Table of Contents

(1) USA v. Reyes.........................................................................................................................2

(2) The Holy See v. RTC............................................................................................................5
(3) SEAFDEC v. NLRC.............................................................................................................8
(4) Callado v. IRRI..................................................................................................................10
(5) DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER NIEVES V. DE CASTRO and JOSE C.
MAGNAYI...............................................................................................................................12
(6) Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Hon. Judge Romeo N. Firme, Juana
Rimando-Baniña, Iaureano Baniña, Jr., Sor Marieta Baniña, Montano Baniña, Orja
Baniña, And Lydia R. Baniña.................................................................................................15
(7) HON. RAMON J. FAROLAN, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs v.. 17
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and BAGONG BUHAY TRADING....................................17
(8) Title THE CITY OF ANGELES v. COURT OF APPEALS.........................................19
(9) VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. v. COURT OF
APPEALS.................................................................................................................................21
(10) M. H. WYLIE and CAPT. JAMES WILLIAMS v. AURORA I. RARANG and THE
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT................................................23
(11) Republic of the Philippines v. Feliciano.........................................................................25
(12) Meritt v. Gov’t of the Philippine Islands.......................................................................27
(13) Fernando Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping..................................................................29
(14) Fontanilla v. Maliaman....................................................................................................31
(15) Republic v. Villasor..........................................................................................................33
(16) Municipality of San Miguel v. Fernandez......................................................................35
(17) Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals..................................................................37
(18) Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu................................................................................................39
(19) ARIGO v. SWIFT............................................................................................................41
(20) USA v. Ruiz.......................................................................................................................43
(21) Buisan v. COA..................................................................................................................45
 (1) USA v. Reyes
GR. No. 79253, March 1, 1993

TOPIC: Immunity from Suit

DOCTRINE:

1. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI
Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II,
Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of
the international community.
2. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
3. Cases state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually
arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice
and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

FACTS:

1. Nelia Montoya, an American citizen at the time of this case, was employed as ID checker
at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group
(JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Maxine Bradford is also an American citizen
who was the activity manager of Joint United States Military Assistance Group
(JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City.
2. After working as the duty ID checker from 7:45-11:45am, Nelia went shopping and left
the store at 12 noon at that day. On the way to her car while already outside the store,
Mrs. Yong Kennedy, also an ID checker upon the instruction of Maxine approached
Nelia and informed her that she needed to search her bags.
3. The search was made on the person, car and bags of Nelia in the presence of the Maxine
and numerous curious onlookers and having found nothing irregular on her person and
belongings, she was allowed to leave the premises.
4. Feeling aggrieved, Nelia checked the records and discovered that she was the only one
whose personas and belongings was searched that day. It also a policy that customers and
employees of JUSMAG are not searched outside unless there is a very strong evidence of
a wrongdoing.
5. Nelia then claimed that the illegal search of her in front of many people has subjected her
to speculations of theft, shoplifting and such other wrongdoings and has exposed her to
 contempt and ridicule which was caused her undue embarrassment and indignity. Thus,
she prayed for damages.
6. Maxine protested that she was immune from suit for acts done by her in the performance
of her official functions as manager of the US Navy Exchange of JUSMAG pursuant to
the Philippines-US Agreement. She further alleged that even if her acts were ultra vires
she would still be immune from the rule that public officers may be sued in their personal
capacity for ultra vires and tortious acts is “domestic law” and not applicable in
International Law.
7. Nelia contended that Maxine was not exempted the (a) search was conducted in a parking
lot at Scout Borromeo, Quezon City, outside the JUSMAG store and, therefore, outside
the territorial control of the U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines; (b) Bradford does not
possess diplomatic immunity under Article 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance
Agreement creating the JUSMAG which provides that only the Chief of the Military
Advisory Group and not more than six (6) other senior members thereof designated by
him will be accorded diplomatic immunity; and (c) the acts complained of do not fall
under those offenses where the U.S. has been given the right to exercise its jurisdiction
(per Article 13 of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, as amended by the, Mendez-Blair
Notes of 10 August 1965).

ISSUE: Is Maxine immune from suit?

RULING:

1. NO. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only
legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts
of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been
invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been
said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act or the State, he violates or invades
the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale
for this ruling is that the doctrinaire of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice.
2. Cases state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually
arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice
and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
 The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air
Base are no exception to this rule.

3. Since it is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in her private or personal
capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official
functions, said complaint is not then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based on the
grounds relied upon by the petitioners because as a consequence of the hypothetical
admission of the truth of the allegations therein, the case falls within the exception to the
doctrine of state immunity.
 (2) The Holy See v. RTC
G.R. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994

DOCTRINES:

1. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer
or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and
Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]).
2. The Holy See is recognized as the sovereign of the Vatican City as provided in the
Lateran Treaty where Italy recognized the dominion and sovereignty of Holy See.
3. A mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the
ultimate test. Such act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether
the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If it is not,
then the activity shall be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity,
or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken
for gain or profit.

FACTS:

1. Holy See exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented
in the Philippines by Papal Nuncio. Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic
corporation engaged in the real estate business. The subject matter of the case is a parcel
of land that consisted of 6000 square meters (Lot 5-A) under the name of Holy See. Lot
5-A was contiguous with Lot 5-B, Lot 5-C, and Lot 5-D under the name of Philippine
Realty Corporation (PRC) that is located in Paranaque, Metro Manila. The three lots were
sold to Ramon Licup through Msgr. Domingo Cirilos, Jr. who acted as the agent to the
sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to Starbright Sales Enterprises. The squatters
refused to vacate the lots sold to the private respondents, and as such a dispute arose as to
who should be responsible for the eviction and clearing of the land. To complicate things
further, Holy See sold the lots to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation
(Tropicana).
2. The private respondents tendered earnest money to Msgr. Cirilos for the lots, and
afterwards demanded that Msgr. Cirilos fulfill their undertaking of clearing the property
from squatters. He merely informed the refusal of the squatters to vacate. There was a
counterproposal that the respondents would undertake the eviction of the squatters in
exchange of reducing the price of the lots. Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money and
wrote to Licup to pay the original price seven days from receipt of the letter. When Licup
sent the earnest money back to the sellers, he only discovered that the lots were sold to
Tropicana, and that the transfer certificate of title were cancelled and instead were
registered in the name of Tropicana. Licup prayed for the annulment of the sale to
Tropicana.
 3. Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
invoking sovereign immunity from suit, and that Msgr. Cirilos was not the proper party.
4. The respondents, however, contended that the motion must be denied because Holy See
had shed off its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract with them.

ISSUE: Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding
selling a lot to a private entity.

RULING:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and the complaint against the petitioner is
dismissed.
2. Generally, there are two accepted concepts of sovereignty:
a. classical or absolute theory, wherein a sovereign cannot be made as respondent to
courts of another sovereign without its consent and;
b. restrictive theory, which puts conditions on when to recognize immunity.
3. Under the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity is only recognized with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii (or those in pursuant to governmental functions) . If the act is
private or acts jure gestionis (those that are for profit), then immunity cannot be invoked.
4. The Holy See is recognized as the sovereign of the Vatican City as provided in the
Lateran Treaty where Italy recognized the dominion and sovereignty of Holy See.
5. The statehood of Vatican City was recognized for the purpose of assuring the Holy See
absolute and visible independence and guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty in the
field of international relations. The Holy See is the international person of the Pope in
conducting foreign relations in his name, and not the Vatican City. Philippines has
accorded Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The diplomatic representation of the
Holy See in the Philippines is Papal Nuncio.
6. This is a universal practice in international relations.
7. A mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the
ultimate test. Such act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether
the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If it is not,
then the activity shall be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity,
or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken
for gain or profit.
8. The acquisition of lands was not in the ordinary course of real estate business but for the
site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
9. The donation was to construct the official place of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a
foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for
the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission is recognized in 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This treaty was concurred by the Senate. In Article
31(a) of the Convention, Diplomatic envoys are granted immunity from the civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private
immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds
on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is
provided for the envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as
regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.
10. Holy See’s decision to transfer the property and subsequent disposal of it were clothed
with governmental character. It did not sell Lot 5-A for profit but merely because of the
squatters living thereon that made it impossible for the petitioner to use it for the purpose
of the donation. Furthermore, the DFA had formally intervened in the proceedings before
the trial court and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly
accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines, exempt from the local
jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights and privileges and immunities of a diplomatic
mission or embassy of the country.
11. As such, private respondents are left with no legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. It can ask its own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic
channels under both Public International Law and Transnational Law. Private
respondents can ask the Philippine government, through DFA, to espouse its claims
against the Holy See by persuading the Philippine government to take up the validity of
its claims with the Holy See. Of course, DFA should first make a determination of the
impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy
See. Once the claim was taken by the Philippine government, the claim ceases to be a
private cause.
12. In this case, the petitioner had denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the
Lot 5-A were made for profit. It claimed that it acquired the property for its mission or
the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. The lot, allegedly, was acquired by donation
from the Archdiocese of Manila for the purpose of building official residence of Papal
Nuncio. However, when the informal settlers refused to leave the property, the petitioner
decided to dispose the property, not for commercial purpose. The DFA intervened as they
established in a Memorandum and Certification the privilege of sovereign immunity of
the petitioner, stating that they are a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Philippines
exempt from local jurisdiction and has title to all rights, privileges and immunities of a
diplomatic mission or embassy in the country. When the plea of immunity has been
recognized by the executive department, such shall be conclusive to courts.
13. NOTE: The United Nations, as well as its organs and specialized agencies are likewise
beyond the jurisdiction of local courts and local administrative tribunals. Even other
International Organizations or International agencies may be immune from the
jurisdiction of local courts and local administrative tribunals.
 (3) SEAFDEC v. NLRC
G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580

TOPIC: Diplomatic Immunity

DOCTRINE:

1. SEAFDEC (SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER) is an

international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity.
2. Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the
agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes,
economic or social and mainly non-political. In so far as they are autonomous and
beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality independent
of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one
leading authority they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of
their own.

FACTS:

1. Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner,
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases,
the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment
by the petitioner.
2. The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization
composed of various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the
jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases.
3. The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is
not immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it
has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the
issue of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is immune from suit.

RULING:

1. YES. The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC
is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already been held in
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National
Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-
AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. It
was established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of
Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of
Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam.
2. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD),
enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory
its office is located. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is
immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes
issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that
the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or
even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such
objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.
 (4) Callado v. IRRI
244 SCRA 210

NACHURA: The court upheld anew the constitutionality of Sec. 3, PD 1620, which provides
the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) shall enjoy immunity from penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except onsofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the
Director General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

DOCTRINE: It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation
of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to
look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI). One day while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, Callado figured in an accident.
Callado was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the
IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager in a Memorandum dated
March 5, 1990 and filed charges against petitioner Callado.
2. Callado submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. After evaluating
Callado’ answer, explanations and other evidence by IRRI's Human Resource
Development Department Manager, Callado issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.
3. Callado then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
4. Private respondent IRRI likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, that it enjoys immunity
from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that it
invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the
instant case filed by Callado, not having waived the same. The Labor Arbiter ruled in
favor of the Callado. However, the NLRC set aside such, and the complaint was
dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether IRRI waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship

RULING:

1. No. The IRRI did not waive its immunity from suit.
2. The Supreme Court held that P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides: Art. 3. Immunity from
Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived
by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
3. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
 branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government or other officer acting under his direction.
4. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and
respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by
the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department
of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield
the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from
political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the
organization, and to ensure the unhampered the performance of their functions.
5. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its
Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying
that such waiver is discretionary on its part.
 (5) DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER NIEVES V. DE CASTRO
and JOSE C. MAGNAYI
G.R. No. 113191 September 18, 1996

DOCTRINES:

1. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local

jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or
even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such
subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially behalf of its member-states.
2. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government. And
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity
upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other
officer acting under his direction. (In short, if the executive branch recognizes and
affirms that an entity enjoys immunity, then the courts should not question that decision.)

FACTS:

1. Private respondent initiated a case for his alleged illegal dismissal by Asian Development
Bank (ADB) and the latter's violation of the "labor-only" contracting law. Two Summons
were served, one to ADB and the other to Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
2. The ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its
President and Office, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for
borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of
the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to
Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of
The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").
3. The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had
waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and ruled in favor of the private respondent.
ADB did not appeal and instead, the DFA referred the matter to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment."
The NLRC did not grant the request. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether ADB is immune from suit

2. Whether ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial
transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit
 3. Whether DFA has legal standing to file the present petition

RULINGS:

1. Yes, ADB is immune from suit.

The ADB is an international organization that has been extended diplomatic

status. As such, the ADB is independent of the municipal law. These immunities and
privileges are the result of the treaty Covenants and commitments specifically the
“Charter” and the “Headquarters Agreement” which were voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government and thus, must be respected.

The stipulations of both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement establishes that,
except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the
purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB and its bank officers (with respect
to acts performed in their official capacity) enjoys immunity from legal process of every
form.

In International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) vs. Calleja, the DFA

which is part of the Executive Branch of the PH Gov’t, considered ICMC as an entity that
enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations. Such determination by the
DFA must be held "conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political
department of the Government." In the instant case, the filing of the petition by the DFA,
in behalf of ADB, is itself an affirmance of the government's own recognition of ADB's
immunity.

2. No, ADB has not descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction
and did not give rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity:

(1) The classical or absolute theory which states that a sovereign cannot, without
its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign; and
(2) The newer or restrictive theory which states that the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a
state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis.

The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
the ultimate test. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the
activity in regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a
business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the
act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperit, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by
the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would
not attack.
3. Yes, DFA has legal standing to file the present petition

In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead

sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the
state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through
the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side
of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support
of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
(6) Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Hon. Judge Romeo N. Firme, Juana
Rimando-Baniña, Iaureano Baniña, Jr., Sor Marieta Baniña, Montano Baniña, Orja
Baniña, And Lydia R. Baniña
G.R. No. L-52179, April 8, 1991

TOPIC: Non-suability of State. The general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it
gives consent to be sued

DOCTRINE:

1. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them
in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be
sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not
acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes
under the exceptions recognized by law.
2. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law
and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed
itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

FACTS:

1. The passengers of the jeepney died as a result of the collision between a jeepney and a
dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union.
2. As a result, the heirs filed a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the
jeepney, as well as the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union.
3. The respondent judge rendered a judgment ruling that the Municipality of San Fernando
is jointly and severally liable with the driver of the dump truck.
4. Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering a
decision.

ISSUE: Whether the Municipality can be held liable for the tort committed.

RULING:

1. NO. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that “he
was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of
San Fernando’s municipal streets.”
2. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of
official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
 Court. Hence, the Court ruled that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or
tasks pertaining to his office.
3. The Court already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the
District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer that “the construction or maintenance of
roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities.”
4. Consequently, municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular
employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the
death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the
municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
(7) HON. RAMON J. FAROLAN, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs
v.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and BAGONG BUHAY TRADING
G.R. No. 42204, January 21, 1993

DOCTRINE:

1. In Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals, 217 SCRA 298, the Supreme Court said that the
Bureau of Customs, being an unincorporated agency without a separate juridical
personality, enjoys immunity from suit.
2. It is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely the power of taxation; it
performs governmental functions.

FACTS:

1. On January 30, 1972, the vessel S/S "Pacific Hawk" with Registry No. 170 arrived at the
Port of Manila carrying, among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Bagong
Buhay Trading (Bagong Buhay).
2. Said importation was declared through a customs broker under Entry No. 8651-72 as 80
bales of screen net of 500 rolls with a gross weight of 12,777 kilograms valued at
$3,750.00 and classified under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs
Code at 35% ad valorem.
3. Since the customs examiner found the subject shipment reflective of the declaration,
Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,350.00 which was paid
through the Bank of Asia under Official Receipt No. 042787 dated February 1, 1972.
4. Acting on the strength of an information that the shipment consisted of "mosquito net"
made of nylon dutiable under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code,
the Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment.
5. A report on the re-examination revealed that the shipment consisted of 80 bales of screen
net, each bale containing 20 rolls or a total of 1,600 rolls.
6. Re-appraised, the shipment was valued at $37,560.00 or $10.15 per yard instead of $.075
per yard as previously declared.
7. Furthermore, the Collector of Customs determined the subject shipment as made of
synthetic (polyethylene) woven fabric classifiable under Tariff Heading No. 51.04-B at
100% ad valorem.
8. Thus, Bagong Buhay Trading was assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the
shipment in question.
9. Since the shipment was also misdeclared as to quantity and value, the Collector of
Customs forfeited the subject shipment in favor of the government.
10. Private respondent then appealed the decision of the Collector of Customs by filing a
petition for review with the Commissioner of Customs.
11. The Commissioner affirmed the Collector of Customs.
12. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
13. From the Commissioner of Customs, private respondent elevated his case before the
Court of Tax Appeals.
 14. Upon review, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs. It ruled that the Commissioner erred in imputing fraud upon private respondent
because fraud is never presumed and thus concluded that the forfeiture of the articles in
question was not in accordance with law.
15. Moreover, the appellate court stated that the imported articles in question should be
classified as "polyethylene plastic" at the rate of 35% ad valorem instead of "synthetic
(polyethylene) woven fabric" at the rate of 100% ad valorem based upon the results
conducted by the Bureau of Customs Laboratory.
16. Consequently, the Court of Tax Appeals ordered the release of the said article upon
payment of the corresponding duties and taxes. (C.T.A. Case No. 2490).
17. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Customs moved for reconsideration.
18. The Court of Tax Appeals denied said motion for reconsideration.
19. Private respondent filed a petition asking for the release of the questioned goods which
this Court denied. After several motions for the early resolution of this case and for the
release of goods and in view of the fact that the goods were being exposed to the natural
elements, we ordered the release of the goods on June 2, 1986.
20. Consequently, private respondent posted a cash bond of P149,443.36 to secure the release
of 64 bales out of the 80 bales originally delivered. Sixteen bales remain missing.
21. Private respondent alleges that of the 143,454 yards (64 bales) released to Bagong Buhay,
only 116,950 yards were in good condition and the 26,504 yards were in bad condition.
Consequently, private respondent demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay
for damages for the 43,050 yards it actually lost.

ISSUE: Whether the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards actually lost
by private respondent.

RULING:

1. NO. We opine that the Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that
the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private
respondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it
demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it
sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this
case has been converted technically into a suit against the state.
2. On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without its consent,"
categorically applies.30 As an unincorporated government agency without any separate
juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty,
namely, taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental
function of collecting revenues which is definitely not a proprietary function. Thus,
private respondent's claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fail.
3. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED.
The Collector of Customs is directed to expeditiously re-compute the customs duties
applying Tariff Heading 39.02 at the rate of 35% ad valorem on the 13,600 kilograms of
polyethylene plastic imported by private respondent.
 (8) Title THE CITY OF ANGELES v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97882, Aug. 28, 1996

TOPIC: State Immunity from Suit

DOCTRINE:

1. Public officials are not immune from damages in their personal capacities arising from
acts done in bad faith.

FACTS:

1. A Deed of Donation covered the donation of the parcel of land by Timog Silangan to
Angeles City. The amended deed contained a provision that any substantial breach of the
stipulations shall entitle Timog Silangan to revoke or rescind the Deed of Donation, and
in such eventuality, the City agrees to vacate and return the premises, together with all
improvements to the donor peacefully without necessity of judicial action. Angeles City
started the construction of a drug rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated land.
Upon learning of such, Timog Silangan protested because their terms covered that it
would be residential subdivision site, and instead offered another site for the
rehabilitation center. Angeles City ignored the protest, maintaining that it was not
violative of the terms of donation. Thus, Timog Silangan filed a case with the RTC,
seeking the revocation of the donation and damages.
2. Angeles City admitted to the commencement of the construction of a drug rehabilitation
center but alleged that the conditions imposed in the amended deed were contrary to
Municipal Ordinance No. 1 Series of 1962 or the Subdivision Ordinance of Angeles. It
contended that Timog Silangan had no right to dictate upon them the terms and
conditions on the use of the donated land, and that it had no cause of acting when a
resolution was issued to change the purpose and usage of the center.

ISSUE: Whether officials may be held liable for their acts.

RULING:

1. YES. Public officials are not immune from damages in their personal capacities arising
from acts done in bad faith.
2. There is no legal basis whatsoever to revoke the donation of the subject open space and to
return the donated land to Timog Silangan. The donated land should remain with the
donee as the law clearly intended such open spaces to be perpetually part of the public
domain, non-alienable and permanently devoted to public use such as parks, playgrounds
or recreation areas.
3. Although the construction and operation of the drug rehabilitation center is laudable, acts
of an outright and continuing violation of the laws of the land, especially when
committed by public officials cannot be countenanced. In theory, the cost of the
demolition and reimbursement of public funds expended in the construction should be
borne by the officials of the City of Angeles who ordered and directed such construction.
Public officials are not immune from damages in their personal capacities from acts
arising in bad faith. In other words, a public official may be liable in his personal capacity
for whatever damage he caused by his act done in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority. In this case, the public officials deliberately violated the law and persisted in
their violations, going so far as attempting to deceive the courts by their pretended
change of purpose and usage for the enter, and "making a mockery of the judicial
system". However, they were sued only in their official capacities, thus they cannot be
held personally liable without first giving them a day in court.
(9) VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. v. COURT
OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 91359. September 25, 1992

TOPIC: Immunity from Suit

DOCTRINES:

1. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY CHIEF AND THE

PC-SUSIA MAY NOT BE SUED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE STATE. —
The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution)
2. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a
legislative act, not from a mere memorandum.

FACTS:

1. VMPSI alleges that the provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of
trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an
interest in more than one security agency.
2. VMPSI likewise questions the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to
Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of
PADPAO requiring that "all private security agencies/company security forces must
register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their
main offices are located xxx” As such membership requirement in PADPAO is
compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against
monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade.
3. Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-
throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower
than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement. PADPAO
found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on
Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of
its license to operate a security agency.
4. The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of
VMPSI’s license. VMPSI wrote the PC Chief requesting him to set aside or disregard the
findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even
without a certificate of membership from PADPAO. PC Chief did not reply. VMPSI filed
Civil Case against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA.
5. RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the cancellation or denying
renewal of VMPSI’s license. CA ordered the RTC to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the
State without its consent

RULING:

1. Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being
instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental
function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or
security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be
sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s
complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but
worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages
2. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced
because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.
(10) M. H. WYLIE and CAPT. JAMES WILLIAMS v. AURORA I. RARANG and
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 74135 May 28, 1992

TOPIC: Extent of Immunity from suit

DOCTRINE:

1. Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of
crimes in the name of official duty.

FACTS:

1. M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station
supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was published daily by
the US Naval Base station. On February 3, 1978, the POD published, under the
"NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY" the following:

Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control inspector/inspectress are (sic)

consuming for their own benefit things they have confiscated from Base Personnel. The
observation is even more aggravated by consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes
and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to mention "Auring" who is in herself, a disgrace
to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal. In lieu of this observation, may I
therefore, ask if the head of the Merchandise Control Division is aware of this
malpractice?

2. The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the Office of the
Provost Marshal and was subsequently proven that it was her being referred to when
petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication.
3. The private respondent then filed an action for damages alleging that the article
constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her
honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and
that the libel was published and circulated in the English language and read by almost all
the U. S. Naval Base personnel.
4. The defendants however contended by filing a motion to dismiss based on the grounds
that the defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted in the performance of
their official functions as officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore, immune
from suit; and the United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government
which cannot be sued without its consent.

ISSUE: Whether the American naval officers who commit a crime or tortious act while
discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit?

RULING:
1. NO. Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission
of crimes in the name of official duty. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize
irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any
other official of the Republic.
2. The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978 mentions a certain
"Auring" as ". . a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal" to
which petitioners actively participated in screening the features and articles.
3. It may be argued that Captain James Williams as commanding officer of the naval base is
far removed in the chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be
asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base.
This may be true as a general rule. In this particular case, however, the records show that
the offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he
approved it.
4. The imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation
against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself
admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of
the name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent
because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name
"Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a
tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. As a result of the petitioners' act, the
private respondent, according to the record, suffered besmirched reputation, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially so, since the article was
baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the
damages they caused the private respondent.
5. Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
 (11) Republic of the Philippines v. Feliciano
GR No. 70853, March 12 1987, 148 SCRA 424

FACTS:

1. Respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then CFI of Camarines Sur against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots situated in the
Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
2. Plaintiff alleged:
a. that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a
Contract of Sale followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale;
b. that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco
Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an informacion
posesoria that upon plaintiff's purchase of the property, he took actual possession
of the same, introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be
surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands;
c. that on November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No.
90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land
situatedin the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which
the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing
and distributing the land to the settlers;
d. that the property in question, while located within the reservation established
under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of plaintiff and should
therefore be excluded therefrom.
3. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in
question; that his title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-
interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and
nullify all awards to the settlers.
4. The trial court rendered its decision declaring Lot No. 1 be the private property of the
plaintiff, "being covered by a possessory information title in the name of his predecessor-
in-interest" and declaring said lot excluded from the NARRA settlement reservation,
while rest of the property be reverted to the public domain.
5. After several motions filed, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines filed its opposition, assailed the non-suability of the State and also on the
ground that the existence and/or authenticity of the purported possessory information title
of the respondents' predecessor-in-interest had not been demonstrated and that at any rate,
the same is not evidence of title, or if it is, its efficacy has been lost by prescription and
laches.

ISSUE: Whether the State is immune from suit.

RULING:
1. The Court finds the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has
proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to
be usurping a piece of property.
2. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is
an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only
such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is
directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a
governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
3. By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the
State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the
State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of
statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant
case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.
4. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.
The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case
was tried before the court a quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal. It is now
settled that such defense "may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the
proceedings."
 (12) Meritt v. Gov’t of the Philippine Islands
GR No. L-11154, March 21, 1916

DOCTRINE:

1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.

FACTS:

1. E. Meritt, a contractor working in Manila, was riding his motorcycle at a speed of 10 to

12 miles per hour, collided with an ambulance of the General Hospital. The accident was
due to the ambulance turning suddenly without having sounded any whistle or horn.
Because of the accident, Meritt was severely injured which resulted in the depreciation of
his mental (difficulty in making mental calculations) and physical (loss of strength and
agility) abilities. He now sues the Government for P18,075 as damages due to the
negligence of its employee, the driver of the ambulance.
2. Meritt, as the basis of his claim, assails Act No. 2457 (effective Feb. 3, 1915) or “An Act
authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.” Section 1 of Act
2457 provides that “E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order
to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine
Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the
Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.”

ISSUES:

1. Did the Government, in enacting Act 2457, waive its immunity from suit or did it also
concede its liability to Meritt?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the ambulance driver?

RULING:

1. No, Act 2457 is not a waiver of the immunity from suit of the Government. By
consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its
liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such
provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
 consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on
the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents.
2. No, the Government is not liable for the negligent act of the ambulance driver because
the driver was not a special agent or government officer acting as a special agent. The
Government can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office
if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as
an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. The Government does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it
employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties, and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.
 (13) Fernando Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping
G.R. No. L-6060, September 30, 1954

TOPIC: State Immunity From Suit

DOCTRINE:

1. When the government enters into a contract, for the state, it is deemed to have divested
itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary
tribunal. Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.

FACTS:

1. Defendant Pan Oriental took possession of the vessel in question after it had repossessed
by shipping administration and title thereto reacquired by the government , following the
original purchaser, Fernando Froilan's default in his payment of the unpaid balance and
the insurance premium of the said vessel.
2. Pan Oriental chartered said vessel and operated the same after it had repaired the vessel
and paid the stipulated payment , thereby exercising its option to purchase, pursuant to a
barebaoat charter contract entered into between the company and the shipping
corporation.
3. The cabinet resolved to restore Froilan to his rights under the original contract of sale on
condition that he shall pay a sum of money upon delivery of the vessel to him, that he
shall continue paying the remaining installments due, and that he shall assume the
expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the vessel.
4. However, Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Froilan's rights under the contract
of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping
Administration had authority to dispose of the said authority to the property, Froilan
having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon.
5. Consequently, Froilan paid the required cash of P10,000 and as Pan Oriental refused to
surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action in the CFI to recover possession
thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of the said property.
6. Moreover, the Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene the said civil case
praying possession of the vessel in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon
may be foreclosed.

ISSUE: Does the court has jurisdiction over the intervenor ( government) with regard to the
counterclaim ?

RULING:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued
when it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative
relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel.
2. It is settled rule that when the government enters into a contract, for the state, is then
deem to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the
 level of the ordinary tribunal. Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and
processes.
3. In this case at bar, the state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions
open to private litigants. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the
rights to sue private parties in its own courts.
4. By taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders the
privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically
acquires , within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he
might have against the state.
 (14) Fontanilla v. Maliaman
194 SCRA 486

FACTS:

1. A pickup owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration then

driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver,
bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto
Deligo along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and
Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for
treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where
he died. Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation
Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and
who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed
the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by
National Irrigation Administration authorities.
2. Petitioners-spouses instituted petition for damages in connection with the death of their
son resulting from the aforestated accident. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment
directed respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits)
and actual expenses to petitioners.
3. Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision which respondent trial court denied. Respondent National Irrigation
Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing the
required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant petition
with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether NIA can be held liable for damages.

RULING:

1. Yes, the NIA is liable. The liability of the State has two aspects. namely: 1. Its public or
governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only. 2. Its
private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes
liable as an ordinary employer. In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability
for the damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent. Under the
aforequoted paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts
done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be
specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said
official's usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is
commissioned to perform nongovernmental functions, then the State assumes the role of
an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the
government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting
through a special agent within the meaning of the provision.
2. Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are
more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is
immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided
 by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is
considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents
within the scope of their employment.
3. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising
proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1.
4. Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a
mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-
governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident
resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA
assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable
for damages.
5. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on
the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of
supervision.
6. It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road
within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim
was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that
driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up
suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA
group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their
not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial
reaction. Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason
that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of
the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and
allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further
aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not
the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and
reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group. Significantly,
this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in the selection and
supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the employee, still if he
ratifies the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the employer would
still be liable.
 (15) Republic v. Villasor
54 SCSRA 84 November 28, 1973

DOCTRINES:

1. State Immunity from Suit. “The State cannot be sued without its consent” [Sec. 3, Art.
XVI]. There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the
right depends, However, it may be sued if it gives consent, whether express or implied.
The doctrine is also known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.
2. Scope of Consent. Consent to be sued does not include consent to the execution of
judgment against it. Such execution will require another waiver, because the power of the
court ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment, unless such disbursement is
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law

FACTS:

1. The case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines requesting to nullify the ruling of
The Court of First Instance in Cebu in garnishing the public funds allocated for the Arm
Forces of the Philippines. A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of
respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the
amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. The respondent Honorable
Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the said decision final and executory,
directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and Manila to execute the said
decision. The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the
aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of
Garnishment with several Banks. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on
deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds duly appropriated and
allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and
civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP.
2. Petitioner filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in
excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of the AFP, hence the
notices and garnishment are null and void.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the state can be sued without its consent.

2. Whether the notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is valid.

RULING:

1. NO. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of

sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its
consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
 obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. A continued
adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may cause private parties, the loss of government efficiency and the
obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater is such a
fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not
thus restricted.das
2. NO. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. From a logical and sound sense from the basic concept of the non-suability
of the State, public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the
consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
 (16) Municipality of San Miguel v. Fernandez
130 SCRA 56

TOPIC: State Immunity from Suit; Public Funds exempt from execution.

DOCTRINE:

1. Unlike the State which has the immunity of not being sued without its consent, a
municipal corporation is an example of an incorporated agency which has a charter of its
own that grants them the competence to sue and be sued.
2. Municipal government is generally not liable for torts committed during the discharge of
its governmental functions. It can be held liable only if it has been proven that they were
acting in a proprietary function. Failing to do this, the claimant cannot recover.

FACTS:

1. In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. De Imperio, et al. v. Municipal
Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al." dated April 28, 1978, under presiding Judge
Oscar C. Fernandez, rendered judgement in favour of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, represented by Mayor Mar
Marcelo G. Aure and its Municipal Treasurer.
2. The court ordered the defendant municipality to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
Php64,440.00 corresponding to the rentals collected from the tenants from 1970 up to and
including 1975 plusinterest thereon at the legal rate from January 1970 until fully paid.
3. In addition to this, the defendant municipality mustpay the plaintiffs the sum of
Php3,000.00 for attorney's fees and to pay the cost of suit.
4. Thereafter, the private respondents moved for issuance of the writ of execution for the
satisfaction of the said judgement, however, petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion
to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the municipality's property or funds are
all public funds exempt from execution.
5. The said Motion was then denied by the respondent judge in an order dated August 23,
1982 and the writ of execution still stands in full force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the possession of the
provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public funds
which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the money judgement.

RULING:

1. Yes, all the funds of the municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San
Miguel and of Bulacan, are public funds which are exempt from execution as stated
under Presidential Decree No. 477, "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration", Section
2, paragraph (a): No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a
lawful appropriation or other specific statutory authority. Furthermore, there must be an
ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan containing the corresponding
appropriation for the funds before any money of the municipality may be paid out.
2. Unlike the State which has the immunity of not being sued without its consent, A
municipal corporation is an example of an incorporated agency which has a charter of its
own that grants them the competence to sue and be sued. However, municipal
government is generally not liable for torts committed during the discharge of its
governmental functions. It can be held liable only if it has been proven that they were
acting in a proprietary function. Failing to do this, the claimant cannot recover.
 (17) Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals
190 SCRA 206

TOPIC: State Immunity from Suit; How a claimant may compel the enactment and approval of
the necessary appropriation ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds
for an EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING.

DOCTRINE:

1. Where a municipality refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a final

money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail the remedy of mandamus in
order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and
the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds for such purpose.

FACTS:

1. An expropriation proceeding was filed by the Municipality of Makati, herein petitioner,

against the private property of Arceli Jo. In compliance to PD 42, the petitioner opened
an account under its name at PNB depositing an amount of P417,510.00. The court fixed
the appraised value of the expropriated property at P5,291,666.00 and an advanced
payment was made in the amount of P338,160 leaving a balance of P4,953,506. After the
decision becomes final and executory, the private respondent moved for the issuance of a
writ of execution.
2. A notice of garnishment was thereafter issued by the court to the PNB account. A
manifestation was filed by the petitioner informing the court that the private respondent
was no longer the true owner of the expropriated property. The court consolidated the
ownership of the property to PSB as a mortgagee/purchaser. The private respondent and
PSB agreed to divide the compensation due from the expropriation proceeding.
3. The judge ordered PNB to immediately release to them the sum of P4,953.506
corresponding to the balance of the appraised value of the expropriated property. The
PNB bank manager refused as he is waiting for the approval of their head office. The
Municipality of Makati contends that its fund with DBP could neither be be garnished or
levied upon execution for to do so would result to the disbursement of public funds
without the proper appropriation required under the law.
4. The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner ruling that the
account with DBP of the petitioner was an account specifically opened for the
expropriation proceeding. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the lower court’s decision. A petition for review with a prayer for
preliminary injunction was filed to the S.C. A temporary restraining order was issued by
the S.C.

ISSUE: Whether the PNB funds may be levied in the expropriation proceeding?

RULING:
1. The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts with
PNB. Account A was the one intended for the expropriation proceeding and account B is
primarily intended for financing governmental functions and activities. Because account
A has a fund that is insufficient to meet the remaining amount of its balance for the
expropriation proceeding, it is unlawful to get the remaining balance from Account B
without an ordinance appropriating said funds for expropriation purpose. Thus the court
ruled that account A maybe levied but not account B.
2. The respondents are without recourse however should the petitioner refuse to pay its
remaining obligation. Where a municipality refuses without justifiable reason to effect
payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail the
remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds for such
purpose.
 (18) Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu
40 SCRA 464

TOPIC: State Immunity from Suit

DOCTRINE:

1. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for
the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of
the State from suit.
2. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.

FACTS:

1. Petitioners filed a complaint for the payment of just compensation for a registered lot,
alleging that in 1927, the National Government through its authorized representatives
took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of a national road
in Cebu City without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written
or verbal. It was further alleged that the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu
appraised the reasonable and just price for the lot at P50 per square meter or a total price
of P52,250 for the 1045 square-meter lot.
2. The principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the
government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown.
3. The defense met a favorable response with the lower court, saying that since no
compensation was given to the owner of the land, the case is undoubtedly against the
National Government and there is no showing that the government had consented to be
sued in this case. Also, considering that the defendants Public Highway Commissioner
and the Auditor General are sued in their official capacity, the action is one against the
National Government who should have been made a party in this case, but again, with its
consent.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners could sue the defendants, in their capacity as public officials,
without violating the principle of government immunity from suit without its consent.

RULING:

1. Yes, petitioners have the right to file a suit of this character. As was clearly set forth by
Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications v. Aligean: "Inasmuch
as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers
by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his
rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.
2. Since the land has already been taken for road purposes, the only relief is to make due
compensation as far back as the date of the taking. The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the
time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment
of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned"
to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." If there were an
observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are
now.
3. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use,
which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained,
it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then
that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked. Accordingly,
the lower court decision is reversed.
 (19) ARIGO v. SWIFT
G.R. No. 206510, SEPTEMBER 16, 2014
735 SCRA 102

DOCTRINE:

1. Article XVI. Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
2. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added
inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot... assert jurisdiction over one another.
3. This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a
restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii)
from private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis)
4. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial... transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs.

FACTS:

1. In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the Tubbataha
Reefs, a marine habitat of which entry and certain human activities are prevented and
afforded protection by a Philippine law.
2. The grounding incident prompted the petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of
Kalikasan with TEPO from the SC. Among those impleaded are US officials in their
capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy.
3. As petitioners argued, they were impleaded because there was a waiver of immunity from
suit between US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms. Petitioners claimed that the
grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian violated their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology since these events caused and
continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect other provinces
surrounding the Tubbataha Reefs.

ISSUE: Whether the US Government has given its consent to be sued through the VFA.

RULING:

1. No. The general rule on state’s immunity from suit applies in this case. First, any waiver
of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special
civil actions such as for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence, contrary to
petitioners’ claim, the US government could not be deemed to have waived its immunity
from suit. Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who have control and supervision over the USS
Guardian and its crew. Since the satisfaction of any judgment against these officials
would require remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by the US government, the
suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. Thus, the principle of State Immunity – in
 correlation with the principle of States as sovereign equals “par in parem non habet non
imperium” – bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the court over their persons.
2. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
3. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is
hereby DENIED.
 (20) USA v. Ruiz
136 SCRA 487

DOCTRINE:

1. State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another state without its
consent or waiver. However, state immunity now extends only to governmental acts of
the state.

FACTS:

1. The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales which was provided
in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
2. Sometime in May 1972, the US opened the submission of bids for the following projects:
3. Sometime in May 1972, the United States organized an auction by invitation for the
repair of its equipment and facilities in at the US Naval Station Subic Bay in Zambales,
which was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the US.
4. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received
two telegrams from the US requesting it to confirm its price proposals and the name of its
bonding company. The company in turn complied with such request.
5. In June 1972, the company received a letter signed by William Collins (director,
contracts Division, Naval Facilities engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Dept. of
the Navy of the US) that says that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects due to its previous unsatisfactory performance on a repair contract for the sea
wall at the boat landings of the US Naval Station in Subic Bay. That the projects have
been awarded to third parties.
6. Company then sued the USA and the members of the Engineering Command of the US
Navy.
7. Complaint is to order the said company to perform the works on the projects and the
event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay
damages.
8. The company also seek for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to retrain the
defendants from entering into contracts with third parties.
9. The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of
defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual
defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which
has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in
the complaint."
10. Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed
the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved
twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
 1. Whether US is suable?
2. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

1. NO. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts
of another State without its consent or waiver. It is however contended that when
asovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be sued uponthe
theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be impliedthat
it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. Stated differently, a State maybe
said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to havetacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does notapply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
theprojects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both
theUnited States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of
thehighest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes.

2. NO. The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract bya State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez. In that
case theplaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States of America for the
use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on
the ground that the term of the leases had expired. They also asked for increased rentals
until the apartments shall have been vacated.

The Court decided that the “US Government has not, given its consent to the
filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is
not only a case of a citizen filing a suit againsthis own Government without the latter's
consent but it is of a citizen filing an actionagainst a foreign government without said
government's consent, which renders moreobvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of
his country.

In Syquia, the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the
contracts notwithstanding the US was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to
be suedfor the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure gestionis.
 (21) Buisan v. COA
G.R. No. 212376, January 31, 2017

DOCTRINE:

1. As the State's engineering and construction arm, the DPWH exercises governmental
functions that effectively insulate it from any suit, much less from any monetary liability.

FACTS:

1. The DPWH undertook the construction of the Liguasan Cut-off Channel in Tunggol,
Pagalungan, Maguindanao, to minimize the perennial problem of flooding in the area.
2. The DPWH received various claims from land owners for damages allegedly caused to
their properties, crops and improvements by the premature opening of the Project.
3. The Technical Working Group (TWG) recommended paying just compensation to the
claimants. It, however, noted that since the event occurred in 1989, it could not account
physically the actual quantity of the damaged crops and properties.
4. Buisan and the other claimants filed a separate petition with the COA for money claims.
Later on, COA denied the petition on the ground of laches.

ISSUE: Whether the Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the DPWH from being held responsible
for alleged damages

RULING:

1. YES. As the State's engineering and construction arm, the DPWH exercises
governmental functions that effectively insulate it from any suit, much less from any
monetary liability. The construction of the Project which was for the purpose of
minimizing the perennial problem of flood in the area of Tunggol, Montawal,
Maguindanao, is well within the powers and functions of the DPWH as mandated by the
Administrative Code of 1997.
2. Hence, the Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the DPWH from being held responsible for
alleged damages it performed in consonance with its mandated duty. Nowhere does it
appear in the petition that the State has given its consent, expressly or impliedly, to be
sued before the courts. The failure to allege the existence of the State's consent to be sued
in the complaint is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, should cause the dismissal of
the complaint.