G.R. No.

125865 January 28, 2000

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and
53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per
criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government
regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the
two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was
denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City
which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After
the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing
that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal
cases were filed in court.1âwphi1.nêt

The petition is not impressed with merit.

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by
any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no
binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu propio dismissing the two criminal cases
without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a
right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at
the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the
proper time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in
the dropping of the charges.2

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing
missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except
when the Bank waives the immunity.

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in "official
capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the
prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to
present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow
the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. 3 The imputation of theft is ultra vires and
cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction.4 It appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General,
does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys
immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. 5 As already
mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.

Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary
investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. 6 Being purely a statutory
right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. 7 The rule on the criminal
procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
MeTC.8 Besides the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

JEFFREY LIANG v. PEOPLE, GR No. 125865, 2000-01-28

Facts:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City with two... counts of grave oral defamation
The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is
immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases.
Issues:
that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement
Ruling:
the mere invocation of the... immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.
under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank
shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:... a.)... immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in
their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."... the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject
to the exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within
the ambit of Section 45(a).
slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.[3] The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part... of official
functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the... diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.[5] As already mentioned above, the
commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
Principles:
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity
from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the... diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.[5] As already mentioned above, the
commission of a crime is not part of official duty
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.

ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT
FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,
respondent.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:

On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on
leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but
more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are many, the
jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.

First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from
life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.

From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his
popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime
friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng
lords.1
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate
Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving
some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the
petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was
referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel)
and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.2

The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative
Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the exposẻ of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez,
Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.

Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement
in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had
lost the moral authority to govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined
the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also
demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the
chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services6
and later asked for petitioner's resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.

The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers,
resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and
Washington Sycip.8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry.9 On
November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected
from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10

The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives
to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as
Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened
the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13

The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started.14 The battle royale
was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor
Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Tañada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno,
Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of
private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as
defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza,
former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his
brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing
rating. Its high and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the
December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was
one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million
investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15

After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2,
2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's
Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr.
Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the
senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner
held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in
protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a
spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine
and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also
filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal.19 Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for
the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of
resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.20

January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding
lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to
symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in
Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of
persuasion, attracted more and more people.21

On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive
Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30
p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the
growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all
the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of
thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong
members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government."23 A little later,
PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.24 Some
Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.25 Rallies for the
resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was
ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope.26 There was no turning back the tide.
The tide had become a tsunami.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer
of power started at Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel
Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by
now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando
Perez.27 Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in
stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice
Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.

At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.28 At 2:30
p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.29 He issued the following press statement:30

"20 January 2001

STATEMENT FROM

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order
in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me
for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.

MABUHAY!

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:31

"Sir:

By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable
to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting
President.

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"

A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.23 Another copy was transmitted to
Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.33

On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the
Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:

"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President of the
Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice — Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to
be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court,
dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the
authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the
oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20,
2001.1âwphi1.nêt

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party."

Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys.34 Recognition of respondent
Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacañang,
led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the
government of respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House
conveying US recognition of her government.36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of Representatives.37 The House then
passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the
House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic
of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment
of the nation's goals under the Constitution."39

On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few days later, she also signed into law the
Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41

On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.42 The next day, February 7,
the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.43 Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending challenge on the
legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were
absent.44 The House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178.45 Senator
Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.46

On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been
terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure of the impeachment
court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the
question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.48

Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20,
2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed
that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed
that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55%
in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the ABC or
middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very poor class.50

After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A.
Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against
Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct,
violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of
public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.

A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the
petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director
Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued
an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting
documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting
any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that
may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another
counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required
the respondents "to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court
ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or before
8:00 a.m. of February 15."

On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51
and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A.
Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised themselves by indicating that they have
thrown their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of
five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.

In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for "Gag Order" on
respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:

"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President
vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;

(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt to
refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by
the Court, and

(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding
the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it
appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E.
Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and
academic."53

The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision.

The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:

Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II

Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

III

Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada.
In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV

Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.

We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.

Whether or not the cases

At bar involve a political question

Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the
Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already
taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been
recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court
cannot enter.

We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question
but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question
doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the
mills of constitutional law.55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political
were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v. Carr,56 viz:

"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these formulations is
inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political question's
presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions', not of 'political cases'."

In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and
outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.59 Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on
the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.60 With the new provision, however,
courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant
the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming
the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid
language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino,
et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of
respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are
inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful
revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people
power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast,
the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath
under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she
has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.

In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the
people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of
speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the
President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of
the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal
questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.

Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the reasons of our
1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press
of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the
revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express
his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for
purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the authorities,
individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the
Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically
provided "that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.66

Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368 Constitution. These rights are now safely
ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."

The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well
put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential
process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all
members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of
maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and
of assembly provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying
the society."70 In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the
amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the basis of the right
of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and by
all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that "… it should be clear even to
those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen.
For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and
the allocation of governmental powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As
early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a
foray in the dark.

II

Whether or not the petitioner

Resigned as President

We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a
legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner
denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President
was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.

The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:

"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.

x x x."

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when
respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang
Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events
after the exposẻ of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of
petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment
filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed,
it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful
political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former
Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his
Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a new
crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people
to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress
of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush
fire.

As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is
provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the
swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At
1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na
ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner
decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for
president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even
at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and
dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo.
The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to
advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82
The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a
graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with
enough funds to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a
graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara,
"Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace."85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled
himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the
palace. It was a matter of time.

The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed,
magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power."86 There was no
defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a
peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.

The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful
Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioner's resignation;
(2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate
the name of the petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot
feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the
following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:

"x x x

I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-
day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.

If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I
am very tired. I don't want any more of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)

I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88

Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na
masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.

The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following happened:

"Opposition's deal

7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied
by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.

Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:

'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on Wednesday, 24
January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.

2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence, and
persons designated by the Vice President to various positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities
in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.

3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authority effective immediately.

4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the President and his family as
approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).

5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings account of the President
in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President.

Our deal

We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:

The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:

'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will
turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and property throughout their
natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guarantee freedom from persecution or retaliation from
government and the private sector throughout their natural lifetimes.

This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the
national military and police authorities – Vice President (Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the opening of the
second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.

'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition Period"), the incoming
Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program.

During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President (Macapagal) as
national military and police authorities.

Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed
to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.

Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in "Annex A" heretofore
attached to this agreement."89

The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second
round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time
were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.

According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was further
refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature
of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The
Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90

"xxx

11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can
hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background.

Agreement.

The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be effective on 24 January
2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.

xxx

The rest of the agreement follows:

2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001, wherein persons
designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials.

'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of the President and his
families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and police authority – Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national military and police
authorities.

'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the contents of which
shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the President.

The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore attached to this
agreement.

11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and awaiting the signature of
the United opposition.

And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is
President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.

'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the agreement)?' I asked.

Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'

I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'

And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).'

Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.

But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot and academic.
Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and
Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.

I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side, as it is important that
the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.

I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12
noon.

The President is too stunned for words:

Final meal

12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.

The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet members who have
gathered.

By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the
Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the President.

1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's personal possessions as they can.

During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before leaving Malacañang.

The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of
unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me
for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.

MABUHAY!"'

It was curtain time for the petitioner.

In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the
press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic
albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability
and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the
people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people
as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5)
he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly,
the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.

It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner
sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:

"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable
to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting
president.

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"

To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not
discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the
Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was
never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when
he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily
unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any
circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press
release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal
significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will
especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any
legal significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.

After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law.
He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his
resignation, viz:

"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or administrative, or pending a
prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."

A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form
Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to
section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill,
"reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is
under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign
or retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:

"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an offense
committed during his incumbency."93

The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the provision and
insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.

Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section
13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President, which
was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or
retirement of a public official with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law
ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield
to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-
Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for
that would be a violation of his constitutional right.94 A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or
resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or
prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against
him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.

There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when
petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-
00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from
conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was
immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on
them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation
or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars
him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming
arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the
process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public
and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the
proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he
resigned.

III

Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.

We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of
the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of
petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.

Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to
discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under
the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in
section 11 of article VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and
respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority
of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office."

That is the law. Now, the operative facts:

Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker of the House;

Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;

Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175;96

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697 which states:

"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS
CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE
NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to
effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn
support from him;

WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in
as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;

WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their recognition to Her Excellency,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing and reconciliation with
justice for the purpose of national unity and development;

WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by reason of the
constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty to the
supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and
therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;

WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious
tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct
representative of the various segments of the whole nation;

WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the House of
Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the Nation's goals under the Constitution.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General"

On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898 which states:

"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice
President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to
the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has served
the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having served the government in
various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines – qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President
of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives confirms the nomination of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General"

(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate signed the following:

"RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and challenge;

WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose and resolve cohesive
resolute (sic) will;

WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite diversities in
perspectives;

WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to
discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99

On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:

"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice
President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to
the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has served the
Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having served the government in
various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the
Republic: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of
the Republic of the Philippines.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.

President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate"

On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states:

"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus officio and has been
terminated.

Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday,
January 17, 2001 be considered approved.

Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope" be transferred to the Archives of
the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof
shall be made only upon written approval of the Senate president.

Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.

President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate"

(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling on
the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and
the Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'

(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.

(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of government,
and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to
claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.

What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter
revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Tañada
v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there
is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court
cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court
without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on
the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

IV

Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be
prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity
from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.

Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine
of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and
Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for
damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the
Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction
would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person
and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the
executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means,
simply, that the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally
mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full
power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-
General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his
property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or
property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct
the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a
member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.

Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation to acts which
he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that
portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that
the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised
discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal
liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used
discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in
determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was
one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of
authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts, not as
Governor-General but as a private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act."

Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from suit, viz "xxx. Action
upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect
engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and
disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government itself."105

Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of
the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended
and one of the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:

"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him
or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.

The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution.

In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The King's Men: The Law of
Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty.
Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive
privilege. To quote his disquisition:

"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity
concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only form civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims.
Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we
broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private
individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or
absolute immunity defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973
Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the
after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced
the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no wrong."107 The effort failed.

The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power revolution in 1986.
When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution.
The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108

"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I
agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out second sentence, at the very least, of the
original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a
restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do
not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii
is now facing litigation's almost daily?

Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is
immune from suit.

Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit
and to add other things.

Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.

I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."

We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be
prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109
Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached
and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a
submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been
subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:110

"xxx

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for example, and the
President resigns before judgement of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it
affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would render the case
moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts."

This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that
the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada
cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for
they have a different factual milieu.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity
of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability
for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.114

Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,115 US
President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his
conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct
Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's
Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator.
President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial
process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial
proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot
prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of
Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the president from civil damages covers only
"official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones117
where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to
unofficial conduct.

There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of
the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.118 It declared as a state policy that "the State
shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule
that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an
anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to
"investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given
fiscal autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president
enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.

Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner

Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed
against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed
bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due process.

There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity
during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity
will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a
threat.126 The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive
publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,
substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.

This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high
profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129
we laid down the doctrine that:

"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the
print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and
now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting
enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field
xxx. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was
given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge
and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-
court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen
straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions
of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our
judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation.
Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that
characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility
of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In
the case at a bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the
trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even by evidence presented
during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.'

We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.130 and its companion cases,
viz:

"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation.
We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a
preliminary investigation.

xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has
been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume
and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction
about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are
sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case – the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers
have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials
cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was

xxx

The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time
this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving
assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants,
or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was
recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the
open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and
emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United
States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this
unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v.
United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.

The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core purpose of
assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as
those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give
meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials,
that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which
had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant,
having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First
Amendment rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally
and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance
the integrity and quality of what takes place.

Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials,
various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated
rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such
trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his
due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity
that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot
just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors.
Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the
klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they
considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners
speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on
the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)

Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge
his burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a
judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation
by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the
petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive
prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second
guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioner's
submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to
the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also been quoted to establish that the
respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner133 and it is postulated that the prosecutors
investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.

Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the
petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman
as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is
entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman
flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to
make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be reversed but they
can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated
like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the
latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before
the proper court.

VI.

Epilogue

A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and then
move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher
decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman
to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has
been categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms."135 To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and
less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free
atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a
democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily
resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of
the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the
minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the
key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure
14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA VS. ARROYO; ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

By LAPADIDAY March 20, 2016 1 comment

G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo

G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto

March 2, 2001

FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his
Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally given
Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game.
Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an
impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint.
The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as
presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students
from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada
and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not
resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned
his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA,
becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and
his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful
and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a
president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD:

The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino
government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing
the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987
constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous
president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace.
Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all
these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his
questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner
Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.

As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to
absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a
public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal
acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his
term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another).

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018

AAA*, Petitioner, v. BBB,* Respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262,1 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, committed through marital
infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country?

The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition 2 for the issuance of a writ of certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, to nullify the Resolutions dated February 24, 2014 3 and May 2, 20144 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468. The assailed resolutions granted the motion to quash the Information 5 which
charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, committed as follows:

On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [BBB], being then legally married to
[AAA], caused herein [AAA] mental and emotional anguish by having an illicit relationship with a certain Lisel Mok as confirmed
by his photograph with his purported paramour Lisel Mok and her children and the e-mailed letter by his mother mentioning
about the said relationship, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA], in violation of the aforecited law.

Contrary to law.

We briefly recount the antecedents.

Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two children: CCC was born on
March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009.6

In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in September of 2008.
This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be in Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from
the time they were married until March of 2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her parents' house in Pasig City.7

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. This
allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a flight attendant. There were
also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make
matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has
been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in
Singapore during her visit with their kids. 8 As can be gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied
forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional
anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.9

The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also able to secure a Hold-Departure
Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was archived. 10

On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash
Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest 11 was filed on behalf of BBB. Granting the motion to quash on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissing the case, the trial court reasoned:

Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in this case and that [BBB] is probably
guilty of the crime charged, considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts complained of him had occurred in
Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since the Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired
outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

xxxx

The Court is not convinced by the prosecution's argument that since [AAA] has been suffering from mental and emotional
anguish "wherever she goes", jurisdiction over the offense attaches to this Court notwithstanding that the acts resulting in said
suffering had happened outside of the Philippines. To the mind of the Court, with it noting that there is still as yet no
jurisprudence on this score considering that Republic Act 9262 is relatively a new law, the act itself which had caused a woman
to suffer mental or emotional anguish must have occurred within the territorial limits of the Court for it to enjoy jurisdiction over
the offense. This amply explains the use of the emphatic word "causing" in the provisions of Section 5(i), above, which denotes
the bringing about or into existence of something. Hence, the mental or emotional anguish suffered by a woman must have been
brought about or into existence by a criminal act which must logically have occurred within the territorial limits of the Court for
jurisdiction over the offense to attach to it. To rule otherwise would violate or render nugatory one of the basic characteristics of
our criminal laws - territoriality.

In the listing provided in the law itself - "repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
minor children of (sic) access to the woman's child/children"- it becomes clear that there must be an act which causes the
"mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation", and it is such act which partakes of a criminal nature. Here, such
act was the alleged maintenance of "an illicit relationship with a certain Liesel Mok" which has been conceded to have been
committed in Singapore.

Granting, without conceding, that the law presents ambiguities as written, quashal of the Information must still be ordered
following the underlying fundamental principle that all doubts must be resolved in favor of [BBB]. At best, the Court draws the
attention of Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law.12 (Emphasis in the original)

Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution�s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case, AAA sought direct
recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA posits that R.A. No. 9262 is in danger of becoming
transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and worthless law because with the court a quo's ruling, it is as if husbands of Filipino
women have been given license to enter into extra-marital affairs without fear of any consequence, as long as they are carried
out abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is an essential element of the offense charged against
BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes place; thus,
the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take cognizance of the case.

In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides:

Sec. 7. Venue - The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option
of the complainant. (Emphasis ours)

As to the ambiguity in the law hypothetically referred to in the assailed order, AAA directs us to:

Section 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and their children.

In his Comment13 filed on January 20, 2015, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an acquittal; that only
the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party; and. that this petition should be dismissed
outright for having been brought before this Court by AAA instead of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the
People in appellate proceedings. BBB furthermore avers that the petition was belatedly filed.

We tackle first the threshold issue of whether or not this Court should entertain the petition.

It must be stated beforehand that BBB is plainly mistaken in asserting that the instant petition was belatedly filed. The date
erroneously perceived by BBB as the date of AAA's Motion for Extension 14 was filed - June 2, 2014 - refers to the date of receipt
by the Division Clerk of Court and not the date when the said motion was lodged before this Court. The motion was in fact filed
on May 27, 2014, well within the period that AAA had under the Rules of Court to file the intended petition. Thus, considering
the timeliness of the motion, this Court in a Resolution 15 dated June 9, 2014, granted AAA an additional period of thirty (30) days
or until June 26, 2014 to file a petition for review.

In AAA's motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was awaiting the OSG's response to her Letter 16 dated May 26,
2014 requesting for representation. Since, the OSG was unresponsive to her plea for assistance in filing the intended petition,
AAA filed the present petition in her own name before the lapse of the extension given her by this Court or on June 25, 2014.

We find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be better served by entertaining the petition if only to
resolve the question of law lodged before this Court. In Morillo v. People of the Philippines, et al.,17 where the Court entertained a
Rule 45 petition which raised only a question of law filed by the private offended party in the absence of the OSG's participation,
we recalled the instances when the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG. One
such instance is when the interest of substantial justice so requires.18

Morillo,19 also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:

Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that
defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is
not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the
evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not
correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant
moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the
merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the
case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted
before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for
the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.20 (Citation omitted and emphasis in the original)

The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an acquittal, which in limited instances may only be
repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave abuse of discretion lest the accused would be twice
placed in jeopardy.21

Indubitably, "the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of
law are raised or involved."22 "There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application
of law and jurisprudence on the matter."23

Further, the question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view of the peculiar provisions of R.A. No. 9262 is a question
of law. Thus, in Morillo,24 the Court reiterated that:

[T]he jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at
the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its
commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of
courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under
Rule 45.25 (Citations omitted)

We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of the charge against BBB, much less weigh the evidence,
especially as the case had not even proceeded to a full-blown trial on the merits. The issue for resolution concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of circumstances, i.e., whether or not Philippine courts are deprived of
territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed through marital
infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place outside the Philippines.

The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when it opined that there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this score,
prompting it to quash the Information even as it maintained its earlier October 28, 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in the
case.26 Calling the attention of Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law, 27 the RTC furnished copies of the
assailed order to the House of Representatives and the Philippine Senate through the Committee on Youth, Women and Public
Relations, as well as the Committee on Justice and Human Rights.28

The issue acquires special significance when viewed against the present economic reality that a great number of Filipino families
have at least one parent working overseas. In April to September 2016, the number of overseas Filipino workers who worked
abroad was estimated at 2.2 million, 97.5 percent of which were comprised of overseas contract workers or those with existing
work contract; while 2.5 percent worked overseas without contract. 29 It is thus necessary to clarify how R.A. No. 9262 should be
applied in a question of territorial jurisdiction over a case of psychological abuse brought against the husband when such is
allegedly caused by marital infidelity carried on abroad.

Ruling of the Court

There is merit in the petition.

"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of
women, is also common."30 In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 made it a point to encompass in a non-limiting manner the
various forms of violence that may be committed against women and their children:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to:

xxxx
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such
as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse
and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or
to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not
limited to the following:

xxxx

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal ease is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, threshing out
the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. In Dinamling v. People,31 this Court already had
occasion to enumerate the elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited
to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.] No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as
follows:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

� �

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or
children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

� �

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

� �

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of
financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.

xxxx

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women
and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic violence, are addressed and
penalized in other sub- parts of Section 5.

xxxx

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim.
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or
the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or
emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. x x
x.32 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the
psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the
said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which
psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of
reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or
emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Tre�as v. People,33 the Court explained that:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.34 (Emphasis in the original)

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides
that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While the
psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally
essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant. The resulting mental or
emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused, as shown in the vouchers, might
have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the criminal action in Mandaluyong where the
damage was consummated. Deceit and damage are the basic elements of estafa.

The estafa involved in this case appears to be a transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in Quezon City or in Rizal.
The theory is that a person charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is in part
committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its
consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others x x x[.]35

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against women and their
children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in
their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of
the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the
first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.36

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A.
No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the
place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the present
scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC
of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB's marital infidelity must be proven
by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for
purposes of conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns itself is
simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the
illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if the alleged extra� marital affair causing the offended wife mental
and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the
reach of Philippine courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February 24, 2014 and May 2, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information filed in
Criminal Case No. 146468 is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) requires the confidentiality
of all records pertaining to cases of violence against women and their children. Per said section, all public officers and employees
are prohibited from publishing or causing to be published in any format the name and other identifying information of a victim or
an immediate family member. The penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon those who violate the provision. Pursuant thereto, in the courts' promulgation of
decisions, final resolutions and/or final orders, the names of women and children victims shall be replaced by fictitious initials,
and their personal circumstances or any information, which tend to identify them, shall likewise not be disclosed.
1
AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on March 8, 2004.

FACTS:

AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced 2 children. In May 2007, BBB started working
in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in September 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his
address to be in Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were married until March
2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her parents’ house in Pasig City.

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. This
allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a flight attendant. There were
also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters
worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been
living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in
Singapore during her visit with their kids. As can be gathered from earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of
abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish
through his alleged marital infidelity.

A warrant of arrest and hold departure order were issued but BBB continued to evade arrest. Consequently, the case was
archived. However, on November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive
Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest was filed on behalf of BBB. The motion to quash was
granted on ground of lack of jurisdiction (acts complained of had occurred in Singapore).

AAA’s motion for reconsideration was denied so she sought direct recourse to the Supreme Court via petition for review under
Rule 45 on pure question of law. In the main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is an essential element of the
offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-marital
affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take cognizance of the case. In support of her theory, AAA
specifically cites Section 7 on Venue of R.A. 9262 and Section 4 on liberal construction of the law to promote the protection and
safety of victims of violence against women and their children.

In his Comment, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an acquittal; that only the civil aspect of a
criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party, and that the petition should be dismissed for having been brought
before the Court by AAA instead of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the People in appellate proceedings.
BBB also asserts that the petition is belatedly filed.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT SHOULD ENTERTAIN THE PETITION FILED BY AAA INSTEAD OF THE OSG AS REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE PEOPLE ON PURE QUESTION OF LAW

WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE UNDER R.A. 9262 WHEN COMMITTED THROUGH
MARITAL INFIDELITY AND THE ALLEGED LILLICIT RELATIONSHIP TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES

RULING:

PETITION ENTERTAINED DESPITE BEING FILED BY PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE
AAA’s motion for extension to file the petition was timely filed. Thus, considering its timeliness, she was granted an additional
period to file a petition for review. In her motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was awaiting the OSG’s
response to her Letter, requesting for representation. Since, the OSG was unresponsive to her plea for assistance in filing the
intended petition, AAA filed the present petition in her own name before the lapse of the extension given her by this Court.

The Court found that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be better served by entertaining the petition if
only to resolve the question of law lodged before this Court. In Morillo v. People of the Philippines, et al., where the Court
entertained a Rule 45 petition which raised only a question of law filed by the private offended party in the absence of the OSG’s
participation, the Court allowed it in the interest of substantial justice.

Dismissal vs. Acquittal

Morillo, also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:

Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not
show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid
or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of
the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal
and the court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to
prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not
an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction;
and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent
jurisdiction.

The grant of BBB’s motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an acquittal, which in limited instances may only be
repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave abuse of discretion lest the accused would be twice
placed in jeopardy.

Indubitably, “the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of
law are raised or involved.” “There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application
of the law and jurisprudence on the matter.”

The question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view of the peculiar provisions of R.A. No. 9262 is a question of law.

In Morillo, the Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information,
in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by
law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involved a proper interpretation of the rules and
jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law
that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.

“We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of the charge against BBB, much less weigh the evidence,
especially as the case had not even proceeded to a full-blown trial on the merits. The issue for resolution concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of circumstances, i.e., whether or not Philippine courts are deprived of
territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed through marital
infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place outside the Philippines.
PHILIPPINE COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER PSYCHOLOGICAL VIOLENCE UNDER R.A. NO. 9262 BECAUSE WHAT THE LAW
PUNISHES IS THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, NOT THE MARITAL INFIDELITY PER SE

There is merit in the petition.

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or Information, threshing out
the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. In Dinamling v. People, this Court already had
occasion to enumerate the elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:

The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman’s child or children, they may be
legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial
support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim.
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or
the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or
emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.

R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife, NOT marital infidelity per se.
Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in
the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the
circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or
emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the
commission of the offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People, the Court explained that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that
for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.
And once it is so show, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

Section 7, R.A. 9262 “Venue” pertains to jurisdiction.

As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the complainant. While the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is
certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is
personal to the complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable element of damage in
a prosecution for estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused, as show in the vouchers, might
have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the criminal action in Mandaluyong where the
damage was consummated. Deceit and damage are the basic elements of estafa. The estafa involved in this case appears to be
transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person charged with a
transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in
which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in
another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of
the case will exclude the others.

Acts of violence against women and their children may manifest transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts
material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another. In such cases, the court wherein the any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was
in part committed.

It is necessary for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (c) was committed outside the Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the
place where the complaint was filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the present
scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC
of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB’s marital infidelity must be proven
by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for
purposes of conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns itself is
simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the
illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental and
emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the
reach of Philippine courts.

G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN
DOES, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.:

This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together
with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation,
loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of
P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator
Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco,
older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were
armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the
vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T
Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was
then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the
while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.

PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and
secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded
negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to await
another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991,
arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline
where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the
vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving
the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 1991.

On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."

On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the
members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities
for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by
a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to
Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second
batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in Metro
Manila.

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The
incident was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn
statements regarding the incident.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:

a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan,
Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.

b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were
pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.

c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.

On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine
Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and
CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and
armed with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with
petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members, employing violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to
the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were
on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T
Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect
that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second
Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a
vessel. They were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with additional
compensation if they worked beyond that period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they
cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone to Singapore, claiming
that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as
salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt
nor contracts of employment signed by the parties.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified
that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia,
obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two
years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the
business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. It owned
four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."

On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the
company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone
operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."

The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil
for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the
latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but
failed to locate the contact vessel.

The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma,"
was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by
Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore
Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a
vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi
Pride" was made by the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance
upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and
did not pass through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.

On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-
side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T
Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for the full name
of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.

Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The
surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the
payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity
and quality of the cargo to the company.

Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride."
The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks,
including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on
March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.

On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo
operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines
to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact
vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha
Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who
later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong
found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.

After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of said
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy
in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to
said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death. However,
considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio
Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the
accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to
Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr.
and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the
accused can no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to said corporation
the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum
from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return
to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to said
corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said
cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused
Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of
Manila during the pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be summarized as follows:

Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco

Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the
proceedings taken during the time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of
their constitutional right to procedural due process.

In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in
the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the
Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.

Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial investigation,
they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to read the
contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of their
constitutional rights.

Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22
and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged
pirates.

Cheong San Hiong

In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court
erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that
Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the
subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified
piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in
convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of
Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5)
the trial court erred in making factual conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary
to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any participation on his part in the
commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T
Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.

As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with qualified piracy as principal under
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for
acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed
within its territory.

We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.

The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a
non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of
counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the
crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was
not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and
territory?

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin,
Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were
represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due process
clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as
represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and
legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also
affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).

It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage of
the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This
is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights
may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third
person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that
"[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can
properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law
for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by
the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure.
Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was
unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly,
denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made ( People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA
553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).

However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation
of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is
to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and
made in the presence of counsel.

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid.
In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated
Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in
the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source (the
"tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other
evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251
SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of
the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in
evidence against them.

However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants
with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU")
and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of
then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —

. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no
less, who identified and pointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2,
1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its
cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the
shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T
Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . .

xxx xxx xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the Accused and their
cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind
of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact,
immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo,
Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified
the said Accused as some of the pirates.

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact,
boarded the said vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its destination, which
turned out to be off the port of Singapore.

(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard evidence but
their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to
the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead,
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three complete
strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-
appellants were conversing with one another along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the
"M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and
handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their destination
or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and
clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate
Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar
place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."

Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that
on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a
weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that
it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that,
at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only
failed to do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.

It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have
an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is
telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).

We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when conspirators are
assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective
effort to achieve a common criminal design.

We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the
ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to
fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to
Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their way
home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack
and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.

Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger
brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio
worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other.
Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in
Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides,
Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and
plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time
remained at large.

As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and
penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January
1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He
reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains
that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be
omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to
passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement
or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any
person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize
the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Italics supplied.)

Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of
its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of
its complement or passengers.

(Italics ours)

On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:

d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or
the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of
said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).

To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the
high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No.
7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other
hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no
contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law.
All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as
neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree
No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason,
piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the
crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel
was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done
under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of
the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of
qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine
waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage
and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of
the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).

However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?

The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he
induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was
indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-
appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the
disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:

SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery brigandage. — Any person who
knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the
movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands
or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or
highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in accordance
with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed them knowingly, unless
the contrary is proven.

The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the
liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation
of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465
[1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).

Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which presumes that any person
who does any of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at
bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the
commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.

The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally directing its
transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services,
Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products, connived
with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went
through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied, the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their
maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).

We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and utilized
by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore
Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily
discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover,
the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.

We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of
the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride,"
one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the vessel
(Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for departure) of
the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was
scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage
was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel
from "M/T Galilee" with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the
"Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic
meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the word
"Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that
Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29,
1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride"
unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric
tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by
accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his end.

Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his superiors and that he has no knowledge of the
illegality of the source of the cargo.

First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he himself
received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any
participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to show a single
piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered to
ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain
Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66
nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first
time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not even
aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the value of the cargo was
P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly,
the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity.
Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation — only to sell at the
aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-
appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.

Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of his superiors." An individual is
justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the
means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the
alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law.
Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said
order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to
consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and
articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of the order of
Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the
cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
judgment of the trial court in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.

Case Digest: People vs Tulin

G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001

FACTS:

“M/T Tabangao,” a cargo vessel loaded fuel was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island when it was suddenly
boarded, by seven fully armed pirates. The pirates were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They
detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel. “M/T Tabangao” then sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical
miles from Singapore’s shoreline where another vessel called “Navi Pride” received the cargo under the supervision of accused-
appellant Cheong San Hiong.

Accused-appellants were arrested and charged with qualified piracy for violating Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine
Waters) and were convicted as principals of the crime charged, except for accused-appellant Hiong who was convicted as an
accomplice. On appeal, Hiong ratiocinates that he cannot be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in
Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of PD 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 has impliedly superseded PD 532. He reasons out
that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered “superfluous or duplicitous” because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to
reconcile the two laws, the word “any person” mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such
that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of the
vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or passengers of
the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellant Hiong was guilty of piracy?

RULING:

Yes, Hiong was guilty of piracy.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any
person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage
of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed “in Philippine waters.” On the other hand, under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including “a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters.” Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not,
any person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no
contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law.
All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as
neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the “whereas” clauses of Presidential Decree
No. 532, piracy is “among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries.” For this reason,
piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016 - VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016

VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated August
12, 2010 and the Resolution3 dated January 4, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00424, which affirmed with
modification the Judgment4 promulgated on May 31, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayawan City, Negros Oriental,
Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 210, finding Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron (Jabalde) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 10(a), Article VI, of Republic Act (R.A) No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation, Discrimination Act."

The Antecedent Facts

The CA narrated the facts as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryJabalde pleaded "not guilty" in a criminal information dated October 14, 2002, for violation of
Section 10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610, before the RTC of Dumaguete City, Branch 31,5 which
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That on December 13, 2000 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, in Barangay Cawitan, Santa Catalina, Negros Oriental,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, [Jabalde], with cruelty and with intent to abuse, maltreat and injure one LIN J.
BITOON, 8 years of age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously slap and strike said Lin J. Bitoon, hitting said Lin J.
Bitoon on the latter's nape; and immediately thereafter[,] [c]hoke the said offended party, causing the latter to sustain the
following injuries: Abrasions: Two (2), linear 1 cm in length at the base of the right mandibular area; One (1), linear 1 inch at the
right lateral neck; Two (2), linear 1 cm in length at the anterior neck; and Four (4), minute circular at the left lateral neck, which
acts of sa[i]d accused caused the said offended part[y] not only physical but also emotional harm prejudicial to his development.

CONTRARY to the aforesaid.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The witnesses presented by the prosecution were: Lin J. Bito-on (Lin), the minor victim; Dr. Rosita Mu�oz (Dr. Mu�oz), the
physician who examined Lin; Ray Ann Samson (Ray Ann), the classmate of Lin who witnessed the incident; and Aileen Bito-on
(Aileen), the mother of Lin.7chanrobleslaw

Lin testified that in the year 2000, he was a Grade 1 pupil of Cawitan Elementary School. At around 9:00 a.m. of December 13,
2000, he was playing "langit lupa" during recess with Ray Ann, Marco, Nova and another classmate. During the course of their
game, he touched the shoulder of Nova, Jabalde's daughter, causing the latter to fall down and wounding her head. He then
helped Nova to stand while one of his classmates called Jabalde. Afraid of what happened, he ran towards a dilapidated building,
which was near the place of the incident. Soon thereafter, Jabalde arrived and slapped him on his neck and choked him. Lin was
able to get out of her hold when he removed her hands from his neck. He immediately ran towards their house some 500 meters
away from the school. He told his mother Aileen about the incident. Thereafter, he was brought to Sta. Catalina Hospital for
treatment and a medical certificate was then issued to him.8chanrobleslaw

Dr. Mu�oz testified that she was the physician who issued the medical certificate to Lin on December 13, 2000 for the physical
examination conducted upon the latter. Dr. Mu�oz stated that Lin sustained abrasions: two (2) linear abrasions 1 cm in length
at the base of the right mandibular area; one (1) linear abrasion 1 inch in length at the right lateral neck; two (2) linear abrasions
1 cm in length at the back of the neck; and four (4) minute circular abrasions at the left lateral neck. According to her, the
abrasions could have been caused by a hard object but mildly inflicted and that these linear abrasions were signs of fingernail
marks. Moreover, the abrasions were greenish in color signifying that they were still fresh. She did not notice other injuries on
the body of Lin except those on his neck.9chanrobleslaw

Ray Ann, the classmate and playmate of Lin, testified that she knows Jabalde because she was a teacher at Cawitan Elementary
School. At about 9:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, she was playing "langit lupa" with Lin, Nova, Ryan and Rhea. Nova, who was
standing on top of an unstable stone fell on the ground and thereafter hit her head on the stone. Then, somebody called Jabalde,
Nova's mother. When Jabalde came to see her daughter, she struck Lin on his neck then squeezed it. Lin cried and was able to
free himself and ran towards their house. Jabalde then shouted, "Better that you are able to free yourself because if not I should
have killed you."10 Ray Ann saw Lin again after their class dismissal at 11:00 a.m. when she went to their house. Lin did not
return to school again because he was afraid of Jabalde. During cross examination, Ray Ann testified that Lin did not run into the
dilapidated building after the incident and that she was near them when Jabalde struck Lin.11chanrobleslaw

Aileen testified that Lin is her son who was born on September 4, 1993, and at the time of the incident, he was still 7 years old.
That at about 10:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, Lin came home crying and trembling. Lin told her that he was strangled by
Jabalde, who happens to be Aileen's aunt and Lin's grandmother. Lin was running back and forth crying but Aileen noticed his
neck with scratches. Thereafter, she went to see his teacher-in-charge whom she asked for details of the incident. While in the
school campus, she did not see Jabalde. She also testified that they went to Dr. Mu�oz for the examination of her son's
injuries. Afterwards, they went home. Her son no longer returned to the school because of fear but they let him pass on that
school year. During cross-examination, she testified that Jabalde's house is just adjacent to their house in Cawitan, Sta. Catalina.
Aileen also filed two cases against her for stealing and physical injuries in the year 2002 in Sta. Catalina. After she filed two cases,
she then filed the instant complaint in the Provincial Prosecution's Office in Dumaguete City. She said it took her until 2002 to file
the present charges against Jabalde because she was still pregnant during the time of the incident and that her husband was still
assigned in Surigao. She admitted that when she was still a child, she already feared Jabalde. She also initiated the filing of the
present case because she heard that if she will not file a case against Jabalde, the latter instead will file a case against
them.12chanrobleslaw
The defense, on the other hand, presented Jabalde herself She testified that she is a school teacher at Cawitan Elementary
School for 18 years. Lin is her grandson and that his mother Aileen is her niece. She remembered that it was about 10:00 a.m. of
December 13, 2000, she was teaching Mathematics when some children went to her classroom and shouted "Mam Jabalde,
Ma'm Jabalde, Nova's head was punctured (nabuslot)".13 Thinking that her daughter was dead, her vision got blurred and she
fainted. When she returned into consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the board for about 5 to 10 minutes. The children
then came again and shouted that her daughter's head got punctured. She ran towards her daughter's classroom while at the
same time, looking for a gathering of people in the hope of finding her daughter. But, before reaching the place of the incident,
she saw her grandson Lin crying. She asked him the whereabouts of Nova but he just kept on jumping and so she held him still.
Lin said, "Lola[,] forgive me, forgive me"14 and immediately ran. Jabalde proceeded to her daughter's room and saw the latter
seated on the desk. Thereafter, she brought Nova to her own classroom and applied first aid. Then she resumed teaching. She
believed that there was a motive in filing the instant complaint which has something to do with a family grudge because of
inheritance.15chanrobleslaw

Another defense witness Rhealuz Pedrona, playmate of Nova and Lin, testified that Nova got injured while they were playing
"langit lupa" during their recess on December 13, 2000. She went to Jabalde to inform her that Nova's head was punctured.
Jabalde immediately ran to the place of incident. She, however, did not see Jabalde slap or choke Lin.16chanrobleslaw

In its Judgment17 promulgated on May 31, 2006, the RTC found Jabalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section
10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of [Jabalde] beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (a), Section
10, Article VI of R.A. 7610, as amended, [Jabalde] is Convicted. Appreciating in her favor the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obluscation, and applying the provisions of the indeterminate sentence law, [Jabalde] is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its minimum
period, as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum

The bond posted for her temporary liberty is hereby ordered release.

SO ORDERED.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Naturally dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, Jabalde appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

On August 12, 2010, the CA dismissed Jabalde's appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with modification.19 The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2006 Decision, of the [RTC], Branch 63, Bayawan City, Negros Oriental, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that [Jabalde] is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jabalde filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA on January 4, 2011.21

The Issues

Whether or not acts complained of are covered by the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or R.A. No. 7610.

Whether or not under the facts established, the lower court erred in appreciating the acts of Jabalde as constitutive of violation
of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

Jabalde posits that in her case, the act of inflicting injuries, however minute they were, is punishable under the RPC particularly
Article 266(1)22 which defines slight physical injuries; hence, she should be punished under the RPC and not under Section 10(a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.23chanrobleslaw

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) pointed out in its Comment24 filed on May 24, 2011 that since the issue was just raised
for the first time on appeal by Jabalde, this is already barred by estoppel citing the cases of People v. Francisco25cralawred and
People v. Lazaro, Jr.26chanrobleslaw

The cases cited by the OSG do not apply in this case. In Francisco, the appellant assailed the order of the trial court for failing to
ascertain the voluntariness of his plea of guilt for the records show neither proof nor a transcript of the proceedings that the
appellant indeed voluntarily made a guilty plea and that he fully understood its import. The appellant also maintained that he
was not given the opportunity to present evidence and that the case was submitted for decision immediately after the
prosecution filed its offer of evidence. In Lazaro, the appellant raised the buy-bust team's alleged non-compliance with Section
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In both cases, this Court held that issues raised for the first time on appeal are barred by estoppel.

However, the reliance on the foregoing cases is misplaced due to different factual antecedents. Here, Jabalde postulates that the
acts complained of do not fall within the definition of R.A. No. 7610 and therefore, she should not be convicted on the basis of
the said law, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

[Jabalde] postulates that other acts of child abuse falling under Section 10 (a), Art. II, R.A. 7610 is limited to acts not punishable
under the [RPC]. As the law is being defined in this section:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary"Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible
for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
as amended, but not covered by the [RPC], as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period[."]

Needless to say, acts which are covered under the [RPC] will be dealt with under the provisions of the [RPC] and definitely, out of
the context of R.A. 7610, particularly Section 10 (a). In the case of [Jabalde], the act of inflicting injuries, however minute they
were, is punishable under the [RPC] particularly Article 266 (1) which defines slight physical injuries. The act of [Jabalde] in
slapping, striking and choking [Lin], causing abrasions on the different parts of his neck is absolutely covered within the realm of
Article 266 (1). When the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to
nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period, shall be punished with arresto menor.27 (Citations
omitted)

Here, Jabalde questions the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 on the factual circumstances of the case and is correct in claiming that
the instant petition raises pure question of law28 and not question of fact29 as being argued by the OSG. In Cucueco v. CA,30 the
Court discussed the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact has long been settled. There is a "question of law" when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the
doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the
question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.

Simple as it may seem, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes complicated. In a case involving a
"question of law," the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it
is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each
other, the issue in that query is factual.
x x x The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the
same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.31 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

"The Court has consistently ruled that a question of law exists when there is a doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
alleged falsehood of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them."32chanrobleslaw

In the case on hand, Jabalde neither questions the veracity or the falsehood of the alleged facts nor the sufficiency of the
evidence, but the appreciation of R.A. No. 7610 on the factual circumstances of the case. Jabalde is simply correct in raising the
question of law in the instant petition.

Now, on the substantive issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 in the case at bar, the Court agrees with the contention of
Jabalde in her Reply to OSG's Comment33 that the acts complained of do not fall within the definition of the said law, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The [OSG] in his comment is correct in saying that the issues that could be raised in a petition for review are purely questions of
law. Guided by this principle, [Jabalde] comes to this Court to raise a question of law. [Jabalde] has been arguing when she
availed of his right to appeal that the acts of the [OSG] does not fall within the definition of R.A. 7610 and should not be
convicted on the basis of the said law. This is not a new matter that [Jabalde] raised.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The law under which Jabalde was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610, which
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development.

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis ours)

Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 3. Definition of terms. -

xxxx

(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

In the recent case of Bongalon v. People,35 the Court expounded the definition of "child abuse" being referred to in R.A. No.
7610. In that case, therein petitioner was similarly charged, tried, and convicted by the lower courts with violation of Section
10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The Court held that only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be
intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be
punished as child abuse, otherwise, it is punished under the RPC, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back
with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the
purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on
Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of
the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own
minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that
specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in
the crime of child abuse.36 (Emphasis ours and italics in the original)

Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin, hitting the latter on his nape, and immediately thereafter, choking the said
offended party causing the latter to sustain injuries.37 However, the records of the case do not show that Jabalde intended to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of Lin as a human being.

Black's Law Dictionary defined debasement as "the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of something."38 Degradation, on
the other hand, is "a lessening of a person's or thing's character or quality."39 Webster's Third New International Dictionary
defined demean as "to lower in status, condition, reputation, or character."40chanrobleslaw

The laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of Jabalde's emotional outrage after being informed that her daughter's head was
punctured, and whom she thought was already dead. In fact, her vision got blurred and she fainted. When she returned into
consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the board for about five to ten minutes.41 Moreover, the testimony of the
examining physician, Dr. Mu�oz, belied the accusation that Jabalde, with cruelty and with intent, abused, maltreated and
injured Lin, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

[T]he abrasions could have been caused by a hard object but mildly inflicted. She also testified that the linear abrasions were
signs of fingernail marks. She did not notice other injuries on the body of the victim except those on his neck. Moreover, the
abrasions were greenish in color, signifying that they were still fresh.42 (Emphasis ours)

It would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with cruelty when prosecution's witness herself testified that the abrasions
suffered by Lin were just "mildly inflicted." If Jabalde indeed intended to abuse, maltreat and injure Lin, she would have easily
hurt the 7-year-old boy with heavy blows.

As a mother, the death of her child, who has the blood of her blood, and the flesh of her flesh, is the most excruciating idea that
a mother could entertain. The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde against Lin is just a product of the instinctive reaction of a
mother to rescue her own child from harm and danger as manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered by
Lin, thus, negating any intention on inflicting physical injuries. Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent
to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of
child abuse. In fine, the essential element of intent was not established with the prescribed degree of proof required for a
successful prosecution under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.

What crime, then, did Jabalde commit?

Jabalde is liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266(2) of the RPC, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment - The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:

2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 20 pesos and censure when the offender has caused physical injuries which do not
prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical assistance.

xxxx
As found out by Dr. Mu�oz, Lin only sustained abrasions namely: two linear abrasions of 1 cm in length at the base of the right
mandibular area; one linear abrasion of 1 inch in length at the right lateral neck; two linear abrasions of 1 cm in length at the
back of the neck; and four minute circular abrasions at the left lateral neck.43 When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of
the offended parly for labor or of the required medical attendance; or when there is no proof as to the period of the offended
party's incapacity for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries.44chanrobleslaw

Although it is found out, as discussed hereinabove, that Jabalde lacked the intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being as required under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, her acts of laying
hands against Lin showed the essential element of intent which is a prerequisite in all crimes punishable under the RPC.

The case of Villareal v. People45 is instructing. In that case, the Court discussed that the RPC belongs to the classical school of
thought. The criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of the actor. The identity of mens rea - defined as a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent - is the predominant consideration. In order for an intentional felony
to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of "dolo" or "malice".46chanrobleslaw

The Court further explained that the term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence,
and intent. The element of intent is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to
the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter
alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken together, the
requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act.47

In order to be found guilty of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the [RPC], the employment of physical injuries must
be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises
from the mental state of the wrongdoer � iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot
be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the [RPC], there must be a specific animus
iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and
deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the
overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony.
The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.48chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of the minor victim Lin that Jabalde slapped him on his neck and choked him,49 and
that of Ray Ann that she saw Jabalde struck Lin on his neck, squeezed it and then shouted, "Better that you are able to free
yourself because if not I should have killed you,"50 deserve more credit than Jabalde's own statement that she merely held Lin
still because the latter kept on jumping.51 The laying of the hands and the utterance of words threatening the life of Lin
established the fact that Jabalde, indeed, intended to cause or inflict physical injuries on, much less kill, Lin.

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one (1) day to thirty (30) days of imprisonment.52 In
imposing the correct penalty, however, the Court has to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under
Article 13(6). of the RPC,53 because Jabalde lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power.54
There is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust
or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.55 For passion and obfuscation to be
considered a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that: (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation
was committed by the intended victim; (2) the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission of
the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused's mind; and (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful
sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge.56 With her having acted under the belief that Lin had killed her
daughter, Jabalde is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e. one [1] day to ten [10] days) when only mitigating circumstance is
present in the case.57 Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not
exceeding one year,58 Jabalde shall suffer a penalty of one (1) day to ten (10) days of arresto menor.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 12, 2010 and Resolution dated January 4, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 00424 are SET ASIDE; and a new judgment is ENTERED (a) finding petitioner Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 2, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code, and (b)
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of one (1) day to ten (10) days of arresto menor.

SO ORDERED.

ADIGESTED CASE G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016 VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Lin
testified that in the year 2000, he was a Grade 1 student at Cawitan Elementary School. On December 13, 2000, at around 9:00
a.m., he was playing "langit lupa" with Ray Ann, Marco, Nova, and another classmate during recess. During the duration of their
game, he touched Nova, Jabalde's daughter, on the shoulder, causing her to fall and injuring her head. He then assisted Nova in
standing while one of his classmates called Jabalde. Fearful of what had happened, he ran towards a dilapidated building near
the scene of the crime. Soon after, Jabalde arrived and slapped him on the neck and choked him. Lin was able to break free from
her grip when he removed her hands from his neck. He dashed towards their house, which was about 500 meters away from the
school. He informed his mother, Aileen, of the incident. He was then taken to Sta. Catalina Hospital for treatment, and a medical
certificate was issued to him.

Jabalde contends that in her case, the act of inflicting injuries, no matter how minor, is punishable under the RPC, particularly
Article 266 (1), which defines minor physical injuries; thus, she should be punished under the RPC rather than Section 10 (a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. ISSUE: Whether Jabalde's actions violate Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. RULING: Jabalde
was accused of slapping and striking Lin, hitting him on the nape, and then choking the offended party, causing injuries. 37.
However, the case records show that Jabalde did not intend to debase, degrade, or demean Lin's intrinsic worth and dignity as a
human being. slaw made from cabbage The laying of hands on Lin was an outgrowth of Jabalde's emotional outrage after
learning that her daughter's head had been punctured and that she had assumed her daughter was already dead. In fact, her
vision became blurred and she fainted. When she regained consciousness, she sat in her chair in front of the board for about five
to ten minutes. It was unforeseeable that Jabalde would act cruelly because the prosecution's witness herself testified that Lin's
abrasions were "mildly inflicted." If Jabalde had truly wanted to mistreat, maltreat, and harm Lin, she might have easily wounded
the 7-year-old child with severe punches

As a mother, the death of her kid, who has the blood of her blood and the flesh of her flesh, is the most agonizing thought a
mother can have. The spontaneous of Jabalde's actions against Lin is simply a result of a mother's instinctual reaction to save her
own kid from danger and risk, as evidenced solely by the minor abrasions, scratches, or scrapes experienced by Lin, negating any
purpose of causing bodily injury. She lacked the particular purpose to debase, degrade, or humiliate a kid's fundamental value
and dignity as a human being that was so necessary in the crime of child abuse since she had lost the strength of her intellect. In
short, the essential element of purpose was not proven with the requisite degree of proof required for a successful prosecution
under Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.

CARANDANG, J.:

The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision[2] dated February 9, 2017
and the Resolution[3] dated December 14, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CR No. 02354. The assailed Decision and
Resolution affirmed the Judgment[4] dated December 6, 2013 and the Resolution[5] dated March 17, 2014 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baybay City, Leyte, Branch 14. The RTC's Judgment and Resolution found petitioner Amalia G. Cardona (Cardona)
guilty of violating Section 23(a)[6] and (c)[7] of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7166[8] in relation to Section 195[9] of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 881 otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code” (OEC).

Facts of the Case

On February 27, 2002, an Information[10] was filed against Cardona. The Information states:

That on or about the 14th day of May 2001 in the Municipality of Mahaplag, Leyte Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors for Poll Precinct No. 8A, for
the May 14, 2001 National and Local Elections, did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously require, instruct and
order the registered voters of said precinct to sign or affix their signatures at the back of their official ballots against their will,
thereby intentionally putting in said ballot a distinguishing mark and using means to identify the vote of the voters.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]

The Information was a result of an Affidavit-Complaint[12] filed by a certain Glenn H. Bartolini (Bartolini) – a mayoral candidate
for Mahaplag, Leyte who lost during the May 14, 2001 elections.

When arraigned, Cardona entered the plea of not guilty.[13] Trial was conducted.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Natividad Lopez Ganton; (2) Bonifacio Cagol Dupal; (3) Constancia Malate
Alterado; (4) Teodoro Vitualla Alombro; (5) Yolanda Duquiatan Bergado; (6) Diogracia Mipana Samorin; (7) Macaria Renegado
Tomulac; and (8) Victoria Villason Refe. Cardona's defense was based solely on her testimony.[14]

The prosecution witnesses were all voters of Poblacion Mahaplag, Leyte. They were assigned to precinct 8-A in Mahaplag Central
School where Cardona was assigned as the chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). Some of the witnesses stated
that Cardona insisted that they (i.e., the voters) sign at the back of the ballot because it is the new law.[15] The witnesses
testified that they were made to sign the dorsal portion of their ballot after they cast their votes. Some added that Cardona
instructed them to sign upon discovering that they voted for Bartolini.[16]

Cardona admitted that she allowed some of the voters to sign the dorsal portion of the latter's ballots on May 14, 2001.
However, Cardona said that she instructed the voters to sign immediately upon receipt of the ballot and not after the voters have
cast their votes.[17] She explained that she had the voters sign at the back of their respective ballots because she experienced a
"mental black-out."[18] She realized her mistake before lunch break, or around 11 a.m.[19] Cardona then clarified the proper
procedure with a certain Teresita Cartilla, a BEI chairperson in a nearby precinct.[20] Upon learning of her mistake, Cardona
ordered the ballot box's closure and requested the poll clerk to go the Commission on Election's (COMELEC) Registrar to ask
what could be done to correct the mistake.[21] The Registrar simply ordered her to write the incident in the minutes.[22]
Thereafter, Cardona continued with the voting and did not let any subsequent voter sign at the back of the ballots.[23] Cardona
clarified that she did not do it on purpose.[24]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Judgment[25] dated December 6, 2013 the RTC found Cardona guilty of the charges against her. The dispositive portion of
the RTC's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and
she [is] hereby condemned to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Two (2) to Four (4) years of imprisonment without benefit of
probation.

Further, accused is ordered disqualified to hold public office and to exercise her right to suffrage in accordance to (sic) Section
264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

SO ORDERED.[26]
In convicting Cardona, the trial court relied on Cardona's admission that she allowed the first few batches of voters to sign the
latter's names at the back of their respective ballots.[27] Because of such admission, the burden of evidence shifted to Cardona.
The RTC held that Cardona failed to prove her claim that she had a mental block and that she immediately corrected her mistake.
[28] It noted that this was Cardona's second time to be the chairperson of a BEI and that "she attended lectures on the conduct
of election proceedings."[29]

The RTC disregarded Cardona's claim of good faith because she was accused of committing an election offense under the OEC – a
law that the RTC ruled as mala prohibitum.[30]

Aggrieved, Cardona appealed[31] the Judgment of the RTC with the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision[32] dated February 9, 2017, the CA affirmed the conviction with modification as to the penalty imposed. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Judgment of the RTC, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte, in Criminal Case No. 02-03-
27 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Amalia G. Cardona is sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment of one (1)
year as minimum to two (2) years as maximum. The Judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.[33]

In affirming the conviction, the appellate court reiterated the RTC's pronouncement that violation of Section 23(a) and (c) of R.A.
7166 in relation to Section 195 of the OEC is a malum prohibitum, hence, Cardona's intent was immaterial.[34] Cardona's
voluntary admission was not considered as a mitigating circumstance. However, the CA lowered the penalty imposed on Cardona
in view of the circumstances surrounding the case.[35]

The CA junked Cardona's attempt to have the criminal proceedings nullified because of the private prosecutor's active
participation during trial. Citing Rule 34,[36] of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the CA concluded that a private
prosecutor is allowed to appear in the criminal case to recover any civil liability due his/her client.

As Cardona's Motion for Reconsideration[37] was denied in a Resolution[38] dated December 14, 2018, Cardona filed the instant
petition for review.[39]

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Comment[40] dated October 30, 2019 and sought the
outright dismissal of the petition due to a defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The OSG explained that
Cardona was convicted on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not because of Cardona's judicial admission.[41] While
the OSG argued that Section 195 of the OEC is malum prohibitum where intent is immaterial, it also claimed that Cardona should
have proven her defense of experiencing a mental blackout as a justifying circumstance.[42]

In her Reply, Cardona insists that: (1) there was no defect in her Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping; (2)
conviction was not proper because (a) it was the voter who placed a distinguishing mark on the ballot; (b) she did not induce the
voters to affix their signatures; (c) the prosecution did not include the voters as principal by direct/active participation; and (d)
none of the supposedly marked ballots were identified and presented during trial; and (3) the burden of proof did not shift to
Cardona because the prosecution failed to prove Cardona's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling of the Court

We find the petition meritorious. Cardona should be acquitted of the crime charged.

This Court notes the OSG's prayer to dismiss the instant petition in view of the petitioner's defective verification and certification
against forum shopping. Given that the merits of the instant petition and Cardona's liberty at stake, this Court deems it best to
set aside the procedural flaw in the interest of substantial justice. We have repeatedly held that "rules of procedure are used to
only help secure, not override substantial justice."[43]

Another procedural issue is the private prosecutor's active participation during trial.

The CA's citation of Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure is incorrect. Rule 34 pertains to the prosecution of election
offenses via a preliminary investigation before the COMELEC or those authorized under Section 4(b)[44] of the said Rules. Here,
Cardona questioned the private prosecutor's participation during trial before the RTC. The applicable rule is Section 5 [45] Rule
110 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC. Under Section 5, the private prosecutor may prosecute the case
upon a written authority of the Chief of the Prosecution Office or Regional State Prosecutor with the trial court's approval.
Cardona admits that the Assistant City Prosecutor deputized the private prosecutor to prosecute the criminal case.[46]
Therefore, the criminal proceeding was regularly conducted.

The RTC and the CA found Cardona guilty of violating Section 23(a) and (c) of R.A. 7166 in relation to Section 195 of the OEC.

Section 23(a) and (c) of R.A. 7166 states:

Section 23. Officials Ballots. – (a) Ballots for national and local elections regular or special, plebiscites and referenda, shall be of
uniform size and shall be provided by the Commission. They shall be printed in black ink on which security paper with distinctive,
clear and legible watermarks that will readily distinguish it from ordinary paper. Each ballot shall be in the shape of a strip with
stub and detachable coupon containing the serial number of the ballot, and a space for the thumbmark of the voter on the
detachable coupon. It shall bear at the top of the voter on the detachable coupon. It shall bear at the top of the middle portion
thereof the coat-of-arms of the Republic of the Philippines, the word "Official Ballot," the name of the city or the municipality
and province in which the election is to be held, the date of the election, and the following notice in English: "Fill out this ballot
secretly inside the voting booth. Do not put any distinct mark on any part of this ballot."

xxxx

(c) There shall not be anything printed or written on the back of the ballot except as provided in Section 24[47] of this Act.

On the other hand, Section 195 of the OEC provides:

Section 195. Manner of preparing the ballot. – The voter, upon receiving his folded ballot, shall forthwith proceed to one of the
empty voting booths and shall there fill his ballot by writing in the proper space for each office the name of the individual
candidate for whom he desires to vote.
No voter shall be allowed to enter a booth occupied by another, nor enter the same accompanied by somebody, except as
provided for in the succeeding section hereof, nor stay therein for a longer time than necessary, nor speak with anyone other
than as herein provided while inside the polling place. It shall be unlawful to prepare the ballot outside the voting booth, or to
exhibit its contents to any person, or to erase any printing from the ballot, or to intentionally tear or deface the same or put
thereon any distinguishing mark. It shall likewise be unlawful to use carbon paper, paraffin paper, or other means for making a
copy of the contents of the ballot or make use of any other means to identify the vote of the voter.

Under Section 262[48] of the OEC, a violation of Section 195 constitutes an election offense. The penalty for committing an
election offense under the OEC is punishable "with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall
not be subject to probation." [49] Furthermore, the person found guilty will also be: (1) disqualified to hold public office; and (2)
deprived of the right of suffrage.

Given the gravity of the penalty imposed, it must be determined whether all marks made on the ballot (outside of those
prescribed under Section 23(a) and (c) of R.A. 7166 and Section 195 of the OEC automatically constitute an election offense.

This Court rules in the negative.

The RTC incorrectly convicted Cardona because of Cardona's admission that she instructed the voters to affix their (i.e., the
voters) signatures at the back of their respective ballots. The trial court ruled that the burden of evidence is shifted to Cardona to
prove that she did not commit the crime.[50] The CA wrongfully upheld the conviction on the basis of the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies.[51]

The RTC and CA held that the OEC is a special law, hence, intent is unnecessary to secure a conviction.

We do not agree.

An act prohibited by a special law does not automatically make it malum prohibitum. "When the acts complained of are
inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law."[52] The bench and bar must rid
themselves of the common misconception that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala
prohibita crimes are provided by special laws. The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes
is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act.[53]

Is a violation of Section 195 of the OEC mala in se such that good faith and lack of criminal intent can be raised as valid defenses
against its conviction?

We rule Section 195 of the OEC to be mala in se.

The applicable portion of Section 195 forbids the intentional tearing or defacing of the ballot or the placement of a distinguishing
mark.

A distinguishing mark is one, whether a letter, figure, or character, which shows an intention on the part of the voter to
distinguish his particular ballot from others of its class, and not one that is common to, and not distinguishable from, others of a
designated class. However, not every mark made by a voter on his ballot, which may separate and distinguish it from other
ballots cast at the election, wiil result in a declaration of invalidity. To constitute a mark a distinguishing mark, it must be placed
on a ballot with the deliberate intention that it shall identify the ballot after the vote has been cast, unless a statute enumerates
certain marks as illegal or distinguishing regardless of the question of intent.[54] (Underscoring supplied)

In the case of Locsin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[55] We defined a distinguishing mark as one "placed in the
ballots x x x which the elector may have placed with the intention of facilitating the means of identifying said ballot, for the
purpose of defeating the secrecy of the suffrage which the law establishes."[56] "Marks made by the voter unintentionally do not
invalidate the ballot. Neither do marks made by some person other than the voter."[57] If these innocuous marks do not violate
the constitutional duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and preserve the sanctity and integrity of the electoral process, then
We can reasonably conclude that such marking does not constitute an election offense, as in this case.

The RTC's reliance in the case of Dr. Domalanta v. COMELEC,[58] is misplaced. In Dr. Domalanta, this Court ruled that the burden
of evidence is shifted to the petitioners in that case because the discrepancies in the Certificates of Canvass and Statement of
Votes were "too substantial and rounded off to be categorized as a mere 'computation error' or a result of fatigue."[59] Thus, it is
understood that unintentional mistakes do not necessarily constitute an election offense or electoral sabotage.[60] Still, this case
is no different from Dr. Domalanta as both involve the violation of a special law (i.e., R.A. 6646). This Court's consideration of
petitioners' claim of fatigue (in Dr. Domalanta) shows that intent was necessary to convict an accused of an election offense
covered by a special law. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,[61] this Court categorically held that an electoral offense under Section
27(b) of R.A. 6646 is mala in se because "it could not [have been] the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass
errors."[62] The same should apply to unintentional marks made on a ballot.

Therefore, is Cardona guilty of deliberately placing or causing the voter to place a distinguishing mark?

We rule in the negative.

It is undisputed that Cardona instructed some of the voters to affix their signatures on the dorsal portion of the ballot. However,
Cardona's actions were not intended to identify the ballot after the vote has been cast.

Cardona explained that she experienced a "mental black-out" because of the belated voting in precinct 8A.[63] She allowed
voters to cast their vote at 8:45 a.m. (instead of the mandated 7:00 a.m. time), despite having the most number of voters in the
area, in order to wait for her poll clerk[64] and Bartolini's poll watcher.[65] Cardona insisted on waiting for all the authorized
people inside the precinct even if it would delay the voting proceedings: (1) in order to avoid any complaints from the candidates
representatives; and (2) to ensure fairness in the conduct of the voting.[66] By the time voting was about to start, the voters in
line were already angry.[67]

Cardona's defense is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. Under such principle, "the pleader has to confess the
allegations against him before he can be allowed to set out matters which, if true, would defeat the action."[68]

The absence of Cardona's intent to place a distinguishing mark on the prosecution witnesses' ballots becomes more evident
because she immediately closed the box upon realizing her mistake and requested the poll clerk to go to the COMELEC Registrar
to ask how she can rectify the situation.[69] Despite the first batch of ballots containing the voters' signatures, Cardona counted
every vote during canvassing.[70] This fact was never disputed by the prosecution.

Prior to Cardona's instruction to close the ballot box, the poll watchers did not protest the voters' act of signing the dorsal
portion of the ballot.[71]Even Bartolini's counsel, who was inside precinct 8A and observed everything, did not object to what
happened on May 14, 2001.[72] Even without any objection from the poll watchers, Cardona corrected her mistake immediately
after realizing it. Taken together, these show Cardona's good faith that should exculpate her from criminal liability.
Even more important is the prosecution's failure to present the allegedly marked ballots. While the trial court had possession of
precinct 8A's ballot boxes since July 22, 2002,[73] the prosecution never presented nor formally offered the same in evidence
during trial. In its formal offer of evidence,[74] the prosecution only presented the following documentary evidence:

a) Exhibit "A" – Judicial Affidavit of Deogracias Samorin dated December 6, 2007;

b) Exhibit "B" – Judicial Affidavit of Macaria R. Tomulac dated September 6, 2007;

c) Exhibit "C" – Judicial Affidavit of Victoria Refe dated March 25, 2008;

d) Exhibit "D" – Judicial Affidavit of Constancia Alterado dated October 30, 2008; and

e) Exhibit "E" - Judicial Affidavit of Laila Padalapat.[75]

Without the physical evidence of the corpus delicti, i.e., the allegedly marked ballots, the trial court was not given the
opportunity to appreciate the nature of the markings made. Thus, the prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the markings were deliberate and made for the purpose of identifying the ballot. It is basic in criminal law that a
conviction "must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the
prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his[/her] innocence."[76]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 9, 2017 and the Resolution dated December 14,
2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 02354 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Amalia G.
Cardona is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23464 October 31, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GAVINO DORADO Y ARABACA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon for
plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto R. Rondolo as counsel de officio for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Criminal Case No. 66095, finding the defendant-
appellant Gavino Dorado y Arabaca guilty of having committed the crime of arson with multiple homicide and multiple frustrated
homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.

The record shows that on September 2, 1962, a 5-door apartment owned by Mr. and Mrs. Ildefonso Tierra and an adjacent
residential house, both located on the densely populated street of Castillejos, Quiapo, Manila were burned, resulting in the
death of 21 persons and injuries to 5 others in varying degrees. On September 4, 1962, the appellant, who had earlier
surrendered to the Mayor of Malabon, Rizal and who was turned over by the latter to the Manila Police Department, gave a
confession in his own handwriting which was witnessed by several newspaper reporters1 in the following tenor:
Noong Sabado ng gabi, ako'y nag good-time sa Baclaran at naparami ang aking nainom na alak. Ng mag-uumaga na, siguro mga
alas dos ng umaga, ako'y umuwi sa Castillejos, napansin ko na sarado ang pinto, kaya ang ginawa ko bumalik ako sa Baclaran at
naginum uli. Maalaala ko ang pagkaapi ko sa bahay kaya naisipan kong bumili ng gasolina at dinala ko sa Castillejos na hindi ko
nalalaman ang aking guinagawa dala ng labis kong pagkalasing. Dumating ako bukas na ang pinto patungo sa second floor, seguro
alas 5:00 o 6:00 ng umaga noon. Pagdating sa itaas tinumba ko yaong lata, pagkatapos sinindihan ko. Tumakbo ako palabas
hanggang makarating sa Arlegui; tumawag ako ng taxi at pumunta ako sa Quezon City, Cubao. Tumuloy ako sa Marikina, at
pagkatapos pumunta ako sa Malabon sa bahay ng Alkalde at nagsurender ako sa kanya.

Sa katunayan ng lahat ng ito ay inilagda ko ang aking pangalan sa ibaba nito ngayon Sept. 4, 1962, dito sa Manila.

Soon after the appellant had written the aforequoted confession, he gave a more detailed statement to the police investigator, in
the form of questions and answers substantially reiterating the confession he made in his handwriting. On September 5, 1962,
the appellant reenacted the burning of the apartment, and on the same day, he subscribed, and swore to, his statement before
an assistant fiscal of the City of Manila.2

On September 6, 1962 an information was filed by an assistant fiscal of the City of Manila charging the appellant with having
committed the crime of arson with multiple homicide and multiple frustrated homicide, before the Court of First Instance of
Manila, as follows:

The undersigned accuses Gavino Dorado y Arabaca of the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide and Multiple Frustrated
Homicide, committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of September, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously set fire to and burn an inhabited building and the contents therein valued at P380,000.00, knowing
the same to be occupied at the time by many persons, located at 1039 Castillejos Street, Quiapo, in said City, which is a
populated place or vicinity and where houses and buildings are closely adjacent to one another, thereby causing the death of the
following persons, to wit: Josephine Curato, Rosemarie Curato, Oliver Curato, Juliana Ravelo Curato, Braulio Curato @ Joseph Lee,
Marcelina Malaluan Vda. de Silva, Eufrocinia Silva, Rose Silva, Rufil Silva, Erlinda Silva, Asterio Alcantara, Simeona Cuenca,
Visitacion Cuenca, Rosalina Navasa, Marcelina Orillo, Eddie Ong Orillo, Lydia Alim, Martin de la Peña, Sinforiana Wero, Baby Wero
de la Peña and Orlando Ortanez and the said act of the said accused could have caused the death of the following, to wit: Rogelio
Villanueva, Helen J. Villanueva, Maria Luisa Villanueva, Phil de Guzman and Leonardo Baaya, as a consequence, thus performing
all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of multiple Homicide, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason or causes, independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Rogelio Villanueva, Helen
J. Villanueva, Maria Luisa Villanueva, Phil de Guzman and Leonardo Baaya which have prevented their death.

There is no dispute over the fact of the burning of the five-door apartment located at 1039 Castillejos Street, Quiapo, Manila, in
the early morning of September 7, 1962, and of the death of 21 of the occupants, and of the injury of 5 of the occupants, of the
apartments, as a result of the burning.

The decision of the trial court finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged in the information is based mainly on the two
extrajudicial confessions of the appellant, Exhibits A and C. In the present appeal, counsel for the appellant contends that the
lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty on the basis of those confessions.

We have examined the record very carefully, and We find that the lower court has not committed the error pointed to by
appellant.

Testifying in his own behalf in the court below the appellant admitted that he had a grievance against the owner of the
apartment, but denied having set fire to the apartment. He claimed in the court below, and he insists in this appeal, that he had
to make and sign the statements presented against him, and he had to reenact the crime, because of the force and violence
applied to him by the police. According to the appellant, when he was turned over to the arson division of the Manila Police
Department, the investigators slapped and kicked him; that due to his sickness, and afraid that he might vomit blood if subjected
to further torture, he wrote his confession, Exhibit C, as dictated to him by Captain Giron that with regard to his statement,
Exhibit A, all that are stated therein, except his name and personal circumstances, were supplied by the police investigators; that
when he subscribed and swore to said statement before Assistant Fiscal Lino Barbosa, he affirmed the truth of its contents
because he was accompanied by one of the policemen; and that he did not reveal the fact of his having been maltreated to the
newspaper reporters, nor to the fiscal, or to any one, because his idea was to expose the matter when he would testify in court,
as he would then be free from harm.

On the other hand, the police investigators who testified for the prosecution denied having obtained the confessions of the
appellant through violence or intimidation. These witnesses testified that the statements of the appellant were given by him
freely and voluntarily. The testimonies of the police investigators were bolstered by the testimony of Rodolfo T. Reyes, a reporter
of the "Manila Times", who was also presented by the appellant as his own witness. Rodolfo T. Reyes testified that he and other
newspapermen saw the appellant write his confession (Exhibit C), without dictation from Captain Giron that he did not see any
sign of injury on the face, nor on any part of the body, of the appellant; 3 that the appellant did not complain to him, or to any of
the reporters present, at the time when he was writing his confession and during the reenactment of the crime, regarding any
maltreatment received by him from the police investigators; and that the appellant reenacted the crime voluntarily and without
hesitation.4

We hold that the lower court did not err when it did not give credence to the claim of appellant that his extra-judicial confession
were extracted from him through force or intimidation. We find no reason to alter the finding of the lower court that the
confessions of the appellant were given by him voluntarily. It is a settled rule that the findings of fact by the trial court should not
be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it being
acknowledged that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their
testimonies.5 It is also a settled rule that a confession is admissible as evidence, and it is presumed to be voluntary until the
contrary is shown.6 Before a confession can be set aside, both the confession and the reasons or motives given for its repudiation
should be carefully scrutinized. It would be an unsound practice for the court to disregard the confession of an accused simply
because the accused repudiates it during the trial.7

In the case now before Us, except for appellant's testimony repudiating his confessions, no other evidence was adduced to show
that the statements in the confessions were obtained through force or intimidation. On the contrary, appellant's claim of torture
is belied by an abundance of evidence showing that his confession, Exhibit C, was written by him under circumstances which
preclude any doubt as to the voluntariness of his act. More so, because he wrote and signed the confession in the presence of
reporters of the metropolitan newspapers. The other confession, Exhibit A, was subscribed and sworn to by the appellant before
an assistant city fiscal of Manila, and it was not shown at all that appellant ever hesitated or refused to sign and swear to the
same, much less did he protest to the fiscal regarding the way he was investigated. 8 We have noted that the statements of the
appellant in answer to the questions in Exhibit A are responsive and informative. The statements mention details which only the
declarant could have furnished, and could not have been concocted by the investigators. For instance, the appellant stated
details regarding his educational attainments; regarding the demolition of his improvised room in the apartment as a result of
which he lost P70.00 in cash and P10.00 worth of medicine, regarding his having filed a complaint against Mrs. Tierra, the owner
of the apartment, in the fiscal's office; regarding the fact that due to his illness he had not been drinking wine for almost 6
months because his doctor prohibited him from doing so; and regarding the fact that after burning the apartment he went to
Quezon City, thence to Marikina, and thereafter to Malabon, where he surrendered to the Municipal Mayor. We cannot believe
that the investigators could fabricate those particulars, and that they are so perverted and depraved as to conspire together to
falsely impute to an innocent man the commission of a very grave offense.9

We agree with the observation of the trial court that appellant's grievance against Mrs. Tierra must have driven him to burn the
apartment, but when overcome by remorse of conscience because those who perished in the fire were his friends and
acquaintances, he voluntarily confessed his criminal act; and realizing later the grave implications of his confessions, it must have
occurred to him, as an afterthought, to repudiate the same and assert his innocence. 10

The defense contends that the appellant could not have committed the crime because of the alleged impossibility for the
appellant to enter the building and set it afire, and that there was no eyewitness who pointed to him as the one who set the
building on fire. This pretension of the defense deserves no consideration in the face of clear evidence that the appellant had
confessed voluntarily his commission of the crime, and his confession is supported by the corpus delicti.11 Well established is the
rule that it is not necessary that an eyewitness should testify on having seen the accused committing the crime, or had seen him
under circumstances indicating his having committed the crime, before the accused may be held liable under his own
confession."12

We find the decision of the lower court to be in accordance with law and the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant. No payment of indemnity is here
ordered because the offended parties, and/or the heirs of the offended parties, reserved their right to institute separate civil
actions to recover indemnities. It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

JERWIN DORADO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 216671, 2016-10-03

Facts:

Dorado, Julius Ramos (Ramos), Jeffrey Confessor (Confessor) and Jayson Cabiaso (Cabiaso) were charged with the crime of
frustrated murder, defined under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) committed against Ronald
Bonion (Ronald) before the RTC. They were also charged with violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, or the
Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, committed against Raniel Parino (Raniel).

That on or about the 15th day of March 2004, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with one another and with Jerwin Dorado y Felipe @ Ewing
who is a 16 year old minor, and with two (2) unidentified companions whose true identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown, with intent to kill by means of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, aggravated by the
circumstances of nighttime and with the use of an improvised shotgun (sumpak), a deadly weapon and unlicensed firearm, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said deadly weapon, one Ronald Bonion y Bozar,
thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said victim which prevented his death.

On November 9, 2004, Dorado and his co-accused were arraigned and they all pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. Thereafter,
the trial ensued.

onald was operated on his forehead and was confined for a month at the Rizal Medical Center. As a result of the shooting
incident, Ronald lost his left eye while his right eye could only see some light. Dr. Artes, the operating surgeon, testified that
without medical intervention, Ronald could have died.

he RTC rendered its decision. In Criminal Case No. 127784, the trial court found Dorado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of frustrated murder; while in Criminal Case No. 127785, accused Dorado, Ramos, Confessor and Cabiaso were all
acquitted as the crime was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It noted that their participation in the crime was limited to the
throwing of stones and bottles and there was no indication that they Singled out Ronald as their target. The RTC also acquitted all
the accused for the charge of violation of R.A. No. 7610 because the prosecution failed to establish Ronald's minority.

In finding Dorado guilty of frustrated murder, as defined under Article 248, in relation to Article 6, paragraph 2, of the RPC, the
RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that it was Dorado who shot Ronald with a sumpak. The trial
court considered the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation because of the following: Dorado's group had an ongoing
feud with Ronald's group; when the assault began, Dorado was already holding a sumpak; after Ronald fled, Dorado waited
intently for an opportunity to shoot him; and when Ronald came out, Dorado shot him on the face. The RTC, nevertheless,
appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in Dorado's favor as he was still a minor at the time of the
incident. It, however, stated that Dorado was not entitled to a suspension of sentence because he was above twenty-one (21)
years old at the time of the pronouncement of guilt. Thus, it disposed the case in this wise:

Aggrieved, Dorado elevated an appeal before the CA.

the CA affirmed the RTC decision, finding that Dorado committed the crime of frustrated murder because he had the intent to kill
Ronald when he fired his sumpak hitting the portion between the two eyes of the victim. It noted that Ronald would have died
were it not for the timely medical attention. The appellate court also agreed with the RTC that Dorado's act of waiting for Ronald
to come out of the talipapa, where the latter was hiding, indicated evident premeditation.The CA did not give credence to
Dorado's defense of alibi because his house was merely one block away from the talipapa. It opined that it was not physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time in question.Dorado moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied
by the CA in its assailed resolution, dated January 29, 2015.Hence, this petition.

Issues:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED.[8]

Ruling:

The Court finds merit in the petition.Dorado was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime

A perusal of the records will readily show that Dorado was a sixteen (16) year old minor at the time of the commission of the
crime on March 15, 2004. The Informations filed against him consistently stated his minority.[11] For said reason, he must
benefit from the provisions of R.A. No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, as amended. Even though the said
law was enacted on April 28, 2006, the same must still be retroactively applied for the benefit of Dorado pursuant to the well-
entrenched principle in criminal law — favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the
accused are given retroactive effect).[12

Curiously, neither the RTC nor the CA paid much attention to Dorado's minority and how it affected his criminal responsibility.
Thus, the Court deems it proper to lay down the salient provisions of R.A. No. 9344 regarding the prosecution of a Child In
Conflict with the Law (CICL).[13]One of the significant features of R.A. No. 9344 is the increase of the minimum age of criminal
responsibility, to wjt:SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth
anniversary of his/her birthdate.A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt
from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case,
such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.The exemption from criminal liability
herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.[14]

In sum, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the following minors shall be exempt from criminal liability:Those below fifteen
(15) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime; and ,Those above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age who acted without discernment.Thus, if a child falls under the above-cited ages, he or she shall be released and shall be
subjected to an intervention program as may be determined by a local social welfare and development officer, pursuant to
Section 20 of the said law.

Consequently, under R.A. No. 9344, only a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age who acted with
discernment shall not be exempted from criminal responsibility.[15] Nevertheless, the said child does not immediately proceed
to trial. Instead, he or she may undergo a diversion, which refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the
responsibility and treatment of the CICL without resorting to formal court proceedings. If the diversion is unsuccessful or if the
other grounds provided by law[16] are present, then the CICL shall undergo the appropriate preliminary investigation of his or
her criminal case, and trial before the courts may proceed.

Once the CICL is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall not immediately execute its judgment; rather, it shall place
the CICL under suspended sentence. Notably, the suspension shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his or her guilt. During the suspension, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. If the disposition
measures are successful, then the court shall discharge the CICL. Conversely, if unsuccessful, then the court has the following
options: (1) to discharge the child, (2) to order execution of sentence, or (3) to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years

The Prosecution did not determine the discernment of Dorado at the time of the commission of the crime

Based on the above-cited discussion, when a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is charged with a crime,
it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During the trial, the prosecution must specifically prove as a
separate circumstance that the CICL committed the alleged crime with discernment.

Notably, R.A. Np. 9344 was enacted while Dorado's trial was pending before the RTC. Consequently, Resolution No. 03-2006,
dated July 11, 2006, of the Juvenile Justice Welfare Council (JJWC)[20] must apply in the present case. It established the
guidelines for the implementation of the transitory provisions of R.A. No. 9344 and it stated that one of the duties of the
prosecution during the trial regarding the CICL was as follows:For above 15 but below 18 years old at the time of the commission
of the alleged offense, with pending case but released on bail or on recognizance or under detention• Trial may proceed for the
prosecution to prove discernment.

After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution did not make an effort to prove that Dorado, then a
sixteen (16)-year old minor, acted with discernment at the time of the commission of the crime. The RTC decision simply stated
that a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado must be appreciated as it was proven that he was a
minor at the time of the incident. Glaringly, there was no discussion at all on whether Dorado acted with discernment when he
committed the crime imputed against him.

Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away with Ronald. Discernment is different from intent. The
distinction was elaborated in Guevarra v. Almodovar.[25] Thus:

From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are products
of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desire of one's act while the latter relate to the moral
significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence, a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the
consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in .negligently handling an air rifle. It is not correct,
therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment,
then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus, did not intend to shoot him, and at the same
time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.

Considering that there was no determination of discernment by the trial court, the Court cannot rule with certainty that Dorado
was criminally responsible. As earlier stated, there can be no presumption of discernment on the part of the CICL. In the absence
of such determination, it should be presumed that the CICL acted without discernment. This is in accordance with Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9344, to wit:Section 3. Liberal Construction of this Act. — In case of doubt, the interpretation of any of the provisions of
this Act, including its implementing rules and regulations (IRRs), shall be construed liberally in favor of the child in conflict with
the law.

Accordingly, Dorado is deemed exempted from criminal liability. Nevertheless, he is not excused from the civil liability that arose
from the act.[27] Thus, the Court is tasked to determine the crime committed and the civil liability that results from it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The judgment of conviction of Jerwin Dorado is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE by
reason of the exempting circumstance of minority. He is hereby referred to the local social welfare and development officer of
the locality for the appropriate intervention program.He is also ordered to pay the private complainant, Ronald B onion, civil
indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00.,The amounts of damages awarded
shall have an interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

Principles:

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because
from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no
other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the
accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be
said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially
correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same
place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house
situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No
one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of
which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part
of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a
chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window,
there were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by
some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and
was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due
to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder
was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck
just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the
defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a
burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden
opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck
out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell
down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the
moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took
place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal
incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with
his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and
Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from
their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No.
27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27
found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that
Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit
of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing
to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects
of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with
extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck
the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal
liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a
dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of
the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's
thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be
questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him
despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an
assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor
any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such
"unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was
no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of
a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them
to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the
time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent
which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in
crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances
demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article
1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by
him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited;
McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596;
Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is whether malice
or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in
the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein
defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice
or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various
definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or
other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general
rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely
contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the
general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of
all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those
touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime
or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even
these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful
thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the
affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a
disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of
the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it,
and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the
guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less
harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be
viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed
be different from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary
act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal
intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words " con malicia," which were
expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as
Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco,
Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility
when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence,
nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention
there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more
apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order
to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the
sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in
which it made use of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the operation of the will
and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the
inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime
because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by
law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the commission of an act
defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of
the trial court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes and
misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be
punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall
constitute a less grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being subject to the rules
prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those
contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may
consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference
from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent),
negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in
English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes
means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate
the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to
mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to
believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad
purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously,"
and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference
between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and
cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed
"voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a
criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter
mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous
citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies between
private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a
criminal mind. So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without
which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age
allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is
of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine
confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has
supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention
were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like
sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or
ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a
man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind
keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the
innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act
from his neighbors does not offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment
for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment
which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr.
Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the
utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature
from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from
the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which
justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have
recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient
here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts
criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in
Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real
departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need
not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
sec. 300, and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt
with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti
excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d
ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault
or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y.,
509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.)
That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the
surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon
which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing
— or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does
believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious
authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently
adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the
law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a man, masked
and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol
demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol
leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will
doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and
wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would
undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the
facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the
"act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1
of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against him, and under that
supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be
either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief.
(Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand,
and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a
club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the
pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is
more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a
man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would
entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party
killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle.
(Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full
because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without other
light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a
person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of
which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the
unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown
lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as
soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow.
The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his
sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted
in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists
rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code
condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was
acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been
proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was
attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent,
because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts
executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because
his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he
did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the
instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known
or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might
accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the
means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court
of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point
where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!"
because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one
of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance,
finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had
been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he
be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the
circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but
only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means
employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The
supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable
and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and
remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window
— at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money,
otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of
whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same
spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites
of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in
favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity
for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed.
Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his
mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property,
and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow
alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from
whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in
view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith,
without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense;
that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his
act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake
as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his
person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the
crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the merits of the case, the
crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as
the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however,
executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under
the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore
incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable
motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be sentenced to the
penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an
indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed
from.

Ah Chong 15 Phil. 488

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

CARSON, J.

Lesson: mistake of fact, definition of felony

Laws: Article 1 RPC, Art 3 RPC

FACTS:

• August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room.
He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it
was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just
above the knee by the edge of the chair (thought to be an unlawful aggression) which had been placed against the door. Seizing
a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned
out, was his roommate, Pascual who is a house boy or muchacho who in the spirit of mischief was playing a trick on him

• Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up
Pascual's wounds.

• There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one of which took place in a house where he was
employed as cook so he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.

• trial court held it as simple homicide

ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he
would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.

HELD: trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime

NO.

• GR: acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may
be held criminally liable

EX: it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code
• Article 1 RPC of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

o A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act
committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

o voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act

o "malice" signifying the intent

o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so

o “ Actus me incito factus non est meus actus” - an act done by me against my will is not my act

• GR: courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to
make their commission criminal WITHOUT regard to the intent of the doer

• EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is
clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed

• ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness

• defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly
exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness
or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.

Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.

Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.

Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.

MORAN, J.:

Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of
Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of
homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months
to two years and two months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.

In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas
with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked
that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D.
Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the
above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if
overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis
who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina,
he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police
tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see
anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants
Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living.
When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and
asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her
paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her
paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still
firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious
criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector,
informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and
to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo
de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his
death.

These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene
Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of
police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further
inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room
thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards
the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.

On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are
Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued
firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the
supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.

The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are vitiated by a
natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired
at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the
other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was
awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But
Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when
each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual
incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that,
according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is
confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the
latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson,
the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her
demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the
exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that
her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading
questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under
these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.

The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and
Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made
previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held
responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the
honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is
murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15
Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the
door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed
and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been
placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded
the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who
was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded
his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head
was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to
make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they
then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances
cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then
asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect
a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea.
This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were
instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by
him.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the
offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People
vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in
resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in
the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer
cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs.
Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a
menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his
arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid
down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).

It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he has by
such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does
something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere
fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a
basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as
here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant
action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule;
otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.

The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without
malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no
haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha
producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo
7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16),
and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.

As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is,
however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of
the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a
justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury
or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second
requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their
duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the
person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his
identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law
shall, in such case, be imposed.

For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision
correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased
Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.

Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., dissenting:

Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to escape and flee form Manila to the provinces. Receiving
information to the effect that he was staying with one Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the office of the Constabulary in Manila
ordered the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan by telegram dispatched on December 25, 1938, to get Balagtas "dead or alive".
Among those assigned to the task of carrying out the said order, were Antonio Z. Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and
Alberto Galanta, a Constabulary corporal, to whom the telegram received by the Provincial Inspector and a newspaper picture of
Balagtas were shown. Oanis, Galanta and a Constabulary private, after being told by the Provincial Inspector to gather
information about Balagtas, "to arrest him and, if overpowered, to follow the instructions contained in the telegram," proceeded
to the place where the house of Irene was located. Upon arriving thereat, Oanis approached Brigida Mallari, who was then
gathering banana stalks in the yard, and inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had pointed out the room, she was asked by
Oanis to tell where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon Mallari answered that he was sleeping with Irene. Upon
reaching the room indicated, Oanis and Galanta, after the former had shouted "Stand up, if you are Balagtas," started shooting
the man who was found by them lying down beside a woman. The man was thereby killed, but Balagtas was still alive, for it
turned out that the person shot by Oanis and Galanta was one Serapio Tecson.

Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having committed murder. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
however, convicted them only of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced them each to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months of prision correctional, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs
of Serapio Tecson in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and Galanta have appealed.

In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged, they undoubtedly followed the order issued by the
Constabulary authorities in Manila requiring the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan to get Balagtas dead or alive, in the honest
belief that Serapio Tecson was Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter became a fugitive criminal, with revolvers in his possession and a
record that made him extremely dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary authorities were justified in ordering his arrest,
whether dead or alive. In view of said order and the danger faced by the appellants in carrying it out, they cannot be said to have
acted feloniously in shooting the person honestly believed by them to be the wanted man. Conscious of the fact that Balagtas
would rather kill than be captured, the appellants did not want to take chances and should not be penalized for such prudence.
On the contrary, they should be commended for their bravery and courage bordering on recklessness because, without knowing
or ascertaining whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded thereto without hesitation and thereby
exposed their lives to danger.
The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were authorized to use their revolvers only after being
overpowered by Balagtas. In the first place, the alleged instruction by the Provincial Inspector to that effect, was in violation of
the express order given by the Constabulary authorities in Manila and which was shown to the appellants. In the second place, it
would indeed be suicidal for the appellants or, for that matter, any agent of the authority to have waited until they have been
overpowered before trying to put our such a character as Balagtas. In the third place, it is immaterial whether or not the
instruction given by the Provincial Inspector was legitimate and proper, because the facts exist that the appellants acted in
conformity with the express order of superior Constabulary authorities, the legality or propriety of which is not herein
questioned.

The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though quite psychological or sentimental, in view only of the fact
that it was not Balagtas who was actually killed, but an "innocent man . . . while he was deeply asleep." Anybody's heart will be
profoundly grieved by the trade, but in time will be consoled by the realization that the life of Serapio Tecson was not vainly
sacrificed, for the incident will always serve as a loud warning to any one desiring to follow in the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas
that in due time the duly constituted authorities will, upon proper order, enforce the summary forfeiture of his life.

In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person killed by them was in fact Anselmo Balagtas for the
reason that they did so in the fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose
(Revised Penal Code, art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held criminally liable even if the person killed by them was not
Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson, because they did so under an honest mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith.
(U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).

It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but said article is clearly inapplicable since the killing of the
person who was believed to be Balagtas was, as already stated, not wrongful or felonious.

The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-General, is not in point, inasmuch as the defendant therein,
who intended to injure Hilario Lauigan with whom he had a quarrel, but killed another by mistake, would not be exempted from
criminal liability if he actually injured or killed Hilario Lauigan, there being a malicious design on his part. The other case involved
by the prosecution is U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234). This is also not in point, as it appears that the defendants therein killed one
Pedro Almasan after he had already surrendered and allowed himself to be bound and that the said defendants did not have
lawful instructions from superior authorities to capture Almasan dead or alive.

The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the appellants, Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, acquitted, with
costs de oficio.

HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:

According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm without
regard to his life which he has, by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever said criminal offers resistance or does something
which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Precisely, the situation which confronted the accused-appellants Antonio
Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, was very similar to this. It must be remembered that both
officers received instructions to get Balagtas "dead or alive" and according to the attitude of not only the said appellants but also
of Capt. Monsod, constabulary provincial inspector of Nueva Ecija, it may be assumed that said instructions gave more emphasis
to the first part; namely, to take him dead. It appears in the record that after the shooting, and having been informed of the case,
Capt. Monsod stated that Oanis and Galanta might be decorated for what they had done. That was when all parties concerned
honestly believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a dangerous criminal who had escaped from his guards and was
supposedly armed with a .45 caliber pistol Brigida Mallari, the person whom the appellants met upon arriving at the house of
Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas, informed them that said Balagtas was upstairs. Appellants found there asleep a
man closely resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are Balagtas stand up," But the supposed criminal showed his
intention to attack the appellants, a conduct easily explained by the fact that he should have felt offended by the intrusion of
persons in the room where he was peacefully lying down with his mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human on
the part of the appellants to employ force and to make use of their weapons in order to repel the imminent attack by a person
who, according to their belief, was Balagtas It was unfortunate, however that an innocent man was actually killed. But taking into
consideration the facts of the case, it is, according to my humble opinion, proper to apply herein the doctrine laid down in the
case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an innocent mistake of fact committed
without any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, who having no time to make a further inquiry, had no alternative
but to take the facts as they appeared to them and act immediately.

The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special circumstances of this case which favored the accused-appellants,
arrives at the conclusion that an incomplete justifying circumstance may be invoked, and therefore, according to Article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should be one which is lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. This
incomplete justifying circumstance is that defined in Article 11, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who acts in
the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office." I believe that the application of this circumstance is not
proper. Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions
required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided
that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper,
in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.

This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines, and which was also
taken from Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.

Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee created by Administrative Order No. 94 of the Department of
Justice for the drafting of the Revised Penal Code, in commenting on Article 69, said that the justifying circumstances and
circumstances exempting from liability which are the subject matter of this article are the following: self-defense, defense of
relatives, defense of strangers, state of necessity and injury caused by mere accident. Accordingly, justifying circumstance No. 5
of Article 11 dealing with the fulfillment of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right, calling or office, cannot be placed within its
scope.

The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary of Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 which is
the source of Article 69 of our Code says:

Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad, ni del que obra violentado por una fuerza inrresistible o
impulsado por miedo insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en cumplimiento de un deber, o en el ejercito legitimo de un
derecho, oficio o cargo, o en virtud de obediencia debida, ni del que incurre en alguna omision hallandose impedido por causa
legitima o insuperable, puede tener aplicacion al articulo que comentamos. Y la razon es obvia. En ninguna de estas execiones
hay pluralidad de requisitos. La irrespondabilidad depende de una sola condicion. Hay o no perturbacion de la razon; el autor del
hecho es o no menor de nueve años; existe o no violencia material o moral irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es lo que respectivamente
hay que examinar y resolver para declarar la culpabilidad o inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto, imposible que acontezca lo que el
texto que va al frente de estas lineas rquiere, para que se imponga al autor del hecho la penalidad excepcional que establece;
esto es, que falten algunos requisitos de los que la ley exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que concurran el mayor numero de
ellos, toda vez que, en los casos referidos, la ley no exige multiples condiciones.

It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required by the law to justify
the same or exempt from criminal liability. The word "conditions" should not be confused with the word "requisites". In dealing
with justifying circumstance No. 5 Judge Guevara states: "There are two requisites in order that this circumstance may be taken
into account: (a) That the offender acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) That the injury
or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office." It is
evident that these two requisites concur in the present case if we consider the intimate connection between the order given to
the appellant by Capt. Monsod, the showing to them of the telegram from Manila to get Balagtas who was with a bailarina
named Irene, the conduct of said appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and giving a warning to the supposed criminal when
both found him with Irene, and the statement made by Capt. Monsod after the shooting.
If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court below, there are more reasons in favor of the acquittal of
appellant Galanta. According to the evidence no bullet from the gun fired by this accused ever hit Serapio Tecson. Galanta was
armed in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, with a .45 caliber revolver (Exhibit L). He so testified and was corroborated by the
unchallenged testimony of his superior officer Sgt. Valeriano Serafica. According to this witness, since Galanta was made a
corporal of the Constabulary he was given, as part of his equipment, revolver Exhibit L with a serial No. 37121. This gun had been
constantly used by Galanta, and, according to Sgt. Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said accused when he took it from his
trunk in the barracks on the night of December 24, 1938, upon order of Captain Monsod, it was the same revolver which was
given to the witness with five .45 caliber bullets and one empty shell. Fourteen unused bullets were also taken from Galanta by
Sergeant Serafica, thus completing his regular equipment of twenty bullets which he had on the morning of December 24, 1938,
when Sergeant Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms in the possession of the non-commissioned officers and
privates of the constabulary post at Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired only one shot and missed. This testimony is
corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who testified that bullets exhibits F and O, — the first being extracted from the head of
the deceased, causing wound No. 3 of autopsy report Exhibit C and the second found at the place of the shooting, — had not
been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor from any other revolver of the constabulary station in Cabanatuan. It was impossible for
the accused Galanta to have substituted his revolver because when Exhibit L was taken from him nobody in the barracks doubted
that the deceased was none other than Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit L was not out of order and therefore there was no reason
why Galanta should carry along another gun, according to the natural course of things. On the other hand, aside from wound No.
3 as above stated, no other wound may be said to have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives
the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the
conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the diameter of the wound's
entrance was only 8 mm., the caliber should be .32 and not .45, because according to the medico-legal expert who testified in
this case, a bullet of a .45 caliber will produce a wound entrance with either 11 mm. or 12 mm. diameter. All other wounds found
by the surgeon who performed the autopsy appeared to have been caused by bullets of a lesser caliber. In consequence, it can
be stated that no bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or kill Serapio Tecson and therefore there is no reason why he should be
declared criminally responsible for said death.

Oanis, 74 Phil. 257

G.R. No.L-47722 July 27, 1943

MORAN, J.

Lesson applicable: mitigating circumstances

FACTS:

Ø Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a
telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan
get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.

Ø The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector.

Ø Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door
where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots,
Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at
him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal
Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.

Ø According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's
room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too
was sleeping in the same room.

ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson

HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance

YES.

Ø ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
Ø appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being
then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even
effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.

Ø "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any
greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."

Ø a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest

Ø The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice.

Ø 2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:

1. offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-present

2. injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise
of such right or office.-not present

Ø According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in
such case, be imposed.

G.R. No. 192330 November 14, 2012

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering from malnutrition to the
beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of victims of calamities.

The Facts and the Case

The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228
of violation of illegal use of public propertry (technical malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.1

The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core Shelter
Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes.
The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for construction.

On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries
stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the
CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials particularly the cement.
Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality’s Supplemental
Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and
boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be
given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval. After explaining
the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines
worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.2 Mayor Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult the accounting department
regarding the matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk of the Municipal Accountant’s Office, signed the
withdrawal slip based on her view that it was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods. Subsequently, CSAP
delivered those goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards, Garcia reported the matter to the MSWDO and to the municipal auditor as
per auditing rules.

On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present complaint against
Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the subject SFP goods were intended for its target
beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished children. She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for
Local Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods.3 Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he
approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.

In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for the poor of the municipality was
valid since they came from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the
municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the COA
Municipal Auditor conducted a comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001 and found nothing irregular in its transactions.

On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical malversation. But, since his
action caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The
Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a pubic purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated
by law or ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro’s motion for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro
appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.

The Questions Presented

In essence, Ysidoro questions the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he committed technical malversation. He particularly raises the
following questions:

1. Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose different from their originally intended
purpose;

2. Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the nature of savings that could be used to augment the other
authorized expenditures of the municipality;

3. Whether or not his failure to present the municipal auditor can be taken against him; and

4. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.

The Court’s Rulings

One. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code4 has three elements: a) that
the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public
use; and c) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were
originally appropriated by law or ordinance.5 Ysidoro claims that he could not be held liable for the offense under its third
element because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or
ordinance for a specific purpose.
But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-133 appropriating the
annual general fund for 2001.6 This appropriation was based on the executive budget7 which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP
and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services8 which covers the CSAP housing projects.9
The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual
budget.

Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used for SFP’s needs, observing the
rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The target clientele of the SFP according to its
manual10 are: 1) the moderately and severely underweight pre-school children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2) the
families of six members whose total monthly income is P3,675.00 and below.11 This rule provides assurance that the SFP would
cater only to the malnourished among its people who are in urgent need of the government’s limited resources.

Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those providing free labor for the
rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction materials
appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food intended
for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.

Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings of the SFP and that, therefore, the same could already be
diverted to the CSAP beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v. People12 which states that funds classified as savings are not
considered appropriated by law or ordinance and can be used for other public purposes. The Court cannot accept Ysidoro’s
argument.

The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ran throughout the year. Consequently,
no one could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already finished its project, leaving funds or goods that it no longer needed. The
fact that Polinio had already distributed the food items needed by the SFP beneficiaries for the second quarter of 2001 does not
mean that the remaining food items in its storeroom constituted unneeded savings. Since the requirements of hungry mouths
are hard to predict to the last sack of rice or can of sardines, the view that the subject goods were no longer needed for the
remainder of the year was quite premature.

In any case, the Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to be enacted to validly apply funds, already
appropriated for a determined public purpose, to some other purpose. Thus:

SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. – Funds shall be available exclusively for the specific purpose for which they
have been appropriated. No ordinance shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations from one item to another.
However, the local chief executive or the presiding officer of the sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance, be authorized to
augment any item in the approved annual budget for their respective offices from savings in other items within the same
expense class of their respective appropriations.

The power of the purse is vested in the local legislative body. By requiring an ordinance, the law gives the Sanggunian the power
to determine whether savings have accrued and to authorize the augmentation of other items on the budget with those savings.

Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing irregular in the diversion of the subject goods, such finding
should be respected. The SB ruled, however, that since Ysidoro failed to present the municipal auditor at the trial, the
presumption is that his testimony would have been adverse if produced. Ysidoro argues that this goes against the rule on the
presumption of innocence and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.

Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the municipal auditor testified, his testimony would have
been adverse to the mayor. The municipal auditor’s view regarding the transaction is not conclusive to the case and will not
necessarily negate the mayor’s liability if it happened to be favorable to him. The Court will not, therefore, be drawn into
speculations regarding what the municipal auditor would have said had he appeared and testified.

Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not
from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting department if the goods could be distributed to
those beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.1âwphi1

But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked
by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the
prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on
considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.13 It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is
completely irrelevant.14

Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical
malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.

WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirely the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 dated
February 8, 2010.

SO ORDERED.

Facts:

This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering from malnutrition to the
beneficiaries of reconstruction projects affecting the homes of victims of calamities.

The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core Shelter
Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes.
The beneficiaries... provided the labor needed for construction.

On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries
stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia),... the
CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials particularly the cement.
Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality's Supplemental
Feeding

Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of
sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to
the CSAP... beneficiaries.

Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval. After explaining
the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines
worth

P3,396.00 to CSAP.[2] Mayor Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult the accounting department regarding the
matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk of the Municipal Accountant's Office, signed the... withdrawal
slip based on her view that it was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods. Subsequently, CSAP delivered
those goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards, Garcia reported the matter to the MSWDO and to the municipal auditor as per
auditing... rules.

On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present complaint against
Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the subject SFP goods were intended for its target
beneficiaries, Leyte's... malnourished children. She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines
for Local Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods.[3] Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he
approved the... distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.

In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for the poor of the municipality was
valid since they came from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the
municipality's... poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the COA
Municipal Auditor conducted a comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001 and found nothing irregular in its transactions.

On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical malversation. But, since his
action caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The
Sandiganbayan held... that Ysidoro applied public property to a pubic purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated
by law or ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro's motion for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro
appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision... to this Court.

Issues:

Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from
him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting department if the goods could be distributed to
those... beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.

Ruling:

But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked
by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the...
prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on
considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.[13] It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the...
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is
completely irrelevant.[14]

Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro's act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical
malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.

Principles:

G.R. No. 244544 - AMALIA G. CARDONA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 244544, July 06, 2020

AMALIA G. CARDONA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARANDANG, J.:

The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision2 dated February 9, 2017
and the Resolution3 dated December 14, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CR No. 02354. The assailed Decision and
Resolution affirmed the Judgment4 dated December 6, 2013 and the Resolution5 dated March 17, 2014 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baybay City, Leyte, Branch 14. The RTC's Judgment and Resolution found petitioner Amalia G. Cardona (Cardona)
guilty of violating Section 23(a)6 and (c)7 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 71668 in relation to Section 1959 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
881 otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code� (OEC).

Facts of the Case

On February 27, 2002, an Information10 was filed against Cardona. The Information states:

That on or about the 14th day of May 2001 in the Municipality of Mahaplag, Leyte Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors for Poll Precinct No. 8A, for
the May 14, 2001 National and Local Elections, did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously require, instruct and
order the registered voters of said precinct to sign or affix their signatures at the back of their official ballots against their will,
thereby intentionally putting in said ballot a distinguishing mark and using means to identify the vote of the voters.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11cralawlawlibrary

The Information was a result of an Affidavit-Complaint12 filed by a certain Glenn H. Bartolini (Bartolini) � a mayoral candidate
for Mahaplag, Leyte who lost during the May 14, 2001 elections.

When arraigned, Cardona entered the plea of not guilty.13 Trial was conducted.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Natividad Lopez Ganton; (2) Bonifacio Cagol Dupal; (3) Constancia Malate
Alterado; (4) Teodoro Vitualla Alombro; (5) Yolanda Duquiatan Bergado; (6) Diogracia Mipa�a Samorin; (7) Macaria Renegado
Tomulac; and (8) Victoria Villason Refe. Cardona's defense was based solely on her testimony.14

The prosecution witnesses were all voters of Poblacion Mahaplag, Leyte. They were assigned to precinct 8-A in Mahaplag Central
School where Cardona was assigned as the chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). Some of the witnesses stated
that Cardona insisted that they (i.e., the voters) sign at the back of the ballot because it is the new law.15 The witnesses testified
that they were made to sign the dorsal portion of their ballot after they cast their votes. Some added that Cardona instructed
them to sign upon discovering that they voted for Bartolini.16
Cardona admitted that she allowed some of the voters to sign the dorsal portion of the latter's ballots on May 14, 2001.
However, Cardona said that she instructed the voters to sign immediately upon receipt of the ballot and not after the voters have
cast their votes.17 She explained that she had the voters sign at the back of their respective ballots because she experienced a
"mental black-out."18 She realized her mistake before lunch break, or around 11 a.m.19 Cardona then clarified the proper
procedure with a certain Teresita Cartilla, a BEI chairperson in a nearby precinct.20 Upon learning of her mistake, Cardona
ordered the ballot box's closure and requested the poll clerk to go the Commission on Election's (COMELEC) Registrar to ask
what could be done to correct the mistake.21 The Registrar simply ordered her to write the incident in the minutes.22
Thereafter, Cardona continued with the voting and did not let any subsequent voter sign at the back of the ballots.23 Cardona
clarified that she did not do it on purpose.24cralawred

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Judgment25 dated December 6, 2013 the RTC found Cardona guilty of the charges against her. The dispositive portion of
the RTC's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and
she [is] hereby condemned to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Two (2) to Four (4) years of imprisonment without benefit of
probation.

Further, accused is ordered disqualified to hold public office and to exercise her right to suffrage in accordance to (sic) Section
264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

SO ORDERED.26cralawlawlibrary

In convicting Cardona, the trial court relied on Cardona's admission that she allowed the first few batches of voters to sign the
latter's names at the back of their respective ballots.27 Because of such admission, the burden of evidence shifted to Cardona.
The RTC held that Cardona failed to prove her claim that she had a mental block and that she immediately corrected her
mistake.28 It noted that this was Cardona's second time to be the chairperson of a BEI and that "she attended lectures on the
conduct of election proceedings."29

The RTC disregarded Cardona's claim of good faith because she was accused of committing an election offense under the OEC
� a law that the RTC ruled as mala prohibitum.30

Aggrieved, Cardona appealed31 the Judgment of the RTC with the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision32 dated February 9, 2017, the CA affirmed the conviction with modification as to the penalty imposed. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Judgment of the RTC, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte, in Criminal Case No. 02-03-
27 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Amalia G. Cardona is sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment of one (1)
year as minimum to two (2) years as maximum. The Judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.33cralawlawlibrary

In affirming the conviction, the appellate court reiterated the RTC's pronouncement that violation of Section 23(a) and (c) of R.A.
7166 in relation to Section 195 of the OEC is a malum prohibitum, hence, Cardona's intent was immaterial.34 Cardona's
voluntary admission was not considered as a mitigating circumstance. However, the CA lowered the penalty imposed on Cardona
in view of the circumstances surrounding the case.35

The CA junked Cardona's attempt to have the criminal proceedings nullified because of the private prosecutor's active
participation during trial. Citing Rule 34,36 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the CA concluded that a private prosecutor
is allowed to appear in the criminal case to recover any civil liability due his/her client.

As Cardona's Motion for Reconsideration37 was denied in a Resolution38 dated December 14, 2018, Cardona filed the instant
petition for review.39

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Comment40 dated October 30, 2019 and sought the
outright dismissal of the petition due to a defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The OSG explained that
Cardona was convicted on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not because of Cardona's judicial admission.41 While
the OSG argued that Section 195 of the OEC is malum prohibitum where intent is immaterial, it also claimed that Cardona should
have proven her defense of experiencing a mental blackout as a justifying circumstance.42

In her Reply, Cardona insists that: (1) there was no defect in her Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping; (2)
conviction was not proper because (a) it was the voter who placed a distinguishing mark on the ballot; (b) she did not induce the
voters to affix their signatures; (c) the prosecution did not include the voters as principal by direct/active participation; and (d)
none of the supposedly marked ballots were identified and presented during trial; and (3) the burden of proof did not shift to
Cardona because the prosecution failed to prove Cardona's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling of the Court

We find the petition meritorious. Cardona should be acquitted of the crime charged.

This Court notes the OSG's prayer to dismiss the instant petition in view of the petitioner's defective verification and certification
against forum shopping. Given that the merits of the instant petition and Cardona's liberty at stake, this Court deems it best to
set aside the procedural flaw in the interest of substantial justice. We have repeatedly held that "rules of procedure are used to
only help secure, not override substantial justice."43

Another procedural issue is the private prosecutor's active participation during trial.

The CA's citation of Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure is incorrect. Rule 34 pertains to the prosecution of election
offenses via a preliminary investigation before the COMELEC or those authorized under Section 4(b)44 of the said Rules. Here,
Cardona questioned the private prosecutor's participation during trial before the RTC. The applicable rule is Section 5 45 Rule
110 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC. Under Section 5, the private prosecutor may prosecute the case
upon a written authority of the Chief of the Prosecution Office or Regional State Prosecutor with the trial court's approval.
Cardona admits that the Assistant City Prosecutor deputized the private prosecutor to prosecute the criminal case.46 Therefore,
the criminal proceeding was regularly conducted.

The RTC and the CA found Cardona guilty of violating Section 23(a) and (c) of R.A. 7166 in relation to Section 195 of the OEC.

Section 23(a) and (c) of R.A. 7166 states:

Section 23. Officials Ballots. � (a) Ballots for national and local elections regular or special, plebiscites and referenda, shall be of
uniform size and shall be provided by the Commission. They shall be printed in black ink on which security paper with distinctive,
clear and legible watermarks that will readily distinguish it from ordinary paper. Each ballot shall be in the shape of a strip with
stub and detachable coupon containing the serial number of the ballot, and a space for the thumbmark of the voter on the
detachable coupon. It shall bear at the top of the voter on the detachable coupon. It shall bear at the top of the middle portion
thereof the coat-of-arms of the Republic of the Philippines, the word "Official Ballot," the name of the city or the municipality
and province in which the election is to be held, the date of the election, and the following notice in English: "Fill out this ballot
secretly inside the voting booth. Do not put any distinct mark on any part of this ballot."

xxxx

(c) There shall not be anything printed or written on the back of the ballot except as provided in Section 2447 of this Act.

On the other hand, Section 195 of the OEC provides:

Section 195. Manner of preparing the ballot. � The voter, upon receiving his folded ballot, shall forthwith proceed to one of the
empty voting booths and shall there fill his ballot by writing in the proper space for each office the name of the individual
candidate for whom he desires to vote.

No voter shall be allowed to enter a booth occupied by another, nor enter the same accompanied by somebody, except as
provided for in the succeeding section hereof, nor stay therein for a longer time than necessary, nor speak with anyone other
than as herein provided while inside the polling place. It shall be unlawful to prepare the ballot outside the voting booth, or to
exhibit its contents to any person, or to erase any printing from the ballot, or to intentionally tear or deface the same or put
thereon any distinguishing mark. It shall likewise be unlawful to use carbon paper, paraffin paper, or other means for making a
copy of the contents of the ballot or make use of any other means to identify the vote of the voter.

Under Section 26248 of the OEC, a violation of Section 195 constitutes an election offense. The penalty for committing an
election offense under the OEC is punishable "with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall
not be subject to probation." 49 Furthermore, the person found guilty will also be: (1) disqualified to hold public office; and (2)
deprived of the right of suffrage.

Given the gravity of the penalty imposed, it must be determined whether all marks made on the ballot (outside of those
prescribed under Section 23(a) and (c) of R.A. 7166 and Section 195 of the OEC automatically constitute an election offense.

This Court rules in the negative.

The RTC incorrectly convicted Cardona because of Cardona's admission that she instructed the voters to affix their (i.e., the
voters) signatures at the back of their respective ballots. The trial court ruled that the burden of evidence is shifted to Cardona to
prove that she did not commit the crime.50 The CA wrongfully upheld the conviction on the basis of the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies.51

The RTC and CA held that the OEC is a special law, hence, intent is unnecessary to secure a conviction.

We do not agree.

An act prohibited by a special law does not automatically make it malum prohibitum. "When the acts complained of are
inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law."52 The bench and bar must rid
themselves of the common misconception that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala
prohibita crimes are provided by special laws. The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes
is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act.53

Is a violation of Section 195 of the OEC mala in se such that good faith and lack of criminal intent can be raised as valid defenses
against its conviction?

We rule Section 195 of the OEC to be mala in se.

The applicable portion of Section 195 forbids the intentional tearing or defacing of the ballot or the placement of a distinguishing
mark.

A distinguishing mark is one, whether a letter, figure, or character, which shows an intention on the part of the voter to
distinguish his particular ballot from others of its class, and not one that is common to, and not distinguishable from, others of a
designated class. However, not every mark made by a voter on his ballot, which may separate and distinguish it from other
ballots cast at the election, wiil result in a declaration of invalidity. To constitute a mark a distinguishing mark, it must be placed
on a ballot with the deliberate intention that it shall identify the ballot after the vote has been cast, unless a statute enumerates
certain marks as illegal or distinguishing regardless of the question of intent.54 (Underscoring supplied)

In the case of Locsin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,55 We defined a distinguishing mark as one "placed in the
ballots x x x which the elector may have placed with the intention of facilitating the means of identifying said ballot, for the
purpose of defeating the secrecy of the suffrage which the law establishes."56 "Marks made by the voter unintentionally do not
invalidate the ballot. Neither do marks made by some person other than the voter."57 If these innocuous marks do not violate
the constitutional duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and preserve the sanctity and integrity of the electoral process, then
We can reasonably conclude that such marking does not constitute an election offense, as in this case.

The RTC's reliance in the case of Dr. Domalanta v. COMELEC,58 is misplaced. In Dr. Domalanta, this Court ruled that the burden of
evidence is shifted to the petitioners in that case because the discrepancies in the Certificates of Canvass and Statement of Votes
were "too substantial and rounded off to be categorized as a mere 'computation error' or a result of fatigue."59 Thus, it is
understood that unintentional mistakes do not necessarily constitute an election offense or electoral sabotage.60 Still, this case
is no different from Dr. Domalanta as both involve the violation of a special law (i.e., R.A. 6646). This Court's consideration of
petitioners' claim of fatigue (in Dr. Domalanta) shows that intent was necessary to convict an accused of an election offense
covered by a special law. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,61 this Court categorically held that an electoral offense under Section
27(b) of R.A. 6646 is mala in se because "it could not [have been] the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass
errors."62 The same should apply to unintentional marks made on a ballot.

Therefore, is Cardona guilty of deliberately placing or causing the voter to place a distinguishing mark?
We rule in the negative.

It is undisputed that Cardona instructed some of the voters to affix their signatures on the dorsal portion of the ballot. However,
Cardona's actions were not intended to identify the ballot after the vote has been cast.

Cardona explained that she experienced a "mental black-out" because of the belated voting in precinct 8A.63 She allowed voters
to cast their vote at 8:45 a.m. (instead of the mandated 7:00 a.m. time), despite having the most number of voters in the area, in
order to wait for her poll clerk64 and Bartolini's poll watcher.65 Cardona insisted on waiting for all the authorized people inside
the precinct even if it would delay the voting proceedings: (1) in order to avoid any complaints from the candidates
representatives; and (2) to ensure fairness in the conduct of the voting.66 By the time voting was about to start, the voters in line
were already angry.67

Cardona's defense is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. Under such principle, "the pleader has to confess the
allegations against him before he can be allowed to set out matters which, if true, would defeat the action."68

The absence of Cardona's intent to place a distinguishing mark on the prosecution witnesses' ballots becomes more evident
because she immediately closed the box upon realizing her mistake and requested the poll clerk to go to the COMELEC Registrar
to ask how she can rectify the situation.69 Despite the first batch of ballots containing the voters' signatures, Cardona counted
every vote during canvassing.70 This fact was never disputed by the prosecution.

Prior to Cardona's instruction to close the ballot box, the poll watchers did not protest the voters' act of signing the dorsal
portion of the ballot.71 Even Bartolini's counsel, who was inside precinct 8A and observed everything, did not object to what
happened on May 14, 2001.72 Even without any objection from the poll watchers, Cardona corrected her mistake immediately
after realizing it. Taken together, these show Cardona's good faith that should exculpate her from criminal liability.

Even more important is the prosecution's failure to present the allegedly marked ballots. While the trial court had possession of
precinct 8A's ballot boxes since July 22, 2002,73 the prosecution never presented nor formally offered the same in evidence
during trial. In its formal offer of evidence,74 the prosecution only presented the following documentary evidence:

a) Exhibit "A" � Judicial Affidavit of Deogracias Samorin dated December 6, 2007;

b) Exhibit "B" � Judicial Affidavit of Macaria R. Tomulac dated September 6, 2007;

c) Exhibit "C" � Judicial Affidavit of Victoria Refe dated March 25, 2008;

d) Exhibit "D" � Judicial Affidavit of Constancia Alterado dated October 30, 2008; and

e) Exhibit "E" � Judicial Affidavit of Laila Padalapat.75

Without the physical evidence of the corpus delicti, i.e., the allegedly marked ballots, the trial court was not given the
opportunity to appreciate the nature of the markings made. Thus, the prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the markings were deliberate and made for the purpose of identifying the ballot. It is basic in criminal law that a
conviction "must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the
prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his[/her] innocence."76

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 9, 2017 and the Resolution dated December 14,
2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 02354 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Amalia G.
Cardona is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, (Chairperson), Zalameda, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.

Gesmundo, J., on official leave.

G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015

DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries, and perpetrated through suffering.
That is the essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the April 26, 2013 Decision1 and the October 8, 2013
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05046, which affirmed the February 23, 2011 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City (RTC). The RTC found petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr.
(Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Facts

On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed the Information4 against the petitioners before
the R TC, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa
Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba ,City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, during an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with
more or less twenty other members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one M4-RLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition
for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On February 7, 2006, upon motion, the RTC admitted the Amended Information5 which reads:

That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-name accused, during a planned initiation rite and being
then officers and members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other
members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use
personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the
fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

On February 7, 2006, Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of probable cause,6 but it was denied by the trial court because the
ground cited therein was not provided by law and jurisprudence. When arraigned, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.7 Thereafter, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses to prove the crime charged. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva (Villanueva) was brought to the
emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP Rizal Hospital). Dr. Ramon Masilungan (Dr. Masilungan), who was then
the attending physician at the emergency room, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no heartbeat.
Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Villlanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes. Villanueva, however, did not respond to the resuscitation
and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several
injuries on his arms and legs. He further attested that Villanueva 's face was cyanotic, meaning that blood was no longer running
through his body due to lack of oxygen; and when he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he saw large contusions on both legs,
which extended from the upper portion of the thighs, down to the couplexial portion, or back of the knees.

Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him that they found Villanueva lying
motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, and brought him to the hospital. When he asked them where
they came from, one of them answered that they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route to San Pablo City. He questioned them
on how they found Villanueva, when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One of the men just said that they were headed
somewhere else.

Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report.8 Due to the nature, extent and location of the injuries, he opined
that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with hazing injuries because he had undergone hazing himself when he
was a student, and also because of his experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.

Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV,
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an autopsy on the body of Villanueva on January 14,
2006 and placed down his findings in an autopsy report.9 Upon examination of the body, he found various external injuries in the
head, trunk and extremities. There were thirty-three (33) external injuries, with various severity and nature. He concluded that
the cause of death was subdural hemorrhage due to head injury contusion-hematoma. Based on multiple injuries and contusions
on the body, and his previous examinations of hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo opined that these injuries were hazing-related.
During the autopsy, he retrieved two (2) matchsticks from the cadaver with the marking of Alpha Phi Omega (APO) Fraternity.10

Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-sari store located at Purok 5, Pansol, Calamba City, in front of Villa Novaliches
Resort, which was barely ten steps away. On January 13, 2006, at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she was tending her
store when she saw a jeepney with more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the resort. Ignacio identified Dungo as the person
seated beside the driver of the jeepney.11 She estimated the ages of these persons in the group to be between 20 to 30 years
old. They were in civilian clothes, while the other men wore white long-sleeved shirts. Before entering the resort, the men and
women shook hands and embraced each other. Three (3) persons, riding on a single motorcycle, also arrived at the resort.

Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace of the resort who looked like they were praying, and then the
lights of the resort were turned off. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy some items.
During her testimony, she was shown photographs and she identified Christopher Braseros and Sibal as two of those who went
to her store.12 It was only on the morning of January 14, 2006 that she learned from the policemen visiting the resort that the
deceased person was Villanueva.

Donato Magat (Magat), a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that at around 3:00 o'clock in the
morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the comer of Villa Novaliches Resort. A man approached him and
told him that someone inside the resort needed a ride. Magat went to the resort and asked the two (2) men at the gate who
needed a ride. Afterwards, he saw three (3) men in their 20's carrying another man, who looked very weak, like a vegetable,
towards his tricycle. Magat touched the body of the man being carried and sensed it was cold.

Magat asked the men what happened to their companion. They replied that he had too much to drink. Then they instructed
Magat to go to the nearest hospital. He drove the tricycle to JP Rizal Hospital. Upon their arrival, two of his passengers brought
their unconscious companion inside the emergency room, while their other companion paid the tricycle fare. Magat then left to
go home. Several days after, he learned that the person brought to the hospital had died.

Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino Espina y Jabay (Espina) were the security guards on duty at JP Rizal Hospital, from 11
:00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006. In the early morning of
January 14, 2006, two men, who signed on the logbook13 under the names Brandon Gonzales and Jerico Paril, brought the
lifeless body of a person. Pursuant to the standard operating procedure of the hospital, the security guards did not allow the two
men to leave the hospital because they called the police station .so that an investigation could be conducted. Two policemen
arrived later at the hospital. During his testimony, Natividad identified Sibal and Dupgo as the two persons who brought
Villanueva to the hospital.

PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (P02 Ignacio). testified that on January 14, 2006 at around 3:30 o'clock in the early morning, Natividad
called up the PNP Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless body of a man was brought to JP Rizal Hospital. When P02 Ignacio
arrived, he saw Villanueva' s corpse with contusions and bite marks all over his body. P02 Ignacio and his policemen companions
then brought Dungo and Sibal to the police station. He asked them about what happened, but they invoked their right to remain
silent. The policemen then proceeded to Brgy. Pansol at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning. After finding Villa Novaliches Resort,
they knocked on the door and the caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened it.

The police asked Capillan if there were University of the Philippines Los Baños (UP Los Baños) students who rented the resort on
the evening of January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and added that about twenty (20) persons arrived onboard a jeepney and told
her that they would be renting the resort from 9:30 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock the following morning.

Gay Czarina Sunga (Sunga) was a food technology student at UP Los Baños during the academic year of 2005-2006 and a member
of the Symbiosis UPLB Biological Society. Around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, she was at their
organization's tambayan in the UPLB Biological Sciences Building, when she noticed three (3) men seated two meters away from
her. She identified the two of the three men as Sibal and Dungo.14 They were wearing black shirts with the logo of APO. Later at
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men arrived and, with their heads bowed, approached the three men. One of them was
Villanueva, who was carrying a 5-gallon water container. Dungo then stood up and asked Villanueva why the latter did not report
to him when he was just at their tambayan. Dungo then punched Villanueva twice, but the latter just kept quiet with his head
bowed. Fifteen minutes later, all the men left.

Joey Atienza (Atienza) had been a good friend of Villanueva since 2004. They were roommates at the UP Los Baños Men's
Dormitory and housemates at the DPS Apartment in Umali Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna. According to Atienza, on January 9,
2006, Villanueva introduced him to Daryl Decena (Decena) as his APO - Theta Chapter batchmate, who was also to undergo final
initiation rites on January 13, 2006.

Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs at UP Los Baños, testified that Dungo and Sibal were both members of the APO
Fraternity, and that there was no record of any request for initiation or hazing activity filed by the said fraternity.
McArthur Padua of the Office of the Registrar, UP Los Baños, testified that Villanueva was a B.S. Agricultural Economics student
at the UP Los Baños,15 as evidenced by his official transcript of record.16

Atty. Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of the UP Los Baños, testified that an
administrative disciplinary case was filed on March 31, 2006 against the APO Fraternity regarding the death of Villanueva. They
confirmed that Capilla of Villa Novaliches Resort and Irene Tan (Tan) of APO Sorority Theta Chapter appeared as witnesses for the
complainant.17

Roman Miguel De Jesus, UP - Office of the Legal Aid (UP-OLA) supervising student, testified that he met Tan of the APO Sorority
sometime between July and August 2006 in UP Diliman: to convince her to testify in the criminal case. Tan, however, refused
because she feared for her safety. She said that after testifying in the SDT hearing, her place in Imus, Cavite was padlocked and
vandalized.

Evelyn Villanueva, mother of victim Villanueva, testified that, as a result of the death of her son, her family incurred actual
damages consisting of medical, burial and funeral expenses in the aggregate amount of ₱140,000.00 which were evidenced by
receipts.18 Her husband also incurred travel expenses in the amount of ₱7,000.00 in returning to the Philippines to attend his
son's wake and burial, as supported by a plane ticket.19 She further attested that she experienced mental anguish, sleepless
nights, substantial weight loss, and strained family relationship as a result of her son's death.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the petitioners. Their testimonies are summarized as
follow:

Richard Cornelio (Cornelio), an APO Fraternity member, testified that on January 13, 2006, around 4:00 to 4:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, he met Dungo at the UP Los Baños Graduate School. Dungo asked him if he would attend the initiation ceremony, and
Cornelio answered in the negative because he had other things to do. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Cornelio
again met Dungo and his girlfriend while eating a hamburger at the Burger Machine along Raymundo Street, Umali Subdivision,
Los Baños, Laguna (Raymundo Street). He asked Dungo if he would attend the initiation ceremony. Dungo replied that he would
not because he and his girlfriend had something to do.

Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of Dungo, testified that on January 13, 2006 at around 1 :00 o'clock in the afternoon,
Dungo came and visited her at her boarding house on Raymundo Street. Around 4:00 o'clock of the same afternoon, they went
to the UP Los Baños Graduate School and saw Cornelio. Afterwards, they went back to her boarding house and stayed there from
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Then, they went to Lacxo Restaurant for dinner and left at around
10:00 o'clock in the evening. On their way back to her boarding house, they encountered Cornelio again at the Burger Machine.
Dungo then stayed and slept at her boarding house. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, they were
roused from their sleep by a phone call from Sibal, asking Dungo to go to a resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo then left the
boarding house.

Dungo testified that around 1:00 o'clock in the early afternoon of January 13, 2006, he arrived at the boarding house of his
girlfriend, Rivera, on Raymundo Street. At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School
and inquired about the requirements for a master's degree. They walked back to the boarding house and met Cornelio. They
talked about their fraternity's ,final initiation ceremony for that night in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo and Rivera then reached the
latter's boarding house around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, they went out for dinner at
the Lacxo Restaurant, near Crossing Junction, Los Baños. They ate and stayed at the restaurant for at least one and a half hours.
Then they walked back to the boarding house of Rivera and, along the way, they met Cornelio again at the Burger Machine along
Raymundo Street. Cornelio asked Dungo if he would attend their fraternity's final initiation ceremony, to which he replied in the
negative. Dungo and Rivera reached the boarding house around 9:00 o'clock in the evening and they slept there.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, Dungo was roused from his sleep because Sibal was palling him on
his cellphone. Sibal asked for his help, requesting him to go to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Upon Dungo 's
arrival at the resort, Sibal led him inside. There, he saw Rudolfo Castillo (Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity brother, and Villanueva,
who was unconscious. Dungo told them that they should bring Villanueva to the hospital. They all agreed, and Castillo called a
tricycle that brought them to JP Rizal Hospital. He identified himself before the security guard as Jerico Paril because he was
scared to tell his real name.

Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the Grand Chancellor of the APO -Theta Chapter for years 2005-2006. At around 7:00
o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006, he was at the tambayan of their fraternity in UP Los Baños because their neophytes
would be initiated that night. Around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, they met their fraternity brothers in Bagong Kalsada, Los
Baños. He noticed that their neophyte, Villanueva, was with Castillo and that there was a bruise on the left side of his face. Then
they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. There, Gopez instructed Sibal to take
Villanueva to the second floor of the resort. He confronted Castillo as to what happened to Villanueva. Around 11:00 or 11:30
o'clock in the evening, Gopez decided to cancel the final rites. He told Sibal to stay at the resort and accompany Villanueva and
Castillo. Together with the other neophytes, Gopez left the resort and went back to UP Los Baños.

Sibal testified that he was a DOST Scholar at the UP Los Baños from 2002 to 2006, taking up B.S. Agricultural Chemistry. He was a
Brother Actuary of the APO - Theta Chapter, and was in charge of fraternity activities, such as tree planting, free medical and
dental missions, and blood donations. On January 13, 2006, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was at the fraternity's
tambayan for the final initiation rites of their neophytes. After preparing the food for the initiation rites, Sibal, together with
some neophytes, went to Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños, where he saw fellow fraternity brother Castillo with their neophyte
Villanueva, who had a bruised face. Thereafter, they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol,
Calamba City. Once inside the resort, he accompanied Villanueva upstairs for the latter to take a rest. A few minutes later, he
went down and confronted Castillo about the bruises on Villanueva's face. He was angry and irritated with Castillo. He then
stayed outside the resort until Gopez and the other neophytes came out and told him that the final initiation rite was cancelled,
and that they were returning to UP Los Baños. Sibal wanted to go with them but ;he was ordered to stay with Villanueva and
Castillo.

After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the condition of Villanueva, who was sleeping on the second; floor of the resort.
Then he went outside for one hour, or until 1 :00 o 'dock in the early morning of January 14, 2006. Sibal entered the resort again
and saw Villanueva, who looked unconscious, seated in one of the benc6es on the ground floor. Sibal inquired about Villanueva's
condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then called Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle
and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done
the same.

The RTC Ruling

On February 23, 2011, the RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court stated that the prosecution established the presence
of Dungo and Sibal (1) at the UP Los Banos Campus on January 13, 2006 around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by the testimony
of Sunga and (2) at the Villa Novaliches Resort around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day by the testimony of Ignacio.
With the extensive testimonies of Dr. Masilungan and Dr. Camarillo, the prosecution also proved that Villanueva died from hazing
injuries.

According to the RTC, the evidence of the prosecution undeniably proved that Villanueva, a UP Los Bafios student, was a
neophyte of the APO - Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and Sibal were members of the said fraternity; that on the evening
of January 13, 2006, Dungo and Sibal, together with the other fraternity members, officers and alumni, brought and transported
Villanueva and two other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol, Calamba City, for the final initiation rites; that
the initiation rites were conducted inside the resort, performed under the cover of darkness and secrecy; that due to the injuries
sustained by Villanueva, the fraternity members and the other two neophytes haphazardly left the resort; and that Dungo and
Sibal boarded a tricycle and brought the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital, where Villanueva was pronounced dead.
The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to bodily assault and harm the victim, it
was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their final initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce
Villanueva to attend the final initiation rites, but they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.

The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi were self-serving negative assertions. The defense of denial and alibi of Dungo,
which was corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend Rivera and his co-fraternity brother, could not be given credence. The
witnesses presented by the defense were partial and could not be considered as disinterested parties. The defense of denial of
Sibal likewise failed. The corroborative testimonies of his fraternity brothers were suspect because they had so much at stake in
the outcome of the criminal action.

The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dandy Dungo and Gregorio Sibal GUILTY of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and order them to jointly and severally pay the family /heirs
of Deceased Marlon Villanueva the following sums of money:

1. ₱141,324.00 for and as actual damages;

2. ₱200,000.00 for and as moral damages;

3. ₱100,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and

4. ₱50,000.00 for the death of Marlon Villanueva.

SO ORDERED.20

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they contended that the prosecution failed to establish their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049. They also assailed the constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law,
which stated that mere presence in the hazing was prima facie evidence of participation therein, because it allegedly violated the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.

The CA Ruling

The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding them guilty of violating R.A. No.
8049, the RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution. The CA painstakingly discussed the
unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence to convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime of hazing.

It further found that the defense of denial and alibi of Dungo and Sibal failed to cast doubt on the positive identification made by
the prosecution witnesses; and that denial, being inherently weak, could not prevail over the positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrators of the crime. The CA also stated that Dungo and Sibal were not only convicted based on their
presence in the venue of the hazing, but also in their act of bringing the victim to Villa Novaliches Resort for the final initiation
rites.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba City in
CRIM. Case No. 13958-2006-C, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of R.A. 8049 is hereby
AFFIRMED in TOTO.

SO ORDERED.21

Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in the assailed October 8, 2013 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR HE JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC AND THE CA A QUO CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM
BECAUSE THE OFFENSE PROVED AS FOUND AND PRONOUNCED THEREBY IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION, NOR DOES ONE INCLUDE OR NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE OTHER.22

Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged them as they "did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon Villanueva y Mejilla."23 Yet, both the RTC and the CA found
them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049 because they "[i]nduced the victim to be present"24 during the initiation rites. The crime
of hazing by inducement does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by actual participation. Thus, they cannot be
convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the information. By reason of the foregoing, the petitioners contend
that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them has been violated.

In its Comment,25 filed on May 23, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General (DSG) asserted that Dungo and Sibal were charged in
the amended information with the proper offense and convicted for such. The phrases "planned initiation" and "in conspiracy
with more or less twenty members and officers" in the amended information sufficiently cover "knowingly cooperated in
carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat." The planned initiation rite would not have been
accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners in inducing the victim to be present thereat and it was obviously
conducted in conspiracy with the others.26 In their Reply27 filed on September 10, 2014, Dungo and Sibal insisted that there was
a variance between the, offense charged of "actually participated in the infliction of physical harm," and the offense "knowingly
cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat."28 The prosecution, moreover, failed to
establish conspiracy because no act or circumstance was proved pointing to a joint purpose and design between and among the
petitioners and the other twenty accused.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Procedural Matter

An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court authority.29 The right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.30

Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004,
governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.31 According to the said provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been imposed by the CA, can simply
file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right before the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens
the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties.32 Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the
constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.33

An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45 under the Rules of
Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law.34 Moreover, such review is
not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons.35
In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file a notice of
appeal under Section 13( c ), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court and open the entire case for
review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion
and raise only questions of law.

In this case, the CA affirmed the R TC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the petitioners. The latter opted
to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly,
the petitioners began to assail the existence of conspiracy in their reply,36 which is a question of fact that would require an
examination of the evidence ;presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due to the novelty of the issue presented, the
Court deems it proper to open the whole case for review.37 Substantive Matter

In our contemporary society, hazing has been a nightmare of parents who send their children to college or university. News of
deaths and horrible beatings primarily among college students due to hazing injuries continue to haunt us. Horrid images of
eggplant-like buttocks and thighs and pounded arms and shoulders of young men are depicted as a fervent warning to those who
dare undergo the hazing rites. The meaningless death of these promising students, and the agony, cries and ordeal of their
families, resonate through the very core of our beings. But no matter how modem and sophisticated our society becomes, these
barbaric acts of initiation of fraternities, sororities and other organizations continue to thrive, even within the elite grounds of
the academe.

The history and phenomenon of hazing had been thoroughly discussed in the recent case of Villareal v. People.38 It is believed
that the fraternity system and its accompanying culture of hazing were transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the
late 19th century.39 Thus, a study of the laws and jurisprudence of the United States (US) on hazing can enlighten the current
predicament of violent initiations in fraternities, sororities and other organizations.

United States Laws and

Jurisprudence on Hazing

There are different definitions of hazing, depending on the laws of the states.40 In the case of People v. Lenti,41 the defendant
therein challenged the constitutionality of the state law defining hazing on the ground of vagueness. The court rejected such
contention and held that it would have been an impossible task if the legislature had attempted to define hazing specifically

because fraternal organizations and associations never suffered for ideas in contriving new forms of hazing. Presently, the
acceptable definition of hazing is the practice of physically or emotionally abusing newcomers to an organization as a means of
initiation.42

Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not limited to, acts of violence, acts of humiliation, sexual-related
acts, and alcohol-related acts.43 The physical form of hazing may include beating, branding, paddling, excessive exercise,
drinking, and using drugs. Sexual hazing have included simulated sex acts, sodomy and forced kissing.44 Moreover, hazing does
not only result in physical injuries and hospitalization, but also lead to emotional damage and traumatic stress.45
Based on statistics and alarming frequency of hazing, states have attempted to combat hazing through the passage of state laws
that prohibit such acts.46 Forty-four states, with the exception of Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and
Wyoming, have passed anti-hazing laws.47 The severity of these laws can range from minor penalties to a prison sentence for up
to six years.48 In the states of Illinois, Idaho, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, hazing that result in death or "great bodily
harm" is categorized as a felony.49

In Florida, the Chad Meredith Act,50 a law named after a student who died in a hazing incident, was enacted on July 1, 2005. It
provides that a person commits a third degree felony when he or she intentionally or recklessly commits any act of hazing and
the hazing results in serious bodily injury or death. If a person only creates substantial risk of physical injury or death, then hazing
is categorized as a first degree misdemeanor. A similar provision can be observed in the Penal Law of New York.51

Interestingly, some states included notable features in their anti-hazing statute to increase its effectiveness. In Alabama,
Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Texas, the law imposes a duty on school personnel to report
hazing.52 In fact, in Alabama, no person is allowed to knowingly permit, encourage, aid, or assist any person in committing the
offense of hazing, or willfully acquiesces in its commission.53

Also, some states enacted statutes that have been interpreted to mean that persons are guilty of hazing even if they have the
consent of the victim.54 In New Jersey, consent is not a defense to a hazing charge, and its law permits the prosecution of
offenders under other applicable criminal statutes.55 By including these various provisions in their anti-hazing statutes, these
states have removed the subjective inquiry of consent from consideration, thus, presumably allowing courts to effectively and
properly adjudicate hazing cases.56

In the US, hazing victims can either file a criminal action, based on anti-hazing statutes, or a civil suit, arising from tort law and
constitutional law, against the members of the local fraternity, the national fraternity and even against the university or college
concerned.57 Hazing, which threatens to needlessly harm students, must be attacked from whatever legal means are possible.58

In State v. Brown,59 a member of the Alpha Kappa Alpha at Kent State University was indicted for complicity to hazing. The group
physically disciplined their pledges by forcing them to stand on their heads, beating them with paddles, and smacking and
striking initiates in the face and head. The Ohio court held that evidence presented therein was more than sufficient to sustain a
conviction.

Excessive intake of alcohol in the fraternity initiations can be considered as hazing. In Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity
Inc.,60 a 17-year old college freshman died as a result of aspirating his own vomit after consuming excessive amounts of alcohol
in a fraternity initiation ritual. The defendants in the said case contended that they only furnished the alcohol drinks to the
victim. The court denied the defense because such acts of the fraternity effectively contributed to the death of the victim as part
of their hazing.

Even in high school, hazing could exist. In Nice v. Centennial Area School District,61 a tenth-grade wrestler at William Tennet High
School was subjected to various forms of hazing, including; a ritual where the victim was forcibly held down, while a teammate
sat on his face with his buttocks exposed. The parents of the student sued the school because it failed to prevent the incident
despite its knowledge of the hazing rites. The court approved the settlement of the parties in the amount ofUS$151,000.00.

More recently, the case of Yost v. Wabash College62 involved the hazing of an 18-year old freshman, who suffered physical and
mental injuries in the initiation rites conducted by the Phi Kappa Psi fraternity. As a pledge, the victim was thrown into a creek
and was placed in a chokehold, until he lost consciousness. The court upheld that action against the local fraternity because,
even if the student consented, the fraternity had the duty to ensure the safety of its activities.

The US anti-hazing laws and jurisprudence show that victims of hazing can properly attain redress before the court. By crafting
laws and prosecuting offenders, the state can address the distinct dilemma of hazing.
Anti-Hazing Law in the

Philippines

R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law .of 1995, has been enacted to regulate hazing and other forms of initiation rites in
fraternities, sororities, and other organizations. It was in response to the rising incidents of death of hazing victims, particularly
the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa.63 Despite its passage, reports of deaths resulting from i hazing continue to emerge. Recent
victims were Guillo Servando of the College of St. Benilde, Marc Andre Marcos and Marvin Reglos of the San', Beda College -
Manila, and Cris Anthony Mendez of the University of the Philippines - Diliman. With the continuity of these senseless tragedies,
one question implores for an answer: is R.A. No. 8049 a sufficient deterrent against hazing?

To answer the question, the Court must dissect the provisions of the law and scrutinize its effect, implication and application.

Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which would not be wrong but
for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent
with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita,
the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.64 When the doing
of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.65

A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes
are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under
R.A. No. 7080, as amended.66 Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical
malversation.67

The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality
or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or .omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se,- on the
contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission b)". reasons of public policy, then it is mala
prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.68

The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would show that the lawmakers
intended the anti-hazing statute to be ma/um prohibitum, as follows: SENATOR GUINGONA: Most of these acts, if not all, are
already punished under the Revised Penal Code.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be murder or homicide.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under rape or acts of
lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of the crime of hazing?

SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or any association from making
this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.

That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or association can require the act of
physical initiation before a person can become a member without being held criminally liable.

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that
he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is
seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, etcetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense
for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal
Code

That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. x x x

Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of persons resort to hazing as a
requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President.
Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then
the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the
act of hazing.

To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun
this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or
maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.

So, what we want to discourage, is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to institute this kind of hazing.
Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiybng makamatay. Hindi ko na
babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin
talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the
fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung
mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his
statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical
injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in
proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without
having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense. And even the distinguished
Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not
punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by
intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President.

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the
sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are
already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.

If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the masters intended to maim.
What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily
escape responsibility and say, "We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not
have any intention to kill or maim."

This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation,
etcetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they are separate offenses.

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR LINA. x x x

I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether it is mala in se or mala
prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.

If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under
the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President.69

[Emphases Supplied]

Having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in se adhered to under the RPC,
the Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle
of mala prohibita.70 In Vedana v. Valencia,71 the Court noted that in our nation's very recent history, the people had spoken,
through the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal.72
The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited.
Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised
in its prosecution.73

Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations
such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or
organization;

2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization; and

3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or
injury.

From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent that there must be an initiation rite or practice performed by the fraternities,
sororities or organization. The law, however, did not limit the definition of these groups to those formed within academic
colleges and universities.74 In fact, the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that the term "organization" shall include any
club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Philippine Military Academy (PMA), or officer
and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. Even the president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of a corporation engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment are covered by the law.75 R.A. No. 8049
qualifies that the physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the
physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP, as approved by the Secretary
of National Defense and the National Police Commission, duly recommended by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director
General of the PNP, shall not be considered as hazing.

And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section 2 thereof provides that initiation rites of fraternities,
sororities or organizations shall be allowed provided that the following requisites are met:

1. That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior written notice to the school authorities or head of organization;

2. The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days before the conduct of such initiation;

3. That the written notice shall indicate:

a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed three (3) days;

b. The names of those to be subjected to such activities; and

c. An undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during such initiation rites. Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049
imposes an obligation to the head of the school or organization or their representatives that they must assign at least two (2)
representatives, as the case may be, to be present during these valid initiations. The duty of such representative ,is to see to it
that no physical harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.

Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities, sororities or organizations that fail to comply with the
notice requirements of Section 2. Also, the school and organization administrators do not have a clear liability for non-
compliance with Section 3.

Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in accordance with Section 4 of the law, which provides different
classes of persons who are held liable as principals and accomplices.
The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of
initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or
organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. Interestingly, the presence of
any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of actual participation, unless he prevented the commission of the acts
punishable herein.76

The prescribed penalty on the principals depends on the extent of injury inflicted to the victim.77 The penalties appear to be
similar to that of homicide, serious physical injuries, less serious physical injuries, and slight physical injuries under the RPC,78
with the penalties for hazing increased one degree higher. Also, the law provides several circumstances which would aggravate
the imposable penalty.79

Curiously, although hazing has been defined as consisting of those activities involving physical or psychological suffering or injury,
the penalties for hazing only covered the infliction of physical harm. At best, the only psychological injury recognized would be
causing insanity to the victim. Conversely, even if the victim only sustained physical injuries which did not incapacitate him, there
is still a prescribed penalty.80

The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority
who actually planned the hazing.81 Although these planners were not present when the acts constituting hazing were
committed, they shall still be liable as principals. The provision took in consideration the non-resident members of the
organization, such as their former officers or alumni.

The third class of principals would ht; officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or sorority who knowingly
cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat.82 These officers or members are penalized,
not because of their direct participation in the infliction of harm, but due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by
inducing the victim to attend the hazing.

The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who was present when the acts constituting hazing were
committed, and failed to take action to prevent them from occurring.83 The liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere
presence in the hazing, but also his failure to prevent the same.

The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or organization.84 The hazing
must be held in the home of one of the officers or members. The parents must have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in
their homes and failed to take any action to avoid the same from occurring.

The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The school authorities, including faculty members, who consented
to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be
punished as accomplices.85 Likewise, the owner of the place where the hazing was conducted can also be an accomplice to the
crime.86 The owner of the place shall be liable when he has actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein and he failed to
take any steps to stop the same. Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person
charged with the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so grave a
wrong.87 Also, the framers of the law intended that the consent of the victim shall not be a defense in hazing. During the
discussion of whether sodomy shall be included as a punishable act under the law, the issue of consent was tackled: SENATOR
LINA x x x

But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be entered into with consent. It is
not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make
the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.

If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it." So,
if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all.
There will be no significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain
or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because
the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like
death or physical injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the
criminal nature of the act.

So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed without consent of the victim,
then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.

SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.88

[Emphasis supplied]

Further, the law acknowledges that the offended party in the crime of hazing can seek different courses of action. n '.'provides
that the responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or citizen's army training organization, may impose the
appropriate administrative sanctions on the person or the persons charged under this provision even before their conviction.89
Necessarily, the offended party can file either administrative, civil, or criminal actions against the offenders.90

The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that, on paper, it is complete and robust in penalizing the crime of hazing. It
was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and disallow the defense of good faith. It took into consideration the
different participants and contributors in the hazing activities. While not all acts cited in the law are penalized, the penalties
imposed therein involve various and serious terms of imprisonment to discourage would-be offenders. Indeed, the law against
hazing is ideal and profound. As to whether the law can be effectively implemented, the Court begs to continue on the merits of
the case.

The Information properly

charged the offense proved

The petitioners claim that the amended ,information avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual participation, but the only
offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement. Their1 contention must fail. The Amended Information reads:

That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, during a planned initiation rite and being
then officers and members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other
members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use
personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the
fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.91
On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, is enlightening:

Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him,
and the court to render judgment properly.92

The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information included the act of inducing
Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be understood to have different phases. Likewise, the hazing
activity had different stages and the perpetrators had different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to the neophyte.
One of the roles of the petitioners in the hazing activity was to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo and Sibal not only
induced Villanueva to be present at the resort, but they actually brought him there. They fulfilled their roles in the planned
hazing rite which eventually led to the death of Villanueva. The hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for the
acts of the petitioners that induced the victim to be present.

Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing.93 To require the prosecutor to indicate every step
of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the criminal case, when details of the clandestine hazing are
almost nil, would be an arduous task, if not downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad
impossibilia).

The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every element of the crime of hazing, the offenders, and the
accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity which has been satisfied in the present case. Accordingly, the
amended information sufficiently informed the petitioners that they were being criminally charged for their roles in the planned
initiation rite.

Conspiracy of the

offenders was duly proven

The petitioners assail that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of conspiracy.

The Court disagrees.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony.94 The overt act or acts of the accused
may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.95

In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue
a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole.96 Responsibility of a conspirator is
not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to
and growing out of the purpose intended.97
The lawmakers deliberated on whether the prosecution was still obliged to prove the conspiracy between the offenders under
R.A. 8049, to wit:

SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My
question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the
prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?

SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.

SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.

SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr. President.98

The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not prove conspiracy. Jurisprudence
dictates that conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends
mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.99

R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable presumption of actual participation; and
which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof provides that the presence of any person during the
hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This
provision is unique because a disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender during the hazing, which
can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the hazing.

The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 before the CA, hut did not succeed. "[A]
finding of prima facie evidence x x x does not shatter the presumptive innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie
evidence arises, certain facts have still to be proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on such evidence, because precisely, it
is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Neither can
it rely on the weak defense the latter may adduce."100

Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions against the offenders are not new, and can be
observed in the following: (1) the possession of drug paraphernalia gives rise to prima facie evidence of the use of dangerous
drug;101 (2) the dishonor of the check for insufficient funds is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds
or credit;102 and (3) the possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence
of fencing.103

Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to the conspiracy in the crime of hazing. The common
design of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts that could be committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan
the hazing activity as a requirement of the victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing; and (3)
actually participate in the infliction of physical injuries.
In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' participation in the hazing because of their presence in the venue.
As correctly held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing at Villa Novaliches Resort was established by the
testimony of Ignacio. She testified that she saw Sibal emerge from the resort and approach her store, to wit:

MR. DIMACULANGAN

Q: And how many persons from this group did you see again?

WITNESS

A: Three (3), sir.

Q: Where did they come from, did they come out from the resort? Where did this 3 people or this group of people coming from?

A: Inside the resort, sir.

Q: And around what time was this?

A: Around 9:00, sir.

Q: And what did they do if any if they came out of the resort?

A: They went to my store, sir.

xxxx

Q: Did you have any other visitors to your store that night?

xxxx

A: "Meron po".

Q: Who were these visitors?

A: I don't know their names but I recognize their faces, sir.

Q: If I show you pictures of these people, will you be able to identify them before this Court.

A: Yes, sir.
xxxx

Q: Mrs. Ignacio, I am showing you this picture of persons marked as Exhibit "L" in the Pre-Trial, can you please look over this
document carefully and see if any of the persons whom you said visited your store is here?

xxxx

A: "Siya rin po."

COURT:

Make it of record that the witness pinpointed to the first picture appearing on the left picture on the first row.

xxxx

ATIY. PAMAOS:

For the record, your Honor, we manifest that the picture and the name pointed by the witness has been previously marked as
Exhibit "L-3" and previously admitted by the defense as referring to Gregorio Sibal, Jr., accused in this case…104

Ignacio, also positively identified Dungo as among the guests of Villa Novaliches Resort on the night of the hazing, to wit:

COURT

Q: xx x Now, when you say other people you could identify who are not in the pictures then how would you know that these
people are indeed those people you could identify?

WITNESS

A: "Iyon pong ... di ba po nagkuwento ako na dumating sila tapos nag shake hands at saka iyong nagyakapan po ... "

Q: And what will be the significance of the alleged embrace and shake hands for you to say that you could identify those people?

A: "Hindi po. Noong dumating po sila nasa isang jeep, meron pong lalaki doon sa may tabi ng driver bumaba siya tapos po noong
bumaba siya tapos iyong mga kasamahan nya sa likod nagbaba-an din, iyon po nagbati-an po sila."

Q: And from these greeting, how could you identify these people?

A: "Ngayon ko lang po napag masdan ang taong iyon, hindi ko po alam na akusado po sa kabila iyon."
Q: And who was that person?

A: "Siya po, iyon po."

Q: Who are you pointing to?

A: "Iyon pong naka-dilaw na ... " (Witness pointing to Dandy Dungo)

Q: So, are you telling the Court that this person you positively saw seated beside the driver came out and subsequently
embraced and shook hands with the other people from the jeepney, is that your testimony?

A: Yes, your Honor.105

The testimony of Ignacio was direct and straightforward. Her testimony was given great weight because she was a disinterested
and credible witness. The prosecution indubitably established the presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing. Such gave rise
to the prima facie evidence of their actual participation in the hazing of Villanueva. They were given an opportunity to rebut and
overcome the prima facie evidence of the prosecution by proving that they prevented the commission of the hazing, yet they
failed to do so.

Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the petitioners, it was shown that they performed an overt act in
the furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they induce the victim to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners
also actually participated in it based on the prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the
conspiracy of hazing.

Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.106 Exceptionally, under R.A.
No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their
presence during the hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.

The guilt of the

petitioners was proven

beyond reasonable doubt

Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their presence during the hazing, the petitioners? guilt was
proven beyond reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. Their involvement in
the hazing of Villanueva is not merely based on prima facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial evidence.

In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all
criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.107 In
criminal law, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof that produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.108

While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting standard
does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine
qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may
resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions
where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons
who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.109 Needless to state, the crime
of hazing is shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially the Greek organizations, are secretive in nature and their
members are reluctant to give any information regarding initiation rites.110 The silence is only broken after someone has been
injured so severely that medical attention is required. It is only at this point that the secret is revealed and the activities become
public.111 Bearing in mind the concealment of hazing, it is only logical and proper for the prosecution to resort to the
presentation of circumstantial evidence to prove it.

The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence require the
existence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts;
and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.112 To
justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable
doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused. Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established
to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the author of the crime.113

The CA meticulously wrote in detail the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence which established the petitioners' gult in the
death of Villanueva as follows:

1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as testified by his roommate Joey Atienza.

2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, Sunga was staying at their tambayan, talking to her organization
mates. Three men were seated two meters way from her. She identified two of the men as appellants Sibal and Dungo, while she
did not know the third man. The three men were wearing black shirts with the seal of the Alpha Phi Omega.

3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men coming from the entomology wing arrived and approached the three
men. Among the men who just arrived was the victim, Marlon Villanueva. One of the men wearing black APO shirts handed over
to the two fraternity neophytes some money and told the men "Mamalengke na kayo." He later took back the money and said,
"Huwag na, kami na lang."

4. One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later identified as appellant Dungo, stood up and asked Marlon if the
latter already reported to him, and asked him why he did not report to him when he was just at the tambayan. Dungo then
continuously punched the victim on his arm. This went on for five minutes. Marlon just kept quiet with his head bowed down.
Fifteen minutes later, the men left going towards the Entomology wing.

5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was 'last seen alive by Joey Atienza at 7:00 in the evening of 13 January 2006, from whom he
borrowed the shoes he wore at the initiation right [sic]. Marlon told Joey that it was his "finals" night.

6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Susan Ignacio saw more than twenty (20) persons arrive at
the Villa Novaliches Resort onboard a jeepney.1âwphi1 She estimated the ages of these persons to be between 20 to 30 years
old. Three (3) persons riding a single motorcycle likewise arrived at the resort.

7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace at the resort who looked like they were praying. Later that
evening, at least three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy some items. She did not know their names but could identity
[sic] their faces. After she was shown colored photographs, she pointed to the man later identified as Herald Christopher
Braseros. She also pointed out the man later identified as Gregorio Sibal, Jr.
8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of
January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the corner of Villa Novaliches Resort when a man approached him and told
him that someone inside the resort needed a ride. Magat then went to the resort and asked the two (2) men standing by the
gate who will be riding his tricycle.

9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed that when he touched the body of the man who was being carried, it
felt cold. The said man looked very weak like a vegetable.

10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a security guard at the J.P. Rizal Hospital and was assigned at the
emergency room. At around 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, he was with another security guard, Abelardo
Natividad and hospital helper Danilo Glindo a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at the emergency room containing four (4)
passengers, excluding the driver. He was an arm's length away from said tricycle. He identified two of the passengers thereof as
appellants Dungo and Sibal. Espina said he and Glinda helped the passengers unload a body inside the tricycle and brought it to
the emergency room.

11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two meq for identification cards. The latter replied that they did not bring with them any I.D. or
wallet.1âwphi1 Instead of giving their true names, the appellants listed down their names in the hospital logbook as Brandon
Gonzales y Lanzon and Jericho Paril y Rivera. Espina then told the two men not to leave, not telling them that they secretly called
the police to report the incident which was their standard operating procedure when a dead body was brought to the hospital.

12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at the emergency room, observed that Marlon was motionless,
had no heartbeat and already cyanotic.

13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20 minutes. However, the latter did not respond to resuscitation and
was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries
on his arms and legs. He further attested that Marlon's face was already cyanotic.

14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he saw a large contusion on both legs which extended from the upper
portion of his thigh down to the couplexial portion or the back of the knee.

15. Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's injuries, Dr. Masilungan opined that he was a victim of hazing. Dr.
Masilungan is familiar with hazing injuries, having undergone hazing when he was a student and also because of his experience
treating victims of hazing incidents.

16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba
City, testified that he performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim on January 14j 2006; that the victim's cause of death
was blunt head trauma. From 1999 to 2006, he was able to conduct post-mortem examination of the two (2) persons whose
deaths were attributed to hazing. These two (2) persons sustained multiple contusions and injuries on different parts of their
body, particularly on the buttocks, on both upper and lower extremities. Both persons died of brain hemorrhage. Correlating
these two cases to the injuries found on the victim's body, Dr. Camarillo attested that the victim, Marlon Villanueva, sustained
similar injuries to those two (2) persons. Based on the presence of multiple injuries and contusions on his body, he opined that
these injuries were hazing-related.114

Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the defense of denial and alibi. These defenses, however, must fail.
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct
and fabricate.115 As properly held by the RTC, these defenses cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of
the petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga and Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense witnesses also lacked credibility and
reliability. The corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect because she was the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was only
logical and emotional that she would stand by the man she loved and cared for. The testimonies of their fellow fraternity
brothers, likewise, do not hold much weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the case. Stated differently,
the petitioners did not present credible and. disinterested witnesses to substantiate their defenses of denial and alibi.
After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA and the R TC that the circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution was overwhelming enough to establish the guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. The unbroken
chain of events laid down by the CA leaves us no other conclusion other than the petitioners' participation in the hazing. They
took part in the hazing and, together; with their fellow fraternity officers and members, inflicted physical injuries to Villanueva as
a requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The physical injuries eventually took a toll on the body of the victim, which led to
his death. Another young life lost.

With the fact of hazing, the identity ,of the petitioners, and their participation therein duly proven, the moral certainty that
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.

Final Note

Hazing has been a phenomenon that has beleaguered the country's educational institutions and communities. News of young
men beaten to death as part of fraternities' violent initiation rites supposedly to seal fraternal bond has sent disturbing waves to
lawmakers. Hence, R.A. No. 8049 was signed into to law on June 7, 1995. Doubts on the effectiveness of the law were raised. The
Court, however, scrutinized its provisions and it is convinced that the law is rigorous in penalizing the crime of hazing.

Hopefully, the present case will serve as a guide to the bench and the bar on the application of R.A. No. 8049. Through careful
case-build up and proper presentation of evidence before the court, it is not impossible for the exalted constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused to be overcome and his guilt for the crime of hazing be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution must bear in mind the secretive nature of hazing, and carefully weave its chain of circumstantial
evidence. Likewise, the defense must present a genuine defense and substantiate the same through credible and reliable
witnesses. The counsels of both parties must also consider hazing as a malum prohibitum crime and the law's distinctive
provisions.

While the Court finds R.A. No. 8049 adequate to deter and prosecute hazing, the law is far from perfect. In Villareal v. People,116
the Court suggested that the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing
should be considered as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties. Equally, based on the discussion
earlier, this Court suggests some further amendments to the law. First, there should be a penalty or liability for noncompliance
with Section 2, or the written notice requirement, and with Section 3, or the representation requirement. Second, the penalties
under Section 4 should also consider the psychological harm done to the victim of hazing. With these additional inputs on R.A.
No. 8049, the movement against hazing can be invigorated. R.A. No. 8049 is a democratic response to the uproar against hazing.
It demonstrates that there must, and should, be another way of fostering brotherhood, other than through the culture of
violence and suffering. The senseless deaths of these young men shall never be forgotten, for justice is the spark that lights the
candles of their graves.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 26, 2013 Decision and the October 8, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 05046 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the
Department of Justice as guidance for the proper implementation and prosecution of violators of R.A. No. 8049; and to the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-
Hazing Law to include the penalty for noncompliance with its Section 2 and 3, and the :penalty for the psychological harms to the
surviving victims of hazing.

SO ORDERED.

Dungo vs. People, G.R. No. 209464 – Case Digest

Post published:July 1, 2015

Reading time:4 mins read

FACTS

Petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. (Sibal), was charged of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049-Anti-
Hazing Law

That on January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba, City, Province of Laguna, the above named accused, during
an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less
twenty other members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his
admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the victim.

The accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment and filed a motion to quash for lack of probable cause which was denied
by the RTC.

RTC indicted Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to bodily assault and harm the victim, it
was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their final initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce
Villanueva to attend the final initiation rites, but they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.

Also, the witnesses presented by the defense were partial and could not be considered as disinterested parties.

The petitioners filed a notice of appeal on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and RA 8049 sec 4 is unconstitutional.

The CA denied the notice of appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
petitioners but the same was denied.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 arguing that they were convicted of a crime not stated in the information.
While the evidence proved that they were guilty of hazing by inducement this does not necessarily include the criminal charge of
hazing by actual participation. Thus, they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the information.

The Court argued that Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended information with the proper offense and convicted for
such.

Dungo and Sibal were found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Their involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not merely based
on prima facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial evidence and an unbroken chain of events. Wherefore
petition is denied.

ISSUE

Whether or not violation of Anti-Hazing law is mala in se or mala prohibita?

RULING
Violation of Anti-Hazing Law is mala prohibita. The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The Senate
deliberations would show that the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing statute to be malum prohibitum. The Congress created a
special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita.

In Vedana v. Valencia, the Court noted that in our nation’s very recent history, the people had spoken, through the Congress, to
deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal. The act of hazing itself is not
inherently immoral, but the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of
criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution.

.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the
vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on
individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very
little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic
obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he
says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the
integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance
to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.

The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it
a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies.
In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades
and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of
the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when
individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that
it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for
this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the
vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of
the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1,
par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree
of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a)
Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for
violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c)
Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for
Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).

On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file
counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack
of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in
that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.

On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause
for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein
did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the
Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to
the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001
the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant
petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether
Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. 3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental
rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong
predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach
upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch
accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is
fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.

In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force
of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of
course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight
lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.

Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing,
there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome
the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused
to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by
receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial
or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
₱50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel,
in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in
amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least ₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in
Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.

In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together
with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined
and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (₱545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT,
SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-
accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (₱130,000,000.00), more or
less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic
supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION
ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(₱1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND
FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (₱744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK
IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱189,700,000.00) MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION
TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series"
in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in
Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; 6 much less do we have to define every word we
use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in
an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in
a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can
be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification,7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words.8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident
from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are
two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a
series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -

REP. GARCIA: Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the
same act.

REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

REP. GARCIA: A series.

REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more,
di ba?

REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is
only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x

REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....

SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....

REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.

REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a
big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.

THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....

SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.

SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder"
there should be, at least, two or more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series,"
it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation
to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards
a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly,
there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the
term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and
others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or
where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain
a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The
doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct
to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but
which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable
to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute
is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. 12 It must be stressed, however,
that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible
as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might
have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would
be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.

Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the
Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."15 The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a
statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."19

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 20 As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." 21 Consequently, there is
no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 22 It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts.23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort," 25 and is generally disfavored.26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its
provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.27

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and
argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts
and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the
law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to
overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware
that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even
registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.

The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are
loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible
of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others,
that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct
offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through
evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their
official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because
they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.

In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence"
merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the
use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of
Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket
Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the
public officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act
3019, as amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is
unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par.
(e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in
that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it
requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless
the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the
community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such
exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in
the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does
that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than ₱100
million, but the totality of the crime committed is ₱100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public
document, coercion, theft?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an
enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say,
instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very
important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to
accumulate only ₱50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate ₱1 million. Now, when we add the totality
of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can
we now convict him?

MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove
that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is ₱100
million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be ₱110 or ₱120
million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which
were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100 million, then there is a
crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).

It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the
crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute the crime.

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of
the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient
to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00. There is
no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the
accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution
need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable
doubt provided only that they amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00.31

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth.
Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as
defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with
reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of

overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten
wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.

Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important
element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element
of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the
Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?

ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying
Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder
Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts
charged constituting plunder?

ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive
element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you
do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?

ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that
cannot be avoided by the prosecution.32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of
Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x

It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral
certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the
sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest
of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec.
4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully
and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute
is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:

SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33

However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34

Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and
every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are
concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, §2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as
well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying
criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."35

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative
by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other
heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this
Court held in People v. Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his
or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well
as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three
days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery
with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and
in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions
of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees
or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in
a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of
an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it
to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now
as an integral part of it.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the
national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption
which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our
nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus
secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the
amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution
and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a
long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge
triumphant in the midst of ferment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 14560, 36 SCRA 394 (November 19, 2001)

Facts:

1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA 7659..

2. Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct
line which divides the valid from the constitutionality infirm. That there was a clear violations of the fundamental rights
of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

Issue/s:
 1. Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

2. Whether or not Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates
the rights of the accused to due process.

3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum.

Ruling:

1. No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them. There is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress’ inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessary result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at
least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain, and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.

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Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part.

There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of R.A. 7080

2. No. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden
still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute a
crime.

What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.

3. No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does
not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder that predicate crimes are
mainly mala in se.

Its abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, green and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government]
terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication
of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of people it
governs over.

Note:

 A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against the specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.

 The “Reasonable Doubt” standard has acquired such exalted statute in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to
the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.

 A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lack comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The first may be “saved” by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however,
that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect”
upon protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value of all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify along attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
persons making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute draw with narrow specificity.
The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.

This do not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terorrem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.