's theory the power of God is conditioned but not limited. decided in the light of history and experience.
From the point of view of God's subjective aim, the conditions In one way Whitehead's princip les give more scope to God's
we have noticed are not restraints preventing God from doing power than it might have in other systems." On � is v� e:W there are
what he wills to do. They are rather conditions in the sense of no absolu te incompatibi lities in God's pnmordial v1s10n . Incom­
opportunities or occasions for the operation of his power. The patibilities are always and only relative to som_e p�r.ticular situ�­
nonsystematic character of the realm of eternal objects, the self­ tion in the course of nature . The scope of his v1s10n makes it
creativity of finite subjects, the reality of transition, the stubborn­ possib le for the process of nature to "escape the exclusions of i�­
ness of given facts, all these are categoreal conditions for the ex­ consis tency" ( MT 75) . This does not mean that every real pos� 1-
istence of a world of finite actualities other than God. Without bility will as a matter of fact be actualized . It does mean that m
such a world, on Whitehead's view of the universe, no field for one sense nothing is absolutely impossible to God.
the operation of God's power would remain, and "the power of
God" would have no meaning. e. The goodn ess of God. I suggest that in respect to this as well
Some theologians have said that God can do anything that is as other attrib utes the gap between traditional theology and
not "absolutely" impossible. Understood in his own systematic Whitehead's theory is not as wide as his criticisms might lead
terms Whitehead could assent to this proposition. The conditions us to suppose. He charges traditional theology with obscuring.
on God's action are categoreal conditions, not some "order of the goodness of God by its assertion of unqualified omnipotence
nature" eternally established and immutable. This is illustrated But certainly on his own theory God is not good in any very
by his interpretation of "Laws of Nature" in chapters 7 and 8 simple sense. We should begin by distinguishing between . the
of A dventures of Ideas. He adopts the view that laws of nature goodness of God as subjec t and the goodness of God_ as. sup_er1ect.
are "immanent" not "imposed," which means that "the order God as a subject of experience means God as he 1s m himself.
of nature expresses the characters of the real things which jointly So considered, his goodness consists in the perfection of his ex-
 400 W H ITEHEAD A N D TRADITIONAL T H E O LOGY THE PROBLEM O F EVIL 40 1
perience. Three aspects o f the perfection o f God's experience ing experiences of pain, deprivation and degradation, and morally
may be discrimin ated. wrong decisions and deeds. But does not God share in the pro­
i. God's experien ce synthesiz es into a unity of satisfaction all duction of such experiences and decisions and deeds? This ques­
pure potential s and all actual occasions, without exclusion . Thus tion arises in the following way.
he transcends in perfectio n the unities of experien ce of actual God envisages all pure possibilities with appetition for their
occasion s, which require exclusio ns. realization. It seems therefore that his appetition includes those
ii. God's experienc e is perfect also in the adequacy of his re­ forms of definiteness which in the course of history characterize
sponse to his data. The infinite richness of his experien ce of satis­ evil experiences and decisions and deeds. Then God must share
faction is the result not only of an infinite multiplic ity of data in their production of these experiences, decisions, and deeds,
positively felt but also of his perfect re-enactio n of the experi­ since his appetition evokes conformal appetition in finite con­
ences of actual occasion s. His subj ective forms of feeling are per­ crescences.
fectly responsiv e to his data. Thus he transcends the experien ces Similarly God prehends and values all the feelings of actual
of actual occasions , which re-enact their physical data imperfectly. occasions, including their feelings of pain, deprivation, and deg­
iii. God's experienc e is perfect also in its intensity. His sub­ radation, and including those intentions. and decisions which
j ective aim is at maximum intensity of experience. This aim is constitute moral evil. It seems that in doing so he accepts and
continua lly achieved in his satisfactio n, the intensity of his satis­ consents to these feelings. He does not rej ect them but aims at
faction being independ ent of any particula r course of events in harmonizing them in the unity of his experience. It seems there­
the temporal world. Thus he transcend s the limited and contin­ fore that God has a share in the preservation as well as the pro­
gent intensitie s of the satisfacti ons of actual occasions . duction of evil experiences and decisions.
God as a superject is God as he is for other subj ects. So con­ Two remarks are in order. The first is that on Whitehead's
sidered, his goodness must be seen in his effects on other subjects. theory God is certainly not morally good, judged by those stand­
These effects we have examined in some detail. To summari ze, ards of behavior that are necessary for the peace and prosperity of
he evokes new subj ects into being and preserves their achieve­ a human community. The question is whether these standards
ments. God is the supreme condition of all finite experien ces of properly apply to his nature, and whether it is reasonable to
value, and thus the source of finite goodnes s. judge God by them. There is a considerable consensus in tradi­
His goodness as superj ect follows from his goodness as subj ect. tional theology to the effect that it is not.
He is good for the world because he is good in himself. Because Whitehead's explanation is as follows. To achieve unity of
he is all-inclus ive in his valuation of possibilit ies, he can present satisfaction an actual occasion must exclude some components
to any situation a relevant ideal. Because of the intensity of his of its initial datum. Translated into human psychology and soci­
experien ce he can evoke a creative response in any situation . Be­ ology this means that inhibitions and exclusions are inevitable
cause of the infinite richness of his experience he can give ob­ in human life, for the person and for the community. The prob­
j ective immorta lity to the complete achievem ent of every finite lem of moral conduct arises from the necessity of deciding what
subject. to inhibit and what to exclude: "The nature of evil is that the
characters of things are mutually obstructive" (PR 5 1 7 ; see RM
7. The problem of evil 9 4-9 , AI 333-9) . To a finite being all things are not possible.
Some desires must be restrained or denied so others may be ful­
At this point we must see how the problem of evil takes shape filled; some actions must be avoided or punished so that other
.
m the context of Whitehead's theory. Since actual occasions have actions may be possible.
freedom, God is not the sole ultimate cause of all things, includ- God is different from other actual entities in that no exclusions
402 W H ITEHEAD A N D TRADITIONAL T H E O L O G Y I S W H ITE HEAD A PANT HEIS T?
are needed for his satisfaction. Therefore God has n o moral I n this way God's aim and function i n the temporal world,
problems as human beings do. It seems to follow that the moral though not morally good, is yet good in a sense intelligible to
standards evolved to guide decisions in the world of finite things finite minds. His aim is indeed not a sufficient rule for human
are not appropriate for human valuation of God. conduct. Moral aims must be projected in specific actual situa­
The second remark is that though the goodness of God is not tions and directed toward limited objectives if they are to be
moral goodness still it is a kind of goodness. God's aim is at maxi­ effective. Exclusions are necessary for finite satisfactions. Also
mum intensity of satisfaction and hence at the production of maxi­ our knowledge of the world in which we act and our vision of
mum depth and richness of actuality in every situation. Because its possibilities are, to say the least, very incomplete. Hence moral
of the all-inclusiveness and the intensity of his aim God ensures decisions require reference to relative standards. Apart from such
that some positive value, some novel act of experience, will come relative standards moral decisions have no meaning. But our very
out of every situation. God cannot and does not ensure that out consciousness of their relativity requires us to hold them in some
of every situation there will come what is best, abstractly con­ relation to an aim which transcends them.
sidered. God cannot prevent the occurrence of evil experiences
and decisions. For just those experiences and decisions may be
8. Is White head a panth eist?
the only constructive outcomes really possible in those situations.
ehead
Anything is better than nothing. "This function of God is anal­ By this time it shoul d be abun dantly clear that Whit
there is no room
ogous to the remorseless working of things in Greek and in does not mean to be a moni st. In his cosmo logy
relati vity,
Buddhist thought. The initial aim is the best for that impasse. for a self-su fficient entity. According to the princ iple of
itself. More
But if the best be bad, then the ruthlessness of God can be per­ every entity essen tially refers to entiti es other than
specifically, there is no actua l entity which does not requi re other
sonified as Ate, the goddess of mischief. The chaff is burnt" (PR
it is categ oreally
373). actua l entiti es for its own existe nce. Therefore
this be called
This does not imply the unreality o f evil. Experiences o f pain, impossible to reduce actua lity to one entity, wheth er
deprivation, and degradation, and morally evil decisions and the universe, the absolu te, or God.
subst itu-
deeds do occur. These are real facts. For their subj ects they are Whit ehead enforces this point when he speaks of his
tion of creativity for Spino za's one subst ance (PR
1 0-1 1 , i 25).
qualities of immediate experience. They become stubborn facts,
among the
requiring conformation and thus acting as real causes. They For creativity is not an entity . It is not to be found
is it an actua l entity . Rathe r
affect not only their temporal successors but God's own physical categories of existence. Much less
unive rse is made
experience. It is difficult to see how facts could be more "real" it is a name for a general fact, name ly that the
than this. up of novel concrescenc es.
with
God's aim is to evoke some constructive response to these facts He enforces it further by his comparison of his system
and judgm ents he says :
and so to overcome them (RM 1 55). But this is possible only if Bradley's. In a discu ssion of propo sition s
­
they are accepted precisely as stubborn facts, and valued as evil, According to Bradley, the ultim ate subjec t of every judge
by finite subjects and by God. Only thus can some good come ment is the one ultim ate substa nce, the absolu te ( PR 304).
out of evil. The overcoming of evil does not mean the annul­
In the philosophy of organism . . . Bradley's doctrine of
ment of evil. Rather it strictly implies the reality of that which
actuality is simply inverted. The final actuality is the partic­
is overcome. It also implies the existence of goodness as well as
evil in the initial situation. And if out of every situation some ular process with its particular attainment of satisfaction.
constructive outcome is possible, this implies some infinite source The actuality of the universe is merely derivative from its
solidarity in each actual entity ( PR 3 05; see 224).
of possibility.
 W H ITEHEAD A N D TRADIT I O N A L T H E O L O G Y I S W H ITEHEAD A PANTHE IST ?
W e might say that this i s the "realistic basis" onto which h e trans­ that finite things have. He is "the subj ect of all change," though
forms "some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism" (PR viii) . In­ not the only subj ect of change, since there are finite subj ects of
stead of saying that the actuality of finite things is derivative from change also.4 Thus God includes all the experiences of finite
the actuality of the universe, he takes the precisely opposite view subj ects, which is to say that God includes the world.
and holds that the actuality of the universe is "merely derivative The other feature of panentheism is that though God includes
from its solidarity in each actual entity." the world he is also independent of the world. But, Hartshorne
From this rej ection of monism it would follow that neither explains, it is not in his concrete actuality but only in his ab­
God nor any other entity is identical with a totality of real things. stract or "individual" or "personal" essence that God is inde­
If pantheism is the assertion that God is identical with the total­ pendent of the world.
ity of real things, that God is "essentially immanent and in no The total actual state of deity-now, as surrelative to the
way transcendent" (AI 1 54), then Whitehead is certainly not a present universe, has nothing outside itself, and in that sense
pantheist (RM 68-g, AI 303) . is the All. But the individual essence of deity (what makes
Usually, however, pantheism is not construed in this simple God God, or the divine divine) is utterly independent of
way. The Stoics and Spinoza distinguished God from the aggre­ this All, since any other possible all (and there are infinite
gate of finite things. He is the sou l of the world. He is natura possibilities of different totalities) would have been com­
naturans, not natura naturata. Therefore we must consider patible with this essence. The divine personal essence in this
whether Whitehead's theory of God and the world approximates fashion infinitely transcends the de facto totality, and every
certain views less simple than pantheism as defined above. In moment a partly new totality contains and embodies the
particular, is Whitehead a panentheist? essence (DR 88-g) .
Panentheism asserts that the world exists only in God and that
Thus God as a concrete actuality includes both the world and
God is more than the world. God includes the world. This view
his own individual essence. But the individual essence of God
has been subtly developed and ably defended by Charles Hart­
is "utterly" or "infinitely" independent and transcendent of any
shorne,3 who attributes it to Whitehead also. This is not the
particular state of affairs.
place to assess its merits and demerits, but we must ask whether
Is Whitehead a panentheist? I suggest he is not, since his
it can be fairly attributed to Whitehead.
theory of God and the world differs in essential respects from
Hartshorne contrasts panentheism with other views in the
the view Hartshorne proposes. God does not literally include or
following way: "Thus there are logically the three views : ( 1 )
contain the world. And he transcends the world not merely in
God i s merely the cosmos, i n all aspects inseparable from the
his "essence" but in his concrete actuality. Two considerations
sum or system of dependent things or effects; (2) he is both this
support this interpretation of Whitehead's theory.
syste � and something independent of it; (3) he is not the system,
. a. God prehends actual occasions, but he does not share their
but is m all aspects independent" (DR go) . He identifies the first
immediacy. Actual occasions enter into God's experience, but
view with traditional pantheism, the second view with pan­
they do so as o bjects of his physical prehensions. God's prehension
entheism, and the third view with traditional theism. Two fea­
of an actual occasion is the objectification of that actual occasion
tures of panentheism must be noticed. One is that "God literally
. for God. And an objectified entity has perished and lost its sub­
contams the universe" (DR go) . This seems to mean that "God
j ective immediacy. It is functioning as an object and not as a
literally has our enj oyments" (DR 9 1 ). God has all the experiences
subject. It is an objectified subj ect.
3 · See The D ivine Relativity, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948
4. Man's Vision of God (Chicago, Willett, Clark & Co., 1 9 4 1 ) , ch. 8.
(cited here as DR).
 W H ITEHEAD A N D TRADITIONAL THEOLOGY IS W H ITEHEA D A PANTHE IST ?
This interpretation o f obj ectification has been explained, sup­ I suggest therefore a fourth logical possibil ity, in additio n
ported, and applied to the experiences of actual occasions and to the three views defined by Hartshorne. This fourth view may
to God's experience. It means that, though there is a sense in be stated as follows : (a) God is not the cosmos, nor does he in­
:Vhich . God includes the world, there is also an important sense clude (in Hartshorne's sense) the cosmos; and (b) his activity is
m whICh God excludes the world. Just as the subj ectively im­ always conditio ned though never determi ned by the cosmos. This
mediate experiences of two actual occasions are mutually ex­ view agrees with traditio nal theism, against traditio nal panthei sm
clusive, so the immediate experience of God and the immediate and panenth eism, in assertin g that God is neither identica l with
experience of an actual occasion are mutually exclusive. Between nor inclusiv e of the world. It agrees with panenth eism and tradi­
G� d and an actual occasion there is no sharing of immediacy. In tional theism, against tradition al pantheis m, in asserting that God
this respect God does not include the world but excludes it. God transcend s the world. And it agrees with tradition al pantheis m
is not the subj ect of all change. There are real processes of change and panenth eism, against traditional theism, in asserting that
of which God is not the subj ect. God is conditio ned by the world. I suggest further that this fourth
b. God prehends an actual occasion only when it has achieved view in the theory of God and the world that Whitehe ad's cate-
its satisfaction. For any incomplete "now," God has not yet pre­ gories imply.
hended the actual occasion that defines that "now." God and Now we can take up a question left unanswe red toward the
that occasion are in "unison of becoming," and the occasion can­ end of Part One (Chapter g, section 2). At that point we were
not be prehended by God until it has achieved its satisfaction asking whether relation s between actual occasion s are "organi c."
and become fully determinate. In this way the principle of the One possible interpre tation was that actual occasion s are related
nonprehension of contemporaries as concrete individuals applies to one another as are cells in an organis m. One translat ion of
to God's experience as well as to the experiences of actual occa­ this view into Whiteh ead's categori es is that actual occasion s are
sions. Every actual occasion is objectified for God, but only when cell-like parts of nexus. We examine d this version and found only
it has achieved its satisfaction. a very limited sense in which relation s among members of a nexus
This interpretation of God and contemporaneity applies the are "organi c." Another version, mention ed but not examine d at
epochal theory of time to the relation between actual occasions that time, was that God is an organism of which actual occasion s
and God. It yields an additional sense in which God does not are cell-like parts. This would yield another sense in which White­
include the world. It followed from a that God never includes head might be a pantheis t, and we ought to ask whether this
any actual occasion "literally," though he includes every actual is a tenable interpre tation of his theory of God and the world.
occasion obj ectively. It follows from b that for any incomplete If actual occasion s are to God as cells are to a body then the
"now" God does not include the world even objectively, though universe might be called a divine organism . Do Whitehe ad's prin­
he will include that world obj ectively when it has become com­ ciples imply that the universe is a divine organism in this way?
plete. God's experience and action participate in the rhythm of Are actual occasions parts of God in the way cells are parts of a
creativity. In this further sense God excludes and thus transcends living organism ?
the world. First let us see how this might be expresse d in Whitehe ad's own
It follows from these considerations that God transcends the systemat ic terms. The most plausibl e interpre tation would be
world not merely in respect to his abstract "essence," however that God is a society of actual occasion s with personal order.5
that might be interpreted in Whitehead's categories, but also Does Whitehe ad's theory permit this descripti on of God? It seems
in respect to his concrete actuality as an actual entity. As a re­ very clear that it does not.
sult Whitehead's theory of God and the world is somewhat nearer 5 . For Hartshorne's discussions of this view see DR 2 9-3 1 , 1 57-8; Schilpp
traditional theism than panentheis m is. 555; with W. L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago, 1 953) , p. 2 74.
 W H ITEHEAD A N D TRADITIONAL THEOLOGY IS GOD A PERS O N ?
s
A society i s a certain sort o f nexus, namely a nexus with social occup ies a region of space- time which is the sum of the region
of its cells. Its region includ es the region s of its cells. This divine
order (PR 50, 1 36). And category of explanation xiv is : "That a
on to
nexus is a set of actual entities in the unity of the relatedness con­ organism would not have this kind of spatio te mporal relati
an
stituted by their prehensions of each other, or-what is the same its memb ers. God does not includ e actua l occasi ons in the way
cells
�hing conversely expressed-constituted by their obj ectifications organism includ es its cells. Finally, ordinarily speaking, the
the
(
m each other" PR 35). Now actual entities and nexus belong to of an organism have a fundamentally differ ent struct ure
ism
from
would
different categories of existence, which is to say mutually exclusive organism of which they are parts. This divine organ
that
classes of entities. And since God is an actual entity, he is not a have the same fundamental struct ure as the actual occasions
nexus and hence not a society of any kind. functio n as its "cells."
the
This distinction between God and societies means that God It seems there are some good reason s for n o t saying that, as
uni­
has a unity of experience which an animal body, for example, outcom e of White head's theory of God and the world, the
im­
does not have. An animal body does not as such have a satis­ verse is a divine organi sm. Certai nly actual occasi ons becom e
ent in actual occasi ons.
faction. Only actual entities have satisfactions. The satisfactions manen t in God, and God becom es imman
achieved in the course of the existence of the body are the satis­ But this relatio n of imman ence is the outcom e of prehen sions.
rec­
factions of the actual occasions that compose it. "All the life in And a prehe nsion is not a symmetrical relatio n; it is a one-di
en­
(
the body is the life of the individual cells" PR 1 65). God on the tional functi on. A subjec t prehen ds an obj ect. Conve
of
rsely
the
an
world in
contrary has his own satisfaction, which is one, continuous and tity is object ified for a subjec t. The imma nence
for a mul­
�
ev rlasting. It does not seem possible to give a plausible interpre­ God and of God in the world is a shorthand expre ssion
tat10n of the statement that the universe is a divine organism in tiplici ty of asymm etrical opera tions of which both God and actual
Whitehead's own systematic terms. occasio ns are agents.
of
Let us ask next whether "The universe is a divine organism" The exper iences of actual occasi ons are not literally parts
ified.
has a good use, as an interpretation of the outcome of Whitehead's God's experience. Actua l occasi ons are in God only as object
imme ­
theory, granting that it cannot be translated plausibly into his In God they have obj ective immortality not subj ective
of his exper iences , j ust
�
o n systematic terms.6 Certain obvious qualifications spring to diacy. God and God alone is the subje ct
iences .
mmd at once. Ordinarily speaking, an organism has an environ­ as an actual occasi on and it alone is the subj ect of its exper
relati on
ment. This "divine organism" would not. Ordinarily speaking, Thus the relati on betwe en God and the world is not the
a relati on betwe en (a) an actua l
an organism has a beginning and an end. This divine organism betwe en a whole and a part. It is
contin uous thoug h
would not. entity in uniso n with every becoming with a
e and
These qualifications might not rule out our statement. But changing satisfa ction, and (b) actua l entiti es which becom
e. And,
� ?
ore serious o j ections have to be considered. Ordinarily speak­ perish at partic ular where-whens in the cours e of natur
hing indiv idual for
"every actua l entity, including God, is somet
mg, an orgamsm has "organic" unity, a mutual immanence
its own sake; and thereby transcends the rest of actua lity" (
PR
?11
a o ng its cells, within each of its durations, as well as a per­
1 35) ·
sistent pattern of unity in time. This divine organism would not
have this sort of unity. Again, ordinarily speaking, an organism
�� �
6. His c racterization of hi theory of actual occasions as "a cell-theory g. Is God a person ?
�.
of actua ity (PR 334; see 347) 1s a way of stressing the real individuality of
Perso nality is not one of Whit ehead 's system atic categ
ories. It
an occasion, not a way of suggesting it is a component of a unity of a higher
rpret ation by mean s of the
order. is a presystema tic term calling for inte
 410 W H ITEHEAD A N D TRADITIONAL THEOLOGY IS COD A PER S O N ? 4i i

categories of existence, explanation, and obligation which make tainly remarks like the following are not out of keeping with
up the categoreal scheme. Human persons are systematically in­ the theory we have examined.
terpreted as highly complex sooet1es of actual occasions of a The depths of his existence lie beyond the vulgarities of
special sort. But clearly God is not a person in this systematic
sense. God is an actual entity.
(
praise or of power RM 1 54)
·
Further, Whitehead is very reluctant to speak of God as a per­ Of course we are unable to conceive the experience of the
son, even in a presystematic way. He wants to avoid misleading (
Supreme Unity of Existence IMM 698) .
ambiguities (RM 78, DIAL 30 1 ) . And he connects traditional con­ Whitehead also offers an interpretation of the freedom of God
ceptions of God as a person with unreflective supernaturalism. and thus locates, so to speak, the mystery of his being. Indeed
(
The idea of God as a person seems too simple to be true RM 68, the perfection of God's power implies the perfection of his free­
72, 7 6) . The only explanatory value he can see in this idea con­
sists in an appeal to an unconditioned will. He finds such explana­
dom. His primordial aim is not conditioned by events i the ?-
course of nature. His power of conceptual supplementat10n is
tions unsatisfactory as we have seen. unlimited. He never fails to achieve satisfaction. And his power
Though he rej ects simple attribution of personality to God, he of initiating novel becomings is unbounded though always con­
also rej ects the opposite extreme, namely thinking of God as ditioned. He is the supreme instance of creativity.
(
"sheer infinity" MG 675) or as "the impersonal order of the uni­ But Whitehead's deep concern for rationality and his faith that
(
verse" RM 1 50; see SMW 1 8) . He proposes his theory as a view "at the base of things we shall not find mere arbitrary mystery"
that avoids both these extremes. ( �
sMw 2 6, my italics) keep him from attributing to God a . arbi­
In some of the more interpretative passages in his writings he trary freedom, a freedom expressed in absolutely uncond1t10ned
uses personal images in referring to God. For example he speaks action. And we might well ask whether freedom of this latter sort
( ( (
of the wisdom PR 525, 5 2 7), the patience PR 5 2 5), the love sMw is apt to be suggested by the image of a "person. " It seems that
(
2 6 8, PR 5 3 2), and the tender care PR 5 2 5) of God. God is "the if by divine freedom a power of absolutely unconditioned action
(
ideal companion" RM 1 54) . At the same time, he makes it quite is meant, then to speak of God as also a "person" is to use the term
clear that this is unsystematic and interpretative discourse. These in a symbolic way or to invite confusion, or both.
(
are images only PR 525). He is using these terms in a symbolic Two final remarks on this topic remain to be made. The first
way. is that on Whitehead's theory God is an actuality that exists
Some theologians have spoken of God as a person in order to through time without loss of immediacy. His unity is not of a
do j ustice to the mystery of the divine nature. The image of a persistent pattern of definiteness with a continuity between indi­
person with freedom of will has been used to suggest a being vidual immediacies. It is a continuing unity within an individual
whose ways are "past finding out." This intention need not con­ immediacy. In this one respect Whitehead's conception of God
flict with Whitehead' s principles or with the outcome of his fits our common-sense notion of personal existence better than
theory. actual occasions and nexus do. The second remark is that, as
The systematic developme nt of a categoreal scheme need not Whitehead tells us plainly, the categoreal notion of an actual en­
dispel mystery from that to which it applies, unless a sense of
mystery is nothing more than a state of intellectual confusion.
tity, which applies both to God and to actual occasions, is itse f :
an imaginative generalization from instances of human experi­
Indeed perhaps it is just when we think most clearly and co­ ence.
herently about reality that we see how "mysterious " it is. Cer-
 WHITEHEAD A N D TRADITIONAL THEOLOGY C O NCLUSION
1 0. Conclusion tinue t o believe it, then w e will judge the scheme i s applicab le.
If on the contrary we find no true proposition, in ordinary dis­
In this chapter we have laid Whitehead's theory of God and course or in science or in theology or in any other mode of dis­
the world alongside some traditional doctrines. The outcome of course, which can be stated adequately in the terms of the cate­
his theory may be closer to traditional theology than some inter­ goreal scheme, then we will judge that the scheme is not
preters have taken it to be. But it would not do to argue that, applicable.
in spite of himself, he is in agreement with traditional theology. . .
Second, we will ask whether there are any propositions we
It is plain enough that he diverges from it at important points. believe to be true which canno t be stated adequately in White­
One problem is just how to formulate and characterize these
head's systematic terms. For example take one of the following
disagreements. This calls for theological analysis, an enterprise sentences : "I am the same person I was yesterday." "No pur­
to which this chapter might be a contribution. This enterprise
is important because it may lead us to invent distinctions that
!
poses are effective." "Stones have no feelings." " here is no
divine being." "God is unchangeable." If we decide after r�­
put old questions in new and clearer ways. As a result, whatever
flection that the proposition stated by some such sentence IS
our own answers to these questions may be, we may acquire a true, and if we j udge that this proposition cannot be expressed
sharper perception of what those answers amount to, what they adequately by using Whitehead's terms, then we will judge that
presuppose and entail, and the alternatives they exclude. his system is not adeq uate to the facts. That is to say it is untrue.
If on the contrary we find no such proposition, then we will judge
that the system is adequate to the facts we have considered. That
Beyond the questions about meaning we have asked in this
is to say, tentatively, that it is true.
and the preceding chapters of this study lies the question of Good judgments depend on understanding the categoreal
truth. I have not argued that Whitehead's system is true or that scheme, and we do not understand it fully until we find out
it is untrue. This is not because the question is irrelevant or how it can be used. Going on beyond our study of the ground­
unimportant. On the contrary it is both a fair and an important work of Whitehead's system, we need to see how well it could
question, though not a simple one . be used to explain the various sorts of obj ects we encounter, for
What sort of truth-claim does Whitehead's system make? Cer­ example stones and human beings, and the various modes �£
.
tainly not the sort of truth-claim made by a scientific or common­
sense statements. Whitehead has done his best to make it clear
experience we have, for example physical mot �on and moral eci­ �
sion. Good judgments depend also on readmess to reconsider
that speculative philosophy is not a substitute for science or for
the beliefs we happen to have, before j udging the system, as we
common sense. It is the truth-claim of a speculative scheme. Let must, by what we believe to be true. In it Whitehead offers a new
us see what this means. Suppose we should grant that the system
view of things, not just a new way of saying what we already see.
is, in his words, logical and coherent . Suppose we should agree
This view of things deserves to be taken seriously. Taking it
that his systematic terms are reasonably well defined and ex­ seriously means, in part, looking again for ourselves at the world
plained, and that the categoreal scheme is elaborated in a rea­
we experience.
sonabJy coherent way. How then might we go about deciding
whether what he proposes is true or untrue?
First, I suggest, we will ask whether there are any proposi­
tions we believe to be true which can be stated adequately in
his systematic terms. If we find any such proposition and con-
Index

Abstraction, 207; limits of, 1 36, 264-6; in Completion, internal, 33

objectification, 38, 64-5, 344-9. See Conceptual reversion, 2 1 2-13, 269, 292
Elimination; Objectification Conceptual valuation, 2 1 2-13, 2 89-g4.
Abstractness: of objects, 1 8 1-2 ; of eternal See also Subjective aim; Subjective
objects, 206-8, 264-6; of space and forms
time, 79, 1 76-7, 33 r. See Concreteness Concrescence, 1 2 , 30-1; phases of, 80- 1 ,
Actual entities, 12, 1 3 , 17, 203-7 3 1 6. See also Priority, genetic
Actual occasions, 5, 1 3, 1 7-1 8, 1 78, and Concreteness, 1 7-20, 1 8 1-2 , 199, 207,
passim, esp. 1 7-172 25 1-2 ; misplaced, 1 36
Actual worlds, 49, 93, 20 1 , 267-8 Conformation, perfect and imperfect,
Actuality, 6-7, 37, 1 80-1 , 197-200, 240- 1 ; 35 1-3; pure, 353-4
o f God, 322-3 Conformity of subjective form, 1 34-8,
Adequacy of Whitehead's system, ques- 14 1-4. See also Feelings, conformal
tions about, 1 23, 1 7 1-2 , 266, 4 1 2- 1 3 Connections, real. See Immanence, social
Alexander, S . , 60, 1 1 7 Consciousness, 1 2 , 19, 2 1 2
Anticipation, 3 1-5, 1 23-4, 1 63 Conservation of energy, 359
Appetition, 2 1 5- 1 6 Contemporary occasions, 53-60, 1 02-3,
Aristotelian adjectives, 1 88, 2 25-7 1 2 0-3, 143-4, 1 62-3, 33 0-4 . See also
Aristotelian logic, 107, 242-3, 254 Relevance; God and contemporaneity
Aristotle, 1 06, 1 36, 387 Contiguity, 94 n., 125-6, 335. See also
External connection
Bergson, 1 1 7, 220 n. Contingency, 279, 308-9
Biology, 1 69, 1 75 Continuity, 1 26, 244-5; of events, 1 80;
Boundaries, 86-90, 1 79, 395 of subjective form, 137-8
Bradley, F. H.,35, 1 60, 235-6, 3 1 1-1 2, 403 Contrasts, 233-6, 353-4; generic, 235 n.;
multiple, 250
Categoreal scheme, I, 2 , 1 1 , 1 8-20, 200, Cosmic epochs, 1 66, 254, 276
2 1 5-20, 233, 240, 249-50, 263-4, 2 83- Cosmic present, 330-1
30 1 , 347, 409-10. See also Derivative Creation. See God
notions; Language Creativity, 1 3, 65-6, 70, 1 1 2-13, 2 1 6, 277-9,
Categories of existence, 222, 263-4, 403 3 1 2- 1 9, 342-3, 368-9, 37 1-2, 403;
Categories of explanation. See Explana­ rhythm of, 1 68, 406
tion Cumulation, temporal. See God
Causal efficacy, 144-54, 354-6
Causation: efficient, 1 2 6-8, 3 1 8, 379; final,
see Subjective aim Datum, initial and objective, 1 3 1-2
Cells, actual occasions as, 1 63-5, 407-9 Decision, 32, 3 15, 355
Change, 2 8-9, 3 1 , 35, 39, 42, 177-8, 1 94; Definiteness: forms of, 1 93, 2 1 9; of re­
and God, 300, 356-63 , 396-7 gions, 82-go
Characters, 1 85-6 Derivative notions, 7 8, 288-9, 293, 394
Christianity, 382, 387 Descartes, 1 2 , 36, 9 1 , 106, 108-9, 1 1 5- 1 6,
Class theory of particulars, 24 7-50 2 86, 384 n ., 388
Classes, 248-50, 260 Dewey, J., 1 1 7
Classification, 222, 242-57 Distinctness, 2 1 9
Coherence of Whitehead's system, 1 66-8, Division, 38; coordinate, 95-6, 99, 2 35 n .
2 1 5- 1 8, 277-9, 30 1 , 3 1 0- 1 1 , 334-6, 338, Durations, 30, 80-1, 1 02, 1 1 3-14, 1 64. See
381 Time as epochal; Unison of becoming
 INDEX INDEX

Earlier writings, 2, 85-8, 90-4, 1 04, 1 75-6, propositional, 2 14, 290, 3 1 5- 1 8; re­ objects, 7-8, 208-1 1 ; o f actual occasions Monism, 1 10-1 1 , 2 1 8, 236, 368, 403-9
193-4, 2 24, 2 36--J , 247-8, 2 83 gional, 1 20-2 . See also Prehensions in God, 337-63, 370- 1 ; absolute, 367-8. Morality, 400-3
Economy, principle of, 290 "Flow of feeling," 62-3, 67-73, 14 1-4, See also God Multiple relations, 224-5, 243
Elimination, 64-5, 75-6, 344-9, 352 162, 1 72 , 329. See Transference of feel­ Immediacy, 1 9, 3g-4 1 . See also Self­ Multiplicities, 249-50, 259-6 1 , 265-6, 338
Embeddedness, 1 8 1-2 ing functioning; Subjective immediacy
Eminent reality, 3 1 1 Forms and things, 6-7, 198--200 Incompatibility, 254-6, 397, 399. See also Negation, 2 1 1 , 2 14-1 5 . See also Prehen­
Empiricism, 1 9 1 , 385-6, 399 Freedom: of actual occasions, 307, 3 1 1-19, Inconsistency sions, negative
Empty space, 90-2 369, 397-8; human, 38g-90; in God, Inconsistency, 260 Nexus, 159-60, 1 65-6, 233, 260 n., 407-8;
Endurance, 1 1 4- 1 5 , 1 94; undifferentiated, 343, 3 7 1-2 . See also Subjective aim; Individuality, 5-6, 20-1, 47, 1 1 1-12, impartial, 326 n .
108-g, 353-4. See Obj ects, enduring Creativity 155-8, 25 1-2, 368--7 0 ; bare, 1 36; God Novelty, 48-50, 1 8g n . , 205, 2 1 3, 2 1 5- 1 6,
Entropy, 356-g Function, 209 as ground of, 334-6, 380 220, 25 1 , 253-4, 278--9, 2 9 1 , 305, 309-10,
Essence: of an actual occasion, real and Future, 60-6 1 , 1 2 3-5, 1 63; for God, 373. Individuation, principle of, 2 1 5 376--7
abstract, 79; of an eternal object, in­ See also Anticipation Influence, 145-54, 302, 337, 350; God as
dividual and relational, 1 83-4, 205-6, ground of, 334-6, 380 Objectification, 1 2 , 36-8, 63-6; causal,
261 Gentry, G. V., 157 Ingredient, 1 84. See also Ingression 1 30-44, 1 60-2; mediate, 1 25-6; presen­
Eternal objects, 13, 50, 1 3 8--4 1 , 1 78, 1 93- Givenness, of the past, 3 1 9-30; for God, Ingression: of objects, 1 84-g2; of eternal tational, 1 62-3. See also Immanence
279; abstract, 206-8; examples of, 350 objects, 208--9; modes of, 2 1 0-1 1 , dative, Objective diversity, 248-g
202-3; in themselves, 263-6; and God, 8-g, 1 3, 158, 165, 1 98, 204, 205, 2 1 3, 2 1 0-1 1 , 2 14, 2 38, restricted (concep­ Objective identity, 25, 290
novelty, 309-10; objective and subjec­ 2 1 6, 2 62-3, 2 83-4 1 1 ; an actual entity, tual) and unrestricted (physical), Objective immortality, 36-8, 1 14. See
tive species, 202, 238; orderings of, 2 86-g; and the categories, 2 83-301, 2 10-14; subjective, 2 10-1 1 , 2 14, 239 Objectification, causal
266-79, 308, 3 1 7 ; relational function, 339-40, 344, 347, 350- 1 , 353-4, 366, Intensity, 352, 356-60; absolute, 358--9. Objects: in earlier writings, 1 75-92, 2 24;
236-g; as specific, 29 1-2 ; terms for, 37 1-2, 384, 39 1-2, 394; not composite, See also Subjective intensity in later writings, 1 94; enduring, 1 14-'-15,
1 94-6. See Ingression 391-2 , 396; conceptual valuation, Intrinsic and extrinsic reality, 44-5 1 78; natural, 1 77, 1 8 1 ; perceptual, 1 76,
Eternality, 1 94-5, 204-5 2 8g-g4; conditions on his activity, Isolation of eternal objects, 252, 261 1 87, 226-7; physical, 1 87-8, 226; scien­
Events, 83-9, 92-4, 1 75-g2, 224 397-g; conformal feelings, 349-56; as "It," bare, 1 36 tific, 1 76, 1 87-8; sense, 1 76, 1 87, 2 2 6
Evidence for Whitehead's theory, 145-53, consequent, 1 3, 307-8, 323; and con­ Occasionalism, 32g-30
1 68--7 2 , 2 1 8--2 0, 285. See also Experi­ temporaneity, 330-4, 406; and creation, James, W., 1 1 7, 149, 1 68 Ontological principle, 140, 237, 304-6,
ence; Adequacy of Whitehead's system 3 1 1 , 363, 379-80; and cumulation, 323, 3 1 9-30
Evil, 400-3 329, 359-60; and evil, 389, 400-3; ex­ Language, Whitehead's, 2-3, 1 1- 1 2 , 1 8--2 0, Ontology, Whitehead's. See Categories of
Exclusiveness: of forms, 254-6; of im­ periential exclusiveness, 33g-44, 369, 28-9, 142-3, 1 5 8--60, 162, 229, 237, 2 84 . existence
mediacy (experiential), 50-76, 327-g, 405-6; and extension (space and time), See also Categoreal scheme Order, 253-4, 260, 376-7; of nature, 2 76,
33g-44, 36 9, 405-6; of regions (spatio­ 331 , 393-6; freedom, 37 1-2, 4 1 0- 1 1 ; and Later writings, 1-5, 193-6, 283-4 398-9
temporal), 93-104. See also Incom­ givenness of the past, 3 1 9-30; good­ Laws of nature, 398-g Organic relations, 1 58-60, 163-66
patibility ness, 399-403; immanence, 8-9, 302- Leibniz, l l0-1 1 , 225, 2 2 7, 276, 279, 286, Organism, 6, 158--60, 163-66, 370, 407-9
Exemplification, 208. See also Ingression 336, 376-7, 409; immutability, 295-7, 3o3, 384
Experience, 1 8--2 0, 1 68--7 2, 2 1 8-20, 225, 396--J ; metaphysical and religious func­ Limitations on actual occasions and God, Panpsychism, 1 9-20
390. See also Evidence for Whitehead's tions, 324; mystery in, 4 1 0-1 1 ; and 355-6 Pantheism, 403-g
theory negative prehensions, 344-g; not om­ Location: simple, 83-4, 224; single, 83-6, Participation, 199, 208
Explanation, 1 46-53, 264, 286, 320, 338-g, nificent, 388-go; omnipresence, 378; 1 7 8--9; multiple, 1 7 8-g Particulars, 22 1-2 . See also Classes
383-6 perfection, in being, 35 1-6, 372-5, Locke, 92, 1 1 6 Passage, 1 77-8. See Process of transition;
Extendedness, 79-81 392-3, 399-400, in power, 378--8 0, Logic, 1 07, 246 Perishing
Extension, 77-104, 1 77-8, 393-6 397-g; not a person, 393, 409-1 1 ; pres­ Lovejoy, A. 0., 83-5, 1 78, 200 n. Patterns, 203, 243-4
Extensive abstraction, 88, 1 03-4 ervation, 380; as primordial, 1 3, 26g-7 1 , Lowe, Victor, 1 n., 55, 146 n. Perception, 1 2 8-g
Extensive connection, 89, 95-104 2 88; satisfaction, 294-300, 353-60, Lure for feeling, 3 1 6; objective lure, Perishing, 34, 296, 298, 32 1-2, 3 29, 343,
Extensive continuum, 79, 82, 334-5, 394 374-5; source of initial aims, 302-1 1 ; 268--9, 354, 362 398
Extensive plenum, 90-2 transcendence, 8-g, 37 1-5, 378-81 , Permanence, 1 1 3-15, 204
External connection, 98-104 405-6; i,mity, 39 1-3, 407-8, 4 1 1 Mathematical forms, 1 36, 202, 223, 238 Personal existence, 1 7 1-2, 4 1 1 , 4 1 3
Mathematics, 197-8, 243-5 Personality, 393, 4og-1 1
"Fact," 1 8 1 Hartshorne, C., 60, 1 1 2 , 291 , 330-1, 404--t Matter, 1 07-g, 1 75 Persuasion, divine, 306-7, 398
Feelings, 1 2 , 24; conceptual, 2 1 1-15, Historical routes of occasions, 1 65-6 Mental pole, 205, 269 Phenomenalism, 1 26-7
2 89-g4; conformal, 1 30-44, 1 67, 229, Hume, 144, 146-54, 2 1 8, 269 Mentality, 2 1 2- 1 3, 220, 353-4 Philosophical tradition, Whitehead and,
2 3 8-g, 306-7, 349-60; hybrid, 2 1 2- 1 3, Metaphysics, 3-4, 225, 242-3 . See also 9-1 0, 1 05- 1 8, 22 1-3 . See also Plato;
306, 3 1 3; imaginative, 3 1 6; indicative, Identity of subjective form, 137-8, 1 4 1 Speculative philosophy Aristotle; Theology, traditional
3 1 6, 3 1 8; intellectual, 235 n.; percep­ Immanence: social, 6, l lg-29, 1 60-3; of Miller, D. L., 1 5 7 Physical pole, 205
tive, 3 1 6; physical, 1 30-4, 2 1 2-13, 3 1 8; objects in events, 1 84-92; of eternal Mingling o f forms, 245--'], 25 1-2, 255-6 Physics, 1 09, 168-70, 1 75
 ·�I

IN DEX INDEX
Plato, 1 36, 196-7, 200, 208, 246, 252, 254, Santayana, G., 261 n., 290 Substance, 1 7, 1 05-1 8, 1 2 7, 1 36, 223, 236, Transference of feeling, 62, 167, 33g-44.
258, 382, 384, 387, 390 Satisfaction, 2 1-47, 1 67, 294-300; as at­ 354; substratum, 107-g, 247 See also "Flow of feeling"; Obj ectifica­
Platonic forms, 1 94, 1 96-200 tainment, 23-4, 2g-30; as determinate, Supernaturalism, unreflective, 383-4, 389 tion, causal
Pluralism, 5-6, 1 55-8, 2 1 6, 2 1 8, 337-g 25-7; in God, 353-60, 374-5; as im­ Supersession, 34 Transition. See Objectification; Perish­
Possibility, 7, 1 8o-1 , 197-202 ; infinitude mediate, 24-5; and objectification, Supplementation by mentality, 353-4, ing; Process
of, 252-4, 3 1 0; pure, 200-202; real, 201 . 36-8; and process, 2 7-36. See also Sub­ 357-8 Translucency of realization, 208
See also Potentiality j ective aim; Subjective unity Synthesis, 25 1 Transmission, physical, 90-1, 1 00-1 ,
Possible worlds, 276 Science, 1 68-'jo, 1 75, 1 80, 1 9 1 , 242-5 125-6, 1 43 n .
Potentiality, 37-38, 1 93; impure, 201, 2 14; Self-causation. See Creativity; Freedom Taylor, A . E., 196 Transmutation, 2 2 5 , 227-8, 2 3 8 n ., 292-3
pure, 1 93, 20 1 , 220; real, 20 1 . See also Self-existence, 1 1 2-13 Telepathy, 57 Truth claim of Whitehead's system,
Possibility Self-feeling. See Self-functioning Temporality, 204-5 4 1 2- 1 3
Predetermination, 308 Self-functioning, 40-2, 3 1 6-19, 39 1 . See Theology, traditional, 296, 382-4 1 2 Truth-relations, 5 8--9
Prehensions, 12, 13, 233; conceptual, also Immediacy Time: alternative time-systems, 53, 102,
2 1 1-15, 2 20; " indirect," 56; negative, Self-transcendence, 1 1 9, 1 67, 1 72 343; as epochal, 30, 7 0-2 , 296-7, 332, Ultimate, category of the, 263-4
26-7, 2 1 1 , 344-g, 359. See also Feelings Significance, 1 68, 1 87, 1 90, 224, 236-7, 406; physical, 30. See also Extension; Unison of becoming, 54-5, 1 02, 331-4,
Presentational immediacy, 54-6, 1 2 8-9 333-4 Durations 406. See also Contemporary occasions;
Principle of limitation, God as, 262, 386 Situation, 1 86-8, 1 90-2 Timelessness. See Eternality God; Durations
Priority, genetic, 80-1, 3 1 4 Societies, 1 14, 1 7 2 , 309, 359, 407-9 Togetherness, 244, 246, 25 1 , 260, 274-6, Unity, internal, 20-1 . See also Subjective
Privacy o f experience, 228, 369, 3 7 2 ; and Solidarity of the world, 1 00, 123, 325-6, 317 unity
publicity, 43-4 334-5 . See also Contemporary occa­ Totality, 272, 296, 404 Universals, 1 94, 22 1-42; of quality, 230- 1 ;
Process, 2 1-2, 2 7-30, 1 16-1 8, 197-8; of sions; Immanence; Objectification; Transcendence: social, 5-6, 48, 1 55-6, o f relation, 23 1-2, 235-6
concrescence and transition, 29 Transmission 1 66-8, 2 1 6, 334; how objects transcend Universe, 296
Process and Reality, 2-3 Space and time, traditional interpreta­ events, 176-83; how eternal objects
Projection, 1 2 1 tions, 1 70, 1 75. See also Abstractness; transcend actual entities, 6-8, 203-8; Valuation, 205, 3 1 2- 1 3, 3 1 7, 352-3 . See
Proper entities, 235 n ., 249, 266 Extension; God; Regions how actual occasions transcend God, also Conceptual valuation; Subjective
Propositions, 2 0 1 , 255, 3 15-1 7; predica- Speculative philosophy, 1 -4, 168, 1 7 8, 36 8--7 0; how God transcends the world, aim; Subjective forms
tive pattern of, 3 1 6- 1 7 . See also Feel­ 2 1 7-1 8, 245-7, 2 84-5, 320, 366-7, 383-4. 8--9 , 37 1-5 (in being), 378-So (in Value, 262
ings, propositional See also Explanation; Metaphysics power); absolute, 1 1 , 207, 364-'j Vitalism, 1 75
Spinoza, 200, 2 79, 338-g, 403-4
Stace, W. T., 146-8
Qualitative pattern, 352, 356, 358-g Standpoints, 79-So, 93; real and hypo­
Qualities, 1 88-g, 2 2 1-4 1 thetical (possible), 95-100, 1 03-4. See
Quantum theory, 1 68-70 also Regions
Stoics, 404
Subject and super] ect, 45 . See also Sub­
Rationalism, Whitehead's, 365-7, 385-6, jective uni ty; Objectification
388 Subjective aim, 20, 23, 157-8, 2 1 5-1 6,
Realm, 1 9 1 ; of eternal objects, 258--79 25 1-2, 254-5, 302-1 9, actualization of,
Re-enaction. See Repetition of subjective 3 1 7-19; derivation of, 304-19, 376-7;
form initial, 2 1 5-16, 305; as propositional
Regions, 77-104, 377, 394-6 feeling, 3 1 5- 1 8; specification of, 3 1 4-
Relations, 2 2 1-4 1 ; external, 1 60, 1 8o, 236; 1 7, 352 . See also God; Satisfaction; Sub­
ingression as a, 1 84-6; internal, 1 60, j ective forms
225, 229, 236; spatiotemporal, 1 79-8 1 Subjective forms, 1 2 , 49, 1 33-8, 2 1 6:... 1 7,
Relativity, principle of, 207-8, 364-8, 22 8--3 1 ; autonomy of, 3 1 2-14; in God,
388, 403 349-6o, 373-4. See also Feelings, con­
Relevance: of contemporaries, 54-6; of formal; Subjective aim; Subjective
eternal objects, 266-7 1 , 2 74-'j, 2 9 1 , harmony
360-2; general and special, 2 70; in­ Subjective harmony, 302-3
direct, 12 2-3 Subjective immediacy, 1 2 . See also Im­
Religious intuitions, 2 85 mediacy
Repetition of subjective form, 1 35, Subjective intensity, 25. See also Intensity
1 37-44, 2 1 7, 356 Subjective unity, 20-1 , 24, 35-6, 72-3,
Reproduction. See Repetition of subjec­ 157-8, 302, 3 1 3-14, 343-4, 346, 369,
tive form 39 1-3 . See also Satisfaction