美國對伊朗有哪些誤判？ - 紐約時報中文網

美國對伊朗有哪些誤判？ - 紐約時報中⽂網 2022/9/13 下午5:03
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國對伊朗哪判
What the U.S. Gets Wrong About Iran
KARIM SADJADPOUR
2022年8⽉17⽇
ILLUSTRATION BY MARK WEAVER; PHOTOGRAPHS BY ATTA KENARE/AFP, VIA GETTY IMAGES (2), SAUL LOEB/GETTY IMAGES
Ibn Khaldun, the 14th-century North 14世紀的學者伊本·赫勒寫帝

https://cn.nytimes.com/opinion/20220817/iran-america-nuclear-policy/zh-hant/dual/ 第1⾴（共23⾴）
African scholar, wrote that empires 國往往會續超三代第⼀代的

tended not to last beyond three 始者是⼀群悍的男⼈由困難
generations. The founders of the first- 稱之為「意」(asabiyyah)
generation are rough men united by 的團結在⼀第⼆代⼈守
hardship, grit and group solidarity, a 先的成⽽到了第三代或第四
concept he called asabiyyah. The next 代財富和位的舒了⼼和團
generation preserves the achievements 結使們在⼀代壯志的⼒
of their forebears. By the third or fourth 者⾯⼀擊
generation, however, the comforts of
wealth and status erode ambition and
unity, leaving them vulnerable to a new
generation of power seekers with fire in
their bellies.
In the 1979 Iranian revolution, religious 在1979年的伊朗⾰命中⼼的

fundamentalists with fire in their bellies 原主義者把個國成了⼀個
transformed the country into an anti- 的伊斯蘭神國天伊朗仍
American Islamist theocracy. Today 由其第⼀代⾰命者之⼀ 83歲的⾼
Iran is still led by one of its first- 袖哈梅伊從1989年開始
generation revolutionaries — 83-year- 治伊朗哈梅伊得維久治的
old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali 原因之⼀是⾼度惕和殘暴的⽅式
Khamenei, who has ruled since 1989. 治伊朗為⾃⼰治的⼤
Among the reasons for Mr. Khamenei’s ⼈世界上⼤的超⼤國都推
longevity is that he rules Iran with the 翻
hyper-vigilance and brutality of a man
who believes that much of his own
society, and the world’s greatest
superpower, aspire to unseat him.
Under Mr. Khamenei’s leadership, anti- 在哈梅伊的下主義已成為

Americanism has become central to 伊朗⾰命⾝的核⼼事實上少
Iran’s revolutionary identity, and 國伊朗樣從的治和⾦融
indeed few nations have spent a greater 本中動⽤了占⼤例的試
percentage of their finite political and 推翻國的世界秩序在當代國
financial capital to try and topple the 乎所的國安問題上——包括俄羅
U.S.-led world order than Iran. On 斯烏克蘭中國對台灣的威核
virtually every contemporary American 和路戰—— ⿊蘭都⾃⼰的利益
national security concern — including 在國對的位置
the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
Chinese threats against Taiwan, nuclear
proliferation, and cyberwarfare —
Tehran defines its own interests in
opposition to the United States.
As I explained to U.S. lawmakers 正如我向國議員釋的那樣⼈

recently, one need only look at how 們只看看普丁在喬治亞克⾥亞和
Vladimir Putin’s brazen military 利亞肆忌憚的軍事冒險是怎樣
adventures in Georgia, Crimea, and 相信可肆忌憚烏克蘭
Syria convinced him he could invade 明⽩伊朗個伊斯蘭共和國是如何
Ukraine with impunity, to understand 作的伊朗成功固了在伊拉克
how the Islamic Republic operates. The 利亞黎巴和⾨的強⼤代理⼈
country’s successful entrenchment of 再加上國性從阿富汗軍
powerful proxies in Iraq, Syria, ⼀步使伊朗相信⾃⼰的成功國
Lebanon and Yemen, coupled with 可免的落種阻了拜登
America’s humiliating withdrawal from 府 2015年伊朗核協議的努⼒在
Afghanistan, have further convinced 川普治下國出了該協議
Iran of its own success as well as
America’s inevitable decline. This
dynamic has hampered the Biden
administration’s attempts to revive the
2015 Iran nuclear deal that Donald
Trump withdrew from.
Although the nuclear program has 儘管核計劃伊朗輕易損失了2000多億

easily cost Iran over $200 billion in lost 元的⽯油⽽且沒阻⽌報
oil revenue and has not deterred Israel ⾊列在⿊蘭的核⾏的明⽬
from reportedly carrying out brazen 的暗和破⾏為但國越是
assassinations and acts of sabotage ⼒於外交努⼒伊朗妥協的緊越
against Tehran’s nuclear sites, the more 即使核協議⿊蘭的世界
committed the United States has been 會
to diplomacy, the lesser Iran’s sense of
urgency to compromise. Even if the
nuclear deal is revived, Tehran’s
worldview will endure.
Multiple U.S. administrations have 多屆國府都曾試或服伊朗

attempted to coerce or persuade Iran to 考其⾰命的神質失
reconsider its revolutionary ethos, but 告終原因簡單對於⼀個打擊
have failed. The reason is simple: U.S.- 帝國主義為組原則提的神府來
Iran normalization could prove deeply 伊關正常可會破它
destabilizing to a theocratic government 的定
whose organizing principle has been
premised on fighting American
imperialism.
Herein lies the conundrum. By and 問題出在裡的來國⼀直

large, the United States has sought to 在⼀個顯想之的
engage a regime that clearly doesn’t ⾏⼀個在中勃
want to be engaged, and isolate a ruling 發的治⽽間的推
regime that thrives in isolation. Yet over 移伊朗⽰出它的影響⼒已經⼤
time, the Iranian regime has shown it’s 到法忽視到法⾰殘暴到
too influential to ignore, too dogmatic 法推翻⼤到法完制的
to reform, too brutal to overthrow, and 度
too large to fully contain.
A sound U.S. policy must reconcile the ⼀個明智的國策必須協制伊朗

short-term objectives of countering 的短期⽬即核⼼和域⼼同
Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions ⼜妨期⽬的實現即建⼀
without hampering the long-term goal 個由⼈⺠的國利益⽽治者的⾰命
of a representative Iranian government 意型動的伊朗代議制府
that is driven by the national interests
of its people, rather than the
revolutionary ideology of its rulers.
In the zero-sum worldview of 在伊朗⾰命的和世界中開

Iran’s revolutionary elite, opening 國可會來弱們私⼈⼩幫的
up the country could bring in 競爭對伊朗的許多治和軍事來
competition that would undermine ⼒之爭是關於⾰命意型或
their private mafias. For many among 伊斯蘭⽽是關於誰制個國的
Iran’s political and military elite the ⼤源
battle for power is not about
revolutionary ideology or Islam, but
about who controls the country’s vast
resources.
“At the beginning of the revolution the 「⾰命之初個的普成員中

rank and file of the regime consisted of 80%是⼦義的信們對
80 percent indoctrinated believers — 現實⼀所知 20%是⼦和⾊
ignorant of global realities — and 20 」伊朗國的⼀名授告我
percent charlatans, and chameleons” a 的學⽣的已當上了⾼官「天的
professor inside the country, whose 況正好相 20%是信 80%是
students rose to senior official ⼦們當官是為了財富和
positions, told me. “Today it is the 」
opposite: 20 percent are believers, and
80 percent are charlatans who flock
around officials for wealth and
privilege.”
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U.S. policy toward Iran has for years 國對伊朗的策多年來⼀直⾯臨⼀

faced a paradox that has been poorly 個尚未得到了的悖論對抗個
understood: The coercive policies 伊斯蘭共和國的核⼼和域⼼所
needed to counter the Islamic 的性策（如制裁）可會在
Republic’s nuclear and regional 意中加強⽽是弱伊朗對⼒
ambitions — i.e., sanctions — may 的制
inadvertently serve to strengthen, not
weaken, the regime’s grip on power.
When Mr. Trump tried to entice Kim 當川普試⽤朝鮮可擁的財富願景

Jong-un with a vision of the riches his 來引⾦正恩（川普曾告⾦正恩
country could have — “You could have 「你可在那裡世界上好的
the best hotels in the world right there” 店」）名朝鮮⼈沒被打
— the North Korean president wasn’t 動沒結束⾃⼰的核計劃獨裁
moved to end his nuclear program. 的⾃⾝利益被其治的⼈⺠的福祉之
There is often a fundamental tension 間往往存在⼀個本性的⽭
between the self-interest of
dictatorships and the well-being of the
people they rule.
Although sanctions force adversarial 儘管制裁使對國付出⾼昂代價

nations to pay a high cost, they do not, 但制裁本⾝並沒太多推翻威的
on their own — with the possible ⼒記可南除外事實上⼀
exception of South Africa — have a 國⾄從其治中受益
strong track record of unseating
authoritarian regimes from power.
Indeed, some even benefit from their
political isolation.
The actor Sean Penn, who had met the 演員⻄恩· 曾已的古巴獨裁者
late Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, once 爾·卡斯楚⾒⾯在⼀晚宴上告
told me over a dinner we were both 我「爾喜開玩笑如果
attending that “Fidel likes to joke that if 國對古巴的制裁會在第⼆天
America were to ever remove the 挑的事國裁明
embargo against Cuba, he would do ⽩⾃⼰的⼒在（國本主義和
something provocative the next day to ⺠社會隔絕的）境中才得到
get it reinstated. He understands his 好的維」
power is best preserved in a bubble,”
sequestered from international
capitalism and civil society.
ILLUSTRATION BY MARK WEAVER; PHOTOGRAPHS BY BETTMAN/GETTY IMAGES, ATTA KENARE/AFP,

VIA GETTY IMAGES
Like Castro, Mr. Khamenei too 卡斯楚⼀樣哈梅伊明⽩的

understands that the greater danger to 神治⾯臨的更⼤危險是
his theocracy is not global isolation but ⽽是融當國得
global integration. When that isolation 於弱哈梅伊願意考種作
becomes too debilitating, Mr. Khamenei 為釋閥⾨的戰性交易對哈梅伊
is willing to consider a tactical deal to 來理想的狀是恰到好的
serve as a release valve. For Mr. 哈梅伊想伊朗成朝鮮
Khamenei, the ideal position is just the 想成杜拜希在受制裁
right amount of isolation. Mr. 的況下在市場出售伊朗⽯油但
Khamenei wants to be neither North 想伊朗完融
Korea nor Dubai. He wants to be able to
sell Iran’s oil on the global market
without sanctions, but he doesn’t want
Iran to be fully integrated in the global
system.
The former president of Iran, 伊朗穆 ·哈對我

Mohammad Khatami, once told me that 哈梅伊曾經告伊斯蘭共和國
Mr. Khamenei used to tell him that the 要國為哈梅伊從未
Islamic Republic needed enmity with 對國的忌曾在2019年「⾄
America. Mr. Khamenei has never 於國何問題都法國
hidden his cynicism about the United 的判只會來經濟上和神上的損
States. “With regard to America” he 失」
said in 2019, “no problem can be
resolved and negotiations with it have
nothing but economic and spiritual
loss.”
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While Mr. Khamenei’s animosity 雖哈梅伊對國的意是真

toward the United States is no doubt 的但符合的⾃⾝利益⼀直
earnest, it is also in his self-interest. His 堅定移⼒於⾰命的核⼼原則對
commitment to the revolution’s core 原則中的何妥協都會破伊本·
principles has been ironclad. 赫勒久到的對何
Compromising any of these principles 的期存在都⾄關要的團結
could erode the group solidarity that
Ibn Khaldun long ago observed is
central to the longevity of any regime.
Eric Hoffer, the American philosopher 國哲學⾥克· 弗在《狂⼦

put it succinctly in his book, “The True 群眾動經》(The True Believer:
Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Thoughts on the Nature of Mass
Mass Movements”: “Hatred is the most movement)⼀書中寫得簡明了「在
accessible and comprehensive of all 所推動團結的作⽤⼒中仇是好
unifying agents,” adding, “Mass ⽤和⾯的」「群眾動
movements can rise and spread without 的發⽣和發壯⼤要相信上帝
belief in a god, but never without belief 但從來都少了相信個王」
in a devil.”
If Iran’s revolutionary elite have 如果伊朗的⾰命在相對的境

thrived in relative isolation, why 下勃發為什國直
doesn’t the United States simply restore 伊朗的關個問題的基礎是假設
relations with Iran? Built into this 國⼒單⽅⾯實現關正常⽽伊
question is the assumption that 朗沒受或絕的⼒
America has the power to unilaterally
normalize relations, and Iran has no
agency whether to accept or decline.
In contrast to the Cold War, when the 戰期國在斯科續的外交

United States had a continuous 存在⽽且擁千名訓練素的俄羅
diplomatic presence in Moscow and 斯專相之下⾃1979年國駐
thousands of trained Russia specialists, ⿊蘭⼤使被佔來國府在伊
the U.S. government has been absent 朗於席狀乎沒在該國打交
from Iran since the 1979 seizure of the 的經驗
U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and boasts of
little in-country expertise.
This estrangement and lack of 種和乏了助了國國

understanding has fueled what the 安問H·R· 克⾺斯所的「戰略
former U.S. National Security adviser ⾃戀」即僅僅國⾏為的鏡來
H.R. McMaster has called “strategic 知世界事件的趨⾃由主義者經常
narcissism,” the tendency to perceive 爭辯伊朗可軟其⾰命意
world events solely through the prism 型或增強溫和的⼒守
of U.S. behavior. Liberals often argue 則為國採更強硬的法可會
that engaging Iran could soften its 使伊朗其意型或者上
revolutionary ideology or empower 從的險兩種⽅法都沒
regime moderates. Conservatives have 奏
argued a tougher U.S. approach could
either force Iran to abandon its ideology
or risk the implosion of the regime.
Neither approach, on its own, has
worked.
Since 1979, every U.S. administration — ⾃1979年來除了喬治·W·布希府

save for that of George W. Bush — has 每⼀屆國府都試伊朗的關
attempted to improve relations with 吉 ·卡府試享伊拉克
Iran. Jimmy Carter’s administration 的姆· 賽因計劃伊朗的報
tried to build confidence with Iran’s 得伊朗⾰命的信但
new revolutionary regime by sharing 報沒引視羅 · 向伊朗
intelligence, which would go unheeded, 府發了三封信未到回喬治
that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was ·H·W·布希的演向伊朗傳了⼀個
planning to invade Iran. Ronald Reagan 信息——「意會產⽣意」爾·柯
sent three unanswered letters to the 林頓希 2000年在聯合國會⾒伊朗⾰
Iranian government. George H.W. 穆 ·哈
Bush’s inauguration speech included a
message — “goodwill begets goodwill”
— for Iran. Bill Clinton hoped to meet
Iran’s reformist president Mohammad
Khatami at the United Nations in 2000.
Barack Obama wrote multiple private 巴拉克· 巴⾺在回憶中給哈梅

letters to Mr. Khamenei whose response 伊寫了多封私⼈信得到的回應是
was to suggest ways America “could 建議國如何「停⽌再帝國主義
stop being an imperialist bully,” as Mr. 者」唐 ·川普府於2020年暗了
Obama recalled in his latest memoir. 伊朗少卡⻄姆· ⼀名伊朗
Even Donald Trump — whose 官員稱即使川普⾄少提出哈
administration assassinated Maj. Gen. ·魯哈會⾯的
Qassim Suleimani of Iran in 2020 —
made at least eight requests to meet
with President Hassan Rouhani,
according to an Iranian official.
By contrast, there is not a single known 相之下從未伊朗⾼⼈為

example of Iran’s supreme leader 了實現關正常提出國官員
initiating a public or private dialogue ⾏開或私下對話的已知例⼦
with U.S. officials in the hopes of ⽌的外交官從事核協議
normalizing relations. Most recently, he 判的國官員會⾯哈梅伊為
has forbidden his diplomats to meet 國的和對構成的⽣存威⼤於
U.S. officials working on renegotiating 雙⽅戰的續
the nuclear deal. Mr. Khamenei
recognizes that rapprochement with the
United States poses far more of an
existential threat to him than continued
Cold War.
To be clear, the United States has 要明確的是國曾犯下難性的

also made catastrophic errors. The 錯 2003年的伊拉克戰爭伊朗的什
2003 Iraq war spread Iran’s Shia 神治傳到伊拉克並促了
theocracy to Iraq, and facilitated Iran’s 伊朗在的川普府2018年單
regional ascent. The main outcome of ⽅⾯出核協議的主要結果卻是伊朗擁
the Trump administration’s unilateral 更先的核計劃
2018 withdrawal from the nuclear
agreement is an Iran with a far more
advanced nuclear program.
If U.S. attempts to engage Iran have 如果國伊朗的試基本上沒

gone largely unreciprocated, and U.S. 得到回報⽽國伊朗的企在
attempts to coerce Iran have largely ⼤度上得其那我們該怎辦
backfired, where does that leave us?
There is no silver bullet that can 沒丹妙可伊朗的性質

transform the nature of the Iranian 或伊關伊朗出意義的妥協的
regime or the U.S.-Iran relationship. 例⼦多但乎所例⼦都是因為
Few examples exist of Iran agreeing to 的況續的⼒國
meaningful compromise, but nearly all 的外交⼿段相結合實現具⽅
of them have been under similar 核協議⽽⾔意味約束它
circumstances: a combination of ⽽是除它同樣的式應該⽤於
sustained global pressure and rigorous 約束——儘管是除——伊朗在中東的
U.S. diplomacy, to achieve a specific 影響⼒
resolution. In the case of the nuclear
deal, that means restraining, rather
than eliminating it. And that same
formula should be applied to limit —
although not eliminate — Iranian
influence in the Middle East.
Robert Cooper, a decorated European 知名外交官羅伯 ·庫珀曾參伊朗

diplomat who negotiated with Iran, 判促戰略耐⼼「⾰命
urges strategic patience. “Revolutionary 會其⼈那樣思考」告
powers don’t think the way others do,” 我「們想⾃⼰在世界上的位
he told me. “They don’t want a different 置們想要⼀個同的世界為你
place in the world; they want a different 可們是沒⽤的但是當們開
world. It’s no good thinking you can 始或下們的⾰命可
change them, but a moment may come 來了……那你可⾏動了」
when they begin to doubt or to get over
their revolution … then you can start
something.”
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Mr. Khamenei has not publicly 哈梅伊沒開現出何但

exhibited any doubts, but he has at 當⼼的存在受到威⽽且
times shown an ability to make tactical ⼀安的之路會⽰出戰
compromises when he has feared his 妥協的⼒
regime’s existence is at stake, and there
is a safe path of retreat.
William J. Burns, the director of the 中局局威廉·伯恩斯是2015年伊朗

C.I.A., and one of the diplomatic 成的核協議的外交者之⼀寫
architects of the 2015 nuclear 該協議是由「強硬的外交制裁的
agreement with Iran, wrote that the 經濟影響⼒國共的治影響⼒
agreement was spawned by “tough- 可使⽤武⼒的軍事影響⼒」催⽣
minded diplomacy, backed up by the 出來的天外交沒強硬制裁沒
economic leverage of sanctions, the 得到執⾏國共更難成
political leverage of an international ⿊蘭乎相信拜登沒興在中
consensus, and the military leverage of 東再發軍事衝
the potential use of force.” Today
diplomacy has not been tough-minded,
sanctions are not enforced fully,
international consensus is more
difficult to obtain and Tehran appears
convinced that President Biden has no
interest in another military conflict in
the Middle East.
The clerical regime that has ruled 去四⼗年來治伊朗的⽂病

Iran over the last four decades is 但它仍繼續存在原因是
terminally ill, yet it continues to endure, 乏可⾏的代⽅它法⾏意義
in part due to a lack of viable 的⾰是因為它理由⼼樣
alternatives. It cannot meaningfully 會加它的伊朗經濟的天四
reform, out of well-founded fears that 騎⼠—— 腐管理和⼈
doing so would hasten its death. The 才失——普存在伊朗該的其
four horsemen of Iran’s economy — ⼒—— 利亞黎巴⾨和伊拉
inflation, corruption, mismanagement, 克——之間的共同是安經濟失
and brain drain — are endemic. The 和度
common denominators between Iran
and its regional spheres of influence —
Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq — are
insecurity, economic failure, and
profound unhappiness.
Crane Brinton, the author of the 開性作《⾰命析》(The Anatomy

seminal book “The Anatomy of of Revolution)的作者克蘭·布林頓為
Revolution,” argued that most ⼤多⾰命在終正常之都經了
revolutions experience a radical period, ⼀個期即「怖治」儘管
the “reign of terror,” before normalcy 伊朗的⾰命久平息了但
eventually sets in. Although 正常⼀直難實現原因在於現
revolutionary fervor long ago subsided 狀中強⼤且固的利益
in Iran, normalcy has been elusive,
partly because of powerful entrenched
interests in the status quo.
The goal of Mr. Khamenei and his 哈梅伊和的⾰命同黨—— 下的真正

revolutionary cohorts — the remaining 信 ——的⽬是免⼀個正常的伊朗
true believers — is to avoid a normal 國關的正常使該伊
Iran, and normalization with the United 斯蘭共和國失去幫助維安
States, which would deprive the Islamic ⼒的外對⼿即伊本·赫勒所寫的
Republic of the external adversary that 意雖從來看是⼀個失
has helped maintain the cohesion of the 的策略但年旬的哈梅伊沒
security forces, the asabiyyah that Ibn 那哈梅伊的⾸要從來都
Khaldun wrote about. Although this is a 是伊朗的國利益⽽是的
losing strategy in the long run, the 團結和國社會的
octogenarian Mr. Khamenei’s time
horizon is limited. Mr. Khamenei’s
priority has never been about Iran’s
national interest, but it’s to keep his
regime united and the international
community divided.
If the four-decade history of the Islamic 如果我們個伊斯蘭共和國的40年

Republic is any guide, Mr. Khamenei 史作為參照的話結論是哈梅伊怕
may be unwilling or incapable of 願意或法成共來
marshaling an internal consensus to 國的核協議除到團結正在
revive the nuclear deal with the United 動社會倦怠開始為⼀代的⼒
States unless he feels regime solidarity 者提供助⼒悖論在於它往往只
is faltering, and societal exhaustion is 在⼤的⼒下才會妥協⽽同樣的
beginning to fuel a new generation of 外⼒和卻助於它活⼒
power seekers. The paradox of the
Islamic Republic is that it tends to
compromise only under severe
pressure, yet that same external
pressure and isolation help keep it alive.
It is a game Mr. Khamenei has been ⼗年來哈梅伊越來越擅種

perfecting for decades.
Karim Sadjadpour(@ksadjadpour)是喬治城⼤學兼授是卡基國和平基⾦會⾼研員主要關注

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美國對伊朗有哪些誤判？ - 紐約時報中⽂網 2022/9/13 下午5:03

Ibn Khaldun, the 14th-century North 14世紀的 學者伊本·赫勒 寫 帝

African scholar, wrote that empires 國往往 會 續超 三代 第⼀代的

In the 1979 Iranian revolution, religious 在1979年的伊朗⾰命中 ⼼的

Under Mr. Khamenei’s leadership, anti- 在哈梅 伊的 下 主義已成為

As I explained to U.S. lawmakers 正如我 向 國議員 釋的那樣 ⼈

Although the nuclear program has 儘管核計劃 伊朗輕易損失了2000多億

Multiple U.S. administrations have 多屆 國 府都曾試 或 服伊朗

Herein lies the conundrum. By and 問題 出在 裡 的來 國⼀直

A sound U.S. policy must reconcile the ⼀個明智的 國 策必須協 制伊朗

In the zero-sum worldview of 在伊朗⾰命 的 和世界 中 開

“At the beginning of the revolution the 「⾰命之初 個 的普 成員中

Your Global Growth

U.S. policy toward Iran has for years 國對伊朗的 策多年來⼀直⾯臨 ⼀

When Mr. Trump tried to entice Kim 當川普試 ⽤朝鮮可 擁 的財富願景

Although sanctions force adversarial 儘管制裁 使 對國 付出⾼昂代價

ILLUSTRATION BY MARK WEAVER; PHOTOGRAPHS BY BETTMAN/GETTY IMAGES, ATTA KENARE/AFP,

Like Castro, Mr. Khamenei too 卡斯楚⼀樣 哈梅 伊 明⽩ 的

The former president of Iran, 伊朗 穆 ·哈 對我

$759 $1,359 $899

While Mr. Khamenei’s animosity 雖 哈梅 伊對 國的 意 是 真

Eric Hoffer, the American philosopher 國哲學 ⾥克· 弗在《狂 ⼦

If Iran’s revolutionary elite have 如果伊朗的⾰命 在相對 的 境

In contrast to the Cold War, when the 戰 期 國在 斯科 續的外交

This estrangement and lack of 種 和 乏了 助 了 國國

Since 1979, every U.S. administration — ⾃1979年 來 除了喬治·W·布希 府

Barack Obama wrote multiple private 巴拉克· 巴⾺在回憶 中 給哈梅

By contrast, there is not a single known 相 之下 從未 伊朗 ⾼ ⼈為

To be clear, the United States has 要明確的是 國 曾犯下 難性的

If U.S. attempts to engage Iran have 如果 國 伊朗的 試基本上沒

There is no silver bullet that can 沒 丹妙 可 伊朗 的性質

Robert Cooper, a decorated European 知名 外交官羅伯 ·庫珀曾參 伊朗

Amtrak Has New Job Openings

Mr. Khamenei has not publicly 哈梅 伊沒 開 現出 何 但

William J. Burns, the director of the 中 局局 威廉·伯恩斯是2015年 伊朗

The clerical regime that has ruled 去四⼗年來 治伊朗的⽂ 病

Crane Brinton, the author of the 開 性 作《⾰命 析》(The Anatomy

The goal of Mr. Khamenei and his 哈梅 伊和 的⾰命同黨—— 下的真正

If the four-decade history of the Islamic 如果我們 個伊斯蘭共和國的40年

It is a game Mr. Khamenei has been ⼗年來 哈梅 伊越來越擅 種

Karim Sadjadpour(@ksadjadpour)是喬治城⼤學兼 授 是卡 基國 和平基⾦會⾼ 研 員 主要關注

© 2022 The New York Times Company.

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Ibn Khaldun, the 14th-century North 14世紀的學者伊本·赫勒寫帝

African scholar, wrote that empires 國往往會續超三代第⼀代的

In the 1979 Iranian revolution, religious 在1979年的伊朗⾰命中⼼的

Under Mr. Khamenei’s leadership, anti- 在哈梅伊的下主義已成為

As I explained to U.S. lawmakers 正如我向國議員釋的那樣⼈

Although the nuclear program has 儘管核計劃伊朗輕易損失了2000多億

Multiple U.S. administrations have 多屆國府都曾試或服伊朗

Herein lies the conundrum. By and 問題出在裡的來國⼀直

A sound U.S. policy must reconcile the ⼀個明智的國策必須協制伊朗

In the zero-sum worldview of 在伊朗⾰命的和世界中開

“At the beginning of the revolution the 「⾰命之初個的普成員中

U.S. policy toward Iran has for years 國對伊朗的策多年來⼀直⾯臨⼀

When Mr. Trump tried to entice Kim 當川普試⽤朝鮮可擁的財富願景

Although sanctions force adversarial 儘管制裁使對國付出⾼昂代價

Like Castro, Mr. Khamenei too 卡斯楚⼀樣哈梅伊明⽩的

The former president of Iran, 伊朗穆 ·哈對我

While Mr. Khamenei’s animosity 雖哈梅伊對國的意是真

Eric Hoffer, the American philosopher 國哲學⾥克· 弗在《狂⼦

If Iran’s revolutionary elite have 如果伊朗的⾰命在相對的境

In contrast to the Cold War, when the 戰期國在斯科續的外交

This estrangement and lack of 種和乏了助了國國

Since 1979, every U.S. administration — ⾃1979年來除了喬治·W·布希府

Barack Obama wrote multiple private 巴拉克· 巴⾺在回憶中給哈梅

By contrast, there is not a single known 相之下從未伊朗⾼⼈為

To be clear, the United States has 要明確的是國曾犯下難性的

If U.S. attempts to engage Iran have 如果國伊朗的試基本上沒

There is no silver bullet that can 沒丹妙可伊朗的性質

Robert Cooper, a decorated European 知名外交官羅伯 ·庫珀曾參伊朗

Mr. Khamenei has not publicly 哈梅伊沒開現出何但

William J. Burns, the director of the 中局局威廉·伯恩斯是2015年伊朗

The clerical regime that has ruled 去四⼗年來治伊朗的⽂病

Crane Brinton, the author of the 開性作《⾰命析》(The Anatomy

The goal of Mr. Khamenei and his 哈梅伊和的⾰命同黨—— 下的真正

If the four-decade history of the Islamic 如果我們個伊斯蘭共和國的40年

It is a game Mr. Khamenei has been ⼗年來哈梅伊越來越擅種

Karim Sadjadpour(@ksadjadpour)是喬治城⼤學兼授是卡基國和平基⾦會⾼研員主要關注