Indian Penal Code, 1860

1 Indian Penal Code, 1860
Introduction
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, contains 511 Sections in 23 Chapters. The Act provides for the definition
of offences and punishment for those offences. The Act also provides for the punishment for offences
committed, by Indians, beyond India. It has territorial extent, extra-territorial extent, and extension of
code to extra-territorial offences. The Indian Penal Code, 1860, is a general penal code that provides
for the punishment for various offences. The Act also provides for the exception as well.
History
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, was passed by the legislature, and the assent of the governor-general was
given on 06 October 1860. This Act came into existence as act number 45 of the year 1860. This Act
commenced from 01 January 1862. The Indian Penal Code, 1860, was drafted by Lord Thomas Babington
Macaulay, on the recommendations of the First Law Commission of India established in 1834 under the
Charter Act of 1833. The First Law Commission prepared the draft of the Indian Penal Code. In 1837,
draft of the Indian Penal Code was submitted to the governor-general of India. Later, in 1856, the Code
was presented to the legislative council, and, finally, the Code was passed in 1860. The Act has been
amended various times as to meet the requirements. The Act came into force in Jammu and Kashmir
on 31 October 2019, by virtue of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, and replaced the
State’s Ranbir Penal Code.
Objectives and Applicability of the Act

The Indian Penal Code, 1860, extends to the whole of India. It is a general penal code that provides for
the punishment for various offences. The Act provides for the exception as well.
Territorial extent—Punishment of offences committed within India—Every person shall be liable to
punishment under this Code and not otherwise for every act or omission contrary to the provisions
thereof, of which he shall be guilty within India.
Extra-territorial extent—Punishment of offences committed beyond, but which by law may be tried
within, India—Any person liable, by any Indian law, to be tried for an offence committed beyond India
shall be dealt with according to the provisions of this Code for any act committed beyond India in the
same manner as if such act had been committed within India.
Extension of the Code to extra-territorial offences—The provisions of this Code apply also to any
offence committed by:
y any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India;
y any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be;
y Any person in any place without and beyond India committing offence targeting a computer resource
located in India.
Explanation—In this section:
y the word ‘offence’ includes every act committed outside India which, if committed in India, would
be punishable under this Code;
y the expression ‘computer resource’ shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (k) of sub-
section (1) of Section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000).
Indian Penal Code, 1860 1

Certain laws not to be affected by this Act—Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of any Act for
punishing mutiny and desertion of officers, soldiers, sailors, or airmen in the service of the Government
of India or the provisions of any special or local law.
Definitions in the Code to be understood subject to exceptions—Throughout this Code, every definition
of an offence, every penal provision, and every illustration of every such definition or penal provision,
shall be understood subject to the exceptions contained in the Chapter entitled ‘General Exceptions’,
though those exceptions are not repeated in such definition, penal provision, or illustration.
List of Amending Acts and Adaptation Orders

1. The Repealing Act, 1870 (Act 14 of 1870)
2. The Indian Penal Code Amendment Act, 1870 (Act 27 of 1870)
4. The Indian Oaths Act, 1873 (Act 10 of 1873)
6. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882 (Act 10 of 1882)
7. The Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1886 (Act 10 of 1886)
8. The Indian Marine Act, 1887 (Act 14 of 1887)
9. The Metal Tokens Act, 1889 (Act 1 of 1889)
10. The Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 (Act 4 of 1889)
11. The Cantonments Act, 1889 (Act 13 of 1889)
12. The Indian Railways Act, 1890 (Act 9 of 1890)
14. The Amending Act, 1891 (Act 12 of 1891)
19. The Currency-Notes Forgery Act, 1899 (Act 12 of 1899)
22. The Indian Elections Offences and Inquiries Act, 1920 (Act 39 of 1920)
23. The Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1921 (Act 16 of 1921)
27. The Workmen’s Breach of Contract (Repealing) Act, 1925 (Act 3 of 1925)
28. The Obscene Publications Act, 1925 (Act 8 of 1925)
30. The Repealing and Amending Act, 1927 (Act 10 of 1927)

31. The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1927 (Act 25 of 1927)
33. The Indian Air Force Act, 1932 (Act 14 of 1932)
34. The Amending Act, 1934 (Act 35 of 1934)
35. The Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937
37. The Offences on Ships and Aircrafts Act, 1940 (Act 4 of 1940)
38. The Indian Merchandise Marks (Amendment) Act, 1941 (Act 2 of 1941)
41. The Indian Independence (Adaptation of Central Acts and Ordinances) Order, 1948
42. The Criminal Law (Removal of Racial Discriminations) Act, 1949 (Act 17 of 1949)
43. The Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1949 (Act 42 of 1949)
44. The Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950
46. The Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951 (Act 3 of 1951)
50. The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Act 26 of 1955)
51. The Adaptation of Laws (No. 2) Order, 1956
54. The Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (Act 43 of 1958)
57. The Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act 40 of 1964)
58. The Criminal and Election Laws Amendment Act, 1969 (Act 35 of 1969)
60. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act 31 of 1972)
61. The Employees’ Provident Funds and Family Pension Fund (Amendment) Act, 1973 (Act 40 of 1973)
62. The Employees’ State Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Act 38 of 1975)
63. The Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Act 40 of 1975)
65. The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983)
66. The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act 43 of 1986)

67. The Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act, 1988 (Act 33 of
1988)
68. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Act 49 of 1988)
71. The Information Technology Act, 2000 (Act 21 of 2000)
72. The Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Act 24 of 2003)
73. The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005
75. The Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 (Act 10 of 2009)
78. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 (Act 34 of 2019)
Points to Remember !
y The Indian Penal Code (IPC) was drafted by Thomas Babington Macaulay.
y The IPC was drafted upon the recommendation of the first Law Commission of India.
y The IPC came into force on 01 January 1862.
y The IPC punishes voluntary acts.
y ‘Doctrine of Necessity’ has been elaborately considered in the landmark decisions of Regina
versus Dudley and Stephens [1884].
y ‘Doctrine of Rarest of Rare’ was established in the case of Bachan Singh versus State of Punjab
[1980].
y “They also serve who only stand and wait” was said by Lord Sumner in Emperor versus Barendra
Kumar Ghosh [1924].
y ‘Transgender people recognised as a third gender’ in the case of National Legal Services Authority
versus Union of India [2014].
y Lord Arbinger observed that the maxim ‘No man is guilty unless his mind is guilty’ is older than
the law of England in the case of R versus Allday [1837].
y “Intention is the aim of the act of which the motive is the spring” was said by Austin.
y “A crime is a violation of a right considered in reference to the evil tendency of such violation as
regards the community at large” was said by William Blackstone.
y Barendra Kumar Ghosh versus King Emperor [1925] is also known as the ‘Post Master Case’.
y Motive is not an essential element of crime.
y Mens rea and Actus reus are the two essential elements of crime.
y Crime is an illegal act.
y No mens rea is required for bigamy.
y Mens rea does not include negligence.
y Bigamy is an offence of strict liability.

y Section 34 is a rule of evidence, and it does not create substantive offence.
y Effect caused partly by act and partly by omission is given in Section 36.
y Sections 76 and 79 provide for the general exception of ‘mistake of fact’.
y Homicide is justifiable as provided in Sections 76, 77, and 78.
y Voluntary intoxication is no excuse for the commission of an offence.
y Right of private defence is available to all irrespective of age and capacity.
y Right of private defence is not available in case of free fight.
y Every person has a right to defend him and the body of any person against any offence affecting
the human body.
y Defence of consent applies to private wrongs.
y Right to private defence is based on the basic principle of self-preservation.
y Right to private defence is available where there is no time to have recourse to the protection of
public authorities.
y Every person has the right to defend movable as well as immovable property.
y A mistake of law in criminal act is not defence.
y Nothing is an offence which is done by misfortunate and accident.
y Causing miscarriage with common consent or her, guardian’s consent is not justified.
y The word ‘benefit’ used in Sections 88, 89, and 90 of the IPC means others as well as pecuniary
benefit.
y In conspiracy there is no distinction between principal and accessory.
y Abetment is complete as soon as the abettor has incited another person to commit an offence.
y Section 149 is not a rule of evidence and it creates distinct offence.
y Riot is an offence against public tranquillity.
y Affray is an offence against public tranquillity.
y All murders are Culpable homicides, but all Culpable homicides are not murders.
y Intention or knowledge is the mens rea required under Section 299.
y The plea of sudden and grave provocation under Section 300 Exception 1 of the IPC is a question
of fact.
y Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed under grave and sudden provocation.
y Culpable homicide is not murder if the accused is deprived of the power of self-control by grave
and sudden provocation by the deceased person.
y Section 304B and Section 498A are not mutually inclusive.
y Suicide is not a punishable offence.
y Punishment for wrongful restraint is simple imprisonment only.
y Assault can be caused by gestures and preparation.
y Kidnapping is of two kinds.
y The consent of a minor is wholly immaterial in the kidnapping.
y Abduction is a continuing offence.
y Theft is an offence against movable property.

y The offence of theft becomes robbery when it is coupled with imminent danger to life.
y The offence of extortion cannot be done against immovable property.
y Dacoity is punishable at four stages.
y Entrustment is an essential element for criminal breach of trust.
y Contractual relationship is an essential ingredient of criminal breach of trust.
y Forgery is an offence relating to document.
y Defamation can be of living as well as deceased persons.
y Dishonest misappropriation of property is an offence against moveable property.
y Criminal breach of trust deals with entrusted property.
y Deception is an essential element of cheating.
y Offence of trespass is an offence against the possession.
y Theory of impossibility is a theory related to criminal attempts.
y The criminal attempt is inchoate crime.

Indian Penal Code
Introduction General Explanations Of Punishments General Exceptions
Punishments Nothing is an
Punishment Punishment Gender Person
Every definition of an offence, (Section 53) offence
of offences of offences (Section 8) (Section 11)
every penal provision, and
committed committed Injury denotes any harm
every illustration of every
within India beyond, but Male whatever illegally caused
such definition or penal
Indian Penal Code, 1860

(Section 2) which by law Company Association (Section 44)
provision, shall be understood
may be tried
subject to the exceptions Female
within, India Body of
contained in the chapter Person Body Mind
(Section 3) person
entitled ‘General Exceptions’,
Quick Views of Law Charts
though those exceptions

Extension of Reputation Property
are not repeated in such
the Code to
definition, penal provision,
extraterritorial
or illustration
offences
(Section 6)
(Section 4)
Death Imprisonment Imprisonment Forfeiture Fine

for life of property
Simple Rigorous
which is done by which is which which is done which is where act

a person who is, done by a is done by a person done by likely to
or who by reason judge when pursuant justified, or accident or cause harm,
of a mistake of acting to the by mistake of misfortune, but done
fact and not judicially judgement fact believing and without without
by reason of a (Section 77) or order himself, any criminal criminal
mistake of law of court justified, by intention or intent, and
in good faith (Section 78) law knowledge to prevent
believes himself (Section 79) (Section 80) other harm
to be, bound (Section 81)
by law to do it
(Section 76)
which is which is done which is done which is which is which is done by reason where
done by a by a child above by a person done by an done in good of any harm which it may act
child under seven years of of unsound of intoxicated faith for the cause to a person for whose causing
seven years age and under 12 mind (Section person benefit of benefit it is done in good slight
of age (Section 83) 84) (Section 85) a person faith, even without harm
(Section 82) (Section 89) that person’s consent (Section
(Section 92) 95)
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Indian Penal Code
General Exceptions Of Abetment Criminal Conspiracy Of Offences

Of Offences against
the State Relating to the
Of the right of
Abetment Punishment Army, Navy, and
private defence When two or Punishment
of a thing Air Force
more persons of criminal Act of waging, Sedition
(Section 107) agree to do, conspiracy (Section
or attempting
Nothing is Right of When the or cause to (Section 120B) to wage war, 124A) Abetment of
an offence private right of be done or abetting mutiny; if mutiny
by by
which defence of private (Section 120A) waging of war, is committed,
instigating engaging
is done the body defence of against the it is punishable
in the and of the body by Government with death, life
an an act which of India is
exercise of property extends intentionally imprisonment, or
illegal is not illegal punishable
the right (Section to causing aiding imprisonment for
act by illegal with
of private 97) death 10 years and fine
means, such death, life
defence (Section (Section 132)
an agreement imprisonment,
(Section 100)
Punishment Punishment is designated or fine
96)
of abetment of abetment a criminal (Section 121)
if the act if the person conspiracy
abetted is abetted does
committed in act with
consequence different
and where intention
no express from that
provision is of abettor
made for its (Section 110)
punishment
(Section 109)
When the The right of private

right of private defence of property
defence of commences when
property extends a reasonable
to causing death apprehension of
(Section 103) danger to the property
commences
(Section 105)

Indian Penal Code

Of Offences Of Of Offences Of Of False Evidence Of Offences Relating to Coins Of Offences
against the Public Offences Relating to Contempts and Offences and Government Stamps Relating to Weights
Tranquillity by or Elections of the against Public and Measures
Relating Lawful Justice
to Public Authority
Servants of Public Counterfeiting Import or Import or
Servants coins export of export of
(Section 231) counterfeit counterfeits
coins of Indian coins
Assembly of Every member (Section 237) (Section 238)
Giving false Fabricating Giving or Counterfeiting
five or more of unlawful evidence false fabricating false Indian coins
persons is assembly (Section 191) evidence evidence with (Section 232)
designated is guilty of (Section 192) intent to procure Sale of
an unlawful the offence conviction of counterfeit
assembly of rioting capital offence government
(Section 141) (Section 147) (Section 194) stamps
(Section 258)
Every member of unlawful

assembly is guilty of offence
committed in prosecution of Causing Intentional Harbouring
common object disappearance omission offender who
(Section 149) of evidence to give has escaped
of offence, or information from custody
giving false of offence by or whose
information to person bound apprehension
screen offender to inform has been
(Section 201) (Section 202) ordered
(Section 216)
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10
Indian Penal Code
Of Offences Affecting the Public Of Offences Of Offences Affecting the

Health, Safety, Convenience, Relating to Religion Human Body
Decency, and Morals
Injuring Disturbing
Public Adulteration of or defiling religious Of offences affecting life Of the causing of miscarriage, of
nuisance food or drink place of assembly injuries to unborn children, of the
(Section 268) intended for sale worship, (Section exposure of infants, and of the
(Section 272) with intent 296) concealment of births
to insult the
religion of
Adulteration Rash driving Obscene any class Culpable Murder Transfer Punishment Causing Causing Causing
of drugs or riding on acts and (Section homicide (Section of malice for murder miscarriage miscarriage death of
(Section 274) a public way songs 295) (Section 299) 300) (Section (Section (Section 312) without quick unborn
(Section 279) (Section 294) 301) 302) woman’s child by act
consent amounting
(Section 313) to culpable
Punishment Causing Dowry Abetment Thug homicide
for culpable death by death of suicide (Section (Section 316)
homicide not negligence (Section (Section 310)
amounting to (Section 304B) 306)
murder 304A)
(Section 304)

Indian Penal Code

Of Offences Affecting
the Human Body
Of hurt Of wrongful restraint and Of criminal force

wrongful confinement and assault
Hurt
(Section 319)
Wrongful Wrongful confinement Force Criminal Assault
restraint (Section 340) (Section force (Section
(Section 339) 349) (Section 350) 351)
Voluntarily Punishment Voluntarily Voluntarily
causing for causing causing hurt Punishment Punishment Wrongful Wrongful
hurt voluntarily hurt by property for wrongful confinement confinement Assault or Sexual
for wrongful
(Section causing dangerous (Section 327) confinement for three or for 10 or criminal harassment
restraint
321) hurt weapons (Section 342) more days more days force to and
(Section
(Section or means (Section 343) (Section 344) woman with punishment
341)
323) (Section intent to for sexual
324) outrage her harassment
modesty (Section 354A)
Wrongful Wrongful Wrongful Wrongful (Section 354)
Causing Voluntarily Voluntarily Voluntarily Causing confinement confinement confinement confinement
hurt by causing causing causing hurt by act of person in secret to extort to extort
means of hurt to hurt to hurt on endangering for whose (Section property confession,
poison, extort deter public provocation life or liberation 346) (Section 347) or compel
etc., with confession, servant from (Section personal writ has been restoration
intent to or to his duty 334) safety of issued of property
commit an compel (Section 332) others (Section 345) (Section 348)
offence restoration (Section 337)
(Section of property
328) (Section
330)
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Indian Penal Code
Of Offences Affecting the Of Offences against Property

Human Body
Of theft Of extortion
Of kidnapping, Sexual Unnatural

abduction, slavery, and offences offences Theft Punishment Theft in Extortion Punishment
forced labour (Section 377) (Section 378) for theft dwelling (Section 383) for extortion
(Section 379) house, etc. (Section 384)
Kidnapping Abduction Rape Punishment (Section 380)
(Section 359) (Section 362) (Section 375) for rape
(Section 376) Theft by clerk Theft after preparation
or servant of made for causing
Kidnapping Kidnapping Punishment property in death, hurt, or
from India from lawful for possession of restraint in order to
(Section 360) guardianship kidnapping master the committing of the
(Section 361) (Section 363) (Section 381) theft (Section 382)
Of Offences against Property
Of robbery and dacoity Dacoity Dishonest Criminal Stolen Cheating Mischief Criminal House
(Section 391) misappropriation breach of property (Section 415) (Section trespass trespass
of property trust (Section 425) (Section (Section
Robbery (Section 403) (Section 405) 410) 441) 442)
(Section 390) Dacoity with Making Cheating by Punishment
murder preparation personation for cheating Punishment
(Section to commit Dishonestly (Section (Section 417) for mischief
When theft When 396) dacoity receiving 416) (Section 426)
is robbery extortion is (Section 399) stolen
robbery property
(Section 411)

Indian Penal Code

Of Offences against Of Offences Relating Of the Of Offences Relating
Property to Documents and to Criminal to Marriage
Property Marks Breach of
Contracts of
Cohabitation Same
Service Marrying
Lurking, House House caused offence with
Forgery Punishment again
house breaking breaking by by a man concealment
(Section 463) for forgery during
trespass (Section 445) night deceitfully of former
(Section 465) lifetime of
(Section 443) (Section 446) inducing marriage
husband
a belief from person
or wife
of lawful with whom
(Section
marriage subsequent
494)
(Section 493) marriage is
contracted
(Section 495)
Marriage Adultery Enticing or

ceremony (Section 497) taking away or
fraudulently gone detaining with
through without criminal intent
lawful marriage a married
(Section 496) woman
(Section 498)
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Indian Penal Code
Of Cruelty by Husband Of Defamation Or Criminal Intimidation, Of Attempts

or Relatives of Insult, and Annoyance to Commit
Husband Offences
Defamation Punishment Printing or Sale of printed
Husband or relative (Section 499) for engraving or engraved Criminal Punishment Word, gesture,
intimidation for criminal or act intended Punishment
of husband of a defamation matter substance containing
(Section 503) intimidation to insult the for attempting
woman subjecting (Section 500) known to be defamatory matter
(Section 506) modesty of a to commit
her to cruelty defamatory (Section 502)
woman offences
(Section 498A) (Section 501) punishable
(Section 509)
with
imprisonment
for life
or other
imprisonment
(Section 511)

Subjective Theory
General Principles of Criminal Liability—Actus Reus and Mens Rea, Individual and Group
Liability and Constructive Liability
In simple terms, crime may be defined as the commission of acts prohibited by penal law, and criminals
as person who commit such acts.
Definitions of Crime
y Austin: a wrong which is pursued by the sovereign, or his subordinates, is a crime.
y Blackstone: Crime as an act committed or omitted in violation of public-law either forbidding or
commanding it.
y Paton: in crime we find that the normal marks are that the state has power to control the procedure
to remit the penalty or to inflict punishment.
y Keeton: a crime today would seem to be any undesirable act, which the state finds most convenient
to correct by the institution of proceedings for the infliction of a penalty, instead of leaving the
remedy to the discretion of some injured person. Crime is any form of conduct which is forbidden by
law under pain of punishment.
y Goodhart: a crime is any act which is punished by the state.
y Halsbury’s Laws of England: a crime is an unlawful act or default which is an offence against the
public and renders the person’s guilty of the act or default liable to legal punishment.
y Michael and Adler: the most precise and least ambiguous definition of crime is that which defines it
as behaviour which is prohibited by the criminal code.
y Russell: crime is the result of human conduct which the penal policy of the state seeks to prevent.
y Hall: analysed the concept of crime and came up with the following.
⚪ There must be some external consequences or harm to social interests.
⚪ The harm must be prohibited by penal law.
⚪ There must be conduct, i.e., intentional or reckless action or inaction that brings the prohibited
harm.
⚪ There must be mens rea or criminal intent.
⚪ There must be concurrence of mens rea and conduct.
⚪ There must be a causal relation between the legally prohibited harm and the voluntary misconduct.
⚪ There must be legally prescribed punishment or threat of punishment.
Elements of Crime: Actus Reus, Acts Prohibited by Law, and Mens Rea
The fundamental principle of criminal liability is that there must be a wrongful act that is an actus
reus along with a wrongful intention that is mens rea. This principle is embodied in the maxim ‘actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’, which means ‘an act does not make one guilty unless the mind is
also legally blameworthy’. In other words, no act is per se criminal, it becomes criminal only when the
actor does it with a guilty mind. However, a careful analysis of the concept brings about the following
elements.

y Actus Reus
Actus reus connotes an overt act, which is the physical result of human conduct. It is the Latin
term for a ‘guilty act’. In other words, the crime is constituted by the event and not by the activity
which caused the event. In the IPC, Sections 32 and 33 define the term ‘act’. Section 32 provides
that in every part of the Code, except where a contrary intention appears from the context, words
which refer to act done also extend to illegal omissions. Section 33 provides that the word ‘act’
includes a series of acts and the word ‘omission’ denotes a series of omissions. Thus, the IPC
makes punishable omissions, provided they are illegal and have caused, intended to cause, or
likely to cause, like acts, an actus reus. For example, death of newly born child may be caused by a
deliberate refusal to feed the baby. In this example, the unlawful homicide, an actus reus, is caused
not by a positive act or deed of commission but a negative act or act of omission. The criminal
action is due to human conduct.
y Acts Prohibited by Law
To create criminal liability, it is not sufficient that there is mens rea, and in an act, the ‘actus’ must
be ‘reus’. In other words, the act must be one that is prohibited by law. Actus reus includes negative
as well as positive elements. The requirements of actus reus vary depending on the definition of
the crime. It may be with reference to place, fact, time, persons, etc. Also important is that the act
must be one that is prohibited or commanded by law which results in some harm. However, the
causing of actual harm may or may not be a part of the actus reus.
y Mens Rea
The underlying principle of the doctrine of mens rea is expressed in the maxim ‘actus non facit reum
nisi mens sit rea’, which means ‘the act does not make one guilty unless the mind is also guilty’. The
mere commission of a criminal act is not enough to constitute a crime unless the same is coupled
with bad intention. Intention is the conscious exercise of the mental faculties of a person to do
an act, for the purpose of accomplishing or satisfying a purpose. But the issue lies in the fact that
intention is an abstract idea and, thus, difficult to establish. Therefore, one has to seek the help
of surrounding facts or factors such as previous relation between the accused and the victim, any
object of hostility between them, existence of instigation, i.e., whether the accused was hired and
what prompted him to the commit crime, whether the accused had something to gain out of the
whole affair, etc. Tests to determine the existence of mens rea are the following.
⚪ Subjective: where the court must be satisfied that the accused had the requisite mental element
present in his mind at the relevant time.
⚪ Objective: where the requisite mens rea element is imputed to the accused, on the basis that a
reasonable person would have had the mental element in the same circumstances (for negligence);
or objective.
⚪ Hybrid: where the test is both subjective and objective.
Mens Rea in the Indian Penal Law

The term ‘mens rea’ does not find place in the IPC as such, but the general concept that crime
must have a criminal act along with the guilty intention is applied likewise in India as well. Guilt in
respect of almost all the offences created under the IPC is fastened either on the ground of intention,
knowledge, reason to believe (Section 26), wrongful gain or loss (Section 23), dishonestly (Section
24), fraudulently (Section 25), ‘criminal knowledge or intention (Section 35), intentional cooperation
(Section 37), voluntarily (Section 39), etc. All these indicate the mental condition required, at the time

of the commission of the offence, to constitute the offence. Thus, though the term ‘mens rea’ as such
is nowhere found in the IPC, its essence is reflected in almost all the provisions.
The importance of mens rea is also effectuated by judgements by the Supreme Court time and again.
For example, in Ravula Hariprasada Rao versus State [1951 SC], the Court has held that unless a statute
either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea as a constituent element of a crime, a
person should not be held guilty of an offence unless he had guilty mind at the time of commission of
the act. Same was reiterated in the famous case of State of Maharashtra versus Mayer Hans George
[1965 SC]. Here the Court said that the common law doctrine of mens rea was not applicable to
statutory crimes in India.
When a clause for presumption of mens rea exists in the statute, then the job of the prosecution is
only to prove that the accused committed certain acts. Once that is proved, the statutory presumption
of mens rea or guilty mind steps in and the accused is presumed to be guilty. But this presumption
is always a rebuttable presumption that the accused person will be given an opportunity to prove to
the court that though the person had committed certain acts, it was done innocently and without any
criminal intent. To this extent, the burden on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt is shifted to the accused. It is for the accused to establish his innocence, though the
standard of proof required is not the same.
Exceptions to Mens Rea or When Is Mens Rea Not Essential

y To establish mens rea, one must see that if the language of the statute and the intention of the
legislation, shows that the act imposed strict liability or there was a requirement of mens rea to
prosecute the accused person.
y If the nature of the act is such that the involving acts that are in real sense not criminal in nature, but
are quasi-criminal, mens rea may not be required because these acts are prohibited in public interest.
For example, public welfare offences (created by the statutes), white-collar crimes (committed by
persons at high positions), crimes relating foods and drugs, weights and packages, etc.
y Mens rea is not essential in respect of certain offences in the IPC where the nature of offence is such
that in commission brings very serious damage to the society which cannot be compensated. For
example, kidnapping, counterfeiting coins, waging war against the State, defamation by libel where
the intention of defamer is not really required, etc.
y Where the penalties are petty fines and where a statute has done away with the necessity of mens
rea based on expediency, strict liability in criminal law may be imposed, and mens rea shall be
dispensed with. For example, violation of traffic rules.
y Cases of public nuisance under Section 268, IPC.
y Cases in which although the proceedings are of criminal nature, but civil rights are to be enforced.
For example, if the rights of property are infringed by a trespasser, the trespasser will be prosecuted.
y Ignorance of the law is no excuse, and thus, mens rea is not required in such offences.
R versus Prince [1875]: in this case, the accused was an adult who had an affair with a girl whom he
believed to be an adult as she seemed to be so due to physical built up. But she was near about only
14 years of age. They were involved in a physical relationship as well. The accused was caught and
charged with the offence of kidnapping and rape. The defence of absence of mens rea was taken. The
Court said this was a case of strict liability; therefore, mens rea could not be taken as an excuse. The
Court further pointed out that in serious offences like kidnapping, the issue of mens rea was dispensed
with.

R versus Stocks [1921 KB]: in this case, Mr Wheals was a person of very little education who wanted
divorce from his wife. He approached a solicitor for the purpose. One day when he was enjoying a
holiday, he received some papers as required to be signed by him to file the divorce case. He signed
and sent the papers back to the solicitor, believing that he got divorced. Thereafter, he married Ms
Stock. His first wife filed a case of bigamy against him. He pleaded before the Court that he was not
aware of the fact that he was not divorced yet, he being a person of very little education. He further
pleaded absence of mens rea. The Court held that bigamy was an offence under the rule of ‘Mala in
Se’, and thus, it could not be tolerated by the State. The Court rejected the plea of absence of mens
rea, and thus, he was held liable for bigamy.
R versus Tolson [1889 QB]: in this case, Mrs Tolson got married after Mr Tolson became missing, as there
was no information about him for seven years. Mrs Tolson waited for her husband during this period.
The elder brother of Mr Tolson told her that he had gone in a vessel, and it sank. So, she decided to
marry again as she believed the vessel was lost and her husband was dead. Mr. Tolson came back and
found his wife got married again. He filed a case against her. In this case the Court held that, “Although,
prima facie and as a general rule, there must be a mind at fault before there can be a crime, it is not
an inflexible rule, and a statute may relate to such a subject matter and may be so framed as to make
an act criminal whether there has been any intention to break the law or otherwise to do wrong or not”.
After considering the plight and circumstances during the period of seven years of the Mrs Tolson, the
Court acquitted her from charges.
Intention
It can be said to mean the object, purpose, ultimate, aim or design behind doing an act. It is usually
used in relation to the consequence of an act, and not in relation to the act itself. The scheme
of ‘intention’ in law is expressed by words such as ‘voluntarily’, ‘wilfully’, ‘deliberately’, ‘deliberate
intention’, ‘with the purpose of’, or ‘knowingly’.
Intention and Motive

Intention and motive are distinct and must be distinguished. A bad motive cannot be a reason for
convicting a person. Similarly, a good motive cannot be an excuse for acquitting him. The intention
has been defined as the fixed direction of the mind to a particular object, or determination to act in
a particular manner, and it is distinguishable from motive—that which incites or stimulates action. A
motive is something which prompts a person to form an opinion or intention to do certain illegal acts or
even a legal act by illegal means with a view to achieve the intention. It is a psychological phenomenon
which impels a person to do a particular act. Motive does not affect criminal liability. Motive by itself
is insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused. However, it, being a compelling force to commit a
crime, becomes a relevant factor in the determination of guilt of an individual or of the quantum of
punishment. In criminal law, motive may be defined as that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge
in a criminal act or as the moving power which impels to act for a definite result. The Supreme Court
ruled that failure to prove motive is irrelevant in a case wherein the guilt of the accused is proved.
Knowledge as Mens Rea

Knowledge is awareness of the consequences of the act. It is the state of mind entertained by a person
about existing facts which he has himself observed or the existence of which has been communicated
to him by persons whose veracity he has no reason to doubt. Thus, it is the desire to achieve a certain
purpose.

Joint and Constructive Liability
Sections 34 to 38 of the IPC deal with the liability of individuals for their ‘co-operative criminal acts’.
Section 34: Acts Done by Several Persons in Furtherance of Common Intention

The principle of joint liability was propounded by the courts in the case of R versus Cruise p1838]. In
this case, a constable and his assistants had gone to arrest a Person A at his house. There were three
other persons, B, C, and D. On seeing the police constable, Persons B, C, and D came out of the house,
gave the constable a blow, and drove away the constable and his assistants. The Court evolved the
‘doctrine of joint liability’ and held that each member of the group, i.e., B, C, and D, were equally liable
and responsible for the blow, irrespective of whether only one of them had struck the blow.
Essentials of Section 34
There are three main ingredients in the Section.
y A criminal act must be done by several persons.
y The criminal act must be to further the common intention of all.
y There must be participation of all persons in furthering the common intention.
Barendra Kumar Ghosh versus King Emperor [1925 PC]: the accused was the only person apprehended
for the murder of the postmaster of Sankaritola Post Office. On that day, several persons appeared
at the door of the backroom of the post office, where the postmaster was counting his money, and
demanded the money. They fired pistols at him, and he died almost immediately. While all the accused
fled the place without taking any money, the accused, Barendra Kumar, alone was chased and caught,
by the post office assistants, with a pistol in his hand. It was his defence that he was only standing
guard outside the post office and that he was compelled to stand so by the other accused, and thus,
he did not have the intention to kill the postmaster. The accused was held liable for murder under
Section 302 read with Section 34. Thus, the essence is concurrent consensus of the minds of persons
participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result. It requires prior concert or
prearranged design to commit a criminal act by several persons.
There must be general intention shared by all the persons concerned. This principle came in the Indus
River case, Mahboob Shah versus Emperor [1945 PC[. In this case, the deceased Allah Dad and few
others were going in a native boat down the river Indus to cut and collect reeds growing on the bank
of the river. A mile from the place where they started, they were warned by Mohammad Shah, father of
Wali Shah, who absconded and was never apprehended, not to cut reeds from the land belonging to
him. However, when they continued to cut and load reeds into their boat, they were stopped by Quasim
Shah, nephew of Mohammad Shah, who tried to remove the reeds from them and prevent them from
moving. When he pushed Allah Dad, the latter struck him with a thick bamboo pole used for rowing and
steering the boat. This made Quasim Shah cry out for help. Hearing this, Wali Shah and Mahboob Shah
appeared on the scene carrying loaded guns. On seeing them, Allah Dad and his friend Hamidullah tried
to escape by fleeing from the place. They were prevented from running by Wali Shah and Mahboob
Shah who stood in front of them obstructing their path. Wali Shah shot at Allah Dad, killing him
instantaneously. Mahboob Shah fired at Hamidullah, causing him slight injuries. Wali Shah was never
caught thereafter. The Lower Courts convicted Mahboob Shah for murder under Section 302 read with
Section 34, IPC. On an appeal to the Privy Council against the conviction for murder, the conviction was
set aside and allowed Mahboob Shah’s appeal on the ground that there was no evidence to prove that
there was a common intention between Mahboob Shah and the absconding Wali Shah. The Court said

that, under Section 34, the essence of liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention
animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention.
Important Aspects of Section 34

y Section 34 is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between criminal
acts of individual members of a party, who act in furtherance of a common intention of all, or to
prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. Every person engaged in the commission of a
crime is held responsible by virtue of his participation in the criminal act, even if the act in question
was not performed by one or the other member of the group.
y Section 34 creates no specific offence. It only lays down a rule of evidence if two or more persons
commit an illegal act conjointly; it is the same as if each of them had done the act separately and
each will be liable constructively for the act in the same manner as if it were done by one alone.
y Section 34 can be invoked even in those cases where some of the co-accused may be acquitted,
provided it can be proved either by direct evidence or inference that the accused and others have
committed an offence in pursuance of common intention of the group.
y Common intention may develop during the occurrence and can develop on the spot.
y Common intention is different from the same or similar intention.
y Participation is a necessary element or condition precedent to a finding of joint liability. It is the
essence of the Section that the person must be physically present at the place of the actual
commission of the crime. He need not be present in the actual room; he can, for instance, stand
guard by a gate outside ready to warn his companions about any approach of danger, or wait in a car
on nearby road ready to facilitate their escape, but he must be physically present at the scene of the
occurrence and must actually participate in the commission of the offence in some way or the other
at the time the crime is actually committed. However, it is not necessary in all cases for participation
to be in the form of physical presence.
y Acquittal of co-accused on the other accused is to the effect that if the facts proved or circumstances
established do not disprove the inference of common intention, then the remaining accused are
liable to conviction using the principle of joint liability contained in Section 34.
y The burden lies on the prosecution to prove the actual participation of more than one person for
commission of the criminal act was done in furtherance of common intention at a prior concert.
Sections 35–38: Other Aspects of Joint Liability

y Whenever a criminal act, which is criminal only be reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge
or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act with such
knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone
with that knowledge or intention (Section 35).
y Wherever the causing of a certain effect, or an attempt to cause that effect, by an act or by an
omission, is an offence, it is to be understood that the causing of that effect, partly by an act and
partly by an omission, is the same offence. For example, A intentionally causes Z’s death, partly by
illegally omitting to give Z food, and partly by beating Z. A has committed murder (Section 36).
y When an offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally cooperates in the
commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other
person, commits that offence (Section 37).

y Where several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they may be
guilty of different offences by means of that act (Section 38).
Unlawful Assembly
The underlying objective of criminalisation of unlawful assembly is to discourage tumultuous assemblage
of persons to preserve public peace.
Section 141: What is an Unlawful Assembly

Section 141 reveals that the essence of the offence under this provision is the combination of five or
more persons for committing an offence. To constitute an ‘unlawful assembly’, the following ingredients
need to be established.
y That there was an assembly of five or more persons.
y They must have a common object.
y The common object must be one of the specified in the section, namely:
⚪ to overawe by criminal force or show of criminal force, the central or any state government or
parliament or the legislature of any state or any public servant in the exercise of his lawful power,
that is overawing the central or a state government or its officers;
⚪ to resist the execution of any law or of any legal process, that is resistance to the execution of
legal process;
⚪ to commit any mischief or criminal trespass or other offence, that is commission of mischief,
criminal trespass, or any other offence;
⚪ to use or show of criminal force to any person to take or obtain possession of any property or to
deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way or of the use of water or other incorporeal
rights of which he is in possession or enjoyment or to enforce any right or supposed right, that is
forcible possession and dispossession of property;
⚪ to use or show of criminal force to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do or
to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do that is illegal omission.
Thus, an unlawful assembly should at least consist of five or more persons who should meet for
a common object. The word ‘object’ here means a purpose or design. To make it ‘common’, all the
persons who compose an unlawful assembly must share it. In other words, the expression ‘common
object’ implies that the object must be shared and possessed by all the members of the assembly,
i.e., there must be a ‘community of object’. The word ‘assemble’ implies the meeting of persons who
assemble for a common purpose with the intention of furthering it. It is the combination of men for a
common purpose that the is discouraged by law.
An assembly, as stated in Explanation to Section 141, may be lawful at the time of its inception or
even sometime thereafter but may become unlawful subsequently on the adoption of one of the
common objects. It is also important to note that an unlawful object can be developed on the spot
and it could be that initially, the person gathered together for a lawful object. Mere membership of
unlawful assembly makes the person liable for the offence committed by the assembly. As per Section
143, whoever is a member of an unlawful assembly shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both.

Section 149: Every Member of Unlawful Assembly to Be Guilty of Offence Committed in
Prosecution of Common Object
This Section provides that every member of an unlawful assembly having a common object is responsible
for acts committed by any other member of that assembly and is guilty of the substantive offence
and thereby is punishable for that offence. The provision says that if an offence is committed by any
member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or such as
the members or that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every
person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty
of that offence.
It is well settled that once a membership of an unlawful assembly is established, it is not incumbent
on the prosecution to establish whether any specific overt act has been assigned to any accused. Mere
membership of the unlawful assembly is sufficient.
Other Aspects of Constructive Liability

y The mere fact that some among the accused persons have evaded justice or acquitted or are not
brought to trial and thereby reduces the number of persons below five will make Section 141 and,
consequentially, Section 149 inapplicable unless there are some other unidentified or unnamed
persons involved in the commission of the said crime.
y A person who is aware of facts that make an assembly an unlawful assembly, intentionally joins that
assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a member of an unlawful assembly (Section 142).
y The Supreme Court has more than once reiterated the rule that the mere presence of a person at
the place where members of an unlawful assembly have gathered for carrying out their illegal object,
does not incriminate him as a member thereof, unless it is shown that he did something or omitted
to do something which would make him a member of an unlawful assembly or unless the case falls
under Section 142.
y If a member of an unlawful assembly is armed with any deadly weapon or with anything which if
used as a weapon of offence is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both (Section 144).
y Whoever joins or continues in an unlawful assembly, knowing that such unlawful assembly has been
commanded in the manner prescribed by law to disperse, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both (Section 145).
y Whoever hires, engages, employs, promotes, connives at the hiring, engagement, or employment of
any person to join or become a member of any unlawful assembly, shall be punishable as a member
of such unlawful assembly, and for any offence which may be committed by any such person as a
member of such unlawful assembly in pursuance of such hiring, engagement, or employment, in the
same manner as if he had been a member of such unlawful assembly, or himself had committed
such offence (Section 150).
y A person who knowingly joins or continues in any assembly of five or more persons likely to cause
a disturbance of the public peace, after such assembly has been lawfully commanded to disperse,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six
months, or with fine, or with both. And if such an assembly is an unlawful assembly, the offender
will be punishable under Section 145 (Section 151).
y Object must be shared and possessed by all the members of the assembly, or that they should all
be aware of it, and concur in it, the same object is not necessarily a common object, and becomes
so only when it is known to and shared by all the members of the assembly.

Difference between Common Intention and Common Object
Common Intention (Section 34) Common Object (Section 149)
Common intention only lays down a principle Common object creates a specific offence. Even
of joint criminal liability and does not create a membership in an unlawful assembly itself is
separate offence. specifically made liable to punishment.
Common intention requires prior meeting of mind Common object may be formed without these
and unity of intention. ingredients. Under Section 149, if any member
of the unlawful assembly commits an offence,
others are also liable, although they may not
have had the same intention, but only shared the
common object.
In Section 34, the crucial factor is that of In Section 149, membership of the unlawful
participation. assembly is a sufficient precondition.
For Section 34, it is sufficient if there are more In Section 149, there have to be a minimum of
than two persons involved. five persons or more.
Some overt act, however small, is a pre- In Section 149, the mere fact of being an unlawful
requisite for anyone to be made liable in assembly itself is sufficient to fix liability.
Section 34.
Stages of Crime and Inchoate Crimes—Abetment, Criminal Conspiracy, and Attempt

Sections 107–120: Abetment to Commit an Offence
The term ‘abet’, in general usage, means to assist, advance, aid, conduce, help. and promote. The term
‘abetment’ indicates that there is a distinction between the person abetting the commission of an
offence (or abettor) and the perpetrator of the offence or the principal offender.
Section 107 defines the abetment of a thing. A person abets the doing of a thing when:
y he instigates any person to do that thing;
y engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or
y intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
It does not make the abetment of an ‘offence’ but of a ‘thing’, which may or may not be an offence. This
makes the abettor solely liable in some cases even though the person abetted may be wholly innocent.
Thus, in other words, abetment means the instigation of a person to do, or not to do, an act in a certain
way, or aid given by some person to another either of his own accord or under instigation in doing an
act, which is an offence. If a person who lends his support does not know or has no reason to believe
that the act which he is aiding or supporting was a criminal act, it cannot be said that he intentionally
aids or facilitates the commission of an offence, and that he is an abettor.
y Abetment by Instigation
The word ‘instigate’ literally means to provoke, incite, urge on, or bring about, by persuasion, to do
anything. A person is said to instigate another when he urges forward or provokes, incites, urges, or
encourages such person to do an act prohibited by law. There needs to be a close causal connection
between instigation and the act committed. A person who is a silent spectator and takes no active
part in the commission of offence is not an abettor. A mere word, without necessary intent to incite

a person, uttered in quarrel or in a spur of the moment or in anger does not constitute instigation. A
form of instigation is as provided in Explanation 1 to Section 107 by which wilful misrepresentation
or concealment of a material fact which one is bound to disclose thereby causing or procuring a
thing to be done has been held to be instigation. In Queen versus Mohit [1871], certain persons
followed a woman preparing herself to be a sati on the pyre of her husband and chanted, ‘Rama,
Rama’. They were held to be guilty of abetment by instigation to lead that woman to commit suicide.
Their approval of the woman’s act by participation in the procession gave encouragement to the
woman to commit suicide.
y Abetment by Conspiracy
Conspiracy and abetment by conspiracy are distinct offences. The distinction between the two, so
far as an agreement to commit an offence is concerned is that for abetment by conspiracy, mere
agreement is not enough. An act or illegal omission must take place in pursuance of the conspiracy
and to the doing of the thing conspired for. The persons who were initially guilty of conspiracy to
commit an offence become guilty of abetting the offence as soon as an act or illegal omission takes
place in pursuance of the conspiracy. In Protima Dutta versus State [1977 Cal], the husband and
mother-in-law were held guilty of abetment to suicide of the deceased (lady), to whom the accused,
by their conduct and by direct and indirect words, suggested that she commit suicide.
y Abetment by Intentional Aiding
Intentional aid consists of any of the following three components.
⚪ Doing of an act by directly assisting the commission of the crime.
⚪ Illegally omitting to do a thing which one is bound to do.
⚪ Doing an act which may facilitate the commission of the crime by another.
An act, which merely amounts to aiding the commission of an offence, does not amount to abetting
an offence unless that act was done with an intent to aid the commission of the ‘thing’. Mere
presence of a person at the commission of a crime does not amount to ‘intentional aid’, unless
it is shown that he, through his presence, intended to have that effect. In Umi versus State [1882
Bom], a priest who officiates a bigamous marriage was held to be guilty of abetment to bigamy by
intentional aiding. The persons present in that wedding or those who permitted the celebration in
their house shall not be liable.
y Abetment by Illegal Omission
When a person is bound legally to do thing but deliberately refrains from doing that, then the person
will be liable for abetment by illegal omission. Here, it is required to prove that the accused did not
intentionally aid the commission of the offence by his non-interference, but also that his omission
led to a breach of legal obligation.
y A person is said to abet a crime if he, by way of assistance or supply of a thing or otherwise, helps
facilitate the crime committed by another.
y When the substantive offence is not established and the principal offender is acquitted, then
generally the abettor cannot be held guilty. In other words, when the substantive charge fails,
then the charge of abetment also fails.
y The abetment of the illegal omission of an act may amount to an offence although the abettor
may not himself be bound to do that act.

y To constitute the offence of abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted should be committed
or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should be caused.
y It is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by law of committing an offence
or that he should have the same guilty intention or knowledge as that of the abettor or any guilty
intention or knowledge.
y The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is also an
offence.
y It is not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by conspiracy that the abettor
should concert the offence with the person who commits it. It is sufficient if he engages in the
conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed.
Section 108
The major difference between Sections 107 and 108 is that while the former covers the ‘doing of a
thing’, the latter provision covers the ‘abetment of an offence’, specifically. Section 108 defines the
abettor to be a person who abets the following.
y The commission of an offence
y The commission of an act which would be an offence if committed by a person capable of committing
an offence in law
Sections 120A–120B: Criminal Conspiracy

Criminal conspiracy is the agreement of two or more persons to do an illegal act or to do a legal
act by illegal means. In other words, joint evil intent is necessary to constitute a crime. No actual
consummation of the crime needs be achieved or may even be attempted. The main ingredients of
Section 120A, IPC, are as follows.
y There should be at least two or more persons.
y There should be an agreement between them.
y The agreement must be to do or cause to be done:
⚪ an illegal act, or
⚪ a legal act by illegal means.
The proviso to the Section amplifies the scope of the liability as follows.
y In case of a conspiracy to commit an offence, the mere agreement is sufficient to impose liability
without the requirement that some overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy must be done.
y In case of a conspiracy to do a legal act by illegal means, there ought to be some overt act which
should have been committed by one or more parties to an agreement, apart from the agreement
itself.
The essence of a criminal conspiracy embodied in Section 120A is the unlawful combination and,
ordinarily, the offence is complete when the combination is framed. Unless a statute so requires, no
overt act needs to be done in furtherance of the agreement, and the object of combination needs not
be accomplished to constitute the criminal conspiracy.
y The offence of criminal conspiracy exists in the very agreement between two or more persons
to commit a criminal offence, irrespective of the further consideration whether the offence has
been committed.

y The meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is
the first and primary condition.
y It is not necessary that all conspirators must know each and every detail of conspiracy.
y It is not necessary that all conspirators should participate from the inception to the end of the
conspiracy; some may join the conspiracy after the time when such intention was first entertained
by any one of them and some others may quit from the conspiracy.
y Where in pursuance of the agreement the conspirators commit offences individually or adopt
illegal means to do a legal act which has a nexus to the object of conspiracy, all of them will be
liable for such offences even if some of them have not actively participated in the commission of
those offences.
y The effect of acquittal of all but one accused person will result in the failure of the prosecution
case itself. This is because one person can never be held guilty of conspiracy for the simple
reason that one cannot conspire with oneself.
The Supreme Court in the Rajiv Gandhi Assassination case [(State of Tamil Nadu versus Nalini (1999
SC)] highlighted the following main principles governing the law of conspiracy.
y Under Section 120A, IPC, offence of criminal conspiracy is committed when two or more persons
agree to do or cause to be done an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means.
y It is the intention to commit crime and joining hands with persons having the same intention. Not
only the intention, but there also has to be an agreement to carry out the object of the intention,
which is an offence.
y Once the object of conspiracy is achieved, any subsequent act, like giving shelter to an absconding
conspirator, which may be unlawful, does not make an accused a part of the conspiracy.
y There must be at least two conspirators and there may be more than that.
y It is not necessary that all conspirators should agree to the common purpose at the same time. They
may join with the other conspirators at any time before the consummation of the intended objective,
and all are equally responsible.
y It is said that a criminal conspiracy is a partnership in crime, and that each conspiracy consists of a
joint and mutual agency for a prosecution of a common plan. Everything said, written, or done by any
of the conspirators in the executing or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been
said, done, or written by each of them. A conspirator is not responsible, however, for acts done by a
co-conspirator after the termination of the conspiracy.
y It is a continuous offence. It continues from the time of agreement to the time of its termination.
In Kehar Singh versus Delhi Administration [Indira Gandhi Assassination Case (1988 SC)], it was alleged
that all four accused expressed their resentment and held Mrs Gandhi responsible for operation ‘Blue
Star’ in Amritsar. To avenge, they entered into a conspiracy to kill Mrs Gandhi. In pursuance of the
aforesaid conspiracy, two accused, being security guards, who had prior knowledge that Mrs Gandhi
was scheduled to go on the morning of 31 October 1984 from her residence at Safdarjung Road to
her office at Akbar Road via TMC Gate for an interview with Irish Television team, got their duties
manipulated in such a way that one of the accused would be present at the TMC Gate and another at
TMC Sentry Booth between 7 a.m. to 10 a.m. While Mrs Gandhi was approaching to TMC Gate towards
her office, one of the accused fired five rounds and another accused fired 25 rounds at her from their
respective weapons. Mrs Gandhi sustained injuries and fell down, and succumbed to her injuries the
same day at the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi. The Court held the accused were

liable for the offence of murder under Sections 302, 120B, 34, 107, and 109 of the IPC. One of the two
actual killers and two conspirators were brought to trial. Both the conspirators were away from the
scene of crime. One of them was acquitted due to lack of evidence. For Kehar Singh, it was shown
that he was having secret talks with one of the actual killers that they were trying all the time to keep
themselves away from their wives and children. They avoided the company of the other members of
the family, and on being asked about their talks, they remained mysterious. It was held that the facts
were sufficient to show that they were planning something secret. Thus, the Court held that the prima
facie evidence of the conspiracy was made out.
Section 120B: Punishment for Criminal Conspiracy

The Section says that a person who is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable
with death, imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall,
where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished
in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence. In other cases, the offender shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months or with a fine or with
both.
Criminal Attempt
There are primarily four stages of a crime.
y The formation of the intention to commit the crime
y The preparations for the commission of the contemplated crime
y The attempt to commit the crime
y If the third stage is successful, the commission of the intended crime
Generally, criminal law does not penalise the first two stages, i.e., the stage of contemplation or
intention and the stage of preparation. The attempt to commit an offence and the actual commission
of the contemplated offence is always punishable.
An attempt to commit a crime is essentially a direct movement towards the commission of the
contemplated offence after preparations are made. An act or a series of acts, more than merely
preparatory to commission the intended offence, is an offence. However, not every act in a series of
acts committed in the direction of the contemplated offence amounts to an attempt. If such an act
still rests in the stage of intention or within the stage of preparation, its doer does not generally attract
criminal liability. An attempt to commit a crime is punishable because it not only poses a threat to
bodily and proprietary security but also infringes the right to security. Criminal liability for attempts
may be justified even in the absence of any harm. Every attempt, although it falls short of success,
must create alarm, which by itself is an injury, and the moral guilt of the offender is the same as if
he had succeeded. Moral guilt must be united to injury to justify punishment. As the injury is not as
great as if the act had been committed, only half the punishment is awarded. Attempt to commit an
offence can be said to begin when the preparations are complete, and the culprit commences to do
something with the intention of committing the offence and which is a step towards the commission
of the offence. The moment the culprit commences to do an act with the necessary intention, he
commences his attempt to commit the offence.
The word ‘attempt’ is not itself defined, and must, therefore, be taken in its ordinary meaning. Thus,
an attempt may be defined as an act which, if not prevented, would result in the full consummation of
the attempted offence. It consists of the intent to commit a crime, combined with the doing of some
act for its actual commission. There are three essentials of the offence of attempt.

y Offender had an intention or mens rea to commit the contemplated or intended offence.
y Some act has been done or a step has been taken towards the commission of the contemplated
offence.
y For reasons beyond the offender’s comprehension or control, failed to commit the intended offence.
Criminal attempt is a form of an inchoate crime. Other forms of inchoate crimes known to criminal
law are criminal conspiracy and incitement. An inchoate crime is a crime committed by doing an act
with the purpose of affecting some other offence or an offence that is relative to the offence-in-
chief. It consists of actions falling short of the consummated crime. Inchoate crimes are also labelled
preliminary crimes or anticipatory crimes.
Preparation When Made Punishable

Generally, the second stage of commission of a crime is not punishable, but following are the exceptions
to this rule.
y Preparations made for waging war against the Government of India (Section 122)
y Preparations made for committing depredations on territories of any power in alliance or at peace
with the Government of India (Section 126)
y Making, selling, or being in possession of instruments for counterfeiting coins or government stamps
(Sections 233–235 and 257)
y Possessing counterfeit coins, government stamps, false weight, or measures (Sections 242, 243, 259,
and 266)
y Preparations made for committing dacoity (Sections 399)
The IPC has dealt with ‘attempt’ in a specific and general way. It treats a criminal attempt in four
different ways. They are as follows.
y The commission of an offence and the attempt to commit it are dealt with in the same section and
the extent of punishment prescribed is the same for both. The attempts that fall in this category are
the following.
⚪ Offences against the State (Sections 121, 124, 124A, 125, and 130)
⚪ Abetting mutiny (Section 131)
⚪ Offences against public tranquillity (Sections 152 and 153A)
⚪ Offences against public justice (Sections 196, 198, 200, and 213)
⚪ Offences relating to coins and government stamps (Sections 239–241 and 251)
⚪ Offences relating to extortion, robbery, and dacoity (Sections 385, 387, 389, 391, 397, and 398)
⚪ Criminal trespass (Section 460)
y Attempt to commit specific offences are dealt with separately and are not dealt side by side with
the offences themselves. The offences which fall in this category are as follows.
⚪ Attempt to commit murder (Section 307)
⚪ Attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 308)
⚪ Attempt to commit robbery (Section 393)
y Attempt to commit suicide (Section 309)
y Attempt to commit offences for which no specific punishment is provided in the IPC (Section 511).

Section 511
Section 511 is applicable where no specific provision in the IPC is made for punishing attempts to
commit an offence. However, it is not applicable to an attempt to commit a non-IPC offence. The
Section says that any person who attempts to commit an offence punishable with either imprisonment
for life or imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed and in such attempts does any
act towards the commission of the offence, shall, where no express provision is made by this Code for
the punishment of such attempt, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the
offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be,
one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence or with such fine as is provided
for the offence or with both.
End of Preparation and Beginning of an Attempt

To understand the issue related to the end of preparation and beginning of an attempt, study of
Abhayanand Mishra versus State of Bihar [1962 SC] is important. In this case, the accused applied
to Patna University to appear as a private candidate in the MA degree examination. In support of his
eligibility, he forwarded certificates showing that he had obtained his BA degree and that he had
been teaching in a certain school. In support of his application, he also attached certain certificates
purporting to be from the headmaster of the school and the inspector of schools. The university
authorities accepted his application and issued him an admission card. The university, however,
received information that the certificates were fake and that the accused was not a teacher. This
was found to be true. It was also found that the accused was debarred from taking any university
examination for a certain number of years on account of his having indulged in corrupt practice at a
university examination. The university prosecuted him for forgery and attempting to cheat. It was held
that the accused was guilty of having committed an offence contrary to Section 420 read with Section
511, IPC. It was ruled that the preparation was complete when the accused prepared the application
for submission to the university and that the moment, he dispatched it, he had entered the realm of
attempt to commit the offence of ‘cheating’.
Tests to Determine Whether an Act Is a Preparation or an Attempt
The test for determining whether an act amounts to mere preparation or an attempt to commit an
offence is based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The following are a few principles taken
from judicial pronouncements to determine whether a particular act or series of acts has crossed the
stage of preparation to enter the area of attempt to commit an offence.
y Proximity Rule
This means that an act or series of acts must be sufficiently proximate and not remotely connected
to the crime intended. An act of the accused is considered proximate if, though it is not the last act
that he intended to do, it is the last act that was legally necessary for him to do if the contemplated
result is afterwards brought about without further conduct on his Article In State of Maharashtra
versus Mohammad Yakub [1980 SC], the accused were arrested by officials of the central excise
for attempting to smuggle silver out of India. Based on secret information, custom officials kept
a watch over the accused and apprehended them when they had brought silver ingots in a truck.
The accused were found to have kept some small and heavy parcels on the ground. It was held
that the accused had committed the offence of attempting to export silver out of India by sea
in contravention of law. The principles laid down were that the measure of proximity was not in
relation to time and action but in relation to intention. The act must reveal the intention to commit

the particular offence in question. Further, proximity was considered in terms of the actual physical
proximity. It was said that the overt act or step to be criminal, needed to be reasonably proximate
to the consummation of the offence.
y Doctrine of Locus Poenitentiae
This refers to the possibility of a person who having made preparations to commit an offence actually
backs out of committing it, owing to a change of heart or out of any other type of compulsion or fear.
Thus, such an act would amount to a mere preparation and not an attempt.
y Equivocality Test
This suggests that an act done towards the commission of the offence would amount to an attempt
to commit it, only if it unequivocally indicates the intention of the doer to accomplish the criminal
object. The steps taken or acts done by the accused must speak for themselves. For example, an
attempt to commit an impossible act is an offence, such as stealing jewels from an empty jewel
box or pocket; if he, with intent to commit the intended offence, has done everything within his
reach to commit it but his criminal objective was frustrated because of reasons unknown to him or
circumstances beyond his control or comprehension, then he is the doer of that offence.
General Exceptions
Chapter IV of the IPC is titled ‘General Exceptions’. It comprises the provisions from Sections 76 to 106.
These exempt certain persons from criminal liability. These are exceptions to the general rule, wherein
a person may be excused of crime. A wrongdoer, who has committed an actus reus with the requisite
mens rea, may escape from liability because he falls under one of the general exceptions. He may be
excused from the consequences of punishment by reason of absence of requisite mens rea necessary
of the commission of an offence.
Classification of Exceptions: Excusable and Justifiable

Exceptions can be grouped under two broad categories of defences.
y Excusable exceptions: where the law excuses certain class of persons, even though their acts
constitute an offence. For example, acts by infants, insane, or intoxicated persons, acts done by
accident, etc.
y Justifiable exceptions: where the acts committed though are offences that are held to be justifiable
under certain circumstances, and hence, exempted from the provisions of the IPC. For example, acts
done by a person justified in law and judicial acts, acts causing slight harm or trivial incidents, etc.
Chapter IV to Be Read with Section 6

Section 6, IPC, clearly states that, throughout the Code, every definition of an offence, every penal
provision, and every illustration of every such definition or penal provision, shall be understood subject
to the exceptions contained in the chapter entitled ‘General Exceptions’, though those exceptions are
not repeated in such definition, penal provision, or illustration. Thus, every provision under the IPC has
to be read along with the chapter ‘General Exceptions’ before coming to any conclusion on the liability
or culpability of a person accused of a crime. The idea behind the incorporation of these provisions
in the Code is that instead of qualifying every offence with the limitations or exceptions, a separate
chapter has been enacted which is applicable to the entire Code. This is basically to avoid repetition.
Chapter IV is also applicable to offences under special or local laws. Section 40 defines the word
‘offence’ as denoting a thing punishable under the IPC as well as under a special or local law. This
implies that by virtue of provisions of Section 40 read with Section 6, it follows that the chapter on

general exceptions is applicable to the accused of all offences, whether in the IPC or any special and
local law.
Burden of proof: as a general rule, there is always a presumption of innocence in favour of an accused
and the burden of proving every aspect of the crime is on the prosecution. However, an exception to
this general rule has been placed under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that places the
burden on the accused to prove that the case falls within one of the general exceptions. It provides
that when a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances
bringing the case within any of the general exceptions in the IPC or within any special exception or
proviso contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him
and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.
Sections 76 and 79: Mistake of Fact

Sections 76 and 79 incorporate the common law principle of ignorantia facit doth excusat, ignorantia
juris non excusat (ignorance of fact excuses, ignorance of law does not excuse). The principle is that
a man who is mistaken or ignorant about the existence of a fact cannot form the necessary intention
to constitute a crime, and is, therefore, not responsible in law for his deeds. A bona fide belief in good
faith in the existence of facts, which if they do exist, would make an act innocent in law. While on the
other hand, mistake of law is no defence, since every man is presumed to know the law, and hence,
responsible in case of its breach.
Section 76 excuses a person, who is bound by law to do something and has done it, or who in good
faith, owing to a mistake of fact, believes that he is bound by law to do something and does it, from
criminal liability. Section 79 absolves a person, who believes, by reason of mistake of fact and not
by reason of mistake of law, in good faith, that his act would be justified by law. Under Section 76, a
person believes himself bound by law to do a thing and thereby feels that he is under legal compulsion
to do a thing, while under Section 79, he acts because he thinks that he is justified in doing so and
thereby believes that there is a legal justification for his action.
Thus, Section 76 deals with two classes of cases, wherein a person is excused from criminal liability
on the ground of mistake of fact, viz.,
y when a person is bound by law to do something and does it;
y when a person believes in good faith, owing to a mistake of fact and not a mistake of law, that he is
bound to do something an does it.
Section 79 comes into play only when there is real or supposed legal justification for a person in doing
the act complained of and that the same was done with an intention of advancing the law to the
best of his judgement exerted in good faith. A mistake can be an extenuating factor provided:
y that the state of things believed to exist would, if true, have justified the act done;
y that the mistake must be reasonable; and
y the mistake must relate to fact and not to law.
In R versus Levett [1688 KB], the accused killed woman (a friend of the servant) who was hiding behind
a curtain in his house mistakenly believing her to be a burglar. The accused was held not to have been
guilty of unlawful homicide for being a case of ‘pure mistake’ having no intention of killing the woman,
but rather of killing a burglar.
The simple distinction between Section 76 and Section 79 is that under the former, a person acts
under legal compulsion, while in case of the latter he acts under a legal justification.

Good Faith
A mistake under both sections must be in good faith as defined under Section 52, to be doing an
act with due care and attention. Thus, a mistake (of fact) must be bona fide, reasonable, and after
exercise of due diligence. So, if a person, howsoever honest in his intention, blunders, he cannot get
the protection under the IPC because apart from an honest intention, he is also expected to act with
due care and caution. Though for due care, the degree of reasonableness is always there.
Mistake Must Be a Fact and Not of Law

The principle ‘ignorance of law is no excuse’, is based on the rule that everybody is presumed, rather
duty bound to know the law. Mistake of law means a mistake as to the existence or otherwise of any
law on a relevant subject as well as a mistake as to what the law is. A mistake or ignorance of law,
whether civil or criminal, is no defence in law, howsoever genuine it might have been. Ignorance of fact
is an excuse as it precludes the accused from forming the required mens rea. However, to exonerate a
person from a criminal liability, the mistake must be of material facts.
In State of Maharashtra versus Mayer Hans George [1965 SC], the Supreme Court refused to accept the
plea of ignorance of the notification issued by the Reserve Bank of India on 24 November 1962 imposing
restrictions on the transit of gold to a place outside the territory of India and held the accused, a
French national, who left Zurich on his way to Manila, liable for violation the said notification, when his
plane landed in Bombay.
Acts Done under Order of a Superior Authority

Any act done under orders of superior authorities is not protected under this section. Where the orders
of the superior authority are illegal, it will not save the subordinate officer from liability.
In State of West Bengal versus Shew Mangal Singh [1981 SC], the deceased and his brother were shot
dead by the police at point-blank range and brutally murdered. It was contended that the accused
police officers were on patrol when they were attacked by a mob. When an assistant commissioner
of police was injured in the mob violence, orders were given by the deputy commissioner of police to
open fire. The accused constables were bound by law to obey the orders of the superior officer. It was
held, that the situation warranted and justified the order to open fire, and hence, the accused was
entitled the protection of Section 76.
Sections 77 and 78: Judicial Acts

The object of this provision is to give protection to judges and their ministerial staff, i.e., officials
attached to a court, whose duty is to execute mandates lawfully issued by magistrates or judges; for
example, court clerks, bailiffs, etc.
Section 77 clearly exempts an act which is done by a judge when acting judicially in the exercise of
any power to be an offence. However, this act should be done in good faith. As per Section 19, IPC,
a ‘judge’ is a person who is officially designated as a judge or who is empowered by law to give a
definitive judgement in any civil or criminal proceeding. However, to accord protection to the officer,
it is important that the act should have been done by him while discharging his judicial powers, which
includes orders passed in chambers, even if he acts beyond his jurisdiction, provided he is under a
bona fide belief. A mistake of law, though made in good faith, is not a good defence under Sections 76
and 79. But such a mistake may be protected under Sections 77 and 9 of the Code. This must be seen
in the light of facts and circumstances of each case.

Sections 78 grants immunity to ministerial officers acting in pursuance of the judgement or direction
issued under the authority or order of a court of law. Under this section, an officer is exempted from
criminal prosecution even if the court issuing the order had no jurisdiction or the order happened to
be erroneous.
y The act is done in good faith.
y There should be a belief in the legality of the order.
Section 80: Accidents

Essential Ingredients
Section 80 exempts a person from liability if:
y the act is done accidentally, by misfortune
y without any criminal intention or knowledge
y the accident occurs while doing a lawful act in a lawful manner and by lawful means
y while doing the act, due care and caution is exercised.
It is important that no human fault contributes. Accident and misfortune, thus mean happening of an
unexpected or unintended event, resulting in injury to another. An important point to establish is that
act was done without a guilty mind. Due care and caution have to be exercised. What is expected is
not utmost care, but sufficient care that a prudent and reasonable man would consider adequate, in
the circumstances of the case.
In State of Orissa versus Khora Ghasi [1978 Ori.], the accused was watching his maize field in the night.
He heard some noise inside his field. Thinking that to be a bear which entered the maize field, he shot
an arrow in the direction from where the said noise was heard. The arrow hit the deceased who had
stealthily entered the maize field of the accused to commit theft of maize. The deceased died because
of the injury caused by the arrow. The accused was acquitted by the court on account of an accident.
Section 81: Necessity

Section 81, IPC, embodies the principle that where the accused chooses lesser evil, in order to avert
the bigger, then he is immune. The genesis this principle emanates from two maxims—quod necessitas
non habet leegem (necessity knows no law) and necessitas vincit legem (necessity overcomes the
law). Thus, it grants immunity to man from criminal charge with respect to acts committed under
compelling circumstances forced by necessity. This provision gives legal protection to the doctrine of
salvage that is self-preservation (rescue of property and things from damage by wrecking, fire, etc.)
common to all nations. It sanctions and justifies the doing of a lesser evil to avert a greater evil. Section
81 clearly contemplates a situation where the accused has knowledge that he is likely to cause harm,
but it is specifically stipulated that such knowledge shall not be held against him. Thus, mens rea is
there in such a case, but still the accused is excused of his act.
In R versus Dudley and Stephens [1884 QB], the crew of a yacht was cast away in a storm and was
compelled to get into an open boat, which had no water or food. After a few days, having had nothing
to eat for eight days and being very far away from land, two of the crew, Dudley and Stephens, agreed
that the cabin boy, who was likely to die first, should be killed to feed themselves upon his body and
one of them carried out the plan. The men ate the cabin boy’s flesh and drank his blood for four days.
They were then rescued by a passing vessel and were subsequently charged with murder. They were
held liable for murder and sentenced to death. However, their death sentence was commuted by the
Crown to a six months’ imprisonment. The principles that can be deduced from the case are as follows.

y Self-preservation is not an absolute necessity.
y No person has a right to take another’s life to preserve his own.
y There is no necessity that justifies homicide.
Sections 82 and 83: Infancy

Sections 82 and 83, IPC, confer immunity from criminal liability on child offenders. Section 82 presumes
that a child below seven years is doli incapax, i.e., he is incapable of committing a crime and cannot
be guilty of an offence. This presumption emanates from the recognition of the fact that he lacks the
adequate mental ability to understand the nature and consequences of his act, and thereby an ability
to form the required mens rea. This provision totally absolves a child below seven years of age from
criminal liability. The scope of the immunity granted under this section is wide enough to exempt a
child from offences under the special as well as local laws, as explained under Section 40 of the Code,
along with the IPC.
In Makhulshah versus State [1886], the accused purchased for one anna, from a child aged six years,
two pieces of cloth valued at 15 annas, which the child had taken from the house of a third person. It
was held that assuming that a charge of an offence of dishonest reception of property under Section
411, IPC, could be sustained owing to the incapacity of the child to commit an offence, the accused
was guilty of criminal misappropriation if he knew that the property belonged to the child’s guardian
and dishonestly appropriated the same to his own use.
Section 83 presumes that a child above seven but below 12 years of age is doli capax, i.e., capable of
committing a crime. The liability of such a child depends upon his maturity of understanding of the
nature and consequences of his conduct and not on his age. It becomes necessary for the defence to
prove that the child had not attained the sufficient maturity required to understand the nature and
consequences of his conduct. In the absence of such evidence, a court presumes that the accused
child intended to do what he really did. The presumption of innocence of a child is based on the
principle that ‘the younger the child in age, the lesser the probability of being corrupt’. This is to say,
malice makes up for age, that is militia supplet aetatem.
In Krishna versus State [1940 Cal.], a child of nine years of age stole a necklace worth a certain
value and immediately sold that same at a higher value to the accused. The question was whether
the accused can be held to be liable for the offence of receiving stolen property. It was held that it
was the act of the child in selling the necklace that showed he had attained sufficient maturity of
understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion for him to be
made liable under Section 83, IPC.
In Ulla Mahapatra versus State [1950 Ori.], the accused boy was over 11 years of age, picked up a knife
and advanced towards the deceased with a threatening gesture, saying that he would cut him to bits
and did so. It was held that his entire action could only lead to one inference, i.e., he did what he
intended to do and that he knew all the time that a blow inflicted with a knife would effectuate his
intention. Thus, he was held to be liable for the offence of murder.
Section 84: Insanity or Mental Abnormality

The justification for providing unsoundness of mind as a complete defence is that an insane person is
incapable of forming criminal intent. The term ‘unsoundness of mind’ has not been defined in the IPC,
but it has been equated by the courts to mean insanity. The underlining principles behind this provision
are that a mad man has no will (furiosis nulla voluntas est) and he is like one who is absent (furiosus

absentis low est). In fact, a mad man is punished by his own madness (furiosus furore sui puniter).
The theory is that ‘one who is insane has no mind’, and hence cannot have the necessary mens rea to
commit a crime. To invoke the benefit of Section 84, it must be proved that:
y at the time of commission of the offence, the accused was insane, i.e., non composmentis (not of
sound mind),
y the accused was incapable of knowing the nature of the act, and because of unsoundness of mind,
he could not understand that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law.
The foundation for the law of insanity was laid down by the House of Lords in 1843, in the popular,
Mc’Naghten case. In this case, the accused, Daniel Mc’Naghten, suffered from a delusion that Sir Robert
Peel, the then Prime Minister of Britain had injured him. The accused mistook Edward Drummond,
Secretary to the Prime Minister for Sir Robert Peel. The accused shot and killed Drummond. Insanity
was pleaded. The medical evidence showed that Mc’Naghten was labouring under a morbid delusion
that carried him away beyond the power of his own control. He was held not guilty due to insanity. The
following main principles were enunciated by the House of Lords w.r.t. the law on insanity.
y Every person is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible
for his crimes, until the contrary is established.
y To establish the defence of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the
crime, the person was so insane as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if
he did know it, he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
y The test of wrongfulness of the act is in the power to distinguish between right and wrong, not in the
abstract or in general, but regarding the particular act committed.
The test is named as the ‘right and wrong test’. Section 84, IPC, more or less, embodies the principles
laid down in the Mc’Naghten Rules. Provisions have been made under Section 330 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, for the detention of such persons in lunatic asylums.
Insanity in law differs from the medical concept. Insanity in law means a disorder of the mind which
impairs the cognitive faculty, i.e., the reasoning capacity of a man, to such an extent as to render
him incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of his actions. In other words, every
abrasive act performed by a person cannot exempt him from criminal responsibility; it is only insanity
of a particular or appropriate kind which is regarded as insanity in law that will exempt a man from
criminal liability.
In Ashriruddin Ahmed versus the King [1948 Cal], the accused had dreamt that he was commanded by
someone in paradise to sacrifice his son of five years. The next morning the accused took his son to a
mosque and killed him by thrusting a knife in his throat. He then went straight to his uncle but, finding
a chaukidar (watchman) nearby, took his uncle to a tank some distance away and slowly related the
story. It was held that the case of insanity under Section 84, IPC, was made out.
Doctrine of Diminished Responsibility

Although the Mc’Naughten Rules still hold good in England, a new defence to murder, known as
Diminished Responsibility was introduced by the Homicide Act of 1957. It makes the accused guilty of
manslaughter, or culpable homicide, instead of murder.
Sections 85 and 86: Intoxication

Sections 85 and 86, IPC, deal with intoxication as an extenuating factor. The former deals with involuntary
intoxication or drunkenness as a defence, while the latter deals with voluntarily intoxication, i.e., when
any crime is committed under the influence of self-administered intoxicant.

Involuntary Intoxication
A person seeking protection of Section 85 is required to establish that he was:
y incapable of knowing the nature of the act committed, or
y that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law, and
y that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against
his will, which led to a loss of his ability to understand the nature of the act committed by him. The
accused should also be ignorant that what was consumed by him was an intoxicant or was mixed
with an intoxicant.
The words ‘against his will’ mean that the person was forced or coerced into consuming an intoxicant.
Such a state of mind has been termed dementia offectatia, a form or lunacy in which the function of
the mind is temporarily suspended.
Voluntary Intoxication
Voluntary Intoxication implies that an act done under the influence of self-induced intoxication would
amount to an offence even if the doer, by reason of intoxication was incapable of knowing the nature
of the act or that what he was doing is either wrong or contrary to law. Section 86 deals with immunity
of self-intoxicated person when he commits an offence, requiring particular knowledge or intention
on his pArticle A person who gets into a state of intoxication voluntarily is presumed to have the same
knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated. The underlining principle behind the
above provisions is that the one, who sins when drunk, should be punished when he is sober (quip
eccat ebrius, luat sobrius).
In Basudev versus State of Pepsu [1956 SC], the accused, a retired military officer, and the deceased, a
boy aged about 15 years, attended a marriage party in their village. Everyone went to the house of the
bride to take the midday meal. Some had settled down in their seats and some had not. The retired
officer, who was very drunk and intoxicated, asked the young boy to step aside a little so that he could
occupy a convenient seat. But, when he did not move, the officer whipped out a pistol and shot the
boy in the abdomen. The injury proved fatal. The evidence proved that he attempted to get away from
the scene and was secured at a short distance from the scene of the crime. When he was secured, he
realised what he had done and asked for forgiveness. It was held he intended to inflict bodily injuries
on the deceased and the bodily injuries intended to be inflicted were sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death. Thus, he was found guilty of murder.
In Director of Public Prosecutions versus Beard [1920 HL], the accused ravished a girl of 1three years,
and in furtherance of the act of rape, placed his hand upon her mouth and his thumb upon her
throat. This caused her death by suffocation. The defence was the plea of drunkenness. It was held
that the drunkenness was no defence, unless it could be established that the accused at the time of
committing the act was so drunk that he was incapable of forming an intent to commit rape; that was
not proved. Thus, he was held liable for the offence of murder.
Sections 87 to 94: Consent

Section 87 gives immunity from criminal prosecution on the ground of consent in general. The policy
behind exemption from criminal responsibility in such cases in based on the principle that a man is the
best judge of his own interest, and that no man will consent to what he considers injurious to his own
interest, and if a man decides to suffer a harm voluntarily, he cannot complain of it, when it comes
about. It is based on the well-known Roman maxim volenti non fit injuria, i.e., he who consents cannot
complain of it. The consent given may be either express or implied.

The section clearly states that consent given by a person above 18 years of age for all acts being done
against him except that of causing or intended to be likely to cause his death or grievous hurt, will clear
the actor from criminal liability, it the consenting man should suffer from any harm. A plain reading
makes it clear that Section 87 will not justify causing of:
y death, or
y grievous bodily injury, or
y any harm which is known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt.
In Queen versus Poonai Fattemah [12 W.R., Crim. Rul., 7], the accused, professed to be a snake charmer,
persuaded the deceased to allow himself to be bitten by a poisonous snake, inducing him to believe
that the accused had the power to protect him from any harm. The accused, however, was not able to
save the deceased from the effect of the snake bite. It was held that the deceased’s consent did not
excuse the accused from criminal liability.
In R versus Wilson [1923], the accused, Wilson, asked his wife to tattoo his initials on her breasts.
She refused, but he persuaded her to burn his initials with a hot knife at her buttocks. The wife was
not only a willing partner, but she was the instigator of the activity. Her doctor, who had discovered it
during a routine examination, reported the matter to the police. Wilson was charged with an assault
occasioning actual bodily harm. It was held that tattooing was a perfectly lawful activity so long as it
is carried out with the consent of an adult, even though actual bodily harm was deliberately inflicted.
Thus, charges were dismissed.
Exceptions to the Doctrine of Consent

y Consent will have no relevance in respect of offences that are grave and are public in character.
Example offences against state (Sections 121–130); offences relating to the army, navy, and air force
(Sections 131–140); offences affecting public tranquillity (Sections 141–160); offences relating to
stamps, coins, weights, and measures (Sections 230–294A); etc. Consent to these offences accords
no immunity from liability.
y The acts committed although with consent are per se illegal, irrespective of the harm caused, will
not be protected under Sections 87, 88, and 89.
y Sections 88, 89, and 92 extend protection in those cases only where harm in caused in good faith,
while doing an act for the benefit of the consenting party or by the guardian or persons empowered
to give consent for the purpose on behalf of such a person.
Section 88
This provision grants immunity to doctors against surgical operations and like person from punishment
for all acts which may cause any harm except that of causing death intentionally, provided the act is
done in good faith for the benefit of the consenting party. It also protects teachers who inflict corporal
punishment on children to correct them and to maintain school discipline. The section says that
“nothing which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause,
or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause, to any person for
whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a consent, whether express or implied, to
suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm”. To avail the protection under this provision, the doer
must prove that he did the act in good faith for the benefit of the person with his consent, express or
implied.

Section 89
The section authorises the guardian or other persons having lawful charge of a child below 12 years of
age or a person of unsound mind, who is not competent and capable of giving consent at law, to accord
permission and consent on their behalf to inflict harm either himself or consent to its infliction by
another person provided that it is done in good faith and for the benefit of the person and that the act
is not immoral or illegal. It has four provisos, whereby the benefit of the section will not be available.
y International causing of death or attempting to cause death.
y Consent to the doing of anything that is likely to cause death for any purpose other than the prevention
of death or the causing of any grievous disease or infirmity.
y Causing or attempting to cause grievous hurt except for the purpose of preventing death or grievous
hurt or the causing of any grievous hurt or infirmity.
y Abetment to the commission of any offence.
Section 91: Proviso to Sections 87, 88, and 89

Section 91 is a proviso to Sections 87, 88, and 89 of the Code. It states that protection accorded under
Sections 87, 88, and 89 to a person based on consent would not apply to acts which are offences
independently of any harm caused, or intended to be caused, or known to be likely to be caused to the
person giving consent, or on whose behalf consent is given.
Section 90: What Is Consent

Consent to secure the benefit of exceptions from criminal liability, must be a free consent. Section 90
does not define what is meant by consent, but defines what would not amount to consent. It says that
a consent is not a free consent in the law and is no answer to charge of crime, if:
y it has been procured by putting a man under the fear of an injury, coercion, undue influence or under
a misconception of fact;
y the consent is given by a person who, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or immaturity
or age, i.e., a child below 12 years of age, is incapable of understanding the nature and consequences
of the act to which the consent was accorded.
Section 92: Acts Done in Good Faith for Benefit of a Person without Consent
In certain situations, even when acts are done with consent, they may not amount to any offence,
if these are done in good faith. Section 92 deals with these cases only; for example, situations of
emergency. Consent may be absolutely dispensed with when the circumstances are such as to render
consent impossible or when, in the case of a person incapable of assenting, there is no one at hand
whose consent can be substituted. Under Section 92 the law presumes an implied consent of the party
in question. Law grants immunity to that class of person who might cause harm while performing an
act of surgical operation, etc., though without consent, provided the act was done in good faith and for
the benefit of that very man (injured).
The section lays down the following exceptions when the person shall not be absolved from the
liability.
y Intentional causing of death, or the attempting to cause death
y Doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death for any purpose other
than the preventing of death or grievous hurt or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity

y Voluntary causing of hurt or to the attempting to cause hurt, for any purpose other than the preventing
of death or hurt
y Abetment of any offence to the committing of which offence it would not extend
It is also important to note is that a mere pecuniary benefit would not be termed as benefit for
Sections 88, 89, and 92.
Section 93: Communications Made in Good Faith

Section 93 gives protection to a man against criminal prosecution for making communication to one
which results in harm to him.
In X versus Hospital Z [1998 SC], Hospital Z conducted a blood test upon an individual who was found
to be HIV positive. They disclosed this information to the prospective bride of the appellant (would be
husband). This led to the cancellation of the marriage. It was held that Hospital Z and doctors were
protected under Section 93, IPC. Such disclosure was neither violative of the rule of confidentiality nor
a patient’s right to privacy as the lady with whom the appellant was likely to be married was saved
in time by such disclosure, or else she too would have been most likely infected by AIDS, if marriage
would have taken place and consummated.
Section 94: Acts Committed by a Person under Compulsion or Duress

Section 94 is founded on the well-known maxim actus ne invito factus est nisi actus, i.e., an act
which is done by me, against my will is not may act and hence I am not responsible for it. But the
defence is subject to two exceptions, murder and waging war against the Government of India, which
is punishable with death. The essentials of this section are as follows.
y Act is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats.
y At the time of doing it, there was reasonable apprehension that instant death to that person will
be caused.
y Such a person should not have placed himself in the situation by which he became subject to such
constraint.
The threat to attract the benefit of Section 94 must be of instant death to the person compelled to
commit the offence. Defence of duress is not admissible, when the accused voluntary associates
with others engaged in criminal activity he had foreseen or ought reasonably to have foreseen the
risk of being subjected to any compulsion by threats of violence. The other aspects that require our
attention are as follows (explanations).
y A person, who of his own accord or by reason of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits,
knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of this exception, on the ground of his having
been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence by law.
y A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant death, to do a thing which is an
offence by law. For example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a house for
the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this exception.
Section 95: Act Causing Slight Harm or Trifle Acts

Section 95 is intended to prevent penalisation of negligible wrongs or of offences of trivial nature.
For instance, it is theft to dip a pen in another man’s ink, or to take a sheet of paper from another’s
drawer, causing hurt to a man by pressing against him while getting into a railway compartment, or
into a theatre hall; it is defamation to call a man liar and the like, but the law will not take notice of

such acts. The law will not take notice of trifles, i.e., de mimis non curat lex; the parties are allowed
to settle such petty matters between themselves outside the court. The section applies when the act
that causes harm, or is intended to cause harm, or is known to be likely to cause harm, is so slight that
no person of ordinary sense or temper would complain of it. For example, person taking pods almost
valueless from a tree standing on the government’s waste land, harm to reputation with an imputation
that the accused was traveling with a wrong ticket and conduct of lawyer using filthy language in
course of cross-examination.
Sections 96 to 106: Private Defence

The right of private defence is based on the cardinal principle that it is the primary duty to a man to
help himself. Self-preservation is the prime instinct of every human being.
Sections 96 and 97: Things Done in Private Defence

Section 96 is merely a declaratory section saying that nothing shall be an offence which is done in
the exercise of the right of private defence. The provisions contained give authority to a man to use
necessary force against an assailant or wrongdoer for the purpose of protecting one’s own body and
property as also another’s body and property when immediate aid from the state machinery is not
readily available and in so doing, he is not answerable in law for his does.
Section 97 makes it clear that subject to the exceptions under the Act, every person has a right to
defend:
y his own body and of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body;
y his property or any other’s property, whether movable or immovable, against any act which is an
offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief, or criminal trespass, or which is an
attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief, or criminal trespass.
Where the right of private defence is pleaded, the defence must be a reasonable and probable version
satisfying the cast that the harm caused by the accused was necessary for either warding off the attack
or for forestalling the further reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused. The burden of
establishing the plea of self-defence is on the accused and the burden stands discharged by showing
preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea based on the material on record.
y The right of private defence is exercised only to repel unlawful aggression and not to punish the
aggressor for the offence committed by him.
y The right of private defence arises only in situations where there is an unlawful aggression against
the accused and it cannot be exercised when a person is carrying out a lawful act. In fact,
preventing a person from doing a lawful act would itself amount to an offence. In Kanwar Singh
versus Delhi Administration [1965 SC], a raiding party possessing authority under a section of the
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act seized the stray cattle belonging to the accused. The accused
resisted the seizure and inflicted injuries on the raiding party. Since the raiding party was carrying
out a lawful act, it was justified in law to seize the cattle. Thus, it was held that no right of private
defence was available to the accused. Accordingly, he was convicted.
y Section 99 makes it crystal clear that the injury to be inflicted should be proportionate to the
harm caused or attempted to be caused that is the right does not extend to causing more harm
than necessary. In Mohinder Pal Jolly versus State of Punjab [1978 SC], there was a dispute
between the workers and management over the demand for wages. The workers threw brickbats

at the factory. The owner of the factory came out and fired with a revolver, killing one worker. It
was held that the owner exceeded his right of self-defence in killing the worker. Thus, Exception
2 to Section 300 was not available to him.
y The person exercising such a right should be in actual physical possession of the property.
Section 98: Right of Private Defence against Acts by Incapable Persons

Section 98, IPC, specifically provides that the right of private defence extends to acts which would be
offences, but for the fact that they are acts of youth, persons of unsound mind, acts of intoxicated
person, and acts done under misconception. It ensures that a person does not lose his right of private
defence merely because the opposite party is legally incompetent to commit an offence and is
protected because of legal abnormality.
Section 99: Limitations to the Right to Private Defence

Section 99 lays down the conditions and limits within which the right of private defence can be
exercised. It says that there is no right of private defence:
y against the acts of a public servant acting in good faith; or
y against the acts of those acting under a public servant’s authority or direction; or
y where there is sufficient time for recourse to public authorities.
The quantum of harm that may be caused shall in no case be in excess of harm that may be necessary
for the purpose of defence. The acts in either of these clauses (first and second) must not be of serious
consequences resulting in apprehension of causing death or of grievous hurt which would deprive one
of his rights of private defence. Also, to avail the benefit of those clauses:
y the act done or attempted to be done by a public servant must be done in good faith;
y the act must be done under the colour of his office; and
y there must be reasonable grounds for believing that the acts were done by a public servant as such
or under his authority in the exercise of his legal duty and that the act is not illegal.
Good faith here also means due care and caution as defined under Section 52 of the Code.
In Kesho Ram versus Delhi Administration [1974 Del], the appellant gave a blow to an inspector of the
Delhi Municipal Corporation, who, in discharge of his duty, had gone to collect mild tax and had seized
the appellant’s buffalo. The appellant was convicted for assaulting the inspector. It was held that
the inspector was acting honestly in good faith in the exercises of the power delegated to him by the
commissioner.
Section 100: When the Right of Private Defence of Body Extends to Causing Death
The categories of assault specified in the section where even causing death or any other harm to the
assailant under the restrictions mentioned in Section 99 is justified are:
y causing the apprehension of death;
y causing the apprehension of grievous hurt;
y with the intention of committing rape;
y with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
y with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
y with the intention of wrongfully confining a person under circumstances which may give apprehension
that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his redress.

“An act of throwing or administering acid or such an attempt causing reasonable apprehension of
grievous hurt” (Added by Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013).
However, to invoke the section, the following four conditions must exist.
y The person exercising the right of private defence must be free from fault in bringing about the
encounter.
y There must be present an impending peril to life or of great bodily harm, either real or so apparent,
as to create an honest belief of exceeding (great) necessity.
y There must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by retreat.
y There must have been a necessity for taking the life.
In Yeshwant Rao versus State of Madhya Pradesh [1992 SC], the minor daughter of the accused had
gone to the toilet on the rear side of the house. The deceased caught her and had sexual intercourse
with her. The accused seeing his minor girl being raped by the deceased, hit him with a spade. The
deceased on trying to flee, fell and hit himself. He died due to injury of the liver. It was held that since
the girl was a minor, the question of ‘consent’ did not arise and the act of the deceased would amount
to committing rape under Section 376, IPC. Thus, the father in defence of the body of his daughter was
justified in exercising his right of private defence. The accused was acquitted.
In Vishwanath versus State of Uttar Pradesh [1960 SC], the accused’s sister was staying with her
father and brother (the accused) because she did not want to live with her husband. The deceased
(the husband) came to the house of the accused and tried to drag his wife away. The woman caught
hold of the door as she was being taken out and tug-of-war followed between her and her husband.
At this state, the accused took out a knife and stabbed the deceased once. The knife penetrated the
heart and he fell senseless, and thereafter died. It was pleaded that his case would come Section 100.
It was held that abduction, in clause (5) of Section 100 meant only abduction simpliciter as defined
under Section 362 where a person was compelled by force to go from any place. It ruled that the
moment there was an assault with intention to abduct, the right to private defence was available
which was also the case in the present circumstances. The Apex Court acquitted the accused.
Section 101: When Such Right Extends to Causing Any Harm Other than Death
Except for circumstances provided under Section 100, in all other situations, the right of private defence
of body will only extend to causing any ‘other harm’, short of death.
Section 102: Commencement and Continuance of the Right to Private Defence

Under this section, the right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable
apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit an offence, though the
offence might not be committed, and such right continues so long as such apprehension of danger to
the body continues.
Section 103: When the Right of Private Defence of Property Extends to Causing Death
Subject to the restrictions mentioned in Section 99, under Section 103, the right of private defence of
property extends to voluntary causing of death, in case of robbery, house-breaking by night, theft, or
mischief, when such theft or mischief is committed in such circumstances as may reasonably cause an
apprehension that death or grievous hurt will result, if such right of private defence is not exercised.

Section 104: When Such Right Extends to Causing Any Harm Other than Death
Section 104 provides that if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right of private defence,
be theft, mischief, or criminal trespass, and not of any of the descriptions enumerated in Section 103,
the right of defence extends only to the voluntary causing of any harm other than death.
Section 105: Commencement and Continuance of the Right of Private Defence of Property
The right of defence of property commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the
property commences. The continuance depends upon the nature of the offence.
y Theft continues until the offender has affected his retreat with the property, or the assistance of
public authorities is obtained, or the property has been recovered.
y Robbery continues as long as the offender causes or attempts to cause any person death or hurt, or
as long as instant personal restraint continues.
y Criminal trespass or mischief continues so long as the offender continues in the commission of
criminal trespass or mischief.
Section 106: Right of Private Defence against Deadly Assault When There Is Risk of Harm to
Innocent Person
The section provides that whenever an apprehension of death exists and the person is so situated that
he cannot effectively exercise the right of private defence without the possibility of doing harm to an
innocent person, he may take the risk of such harm resulting. In other words, in the exercise of right of
private defence if some innocent person is killed or injured, law protects the man exercising the right
of private defence by exempting him from criminal liability.
Offences against Human Body—Culpable Homicide and Murder

Section 299: Culpable Homicide
Homicide means the killing of a human being by a human being. Killing by an omission is in no case
criminal, unless there is a legal duty to do that which is omitted. Homicide may be either—lawful,
where law will set the culprit free, or unlawful, where the culprit will be held criminally responsible
for his criminal act.
Culpable homicide may broadly be classified into the following.
y Culpable homicide amounting to murder (Section 300)
y Culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 300, Exceptions 1 to 5)
The Code has recognised three degrees of culpable homicide. They are as follows.
y First degree is the gravest form of culpable homicide and is termed ‘murder’, defined in Section 300
and punishable under Section 302 with death or imprisonment for life to either of which fine may
be added.
y Second degree (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) is defined in Section 300. Exceptions 1 to
5 and Section 299, clauses (i) and (ii) are punishable under Section 304 (first part) with imprisonment
for life or imprisonment or either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, to either of
which fine may be added.
y Third degree, defined in Section 299, clause (iii), is punishable under the latter part of Section 304
with fine only or with imprisonment up to a limit of 10 years or with both.

The important elements to establish the offence of culpable homicide under Section 299 are:
y causing of death,
y by doing an act.
The act of causing death must be done:
y with the intention of causing death,
y with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or
y with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death.
To hold a person liable under the impugned section there must be causing of death of human being
as defined under Section 46 of the Code. It says that the word ‘death’ denotes the death of a human
being unless the contrary appears from the context. In case of a child in a mother’s womb, the act of
causing death amounts to culpable homicide if any part of that child has been brought forth, though
the child may not have breathed or been completely born.
There are three explanations attached to the section.
y Explanation 1 provides for a situation where the injured person is suffering from some disorder,
disease, or bodily infirmity, which quickened his death. The person who caused the injury cannot
escape criminal liability of culpable homicide by stating that if the person injured did not suffer from
the said disease or disorder, he would not have died.
y Explanation 2 provides for a situation wherein a person who has been injured could have recovered
and escaped death, if he had been given prompt and proper medical treatment.
y Explanation 3 states that if the death of the child is caused when still in the mother’s womb, it is
not culpable homicide.
It is the mental element of the accused alone, which is material to decide whether a particular act
is culpable homicide amounting to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. There are
three species of mens rea in culpable homicide.
y Expectation of death to be the consequence thereof
y Expectation of a dangerous injury to be the consequence of the act
y Knowledge that death is a likely consequence of his act, and in each case death ensues, his intention
in the first two cases, and his knowledge in the third, renders the act a homicide.
Section 300: Murder

The word ‘murder’ has been derived from the Germanic word mortna, which means secret killing.
Section 300 tells when the offence is ‘murder’ and when it is ‘culpable homicide not amounting to
murder’. The exceptions tell when the offence is culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable
under the first part of Section 304, IPC. ‘Culpable homicide’ is genus, and ‘murder’ is the specie. This
means that all murders are culpable homicide but vice versa is not true.
In Reg versus Govinda [1877 Bom], the prisoner, a young man of 18, kicked his wife (a girl of 15) and
struck her several times with his fist on the back. These blows seemed to have caused her no serious
injury. She, however, fell on the ground, and then the accused put one knee on her chest and struck her
two or three times on the face. One or two of these blows were violent and took effect on the girl’s eye,
produced an injury and discoloration. The skull was not fractured, but the blow caused extravasations
of blood in the brain and the girl died in consequence either on the spot or very shortly afterwards. It
was held that since in the present case the bodily injury was not sufficient in the ordinary course of

nature to cause death the offence committed was not murder but culpable homicide punishable under
Section 304, IPC.
Clause (i) of Section 300: Intentionally Causing Death

Sections 299(a) and 300(1), IPC, show that where there is an intention to kill, the offence is always
murder. In other words, the first clause of Section 300 stipulates that when an act is done with the
intention of causing death, then it is culpable homicide amounting to murder. It is the gravest of the
species of murder. The intention to cause death can be inferred from the act.
Clause (ii) of Section 300: Injury Caused Resulting in Death Knowing the Peculiar Conditions
of the Victim
The second clause of Section 300 stipulates that if a person intentionally causes bodily injury, with
the knowledge that such bodily injury will cause death of the person injured, then it will be culpable
homicide amounting to murder. In other words, the offence of murder will be made if the offender
knows that the person injured is likely, either from peculiarity of the Constitution or immature age or
other special circumstances could be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death. The
second clause of Section 299 is like clause (ii) of Section 300. But the difference lies that in Section
299, ‘knowledge’ that the injury is likely to cause death is not postulated as contemplated in clause
(ii) of Section 300.
Clause (iii) of Section 300: Intentional Causing of Injury Sufficient to Cause Death
The third clause includes within itself mens rea to cause bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. Here, if the intention of the offender to cause the injury is established
and the injury caused is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, then the accused
is guilty of culpable homicide amounting to murder.
In Virsa Singh versus State of Punjab [1958 SC], the injury caused was the result of blow with a knife in
the stomach which was given with such force that the weapon had penetrated the abdomen and had
injured the bowels. According to the doctor, the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death. Therefore, in the absence of any circumstances to show that the injury was caused
accidentally or unintentionally, it had to be presumed that the accused had intended to cause the
inflicted injury and the condition of clause (iii) of Section 300 were satisfied. Conviction under Section
302 was upheld.
Clause (iv) of Section 300: Knowledge That the Act Is So Imminently Dangerous So as to
Cause Death
Clause (iii) of Section 299, IPC, and clause (iv) of Section 300, IPC, are intended to apply to cases in
which there is no intention to cause death, however death results. In such a case whether the offence
is culpable homicide or murder depends upon degree of risk to human life. If death is a likely result,
it is culpable homicide; if it is the most probable result, it is murder. In cases the offender should
commit to an imminently dangerous act having the knowledge of it being imminently dangerous, that
in all probability it will cause either death or any bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The mental
element contemplated under this clause is ‘knowledge’ and not intention, i.e., least mens rea to cause
death.

Exceptions to Murder—When Culpable Homicide Is Not Murder
Exception I: Grave and Sudden Provocation
To bring about this exception to any alleged offence of murder, the following need to be established.
y The deceased must have given provocation to the accused.
y The provocation must be grave and sudden.
y By reason of the said provocation, the offender should have been deprived of his power of self-
control.
y The killing was done during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control.
y The death of the person caused should be of the one who gave the provocation or that of any other
person by mistake or accident.
The exception shall not available under the following circumstances.
y If the accused gives provocation or uses it as an excuse for assaulting another.
y If the act is legally done by a public servant in the exercise of his legal right as a public servant.
y If the act is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.
The test to be applied in each case is the effect of the provocation on a reasonable man belonging
to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed
would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. Subsequently, in applying the test, it is of particular
importance to:
y consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since the provocation to allow a reasonable man
time to cool, and
y consider the instrument with which the homicide was affected. To retort, in the heat of passion
induced by provocation, by a simple blow is a very different thing from making use of a deadly
instrument such as a concealed dagger.
In KM Nanavati versus State of Maharashtra [1962 SC], the accused was naval officer. One day, his wife
confessed to his that she had developed intimacy with the deceased. The accused then drove his wife
and children to a cinema, left them there. Then went to his ship, took a revolver on a false pretext,
loaded it with cartridges, did some official work, went to the office of the victim. He could not find
him there. Thus, went to his flat and straight into his bedroom where he shot him dead, after a heated
exchange of words. Thereafter, the accused surrendered himself to the police. The question before the
Supreme Court was whether the act of the accused could be said to fall within Exception 1 of Section
300. The court laid down the following principles.
y The test is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed
when the accused was place, would be so provoked as to lose his self-control.
y Words and gestures may, also under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation.
y The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration.
y The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and
not after the passion has cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving the accused room and
scope for premeditation and calculation.
In this case, the time lapse between his leaving his house and the time or the murder was three hours.
The court held that this was sufficient time for passion to cool and for self-control to be regained,
even if he had not regained it earlier that is during the time lapse between his wife’s confession and

putting his plan of action against the deceased into effect. Thus, the accused was liable for the offence
of murder only.
Exception II: Exceeding the Right of Private Defence

To avail this exception, first it must be proved that the accused had the right of private defence as
stipulated in Sections 96–106, IPC. If a person genuinely exercises his right or private defence within
the limits prescribed by law, then he commits no offence. If the accused caused the death of a person
without premeditation and he had no intention of causing more harm than was necessary for the
purpose of defence and that the act was done in good faith, the exception shall be available to him.
Thus, if he exceeds the right, it will amount to a lesser offence than murder.
Exception III: Act of Public Servant

Exception III deals with situations where a public servant exceeds his lawful powers in the discharge
of his duties and thereby causes death. For the exception to be available to the accused, the following
must be established.
y The offence must be committed by a public servant or by a person aiding a public servant in the
discharge of official duties.
y He should have exceeded the powers given to him by law.
y The act should be done in good faith without any ill will towards the person whose death was caused.
y The public servant should have believed that his act was lawful and necessary for the due discharge
of his duties.
Exception IV: Sudden Fight or Quarrel

For an act of killing another to fall under this exception, the death of an individual must be caused
as a result of a sudden fight in the heat of passion without premeditation, arising out of such sudden
quarrel. The offender should not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner. An important thing to note is that the fight must have been with the person killed.
Exception V: Consent or Euthanasia (Mercy Killing)

To bring about this exception, the following should be established.
y The deceased was above the age of 18 years.
y He either suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.
Punishment for murder and Culpable Homicide

y Murder: death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine (Section 302).
y Murder by a life convict: death (Section 303).
y Culpable homicide not amounting to murder: imprisonment for life or imprisonment which may
extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine (Section 304, Part I).
y If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or of causing such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death: imprisonment for life or imprisonment which may extend to
10 years and shall also be liable to fine (Section 304, Part I).
y If the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to
cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death: imprisonment which may
extend to 10 years or with fine or with both (Section 304, Part II).

Distinction between Murder and Culpable Homicide
Culpable Homicide (Section 299) Murder (Section 300)
A person commits culpable homicide, if the act Subject to certain exceptions, culpable homicide
by which the death is caused is done: is murder, if the act by which the death is caused
y with the intention of causing death; is done:
y with the intention of causing such bodily y with the intention of causing death;
injury as is likely to cause death; y with the intention of causing such bodily
y with the knowledge that the act is cause injury, as the offender knows to be likely to
death. cause the death of the person to whom the
harm is caused;
y with the intention of causing bodily injury to
any person, and the bodily injury intended
to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death;
y with the knowledge that the act is so likely
to imminently dangerous that is must in all
probability cause death, or such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death and committed
without any excuse for incurring the risk or
causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Section 301: Transfer of Malice

Section 301, IPC, embodies the principle of transfer of or transmigration of malice or motive. Here, if a
person commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any person whose death was not intended,
still he shall be liable the same way as if the death of such a person was thought of and not of someone
else. The idea behind this provision is perhaps that the criminal intent needs to be punished even if
death of another has been caused by mistake as to whose actually was intended.
In other words, this relates to causing of the death of a person other than whose death was intended.
The best example to explain the principle is the case of Public Prosecutor versus Mushunooru
Suryanarayana Moorty [1912 Mad]. Here, the accused, with the intention of killing A on whose life he
had taken out considerable insurance without latter’s knowledge, to obtain the insured amount gave
him some sweets mixed with a well-known poison like arsenic. The intended victim ate some of the
sweets and threw the rest away which were picked up by two children who ate them and died of
poisoning. It was held that the accused was liable for the murder of the children though he intended
only to kill A.
Section 304A: Death by Negligence

To bring a case of homicide under Section 304A, IPC, the following conditions must exist.
y There must be death of the person in question.
y The accused must have caused such death.
y That such act of the accused was rash or negligent and that it did not amount to culpable homicide.

y There must be a direct nexus between the death of a person and the rash and negligent act of the
accused.
Rash act denotes the want of proper care and caution. Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law.
To impose criminal liability for doctor’s negligence under Section 304A, IPC, there must be a direct
nexus between the death of the patient and the negligent act of the doctor and that act must be the
proximate cause and efficient cause without the intervention or another’s negligence.
In Cherubin Gregory versus State of Bihar [1964 SC], the deceased was an inmate of a house near that
of the accused. The wall of the latrine of the house of the deceased had fallen about a week prior
to the day of the occurrence. As a result, the latrine became exposed to public view. Consequently,
the deceased, among others, stared using the latrine of the accused. The accused resented this and
clarified that they did not have his permission to use it. The accused fixed up a naked and uninsulated
copper wire across the passage leading up to his latrine. There was no warning that the wire was live.
Though the deceased had previously managed to pass into the latrine without contacting the wire, but
one day as she came out her hand happened to touch it and she received a shock that proved fatal and
resulted in her death soon after. It was held that the voltage of the current passing through the naked
wire being high enough to be lethal, there could be no dispute that charging it with current of that
voltage was a rash act done in reckless disregard of the serious consequences to people encountering
it for which the accused is solely responsible under Section 304A.
The punishment of causing death by negligence is imprisonment which may extend to two years or
with fine or with both.
Section 304B: Dowry Death

Section 304B was inserted in the IPC by an amendment in the year 1986 with a view to reduce the
menace of bride burning in India. When cruelty or harassment is inflicted by the husband or his
relative for or in connection with, any demand for dowry immediately preceding death of the woman
by burns and bodily injury or in abnormal circumstances within seven years of marriage, such husband
or relative is deemed to have caused her death and is liable to be punished under Section 304B, IPC,
for dowry death.
Section 113B, Evidence Act, was also inserted which provides for presumption of dowry death. It states
that if it is shown that soon before the death of a woman such woman has been subjected to cruelty
or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such
person has caused the dowry death under Section 304B, IPC.
The term ‘dowry’ has not been defined in the IPC. However, it has been clarified in the explanation
to Section 304B that ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as defined in Section 2(1) of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961. According to Section 2 of the 1961 Act, ‘dowry’ means any property or valuable
security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly:
y by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
y by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or
to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of
said parties but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal
Law (Shariat) applies.
As per the wordings of Section 304B, the following must be established.
y Death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances.
y Death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage.

y The woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband for or in connection with the demand for dowry.
y Cruelty or harassment should have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.
The meaning of cruelty shall be the same as for the one provided for Section 498A, IPC, as per the
explanation clause of that section.
The punishment for dowry death is imprisonment for seven years to life imprisonment.
Section 305: Abetment of Suicide of a Child or an Insane Person

y Suicide has been committed by the deceased.
y Such a suicide was committed by a child below 18 years of age; or an insane person; or a person in
the state of intoxication; or an idiot; or any delirious person.
y There shall be an abetment to such a commission of suicide.
The punishment of abetment of suicide of a child or an insane person is imprisonment to the extent
of life imprisonment or up to 10 years and fine.
Section 306: Abetment of Suicide

The offence of ‘abetment to suicide’ must conform to the same definition of ‘abetment’ as given
in Section 107, IPC. Thus, there can be instigation or engaging in conspiracy or assistance in the
commission of the offence.
y There has been commission of suicide by a person.
y Such suicide was abetted by another person.
The punishment for abetment of suicide is imprisonment that may extend up to 10 years and also a
fine.
Section 113A was inserted in the Evidence Act, 1872, by an amendment made in 1983 which provides
for presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. It says that when abetment of suicide
by a married woman is alleged by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that
she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage, the Court
may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
It should also be established that she was subject to cruelty by her husband or such relative of her
husband.
Constitutional Validity
In P Rathinam versus Union of India [1994 SC], the provision was held to be unconstitutional. Gian Kaur
versus State of Punjab [1996 SC] held the provision was not ultra vires the Constitution. It was based
on the public policy that no person should involve himself in or instigate or aid the commission of a
crime.
Section 307: Attempt to Murder

To attract the provisions of Section 307, IPC, the following must exist.
y The death of human being must be attempted.
y The accused must have made the attempt.
y The act must be done with the intention of causing death or it be done with the intention of causing
such bodily injury as:

⚪ the accused knew to be likely to cause death, and
⚪ that it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
y The accused attempted to cause such death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently
dangerous that it must in all probability cause.
Thus, here all the elements of murder exist, except for the fact that death has not occurred.
Section 308: Attempt to Commit Culpable Homicide

A person is said to commit an offence under this section, if he does an act with such intention or
knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he thereby caused death, he would be guilty of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder as defined under any of the Exceptions 1 to 5, Section 300,
IPC. The accused shall be punished with an imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine
or with both. If hurt is caused to any person by such act, imprisonment which may extend to seven
years or with fine or with both.
Section 309: Attempt to Commit Suicide

y An act has been done in furtherance of intention to commit suicide by a person.
y Such an act falls short of commission but remains in the stage of attempt only.
The punishment for attempt to comment suicide is simple imprisonment which may extend to one
year or with fine or with both.
In the P Rathinam case [1994 SC], the petitioners assailed the validity of Section 309, IPC, by contending
that it was violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. While striking down Section 309, IPC,
the Apex Court said, “it was a cruel and irrational provision, violative of Article 21 of the Constitution”.
Expanding the scope of the Article, the court upheld that ‘right to life’ would include ‘right not to live
a forced life’ that is to end one’s life if one so desire.
In the Gian Kaur case [1996 SC], the appellant and her husband were convicted by the Trial Court under
Section 306, IPC, for abetting the commission of suicide by Kulwant Kaur. It was urged that ‘right to
die’ being included in Article 21 of the Constitution declaring Section 309, IPC, to be unconstitutional,
any person abetting the commission of suicide by another was merely assisting in the enforcement of
fundamental ‘right to die’ under Article 21, and, therefore, Section 306, IPC, penalising assisted suicide
was equally violative of Article 21. The Supreme Court set aside its earlier judgement in P Rathinam/
Nagbhushan Patnaik versus Union of India. It said that in a country where one-half of its population still
lived below the poverty line, right to die by suicide could not be granted to any person. Article 21 of the
Constitution, which gave right to life and personal liberty, by no stretch of imagination could be said
to impliedly include right to death by committing suicide. The section was also not violative of Article
14. There was no requirement of awarding any minimum sentence. The sentence of imprisonment or
fine was not compulsory but discretionary. In other words, the Apex Court held Section 306, IPC, as
constitutional and said that ‘right to life’ did not include ‘right to die’.
Section 310: Thug

The essentials are as follows.
y The accused should have been habitually associated other or others.
y Such association should be for the purpose of committing robbery or child-stealing by means of or
accompanied with murder.
y The punishment is imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine (Section 311).

Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to Unborn Children, of Exposure of Infants, and of
Concealment of Births
Section 312: Causing Miscarriage

Section 312 makes the causing of miscarriage with the consent of the woman to be a punishable
offence. In simple words, miscarriage means expulsion of the immature foetus at any time before it
reaches full growth. To call for the application Section 312, the following should be established.
y Voluntarily causing a woman with child to miscarry (abort)
y Such miscarriage (abortion) should not have been caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the
life of the woman.
The IPC makes voluntarily causing miscarriage an offence in two situations.
y When a woman is ‘with child’, i.e., the situation as soon as gestation begins. The punishment for this
is up to three years of imprisonment, or fine, or both
y when a woman is ‘quick with child’, i.e., the situation when the motion is felt by the mother. This is
the perception by the mother that movement of the foetus has started. The punishment for this is
imprisonment which may extend to seven years and fine.
Section 313: Causing Miscarriage without the Woman’s Consent

y The offence of causing miscarriage should be made out.
y Such miscarriage should be caused without the consent of the woman, whether the woman is quick
with child or not.
The punishment is imprisonment for life or imprisonment which may extend to 10 years and shall also
be liable to fine.
Note: under this section, only the person procuring the abortion is liable to punishment, whereas under
Section 312, IPC, the woman is also liable to punishment.
Section 314: Death Caused by Act Intended to Cause Miscarriage

y Intention to cause the miscarriage of woman with child should be there.
y An act is done towards such an offence.
y Such an act causes the death of such woman.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. If act is
done without woman’s consent, imprisonment for life or with the punishment mentioned above.
For this offence, it is not essential to this offence that the offender should know that the act is likely
to cause death (explanation).
Section 315: Act Done with Intent to Prevent a Child from Being Born Alive
Section 315 makes any act done with intent to prevent a child from being born alive or to cause it to
die after birth punishable, unless the act is done in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both.

Section 316: Causing Death of a Quick Unborn Child by Act Amounting to Culpable Homicide
y The woman was quick with child.
y The accused did an act to cause the death of the child.
y The circumstances under which the act was done were such as to make the accused guilty of
culpable homicide if death has been caused.
Section 317: Exposure and Abandonment of a Child under 12 Years by Parent or Person Having
Care of It
y The accused should be either the father or mother of a child, having the care of such child.
y Such a child should be under the 12 years of age.
y The father or the mother should expose or leave such child in any place with the intention of wholly
abandoning such child.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to seven years or with fine or with both.
Explanation: this section is not intended to prevent the trial of the offender for murder or culpable
homicide if the child dies in consequence of the exposure.
Section 318: Concealment of Birth by Secret Disposal of Dead Body

y Secret burying or otherwise disposing of the dead body of a child.
y It is immaterial whether such child dies before or after or during his birth.
y Intention to conceal the birth of such child by such secret burying or disposal.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to two years or with fine or with both.
Hurt and Grievous Hurt

Section 319: Simple Hurt
This section does not define any offence. It merely states what is meant by hurt. To constitute hurt
under Section 319, it is necessary to cause:
y bodily pain,
y disease, or
y infirmity to another.
The expression ‘bodily pain’ means that the pain must be physical as opposed to any mental pain.
‘Infirmity’ denotes an unsound or unhealthy state of the body. By the courts, it has been interpreted to
mean inability of an organ to perform its normal function. A person communicating a particular disease
to another would be guilty of hurt.
In Emperor versus Anis Beg [1924 All], Anis, a boy of 16 years of age, was in love with a girl. Intending
to administer to her something in nature of a love philtre (potion), gave her some sweetmeats. The
girl and some of her family ate the sweetmeats and all of them were seized with violent symptoms of
poisoning, though none of them died. The boy was held guilty of causing hurt.

Section 321: Voluntarily Causing Hurt
Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge
that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said
‘Voluntarily to cause hurt’.
The punishment for voluntarily causing hurt is imprisonment which may extend to one year or with
fine which may extend to 1000 rupees or with both (except in the case provided for by Section 334)
(Section 323).
Section 320: Grievous Hurt

This section designates eight kinds of hurt as grievous.
y Emasculation (deprivation of masculine vigour of a male person)
y Permanent deprivation of the sight of either eye (the test of gravity being permanency of the injury
caused to one eye or both eyes)
y Permanent deprivation of hearing of either ear (may be with respect to one ear or both ears)
y Deprivation of any member or joint
y Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint
y Permanent disfiguration of the head or face
y Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth
y Hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of 20 days in severe
bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits
In Palani Gowndan versus Emperor [1919 Mad], the accused struck his wife a violent blow on the head
which rendered her unconscious. He hanged his wife soon afterwards under the impression that she
was already dead intending to create false evidence as to the cause of the death and to conceal his
own crime. It was held that the intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of the actual
circumstances, but in the light of what he supposed to be the circumstances. Hence, the accused
could not be convicted either of murder or culpable homicide. He could of course be punished both
for his original assault on his wife and for his attempt to create fake evidence by hanging her.
Section 322: Voluntarily Causing Grievous Hurt

Whoever voluntarily causes hurt, if the hurt which he intends to cause or knows himself to be likely
to cause is grievous hurt, and if the hurt which he causes is grievous hurt, is said ‘voluntarily to cause
grievous hurt’.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine
(except in the case provided for by Section 335) (Section 325).
Sections 326A and 326B (Provisions Added by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013):
Causing Grievous Hurt by Acid Attacks
To further punish offenders of acid attacks, new sections by way of Sections 326A and 326B have
been added. The former provision clarifies that if any person causes permanent or partial deformity or
damage, burns, maims, disfigures, or disables any part of the body of another with an acid, he shall be
punished with imprisonment which shall not be less than 10 years and may extend to life and shall be
with fine so as to meet medical expenses of the victim and such fine shall be paid to him only. To add
to this, Section 326B clarifies that throwing and attempting to throw acid on any other person with the

intention of causing grievous hurt to him, shall be punishable with at least five years which may extend
to seven years and shall be liable to pay fine to the victim.
The difference between the aforementioned provisions lies in the fact that the former talks about
causing grievous hurt using acid but the latter punishes throwing or even attempting to throw acid on
another person.
Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement

Section 339: Wrongful Restraint
In simple words, wrongful restraint means obstructing a man from moving from one place to another,
where he has the right to be and wants to go. Malice is not a necessary element of the offence under
this section. This provision requires the following
y Voluntary obstruction of a person
y The obstruction must be such as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which
he has a right to proceed
In wrongful restraint, there not need be any stoppage of movement. It may be directed into a channel
different from the direction in which the victim intends to move. If the obstruction is made in good
faith and the accused believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, no offence is committed as
has been stated in the exception clause.
The punishment is simple imprisonment which may extend to one month or with fine which may
extend to 500 rupees or with both (Section 341).
Section 340: Wrongful Confinement

y Wrongful restraint of a person.
y Such restraint must prevent that person from proceedings beyond certain circumscribing limits.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to 1000
rupees or with both (Section 342).
Criminal Force and Assault

Section 349: Force
A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion
to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of
motion as brings that substances into contract with any part of that other’s body, or with anything
which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that
other’s sense of feeling:
Provided that the person causing the motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion, causes that
motion, change of motion, or cessation or motion in one of the three ways hereinafter described. Thus,
this section defines ‘force’ and does not constitute any offence.
Section 350: Criminal Force

Criminal force is equivalent to battery in English law, which means the intentional infliction of force by
one person upon another against the latter’s consent. The use of force which causes motion, change of
motion or cessation of motion to another person, done without the consent of such person, in order to
commit an offence, or cause injury, fear or annoyance to the said person, will amount to criminal force.

Section 351: Assault
The essential ingredients of assault are as follows.
y That the accused should make a gesture or preparation to use criminal force.
y Such gesture or preparation should be made in the presence of the person in respect of whom it is
made.
y There should be intention or knowledge on the part of the accused that such gesture or preparation
would cause apprehension in the mind of the victim that criminal force would be used against him.
y The person threatened should be present and near enough to apprehend danger.
Section 354: Assault or Criminal Force to Outrage the Modesty of a Woman

y An assault or criminal force is used to any woman.
y Such an act is done with the intent to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage
modesty of such woman.
The punishment is imprisonment of one year which may extend to five years and fine.
Section 354A: Sexual Harassment and Punishment for Sexual Harassment

If any man commits any of the following acts, he shall be guilty for commission of the offence of sexual
harassment.
y Physical contact and advances involving unwelcomed and explicit sexual overtures
y Demand or request for sexual overtures
y Showing pornography against the will of another person
y Making sexually-coloured remarks
The punishment for the first three has been fixed at an imprisonment for three years or fine or both,
while punishment for the last has been fixed at an imprisonment for one year or fine or both.
Section 354B: Assault or Use of Criminal Force to Woman to Disrobe Her

An assault or use of criminal force or such an abetment, to a woman with the intention to disrobe her
or compelling her to be naked has been made punishable with an imprisonment of three years which
may extend to seven years and fine.
Section 354C: Voyeurism

If any man watches or captures images of a woman, engaged in such a private act that she would not
expect any person to watch her, shall be punished with an imprisonment of at least one year which
may extend to three years and fine. Upon a subsequent conviction, the imprisonment would be at least
for three years which may extend to seven years imprisonment and fine. As per the explanation to the
provision, a private act would include an act of watching carried out in a place which would reasonably
be expected to provide privacy and where the victim’s genitals, posterior, or breasts are exposed or
covered only in underwear; or that she is using a lavatory; or is doing a sexual act generally not done
in public. For further protection to women, the second explanation makes it clear that if the victim
consents to such capturing of images but not be shown to third persons, such showing will amount
to voyeurism only.

Section 354D: Stalking
A man commits the offence of stalking when he does the following.
y Follows a woman and contacts or attempts to contact her for his personal interaction, despite of
repeated refusal by her
y Monitors the use of internet, email, or other electronic forms of a woman
However, it is important to note that if the man proves the following, his act will not amount to the
offence of stalking.
y Such acts committed by him were in the nature to prevent or detect commission of crimes by such
woman under the authority by the state
y Such acts were done in pursuance of any law or to comply with any of such requirements
y Such conduct was reasonable and justified in the given circumstances
Stalking has been made punishable with an imprisonment which may extend to three years and fine.
Upon subsequent conviction, the punishment may extend to five years and fine.
Kidnapping and Abduction
Section 359: Classification of Kidnapping

Kidnapping literally means child-stealing. Section 359, IPC, classifies kidnapping under two categories.
y Kidnapping from India (Section 360)
y Kidnapping from lawful guardianship (Section 361)
Section 360: Kidnapping from India

y Conveying of any person beyond the limits of India
y Without the consent of that person, or of someone legally authorised to consent on behalf of that
person
The offence under this section may be committed in respect of any person whether a male, female, or
minor and irrespective of his or her nationality.
Section 361: Kidnapping from Lawful Guardianship

To establish an offence under Section 361, the following conditions must exist.
y There must be taking or enticing of a minor, or a person of unsound mind.
y Such minor must be under 16 years of age, if a male, or under 18 years of age, if a female.
y Taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of
unsound mind.
y Taking or enticing must be without the consent of such guardian.
The word ‘takes’ merely means to cause to go, to escort or to get into possession. The word ‘entice’
means the idea of inducement or allurement by giving rise to hope or desire in the other. It is not
necessary that the taking or enticing must be shown to have been by means of force or fraud. Persuasion
by the accused person which creates willingness on the part of the minor to be taken out of the
keeping of lawful guardian would be sufficient to attract the section.
A lawful guardian is a guardian whose custody is sanctioned by law. The expression lawful guardian
would include a natural guardian, a testamentary guardian appointed by the court, and a person

lawfully entrusted with the care and custody of a minor. The word ‘keeping’ connotes the idea of
charge, protection, maintenance, and control. If a minor is not in the custody of a lawful guardian,
the section is not attracted. As for the question of consent, the consent of the minor child is of no
relevance, because a minor has no legal capacity to contract and the consent given by a minor or a
person of unsound mind is not consent.
In S Varadarajan versus State of Madras [1964 SC], Savitri was a student at college and the appellant
were neighbours. They became friendly with each other. On 01 October 1960, Savitri left her father’s
house and telephoned the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place. She went to that place
and finding the accused waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. The accused took her
to certain places and then to the registrar’s office and got the agreement of marriage registered there.
Thereafter, both remained as husband and wife. There was no evidence that any force or inducement
was used. On the contrary, it appeared that insistence of marriage came from her side. He was
thereafter charged for the offence of kidnapping. There was no evidence whatsoever that the accused
had ‘taken’ her out of the lawful guardianship of her parents, as there was no active part played by the
accused to persuade her to leave the house. It was held that no offence under this section was made.
In Thakoral D Vadgama versus State of Gujarat [1973 SC], the accused came into contract with the
family of the girl’s (Mohini) father. He held hopes of being appointed as the manager of a new factory,
which he was going to start at Mount Abu and Ahmedabad and stayed in big hotels spending lavishly.
Within a few days, thereafter, he purchased gifts for Mohini. He was found on Mohini’s bed by her
mother at Mount Abu and his connection with Mohini was suspected, and in spite of the mother’s
grave protest, he was in correspondence with her without the knowledge of her parents. She wrote
letters to the accused exaggerating incidents of rebuke and beatings by her mother. The accused took
advantage of her immature feelings and induced her to come to his house on an appointed day. She
came and was taken to his garage and then she was induced to go to the public road by the accused
when the police party came with her father. The accused falsely denied her presence in his house but
some of her clothes, her school exercise books, etc., were taken from the garage, where she had been
asked to remain by the accused. The accused was held liable for the offence of kidnapping. The court
said that if the minor leaves her guardian’s protection uninfluenced by any promise or inducement
emanating from the accused, then the latter cannot be held responsible. But if he had ordered any
inducement earlier that became an immediate cause of her leaving then guardian’s protection, it would
constitute the offence under Section 361, IPC.
The punishment for kidnapping is imprisonment which may extend to seven years and shall also be
liable to fine (Section 363).
Section 362: Abduction

Abduction pure and simple is not an offence. It is an auxiliary act not punishable in itself, but when
it is accompanied by a certain intention to commit another offence, it per se becomes punishable as
an offence. Abduction is an offence only if it is done with intent to:
y murder (Section 364);
y secretly and wrongfully confining a person (Section 365);
y induce woman to compel her marriage (Section 366);
y subject person to grievous hurt, slavery, etc. (Section 367);
y steal from a person under 10 years (Section 369).

As per Section 362, if any person by force compels or by any deceitful means induces any person to go
from any place, is said to abduct that person. The word ‘force’ used therein connotes the actual force
and not merely a show or threat of force.
Abduction as an Offence
y Section 364: kidnapping or abduction to commit murder or being disposed of as to be put in danger
of being murdered; the punishment is imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term
which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine.
y Section 365: kidnapping or abduction to secretly and wrongfully confining a person; the punishment
is imprisonment which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.
y Section 366: kidnapping or abduction of any woman with intent to marry her or to have illicit
intercourse; the punishment is imprisonment which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable
to fine.
y Section 367: kidnapping or abduction to subject such person to grievous hurt, or slavery, or to
unnatural lust of any person; the punishment is imprisonment which may extend to 10 years and
shall also be liable to fine.
y Section 369: kidnapping or abduction of a child under the age of 10 years with the intention to steal;
the punishment is imprisonment which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.
y Abduction may take place against a person of any age. Likewise, kidnapping from India as discussed
in Section 360 can take in respect of any person irrespective of his age.
y Abduction has reference only to the person abducted.
y In abduction, force, compulsion, or deceitful means are used.
y Free and voluntary consent of the person abducted condones abduction.
y Intention of the abductor is an important factor in determining guilt of the accused.
y Abduction is not a substantive offence and is not punishable in itself. It is an offence only when
done with some other intent as given in Sections 363A, 364, 364A to 369, IPC.
y Abduction is a continuing offence and continues so long as the abducted person is removed from
one place to another.
y In abduction the question of taking or enticing does not arise.
Sexual Offences
Section 375: Rape
The word ‘rape’ is derived from the Latin term rapio, which means ‘to seize’. It means intercourse with
a woman without her consent by force, fear, or fraud. The provision reads that a man is said to commit
rape, if he does the following.
y Penetrates his penis or inserts any object or other part of his body, to any extent, into the vagina,
mouth, urethra, or anus of a woman or makes her to do the same with himself or some other person
y Manipulates any part of the body of the woman so as to cause penetration into vagina, urethra, anus,
or any other part of such woman, or makes her to do the same with another person
y Applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, or urethra of a woman or makes her to do the same with some
other person

Further, to constitute the offence, the aforementioned acts should be done under any of the following
circumstances.
y Against her will
y Without her consent
y With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is
interested in fear of death or of hurt (the consent so obtained will not be free in such a case)
y With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given
because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married
y With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind
or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or
unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which
she gives consent
y With or without her consent, when she is under 18 years (earlier it was 16 years) of age
y When she is unable to commute her consent
The section clarifies that penetration means “penetration to any extent” and lack of physical resistance
is immaterial for constituting an offence. To cater to the issue of ‘consent’ the proviso says that only
because the woman does not physically resist to the penetration does not mean that she consented
to the sexual activity. The provision further provides for the following two exceptions to the offence.
y A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape.
y Sexual intercourse by a man with his wife does not amount to rape when she is above 15 years of age.
The word ‘will’ under this section implies the faculty of reasoning power of mind that determines
whether to do an act or not. The idea behind exemption from liability in the case of consent is that if
a man (includes woman) decides to suffer a harm voluntarily, he or she cannot complain of it when
it comes about. This is based on the principle of volenti non fit injuria, i.e., a person who voluntarily
consents to an injury, he must bear the consequences and suffer the loss arising from acts to which
he assented. In addition to this, consent so given must be free and not the one that is obtained by
fraud or by mistake or under a misconception of fact. Consent here means the same as defined under
Section 90 of the Code. It may be either express or implied. Moreover, a woman under 18 is considered
incapable of giving consent for sexual intercourse. The consent of the victim is immaterial when she
happens to be less than 18 years of age on date of the occurrence.
In Tukaram versus State of Maharashtra [Mathura rape case, 1979 SC], Mathura, an 18-year-old girl was
called to the police station on an abduction report filed by her brother at the police station. When they
were about to leave the police station, Mathura was kept back at the police station in the late hours
of the night by one of the constables, Ganpat, who was on duty. She was taken to a toilet and raped
by Ganpat. Then another constable, Tukaram, molested and tried to rape her, but being too heavily
drunk, failed. It was alleged that the two constables, while on duty, had bolted the doors of the police
station from inside and plunged the place into darkness. It was held that Mathura was subjected to
no fear of death or hurt, which may have led her to submit to the act and that there were no marks
of injury on her person, which showed that the whole affair was a peaceful one and that the story of
stiff resistance having been put up by the girl was totally false. Thus, there was no rape committed by
the accused.

However, this judgement was widely criticised and led to introduction of Section 114A of the Evidence
Act, which presumes that in cases of rape, the fact that consent was present shall have to be proved
by the accused as the court shall always presume to be its absence. According to this section, where
sexual intercourse by the accused is proved, and the question is whether it was without the consent of
the woman and she states in her evidence before the court that she had not given consent, the court
must presume that consent was not given by her.
In R versus Williams [1923 KB], the accused was a choirmaster who had sexual intercourse with
prosecutrix making her to believe that he is performing a surgical operation to improve her singing
voice. He was held to be guilty of rape as the consent was vitiated by fraud and was obtained under a
misconception, that the physical manipulation would provide her with extra air supply to improve her
singing skill.
The punishment [Section 376(1)] for rape is seven years, which may extend to life, along with fine.
Marital Rape
The exception to the section states that non-consensual sexual intercourse by a man with his own
wife, if she is over 15 years, does not amount to rape.
Section 376(2): Other Circumstances

When rape is committed by certain persons under the mentioned circumstances, the punishment shall
be rigorous imprisonment of 10 years which may extend to life, i.e., imprisonment for the remainder of
that person’s natural life, along with fine. Such persons and such circumstances mean the following.
y A police officer committing rape within the local limits of his police station to which he was appointed;
or in the premises of any station house; or upon a woman in his custody or even his subordinate.
y A public servant committing rape upon a woman in his custody or his subordinate.
y A member of armed forces committing rape in the area so assigned by the Central or State Government
Armed forces here would mean naval, military, and air forces and includes any member of armed
force constituted under any law; paramilitary forces; auxiliary forces as under the control of the
Central or State Government.
y Rape by a person in management or the staff of the jail or a hospital; a remand home; woman’s or a
children’s institution (example an orphanage, home for neglected women or children, widow’s home
or any other like institution) or any other place so established by the law. In this clause, hospital is
said to include premises of the hospital as well, including the area of reception or where treatment
or rehabilitation of the patients is undertaken.
y Rape by a relative; guardian; teacher or a person in a position of trust or authority towards the
woman raped.
y Rape by a man upon a woman during communal or sectarian violence.
y Rape by a man upon a pregnant woman, knowing her to be pregnant.
y Rape by a man upon a woman who is less than 16 years of age.
y Rape by a man upon a woman, unable to give consent.
y Rape by a man upon a woman suffering from mental or some physical disability.
y Repeated acts of rape upon the same woman.
y Causing of grievous bodily harm; maiming; disfiguring or endangering the life of such woman.

Section 376A: Punishment for Causing Death or Resulting in the Persistent Vegetative State
of the Victim
In the event of rape, if the offender causes death of the victim or leaves her in a persistent vegetative
state, he shall be punished for an imprisonment which shall be at least 20 years, and may extend to
life, i.e., the remainder of the life of the offender, or even death.
Section 376B: Sexual Intercourse by a Husband upon His Wife during Separation
Sexual intercourse by a husband upon his wife living separately either under a decree of separation
or even otherwise, without her consent will be punishable with an imprisonment of two years which
may extend to seven years, along with fine. Sexual intercourse under the clause means the following.
y Penetrates his penis or inserts any object or other part of his body, to any extent, into the vagina,
mouth, urethra, or anus of a woman or makes her to do the same with himself or some other person
y Manipulates any part of the body of the woman so as to cause penetration into vagina, urethra, anus,
or any other part of such woman, or makes her to do the same with another person
y Applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, or urethra of a woman or makes her to do the same with some
other person
Section 376C: Sexual Intercourse by a Person in Authority

Whenever a person is either:
y in a position of authority; or
y in a fiduciary relationship; or
y superintendent or a manager in jail, any remand home or any other public place of custody
established under law; or
y in management of a hospital or being on the staff of the hospital.
And he abuses his authority to induce or seduce any woman under his custody or present in the
premises to have sexual intercourse which does not amount to rape, he is said to commit an offence
under this section.
The punishment is rigorous imprisonment of at least five years which may extend to 10 years, along
with fine.
Section 376D: Gang Rape

The punishment shall be a rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 20 years,
but which may extend to life (remainder of the life of the offender). Compensation shall also be paid
to the victim which shall be reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim.
Section 376DA (Added by Criminal Amendment Act, 2018): Punishment for Gang Rape on
Woman under 16 Years of Age
Where a woman under 16 years of age is raped by one or more persons constituting a group or acting
in furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons shall be deemed to have committed the
offence of rape and shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for
the remainder of that person’s natural life, and with fine. Such fine shall be just and reasonable to
meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim. Any fine imposed under this section shall
be paid to the victim.

Section 376DB (Added by Criminal Amendment Act, 2018): Punishment for Gang Rape on
Woman under 12 Years of Age
Where a woman under 12 years of age is raped by one or more persons constituting a group or acting
in furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons shall be deemed to have committed the
offence of rape and shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for
the remainder of that person’s natural life, and with fine, or with death. Such fine shall be just and
reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim. Any fine imposed under this
section shall be paid to the victim.
Section 376E: Subsequent Convictions

Any person, who has been previously convicted under Section 376 (rape) or Section 376A (causing
death or resulting in the persistent vegetative state of the victim due to rape committed upon her) or
Section 376D (gang rape), shall be punished for an imprisonment for life, that is remainder of the life
of the offender.
Section 377: Unnatural Offences

Section 377 deals with unnatural carnal intercourse against the order of nature. The section establishes
the following ingredients.
y The accused must have carnal intercourse with a man, woman, or animal.
y The act was against the order of nature.
y The act was done voluntarily by the accused.
y There was proof of penetration.
The punishment is imprisonment for life or imprisonment up to 10 years and fine.
The word ‘sodomy’ generally denotes anal intercourse with a man or with a woman or with an animal.
Bestiality means the sexual intercourse either by a man or by a woman carried out in any way with
a beast (animal) or bird. As per the explanation, penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal
intercourse necessary to the offence described in this section.
In Naz Foundation versus National Capital Territory of Delhi [2009 Del], the Delhi High Court overturned
the 150-year-old section, legalising consensual homosexual activities between adults. The court
said that the essence of the section went against the fundamental rights of citizens. In a 105-page
judgement, a bench of Chief Justice Ajit Prakash Shah and Justice S Muralidhar said that if not amended,
to the extent, Section 377 criminalised consensual non-vaginal sexual acts between adults, it violated
an individual’s fundamental rights to equality before the law, freedom from discrimination and to life
and personal liberty under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India. The court stated that the
judgement would hold until the Parliament chose to amend the law. However, the judgement keeps
intact the provisions of Section 377 insofar as it applies to non-consensual non-vaginal intercourse
and intercourse with minors.
In Suresh Kumar Koushal and Another versus NAZ Foundation and Others [2013 SC], the Supreme Court
set aside the verdict by the High Court upholding the provision to be constitutional and decriminalised
consensual sex among adult homosexual men. Consequently, the court left it for the court to decide
about this law.
In Navtej Singh Johar & Ors versus Union of India [2018 SC], on 06 September 2018, the court declared
consensual sexual acts between adults as legal. This landmark decision overturned the 2013 ruling

in the Suresh Kumar Koushal case, where the law was upheld. However, very important to note is
that the other portions of the provision relating to sex with minors, non-consensual sexual acts, and
bestiality remain in force. Thus, the section has been held as unconstitutional only to a certain extent.
The court held that the criminalisation of sexual acts between consenting adults violated the right
to equality guaranteed by the Constitution of India. While reading the judgement, Chief Justice Misra
pronounced that the court found “criminalising carnal intercourse” to be “irrational, arbitrary, and
manifestly unconstitutional”. It was emphasised that LGBTs were entitled to an equal citizenship and
protection under law, without any discrimination.
Offences against State and Terrorism

The provisions relating to offences against the State under IPC are the following.
y Waging War against the Government of India (Section 121)
The IPC declares that a person, who wages, attempts, or abets to wage war against the Government
of India shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. The
term ‘whoever’ in the section indicates that the provisions of this section are applicable both to
citizens and foreigners. For example, deliberate and organised attack upon the government forces
and government offices amounts to a waging of war. Whether it is the attempt to commit the
offence or the abetment of the offence or whether the offence has been committed, the section
imposes the same punishment. The waging of war is the attempt to accomplish by violence any
purpose of a public nature.
y Conspiracy to Wage War (Section 121A)
A person who conspires to commit the offence of waging war is liable for a punishment. The section
deals with the two kinds of conspiracies—firstly, conspiracy to wage war (or to attempt or abet)
against the Government of India, and secondly, conspiracy to overawe by means of criminal force or
the show of criminal force. The offence of conspiracy is complete, as soon as two or more persons
agree to do or cause to be done, an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. The explanation makes
it clear that for the conspiracy in this section, it is not necessary that any act or illegal omission
should take place in pursuance thereof.
y Collecting Arms, Etc., with Intention of Waging War against the Government of India (Section 122)
Whoever collects men, arms, or ammunition or otherwise prepares to wage war with the intention
of either waging or being prepared to wage war against the Government of India, shall be punished
with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding 10 years
and shall also be liable to fine.
y Concealing with Intent to Facilitate Design to Wage War (Section 123)
Whoever by any act or illegal omission, conceals the existence of a design to wage war against the
intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that such concealment will facilitate the waging of
such war, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to 10 years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y Assaulting President, Governor, Etc., with Intent to Compel or Restrain the Exercise of Any Lawful
Power (Section 124)
Whoever, with the intention of inducing or compelling the president of India or Governor of any
State to exercise or refrain from exercising in any manner any of their lawful powers, assaults or
wrongfully restrains, or attempts wrongfully to restrain, or overawes, by means of criminal force or

the show of criminal force, or attempts to overawe him, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y Sedition (Section 124A)
The provision is based on the principle that “every state, whatever its form of government, has
to be armed with the power to punish those who by their conduct, jeopardise the safety and
stability of the state, or disseminate such feelings of disloyalty as have the tendency to lead to
the disruption of the state or to public disorder”. The section says that whoever by words (spoken
or written); signs; visible representation, or otherwise brings or attempts to bring into hatred;
contempt; excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government in India, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added or with imprisonment which
may extend to three years to which fine may be added or with fine. The expression ‘disaffection’
includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. However, comments expressing disapprobation of the
measures of the government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting
or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this
section (Explanation 1). Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or other action
of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt. Or disaffection, do
not constitute an offence under this section (Explanation 2). Disaffection means a feeling contrary
of affection, in other words, dislike or hatred. Disapprobation means disapproval (Explanation 3). In
Tara Singh Gopichand versus State [1951 Punj], the constitutional validity of Section 124A was put
to judicial scrutiny for the first time. It was contended that the section goes against the letter of
spirit of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution that guarantees the freedom of speech and expression.
The section was declared ultra vires to the Constitution as it curtailed the freedom of speech and
expression in a manner not permitted by the Constitution. However, subsequently, the Constitution
First (Amendment) Act, 1951, added two words of wide amplitude, namely, ‘in the interest of’ and
‘public order’ in Article 19(2) dealing with the restrictions that can be put through law on the
freedom of speech and expression. Later, the Supreme Court, through its pronouncement in Kedar
Nath versus State of Bihar [1962 SC] held that any law which is enacted ‘in the interest of public
order’ could be saved from the vice of the Constitutional invalidity.
y Waging War against Any Asiatic Power in Alliance with the Government of India (Section 125)
Whoever wages, attempts, or abets waging of war against the government of any Asiatic power in
alliance or at peace with the Government of India, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, to
which fine may be added, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to seven years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.
y Committing Depredation on Territories of Power at Peace with the Government of India (Section
126)
Whoever commits depredation, or makes preparations to commit depredation, on the territories of
any power in alliance or at peace with the Government of India, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine
and to forfeiture of any property used or intended to be used in committing such depredation, or
acquired by such depredation.
y Receiving Property Taken by War or Depredation (Section 127)
Whoever receives any property knowing the same to have been taken in the commission of any of
the offences mentioned in Sections 125 and 126, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine and to
forfeiture of the property so received.

y Public Servant Voluntarily Allowing Prisoner of State or War to Escape (Section 128)
Whoever, being a public servant and having the custody of any state prisoner or prisoner of war,
voluntarily allows such prisoner to escape from any place in which such prisoner is confined, shall
be punished with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to 10 years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y Public Servant Negligently Suffering Such Prisoner to Escape (Section 129)
Whoever, being a public servant and having the custody of any state prisoner or prisoner of war,
negligently suffers such prisoner to escape from any place of confinement in which such prisoner is
confined, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years,
y Aiding Escape Of, Rescuing, or Harbouring Such Prisoner (Section 130)
Whoever knowingly aids or assists any state prisoner or prisoner of war in escaping from lawful
custody, or rescues or attempts to rescue any such prisoner, or harbours or conceals any such
prisoner who has escaped from lawful custody, or offers or attempts to offer any resistance to the
recapture of such prisoner, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall also be liable to fine. A state
prisoner or prisoner of war, who is permitted to be at large on his parole within certain limits in
India is said to escape from lawful custody if he goes beyond the limits within which he is allowed
to be at large.
Offences against Property

Section 378: Theft
Theft is the dishonest removal of movable property out of the possession of any person without his
consent. It is thus an offence against possession and not against ownership.
To constitute theft, the following ingredients are required.
y The accused must have a dishonest intention to take the property.
y The property must be movable.
y The property must be taken out of the possession of another person, resulting in wrongful gain by
one and wrongful loss to another.
y The property must be moved in order to such taking, i.e., obtaining property by deception.
y Taking must be without that person’s consent—express or implied.
The subject of theft must be movable property that is corporeal property of every description except
land and things attached to the earth or permanently fixed to anything which is attached to the earth.
Property is said to be movable when it is capable of being carried about.
Explanation 1 states that a property becomes movable when it is severed from the earth. The offence is
complete the moment a thing is moved. Even animals can become the subject of theft, for they can be
classed as movables. The dishonest intention as under Section 378 is known as animo furandi that is
the intent to steal. Also, such taking out must be done without the consent of the possessor, whether
express or implied with a dishonest intention.
Explanation 2 states that even a temporary retention or deprivation is enough to show that the offence
has been committed. A moving effected by the same act which affects the severance may be a theft.
Explanation 3 states that person is said to cause a thing to move by removing an obstacle which
prevented it from moving or by separating it from any other thing, as well as by actually moving it.

Explanation 4 states that a person, who by any means causes an animal to move, is said to move that
animal, and to move everything which, in consequence of the motion so caused, is moved by that
animal.
Explanation 5 states that the consent mentioned in the definition may be express or implied and may
be given either by the person in possession or by any person having for that purpose authority either
express or implied.
In Pyare Lal Bhargawa versus State of Rajasthan [1963 SC], the accused was a superintendent in a
government office. At the instance of somebody, he got a file from the secretariat through the clerk
and took the file to his house for a day and made it available to a person to facilitate the removal of
some papers and the insertion of some. Thereafter, the file was replaced. He was held liable for theft
as the definition under Section 378 was satisfied, even though he intended to return the file later.
The punishment for theft is imprisonment, either simple or rigorous for a period which may extent to
three years or fine or with both (Section 379).
Section 383: Extortion

The essential ingredients are as follows.
y Intentionally putting a person in fear of injury or to any other
y Dishonestly induce the person put in fear
y To deliver property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a
valuable security
The word ‘injury’ is defined in Section 44 as denoting “any harm whatever illegally caused to any
person, in body, mind, reputation, or property”.
In Purshottam Jethanand versus State of Kutch [1954 SC], the accused was a police jamadar working
in the local investigation branch of Kutch. He had visited a particular taluk and checked passports of a
number of persons who had returned from Africa. During the check, he collected the passport of one
Ananda Ratna in a village and demanded a sum of Rs 800 for its return. Accordingly, the said person
paid the amount and took back the passport. The accused was convicted under Section 384, IPC.
The punishment is imprisonment, either simple or grievous, which may extend for a period of three
years or fine or both (Section 384).
Theft Extortion
In theft, property is taken away without the In extortion, the consent of the owner is
consent of the owner. obtained but wrongfully.
Theft may be only with movable property. In extortion, the property may be either movable
or immovable.
In theft, there is no element of force. In extortion, property is obtained by putting a
person in fear of injury and, thereby, inducing
him to part with his property.
In theft, the possessor does not deliver any In extortion, there is delivery of property.
property.
Section 390: Robbery

Robbery is an aggravated form of either theft or extortion. There cannot be any robbery if there is no
theft or extortion.

Theft becomes robbery, if to facilitate the committing of theft or in carrying away or attempting to
carry away the stolen property, the offender voluntarily causes or attempts to cause death, hurt or
wrongful restraint or fear of instant death, instant hurt, or instant wrongful restraint [Robbery = Theft
+ Voluntarily causes or attempts to cause death, hurt, or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death,
instant hurt, or instant wrongful restraint].
Extortion is robbery, if the extortionist at the time of committing the extortion, is in the immediate
presence of the victim and puts the victim in fear of instant death of instant hurt or of instant wrongful
restraint, either to that person or to some other person. If out of this fear induced in the victim by
the extortionist, he is able to obtain delivery of the thing extorted, then the offence of robbery is
committed [Robbery = Extortion + Presence of the victim + Fear of instant death or instant hurt or of
instant wrongful restraint + Delivery of some property].
In Harish Chandra versus State of Uttar Pradesh [1976 SC], the victim boarded a train with the accused
and the co-accused in the same compartment. When the train reached railway station, the accused
forcibly took away the wristwatch of the victim and when he raised an alarm, the co-accused slapped
him and his other companion hit him with a stick. Both the accused jumped out of the compartment.
The victim also followed them. The victim found a constable on the platform and informed him about
the incident. A search was immediately made for the accused and ultimately both the accused were
caught. It was held that because the co-accused slapped the victim to enable the accused to carry
away the stolen property, he had committed robbery.
The punishment is rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years and fine as well. If
a robbery is committed on a highway between sunset and sunrise, the imprisonment may be extended
to 14 years (Section 392).
Section 391: Dacoity

Dacoity is robbery committed by five or more persons. The essentials are as follows.
y Five or more persons must act in association.
y Such act must be robbery or attempt to commit robbery.
y The five persons must consist of those who themselves commit or attempt to commit robbery or
those who are present and aid the principal actors in the commission or attempt of such robbery.
It is important to note that, where the charge of dacoity is against five named persons and out of them
two are acquitted, the remaining three cannot be convicted for dacoity. All five persons should also act
in a concerted manner participating in the transaction. Element of ‘dishonest intention’ on the part of
the offender must be present.
The punishment is life imprisonment or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years
(Section 395).
Section 396: Dacoity with Murder

If during the commission of dacoity, any of the five or more persons commit murder, then each one of
them will be made vicariously liable for the act of murder, even if the individuals concerned did not
participate in committing the murder.
Section 403: Criminal Misappropriation of Property

The word ‘misappropriation’ in general means a dishonest appropriation and use of another’s property for
sole purpose of capitalising it for one’s own use. To constitute the offence of criminal misappropriation
under the IPC, the following must be established.

y The accused misappropriated that property.
y He thereby converted the same to his own use dishonestly.
y The movable property belonged to the complainant.
Thus, criminal misappropriation takes place when the possession has come innocently but is continued
due to a subsequent change of intention or after knowledge of some new fact with which the party was
not previously acquainted. The offence of misappropriation consists in dishonest misappropriation or
conversion either permanently or temporarily or movable property which is already in the possession
of the offender.
Explanation 1 of the section makes it clear that a dishonest misappropriation for a time only is a
misappropriation with the meaning of this section. Furthermore, Explanation 2 of the section emphasises
that in case of a finder of goods, if he has taken all precautions to ascertain the true owner and kept
the goods for a reasonable time for restoring it to the true owner, he can use the property for himself
if the true owner is not found. But if he immediately misappropriates the property, he would be liable
under this section. What are reasonable means or what is a reasonable time in such a case, is a
question of fact. It is not necessary that the finder should know who the owner of the property is, or
that any particular person is the owner of it; it is sufficient if, at the time of appropriating it, he does
not believe it to be his own property, or in good faith believe that the real owner cannot be found.
In Phuman versus Emperor [1907], the accused found a purse on the pavement of a temple in a
crowded gathering which he then put in his pocket. He was, thereafter, immediately arrested. It was
held that he could not be said to be guilty of criminal misappropriation as the mere act of picking up
the purse and putting it in his pocket could not be said to be appropriating the contents for himself.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to two years or with fine or with both.
Distinction between Theft and Criminal Misappropriation

y The initial taking in theft is always wrongful. In criminal misappropriation, it may be innocent and
lawful. It is the subsequent change of intention that converts the lawful taking into unlawful act in
criminal misappropriation.
y In theft, there is infringement of right of possession of another person by the wrongdoer, whereas in
criminal misappropriation, there is no such infringement.
y In theft, the movement of the thing causes the offence. But in criminal misappropriation, subsequent
intention to convert or misappropriate the property constitutes the offence.
y In theft, the property is moved without the consent of the owner. In criminal misappropriation, the
person might have come into possession of the property with the consent of the owner. He commits
the offence only subsequently when he converts the property to his own use.
Section 404: Dishonest Misappropriation of Property Possessed by a Deceased Person at the

Time of His Death
To attract this section, the following ingredients must exist.
y The property must be movable property.
y Such property was in possession of the deceased at the time of his death has not since been in the
possession of any person legally entitled to such possession.
y The accused dishonestly misappropriated it or converted it to his own use.
y The accused did so dishonestly.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

If the offender at the time of such person’s decease was employed by him as a clerk or servant, the
imprisonment may extend to seven years.
Section 405: Criminal Breach of Trust

The most important aspect of this offence lies in the fact that it must be established that the accused
was entrusted with the property or with dominion or power over the property of another and that he
dishonestly misappropriated it or converted it to his own use.
The ingredients are as follows.
y The accused must be entrusted with property or with dominion over property.
y The person so entrusted must:
⚪ dishonestly misappropriate or convert to his own use that property;
⚪ dishonestly use or dispose of that property or wilfully cause any other person to do so.
Either in violation of any directions of law prescribing the mode in which such property is to be
discharged or any legal contract made touching discharge of such trust.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to three years of imprisonment or fine or both
(Section 406).
Criminal Misappropriation (Section 403) Criminal Breach of Trust (Section 405)

The property comes into the possession of the The property comes into the possession of the
accused in some natural manner. accused either by an express entrustment or by
some process.
The property comes into the possession of the The offender is lawfully entrusted with the
offender by some causality or otherwise and he property and he dishonestly misappropriates the
afterwards misappropriates it. same.
Theft (Section 378) Criminal Breach of Trust (Section 405)

In theft, property is moved from the possession of In criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully
another man with dishonest intention. entrusted with the property and he dishonestly
misappropriates it.
The offender comes in possession of the property Possession is derived with the consent of the
without the consent of the concerned person. owner.
Sections 410 and 411: Receiving of Stolen Property

Section 410 defines a stolen property to be that property, the possession of which has been transferred
by either theft, extortion, robbery, criminal misappropriation, or criminal breach of trust.
Section 411: Dishonestly Receiving Stolen Property

y The accused dishonestly received or retains any stolen property.
y Some person other than the accused had possession of the property before the accused got
possession of it.
y He has the knowledge or has a reason to believe that such property is a stolen property.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.

Section 415: Cheating
Section 415 deals with three types of cheating.
y By fraudulently deceiving and inducing the person so deceived (a) to deliver any property, or (b) to
consent to the retention of any property by any person
y By dishonestly inducing the person to deliver any property or to give consent to the retention of any
property
y By intentionally inducing the person deceived to do or to omit to do anything which he would not
have done, if he was not so deceived and such act of him caused or was likely to cause damage, or
harm in body, mind, reputation, or property
The ingredients are deception of any person; fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person; and to
delivery any property to any person.
By virtue of explanation to the section, a dishonest concealment of facts is tantamount to deception.
False personation consists of personating another, or by knowingly substituting another person and
pretending to be that other person and representing that other person (Section 416). Such person shall
be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or with both (Section
419). Further, whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived any property to any
person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is
signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine (Section 420).
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend for a period of one year or fine or both (Section
417).
Section 425: Mischief

y The accused has intention to cause or he knows that is likely to cause, wrongful loss, or damage to
the public or to any person.
y Such person causes the destruction of any property or any such change in any property or in the
situation thereof as destroys or diminishes its value or utility or affects it injuriously.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend for a period of three months of fine or both
(Section 426).
Trespass
Section 441: Criminal Trespass
In simple words, ‘trespass’ means to go on another’s property without his permission express or implied
or right. The idea behind making trespass a criminal offence is to keep the trespasser away from the
premises and dwelling houses of private persons so that one may enjoy his property uninterrupted by
any outside intruder.
y There must be an unauthorised entry into or upon another’s property against the will of the person
in possession.
y An authorised entry lawfully obtained but unlawfully remaining therein.

y Such entry or unlawful stay must be with an intention:
⚪ to commit an offence, or
⚪ to intimidate, insult, or annoy the person in possession of the property.
There must be an actual personal entry by the accused. The word property used in the section includes
any kind of property, either movable or immovable, into or upon which it is possible to enter.
The punishment is imprisonment that may extend for a period of three months or fine which may
extend to 500 rupees or both (Section 447).
Section 442: House Trespass

y The accused commits criminal trespass.
y Such criminal trespass is committed by entering into or remaining in any building, tent, or vessel,
used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship or as a place for the custody
of property.
The explanation clarifies that the introduction of any part of the criminal trespasser’s body is entering
sufficient to constitute house trespass.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend for one year or fine up to 1000 rupees, or both
(Section 448).
Section 444: Lurking (Hiding) House Trespass

y The accused commits house trespass.
y He takes ample precautions to conceal such house trespass from some person who has a right to
exclude or eject the trespasser from the building, tent, or vessel which is the subject of trespass.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine
(Section 453).
Section 444: Lurking (Hiding) House Trespass by Night

This punishes lurking house trespass by night, i.e., after sunset and before sunrise, the offence is
considered more aggravated than the commission of the offence during daytime.
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine
(Section 456).
Section 445: House-Breaking

In simple terms, house-breaking implies a forcible entry into a house. As per the section, the offender
can commit house-breaking by any of the following ways.
y Through passage made by the house-breaker himself, or by an abettor of the house trespass
y Through any passage not intended by any person other than himself or by an abettor of the offence
y By opening any lock
y By using criminal force
y If the accused enters or quits through any passage which he or any abettor has opened to commit
the offence of house trespass
y By entering or quitting any passage fastened against such entrance or exit

The punishment is imprisonment, which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine
(Section 453).
House-breaking by night means when the offence is committed after sunset and before sunrise
(Section 446).
The punishment is imprisonment which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine
(Section 456).
Offences against Women and Children

Note: offences against women are also included in the chapter on offences against human body,
especially rape. Offences against children include kidnapping and abduction as well.
Sections 493 to 498A: Offences Relating to Marriage

Sections 493 and 496: Mock or Invalid Marriages
Both the sections below denote the fact that the woman is cheated by the man into believing that
she is legally wedded to him, while the man is fully aware that the same is not true. The deceit and
fraudulent intention should exist at the time of the marriage.
Section 493 stipulates that when deception is caused by the man that leads the woman who though
is not lawfully married to him, believes that she is lawfully married to him, and thereby, indulges
in cohabitation or sexual intercourse with him in that belief, shall be liable for punishment. Such
punishment may either be an imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10
years and shall also be liable to fine. However, if the woman is aware that the marriage is not a valid
one and still allows the man to have sexual intercourse, then no offence is made out under this section.
When a man dishonestly or with a fraudulent intention goes through the ceremony of marriage knowing
that he is not thereby lawfully married, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine (Section 496).
Sections 494 to 495: Bigamy

This offence applies not only to a man, but a woman can also be liable for committing bigamy. Section
494 states that when any person, having a husband or wife living from a valid marriage, marries
again during the life of such husband or wife, he/she shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 494
itself carves out two exceptions wherein the contracting of the second marriage will not be an offence.
y When the first marriage has been declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction.
y When the former husband or wife has been continually absent for a period of over seven years and
has not been heard of as being alive. It is necessary that these facts are disclosed to the person with
whom the second marriage is contracted.
Under Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, when it is proved that a man has not been heard of
for more than seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive, there
is a presumption that he is dead.
Section 495 of the Code prescribes for the punishment for the offence of bigamy, having concealed
from the person with whom the subsequent marriage is contracted that he/she is already married,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and
shall also be liable to fine.

Points to Remember
y It is important that the first marriage should be subsisting at the time of the second marriage and
should be a validly contracted one. The first husband or wife should also be alive when the second
marriage was contracted.
y To attract the provision of this section, not only the first marriage, but also the second marriage
should be a valid one. This means that all the necessary ceremonies required by the personal laws
governing the parties to the marriage should have been complied with.
y The section has no application to cases where a second marriage is permitted under the personal
laws or customs governing the parties.
In Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani versus Union of India [1995 SC], Sarla Mudgal was the president of
‘Kalyani’, a registered society which worked for the welfare of women in distress. The second petitioner
was Meena Mathur, married to Jitender Mathur. After 10 years of their marriage, Jitender Mathur married
another woman, Sunita Narula. Both Jitender and Sunita converted themselves to Islam for the purpose
of going through the second marriage. The question before the Supreme Court was whether by virtue
of the conversion of the respective husbands to Islam, would the second marriage be a valid marriage.
Whether such husbands would be guilty of the offence of bigamy under Section 494, IPC? The Supreme
Court held the following.
y Where a marriage takes place under the Hindu law, the parties acquired a status and certain rights by
virtue of the marriage under the Hindu law. Such rights could not be extinguished by the conversion
of one of the spouses.
y There was no automatic dissolution of the Hindu marriage upon the conversion of one of the spouses
to another religion.
In Lily Thomas & Ors versus Union of India & Ors [2000 SC], one of the main contentions raised was
that the judgement was in violation of Articles 20(1) and 25 of the Constitution of India. The review
petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court and it was held that this law could not be said to be
violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution. It also brushed aside the contention that ratio of the Sarla
Mudgal case goes against the freedom of conscience and free profession, practice, and propagation of
a religion.
Section 497: Adultery

The section points out that a man who has sexual intercourse with a lady who is and whom he knows
or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man,
such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery. He
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years
or with fine or with both. Woman must be married for the offence of adultery to be made out. Sexual
intercourse with a prostitute, an unmarried woman or a widow, does amount to adultery under the IPC.
In addition to this, the man should ‘know’ or have ‘reason to believe’ that such woman is the ‘wife of
another man’. This does not mean that he should know the identity of the husband. It is sufficient if
he knows or has reason to believe that the woman is married. The woman, although married, must be
a willing partner to the sexual intercourse. However, if the accused has sexual intercourse without the
consent of the woman, then it is a much graver offence and would amount to rape. Apart from being
an offence, a petition for divorce can be filed by the aggrieved party.
Exemption of Women from Prosecution

Section 497 expressly exempts the women from prosecution and from being charged as an abettor.

The constitutional validity of this provision has been challenged time and again in the Supreme Court
in cases of Yusuf Abdul Aziz versus State of Bombay [1954 SC], Sowmithri Vishnu versus Union of India
& Anr [1985 SC], and V Revathi versus Union of India [1988 SC]. But it was always held as valid. However,
recently, in Joseph Shine versus Union of India [2018 SC], the issue regarding the constitutional validity
again came in question before the court. This time the court struck Section 497, IPC, as unconstitutional
and held it to be violative of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. Hence, now, adultery is no longer
a criminal offence.
Section 498: Criminal Elopement or Seduction

This section makes taking or enticing away any woman who is and whom the man (offender) knows or
has reason to believe to be the wife of any other man from him or from any person having the care of
her on behalf of that man with intent of having illicit intercourse with any person or conceals or detains
with that intent any such woman, an offence. Such a man shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Thus, if the wife
is living with the husband, man knowingly goes away with her is such a way as to deprive the husband
of his control over her, with the intent to have illicit intercourse, then it constitutes an offence within
the meaning of the section. This section also is applicable only in respect of a woman, who is legally
married to man. Subsequently, the person enticing or taking away the married woman should have
knowledge or reason to believe that she is the wife of another man.
Section 498A: Cruelty by Husband or Relatives of Husband

The provision relating to cruelty to a married woman was added by an amendment in the year 1983,
under Chapter XXA. This offence is restricted to only acts of commission of omission done by the
husband or his relatives. Under this provision of law, if any person being the husband or the relative of
the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty, he shall be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. The explanation clarifies that
cruelty for the purposes of the section would mean the following.
y Any wilful conduct which is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause any grave injury
of danger to life, limb, or mental or physical health of the woman, is cruelty.
y Harassment of a woman, with a view to coerce her or her relatives to meet unlawful demand for any
property or valuable security, is cruelty. ‘Cruelty includes both mental and physical cruelty.
In Sushil Kumar Sharma versus Union of India & Ors [2005 SC], the constitutional validity of Section
498A was challenged. However, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 498A.
Section 509: Insult to the Modesty of a Woman

An offender commits the offence when he:
y utters a word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object;
y with the intention that it be heard, seen, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman.
In Rupan Deol Bajaj versus KPS Gill [1996 SC], the complainant was a senior IAS officer in the Punjab
Government. Her allegation was that in a party, the accused, KPS Gill, behaved indecently with her in
the presence of many people and had slapped her posterior. The question was whether the act of the
accused could be said to be an act which outraged the modesty of the officer. The Supreme Court held
that “the ultimate test for ascertaining whether the modesty has been outraged was in the action of
the offender such as could be perceived as on which was capable of shocking the sense of decency
of a woman”.

The punishment is simple imprisonment which may extend to three years, along with fine (as amended
by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013).
Drug Trafficking and Counterfeiting

Drug Trafficking Law in India
The law relating to drug trafficking in India is the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985 or the NDPS Act. The salient features of the Act are given below.
y The quantum of punishment is based on the quantity of drugs found with the offender. It may be
classified into three categories—small, less than commercial, and commercial.
y The Act clearly prohibits the cultivation of opium, poppy, coca, or cannabis plants as well as the
production, manufacture, distribution, including warehousing, transporting, purchasing, and selling,
of prohibited drugs and psychotropic substances. It also prohibits their financing as well as
consumption and harbouring offenders guilty under the Act.
y If any farmer cultivates opium in accordance with a license but embezzles, he shall be punished
with rigorous imprisonment for a term ranging between 10 and 20 years, and shall also be liable to
pay a fine.
y The production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transport, import, and export among states
or use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances such as poppy straw, prepared opium, opium
poppy, cannabis, etc., shall result in:
⚪ in case of small quantity, rigorous imprisonment up to one year with or without fine up to 10000
rupees;
⚪ in case the quantity is between small and commercial, rigorous imprisonment up to 10 years and
fine up to one lakh rupees; and
⚪ In cases involving commercial quantity, rigorous imprisonment between 10 to 20 years and fine
ranging between one and two lakh rupees.
However, if the contravention pertains to ganja, the punishment would be significantly less, i.e., rigorous
imprisonment for a term which may extend up to five years and fine up to 50000 rupees. In all these
cases, the court can increase the fine, if it pleases.
y Under the Act, if any person engages in illegal import, export, or trans-shipment of narcotic drugs
or psychotropic substances, he shall be punished with a punishment ranging between rigorous
imprisonment for one to 20 years and fine based on the quantity of the prohibited substance.
y If any person engages in external dealings in contravention of the Act, he shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment ranging between 10 to 20 years and fine.
y Any person who knowingly allows his premises to be used for the commission of any offence under
the Act shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment ranging between 10 to 20 years and fine.
y Any person financing illicit traffic or harbouring an offender shall also face the same punishment.
y A consumer of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance shall also be punished. However, such
a punishment would vary depending on the substance consumed. For example, if the substance
consumed is cocaine, morphine, or diacetyl-morphine, then the punishment would be rigorous
imprisonment up to one year with or without fine up to 20000 rupees.
y The court under the Act has been empowered to send any person who is imprisoned for consumption
of drugs to an appropriate medical centre for seeking necessary treatment.

y The Act orders the agencies seizing the drugs to destroy them suitably in the prescribed manner.
y If the accused is found to have any illegal property, it shall be forfeited to the central government and
such proceeds shall be sent into the National Fund for Control of Drug Abuse in order to facilitate the
treatment of drug addicts and to promote initiatives for drug control.
y The Act prescribes a stricter punishment for repeat offenders which can be imprisonment or fine
up to one and half times the quantum of punishment for the first offence, as the case may be. In
addition to this, death penalty can be imposed as a substitute for the other punishments that have
been set out in the Act for a repeat offender but its application is not mandatory.
y The police officer seizing the prohibited substances should keep them in safe custody. They must
contain the seal of the officer seizing them as well as the officer-in-charge of the police station.
y The Act gives the accused the right to be searched in the presence of the magistrate or a gazetted
officer.
y The Act also imposes strict punishments on people making vexatious or frivolous complaints.
y The Act requires the healthcare institutions to obtain licenses from various regulatory agencies that
deal with issues related to excise, drug control, health administration, etc.
y The Act calls for the establishment and working of centres for the identification and treatment of
addicts. The focus is on the management of drug dependents and accreditation of treatment centres
by relevant government authorities.
y The Act presumes the guilt of the accused and puts the onus on him to prove that he is innocent. It
further states that, unless the contrary is proved, it will be believed that the accused intentionally
held the illicit drugs that were found in his possession.
y Under the Act, the report should be made to the concerned officers of central excise, narcotics,
customs particular departments who have been empowered by the government to it.
y The investigation is required to be completed within 180 days. Though this time period may be
extended to one year depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case.
y The government is required to set up a Special Court which shall be deemed to be a Court of
Sessions, for speedy trial of offences under the Act. It shall consist of a single judge who shall be
appointed by the government with the concurrence of the chief justice of the High Court. The judge
so appointed must be a sessions judge or additional sessions judge before being appointed as a
judge of the Special Court.
y A right of appeal has been given to the aggrieved. He may apply to the High Court of the state where
the Special Court is based.
y Every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable and non-bailable.
Agencies Controlling Drug Trafficking

y Department of Social Welfare
y Narcotics Control Bureau
y Ministry of Welfare and Ministry of Finance
Counterfeiting of Coins and Government Stamps

The law relating to counterfeiting is provided under Chapter XII of the IPC, from Section 230 to Section
263. The important provisions from the Chapter have been enumerated below.

y A ‘coin’ under the Chapter has been defined as the metal used for the time being as money and
stamped and issued by the authority of some State or sovereign power in order to be so used. While
an ‘Indian coin’ is said to be the metal stamped and issued by the authority of the Government of
India in order to be used as money. The illustrations attached to the section state that cowries,
lumps of unstamped copper, though used as money and medals are not coins, inasmuch as they are
not intended to be used as money. However, the coin denominated as the Company’s rupee and the
‘Farukhabad rupee’ (which was formerly used as money under the authority of the Government of
India, although it is no longer used) are Indian coins.
y Whoever counterfeits or knowingly performs any part of the process of counterfeiting coin, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and
shall also be liable to fine. A person commits this offence who intending to practise deception or
knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby be practised, causes a genuine coin to appear like
a different coin.
y Whoever counterfeits, or knowingly performs, any part of the process of counterfeiting Indian coin
shall be punished with imprisonment for life with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine.
y Whoever makes or mends or performs any part of the process of making or mending, or buys, sells
or disposes of, any die or instrument, for the purpose of being used, or knowing or having reason to
believe that it is intended to be used, for the purpose of counterfeiting coin, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extended to three years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
y Whoever makes, mends, or performs any part of the process of making or mending, or buys, sells,
or disposes of, any die or instrument, for the purpose of being used, or knowing or having reason to
believe that it is intended to be used, for the purpose of counterfeiting Indian coin shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also
be liable to fine.
y Whoever is in possession of any instrument or material, for the purpose of using the same for
counterfeiting coin or knowing or having reason to believe that the same is intended to be used
for that purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. If the coin to be counterfeited is an Indian coin,
the punishment shall be imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years
y Whoever, being within India, abets the counterfeiting of coin out of India shall be punished in the
same manner as if he abetted the counterfeiting of such coin within India.
y Whoever imports into India or exports any counterfeit coin, knowing or having reason to believe that
the same is counterfeit, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. And if it is an Indian coin, the punishment
shall be Imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine.
y Whoever, having any counterfeit coin, which at the time when he became possessed of it, he knew
to be counterfeit, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, delivers the same to
any persons or attempts to induce any person to receive it, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.

y Whoever, having any counterfeit coin which is a counterfeit of Indian coin and which, at the time
when he became possessed of it, he knew to be a counterfeit of Indian coin, fraudulently or with
intent that fraud may be committed, delivers the same to any person, or attempts to induce any
person to receive it, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
y Whoever delivers to any other person as genuine, or attempts to induce any other person to receive
as genuine, any counterfeit coin which he knows to be counterfeit, but which he did not know to be
counterfeit at the time when he took it into his possession, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine to an amount which may
extend to 10 times the value of the coin counterfeited, or with both.
y Whoever, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of counterfeit
coin, having known at the time when he became possessed thereof that such coin was counterfeit,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y Whoever, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of counterfeit
coin, which is a counterfeit of Indian coin, having known at the time when he became possessed of
it that it was counterfeit, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y If an employee of any mint lawfully established in India, does any act, or omits what he is legally
bound to do, with the intention of causing any coin issued from that mint to be of a different weight
or composition from the weight or composition fixed by law, shall be punished with imprisonment of
y Whoever, without lawful authority, takes out of any mint, lawfully established in India, any coining
tool or instrument, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y Whoever, fraudulently or dishonestly performs on any coin any operation which diminishes the weight
or alters the composition of that coin, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly performs on any Indian coin any operation which diminishes
the weight or alters the composition of that coin, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y Whoever performs on any coin any operation which alters the appearance of that coin, with the
intention that the said coin shall pass as a coin of a different description, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
y Whoever performs on any operation on any Indian coin which alters the appearance of that coin,
with the intention that the said coin shall pass as a coin of a different description, shall be punished
be liable to fine.
y Whoever, having coin in his possession with respect to which the offence defined in Section 246 or
248 has been committed, and having known at the time when he became possessed of such coin
that such offence had been committed with respect to it, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may
be committed, delivers such coin to any other person, or attempts to induce any other person to

receive the same, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y Whoever, having coin in his possession with respect to which the offence defined in Section 247 or
249 has been committed, and having known at the time when he became possessed of such coin
that such offence had been committed with respect to it, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may
be committed, delivers such coin to any other person, or attempts to induce any other person to
receive the same, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
y Whoever fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of coin with
respect to which the offence defined in either of the Section 246 or 248 has been committed, having
known at the time of becoming possessed thereof that such offence had been committed with
respect to such coin, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y Whoever, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of coin with
respect to which the offence defined in either of the Section 247 or 249 has been committed having
known at the time of becoming possessed thereof, that such offence had been committed with
respect to such coin, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y Whoever delivers to any other person as genuine or as a coin of a different description from what it
is, or attempts to induce any person to receive as genuine, or as a different coin from what it is, any
coin in respect of which he knows that any such operation as that mentioned in Sections 246, 247,
248, or 249 has been performed, but in respect of which he did not, at the time when he took it into
his possession, know that such operation had been performed, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine to an amount which
may extend to 10 times the value of the coin for which the altered coin is passed, or attempted to
be passed.
y Whoever counterfeits, or knowingly performs any part of the process of counterfeiting, any stamp
issued by the government for the purpose of revenue shall be punished with imprisonment for life
or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also
be liable to fine.
y Whoever has in his possession any instrument or material for the purpose of being used or knowing
or having reason to believe that it is intended to be used, for the purpose of counterfeiting any stamp
issued by the government for the purpose of revenue, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y Whoever makes or performs any part of the process of making, buying, selling, or disposing of, any
instrument for the purpose of being used, or knowing or having reason to believe that it is intended
to be used, for the purpose of counterfeiting any stamp issued by the government for the purpose
of revenue, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
y Whoever sells, or offers for sale, any stamp which he knows or has reason to believe to be a
counterfeit of any stamp issued by the government for the purpose of revenue, shall be punished
be liable to fine.

y Whoever has in his possession any stamp which he knows to be a counterfeit of any stamp issued
by the government for the purpose of revenue, intending to use, dispose of the same as a genuine
stamp, or in order that it may be used as a genuine stamp, shall be punished with imprisonment of
y Whoever uses as genuine any stamp, knowing it to be a counterfeit of any stamp issued by the
government for the purpose of revenue, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.
y Whoever, fraudulently or with intent to cause loss to the government, removes or effaces from any
substance, bearing any stamp issued by the government for the purpose of revenue, any writing or
document for which such stamp has been used, or removes from any writing or document a stamp
which has been used for such writing or document, in order that such stamp may be used for a
different writing or document, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
y Whoever, fraudulently or with intent to cause loss to the government, uses for any purpose a stamp
issued by the government for the purpose of revenue, which he knows to have been before used,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years,
or with fine, or with both.
y Whoever, fraudulently or with intent to cause loss to the government, erases or removes from a
stamp issued by the government for the purpose of revenue, any mark, put or impressed upon such
stamp for the purpose of denoting that the same has been used, or knowingly has in his possession
or sells or disposes of any such stamp from which such mark has been erased or removed, or sells or
disposes of any such stamp which he knows to have been used, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Offences against Public Tranquillity

The offences against public tranquillity have been explained under Chapter VII of the IPC from Section
141 to Section 160. The relevant provisions from the Chapter have been enumerated below.
y Unlawful assembly: this topic has already been discussed earlier.
y Rioting: whenever force or violence is used by an unlawful assembly or by any member thereof, in
prosecution of the common object of such assembly, every member of such assembly is guilty of
the offence of rioting (Section 146). Such a person shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both (Section 147). A
person who is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used
as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both (Section 148).
Whenever a riot is committed for the benefit or on behalf of any person who is the owner or occupier
of any land respecting which such riot takes place or who claims any interest in such land, or in
the subject of any dispute which gave rise to the riot, or who has accepted or derived any benefit
therefrom, such person shall be punishable with fine, if he or his agent or manager, having reason
to believe that such riot was likely to be committed or that the unlawful assembly by which such
riot was committed was likely to be held, shall not respectively use all lawful means in his or their
power to prevent such assembly or riot from taking place, and for suppressing and dispersing the
same (Section 155). Whenever a riot is committed for the benefit or on behalf of any person who is
the owner or occupier of any land respecting which such riot takes place, or who claims any interest

in such land, or in the subject of any dispute which gave rise to the riot, or who has accepted or
derived any benefit therefrom, the agent or manager of such person shall be punishable with fine,
if such agent or manager, having reason to believe that such riot was likely to be committed, or that
the unlawful assembly by which such riot was committed was likely to be held, shall not use all
lawful means in his power to prevent such riot or assembly from taking place and for suppressing
and dispersing the same (Section 156).
y Assaulting or obstructing public servant when suppressing riot, etc. (Section 152): whoever assaults,
or threatens to assault, or obstructs, or attempts to obstruct, any public servant in the discharge of
his duty as such public servant, in endeavouring to disperse an unlawful assembly, or to suppress
a riot or affray, or uses, or threatens, or attempts to use criminal force to such public servant, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or
with fine, or with both.
y Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot, if rioting be committed; if not committed
(Section 153): whoever malignantly, or wantonly, by doing anything which is illegal, gives provocation to
any person intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause the offence of rioting
to be committed, shall, if the offence of rioting be committed in consequence of such provocation,
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine, or with both; and if the offence of rioting be not committed, with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
y Promoting enmity between different groups on ground of religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony (Section 153A): whoever:
⚪ by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes
or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste,
community, or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill will
between different religious, racial, language, or regional groups or castes or communities, or
⚪ commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious,
racial, language, or regional groups, castes, or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to
disturb the public tranquillity, or
⚪ organises any exercise, movement, drill, or other similar activity intending that the participants
in such activity shall use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely
that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, or
participates in such activity intending to use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or
knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal
force or violence, against any religious, racial, language, or regional group, caste, or community
and such activity for any reason whatsoever causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm or a feeling
of insecurity among members of such religious, racial, language, or regional group, caste, or
community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine,
or with both. If such offence is committed in place of worship, then offender shall be punished
with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.
y Punishment for knowingly carrying arms in any procession or organising, holding, or taking part in
any mass drill or mass training with arms (Section 153AA): whoever knowingly carries arms in any
procession or organises or holds or takes part in any mass drill or mass training with arms in any
public place in contravention of any public notice or order issued or made under Section 144A, CrPC,

shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and with fine which
may extend to 2000 rupees.
y Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration (Section 153B): whoever, by words either
spoken, written, or by signs or visible representations or otherwise:
⚪ makes or publishes any imputation that any class of persons cannot, by reason of their being
members of any religious, racial, language, or regional group, caste, or community, bear true faith
and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established or uphold the sovereignty and
integrity of India, or
⚪ asserts, counsels, advises, propagates, or publishes that any class of persons shall, by reason of
their being members of any religious, racial, language, or regional group, caste, or community, be
denied or deprived of their rights as citizens of India, or
⚪ makes or publishes an assertion, counsel, plea, or appeal concerning the obligation of any class
of persons, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language, or regional group,
caste, or community, and such assertion, counsel, plea, or appeal causes or is likely to cause
disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill will between such members and other persons,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
If such an offence is committed in any place of worship, then offender shall be punished with
imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.
y Owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held (Section 154): whenever any
unlawful assembly or riot takes place, the owner or occupier of the land upon which such unlawful
assembly is held, or such riot is committed, and any person having or claiming an interest in such
land, shall be punishable with fine not exceeding 1000 rupees, if he or his agent or manager, knowing
that such offence is being or has been committed, or having reason to believe it is likely to be
committed, do not give the earliest notice thereof in his or their power to the principal officer at the
nearest police station, and do not, in the case of his or their having reason to believe that it was
about to be committed, use all lawful means in his or their power to prevent it and, in the event of
its taking place, do not use all lawful means in his or their power to disperse or suppress the riot or
unlawful assembly.
y Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (Section 157): whoever harbours, receives, or
assembles, in any house or premises in his occupation or charge, or under his control any persons
knowing that such persons have been hired, engaged, or employed, or are about to be hired,
engaged, or employed, to join or become members of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine,
or with both.
y Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly or riot (Section 158): whoever is engaged or hired,
or offers or attempts to be hired or engaged, to do or assist in doing any of the acts specified in
Section 141, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to six months, or with fine, or with both, or to go armed and whoever, being so engaged or hired as
aforesaid, goes armed, or engages or offers to go armed, with any deadly weapon or with anything
which used as a weapon of offence is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
y Affray: when two or more persons, by fighting in a public place, disturb the public peace, they are
said to ‘commit an affray’ (Section 159). Such a person shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to 100 rupees,
or with both (Section 160).

Theories and Kinds of Punishment—Compensation to the Victims of Crime
Theories of Punishment
y Retributive theory of punishment or vengeance theory or expiatory theory is a concept of primitive
society which consists of injury inflicted by way of retaliation by victim of crime on actor of crime,
which requires the existence of victim as well as a wrongdoer. Its idea is severity of punishment
where victim of crime inflicts the retaliatory harm that expunges the crime. Retributive theory is
based on rights, desert, and justice. The guilty deserve to be punished, and no moral consideration
relevant to punishment outweighs the offender’s criminal desert is the philosophy of retributive
theory. This theory takes one closer to another principle of expiation. According to this, the penalty
of wrongdoing is a debt, which offender owes to his victim. When punishment has been endured, the
debt is paid, the liability is extinguished. However, modern legal system has given up the vengeance
theory because of its heinous, barbaric and uncilivised nature of punishment.
y Reformative theory of punishment is reformist. It looks at a sanction as an instrument of rehabilitation
and tries to mould the behaviour of the criminal on the premises that he is not born but made by the
environment of society. Therefore, it is the responsibility of society to reform him by adopting certain
suitable methods. This approach rejects the deterrence and retributive elements of punishments
and impeccably advocates reformative approach on simple idea that, ‘we must cure our criminal,
not kill them’. The reformative theory is reaction to the deterrent theory which has failed to take
into consideration of the welfare of criminal. According to this theory, crime is like a disease, it is
committed because of the conflict between the character and the motive of the criminal.
y Deterrent theory of punishment marks at the objective that the persons of the society should be
deterred by the punishment inflicted upon the criminal that discourages them to commit the offence
in future. Punishment (sanction) under this approach is before all things deterrent and the chief end
of the law of crime is to make the evildoer an example and warning to all that are like minded with
him. According to this theory, offences are result of a conflict between the interests of the wrongdoer
and those of society. The aim of punishment is to dissolve the conflict of interests by making every
offence.
y Under the preventive theory of punishment, punishment is preventive or disabling. Its primary and
general purpose is to deter by fear, its secondary and special purpose is to prevent a repetition by
wrongdoer by the disablement of the offender. The aim of this theory is not to repeat the crime, but
this theory takes no note of the criminal. It prefers to disable the wrongdoer from committing any
more crime, but it ignores one of the basic objects of the criminal law, i.e., to reform the criminal.
However, preventive philosophy is a useful mode of punishment because it serves as effective
deterrent and useful preventive measures.
y Compensatory theory of punishment is a new approach. The entire focus of the criminal justice system
is on the offender, to punish him or to seek his reformation and rehabilitation with all the resources
and goodwill available through courts and other governmental and non-governmental agencies. The
victims of crimes are, on the other hand, forgotten people in the system. Thus, this approach to
punishment aims at the idea that along with the punishment being inflicted upon the criminal, the
victim of the crime should be compensated, the amount of which shall be paid by the criminal only.
Kinds of Punishment under the Indian Penal Code

Initially, there were six kinds of punishment that were described in the IPC. However, in 1949, the third
punishment ‘Penal Servitude’ was removed. Now, there are five kinds of punishment under the IPC.

y Death or capital punishment: punishment of death may be imposed on the following offences.
⚪ Waging or attempting to wage war or abetting the waging of war against the Government of India
(Section 121)
⚪ Abetment of mutiny actually committed (Section 132)
⚪ Giving or fabricating false evidence upon which an innocent person suffers death (Section 194)
⚪ Murder (Section 302)
⚪ Punishment for murder by a life-convict (Section 303) [This section was struck down by the
Supreme Court holding that it was unconstitutional, while disposing the case Mithu versus State
of Punjab (AIR 1983 SC 4731)]
⚪ Abetment of suicide of a child or an insane or intoxicated person (Section 305)
⚪ Attempt to murder by a person under sentence of imprisonment for life, if hurt is caused
(Section 307)
⚪ Dacoity with murder (Section 396)
y Imprisonment for life: before 1955, the words ‘transportation for life’ was used. Thereafter, the Code
of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 1955, substituted it by the words ‘Imprisonment for life’.
During the British Rule, the convicts under ‘transportation for life’ were used to be deported to the
Andamans and other colonies, and were taken forever from the society of all who were acquainted
with him. But such system was stopped post-independence.
y Penal servitude: ‘servitude’ means ‘slavery’. Penal servitude means the convict becomes a slave
of the state. British Courts used to impose penal servitude as a severe punishment next to the
death sentence. Generally, this punishment was imposed on Indians, who revolted against the then
British Rule. To make it more grave, penal servitude was coupled with transportation, where the
convicts were sent to uninhibited lands and areas such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These
punishments were also called ‘extermination’ or ‘exterminating’.
y Imprisonment: there are two descriptions of imprisonment.
⚪ Rigorous imprisonment with hard labour: rigorous imprisonment may be imposed for the offences
like house trespass. The convicted person is put to do hard labour such as digging earth, cutting
stones, agriculture, grinding corn, drawing water, carpentry, etc.
⚪ Simple imprisonment: this punishment is imposed for the lighter offences such as public servant
unlawfully engaging in trade or unlawfully buying or bidding for property; absconding to avoid
service of summons or other proceedings, or not attending in obedience to an order from a public
servant; to obstruct traffic or cause public nuisance; eve-teasing, drunken brawls, etc.
y Solitary confinement (Section 73): a harsh and hardened convict may be confined in a separate cell
to correct his conduct. He is put separately without interaction with other prisoners. However, for a
valid solitary confinement, the following conditions need to be fulfiled.
⚪ Solitary confinement should not exceed three months of the whole term of imprisonment.
⚪ It cannot be awarded where imprisonment is not part of the substantive sentence.
⚪ It cannot be awarded where imprisonment is in lieu of fine.
⚪ It cannot also be awarded for the whole term of imprisonment.
Further, according to Section 73, the following scale shall be adhered.
⚪ Time not exceeding one month if the term of imprisonment shall not exceed six months.

⚪ A time not exceeding two months if the term of imprisonment shall exceed six months and shall
not exceed one year.
⚪ A time not exceeding three months if the term of imprisonment shall exceed one year.
Section 74 limits the solitary confinement and clarifies that it shall in no case exceed 14 days
at a time with intervals between the periods of solitary confinement of not less duration than
such periods, and when the imprisonment awarded shall exceed three months, such confinement
shall not exceed seven days in any one month of the whole imprisonment awarded, with intervals
between the periods of solitary confinement of not less duration than such periods.
y Enhanced punishment (Section 75): a person who has been previously convicted of an offence
punishable under Chapter XII (offences relating to coins and government stamps) or Chapter XVII
(offences against property) of this Code, with imprisonment of either description for a term of three
years or upwards shall be guilty of any offence punishable under either of those chapters with like
imprisonment for the like term, shall be subject for every such subsequent offence to imprisonment
for life, or to imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years. The
conditions for imposing enhanced punishment are as follows.
⚪ The accused must have been previously convicted.
⚪ Such conviction must be for any offence mentioned in Chapter XII or XVII.
⚪ Such previous conviction must have been for an offence punishable for not less than three years.
⚪ Subsequent offence must also be punishable with imprisonment for not less than three years.
Note: imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining life period of the
convicted person’s natural life. According to Section 57, imprisonments for life shall be reckoned
as equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years, but only for calculating fractions of punishments.
Otherwise, the sentence of imprisonment for life is of indefinite duration only.
y Forfeiture of property: forfeiture is the divestiture of specific property without compensation in
consequence of some default or act of forbidden by law. For example, white-collar crimes.
y Fine: the courts may impose fine along with or without imprisonment. According to Section 63,
where no sum is expressed to which a fine may extend, the amount of fine to which the offender is
liable is unlimited but shall not be excessive.
As per the provisions of Section 64, in every case of an offence punishable with imprisonment as well
as fine, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine, whether with or without imprisonment, and in
every case of an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine, or with fine only, in which the offender
is sentenced to a fine, it shall be competent to the court, which sentences such offender to direct
by the sentence that, in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall suffer imprisonment for a
certain term, which imprisonment shall be in excess of any other imprisonment to which he may have
been sentenced or to which he may be liable under a commutation of a sentence.
Other Important Provisions

y Limit to imprisonment if fine imposed is not paid (Section 65): shall not exceed one fourth of the
term of imprisonment which is the maximum fixed for the offence if the offence be punishable with
imprisonment as well as fine.
y Description of imprisonment for non-payment of fine (Section 66): may be of any description to
which the offender might have been sentenced for the offence.

y Imprisonment for non-payment of fine when offence punishable with fine only (Section 67):
imprisonment in default of payment of the fine shall be simple.
y Termination of imprisonment on payment of fine (Sections 68 and 69): whenever the fine is paid the
imprisonment, shall be terminated forthwith. If before the expiration of the term of imprisonment fixed
in default of payment, such a proportion of the fine be paid or levied that the term of imprisonment
suffered in default of payment is not less than proportional to the part of the fine still unpaid, the
imprisonment shall terminate.
y Section 70: imprisonment for default of fine shall not liberate the offender from his liability to pay
the full amount of fine imposed upon him. Imprisonment in default of fine is not a satisfaction for
the fine, but it is a punishment for non-payment or contempt or resistance to the due execution of
the sentence and such fine shall be recoverable from the offender within six years from the date of
sentence passed by the trial court or during imprisonment.
Compensation to the Victims of Crime

In simple terms, a victim is a person who has suffered harm because of violation of criminal law. It
includes a person who though may not have suffered a direct harm but is related to the victim in such
a manner that he too is affected by the commission of the overt act. Articles 1 and 2 of the United
Nations General Assembly Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victim and Abuse of Power, 1985,
give an exhaustive definition of the term ‘victim’. According to Article 1, ‘victim’ means persons who,
individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering,
economic loss, or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that
are in violation of criminal laws operative within member states, including those laws proscribing
criminal abuse of power. Article 2 further states that a person may be considered a victim regardless
of whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted, or convicted and regardless of the
familial relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. Thus, the term ‘victim’ also includes,
where appropriate, the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have
suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimisation. A victim is entitled
to compensation when ordered by the court, upon the application by him. It may be in the form of
medical expenses, loss of livelihood or mental trauma. Laws that cater to victim compensation in India
are the following.
y Judicial activism under Article 32 or 226: the Supreme Court and High Courts in various cases has
now held that the right to victim compensation is implicit in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
of India. They have justified the concept saying it to be the primary duty of the welfare state to
protect the fundamental rights of the citizens not only against the actions of its agencies but is
also responsible for hardships on the victims on the grounds of humanitarianism and obligation of
social welfare, duty to protect its subject, equitable justice, etc. Some cases where the courts have
ordered compensation include Nilabati Behra versus State of Orissa [1993 SC], Rudal Shah versus
State of Bihar [1983 SC], Meja Singh versus SHO, Police Station Zira [1990 Punj], Ravikant Patil versus
DG Police, State of Maharashtra [1990 Bom], Prem Shanker Shukla versus Delhi Administration [1980
SC], SAHELI versus Commissioner of Police [1990 SC], etc.
y Section 357, CrPC: when a court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a sentence of
death) of which fine forms a part, the court may order the whole or any part of the fine recovered
to be applied:
⚪ in defraying the expenses of properly incurred in the prosecution;

⚪ in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when
compensation is, in the opinion of the court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court;
⚪ when any person is convicted of any offence for having caused the death of another person or of
having abetted the commission of such an offence, in paying compensation to the persons who
are, under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, entitled to recover damages from the person sentenced
for the loss resulting to them from such death;
⚪ when any person is convicted of any offence which includes theft, criminal misappropriation,
criminal breach of trust, cheating, of having dishonestly received or retained, or of having voluntarily
assisted in disposing of, stolen property knowing or having reason to believe the same to be
stolen, in compensating any bona fide purchaser of such property for the loss of the same if such
property is restored to the possession of the person entitled thereto. However, while awarding
compensation in any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter, the court shall consider
any sum paid or recovered as compensation under this section.
y Section 357A, CrPC: this provision was added in 2009. Every state government in coordination with
the central government is required to prepare a scheme for providing funds for the purpose of
compensation to the victim or his dependents who have suffered loss or injury because of the crime
and who require rehabilitation. Whenever a recommendation is made by the court for compensation,
the District Legal Service Authority or the State Legal Service Authority, as the case may be, shall
decide the quantum of compensation to be awarded under the scheme. Further, if the trial court,
at the conclusion of the trial, is satisfied, that the compensation awarded under Section 357 is not
adequate for such rehabilitation, or where the cases end in acquittal or discharge and the victim
must be rehabilitated, it may make recommendation for compensation. However, if the offender is
not traced or identified, but the victim is identified, and where no trial takes place, the victim or his
dependents may make an application to the State or the District Legal Services Authority for award
of compensation.
y Section 5, Probation of Offenders Act, 1958: this provision also empowers the trail court to order for
compensation for the loss or the injury occurred to him or cost of the proceeding.
y Central Victim Compensation Fund (CVCF) Scheme: the central government in 2015 formulated the
CVCF Scheme to compensate the determined. Every state has their own guidelines which decide the
procedure.
Classification of Offences
Explanatory Notes
1. In regard to offences under the IPC, the entries in the second and third columns against a section
the number of which is given in the first column are not intended as the definition of, and the
punishment prescribed for, the offence in the IPC, but merely as indication of the substance of the
section.
2. In this Schedule, (i) the expression ‘Magistrate of the first class’ and ‘Any Magistrate’ include
Metropolitan Magistrates but not Executive Magistrates; (ii) the word ‘cognizable’ stands for ‘a
police officer may arrest without warrant’; and (iii) the word ‘non-cognizable’ stands for ‘a police
officer shall not arrest without warrant’.

I—Offences under the Indian Penal Code
Section Offence Punishment Cognizable or Bailable or By What Court Triable
Non-cognizable Non-bailable
1 2 3 4 5 6
Chapter V—Abetment
109 Abetment of any offence, if Same as for offence According as offence According as offence Court by which offence
the act abetted is committed abetted. abetted is cognizable or abetted is bailable or abetted is triable

in consequence, and where no non-cognizable. non-bailable.
express provision is made for
its punishment.
110 Abetment of any offence, if the Same as for offence According as offence According as offence Court by which offence
person abetted does the act abetted. abetted is cognizable or abetted is bailable or abetted is triable
with a different intention from non-cognizable. non-bailable.
that of the abettor.
111 Abetment of any offence, Same as for offence According as offence According as offence Court by which offence
when one act is abetted and a intended to be abetted. abetted is cognizable or abetted is bailable or abetted is triable
different act is done; subject non-cognizable. non-bailable.
to the proviso.
113 Abetment of any offence, when Same as for offence According as offence According as offence Court by which offence
an effect is caused by the act committed. abetted is cognizable or abetted is bailable or abetted is triable
abetted different from that non-cognizable. non-bailable.
intended by the abettor.
114 Abetment of any offence, Same as for offence According as offence According as offence Court by which offence
if abettor is present when committed. abetted is cognizable or abetted is bailable or abetted is triable
offence is committed. non-cognizable. non-bailable.
115 Abetment of an offence, Imprisonment for seven According as offence Non-bailable Court by which offence
punishable with death or years and fine. abetted is cognizable or abetted is triable
imprisonment for life, if the non-cognizable.
offence be not committed in
consequence of the abetment.
If an act which causes harm Imprisonment for 14 years According as offence Non-bailable Court by which offence
be done in consequence of the and fine. abetted is cognizable or abetted is triable
abetment. non-cognizable.
116 Abetment of any offence, Imprisonment extending According as offence According as offence Court by which offence
punishable with imprisonment, to a quarter part of the abetted is cognizable or abetted is bailable or abetted is triable
if the offence be not longest term provided for non-cognizable. non-bailable.
committed in consequence of the offence, or fine, or
the abetment. both.
89
90
1 2 3 4 5 6
If the abettor or the person Imprisonment extending According as offence According as offence Court by which offence
abetted be a public servant to half of the longest term abetted is cognizable or abetted is bailable or abetted is triable
whose duty it is to prevent the provided for the offence, or non-cognizable. non-bailable.
offence. fine, or both.
117 Abetting the commission of Imprisonment for three According as offence According as offence Court by which offence
an offence by the public or by years, or fine, or both. abetted is cognizable or abetted is bailable or abetted is triable
more than 10 persons. non-cognizable. non-bailable.
118 Concealing a design to commit Imprisonment for seven According as offence Non-bailable Court by which offence
an offence punishable with years and fine. abetted is cognizable or abetted is triable
death or imprisonment for life, non-cognizable.
if the offence be committed.
If the offence be not Imprisonment for three According as offence Bailable Court by which offence
committed years and fine. abetted is cognizable or abetted is triable
non-cognizable.
119 A public servant concealing a Imprisonment extending According as offence According as offence Court by which offence
design to commit an offence to half of the longest term abetted is cognizable or abetted is bailable or abetted is triable
which it is his duty to prevent, provided for the offence, or non-cognizable. non-bailable.
if the offence be committed. fine, or both.
If the offence be punishable Imprisonment for 10 years. According as offence Non-bailable Court by which offence
with death or imprisonment for abetted is cognizable or abetted is triable
life. non-cognizable.
If the offence be not Imprisonment extending According as offence Bailable Court by which offence
committed. to a quarter part of the abetted is cognizable or abetted is triable
longest term provided for non-cognizable.
the offence, or fine, or
both.
120 Concealing a design to commit Imprisonment extending According as offence According as offence Court by which offence
an offence punishable with to a quarter part of the abetted is cognizable or abetted is bailable or abetted is triable
imprisonment, if offence be longest term provided for non-cognizable. non-bailable.
committed. the offence, or fine, or
both.
If the offence be not Imprisonment extending According as offence Bailable Court by which offence
committed. to one-eighth part of the abetted is cognizable or abetted is triable
longest term provided for non-cognizable.
the offence, or fine, or
both.

1 2 3 4 5 6
Chapter VA—Criminal Conspiracy
120B Criminal conspiracy to commit Same as for abetment of According as the offence According as offence Court by which abetment
an offence punishable life, or the offence which is the which is the object of which is object of of the offence which is
rigorous imprisonment for a object of the conspiracy. conspiracy is cognizable conspiracy is bailable or the object of conspiracy
term of two years or upwards. or non-cognizable. non-bailable. is triable

Any other criminal conspiracy. Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
months, or fine, or both. class
Chapter VI—Offences against the State
121 Waging or attempting to wage Death, or imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
war, or abetting the waging of life and fine.
war, against the Government of
India.
121A Conspiring to commit certain Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
offences against the State. imprisonment for 10 years
and fine.
122 Collecting arms, etc., with the Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
intention of waging war against imprisonment for 10 years
the Government of India. and fine.
123 Concealing with intent to Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
facilitate a design to wage war. and fine.
124 Assaulting President, Governor, Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
etc., with intent to compel or years and fine.
restrain the exercise of any
lawful power.
124A Sedition Imprisonment for life and Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
fine, or imprisonment for
three years and fine, or
fine.
125 Waging war against any Asiatic Imprisonment for life and Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
power in alliance or at peace fine, or imprisonment for
with the Government of India, seven years and fine, or
or abetting the waging of such fine.
war.
126 Committing depredation on Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
the territories of any power in years and fine, and
alliance or at peace with the forfeiture of certain
Government of India. property.
91
92
1 2 3 4 5 6
127 Receiving property taken by Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
war or depredation mentioned years and fine, and
in sections 125 and 126. forfeiture of certain
property.
128 Public servant voluntarily Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
allowing prisoner of State or imprisonment for 10 years
war in his custody to escape. and fine.
129 Public servant negligently Simple imprisonment for Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
suffering prisoner of State of three years and fine. class
war in his custody to escape.
130 Aiding escape of, rescuing or Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
harbouring, such prisoner, or imprisonment for 10 years
offering any resistance to the and fine.
recapture of such prisoner.
Chapter VII—Offences Relating to the Army, Navy, and Air Force
131 Abetting mutiny, or attempting Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
to seduce an officer, soldier, imprisonment for 10 years
sailor or airman from his and fine.
allegiance or duty.
132 Abetment of mutiny, if mutiny Death, or imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
is committed in consequence life, or imprisonment for
thereof. 10 years and fine.
133 Abetment of an assault by an Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
officer, soldier, sailor or airman years and fine. class
on his superior officer, when in
the execution of his office.
134 Abetment of such assault, if Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
the assault is committed. years and fine. class
135 Abetment of the desertion of Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
an officer, soldier, sailor or years, or fine, or both.
airman.
136 Harbouring such an officer, Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
soldier, sailor or airman who years, or fine, or both.
has deserted.
137 Deserter concealed on board Fine of 500 rupees Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
merchant vessel, through

negligence of master or person
in charge thereof.
1 2 3 4 5 6
138 Abetment of act of Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
insubordination by an officer, months, or fine, or both.
soldier, sailor or airman, if
the offence be committed in
consequence.

140 Wearing the dress or carrying Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
any token used by a soldier, months, or fine of 500
sailor or airman with intent rupees, or both.
that it may be believed that
he is such a soldier, sailor or
airman.
Chapter VIII—Offences against the Public Tranquility
143 Being member of an unlawful Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
assembly. months, or fine, or both.
144 Joining an unlawful assembly Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
armed with any deadly weapon. years, or fine, or both.
145 Joining or continuing in an Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
unlawful assembly, knowing years, or fine, or both.
that it has been commanded
to disperse.
147 Rioting Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate

years, or fine, or both.
148 Rioting, armed with a deadly Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
weapon. years, or fine, or both. class
149 If an offence be committed by The same as for the According as offence According as offence is The Court by which the
any member of an unlawful offence. is cognizable or non- bailable or non-bailable. offence is triable
assembly, every other member cognizable.
of such assembly shall be
guilty of the offence.
150 Hiring, engaging or employing The same as for a member Cognizable According as offence is The Court by which the
persons to take part in an of such assembly, and for bailable or non-bailable. offence is triable
unlawful assembly. any offence committed
by any member of such
assembly.
93
94
1 2 3 4 5 6
151 Knowingly joining or continuing Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
in any assembly of five or months, or fine or both.
more persons after it has been
commanded to disperse.
152 Assaulting or obstructing Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
public servant when years, or fine, or both. class
suppressing riot, etc.
153 Wantonly giving provocation Imprisonment for one year, Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
with intent to cause riot, if or fine, or both.
rioting be committed.
If not committed. Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
months, or fine, or both. class
153A Promoting enmity between Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
classes. years, or fine, or both. class
Promoting enmity between Imprisonment for five years, Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
classes in place of worship, and fine. class
etc.
153AA Knowingly carrying arms in Imprisonment for six Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
any procession or organising months and fine of 2000
or holding or taking part in any rupees.
mass drill or mass training with
arms.
153B Imputations, assertions Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
prejudicial to national years, or fine, or both. class
integration.
If committed in a place of Imprisonment for five years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
public worship, etc. and fine. class
154 Owner or occupier of land not Fine of 1000 rupees. Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
giving information of riot, etc.
155 Person for whose benefit or on Fine Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
whose behalf a riot takes place
not using all lawful means to
prevent it.
156 Agent of owner or occupier Fine Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
for whose benefit a riot is
committed not using all lawful

means to prevent it.
1 2 3 4 5 6
157 Harbouring persons hired for Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
an unlawful assembly. months, or fine, or both.
158 Being hired to take part in an Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
unlawful assembly or riot. months, or fine, or both.
Or to go armed. Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate

160 Committing affray Imprisonment for one Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
month, or fine of 100
rupees or both.
Chapter IX—Offences by or Relating to Public Servants
161 Being or expecting to be a Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
public servant, and taking a years, or fine, or both. class
gratification other than legal
remuneration in respect of an
official act.
162 Taking a gratification in order, Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
by corrupt or illegal means, to years, or fine, or both. class
influence a public servant.
163 Taking a gratification for the Simple imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
exercise of personal influence one year, or fine, or both. class
with a public servant.
164 Abetment by public servant of Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
the offences defined in the last years, or fine, or both. class
two preceding clauses with
reference to himself.
165 Public servant obtaining Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
any valuable thing, without years, or fine, or both. class
consideration, from a person
concerned in any proceeding
or business transacted by such
public servant.
165A Punishment for abetment of Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
offences punishable under years, or fine, or both. class
section 161 or section 165.
166 Public servant disobeying a Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
direction of the law with intent one year, or fine, or both. class
to cause injury to any person.
95
96
1 2 3 4 5 6
166A Public servant disobeying Imprisonment for minimum Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
direction under law. six months which may class
extend to two years and
fine.
166B Non-treatment of victim by Imprisonment for one year Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
hospital. or fine or both. class
167 Public servant framing an Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
incorrect document with intent years, or fine, or both. class
to cause injury.
168 Public servant unlawfully Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
engaging in trade. one year, or fine, or both. class
169 Public servant unlawfully Simple imprisonment Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
buying or bidding for property. for two years, or fine, or class
both and confiscation of
property, if purchased.
170 Personating a public servant. Imprisonment for two years Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
or fine, or both.
171 Wearing garb or carrying token Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
used by public servant with months, or fine of 200
fraudulent intent. rupees, or both.
Chapter IXA.—Offences Relating to Elections
171E Bribery Imprisonment for one Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
year or fine, or both, or if class
treating only, fine only.
171F Undue influence at an election. Imprisonment for one year, Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
or fine, or both. class
Personation at an election. Imprisonment for one year, Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
171G False statement in connection Fine Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
with an election. class
171H Illegal payments in connection Fine of 500 rupees. Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
with elections. class
171I Failure to keep election Fine of 500 rupees. Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
accounts. class

1 2 3 4 5 6
Chapter X—Contempts of the Lawful Authority of Public Servants
172 Absconding to avoid service of Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
summons or other proceeding one month, or fine of 500
from a public servant. rupees, or both.

If summons or notice require Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
attendance in person, etc., in a six months, or fine of 1000
Court of Justice. rupees, or both.
173 Preventing the service or the Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
affixing of any summons of one month, or fine of 500
notice, or the removal of it rupees, or both.
when it has been affixed, or
preventing a proclamation.
If summons, etc., require Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
attendance in person, etc., in a six months, or fine of 1000
Court of Justice. rupees, or both.
174 Not obeying a legal order Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
to attend at a certain place one month, or fine of 500
in person or by agent, or rupees, or both.
departing therefrom without
authority.
If the order requires personal Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
attendance, etc., in a Court of six months, or fine of 1000
Justice. rupees, or both.
174A Failure to appear at specified Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the
place and specified time as years, or with fine, or with first class
required by a proclamation both.
published under sub-section
(1) of Section 82 of the Code.
In a case where declaration Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the
has been made under sub- years and fine. first class
section (4) of Section 82 of the
Code pronouncing a person as
proclaimed offender.
97
98
1 2 3 4 5 6
175 Intentionally omitting to Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable The Court in which the
produce a document to a one month, or fine of 500 offence is committed,
public servant by a person rupees, or both. subject to the provisions
legally bound to produce or of Chapter XXVI; or, if not
deliver such document. committed, in a court,
any Magistrate
If the document is required to Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable The Court in which the
be produced in or delivered to six months, or fine of 1000 offence is committed,
a Court of Justice. rupees, or both. subject to the provisions
of Chapter XXVI; or, if not
committed, in a court,
any Magistrate
176 Intentionally omitting to give Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
notice or information to a one month, or fine of 500
public servant by a person rupees, or both.
legally bound to give such
notice or information.
If the notice or information Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
required respects the six months, or fine of 1000
commission of an offence, etc. rupees, or both.
If the notice or information is Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
required by an order passed months, or fine of 1000
under sub-section (1) of rupees, or both.
Section 356 of this Code.
177 Knowingly furnishing false Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
information to a public servant. months, or fine of 1000
rupees, or both.
If the information required Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
respects the commission of an years, or fine, or both.
offence, etc.
178 Refusing oath when duly Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable The Court in which the
required to take oath by a six months, or fine of 1000 offence is committed,
public servant. rupees, or both. subject to the provisions
of Chapter XXVI or, if not
committed in a Court,
any Magistrate

1 2 3 4 5 6
179 Being legally bound to state Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable The Court in which the
truth, and refusing to answer six months, or fine of 1000 offence is committed,
questions. rupees, or both. subject to the provisions
any Magistrate

180 Refusing to sign statement Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable The Court in which the
made to a public servant when three months, or fine of offence is committed,
legally required to do so. 500 rupees, or both. subject to the provisions
any Magistrate
181 Knowingly stating to a public Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
servant on oath as true that years and fine. class
which is false.
182 Giving false information to Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
a public servant in order months, or fine of 1000
to cause him to use his rupees, or both.
lawful power to the injury or
annoyance of any person.
183 Resistance to the taking of Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
property by the lawful authority months, or fine of 1000
of a public servant. rupees, or both.
184 Obstructing sale of property Imprisonment for one Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
offered for sale by authority of month, or fine of 500
a public servant. rupees, or both.
185 Bidding, by a person under a Imprisonment for one Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
legal incapacity to purchase month, or fine of 200
it, for property at a lawfully rupees, or both.
authorised sale, or bidding
without intending to perform
the obligations incurred
thereby.
186 Obstructing public servant Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
in discharge of his public months, or fine of 500
functions. rupees, or both.
99
100
1 2 3 4 5 6
State Amendments
Andhra Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, offence under Section 186 shall be cognizable.
[APGO Ms. No. 732, dated 05 December 1991].
187 Omission to assist public Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
servant when bound by law to one month, or fine of 200
give such assistance. rupees, or both.
Wilfully neglecting to aid a Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
public servant who demands six months, or fine of 500
aid in the execution of process, rupees, or both.
the prevention of offences, etc.
188 Disobedience to an order Simple imprisonment for Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
lawfully promulgated by one month, or fine of 200
a public servant, if such rupees, or both.
disobedience causes
obstruction, annoyance or
injury to persons lawfully
employed.
If such disobedience causes Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
danger to human life, health or months, or fine of 1000
safety, etc. rupees, or both.
State Amendment
Andhra Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, offence under Section 188 shall be non-bailable.
189 Threatening a public servant Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
with injury to him or one in years, or fine, or both.
whom he is interested, to
induce him to do or forbear to
do any official act.
State Amendment

1 2 3 4 5 6
190 Threatening any person to Imprisonment for one year, Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
induce him to refrain from or fine, or both.
making a legal application for
protection from injury.
State Amendments

Andhra Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, offence under section 190 shall be cognizable.
Chapter XI—False Evidence and Offences against Public Justice
193 Giving or fabricating false Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
evidence in a judicial years and fine. class
proceeding.
Giving or fabricating false Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
evidence in any other case. years and fine.
194 Giving or fabricating false Imprisonment for life, or Non-cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
evidence with intent to cause rigorous imprisonment for
any person to be convicted of 10 years and fine.
capital offence.
If innocent person be thereby Death, or as above. Non-cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
convicted and executed.
195 Giving or fabricating false The same as for the Non-cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
evidence with intent to procure offence.
conviction of an offence
punishable with imprisonment
for life or with imprisonment
for seven years, or upwards.
195A Threatening any person to give Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Court by which offence
false evidence. years, or fine, or both. of giving false evidence
is triable
If innocent person is convicted The same as for the Cognizable Non-bailable Court by which offence
and sentenced in consequence offence. of giving false evidence
of false evidence with death, is triable
or imprisonment for more than
seven years.
101
102
1 2 3 4 5 6
196 Using in a judicial proceeding The same as for giving or Non-cognizable According as offence of Court by which offence
evidence known to be false or fabricating false evidence. giving such evidence is of giving or fabricating
fabricated. bailable or non-bailable. false evidence is triable
197 Knowingly issuing or signing a The same as for giving or Non-cognizable Bailable Court by which offence
false certificate relating to any fabricating false evidence. of giving false evidence
fact of which such certificate is is triable
by law admissible in evidence.
198 Using as a true certificate one The same as for giving or Non-cognizable Bailable Court by which offence
known to be false in a material fabricating false evidence. of giving false evidence
point. is triable
199 False statement made in any The same as for giving or Non-cognizable Bailable Court by which offence
declaration which is by law fabricating false evidence. of giving false evidence
receivable as evidence. is triable
200 Using as true any such The same as for giving or Non-cognizable Bailable Court by which offence
declaration known to be false. fabricating false evidence. of giving false evidence
is triable
201 Causing disappearance Imprisonment for seven According as the Bailable Court of Session
of evidence of an offence years and fine. offence in relation to
committed, or giving false which disappearance
information touching it to of evidence is caused
screen the offender, if a capital is cognizable or non-
offence. cognizable.
If punishable with Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
imprisonment for life or years and fine. class
imprisonment for 10 years.
If punishable with less than 10 Imprisonment for a quarter Non-cognizable Bailable Court by which the
years’ imprisonment. of the longest term offence is triable
provided for the offence, or
fine, or both.
202 Intentional omission to give Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
information of an offence by a months, or fine, or both
person legally bound to inform.
203 Giving false information Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
respecting an offence years, or fine, or both.

committed.
1 2 3 4 5 6
204 Secreting or destroying any Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
document to prevent its years, or fine, or both. class
production as evidence.
205 False personation for the Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first

purpose of any act or years, or fine, or both. class
proceeding in a suit or criminal
prosecution, or for becoming
bail or security.
206 Fraudulent removal or Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
concealment, etc., of property years, or fine, or both.
to prevent its seizure as a
forfeiture or in satisfaction of
a fine under sentence, or in
execution of a decree.
207 Claiming property without Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
right, or practicing deception years, or fine, or both.
touching any right to it, to
prevent its being taken as a
forfeiture, or in satisfaction
of a fine under sentence, or in
execution of a decree.
208 Fraudulently suffering a Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
decree to pass for a sum not years, or fine, or both. class
due, or suffering decree to
be executed after it has been
satisfied.
209 False claim in a Court of Imprisonment for two years Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
Justice. and fine. class
210 Fraudulently obtaining a decree Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
for a sum not due, or causing a years, or fine or both. class
decree to be executed after it
has been satisfied.
211 False charge of offence made Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
with intent to injure. years, or fine or both. class
103
104
1 2 3 4 5 6
If offence charged be Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
punishable with imprisonment years and fine. class
for seven years or upwards.
If offence charged be capital or Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Bailable Court of Session
punishable with imprisonment years and fine.
for life.
State Amendments
Chhattisgarh.—(a) In its application to the State of Chhattisgarh, in the entries relating to Section 211, the following entries shall be added,
namely:
“If offence charged be Imprisonment not less than Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
punishable under sections 354, three years but which may class
354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 354E, extend to five years and
376B, 376C, 376F, 509, 509A, or fine.
509B.
[Chhattisgarh Act 25 of 2015, s. 13(a) (w.e.f. 21-07-2015)].
212 Harbouring an offender, if the Imprisonment for five years Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
offence be capital. and fine. class
If punishable with Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
imprisonment for life or with years and fine. class
If punishable with Imprisonment for a quarter Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
imprisonment for one year and of the longest term, and of class
not for 10 years. the description, provided
for the offence, or fine, or
both.
213 Taking gift, etc., to screen an Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
offender from punishment if years and fine. class
the offence be capital.
imprisonment for less than 10 of the longest term class
years. provided for the offence, or
fine, or both.

1 2 3 4 5 6
214 Offering gift or restoration Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
of property in consideration years and fine. class
of screening offender if the
offence be capital.
If punishable with Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first

If punishable with Imprisonment for a quarter Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
imprisonment for less than 10 of the longest term, class
years. provided for the offence, or
fine, or both.
215 Taking gift to help to recover Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
movable property of which a years, or fine, or both. class
person has been deprived by
an offence without causing
apprehension of offender.
216 Harbouring an offender who Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
has escaped from custody, years and fine. class
or whose apprehension has
been ordered, if the offence be
capital.
imprisonment for life or with years, with or without fine. class
imprisonment for one year and of the longest term class
not for 10 years. provided for the offence, or
fine, or both.
216A Harbouring robbers or dacoits. Rigorous imprisonment for Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
seven years and fine. class
217 Public servant disobeying a Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
direction of law with intent to years, or fine, or both.
save person from punishment,
or property from forfeiture.
105
106
1 2 3 4 5 6
218 Public servant framing an Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
incorrect record or writing with years, or fine, or both. class
intent to save person from
punishment, or property from
forfeiture.
219 Public servant in a judicial Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
proceeding corruptly making years, or fine, or both. class
and pronouncing an order,
report, verdict, or decision
which he knows to be contrary
to law.
220 Commitment for trial or Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
confinement by a person years, or fine, or both. class
having authority, who knows
that he is acting contrary to
law.
221 Intentional omission to Imprisonment for seven According as the offence Bailable Magistrate of the first
apprehend on the part of a years, with or without fine. in relation to which such class
public servant bound by law to omission has been made
apprehend an offender, if the is cognizable or non-
offence be capital. cognizable.
imprisonment for life or years, with or without fine. class
If punishable with Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
imprisonment for less than 10 years, with or without fine. class
years.
222 Intentional omission to Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
apprehend on the part of a imprisonment for 14 years,
public servant bound by law with or without fine.
to apprehend person under
sentence of a Court of Justice
if under sentence of death.
If under sentence of Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
imprisonment for life or years, with or without fine. class
imprisonment for 10 years, or
upwards.

1 2 3 4 5 6
If under sentence of Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
imprisonment for less than 10 years, or fine, or both. class
years or lawfully committed to
custody.
223 Escape from confinement Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate

negligently suffered by a public two years, or fine, or both.
servant.
224 Resistance or obstruction Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
by a person to his lawful years, or fine, or both.
apprehension.
225 Resistance or obstruction to Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
the lawful apprehension of any years, or fine, or both.
person, or rescuing him from
lawful custody.
If charged with an offence Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
punishable with imprisonment years and fine. class
for life or imprisonment for 10
years.
If charged with a capital Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
offence. years and fine. class
If the person is sentenced Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
to imprisonment for life, or years and fine. class
imprisonment for 10 years, or
upwards.
If under sentence of death Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
imprisonment for 10 years
and fine.
225A Omission to apprehend, or

sufferance of escape on part
of public servant, in cases not
otherwise provided for:
(a) in case of intentional Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
omission or sufferance; years, or fine, or both. class
(b) in case of negligent Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
omission or sufferance. two years, or fine, or both.
107
108
1 2 3 4 5 6
225B Resistance or obstruction Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
to lawful apprehension, or months, or fine, or both.
escape or rescue in cases not
otherwise provided for.
227 Violation of condition of Punishment of original Cognizable Non-bailable The Court by which the
remission of punishment. sentence, or if part of original offence was
the punishment has been triable
undergone, the residue.
228 Intentional insult or Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable The Court in which the
interruption to a public servant six months, or fine of 1000 offence is committed
sitting in any stage of a judicial rupees, or both. subject to the provisions
proceeding. of Chapter XXVI
State Amendments
228A Disclosure of identity of the Imprisonment for two years Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
victim of certain offences, etc. and fine.
Printing or publication of Imprisonment for two years Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
a proceeding without prior and fine.
permission of court.
229 Personation of a juror or Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
assessor. years, or fine, or both. class
229A Failure by person released on Imprisonment for one year, Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
bail or bond to appear in court. or fine, or both
Chapter XII.—Offences Relating to Coins and Government Stamps
231 Counterfeiting, or performing Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
any part of the process of years and fine. class
counterfeiting, coin.
232 Counterfeiting, or performing Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
any part of the process of imprisonment for 10 years
counterfeiting, Indian coin. and fine.
233 Making, buying or selling Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
instrument for the purpose of years and fine. class
counterfeiting coin.

1 2 3 4 5 6
234 Making, buying or selling Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
instrument for the purpose of years and fine.
counterfeiting Indian coin.
235 Possession of instrument Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
or material for the purpose years and fine. class

of using the same for
counterfeiting coin.
If Indian coin. Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session

and fine.
236 Abetting, in India, the The punishment Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
counterfeiting, out of India, of provided for abetting the
coin. counterfeiting of such coin
within India.
237 Import or export of counterfeit Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
coin, knowing the same to be years and fine. class
counterfeit.
238 Import or export of counterfeit Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
of Indian coin, knowing the imprisonment for 10 years
same to be counterfeit. and fine.
239 Having any counterfeit coin Imprisonment for five years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
known to be such when it and fine. class
came into possession, and
delivering, etc., the same to
any person.
240 Same with respect to Indian Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
coin. and fine.
241 Knowingly delivering to Imprisonment for two Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
another any counterfeit coin years, or fine, or 10 times
as genuine, which, when first the value of the coin
possessed, the deliverer did counterfeited, or both.
not know to be counterfeit.
242 Possession of counterfeit coin Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
by a person who knew it to be years and fine. class
counterfeit when he became
possessed thereof.
109
110
1 2 3 4 5 6
243 Possession of Indian coin by Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
a person who knew it to be years and fine. class
counterfeit when he became
possessed thereof.
244 Person employed in a Mint Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
causing coin to be of a years and fine. class
different weight or composition
from that fixed by law.
245 Unlawfully taking from a Mint Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
any coining instrument. years and fine. class
246 Fraudulently diminishing Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
the weight or altering the years and fine. class
composition of Indian coin.
247 Fraudulently diminishing Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
the weight or altering the years and fine. class
composition of Indian coin.
248 Altering appearance of any Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
coin with intent that it shall years and fine. class
pass as a coin of a different
description.
249 Altering appearance of Indian Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
coin with intent that it shall years and fine. class
pass as a coin of a different
description.
250 Delivery to another of coin Imprisonment for five years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
possessed with the knowledge and fine. class
that it is altered.
251 Delivery of Indian coin Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
possessed with the knowledge and fine.
that it is altered.
252 Possession of altered coin Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
by a person who knew it to years and fine. class
be altered when he became
possessed thereof.

1 2 3 4 5 6
253 Possession of Indian coin Imprisonment for five years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
by a person who knew it to and fine. class
be altered when he became
possessed thereof.
254 Delivery to another of coin Imprisonment for two years Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate

as genuine which, when first or fine, or 10 times the
possessed, the deliverer did value of the coin.
not know to be altered.
255 Counterfeiting a Government Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
stamp. imprisonment for 10 years
and fine.
256 Having possession of an Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
instrument or material for the years and fine. class
purpose of counterfeiting a
Government stamp.
257 Making, buying or selling Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
instrument for the purpose of years and fine. class
counterfeiting a Government
stamp.
258 Sale of counterfeit Government Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
stamp. years and fine. class
259 Having possession of a Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
counterfeit Government stamp. years and fine. class
260 Using as genuine a Government Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
stamp known to be counterfeit. years, or fine, or both. class
261 Effacing any writing from Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
a substance bearing a years, or fine, or both. class
Government stamp, removing
from a document a stamp used
for it, with intent to cause a
loss to Government.
262 Using a Government stamp Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
known to have been before years, or fine, or both.
used.
263 Erasure of mark denoting that Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
stamps have been used. years, or fine, or both. class
111
112
1 2 3 4 5 6
263A Fictitious stamps Fine of 200 rupees Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
Chapter XIII—Offences Relating to Weights and Measures
264 Fraudulent use of false Imprisonment for one year, Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
instrument for weighing. or fine, or both.
265 Fraudulent use of false weight Imprisonment for one year, Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
or measure. or fine, or both.
266 Being in possession of false Imprisonment for one year, Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
weights or measures for or fine, or both.
fraudulent use.
267 Making or selling false weights Imprisonment for one year, Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
or measures for fraudulent use. or fine, or both.
Chapter XIV—Offences Affecting the Public Health, Safety, Convenience, Decency and Morals
269 Negligently doing any act Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
known to be likely to spread months, or fine, or both.
infection of any disease
dangerous to life.
270 Malignantly doing any act Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
known to be likely to spread years, or fine, or both.
infection of any disease
dangerous to life.
271 Knowingly disobeying any Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
quarantine rule. months, or fine, or both.
272 Adulterating food or drink Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
intended for sale, so as to months, or fine of 1000
make the same noxious. rupees, or both.
273 Selling any food or drink as Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
food and drink, knowing the months, or fine of 1000
same to be noxious. rupees, or both.
274 Adulterating any drug or Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
medical preparation intended months, or fine of 1000
for sale so as to lessen its rupees, or both.
efficacy, or to change its
operation, or to make it
noxious.

1 2 3 4 5 6
275 Offering for sale or issuing Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
from a dispensary any drug or months, or fine of 1000
medical preparation known to rupees, or both.
have been adulterated.
276 Knowingly selling or issuing Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate

from a dispensary any drug months, or fine of 1000
or medical preparation as rupees, or both.
a different drug or medical
preparation.
State Amendments
Odhisha.—In its application to the State of Odisha, for the entries relating to Sections 272, 273, 274, 275, and 276, the following entries
shall be substituted, namely:
272 Adulterating food or drink Imprisonment for life, and Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
intended for sale, so as to make fine.
the same noxious.
273 Selling any food or drink as Imprisonment for life, and Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
food and drink, knowing the fine.
same to be noxious.
274 Adulterating any drug or Imprisonment for life, and Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
medical preparation intended fine.
for sale so as to lessen its
noxious.
275 Offering for sale or issuing Imprisonment for life, and Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
from a dispensary any drug or fine.
medical preparation known to
276 Knowingly selling or issuing Imprisonment for life, and Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
from a dispensary any drug fine.
or medical preparation as
preparation.
[Orissa Act 6 of 2004, s. 4].
Uttar Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh, for the entries relating to Sections 272, 273, 274, 275, and 276, the following
entries shall be substituted, namely:
113
114
1 2 3 4 5 6
272 Adulterating food or drink Imprisonment for life, with Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
intended for sale, so as to make or without fine.
the same noxious.
273 Selling any food or drink as food Imprisonment for life, with Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
and drink, knowing the same to or without fine.
be noxious.
274 Adulterating any drug or Imprisonment for life, with Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
medical preparation intended or without fine.
noxious.
275 Offering for sale or issuing Imprisonment for life, with Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
from a dispensary any drug or or without fine.
276 Knowingly selling or issuing Imprisonment for life, with Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
from a dispensary any drug or without fine.
preparation.
[Uttar Pradesh Act 47 of 1975, s. 5 (w.e.f. 15-09-1975)].
West Bengal.—In its application to the State of West Bengal, for the entries relating to Sections 272, 273, 274, 275, and 276, the following
entries shall be substituted, namely:
272 Adulterating food or drink Imprisonment for life, with Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
intended for sale, so as to make or without fine.
the same noxious.
273 Selling any food or drink, as Imprisonment for life, with Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
food and drink, knowing the or without fine.
same to be noxious.
274 Adulterating any drug or Imprisonment for life, with Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
medical preparation intended or without fine.
noxious.

1 2 3 4 5 6
275 Offering for sale or issuing Imprisonment for life, with Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
from a dispensary any drug or or without fine.
276 Knowingly selling or issuing Imprisonment for life, with Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session

from a dispensary any drug or without fine.
preparation.
[West Bengal Act 34 of 1974, s. 5 (w.e.f. 16-07-1974)].
277 Defiling the water of a public Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
spring or reservoir. months, or fine of 500
rupees, or both.
278 Making atmosphere noxious to Fine of 500 rupees Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
health.
279 Driving or riding on a public Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
way so rashly or negligently as months, or fine of 1000
to endanger human life, etc. rupees, or both.
280 Navigating any vessel so rashly Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
or negligently as to endanger months, or fine of 1000
human life, etc. rupees, or both.
281 Exhibition of a false light, mark Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
or buoy. years, or fine, or both. class
282 Conveying for hire any person Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
by water, in a vessel in such months, or fine of 1000
a state, or so loaded, as to rupees, or both.
endanger his life.
283 Causing danger, obstruction or, Fine of 200 rupees. Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
injury in any public way or line
of navigation.
284 Dealing with any poisonous Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
substance so as to endanger months, or fine of 1000
human life, etc. rupees, or both.
285 Dealing with fire or any Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
combustible matter so as to months, or fine of 1000
endanger human life, etc. rupees, or both.
115
116
1 2 3 4 5 6
286 So dealing with any explosive Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
substance. months, or fine of 1000
rupees, or both.
287 So dealing with any machinery. Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
months, or fine of 1000
rupees, or both.
288 A person omitting to guard Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
against probable danger to months, or fine of 1000
human life by the fall of any rupees, or both.
building over which he has a
right entitling him to pull it
down or repair it.
289 A person omitting to take Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
order with any animal in his months, or fine of 1000
possession, so as to guard rupees, or both.
against danger to human life,
or of grievous hurt, from such
animal.
State Amendments
Himachal Pradeh.—In its application to the State of Himachal Pradesh, after the entries relating to Section 289, the following entries shall
be inserted, namely:
289A Whoever throws eatables Imprisonment for one Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
in public place, other than month or fine of 1000
those notified by the State rupees or both.
Government in the Official
Gazette, and thereby entice
monkeys to assemble at such
place for taking eatables which
result in causing danger to
human life or to be likely to
cause injury or annoyance to
the public or to the people in
general or to cause hindrance
in smooth running of vehicular
traffic.
[Himachal Pradesh Act 15 of 2006, s. 3].

1 2 3 4 5 6
290 Committing a public nuisance. Fine of 200 rupees. Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
291 Continuance of nuisance after Simple imprisonment for Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
injunction to discontinue. six months, or fine, or both.
292 Sale, etc., of obscene books. On first conviction, with Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
imprisonment for two

years, and with fine of
2000 rupees, and in
the event of second or
subsequent conviction,
with imprisonment for five
years, and with fine of 5000
rupees.
State Amendments
Odhisha.—In its application to the State of Orissa, after the entries relating to Section 292, the following entries shall be inserted, namely:
292A Printing, etc., of grossly Imprisonment of either Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
indecent or scurrilous matter description for two years,
or matter intended for or fine, or both.
blackmail
[Orissa Act 13 of 1962, s. 3 (w.e.f. 16-05-1962)].
Tamil Nadu.—In its application to the State of Tamil Nadu, after the entries relating to Section 292, the following entries shall be inserted,
namely:—
292A Printing, etc., of grossly Imprisonment of either Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
indecent or scurrilous matter description for two years,
or matter intended for or fine, or both.
blackmail.
[Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1984, s. 3 (w.e.f. 02-07-1984)]. Ed. Earlier entries relating to Sections 292A and 293 were substituted by the Tamil Nadu Act,
13 of 1982, s. 3 (w.e.f. 21-09-1981).
293 Sale, etc., of obscene objects On first conviction, with Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
to young persons. imprisonment for three
years, and with fine of
2000 rupees, and in
the event of second or
subsequent conviction, with
imprisonment for seven
years, and with fine of 5000
rupees.
294 Obscene songs Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
months, or fine or both.
117
118
1 2 3 4 5 6
294A Keeping a lottery office. Imprisonment for six Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
months, or fine, or both.
Publishing proposals relating to Fine of 1000 rupees. Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
lotteries.
State Amendments
Andhra Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, entries relating to Section 294A have been repealed.
[Andhra Pradesh Act 16 of 1968, s. 27].
Gujarat.—In its application to the State of Gujarat, entries relating to Section 294A have been repealed.
[Bombay Act 82 of 1958].
Maharashtra.—In its application to the State of Maharashtra, entries relating to Section 294A have been repealed.
[Bombay Act 82 of 1958].
Mysore (Karnataka).—In its application to the whole of Mysore except Bellary district, entries relating to Section 294A have been repealed.
[Mysore Act 27 of 1951].
Uttar Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh, entries relating to Section 294A have been repealed.
[Uttar Pradesh Act 24 of 1995, s. 11].
Chapter XV.—Offences Relating to Religion
295 Destroying, damaging or Imprisonment for two Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
defiling a place of worship or years, or fine or both.
sacred object with intent to
insult the religion of any class
of persons.
295A Maliciously insulting the Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
religion or the religious beliefs years, or fine, or both. class
of any class.
State Amendments
Andhra Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, offence under Section 295A shall be cognizable.
296 Causing a disturbance to an Imprisonment for one year, Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
assembly engaged in religious or fine, or both.
worship.
297 Trespassing in place of worship Imprisonment for one year, Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
or sepulcher, disturbing funeral or fine, or both.
with intention to wound the
feelings or to insult the religion
of any person, or offering
indignity to a human corpse.

1 2 3 4 5 6
298 Uttering any word or making Imprisonment for one year, Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
any sound in the hearing or or fine, or both.
making any gesture, or placing
any object in the sight of
any person, with intention to
wound his religious feeling.

State Amendments
Chapter XVI.—Offences Affecting the Human Body
302 Murder Death, or imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
life, and fine.
303 Murder by a person under Death Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
sentence of imprisonment for
life.
304 Culpable homicide not Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
amounting to murder, if act by imprisonment for 10 years
which the death is caused is and fine.
done with intention of causing
death, etc.
If act is done with knowledge Imprisonment for 10 years, Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
that it is likely to cause death, or fine, or both.
but without any intention to
cause death, etc.
304A Causing death by rash or Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
negligent act. years, or fine, or both. class
State Amendments
Himachal Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Himachal Pradesh, after the entries relating to Section 304A, the following entries
shall be inserted, namely:
304AA Causing death or injury by Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
driving *[any vehicle] while in a imprisonment for seven
state of intoxication. years and fine.
[Himachal Pradesh Act 19 of 1997, s. 3, (w.e.f. 30-08-1997) * Substituted for the words ‘Public Service Vehicle’ by Himachal Pradesh Act 7
of 2012, s. 3].
119
120
1 2 3 4 5 6
304B Dowry death Imprisonment of not Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
less than seven years
but which may extend to
imprisonment for life.
305 Abetment of suicide committed Death, or imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
by child, or insane or delirious life, or imprisonment for 10
person or an idiot, or a person years and fine.
intoxicated.
306 Abetting the commission of Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
suicide. and fine.
307 Attempt to murder. Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
and fine.
If such act causes hurt to any Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
person. imprisonment for 10 years
and fine.
Attempt by life-convict to Death, or imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
murder, if hurt is caused. 10 years and fine.
308 Attempt to commit culpable Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
homicide. years, or fine, or both.
If such act causes hurt to any Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
person. years, or fine, or both.
309 Attempt to commit suicide. Simple imprisonment for Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
one year, or fine, or both.
311 Being a thug. Imprisonment for life and Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
fine.
312 Causing miscarriage. Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
years, or fine, or both. class
If the woman be quick with Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
child. years and fine. class
313 Causing miscarriage without Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
women’s consent. imprisonment for 10 year
and fine.
314 Death caused by an act Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
done with intent to cause and fine.
miscarriage.

1 2 3 4 5 6
If act done without women’s Imprisonment for life, or as Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
consent. above.
315 Act done with intent to prevent Imprisonment for 10 years, Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
a child being born alive, or to or fine, or both.
cause it to die after its birth.

316 Causing death of a quick Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
unborn child by an act and fine.
amounting to culpable
homicide.
317 Exposure of a child under Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
12 years of age by parent or years, or fine, or both. class
person having care of it with
intention of wholly abandoning
it.
State Amendment
Madhya Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, in the entry relating to Section 317, in column 6, for the words
‘Magistrate of the first class’, the words ‘Court of Session’ shall be substituted.
[Madhya Pradesh Act 2 of 2008, s. 4 (w.e.f. 14-02-2008)].
318 Concealment of birth by secret Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
disposal of dead body. years, or fine, or both. class
State Amendments
323 Voluntarily causing hurt. Imprisonment for one year Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
or fine of 1000 rupees, or
both.
324 Voluntarily causing hurt by Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
dangerous weapons or means. years, or fine, or both.
325 Voluntarily causing grievous Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
hurt. years and fine.
326 Voluntarily causing grievous Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
hurt by dangerous weapons or imprisonment for 10 years class
means. and fine.
121
122
1 2 3 4 5 6
State Amendments
326A Voluntarily causing grievous Imprisonment for not Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
hurt by use of acid, etc. less than 10 years but
which may extend to
imprisonment for life and
fine to be paid to the
victim.
326B Voluntarily throwing or Imprisonment for five years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
attempting to throw acid. but which may extend to
seven years and with fine.
327 Voluntarily causing hurt to Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
extort property or a valuable and fine. class
security, or to constrain to
do anything which is illegal
or which may facilitate the
commission of an offence.
328 Administering stupefying drug Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
with intent to cause hurt, etc. and fine.
329 Voluntarily causing grievous Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
hurt to extort property or imprisonment for 10 years
a valuable security, or to and fine.
constrain to do anything which
is illegal, or which may facilitate
the commission of an offence.
330 Voluntarily causing hurt Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
to extort confession or years and fine. class
information, or to compel
restoration of property, etc.
331 Voluntarily causing grievous Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
hurt to extort confession or and fine.
information, or to compel
332 Voluntarily causing hurt to Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
deter public servant from his years or fine or both. class

duty.
1 2 3 4 5 6
State Amendments
Maharashtra.—In its application to the State of Maharashtra, for the entry related to Section 332, the following entry shall be substituted,
namely:
332 Voluntarily causing hurt to Imprisonment for five years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
deter public servant from his or fine or both.

duty.
[Maharashtra Act 40 of 2018, s. 5(i) (w.e.f. 07-06-2018)].
333 Voluntarily causing grievous Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
hurt to deter public servant and fine.
from his duty.
334 Voluntarily causing hurt on Imprisonment for one Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
grave and sudden provocation, month, or fine of 500
not intending to hurt any other rupees, or both.
than the person who gave the
provocation.
335 Causing grievous hurt on grave Imprisonment for four Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
and sudden provocation, not years, or fine of 2000 class
intending to hurt any other rupees, or both.
than the person who gave the
provocation.
336 Doing any act which endangers Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
human life or the personal months, or fine of 250
safety of others. rupees, or both.
337 Causing hurt by an act which Imprisonment for six Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
endangers human life, etc. months, or fine of 500
rupees, or both.
338 Causing grievous hurt by an act Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
which endangers human life, years, or fine of 1000
etc. rupees, or both.
341 Wrongfully restraining any Simple imprisonment for Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
person. one month, or fine of 500
rupees, or both.
342 Wrongfully confining any Imprisonment for one year, Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
person. or fine of 1000 rupees, or
both.
343 Wrongfully confining for three Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
or more days. years, or fine, or both.
123
124
1 2 3 4 5 6
344 Wrongfully confining for 10 or Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
more days years and fine.
345 Keeping any person in wrongful Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
confinement, knowing that a years, in addition to class
writ has been issued for his imprisonment under any
liberation. other section.
346 Wrongful confinement in Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
secret. years, in addition to class
imprisonment under any
other section.
347 Wrongful confinement for the Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
purpose of extorting property, years and fine.
or constraining to an illegal act,
etc.
348 Wrongful confinement for the Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
purpose of extorting confession years and fine.
or information, or of compelling
352 Assault or use of criminal Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
force otherwise than on grave months, or fine of 500
provocation. rupees, or both.
353 Assault or use of criminal force Imprisonment for two Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
to deter a public servant from years, or fine, or both.
discharge of his duty.
State Amendments
Maharashtra.—In its application to the State of Maharashtra, for the entry related to Section 353, the following entry shall be substituted,
namely:
353 Assault or use of criminal force Imprisonment for five years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
to deter a public servant from or fine or both.
discharge of his duty.
[Maharashtra Act 40 of 2018, s. 5(ii) (w.e.f. 07-06-2018)].
354 Assault or use of criminal Imprisonment of one year Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
force to woman with intent to which may extend to five
outrage her modesty. years, and with fine.
State Amendments

Andhra Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, for the entries related to Section 354, the following entries shall be
substituted, namely:
1 2 3 4 5 6
354 Assault or use of criminal force Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
to a woman with intent to years and fine.
outrage her modesty.
[Andhra Pradesh Act 3 of 1992, s. 2 (w.e.f. 15-02-1992)].
Arunachal Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Arunachal Pradesh, for the entries related to Section 354, the following entries shall

be substituted, namely:—
354 Assault or use of criminal force Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
to a woman with intent to than two years but which class
outrage her modesty. may extend to seven years
and with fine.
[Arunachal Pradesh Act 3 of 2019, s. 23].
Chhattisgarh.—In its application to the State of Chhattisgarh, in the entries relating to Section 354, the following entries shall be added,
namely:
354. If committed by relative of the Imprisonment not less than Cognizable Non-cognizable Magistrate of the first
woman. two years but which may class
extend to seven years and
fine.
[Chhattisgarh Act 25 of 2015, s. 13(b) (w.e.f. 21-07-2015)].
Odisha.—In its application to the State of Odisha, the offence under Section 354 shall be non-bailable.
[Orissa Act 6 of 1995, s. 3 (w.e.f. 10-03-1995)].
354A Sexual harassment of the Imprisonment which may Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
nature of unwelcome physical extend to three years or
contact and advances or a with fine or with both.
demand or request for sexual
favours, showing pornography.
Sexual harassment of the Imprisonment which may Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
nature of making sexually extend to one year or with
coloured remark. fine or with both.
Madhya Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, after the entries relating to Section 354, the following entries shall
be inserted, namely:
354A Assault or use of criminal Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
force to woman with intend to than one year but which
disrobe her. may extend to 10 years and
fine.
125
126
1 2 3 4 5 6
354B Assault or use of criminal Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
force to woman with intent to than three years but which
disrobe. may extend to seven years
and with fine.
Arunachal Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Arunachal Pradesh, for the entries relating to Section 354B, the following entries shall
be substituted, namely:
354B Assault or use of criminal Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
force to woman with intent to than three years but which class
disrobe. may extend to seven years
and with fine on first
conviction.
Rigorous imprisonment of Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
not less than seven years class
10 years and with fine of
minimum one lakh rupees
on second or subsequent
conviction.
354C Voyeurism Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
than one year but which
may extend to three years
and with fine for first
conviction.
Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
than three years but which
may extend to seven years
and with fine for second or
subsequent conviction.
354D Stalking Imprisonment up to three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
years and with fine for first
conviction.
Imprisonment up to five Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate]
years and with fine for
second or subsequent
conviction.
State Amendments

Arunachal Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Arunachal Pradesh, for the entries relating to Section 354D, the following entries shall
be substituted, namely:
1 2 3 4 5 6
354D Stalking Imprisonment which may Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
extend to three years and class
with fine on first conviction.
Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
than three years but which class

and with fine of minimum
1 lakh rupees on second or
subsequent conviction.
Chhattisgarh.—In its application to the State of Chhattisgarh, after the entries relating to Section 354D, the following entries shall be
inserted, namely:—
354E Liability of person present Imprisonment upto three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
who fails to prevent the years or fine or both.
commission of offence under
sections 354, 354A, 354B,
354C, or 354D.
[Chhattisgarh Act 25 of 2015, s. 13(c) (w.e.f. 21-07-2015)].
Jammu and Kashmir.—In its application to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, after the entries relating to Section 354D, the following
entries shall be inserted, namely:
354E Sextortion Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
than three years but which class
may extend to five years
and with fine.
[The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Adaptation of Central Laws) Order, 2020, SO 1123(E), (w.e.f. 18-03-2020)].
Ladakh.—In its application to the Union Territory of Ladakh, after the entries relating to Section 354D, the following entries shall be inserted,
namely:
354E Sextortion Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the First
than three years but which Class
may extend to five years and
with fine.
[The Union Territory of Ladakh Reorganisation (Adaptation of Central Laws) Order, 2020, vide SO 3774(E), (w.e.f. 23-10-2020)].
355 Assault or criminal force with Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
intent to dishonor a person, years, or with fine, or with
otherwise than on grave and both.
sudden provocation.
127
128
1 2 3 4 5 6
State Amendments
Andhra Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, for the entries relating to Section 355, the following entries shall be
substituted, namely:
355 Assault or criminal force with Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
intent to dishonour a person, years, or fine, or both.
otherwise than on grave and
sudden provocations.
356 Assault or criminal force in Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
attempt to commit theft of years, or fine, or both.
property worn or carried by a
person.
357 Assault or use of criminal Imprisonment for one year, Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
force in attempt wrongfully to or fine of 1000 rupees, or
confine a person. both.
358 Assault or use of criminal Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
force on grave and sudden one month, or fine of 200
provocation. rupees, or both.
363 Kidnapping Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
years and fine. class
State Amendments
Madhya Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, in the entries relating to Section 363, in column 6, for the words
Uttar Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh, in the entries relating to Section 363 in column 5, for the word ‘bailable’,
the words ‘non-bailable’ shall be substituted.
[Uttar Pradesh Act 1 of 1984, s. 12 (w.e.f. 01-05-1984)].
363A Kidnapping or obtaining the Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
custody of a minor in order and fine. class
that such minor may be
employed or used for purposes
of begging.
Maiming a minor in order that Imprisonment for life and Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
such minor may be employed fine.
or used for purposes of
begging.

1 2 3 4 5 6
State Amendments
Madhya Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, in the entry relating to Section 363A, in column 6, for the words

364 Kidnapping or abducting in Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
order to murder. rigorous imprisonment for
10 years and fine.
364A Kidnapping for ransom, etc. Death, or imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
life and fine.
365 Kidnapping or abducting with Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
intent secretly and wrongfully years and fine. class
to confine a person.
State Amendments
366 Kidnapping or abducting a Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
woman to compel her marriage and fine.
or to cause her defilement, etc.
366A Procuration of a minor girl. Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
and fine.
366B Importation of a girl from Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
foreign country. and fine.
367 Kidnapping or abducting in Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
order to subject a person to and fine.
grievous hurt, slavery, etc.
368 Concealing or keeping in Punishment for kidnapping Cognizable Non-bailable Court by which the
confinement a kidnapped or abduction. kidnapping or abduction
person. is triable
369 Kidnapping or abducting a child Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
with intent to take property years and fine. class
from the person of such child.
129
130
1 2 3 4 5 6
370 Trafficking of person. Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
than seven years but which
may extend to 10 years and
with fine.
Trafficking of more than one Imprisonment of not Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
person. less than ten years but
which may extend to
with fine.
Trafficking of a minor. Imprisonment of not Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
less than 10 years but
which may extend to
with fine.
Trafficking of more than one Imprisonment of not Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
minor. less than 14 years but
which may extend to
with fine.
Person convicted of offence of Imprisonment for life which Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
trafficking of minor on more shall mean the remainder
than one occasion. of that person’s natural life
and with fine.
Public servant or a police Imprisonment for life which Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
officer involved in trafficking of shall mean the remainder
minor. of that person’s natural life
and with fine.
370A Exploitation of a trafficked Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
child. than five years but which
and with fine.
Exploitation of a trafficked Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
person. than three years but which
may extend to five years
and with fine.
371 Habitual dealing in slaves. Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
and fine.

1 2 3 4 5 6
372 Selling or letting to hire a minor Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
for purposes of prostitution, and fine.
etc.
373 Buying or obtaining possession Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
of a minor for the same and fine.

purposes.
374 Unlawful compulsory labour. Imprisonment for one year, Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
or fine, or both.
376 Rape Rigorous imprisonment Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session

of not less than 10 years
with fine.
Rape by a police officer or Rigorous imprisonment Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session

a public servant or member of not less than 10 years
of armed forces or a person but which may extend to
being on the management or imprisonment for life which
on the staff of a jail, remand shall mean the remainder
home or other place of custody of that person’s natural life
or women’s or children’s and with fine.
institution or by a person on
the management or on the
staff of a hospital, and rape
committed by a person in a
position of trust or authority
towards the person raped or
by a near relative of the person
raped.
Persons committing offence Rigorous imprisonment Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session

of rape on a woman under 16 for a term which shall
years of age. not be less than 20 years
but which may extend
to imprisonment for
life, which shall mean
imprisonment for the
remainder of that person’s
natural life and with fine.
131
132
1 2 3 4 5 6
376A Person committing an offence Rigorous imprisonment Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
of rape and inflicting injury of not less than 20 years
which causes death or but which may extend to
causes the woman to be in a imprisonment for life which
persistent vegetative state. shall mean imprisonment
for the remainder of that
person’s natural life or with
death.
State Amendments
Arunachal Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Arunachal Pradesh, after the entries relating to Section 376A, the following entries
376AA Person committing an offence Death, rigorous Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
of rape on a woman up to 12 imprisonment of not
years of age. less than 14 years but
which may extend to
imprisonment for life which
shall mean imprisonment
for remainder of that
person’s natural life, and
with fine.
376AB Person committing an offence Rigorous imprisonment Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
of rape on a woman under 12 of not less than 20 years
years of age. but which may extend to
person’s natural life and
with fine or with death.
376B Sexual intercourse by Imprisonment for not less Cognizable (but only on Bailable Court of Session
husband upon his wife during than two years but which the complaint of the
separation. may extend to seven years victim).
and with fine.
376C Sexual intercourse by a person Rigorous imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
in authority. not less than five years but
which may extend to 10
years and with fine.

1 2 3 4 5 6
376D Gang rape Rigorous imprisonment Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session

for not less than 20 years

with fine to be paid to the
victim.
State Amendments
Arunachal Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Arunachal Pradesh, after the entries relating to Section 376D, the following entries
376DA Gang rape on a woman up to 12 Death or rigorous Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
years of age. imprisonment of not
less than 20 years but
which may extend to
person’s natural life, and
with fine
376DA Gang rape on a woman under Imprisonment for life which Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
16 years of age. shall mean imprisonment
with fine.
376DB Gang rape on woman under 12 Imprisonment for life which Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
years of age. shall mean imprisonment
with fine or with death.
376E Repeat offenders. Imprisonment for life which Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
person’s natural life or with
death.
133
134
1 2 3 4 5 6
State Amendments
Chhattisgarh.—In its application to the State of Chhattisgarh, after the entries relating to Section 376E, insert the following, namely:
376F Liability of person incharge of Imprisonment upto three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
any work place and others to years and fine. class
give information about offence.
[Chhattisgarh Act 25 of 2015, s. 13(d) (w.e.f. 21-07-2015)].

377 Unnatural offences Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the
imprisonment for 10 years first class
and fine.
State Amendments
Chapter XVII—Offences against Property
379 Theft Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
State Amendments
Gujarat.—In its application to the State of Gujarat, in the First Schedule, in the table, under the heading ‘Chapter XVII – Offences against
Property’, after Section 379, the following shall be inserted, namely:
379A Attempt to commit snatching. Rigorous imprisonment of Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
not less than five years
10 years, and fine of 25000
rupees.
Committing snatching. Rigorous imprisonment of Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
not less than seven years
10 years, and fine of 25000
rupees.
Causing hurt or wrongful Rigorous imprisonment Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
restraint or fear of hurt, in which may extend to
order to effect escape after three years, in addition to
attempting to commit or after punishment under other
committing snatching. sub-sections

1 2 3 4 5 6
379B Snatching, after preparation Rigorous imprisonment of Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
having been made for causing not less than seven years
death, or hurt, or restraint, but which may extend to
in order to the committing of 10 years, and fine of 25000
such snatching, or to retaining rupees.
property taken by it.

[Gujarat Act 6 of 2019, s. 3].
Haryana.—In its application to the State of Haryana, after Section 379, the following entries shall be inserted, namely:
379A Snatching Rigorous imprisonment Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session

for a term which shall not
be less than five years but
which may extend to 10
years, and fine of 25000
rupees.
379B Snatching with hurt or wrongful Rigorous imprisonment Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
restraint or fear of hurt. for a term which shall
not be less than ten years
and which may extend to
14 years, and fine of Rs.
25,000.
[Haryana Act 19 of 2015, s. 2 (w.e.f. 03-09-2015)].
Punjab.—In its application to the State of Punjab, after Section 379, the following entries shall be inserted, namely:
379B Snatching Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
than five years, but which
may extend to 10 years and
fine of 10000 rupees.
If in order to the committing of Imprisonment of not less Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
snatching, or in committing the than 10 years and fine of
snatching, the offender causes 10000 rupees.
hurt, or wrongful restraint or
fear of hurt or after committing
the offence of snatching,
causes hurt or wrongful
restraint or fear of hurt in order
to effect his escape.
[Punjab Act 30 of 2014, s. 2 (w.e.f. 05-11-2014)].
135
136
1 2 3 4 5 6
380 Theft in a building, tent or Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
vessel. years and fine.
381 Theft by clerk or servant of Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
property in possession of years and fine.
master or employer.
382 Theft, after preparation Rigorous imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
having been made for causing 10 years and fine. class
death, or hurt, or restraint,
or fear of death, or of hurt,
or of restraint, in order to the
committing of such theft, or to
retiring after committing it, or
to retaining property taken by
it.
384 Extortion Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
385 Putting or attempting to put Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
in fear of injury, in order to years, or fine, or both.
commit extortion.
386 Extortion by putting a person in Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
fear of death or grievous hurt. and fine. class
387 Putting or attempting to put Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
a person in fear of death years and fine. class
or grievous hurt in order to
commit extortion.
388 Extortion by threat of Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
accusation of an offence and fine. class
punishable with death,
imprisonment for life, or
If the offence threatened be an Imprisonment for life. Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
unnatural offence. class
389 Putting a person in fear of Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
accusation of an offence and fine. class
punishable with death,
imprisonment for life, or
imprisonment for 10 years in

order to commit extortion.
1 2 3 4 5 6
If the offence be an unnatural Imprisonment for life. Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
offence. class
392 Robbery Rigorous imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
10 years and fine. class
If committed on the highway Rigorous imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first

between sunset and sunrise. 14 years and fine. class
State Amendment
393 Attempt to commit robbery. Rigorous imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
seven years and fine. class
State Amendment
394 Person voluntarily causing hurt Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
in committing or attempting to rigorous imprisonment for class
commit robbery, or any other 10 years and fine.
person jointly concerned in
such robbery.
State Amendments
395 Dacoity Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
rigorous imprisonment for
10 years and fine.
396 Murder in dacoity Death, imprisonment Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
for life, or rigorous
and fine.
397 Robbery or dacoity, with Rigorous imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
attempt to cause death or not less than seven years.
grievous hurt.
137
138
1 2 3 4 5 6
398 Attempt to commit robbery Rigorous imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
or dacoity when armed with not less than seven years.
deadly weapon.
399 Making preparation to commit Rigorous imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
dacoity. 10 years and fine.
400 Belonging to a gang of persons Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
associated for the purpose of rigorous imprisonment for
habitually committing dacoity. 10 years and fine.
401 Belonging to a wandering Rigorous imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
gang of persons associated seven years and fine. class
for the purpose of habitually
committing thefts.
402 Being one of five or more Rigorous imprisonment for Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
persons assembled for the seven years and fine.
purpose of committing dacoity.
403 Dishonest misappropriation of Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
movable property, or converting years, or fine, or both.
it to one’s own use.
404 Dishonest misappropriation of Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
property, knowing that it was years and fine. class
in possession of a deceased
person at his death, and that
it has not since been in the
possession of any person
legally entitled to it.
If by clerk or person employed Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
by deceased. years and fine. class
406 Criminal breach of trust. Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
407 Criminal breach of trust by a Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
carrier, wharfinger, etc. years and fine. class
408 Criminal breach of trust by a Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
clerk or servant. years and fine. class
409 Criminal breach of trust by Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
public servant or by banker, imprisonment for 10 years class
merchant or agent, etc. and fine.

1 2 3 4 5 6
State Amendments

411 Dishonestly receiving stolen Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
property knowing it to be years, or fine, or both.
stolen.
412 Dishonestly receiving stolen Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
property, knowing that it was rigorous imprisonment for
obtained by dacoity. 10 years and fine.
413 Habitually dealing in stolen Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
property. imprisonment for 10 years
and fine.
414 Assisting in concealment or Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
disposal of stolen property, years, or fine, or both.
knowing it to be stolen.
417 Cheating Imprisonment for one year, Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
or fine, or both.
418 Cheating a person whose Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
interest the offender was years, or fine, or both.
bound, either by law or by legal
contract, to protect.
419 Cheating by personation. Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
420 Cheating and thereby Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
dishonestly inducing delivery years and fine. class
of property, or the making,
alteration or destruction of a
valuable security.
concealment of property, etc., years, or fine, or both.
to prevent distribution among
creditors.
139
140
1 2 3 4 5 6
422 Fraudulently preventing from Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
being made available for his years, or fine, or both.
creditors a debt or demand
due to the offender.
423 Fraudulent execution of deed Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
of transfer containing a false years, or fine, or both.
statement of consideration.
concealment of property, of years, or fine, or both.
himself or any other person or
assisting in the doing thereof,
or dishonestly releasing any
demand or claim to which he is
entitled.
426 Mischief Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
months or fine, or both.
427 Mischief, and thereby causing Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
damage to the amount of 50 years, or fine, or both.
rupees or upwards.
428 Mischief by killing, poisoning, Imprisonment for two Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
maiming or rendering useless years, or fine, or both.
any animal of the value of 10
rupees or upwards.
429 Mischief by killing, poisoning, Imprisonment for five years, Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
maiming or rendering useless or fine, or both. class
any elephant, camel, horse,
etc., whatever may be its value,
or any other animal of the
value of 50 rupees or upwards.
430 Mischief by causing diminution Imprisonment for five years, Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
of supply of water for or fine, or both. class
agricultural purposes, etc.
431 Mischief by injury to public Imprisonment for five years, Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
road, bridge, navigable river, or fine, or both. class
or navigable channel, and
rendering it impassable or less
safe for travelling or conveying
property.

1 2 3 4 5 6
432 Mischief by causing inundation Imprisonment for five years, Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
or obstruction to public or fine, or both. class
drainage attended with
damage.
433 Mischief by destroying or Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first

moving or rendering less useful years, or fine, or both. class
a lighthouse or seamark, or by
exhibiting false lights.
434 Mischief by destroying or Imprisonment for one year, Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
moving, etc., a landmark fixed or fine, or both.
by public authority.
435 Mischief by fire or explosive Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
substance with intent to cause years and fine. class
damage to an amount of 100
rupees or upwards, or in case
of agricultural produce, 10
rupees or upwards.
State Amendments
436 Mischief by fire or explosive Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
substance with intent to imprisonment for 10 years
destroy a house, etc. and fine.
437 Mischief with intent to destroy Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
or make unsafe a decked and fine.
vessel or a vessel of 20 tonnes
burden.
438 The mischief described in the Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
last section when committed imprisonment for 10 years
by fire or any explosive and fine.
substance.
439 Running vessel ashore with Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
intent to commit theft, etc. and fine.
440 Mischief committed after Imprisonment for five years Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
preparation made for causing and fine. class
death, or hurt, etc.
141
142
1 2 3 4 5 6
447 Criminal trespass Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
months, or fine of 500
rupees, or both.
State Amendments
Karnataka.—In its application to the State of Karnataka, in the entry relating to Section 447, in column (5), for the word ‘bailable’, the word
‘non-bailable’ shall be substituted.
[Karnataka Act 40 of 2014, s. 2].
448 House-trespass Imprisonment for one year, Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
or fine of 1000 rupees, or
both.
449 House-trespass in order to Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
the commission of an offence rigorous imprisonment for
punishable with death. 10 years and fine.
450 House-trespass in order to Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
the commission of an offence and fine.
punishable with imprisonment
for life.
451 House-trespass in order to Imprisonment for two years Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
the commission of an offence and fine.
punishable with imprisonment.
If the offence is theft. Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
years and fine.
452 House-trespass, having made Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
preparation for causing hurt, years and fine.
assault, etc.
453 Lurking house-trespass or Imprisonment for two years Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
house-breaking. and fine.
454 Lurking house-trespass or Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
house-breaking in order to years and fine.
the commission of an offence
punishable with imprisonment.
If the offence be theft. Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
and fine. class
455 Lurking house-trespass Imprisonment for 10 years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
or house-breaking after and fine. class
preparation made for causing

hurt, assault, etc.
1 2 3 4 5 6
456 Lurking house-trespass or Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
house-breaking by night. years and fine.
457 Lurking house-trespass or Imprisonment for five years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
house-breaking by night in and fine. class
order to the commission of

an offence punishable with
imprisonment.
If the offence is theft. Imprisonment for 14 years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
and fine. class
458 Lurking house-trespass or Imprisonment for 14 years Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
house-breaking by night, after and fine. class
preparation made for causing
hurt, etc.
459 Grievous hurt caused whilst Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
committing lurking house- imprisonment for 10 years
trespass or house-breaking. and fine.
460 Death or grievous hurt Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
caused by one of several imprisonment for 10 years
persons jointly concerned in and fine.
housebreaking by night, etc.
461 Dishonestly breaking open Imprisonment for two years Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
or unfastening any closed or fine, or both.
receptacle containing or
supposed to contain property.
462 Being entrusted with any Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
closed receptacle containing years or fine, or both.
or supposed to contain any
property, and fraudulently
opening the same.
Chapter XVIII—Offences Relating to Documents and to Property Marks
465 Forgery Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
466 Forgery of a record of a Court Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
of Justice or of a Registrar of years and fine class
Births, etc., kept by a public
servant.
143
144
1 2 3 4 5 6
State Amendment
467 Forgery of a valuable security, Imprisonment for life, or Non-cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
will or authority to make or imprisonment for 10 years class
transfer any valuable security, and fine.
or to receive any money, etc.
When the valuable security is a Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
promissory note of the Central imprisonment for 10 years class
Government. and fine.
State Amendment
468 Forgery for the purpose of Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
cheating. years and fine. class
State Amendments
469 Forgery for the purpose of Imprisonment for three Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
harming the reputation of years and fine. class
any person or knowing that
it is likely to be used for that
purpose.
471 Using as genuine a forged Punishment for forgery of Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
document which is known to such document. class
be forged.
When the forged document is a Punishment for forgery of Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
promissory note of the Central such document. class
Government.

1 2 3 4 5 6
State Amendment
Madhya Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, in the entry relating to Section 471 in column 6, for the words ‘Magistrate
of the first class’, the words ‘Court of Session’ shall be substituted.

472 Making or counterfeiting a Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
seal, plate, etc., with intent to imprisonment for seven class
commit a forgery punishable years and fine.
under Section 467 of the Indian
Penal Code, or possessing with
like intent any such seal, plate,
etc., knowing the same to be
counterfeit.
State Amendment
Madhya Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, in the entry relating to Section 472 in column 6, for the words
473 Making or counterfeiting a Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
seal, plate, etc., with intent to years and fine. class
commit a forgery punishable
otherwise than under Section
467 of the Indian Penal Code,
or possessing with like intent
any such seal, plate, etc.,
knowing the same to be
counterfeit.
State Amendment
474 Having possession of a Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
document, knowing it to be years and fine. class
forged, with intent to use it
as genuine; if the document
is one of the description
mentioned in Section 466 of
the Indian Penal Code.
145
146
1 2 3 4 5 6
If the document is one of the Imprisonment for life, or Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
description mentioned in imprisonment for seven class
Section 467 of the Indian Penal years and fine.
Code.
State Amendment
475 Counterfeiting a device or Imprisonment for life, or Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
mark used for authenticating imprisonment for seven class
documents described in years and fine.
Section 467 of the Indian Penal
Code, or possessing counterfeit
marked material.
State Amendment
476 Counterfeiting a device or Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
mark used for authenticating years and fine. class
documents other than those
described in Section 467 of
the Indian Penal Code, or
possessing counterfeit marked
material.
State Amendment
477 Fraudulently destroying or Imprisonment for life, or Non-cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
defacing, or attempting to imprisonment for seven class
destroy or deface, or secreting, years and fine.
a will, etc.
State Amendment

1 2 3 4 5 6
477A Falsification of accounts. Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
years or fine, or both. class
State Amendments
Madhya Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, in the entry relating to Section 477A, in column 6, for the words

482 Using a false property mark Imprisonment for one year, Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
with intent to deceive or injure or fine, or both.
any person.
483 Counterfeiting a property mark Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
used by another, with intent to years, or fine, or both.
cause damage or injury.
484 Counterfeiting a property Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
mark used by a public servant, years and fine. class
or any mark used by him to
denote the manufacture,
quality, etc., of any property.
485 Fraudulently making or having Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
possession of any die, plate years, or fine, or both. class
or other instrument for
counterfeiting any public or
private property mark.
486 Knowingly selling goods Imprisonment for one year, Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
marked with a counterfeit or fine, or both.
property mark.
487 Fraudulently making a false Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
mark upon any package or years, or fine, or both.
receptacle containing goods,
with intent to cause it to be
believed that it contains goods,
which it does not contain, etc.
488 Making use of any such false Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
mark. years, or fine, or both.
489 Removing, destroying or Imprisonment for one year, Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
defacing property mark with or fine, or both.
intent to cause injury.
147
148
1 2 3 4 5 6
489A Counterfeiting currency-notes Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
or bank-notes. imprisonment for 10 years
and fine.
489B Using as genuine forged or Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
counterfeit currency-notes or imprisonment for 10 years
banknotes. and fine.
489C Possession of forged or Imprisonment for seven Cognizable Bailable Court of Session
counterfeit currency-notes or years, or fine, or both.
bank-notes.
489D Making or possessing Imprisonment for life, or Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session
machinery, instrument imprisonment for 10 years
or material for forging or and fine.
counterfeiting currency-notes
or bank-notes.
489E Making or using documents Fine of 100 rupees. Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
resembling currency-notes or
banknotes.
On refusal to disclose the Fine of 200 rupees. Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
name and address of the
printer.
Chapter XIX—Criminal Breach of Contracts of Service
491 Being bound to attend on Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
or supply the wants of a months, or fine of 200
person who is helpless from rupees, or both.
youth, unsoundness of mind
or disease, and voluntarily
omitting to do so.
Chapter XX—Offences Relating to Marriage
493 A man by deceit causing a Imprisonment for 10 years Non-cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
woman not lawfully married and fine. class
to him to believe, that she is
lawfully married to him and to
cohabit with him in that belief.

1 2 3 4 5 6
494 Marrying again during the life Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
time of a husband or wife. years and fine. class
State Amendment
Andhra Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, for the entries against Section 494, in column 4, for the words ‘non-

cognizable’, the words ‘cognizable’ and in column 5, for the words ‘bailable’, the words ‘non-bailable’ shall be substituted.
495 Same offence with Imprisonment for 10 years Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
concealment of the former and fine. class
marriage from the person with
whom subsequent marriage is
contracted.
State Amendment
cognizable’, the words ‘cognizable’ and in column 5, for the words ‘bailable’, the words ‘non-bailable’ shall be substituted.
496 A person with fraudulent Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
intention going through the years and fine. class
ceremony of being married,
knowing that he is not thereby
lawfully married.
State Amendments
cognizable’, the words 'cognizable’ and in column 5, for the words ‘bailable’, the words ‘non-bailable’ shall be substituted.
497 Adultery Imprisonment for five years, Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
498 Enticing or taking away or Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
detaining with a criminal intent years, or fine, or both.
a married woman.
149
150
1 2 3 4 5 6
Chapter XXA—Of Cruelty by Husband or Relatives of Husband
498A Punishment for subjecting a Imprisonment for three Cognizable if information Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
married woman to cruelty. years and fine. relating to the class
commission of the
offence is given to an
officer in charge of a
police station by the
person aggrieved by the
offence or by any person
related to her by blood,
marriage or adoption
or if there is no such
relative, by any public
servant belonging to
such class or category
as may be notified by the
State Government in this
behalf.
Chapter XXI—Defamation
500 Defamation against the Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Court of Session
President or the Vice- two years, or fine, or both.
President or the Governor of
a State or Administrator of a
Union territory or a Minister
in respect of his conduct in
the discharge of his public
functions when instituted
upon a complaint made by the
Public Prosecutor.
Defamation in any other case. Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the
two years, or fine, or both. first class
501 (a) Printing or engraving matter Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Court of Session
knowing it to be defamatory two years, or fine, or both.
against the President or
the Vice-President or the
Governor of a State or
Administrator of a Union
territory or a Minister in
respect of his conduct in the

1 2 3 4 5 6
discharge of his public
upon a complaint made by
the Public Prosecutor.
(b) Printing or engraving matter Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first

knowing it to be defamatory, two years, or fine, or both. class
in any other case.
502 (a) Sale of printed or engraved Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Court of Session
substance containing two years, or fine, or both.
defamatory matter, knowing
it to contain such matter
against the President or
the Vice-President or the
Governor of a State or
Administrator of a Union
territory or a Minister in
respect of his conduct in
the discharge of his public
upon a complaint made by
the Public Prosecutor.
(b) Sale of printed or engraved Simple imprisonment for Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
substance containing two years, or fine, or both. class
defamatory matter, knowing
it to contain such matter in
any other case.
Chapter XXII—Criminal Intimidations, Insult, and Annoyance
504 Insult intended to provoke Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
breach of the peace. years, or fine, or both.
505 False statement, rumour, etc., Imprisonment for three Non-cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
circulated with intent to cause years, or fine, or both.
mutiny or offence against the
public peace.
False statement, rumour, etc., Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
with intent to create enmity, years, or fine, or both.
hatred or ill-will between
different classes.
151
152
1 2 3 4 5 6
False statement, rumour, etc., Imprisonment for five years Cognizable Non-bailable Any Magistrate
made in place of worship, etc., and fine.
with intent to create enmity,
hatred or ill will.
State Amendment
Andhra Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, offences under Section 505 shall be Cognizable.
506 Criminal intimidation. Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
If threat be to cause death or Imprisonment for seven Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
grievous hurt, etc. years, or fine, or both. class
State Amendments
Andhra Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, offence under Section 506 shall be non-bailable.
Meghalaya.—In its application to the State of Meghalaya, for Section 506, the following section shall be substituted, namely:
506 Criminal intimidation Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
If threat be to cause death or Imprisonment for three Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
grievous hurt, etc. years which may extend class
to seven years, or fine, or
both.
[Meghalaya Act 8 of 2014, s. 3 (w.e.f. 07-07-2014)].
Uttar Pradesh.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, the offence under Section 506 shall be cognizable and non-bailable.
[Notification No. 777/VIII 9-4(2)-87, dated 31 July 1989, published in UP Gazette, Extra, Part A, Section (Kha), dated 02 August 1989].
507 Criminal intimidation by Imprisonment for two Non-cognizable Bailable Magistrate of the first
anonymous communication years, in addition to the class
or having taken precaution to punishment under above
conceal whence the threat section.
comes.
State Amendments

1 2 3 4 5 6
508 Act caused by inducing a Imprisonment for one year, Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
person to believe that he will or fine, or both.
be rendered an object of divine
displeasure.
509 Uttering any word or making Simple imprisonment for Cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate

any gesture intended to insult three years and with fine.
the modesty of a woman, etc.
State Amendments
Chhattisgarh.—In its application to the State of Chhattisgarh, after the entries relating to Section 509, the following entries shall be inserted,
namely:
509A Sexual harassment by relative. Rigorous imprisonment Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
not less than one year but class
which may extend upto five
years and fine.
509B Sexual harassment by Rigorous imprisonment not Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the first
electronic modes. less than six months but class
which may extend upto two
years and fine.
[Chhattisgarh Act 25 of 2015, s. 13(e) (w.e.f. 21-07-2015)].
510 Appearing in a public place, Simple imprisonment for 24 Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate
etc., in a state of intoxication, hours, or fine of 10 rupees,
and causing annoyance to any or both.
person.
Chapter XXIII—Attempts to Commit Offences
511 Attempting to commit offences Imprisonment for life, According as the offence According as the offence The court by which the
punishable with imprisonment or imprisonment not is cognizable or non- attempted by the offence attempted is
for life, or imprisonment, and exceeding half of the cognizable. offender is bailable or triable
in such attempt doing any act longest term, provided not.
towards the commission of the for the offence, or fine, or
offence. both.
153
Landmark Judgements
Legal Aid – Fundamental Right

Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot versus State of Maharashtra
[AIR 1978 1548 SC: 1978 (3) SCC 544: 1978 Cri LJ 1678: 1979 (1) SCR 192]
Decided on: 17-08-1978
Bench: Justices DA Desai, O Chinnappa Reddy, and VR Krishna Iyer
Facts: Petitioner was held guilty of offences under Sections 417, 511, 467, 468, and 471, IPC, by the
Sessions Court. According to the prosecution, the petitioner approached a block maker in Bombay and
placed order to prepare embossing seal in name of Karnataka University. The petitioner forged letter
of authority purporting to be signed by the vice chancellor’s personal assistant, authorising him to get
seals made. Before it could fulfil itself, the petitioner’s misadventure intercepted because the Bombay
block maker was too clever a customer. Pre-emptive information given by him to police leading to
unearthing in time of criminal scheme.
Issue: Legal aid by court to prisoner.
Held: Though party preferred legal aid by court, it is observed that it preferred to argue himself.
SLP dismissed and directions issued by court, viz., free transcript of judgement shall be furnished
forthwith by the court when sentencing a person to prison term. In the event any such copy sent to
jail authorities to be delivered to petitioner, by appellate revisional or other court, official concerned
with quick dispatch shall get it delivered to sentence and written acknowledgement obtained from
him. Where appeal or revision sought to be filed by petitioner, every facility to exercise that right shall
be made available by jail authorities.
—————
Consensual Sex Acts – Decriminalisation

Naz Foundation versus Government of NCT
[2010 Cri LJ 94 (Del): (2009) 160 DLT 277: 2009 (111) DRJ 1: 2009 (3) LRC 328]
Bench: Justices Ajit Prakash Shah and S Muralidhar
Facts: the NGO filed a writ petition (WP) as a public interest litigation (PIL) to challenge the constitutional
validity of Section 377, IPC, which criminally penalises ‘unnatural offences’, to the extent that said
provision criminalises consensual sexual acts between adults in private. Petitioners submit that
Section 377, IPC, should apply only to non-consensual penile non-vaginal sex and penile non-vaginal
sex involving minors.
Issue: whether Section 377, IPC, is violative of Articles 21, 14, and 15 of the Constitution as it criminalises
consensual sexual acts of adults in private.
Held: the Court held that Section 377, IPC, is violative of Articles 21, 14, and 15 of the Constitution, in
so far it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults in private. That provision of Section 377, IPC,
will continue to govern non-consensual penile non-vaginal sex and penile non-vaginal sex involving
minors. Person below 18 would not be presumed to be able to consent to sexual act. Said judgement
will not result in reopening of criminal cases involving Section 377, IPC, already attained finality. This
clarification will hold till the Parliament amends law to effectuate recommendation of Law Commission
of India in its 172nd report which removes great deal of confusion.
—————

Prevention of Cow Slaughtering in State of J&K
Parimoksh Seth versus State of Jammu and Kashmir
[2015 (4) RCR (Civil) 885: 2015 (4) RCR (Criminal) 815: 2015 (4) JKJ 577: 2015 (5) Law Herald 3457]
Bench: Justices Muzaffir Hussain Attar, Ali Mohd Magrey, and Tashi Rubstan
Facts: the petitioner has challenged vires of Sections 298A, B, C, and D of the RPC and be declared
to be ultra vires to the Constitution as well as the Constitution of J&K be struck down. That meat of
cow and bovine animals is sold in open markets of state and state administration watching same as
mute spectator, encouraging such sacrilegious acts in the state. The petitioner prayed for issuance
of appropriate writ, order, or direction in nature of mandamus commanding respondents to put in
place strong mechanism for prevention of cow slaughtering in State of J&K by directing authorities
concerned to initiate serious punitive actions against all persons involved in such criminal activities.
Held: the State of J&K is directed by the court to review existing laws and take policy decision within
constitutional framework and ensure that no inter-religious conflicts take place among people of
the state. The court observed that when forces of destruction and divisiveness are at work, then the
forces of legislation and cohesiveness to take charge and provide acceptable legal and constitutional
solutions. The court can neither direct for legislating a law for banning slaughter of bovine animals nor
can direct state government to make law to permit slaughter of any kind of animal, which is a policy
matter of state, and the state has always to take call on such issues.
—————
Murder – Intention
Virsa Singh versus State of Punjab
[AIR 1958 SC 465: 1958 SCR 1495: 1958 Cri LJ 818: 1958 SCJ 772]
Bench: Justices PB Gajendragadkar, SJ Imam, and Vivian Bose
Facts: the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment, under Section 302, IPC, for the murder of
the deceased. He was also tried under Sections 149, 324, and 323 with others and charged individually
under Section 302, IPC. Others were acquitted of all offences. The appellant was granted special leave
to appeal by the Supreme Court limited to question that on finding accepted by the Punjab High Court
what offence is made out as having been committed by petitioner.
Issue: what offence committed by the petitioner?
Held: no evidence or explanation given about why appellant thrust spear into abdomen of deceased
with such force that penetrated bowels. Three coils of intestine came out of wound and digested food
oozed out from cuts in three places. In absence of any reasonable explanation, it would be perverse
to conclude that he did not intend to inflict injury that he did. In a given case, inquiry may be linked
with seriousness of injury. It is not for guess work and fanciful conjecture. Prosecution must prove
for bringing case under Section 300, that bodily injury is present and proved. There are objective
investigations. That there was intention to inflict that particular injury, not accidental or unintentional
and injury is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. Once prosecution establishes these
elements, burden of proving is on prosecution that offence is murder under Section 300. It does not
matter intention to cause death was not there.
—————

Custodial Interrogation – Right to Silence of Accused
Nandini Satpathy versus PL Dani
[AIR 1978 SC 1025: 1978 (2) SCC 424: 1978 Cri LJ 968: 1978 (3) SCR 608]
Bench: Justices VR Krishna Iyer, Jaswant Singh, and VD Tulazapurkar
Facts: DSP Vigilance, filed complaint against the appellant, the former chief minister of Orissa, before
SDJM, Cuttack alleging some offending facts. Cognizance of offence taken by the magistrate and
summons for appearance issued against the accused appellant. Aggrieved against the action of the
magistrate, the appellant moved to the High Court. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging
validity of magisterial proceedings, the High Court rebuffed the plea of unconstitutionality and illegality.
Issue: whether the accused has right to consult his lawyer in custodial interrogation or not and the
accused has the right to be silent in police interrogation?
Held: self-incrimination or tendency to expose oneself to criminal charge is more than ‘confessional’
and less than ‘relevant’. The accused person cannot be forced to answer questions merely because
answers there to are not implicative when viewed in isolation and confined to that particular case.
If answer sought has reasonable prospect of exposing him to guilt in some other accusations, actual
or imminent, he is entitled to keep his mouth shut, even though investigation under way is not with
reference to that. But the accused person cannot have hiding ground for fanciful claims, unreasonable
apprehensions, and vague possibilities. He is bound to answer where there is no clear tendency to
criminate.
—————
Freedom of Religion Not Violated on Prosecution of Hindu Converted to

Islam on His Contracting Second Wife
Lily Thomas versus Union of India
[AIR 2000 SC 1650: 2000 Cri LJ 2433: 2000 (6) SCC 224: 2000 (4) SCALE 176]
Bench: Justices S Saghir Ahmad and RP Sethi
Facts: the writ petition in Supreme Court filed by wife of GC Ghosh (Mohd Karim Ghazi), Sushmita Ghosh,
stating she was married to GC Ghosh in accordance with Hindu rites in 1984, and since then both of
them were happily living in Delhi. She prayed for appropriate writ, order or direction, declare polygamy
marriages by Hindus and non-Hindus after conversion to Islam, illegal and void. Issue appropriate
directions to respondent numbers 1 and 2 carry out suitable amendments in Hindu Marriage Act so as
to curtail and forbid the practice of polygamy. Issue appropriate directions to declare that where non-
Muslim male gets converted to Islam without any real change of belief and with a view to avoid earlier
marriage or enter into second marriage any marriage entered into by him after conversion would be
void.
Issue: whether on contracting second marriage conversion of Hindu to Islam violates freedom of
religion?
Held: making a convert Hindu after taking second wife after conversion, liable for prosecution under
Section 494, IPC, is not against Islam, religion adopted upon conversion by such person. It would
demonstrate ignorance about tenets of Islam and its teachings saying it would be against Islam. The
concept of Muslim law is passed upon edifice of Shariat. Plurality of marriage is not unconditionally

conferred upon husband even under Muslim law. It would be doing injustice to Islamic law to urge that
convert is entitled to practice bigamy notwithstanding continuance of his marriage under law to which
he belonged before conversion. Violators of law who contracted second marriage cannot be permitted
to urge that such marriage should not be made subject matter of prosecution under the penal law
prevalent in the country.
—————
Mumbai Blasts Case – Mercy Petitions Rejected by the president after

Due Consideration of All Relevant Facts
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon versus State of Maharashtra
[2015 (3) KLJ 770: 2015 (8) SCALE 339: 2015 (9) SCC 552: 2015 (3) KLR 473]
Bench: Justices Dipak Misra, Prafulla C Pant, and Amitava Roy
Facts: At 3 a.m., the Supreme Court was opened for judges. The final plea against the execution of Yakub
Memon for his role in 1993 Mumbai blasts case. Judges, after about 90 minutes, rejected Memon’s
appeal to stop his execution. The mercy plea of Memon was rejected by the Supreme Court observing
that stay on death warrant could be travesty of justice since ample opportunity was provided to
Memon, after rejection of his first mercy petition. The petitioner’s counsel contended that he must be
given 14 days as mandated by the Supreme Court to meet family members, prepare his will, and make
peace with God before his death warrant is executed. That rejection of mercy petition by the president
and governor faulted for non-application of mind as new clemency petitions sought commutation of
death penalty to life imprisonment on grounds different from reasons cited by Memon in 2013, while
seeking mercy from the president.
Issue: whether mercy petition was rejected by the president after due consideration of all relevant
facts?
Held: the Bench said in the order the execution was inevitable after rejection of mercy petitions. While
rejecting Memon’s last appeal before the Supreme Court, Justice Dipak Misra held that the president
had rejected mercy petitions after due consideration of all relevant facts. Twenty-two years had passed
since the incident and the judgements passed by this court are not erroneous.
—————
Rape – Sex with Minor Wife

Independent Thought versus Union of India
[AIR 2017 SC 4904: 2017 (12) SCALE 621: 2017 (10) SCC 800: 2018 Cri LJ 3541]
Bench: Justices Madan B Lokur and Deepak Gupta
Facts: The petitioner-society filed petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, in public interest,
to draw attention to violation of rights of girls married between the ages of 15 and 18 years. The
petitioner-society involved in legal intervention, research, and training on issues concerning children
and their rights. Almost every statute in India recognises that a girl below 18 years of age is child, and
law penalises sexual intercourse with a girl below 18 years of age. By virtue of Exception 2 to Section
375 of the IPC, unfortunately if a girl child between 15 and 18 years of age is married, her husband can

have non-consensual intercourse with her without being penalised under the IPC, only because she is
married to him and for no other reason.
Issue: whether sexual intercourse between wife being a girl between 15 and 18 years of age and man
is rape?
Held: Justice Madan B Lokur held that except to harmonise system of laws relating to children, no
other option left and require exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC to meaningfully read as “Sexual
intercourse or acts by a man with his own wife, wife not being under 18 years of age, is not rape.” Only
through this reading intent of social justice to married girl child and constitutional vision of framers of
the Constitution can be preserved and protected and given impetus.
Justice Deepak Gupta (concurred view) stated that exception 2 in so far as it relates to girl below 18
years is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This is invidious discrimination
which is writ large when on one hand state by legislation laid down that abetting child marriage is
criminal offence, it cannot, on other hand, defend this classification of girls below 18 years on ground
of sanctity of marriage because such classification has no nexus with object sought to be achieved.
—————
Adultery under Section 497 IPC – Criminalisation

Joseph Shine versus Union of India
[(2019) 3 SCC 39: 2018 (11) SCALE 556: AIR 2018 SC 4898: 2019 Cri LJ 1]
Bench: Justices Dipak Misra, AM Khanwilkar, RF Nariman,
Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra
Facts: the validity of Section 497, IPC, challenged in petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India.
Issue: whether subject to criminal sanctions, adultery must be treated as penal offence, or marital
wrong which is valid ground for divorce? Whether Section 497, IPC, is constitutionally valid, which
makes adultery a crime?
Held: Section 497, IPC, is struck down as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the
Constitution. Section 198(2), CrPC, which contains procedure for prosecution under Chapter XX of IPC
shall be unconstitutional to the extent that it is applicable to the offence of adultery under Section
497, IPC.
Chief Justice Dipak Misra (for himself and Justice AM Khanwilkar) stated that law expects parties to
remain loyal in case of adultery and maintain fidelity throughout, and also makes the adulterer, the
culprit. This expectation by law is a command which gets into core of privacy. Two individuals may
part on said ground but it is inapposite to attach criminality. When parties to marriage lose their moral
commitment of relationship, it creates a dent in marriage, and it depends on parties how they deal
with situation. Some may seek divorce and some may exonerate and live together. Whether deterrent
or reformative, theories of punishment, would not save the situation. In certain situations, adultery
may not be the cause of unhappy marriage. As Section 497, IPC, is held unconstitutional and adultery
should not be treated as an offence, it is appropriate to declare Section 198, CrPC, unconstitutional,
which deals with procedure for filing complaint in relation to offence of adultery.
Justices RF Nariman, Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra concurred.
—————

Death Sentence – Petition against Not to Be
Dismissed without Reasons
Baba Saheb Maruti Kamble versus State of Maharashtra
[2018 (15) SCALE 228: 2018 (4) Crimes 494: 2018 (3) PCCR 437: 2019 (195) AIC 233]
Bench: Justices AK Sikri, Ashok Bhushan, and Indira Banerjee
Facts: the petitioner filed review petition against death penalty for commission of offences under
Sections 302, 376(2)(f), and 342, IPC. The High Court heard together the appeal and the reference.
The conviction and the death sentence of the petitioner was upheld by the High Court. The review
petitioner filed a special leave petition (SLP) against that judgement, which was dismissed.
Issue: whether against award of death sentence, SLP could be dismissed in limine?
Held: at least qua death sentence, SLP filed in that case against order of lower courts, should not be
dismissed without giving reasons. There may be cases at SLP stage itself, the court may find there is
no scope for interference at all in conviction for offence under Section 302, IPC, as the conviction is
recorded on basis of evidence, which is impeccable, trustworthy, and credible, and proves the guilt
of accused beyond any shadow of doubt. At the same time if death penalty is to be affirmed while
dismissing SLP, it should be by reasoned order on aspect of sentence. Impugned order dismissing SLP
in limine with one word and without giving reasons, recalled.
—————
Brutality by Police Methodology – Rule of Law –

Special Strategies to Prevent
Raghubir Singh versus State of Haryana
[AIR 1980 SC 1087: 1980 Cri LJ 801: 1980 (3) SCC 70: 1980 (3) SCR 277]
Bench: Justices VR Krishna Iyer and ES Venkataramiah
Facts: The theft case in the officer’s house reported to police, and, as part of investigation, the suspects
were picked up and tortured, and one of them succumbed to his injuries. This triggered an investigation
into murder and conduct of investigation by the petitioner and another. The cause of death revealed
as asphyxia in medical examination. Conviction under Section 302, IPC, was entered, trial for murder
followed. The High Court confirmed conviction and sentence of life imprisonment.
Issue: For credibility of rule of law, special strategies to prevent and punish brutally by police
methodology.
Held: Conviction and sentence by lower courts were upheld by the Supreme Court. No relief was made
to the police officer petitioner.
—————

Special Power of Governor or President vis-a-vis
General Power of the Supreme Court – No Conflict
KM Nanavati versus State of Bombay
[AIR 1961 SC 112: 1961 (1) SCR 497: 1961 (1) Cri LJ 173: 1961 (1) SCA 54]
Bench: Justices BP Sinha, JL Kapur, K Subba Rao, KN Wanchoo, and PB Gajendragadkar
Facts: the petitioner was charged under Section 302, IPC, and produced before the Additional Chief
Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, and taken into police custody. The magistrate received letter from
the Flag Officer, Bombay, to effect that he was ready to take accused in command in INS Mysore,
in naval custody as defined in Section 3(12) of the Navy Act, 1957. He would continue to be detained
under orders of Naval Provost Marshall in exercise of his authority under Sections 8(2) and 8(3) of the
Navy Act, 1957. The petitioner continued to remain in naval custody, and, in due course, placed for trial
before the Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay Jury, by majority of eight to one, held him not guilty. The
Sessions Judge made reference to the High Court under Section 307, CrPC, disagreeing with the verdict
of the jury. The High Court accepted reference and convicted petitioner under Section 302, IPC, and
sentenced him to life imprisonment. Application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court made soon
after judgement pronounced by the High Court. The matter of unexecuted warrant was placed before
the Division Bench., which directed that in view of unusual and unprecedented situation arising out of
the order of the governor matter should be referred to larger bench.
Issue: what is the scope of power under Article 161 of the Constitution conferred upon the governor?
Held: Justice K Subba Rao stated that in the interest of justice, the Supreme Court can pass any
suitable order. Under Article 141, the power of the Supreme Court is generally exercisable in all cases,
but the governor’s power is a special power. If there is conflict between special and general power,
special power should prevail, although there is no conflict. There are two ways of reconciling the
powers of the governor and those of the Supreme Court under Article 161. Under Articles 142, 144, and
145. One was that the Supreme Court had no power when the Executive exercised its powers, and
the other was to say that so far as pardon and remission was concerned, while both had powers—the
Executive had exclusive power, but as far as suspension was concerned, the Executive could not make
order impugning upon the Supreme Court is power, when proceedings are pending in the Supreme
Court.
—————
Death Sentence – Rarest of Rare Case

Bachan Singh versus State of Punjab
Bench: Justices YV Chandrachud, AC Gupta, NL Untwalia, PN Bhagwati, and RS Sarkaria
Facts: the Sessions Judge tried, convicted, and sentenced the appellant to death under Section 302,
IPC, for three murders of P, DB, and VB. The death sentence was confirmed by the High Court and the
appeal was dismissed. By special leave, he appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Bench
heard the appeal and directed the records of case to be submitted to the Chief Justice, for conducting
a larger bench to resolve the constitutional validity of death penalty for murder provided in Section
302, IPC, and sentencing procedure embodied in Section 354(3), CrPC.

Issue: constitutional validity of death penalty provided in Section 302, IPC, and sentencing procedure
embodied in Section 354(3), CrPC.
Held: in so far as Section 302, IPC, provides for death sentence and Section 354(3), CrPC, is
constitutionally valid. Under Section 354(3), CrPC, the exercise of discretion should be exceptional
and grave circumstances and imposition of death sentence should only be in rarest of rare cases.
Challenge to constitutionality of impugned provisions contained in Section 302, IPC, and Section 354(3),
CrPC, rejected. Only effect is that application of these principles is now to be guided by paramount
beacons of legislative policy discernible from Sections 354(3) and 235(2), viz., (a) extreme penalty can
be inflicted only in gravest cases of extreme culpability, (b) in making choice of sentence, in addition
to circumstances of offences, due regard must be paid to circumstances of offender as well.
—————
Acquittal by Court after Illegal Detention for 14 Years

Rudal Sah versus State of Bihar
Bench: Justices YV Chandrachud, Ranganath Misra, and Amarendra Nath Sen
Facts: on 03-06-1968, the petitioner was acquitted by the Court of Sessions, Muzaffarpur, Bihar, but
released from jail on 16-10-1982, more than 14 years after he was acquitted. By Habeas Corpus Petition
the petitioner asked for his release on ground that his detention in jail is unlawful. Ancillary reliefs
like rehabilitation, reimbursements of expenses asked for by him, which he may incur for medical
treatment and compensation for illegal incarceration.
Issue: whether the Supreme Court can pass order of compensation for infringement of fundamental
rights (FRs) by officers under Article 32?
Held: under Article 32, the Supreme Court can pass order of compensation for infringement of FR.
Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for enforcement of rights and obligations which can be
enforced efficaciously through ordinary processes of courts, civil and criminal. Whether the Supreme
Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32 can pass an order for payment of money, if such
an order is in the nature of compensation consequential upon deprivation of FR. The petitioner was
illegally detained for 14 years after his acquittal in full dressed trial. He filed an HCP in the Supreme
Court for his release from illegal detention. If the petitioner files suit to recover damages for his illegal
detention, decree for damages would have to be passed in that suit, though in absence of evidence, it
is not possible to predicate precise amount which would be decreed in his favour. The Supreme Court’s
refusal to pass order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing lip service to his FR to
liberty, which the state government has grossly violated. Article 21 will be demanded of its significant
content which guarantees right to life and liberty, if the power of the Supreme Court were limited to
passing orders to release from illegal detention.
—————

Corruption Case Triable by Special Judge – Supreme Court Not Competent
to Issue Direction Transferring Case to High Court Judge
AR Antulay versus RS Nayak
[AIR 1988 SC 1531: 1988 Cri LJ 1661: 1988 (2) SCC 602: 1988 (25) ACC 448]
Bench: Justices Sabyasachi Mukherji, Ranganath Misra, GL Oza, BC Ray, S Natarajan, MN
Venkatachaliah, and S Ranganathan
Facts: respondent no. 1 filed complaint before the Additional Metroplitan Magistrate Bombay, against the
appellant, the then chief minister of Maharashtra, on 01-09-1981, for alleged offences under Sections
161 and 165, IPC, and other provisions. The magistrate refused to take cognizance of offences without
sanction for prosecution. Then application was filed before the Bombay High Court. On 28-07-1982, the
governor of Maharashtra granted sanction under Section 197, CrPC, in respect of five items and refused
sanction in respect of all other items. Respondent mo. 1 filed fresh complaint against appellant before
a special judge bringing in many more allegations. It was registered as a special case. The special
judge issued the process to the appellant without relying on sanction order on 28-07-1982. The state
government notified the appointment of RB Sule as the special judge to try offences specified under
Section 6(1) of the 1952 Act. On 25-07-1983, the special judge discharged the appellant, holding that a
member of legislative assembly is a public servant, and no valid sanction for prosecuting the appellant
was there. On 06-02-1984, in appeal by respondent no. 1, under Article 136, the Constitution Bench of
the Supreme Court held that a member of legislative assembly is not a public servant, and set aside
order of the special judge. The Supreme Court instead of remanding the case to the special judge
for disposal in accordance with law. Suo motu withdraw special case pending in the Court of Special
Judges, Bombay, and transferred same to Bombay High Court.
Issue: whether direction for transfer of case by the Supreme Court is legally proper?
Held: the direction given by the Supreme Court was not per incuriam. Exclusive jurisdiction created
under Section 7(1) of the 1952 Act, when brought to the Supreme Court’s notice, precluded exercise
of power under Section 407, CrPC. On this aspect, there was no argument, submission, and decision.
—————
Grant of Pardon – Appeal to President

Kehar Singh versus Union of India
Bench: Justices RS Pathak, ES Venkataramiah, MN Venkatachaliah, ND Ojha, and Ranganath Misra
Facts: Indira Gandhi, the former prime minister of India was assassinated on 31-10-1984 by Sub-
inspector Beant Singh and Constable Satwant Singh. When she was proceeding to her office from her
residence, both of them fired bullets at her. One Kehar Singh was convicted of offence under Section
120B read with Section 302, IPC, and sentenced to death in connection with this assassination. Petition
for grant of pardon, was presented to the president of India, for Kehar Singh by his son under Article
72 of the Constitution. It was sought to be established that Kehar Singh was innocent and verdict of
the court was erroneous.
Issue: the area or scope of power of president under Article 72. Whether on his petition petitioner is
entitled to oral hearing from president invoking powers under Article 72?

Held: Article 72 entitles the president to examine record of evidence of criminal case and come to
different conclusion from that recorded by the court. The president in doing so does not amend or
modify or supersede the judicial record. While exercising powers under Article 72, the president acts
under constitutional power, which is entirely different from judicial power and cannot be regarded as
an extension of it. The condemned person who has applied for pardon has no right to insist on an oral
hearing before the president. It lies within the discretion of the president, the manner of consideration
of petition, and decide how best he can acquaint himself with all necessary information for proper and
effective disposal.
—————
Custodial Death – Compensation – Contravention of Fundamental Freedom and

Human Rights by the State and Its Agencies
Nilabati Behera versus State of Orissa
[AIR 1993 SC 1960: 1993 Cri LJ 2899: 1993 (2) SCR 581: 1993 (2) SCC 746]
Bench: Justices JS Verma, AS Anand, and MN Venkatachaliah
Facts: the letter written by the petitioner dated 14-09-1988, sent to the Supreme Court, treated as writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for determining compensation claim consequent upon
death of petitioner’s son aged 22 years in police custody. The allegation of custodial death as a result
of multiple injuries inflicted on him, and contravention of fundamental rights (FRs) under Article 21 of
the Constitution. State of Orissa and its police officers, ASI and constable impleaded as respondents.
In view of controversy relating to cause of death of petitioner’s son, direction was given by this court
on 04-03-1991 to the district judge to hold inquiring into matter and submit report. The district judge
submitted report that death occurred on account of multiple injuries inflicted on him while he was in
police custody. The doctor deposed that all injuries were caused by hard and blunt object, injuries on
face and left temporal were post-mortem while rest were ante-mortem.
Issue: whether through writ petition compensation for custodial death can be available?
Held: Relief of monetary compensation as exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by the
Supreme Court and under Article 226 by the High Court for established infringement of indefeasible
right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is remedy available in public law. It is based on
strict liability for contravention of guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of citizen. When the court
would relief by granting compensation in proceedings under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution
seeking enforcement of FRs, it does so under public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing
liability for public wrong on the state, which has failed in its public duty to protect FRs of citizen.
The state has right to be indemnified by and take such action as way be available to it against the
wrongdoer in accordance with law, through appropriate proceedings. For the reasons recorded by
Justice Verma, it is agreed that the State of Orissa should pay sum of Rs 1.5 lakh to the petitioner and
sum of Rs 1000 by way of costs to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee.
—————

Conversion of Religion only for Marrying Second Time
Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani versus Union of India
Bench: Justices Kuldip Singh and RM Sahai
Facts: Petitioner 2 is the president of Kalyani, registered society organisation working for welfare of
needy families and women in distress. Petitioner 2, MM, was married to JM, and was shocked to learn
that her husband solemnised a second marriage with Sunita @ Fathima. The marriage was solemnised
after they converted to Islam. The grievance of Sunita @ Fathima is that she continues to be Muslim,
not being maintained by her husband and has no protection under either of the personal laws. That
after embracing Islam, they got married and a son was born to her. That after marriage, J under the
influence of his first Hindu wife gave an undertaking that he reverted back to Hinduism and agreed to
maintain his first wife and children. Further grievance in writ petition nos 424/192 and 509/92 were
raised by the petitioner.
Issue: the Hindu husband, married under Hindu Law, whether by embracing Islam, can solemnise
second marriage? Without dissolving first marriage under law, whether such marriage would be valid
marriage qua first wife who continues to be Hindu? Whether apostate husband would be guilty of
offence under Section 494, IPC?
Held: conversion to Islam and marrying again would not by itself dissolve a Hindu marriage. Without
having his first marriage dissolved under law, second marriage by convert would be in violation of the
Hindu Marriage Act and void in terms of Section 494, IPC.
—————
Life Story or Autobiography of a Prisoner – Right to Privacy

R Rajagopal versus State of Tamil Nadu
[AIR 1995 SC 264: 1994 (6) SCC 632: 1994 (4) SCALE 494: JT 1994 (6) SC 514]
Bench: Justices BP Jeevan Reddy and Suhas C Sen
Facts: the first and second petitioner, editor and associate editor of a magazine, seek issuance of writ
order or direction under Article 32, restraining respondents, viz., State of Tamil Nadu, Represented
By Secretary, Home Department, Inspector General of Prisons, Madras Superintendent of Prisons
(Central Prison), Salem, Tamil Nadu, from taking any steps as contemplated in communication of the
respondents and restraining them from interfering with publication of autobiography of the condemned
prisoner, Auto Shankar, in their magazine. Shankar was charged and tried for six murders, convicted,
and sentenced to death by the sessions judge. This was confirmed by the Madras High Court and the
appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 15-04-1994. His mercy petition to the president of India
pending consideration. While confined in jail, during 1991 Auto Shankar wrote his autobiography running
into 300 pages. With knowledge and approval of jail authorities, the autobiography was handed over by
him to his wife. The prisoner requested his advocate to ensure publication of his autobiography in the
petitioner’s magazine and the petitioner accepted. The announcement of publication sent shock waves
among several police and prison officials who were afraid their links with condemned prisoners would
be exposed. They forced him by applying third degree methods to write letters addressed to second
respondent (IG of Prisons) and first petitioner requesting not to publish the autobiography.

Issue: whether citizen of this country can prevent another person from writing his life story or
autobiography? Whether freedom to press under Article 19(1) entitles press to publish such unauthorised
account of citizens’ life and activities and if so to what extent and in what circumstances? Whether
action for defamation can be maintained by the government? Whether public officials apprehending
they or their colleagues may be defamed, can impose prior restraint upon press to prevent such
publication?
Held: Even without his consent or authorisation, the petitioners have right to publish what they allege
to be life story or autobiography of Auto Shankar as it appears from records. But if they go beyond that
and publish his life story, they may be invading his right to privacy and will be liable for consequences
in accordance with law. The state or its officials, cannot prevent or restrain the said publication.
Remedy, if any, for the affected public officials or figures is after the publication.
—————
Right of Compensation of Rape Victim

Bodhisattawa Gautam versus Subhra Chakraborthy
[AIR 1996 SC 922: 1995 (7) SCALE 228: 1996 (1) SCC 490: 1996 (2) BLJR 1533]
Bench: Justices Kuldip Singh and S Saghir Ahmad
Facts: the complainant, a student of Baptist College, filed a complaint against OP, lecturer in Court
of Judicial Magistrate, First Class. The accused used to visit the complainant’s house as a teacher
and was respected by complainant and all family members. In course of such visits, once he told the
complainant that he was in love and there developed love affair between them since 1989. That on
false assurance of marriage to complainant, the accused dishonestly procured sexual intercourse with
her. In course of continuation of the affair between two, the complainant got pregnant twice, out of
her co-habitation with the accused person. The complainant, being innocent, failed to understand the
accused’s wicked and mischievous plan, whereby the accused succeeded, and dishonestly motivated
the complainant for abortion and undergo operation in a clinic. The accused also fraudulently through
a certain marriage ceremony with knowledge that it was not valid marriage, and dishonestly made
the complainant to believe that she was the lawfully married wife of the accused. The accused has
committed offences under Sections 342, 420, 493, 496, and 498A, IPC.
Issue: whether rape is crime against society or only crime against person of woman (victim)?
Held: the accused alleged to have married the victim before the God he worshipped, by putting vermillion
on her forehead and accepting her as his wife and impregnated her twice resulting in abortion on both
occasions. This court on being prima facie satisfied, dispose of matter by providing that accused shall
pay sum of Rs 1000 every month as interim maintenance to the victim, during pendency of criminal
case in Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kohima. He shall also be liable to pay arrears of
compensation at the same rate from date of complaint till this date.
—————

Quashing of FIR by HC
Rupan Deol Bajaj versus KPS Gill
Bench: Justices AS Anand and MK Mukherjee
Facts: the appellant, IAS officer, PB Cadre, and working as Special Secretary, Finance, lodged complaint
with the IGP, Chandigarh UT, against the respondent, DGP, alleging commission of offence under
Sections 341, 342, 352 354, and 509, IPC, at a dinner party. The case was registered and investigation
taken up, treating that complaint as FIR. Her husband, senior IAS officer of PB Cadre, lodged complaint
in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistratefor same offences, alleging that the respondent being a high-
ranking police officer, the police neither arrested him nor conducted investigation in fair and impartial
manner, in connection with case registered by the police on his wife’s complaint. He filed complaint
apprehending that the police would conclude investigation by treating the case as untraced. In the
meantime, the respondent accused moved to the High Court by filing petition under Section 482, CrPC,
for quashing of FIR and complaint. This was allowed by the High Court, and FIR and complaint were
quashed.
Issue: the High Court under what circumstances and in what categories can quash FIR or complaint in
exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482, CrPC?
Held: the High Court is not justified in embarking upon enquiry as the stage of quashing of FIR or
complaint, as to probability, reliability, or genuineness of allegations made therein. If the allegations
made are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion,
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against accused, FIR or complaint may be quashed. The
CJM directed to take cognizance upon the police report in respect of offences under Sections 354 and
409, IPC, and try himself case in accordance with law.
—————
Medical Negligence – Liability of Doctors

Jacob Mathew versus State of Punjab
[AIR 2005 SC 3180: 2005 (6) SCC 1: 2005 (6) SCALE 130: 2005 (122) DLT 83]
Bench: Justices RC Lahoti, GP Mathur, and PK Balasubramanyam
Facts: the patient was admitted in the private ward of the hospital. He felt difficulty in breathing. His
son contacted the duty nurse, who, in turn, called the doctor. No doctor turned up for about 20–25
minutes. Then two doctors came to the room of the patient. The oxygen cylinder was connected to the
mouth of the patient, but breathing problem increased further. The oxygen gas cylinder was found to be
empty. No other oxygen cylinder was available in the room. Another oxygen cylinder was brought from
the adjoining room, but there was no arrangement to make it functional, and five to seven minutes
were wasted, and doctor declared that the patient was dead. The FIR was lodged alleging negligence
on part of doctors and offence under Sections 304A, 34, IPC; the FIR was registered and investigated.
The judicial magistrate framed charges against doctors. The revision was filed against the dismissal by
the Sessions Judge, and the petition was filed under Section 482, CrPC, in the High Court for quashing
the FIR dismissed. Appeal was filed before the Supreme Court by special leave.
Issue: liability for negligence under civil and criminal law of medical professionals.

Held: for negligence to amount to offence, element of mens rea must exist. Jurisprudential concept
of negligence differs in civil and criminal law. In context of medical profession negligence calls for
treatment with difference. So long a doctor follows practice acceptable to medical profession of
that day, he cannot be held liable for negligence merely because better alternative course or method
of treatment is also available, or more skilled doctor would not have followed that practice which
accused followed. All averments in complaint even if held to be proved, do not make out case of
criminal rashness or negligence on part of accused appellant. The hospital may be liable in civil law,
but the accused appellant cannot be proceeded against under Section 304A, IPC.
—————
Section 377, IPC, – Constitutional Validity

Suresh Kumar Koushal versus NAZ Foundation
Bench: Justices GS Singhvi and Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhyaya
Facts: the writ petition filed by the respondent NGO before the Delhi High Court praying for grant of
declaration that Section 377, IPC, is violative of Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(a)(d), and 21 of the Constitution
to the extent it is applicable to and penalises sexual acts in private between consenting adults. That
thrust of Section 377, IPC, is to penalise sexual acts which are against order of nature. That provision
is based on traditional Judeo–Christian rural and ethical standards and being used to legitimise
discrimination against sexual minorities. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court observing
no cause of action accrued to respondent and court cannot examine purely academic issues. The
High Court also dismissed the review petition filed by the respondent. Both orders were challenged
before the Supreme Court by the respondent, and the Supreme Court remitted the writ petition to the
High Court for a fresh decision. The High Court declared Section 377, IPC, in so far as it criminalises
consensual sexual acts of adults in private is violative of Articles 21, 14, and 15 of the Constitution. The
petitioner filed appeal before the Supreme Court against the High Court’s decision.
Issue: constitutional validity of Section 377, IPC.
Held: the declaration made by the Division Bench of the High Court is legally unsustainable. Section 377,
IPC, does not suffer from vice of unconstitutionality. What Section 377, IPC, does is merely to define
particular offence and prescribe punishment for same which can be awarded in trial conducted in
accordance with provisions of the CrPC and other statues. If person is found guilty. The High Court not
right in declaring Section 377 of the IPC ultra vires Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The Division
Bench of the High Court while reading down Section 377, IPC, overlooked that minuscule fraction of
country’s population constitutes lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or transgenders. In the last more than 150
years, less than 200 persons have been prosecuted for committing offence under Section 377, IPC, and
this cannot be made sound basis for declaring that Section 377, IPC, is ultra vires provisions of Articles
14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution.
—————

Defamation – Provisions of Sections 499 and 500, IPC, Constitutionally Valid
Subramaniam Swamy versus Union of India, Ministry of Law
Bench: Justices Dipak Misra and Prafulla C Pant
Facts: assertion by Union of India and complainant in the writ petitions. Under Article 32 of the
Constitution that reasonable restrictions are based on paradigms and parameters of the Constitution
that are structure and pedestaled on doctrine of non-absoluteness of any fundamental right, cultural
and social ethos, need and feel of time. For every right engulfs and incorporates duty to respect other’s
rights and ensure mutual compatibility and of individual based on collective harmony and conceptual
grace of eventual social order.
Issue: whether Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC, 1860, and Sections 199(1) to 199(4) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, are constitutionally valid?
Held: the constitutional validity of Sections 499 and 500, IPC, and Section 199, CrPC, was upheld by
court. Criminal defamation which is in existence in the form of Sections 499 and 500, IPC, is not a
restriction on free speech that can be characterised as disproportionate. Right to free speech cannot
mean that citizen can defame the other. Protection of reputation is a fundamental right. It is also a
human right. Cumulatively, it serves the social interest. In case of criminal defamation neither any FIR
can be filed nor can any direction be issued under Section 156(3), CrPC. The offence has its own gravity,
and hence, the responsibility of the magistrate is more. In matters of criminal defamation heavy burden
is on the magistracy to scrutinise the complaint from all aspects. The magistrate has also to keep in
view the language employed in Section 202, CrPC, which stipulates about the resident of the accused
at a place beyond the area in which the magistrate exercises his jurisdiction. He must be satisfied
that ingredients of Section 499, CrPC, are satisfied. Application of mind in the case of complaint is
imperative.
—————
Guidelines – Inherent Powers of HC

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd versus Central Bureau of Investigation
[AIR 2018 SC 2039: 2018 (5) SCALE 269: 2018 (16) SCC 299: 2018 (187) AIC 38]
Bench: Justices Adarsh Kumar Goel, Rohinton Fali Nariman, and Navin Sinha
Facts: FIR at instance of MCD recorded under Section 120B, read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471,
and 477A, IPC, and Section 13(2) read with Sections 13(1)(d), PC Act, alleging causing wrongful loss to
MCD by using false invoices of oil companies relating to transportation of Bitumen for use in Dense
Carpeting Works of roads. After investigation, a chargesheet was filed against the appellant and certain
employees of the MCD by the respondent, CBI, before the Special Judge. The appellants filed application
for discharge, however, the Special Judge, CBI, directed framing of charges after considering material
before court. The appellants filed revision before the High Court against order framing charge. The
revision petition was converted into a writ petition.
In view of conflict of views in two judgements, the division bench reframed questions. Division bench
held that order framing charge was an interlocutory order and no revision petition under Section 401
read with Section 397(2), CrPC, would lie to the High Court against such order. Any petition presented

under Section 482 of the CrPC, Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950, shall be entertained
despite the statutory bar contained under the act. However, even if the petition is entertained by the
court under Section 482 of the CrPC, or Article 227 of the Constitution of India, no order of stay shall
be passed in a routine manner in light of the statutory bar contained under the act. The exercise of
power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950, or Section 482 of CrPC, should be exercised
sparingly and under exceptional circumstances to meet the ends of justice.
Issue: order framing charge. Whether interlocutory order?
Held: order framing charge held is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of
High Court is not barred irrespective of label of petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482, CrPC, or
Article 227 of the Constitution. Said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy
to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered.
Justice Nariman concurred.
—————
Right to Life Does Not Include Right to Die

Gian Kaur versus State of Punjab
[AIR 1996 SC 1257: 1996 Cri LJ 1600: 1996 (3) SCR 697: 1996 (2) SCR 648]
Bench: Justices JS Verma, GN Ray, NP Singh, Faizan Uddin, and GT Nanavati
Facts: the appellant and her husband convicted by the trial court under Section 306, IPC, and sentenced
to rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs 2000 or in-default for further rigorous imprisonment for nine
months for abetting commitment of suicide by K. On appeal, the High Court maintained conviction
of both but only sentence of appellant reduced to rigorous imprisonment for three years. Aggrieved
against order appeal filed before the Supreme Court. by special appeal against their conviction and
sentence. It is urged that ‘right to die’ being included in Article 21 of the Constitution as held in P
Rathinam declaring Section 309, IPC, unconstitutional, any person abetting commission of suicide by
another is merely assisting in the enforcement of fundamental rights. Under Article 21 and Section 306,
IPC, penalising assisted suicide is equally violative of Article 21.
Issue: constitutional validity of Sections 306 and 309, IPC. Whether right to life also includes right to
die under Article 212?
Held: right to life does not include right to die. Sections 306 and 309, IPC, are constitutionally valid.
Abetment of suicide or attempted suicide is distinct offence found enacted even in the law of
Countries where attempted suicide is not made punishable. Section 306, IPC, can survive independent
of Section 309, IPC, as it enacts distinct offence. There is no ground to hold, that Section 309, IPC, is
constitutionally invalid. Contrary view taken in P Rathinam on basis of construction made of Article 21
to include therein ‘right to die’ cannot be accepted as correct.
—————

Prevention of Honour Killing
Shakti Vahini versus Union of India
[AIR 2018 SC 1601: 2018 (5) SCALE 51: 2018 (7) SCC 192: 2019 (1) HLR 267]
Bench: Justices Dipak Misra, AM Khanwilkar, and DY Chandrachud
Facts: by order passed by the National Commission for Women, the petitioner organisation authorised
for conducting a research study on honour killings in Haryana and Western Uttar Pradesh. Social
pressure and consequent inhuman treatment by core groups who arrogate to themselves the position
of law makers and impose punishments which are extremely cruel instil immense fear that compels
victims to commit suicide or to suffer irreparably at hands of these groups. The petition under Article
32 preferred seeking directions to the respondents, state governments and central government, to
take preventive steps to combat honour crimes. To submit a National Plan of Action and State Plan of
Action to curb crimes of said nature and further to direct state governments to constitute special cells
in each district which can be approached by couples for their safety and well–being.
Issue: to prevent honour crimes, what directions need to be issued?
Held:
Preventative Steps
The state governments should identify districts, tax divisions, or villages where instances of honour
killing or assembly or Khap Panchayats reported, e.g., last five years. Directives or advisories to
Superintendent of Police of concerned districts to be issued by Secretary, Home Department, of
concerned states for ensuring that officer in charge of police station of identified areas are extra
cautious. If information about any proposed of Khap Panchayat comes to knowledge of any police
officer or officer of the district administration, he shall forthwith inform his immediate superior officer
and intimate jurisdictional division and Superintendent of Police. They shall immediately interact with
members of the Khap Panchayat and impress upon them that convening of such meetings or gatherings
is not permissible in law and eschew from going ahead with such meeting. The Home Department
of the Government of India must take initiative and work in coordination with state governments
for subsisting law enforcement agencies and by involving all stakeholders to identify measures for
prevention of such violence. Different state governments and the centre ought to work on sensitisation
of law enforcement agencies to mandate social initiative and awareness to curb such violence.
Remedial Measures
Despite preventive measures taken by the state police, if it comes to notice of local police that Khap
Panchayat has taken place and it has passed any diktat to take action against a couple or family of an
inter-caste or inter-religious marriage (or any other marriage which does not meet their acceptance),
jurisdictional police official shall cause to immediately lodge an FIR under appropriate provisions of the
IPC including Sections 141, 143, and 503 read with Section 506 of the IPC, 1860.
Young bachelor-bachelorette couples whose relationship is being opposed by their families, local
community, or Khaps.
Young married couples (of an inter-caste or inter-religious or any other marriage) being opposed by
their families, local community, or Khaps.
After marriage, if couple so desire, they can be provided accommodation on payment of nominal
charges in the safe house initially for a period of one month to be extended on monthly basis but not
exceeding one year in aggregate, depending on their threat assessment on case to case basis.

District Superintendent of Police, upon receipt of such report, shall direct Deputy Superintendent of
Police in-charge of concerned sub-division to cause to register an FIR against persons threatening the
couple(s), and if necessary, invoke Section 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
Punitive Measures
States are directed to take disciplinary action against concerned officials if it is found that:
(i) such official(s) did not prevent the incident, despite having prior knowledge of it, or
(ii) where the incident had already occurred, such official(s) did not promptly apprehend and institute
criminal proceedings against the culprits.
Any failure by either police or district officer or officials to comply with aforesaid directions shall be
considered as an act of deliberate negligence and/or misconduct for which departmental action must
be taken under service rules.
Criminal cases pertaining to honour killing or violence to the couple(s) shall be tried before the
designated court or fast-track court earmarked for that purpose. The trial must proceed on a day-to-
day basis, and is to be concluded preferably within six months from the date of taking cognizance of
the offence.
—————
Constitutionality of Section 377 of the IPC, 1860

Navtej Singh Johar versus Union of India
[2018 (10) SCALE 386: 2018 Cri LJ 4754: AIR 2018 SC 4321: 2018 (10) SCC 1]
Bench: Justices RF Nariman, DY Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra
Facts: petition filed for declaring Section 377 of the IPC to be unconstitutional, for declaring right
to sexuality, right to sexual autonomy and right to choose sexual partner to be part of right to life
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is vigorously propounded by petitioners that
sexual autonomy and right to choose partner of one’s choice is inherent aspect of right to life and right
to autonomy. Petitioners contend that Section 377 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as said
Section 377 is vague in sense that carnal intercourse against order of nature is neither defined in the
Section 377 nor in the IPC or, for that matter, any other law. Petitioners also contended that Section 377
violates rights of LGBT persons under Article 19(1)(c) and denies them the right to form associations.
Issue: criminalising “consensual acts of adults in private” falling under Section 377, IPC. Whether
constitutionally valid? Whether constitutional standards in penalising consensual sexual conduct
between adults of same sex fulfiled by Section 377, IPC?
Held: Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justice AM Khanwikar stated that Section 377, IPC, subjects LGBT
community to societal pariah and dereliction, and is, therefore, manifestly arbitrary for it has become
an odious weapon for harassment of LGBT community by subjecting them to discrimination and
unequal treatment. Section 377, IPC, so far as it criminalises even consensual sexual acts between
competent adults, fails to make a distinction between non-consensual and consensual sexual acts of
competent adults in private space which are neither harmful nor contagious to society. Consensual
carnal intercourse among adults, be it homosexual or heterosexual in private space, does not in any
way harm public decency or mortality. Therefore, Section 377, IPC, in its present form, violates Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

An examination of Section 377, IPC, on the anvil of Article 19(1)(a) reveals that it amounts to an
unreasonable restriction, for public decency and morality cannot be amplified beyond a rational or
logical limit and cannot be accepted as reasonable grounds for curbing the fundamental rights of
freedom of expression and choice of LGBT community. Section 377, IPC, so far as it penalises any
consensual sexual relationship between two adults, be it homosexuals or heterosexuals, cannot be
regarded as constitutional. If anyone by which we mean both a man and a woman, engages in any kind
of sexual activity with an animal, the said aspect of Section 377 is constitutional and it shall remain
a penal offence under Section 377, IPC. Any act of description covered under Section 377, IPC, done
between two individuals without consent of any one of them would invite penal liability under Section
377, IPC.
Justices RF Nariman, DY Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra concurred.
—————
Mob Violence and Lynching – Guidelines for Prevention

Tehseen S Poonawalla versus Union of India
[AIR 2018 SC 3354: 2018 (9) SCALE 4: 2018 (9) SCC 501: 2018 (4) Civil LJ 657]
Facts: writ petition under Article 32 preferred by petitioner, social activist for commanding respondent
nos 3 to 8, states to take immediate and necessary action against cow protection groups indulging
in violence; and further to issue a writ or direction to remove violent contents from social media
uploaded and hosted by said groups. Declare Section 12 of the Gujarat Animal Prevention Act, 1954,
Section 13 of the Maharashtra Animal Prevention Act, 1976, and Section 15 of the Karnataka Prevention
of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964, as unconstitutional.
Issue: to control mob violence and lynching whether any directions to be issued?
Held:
Guidelines: Preventive Measures
The state governments shall designate, a senior police officer, not below the rank of Superintendent
of Police, as Nodal Officer in each district. Such Nodal Officer shall be assisted by one of the DSP rank
officers in the district for taking measures to prevent incidents of mob violence and lynching.
The Nodal Officer, so designated shall hold regular meetings (at least once a month) with the local
intelligence units in the district along with all Station House Officers of the district so as to identify
the existence of the tendencies of vigilantism, mob violence or lynching in the district and take steps
to prohibit instances of dissemination of offensive material through different social media platforms
or any other means for inciting such tendencies. It shall be the duty of every police officer to cause a
mob to disperse, by exercising his power under Section 129 of the CrPC.
The Central Government and State Governments should broadcast on radio and television and other
media platforms including the official websites of the Home Department and state police that lynching
and mob violence of any kind shall invite serious consequence under the law.
The police shall cause to register FIR under Section 153A of the IPC and/or other relevant provisions of
law against persons who disseminate irresponsible and explosive messages and videos having content
which is likely to incite mob violence and lynching of any kind.

Remedial Measures
If it comes to the notice of the local police that an incident of lynching or mob violence has taken
place, the jurisdictional police station shall immediately cause to lodge an FIR, without any undue
delay, under the relevant provisions of the IPC and/or other provisions of law.
Investigation in such offences shall be personally monitored by the Nodal Officer who shall be duty
bound to ensure that the investigation is carried out effectively and the chargesheet in such cases is
filed within the statutory period from the date of registration of the FIR or arrest of the accused, as
the case may be.
The state governments shall prepare a lynching or mob violence victim compensation scheme in the
light of the provisions of Section 357A of the CrPC within one month from the date of this judgement.
The cases of lynching and mob violence shall be specifically tried by designated court or fast-track
courts earmarked for that purpose in each district. Such courts shall hold trial of the case on a day-
to-day basis.
The victim(s) or the next kin of the deceased in cases of mob violence and lynching shall receive free
legal aid if he or she chooses and engage any advocate of his/her choice from among those enrolled in
the legal aid panel under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.
Punitive Measures
States are directed to take disciplinary action against the concerned officials if it is found that:
(i) such official(s) did not prevent the incident, despite having prior knowledge of it, or
(ii) where the incident has already occurred, such official(s) did not promptly apprehend and institute
criminal proceedings against the culprits.
Wherever it is found that a police officer or an officer of the district administration has failed to
comply with the aforesaid directions in order to prevent and/or investigate and/or facilitate expeditious
trial of any crime of mob violence and lynching, the same shall be considered as an act of deliberate
negligence and/or misconduct for which appropriate action must be taken against him/her and not
limited to departmental action under the service rules
—————
Attempt to Rape
Nemai Dey versus State of Tripura
[MANU/TR/0165/2018]
Bench: Justice Arindam Lodh
Facts: FIR lodged by mother of victim prosecutrix. Complainant alleged that middle daughter, victim
girl was alone at home, cooking rice. Accused alleged to have trespassed into kitchen of house of
complainant and grabbed victim girl, laid her on ground, tore her frock, removed her panty, removed
his undergarments and tried to lay his body over body of victim. Victim raised alarm and struggled hard
when informant mother on hearing her cries immediately returned back to home and found appellant
to run away. Officer in-charge of the police station registered case under Sections 448, 376, and 511,
IPC, against accused.
Issue: attempt to rape. Penetration of whichever degree essential.

Held: the High Court acquitted main accused of attempting to commit rape charges. It was observed
that at best it was case of fondling. Offence does not fall within sake of Section 376 but under Section
354, IPC.
—————
Acid Attack – Horrifying form of Gender Based Violence

Mahender versus State
[2013 (10) AD (Del) 577: 2014 (8) RCR (Criminal) 3379]
Bench: Justices Kailash Gambhir and Inderjeet Kaur
Facts: deceased victim was woman of 24 years of age, and had six-year-old boy from previous marriage.
Her second husband was attacker who could not bear rejection after she decided to divorce him. Victim
in her dying declaration said accused used to threaten her even to the extent of physically eliminating
her if she dared to divorce him.
Issue: whether acid attack is gender-based violence of horrifying form?
Held: relying upon dying declaration of victim, the court dismissed plea of accused who contended
that he was falsely implicated in case and not even married to victim and upheld sentence of life
imprisonment given by trial court.
—————
Supreme Court Guidelines
Amicus Curiae – Appointment Where There Is Possibility of

‘Life Sentence’ or ‘Death Sentence’
Anokhilal versus State of Madhya Pradesh
[2019 SCC Online SC 1637: AIR 2020 SC 232: 2020 (1) SCALE 75: JT 2019 (12) SC 520]
Criminal Appeal Nos 62–63 of 2014
Dated: 18-12-2019
Bench: Justices UU Lalit, Indu Malhotra, and Krishna Murari
Issue: fair trial, whether expeditious disposal required in criminal matters.
y In all cases where there is a possibility of life sentence or death sentence, learned advocates who
have put in minimum of 10 years practice at the Bar alone be considered to be appointed as Amicus
Curiae or through legal services to represent an accused.
y In all matters dealt with by the High Court concerning confirmation of death sentence, senior
advocates of the court must first be considered to be appointed as Amicus Curiae.
y Whenever any counsel is appointed as Amicus Curiae, some reasonable time may be provided to
enable the counsel to prepare the matter. There cannot be any hard and fast rule in that behalf.
However, a minimum of seven days’ time may normally be considered to be appropriate and adequate.
y Any learned counsel, who is appointed as Amicus Curiae on behalf of the accused must normally be
granted to have meetings and discussion with the concerned accused.
—————

Arrest – Unnecessary Arrest and Causal and Mechanical Detention
Arnesh Kumar versus State of Bihar
[(2014) 8 SCC 273: 2014 (8) SCALE 250: AIR 2014 SC 2756: 2014 Cri LJ 3707]
Criminal Appeal No. 1277 of 2014
Dated: 02-07-2014
Bench: Justices Chandramauli Kumar Prasad and Pinaki Chandra Ghose
Court has issued following directions to prevent from unnecessary arrest and causal and mechanical
detention. Directions were issued in an endeavour to ensure that police officers do not arrest the
accused unnecessarily and magistrate do not authorise detention casually and mechanically in cases
under Section 498A, IPC, the court gave certain directions (however, the directions apply also to other
cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment of not more than seven years) which include
the following.
y All the state governments to instruct their police officers not to automatically arrest when a case
under Section 498A of the IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest
under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41, CrPC.
y All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses under Section 41(1)
(b)(ii).
y The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the reasons and materials which
necessitated the arrest, while forwarding or producing the accused before the magistrate for further
detention.
y The magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by
the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the magistrate will
authorise detention.
y The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the magistrate within two weeks from the
date of the institution of the case with a copy to the magistrate which may be extended by the
superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing.
y Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A of the CrPC, be served on the accused within two
weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the superintendent of
police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing.
y Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers
concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of
court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.
y Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the judicial Magistrate concerned
shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.
y We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the cases under Section 498A
of the IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where
offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which
may extend to seven years; whether with or without fine.
y We direct that a copy of this judgement be forwarded to the chief secretaries as also the director
generals of police of all state governments and union territories and the registrar general of all High
Courts for onwards transmission and ensuring its compliance.
—————

Section 498A, IPC - Misuse
Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar versus Union of India
[2018 SCC Online SC 1501: AIR 2018 SC 4273: 2018 (11) SCALE 191:
2018 (3) Crimes 503]
Dated: 14-09-2018
Directions were given to prevent misuse of Section 498A, IPC. The Bench modified the directions
concerning registration of FIR, arrest and bail as given in a judgement in Rajesh Sharma versus State
of UP. These directions include the following.
y Complaints under Section 498A and other connected offences may be investigated only by a
designated investigating officer of the area.
y If a settlement is reached between the parties, it is open to them to approach the High Court under
Section 482 seeking quashing of proceedings or any other order.
y If a bail application is filed with at least one day’s notice to the public prosecutor or complainant,
the same may be decided as far as possible on the same day. Recovery of disputed dowry items may
not, by itself, be a ground for denial of bail if maintenance or other rights of wife or minor children
can otherwise be protected.
y In respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of Red
Corner Notice should not be a routine.
y These directions will not apply in case of tangible physical injuries or death.
—————
FIR – Power of the High Court to Quash Criminal Proceedings or FIR

State of Haryana versus Ch. Bhajan Lal
[AIR 1992 SC 604: 1990 SCR Supl. (3) 259: 1992 Cri LJ 527: 1992 (3) SCR 735]
Dated: 21-11-1990
Bench: Justice S Pandian
“Supreme Court of India considered the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR.”
The following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a
criminal complaint.
y Where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
y Where the allegations in the FIR and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
y Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused.
y Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a magistrate
as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

y Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based
on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
y Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
y Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
—————
Section 498A, IPC - Misuse

Rajesh Sharma versus State of Uttar Pradesh
Dated: 27-07-2017
Bench: Justices AK Goel and UU Lalit
Directions were issued to regulate the purported misuse of Section 498A, IPC. After careful consideration
of the whole issue, the Court gives the following directions.
(i) (a) In every district one or more Family Welfare Committees be constituted by the District
Legal Services Authorities preferably comprising of three members. The and working of such
committees may be reviewed from time to time and at least once in a year by the district and
sessions judge of the district who is also the chairman of the District Legal Services Authority.
(b) The committees may be constituted out of para legal volunteers/social workers/retired persons/
wives of working officers/other citizens who may be found suitable and willing.
(c) The committee members will not be called as witnesses.
(d) Every complaint under Section 498A received by the police or the magistrate be referred to
and looked into by such committee. Such committee may have interaction with the parties
personally or by means of telephone or any other mode of communication including electronic
communication.
(e) Report of such committee be given to the authority by whom the complaint is referred to it
latest within one month from the date of receipt of complaint.
(f) The committee may give its brief report about the factual aspects and its opinion in the matter.
(g) Till report of the committee is received, no arrest should normally be affected.
(h) The report may be then considered by the investigating officer or magistrate on its own merit.
(i) The members of the committee may be given such basic minimum training as may be considered
necessary by the Legal Services Authority from time to time.
(j) The members of the committee may be given such honorarium as may be considered viable.
(k) It will be open to the district and sessions judge to utilise the cost fund wherever considered
necessary and proper.
(ii) Complaints under Section 498A and other connected offences may be investigated only by a
designated investigating officer of the area. Such designations may be made within one month

from today. Such designated officer may be required to undergo training for such duration (not
less than one week) as may be considered appropriate. The training may be completed within four
months from today.
(iii) In cases where a settlement is reached, it will be open to the district and sessions judge or
any other senior judicial officer nominated by him in the district to dispose of the proceedings
including closing of the criminal case if dispute primarily relates to matrimonial discord.
(iv) If a bail application is filed with at least one clear day’s notice to the public prosecutor or
complainant, the same may be decided as far as possible on the same day. Recovery of disputed
dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail if maintenance or other rights of wife
or minor children can otherwise be protected. Needless to say that in dealing with bail matters,
individual roles, prima facie truth of the allegations, requirement of further arrest or custody and
interest of justice must be carefully weighed.
(v) In respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of Red
Corner Notice should not be a routine.
(vi) It will be open to the district judge or a designated senior judicial officer nominated by the district
judge to club all connected cases between the parties arising out of matrimonial disputes so that
a holistic view is taken by the court to whom all such cases are entrusted.
(vii) Personal appearance of all family members and particularly outstation members may not be
required, and the trial court ought to grant exemption from personal appearance or permit
appearance by video conferencing without adversely affecting progress of the trial.
(viii) These directions will not apply to the offences involving tangible physical injuries or death.
Note: see Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar versus Union of India [2018 SCC 1501], wherein the
above-stated directions were modified.
—————
Arresting and Detaining a Person

DK Basu versus State of West Bengal
[(1997) 1 SCC 416: AIR 1997 SC 610: 1997 Cri LJ 743: 1996 (9) SCALE 298]
Dated: 18-12-1996
Bench: Justices Kuldip Singh and AS Anand
Eleven guidelines were issued by the Supreme Court to be followed in all cases of arrest and detention
till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive measures.
1. Police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear
accurate, visible, and clear identification and name togs with their designations. The particulars of
all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be recorded in a register.
2. That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at
the time of arrest and such memo shall be attested by at least one witness who may be either a
member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest
is made. It shall also be counter signed by the arrestee and shall contain the time and date of
arrest.
3. A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police station or
interrogation centre or other lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other
person known to him or having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that

he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless the attesting witness of
the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a relative of the arrestee.
4. The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the police where
the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the legal aid
organisation in the district and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within a
period of eight to 12 hours after the arrest.
5. The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone informed of his arrest or
detention as soon he is put under arrest or is detained.
6. An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding the arrest of the person
which shall also disclose the name of the next friend of the person who has been informed of the
arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is.
7. The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined at the time of his arrest and major
and minor injuries, if any present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time. The Inspection
Memo must be signed both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy
provided to the arrestee.
8. The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by trained doctor every 48 hours during
his detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health
Services, of the concerned state or union territory. Director, Health Services, should prepare such
a penal for all Tehsils and Districts as well.
9. Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, referred to above, should be sent to the
magistrate for his record.
10. The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the
interrogation.
11. A police control room should be provided at all district and state headquarters, where information
regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer
causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room it should
be displayed on a conspicuous notice board.
Note: it was further stated that “The requirements need to be strictly followed and the same would
apply with equal force to the other governmental agencies also to which a reference has been made
earlier”. These requirements are not detract from various other directions given by the courts from
time to time in connection with the safeguarding of the rights and dignity of the arrestee.
—————
Medical Negligence
Jacob Mathew versus State of Punjab
[(2005) 6 SCC 1: AIR 2005 SC 3180: 2005 (6) SCALE 130: 2005 Cri LJ 3710
Criminal appeal: 144–145 of 2004]
Dated: 05-08-2005
Bench: Justices RC Lahoti, GP Mathur, and PK Balasubramanyan
Highlighted sections of the IPC—Sections 34 and 304A. The Supreme Court noticed that the cases
of doctors (surgeons and physicians) being subjected to criminal prosecution are on an increase.
Sometimes such prosecutions are filed by private complainants and sometimes by police on an FIR
being lodged and cognizance taken. Further it was stated that Statutory Rules of Executive Instructions

incorporating certain guidelines need to be framed and issued by the Government of India and/or the
state governments in consultation with the Medical Council of India. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
laid down the guidelines regarding prosecuting medical professionals as follows.
Absence of knowledge of medical science: the investigating officer and private complainant cannot
always be supposed to have knowledge of medical science so as to determine whether the act of
the accused medical professional amounts to rash or negligent act within the domain of criminal law
under Section 304A of the IPC. The criminal process once initiated subjects the medical professional to
serious embarrassment and sometimes harassment. He has to seek bail to escape arrest, which may
or may not be granted to him.
At the end he may be exonerated by acquittal or discharge but the loss which he has suffered in his
reputation cannot be compensated by any standards. We may not be understood as holding that doctors
can never be prosecuted for an offence of which rashness or negligence is an essential ingredient.
All that we are doing is to emphasise the need for care and caution in the interest of society; for,
the service which the medical profession renders to human beings is probably the noblest of all, and
hence there is a need for protecting doctors from frivolous or unjust prosecutions. Many a complainant
prefers recourse to criminal process as a tool for pressurizing the medical professional for extracting
uncalled for or unjust compensation. Such malicious proceedings have to be guarded against.
Further the Statutory Rules of Executive Instructions incorporating certain guidelines need to be
framed and issued by the Government of India and/or the state governments in consultation with the
Medical Council of India.
A private complaint may not be entertained unless the complainant has produced prima facie evidence
before the Court in the form of a credible opinion given by another competent doctor to support the
charge of rashness or negligence on the part of the accused doctor.
The investigating officer should, before proceeding against the doctor accused of rash or negligent
act or omission, obtain an independent and competent medical opinion preferably from a doctor in
government service qualified in that branch of medical practice that can normally be expected to give
an impartial and unbiased opinion applying Bolam’s test to the facts collected in the investigation.
“No arrest in a routine manner unless the investigation officer feels satisfied.” A doctor accused of
rashness or negligence, may not be arrested in a routine manner (simply because a charge has been
levelled against him). Unless his arrest is necessary for furthering the investigation or for collecting
evidence or unless the investigation officer feels satisfied that the doctor proceeded against would not
make himself available to face the prosecution unless arrested, the arrest may be withheld.
Note: the above-stated guidelines were laid down to prosecute a medical professional for negligence
under criminal law, to govern the prosecution of doctors for offences of which criminal rashness or
criminal negligence is an ingredient.
—————
Arrest and Detention

Joginder Kumar versus State of Uttar Pradesh
[1994 SCC (4) 260: AIR 1994 SC 1349: 1994 Cri LJ 1981: 1994 (3) SCR 661]
Dated: 25-04-1994
Bench: Justice MN Venkatachalliah
Facts and issues of the case: Joginder Kumar, a young lawyer aged 28, was illegally detained over a
period of five days; earlier, he was called to the office of the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP),

Ghaziabad, in connection with some inquiries) A writ of habeas corpus was filed by the family to find
out his whereabouts. Accordingly, the notices were issued to the State of Uttar Pradesh and to the SSP
to immediately produce Joginder Kumar and answer why he was detained for five days without a valid
reason; why his detention was not recorded by the police in its diary; and why he was not produced
before a magistrate.
The Supreme Court issued following guidelines.
1. An arrested person being held in custody is entitled, if he so requests to have one friend, relative
or other person who is known to him or likely to take an interest in his welfare told as far as is
practicable that he has been arrested and where he is being detained.
2. The police officer shall inform the arrested person when he is brought to the police station of this
right.
3. An entry shall be required to be made in the diary as to who was informed of the arrest. These
protections from power must be held to flow from Articles 21 and 22(1) and enforced strictly.
Note: it shall be the duty of the magistrate, before whom the arrested person is produced, to satisfy
himself that these requirements have been complied with. The above-stated guidelines are not
exhaustive but the same shall be followed in all cases of arrest till legal provisions are made in this
behalf.
—————
FIR Registration
Lalita Kumari versus Government of UP
[(2014) 2 SCC 1: 2013 (13) SCALE 559: AIR 2014 SC 187: 2014 Cri LJ 470
WP (Crl) No. 68/2008]
Dated: 12-11-2013
Bench: Justices P Sathasivam, BS Chauhan, Ranjana Prakash Desai, Ranjan Gogoi, and SA Bobde
The Supreme Court issued the following guidelines regarding the registration of FIR. It was held that
“Registration of FIR is mandatory if the information discloses the commission of cognizable offence.”
The guidelines to read as follows.
(i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
(ii) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for
an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is
disclosed or not.
(iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In
cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure
must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose
reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.
(iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed.
Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by
him discloses a cognizable offence.
(v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information
received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.

(vi) As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made
are as under.
(a) Matrimonial or family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay or laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example,
over three months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons
for delay
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant
preliminary inquiry.
(vii) While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry
should be made time bound, and, in any case, it should not exceed seven days. The fact of such
delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the general diary entry.
(viii) Since the general diary or station diary or daily diary is the record of all information received in a
police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in
registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the
said diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned
above.
—————
Witness Protection Scheme, 2018

Mahender Chawla versus Union of India
[2018 SCC Online SC 2679: 2018 (15) SCALE 497: JT 2018 (12) SC 21: 2019 (1) KLT 277]
Dated: 05-12-2018
Bench: Justices AK Sikri and Ashok Bhushan
The Supreme Court directed the Union of India as well as the states and union territories to enforce
the Witness Protection Scheme, 2018. The aim and object of the scheme is to ensure that investigation,
prosecution and trial of criminal case is not prejudiced because the witnesses are intimidated or
frightened to give evidence without protection from violent or other criminal recrimination.
Categories of Witness as per Threat Perception

Category ‘A’: is where the threat extends to life of witness or his family members, during investigation
or trial or thereafter.
Category ‘B’: is where the threat extends to safety, reputation, or property of the witness or his family
members, during the investigation or trial or thereafter.
Category ‘C’: is where the threat is moderate and extends to harassment or intimidation of the witness
or his family member’s, reputation, or property, during the investigation or trial or thereafter.
State Witness Protection Fund

(a) There shall be a fund, namely, the Witness Protection Fund, from which the expenses incurred
during the implementation of the witness Protection Order passed by the competent authority and
other related expenditure, shall be met.

(b) The Witness Protection Fund shall comprise the following.
(i) Budgetary allocation made in the Annual Budget by the state government
(ii) Receipt of amount of costs imposed/ordered to be deposited by the courts or tribunals in the
Witness Protection Fund
(iii) Donations or contributions from charitable institutions or organisations and individuals
permitted by the central government or state governments
(iv) Funds contributed under corporate social responsibility
(c) The said fund shall be operated by the Department or Ministry of Home under the Government of
the State or Union Territory.
The scheme approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the aforesaid judgement reads as
under.
1. Short title and commencement
2. Definitions
3. Categories of witness as per threat perception
4. State witness protection fund
5. Filing of application before competent authority
6. Procedure for processing the application
7. Types of protection measures
8. Monitoring and review
9. Protection of identity
10. Change of identity
11. Relocation of witness
12. Witnesses to be apprised of the scheme
13. Confidentiality and preservation of records
14. Recovery of expenses
15. Review
—————
Death Penalty
Shatrughan Chauhan versus Union of India
[2014 (1) SCR 609: 2014 (1) SCALE 437: 2014 (3) SCC 1: 2014 Cri LJ 1327
Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 55 of 2013]
Dated: 21-01-2014
Bench: Justices P Sathasivam, Ranjan Gogoi, and Shiv Kirti Singh.
The following guidelines were framed for safeguarding the interest of the death row convicts.
1. Solitary confinement: this Court, in the Sunil Batra case, held that solitary or single cell confinement
prior to rejection of the mercy petition by the president is unconstitutional. Almost all prison
manuals provide the necessary rules governing the confinement of death convicts. The rules should
not be interpreted to run counter to the above ruling and violate Article 21 of the Constitution.

2. Legal aid: there is no provision in any of the prison manuals for providing legal aid, for preparing
appeals or mercy petitions or for accessing judicial remedies after the mercy petition has been
rejected. Various judgements of this Court have held that legal aid is a fundamental right under
Article 21. Since this Court has also held that Article 21 rights are applicable till a convict’s last
breath, even after rejection of the mercy petition by the president, the convict can approach a writ
court for commutation of the death sentence on the ground of supervening events, if available,
and challenge the rejection of the mercy petition and legal aid should be provided to the convict
at all stages. Accordingly, superintendents of jails are directed to intimate the rejection of mercy
petitions to the nearest Legal Aid Centre apart from intimating the convicts.
3. Procedure in placing the mercy petition before the president: the Government of India has framed
certain guidelines for disposal of mercy petitions filed by the death convicts after disposal of their
appeal by the Supreme Court. As and when any such petition is received or communicated by the
state government after the rejection by the governor, necessary materials such as police records,
judgement of the trial court, High Court, and Supreme Court and all other connected documents
should be called at once fixing a time limit for the authorities for forwarding the same to the
Ministry of Home Affairs. Even here, though there are instructions, we have come across that in
certain cases the department calls for those records in piece-meal or one by one and in the same
way, the forwarding departments are also not adhering to the procedure or instructions by sending
all the required materials at one stroke. This should be strictly followed to minimise the delay.
After getting all the details, it is for the Ministry of Home Affairs to send the recommendation or
their views to the president within a reasonable and rational time. Even after sending the necessary
particulars, if there is no response from the office of the president, it is the responsibility of the
Ministry of Home Affairs to send periodical reminders and to provide required materials for early
decision.
4. Communication of rejection of mercy petition by the governor: no prison manual has any provision
for informing the prisoner or his family of the rejection of the mercy petition by the governor. Since
the convict has a constitutional right under Article 161 to make a mercy petition to the governor,
he is entitled to be informed in writing of the decision on that mercy petition. The rejection of the
mercy petition by the governor should forthwith be communicated to the convict and his family in
writing or through some other mode of communication available.
5. Communication of rejection of the mercy petition by the president: Many, but not all, prison
manuals have provision for informing the convict and his family members of the rejection of mercy
petition by the president. All states should inform the prisoner and their family members of the
rejection of the mercy petition by the president. Furthermore, even where prison manuals provide
for informing the prisoner of the rejection of the mercy petition, we have seen that this information
is always communicated orally, and never in writing. Since the convict has a constitutional right
under Article 72 to make a mercy petition to the president, he is entitled to be informed in writing
of the decision on that mercy petition. The rejection of the mercy petition by the president should
forthwith be communicated to the convict and his family in writing.
6. Death convicts are entitled as a right to receive a copy of the rejection of the mercy petition by the
president and the governor.
7. Minimum 14-day notice for execution: some prison manuals do not provide for any minimum
period between the rejection of the mercy petition being communicated to the prisoner and his
family and the scheduled date of execution. Some prison manuals have a minimum period of one

day, others have a minimum period of 14 days. It is necessary that a minimum period of 14 days be
stipulated between the receipt of communication of the rejection of the mercy petition and the
scheduled date of execution for the following reasons.
(a) It allows the prisoner to prepare himself mentally for execution, to make his peace with god,
prepare his will and settle other earthly affairs.
(b) It allows the prisoner to have a last and final meeting with his family members. It also allows
the prisoners’ family members to make arrangements to travel to the prison which may be
located at a distant place and meet the prisoner for the last time. Without sufficient notice
of the scheduled date of execution, the prisoners’ right to avail of judicial remedies will be
thwarted and they will be prevented from having a last and final meeting with their families.
It is the obligation of the superintendent of jails to see that the family members of the convict
receive the message of communication of rejection of mercy petition in time.
8. Mental health evaluation: we have seen that in some cases, death-row prisoners lost their mental
balance on account of prolonged anxiety and suffering experienced on death row. There should,
therefore, be regular mental health evaluation of all death row convicts and appropriate medical
care should be given to those in need.
9. Physical and mental health reports: All prison manuals give the prison superintendent the
discretion to stop an execution on account of the convict’s physical or mental ill health. It is,
therefore, necessary that after the mercy petition is rejected and the execution warrant is issued,
the prison superintendent should satisfy himself on the basis of medical reports by government
doctors and psychiatrists that the prisoner is in a fit physical and mental condition to be executed.
If the Superintendent is of the opinion that the prisoner is not fit, he should forthwith stop the
execution, and produce the prisoner before a medical board for a comprehensive evaluation and
shall forward the report of the same to the state government for further action.
10. Furnishing documents to the convict: most death-row prisoners are extremely poor and do not
have copies of their court papers, judgements, etc. These documents are must for preparation
of appeals, mercy petitions and accessing post-mercy judicial remedies which are available to
the prisoner under Article 21 of the Constitution. Since the availability of these documents is a
necessary pre-requisite to the accessing of these rights, it is necessary that copies of relevant
documents should be furnished to the prisoner within a week by the prison authorities to assist
in making mercy petition and petitioning the courts.
11. Final meeting between prisoner and his family: while some prison manuals provide for a final
meeting between a condemned prisoner and his family immediately prior to execution, many
manuals do not. Such a procedure is intrinsic to humanity and justice, and should be followed by
all prison authorities. It is therefore, necessary for prison authorities to facilitate and allow a final
meeting between the prisoner and his family and friends prior to his execution.
12. Post-mortem reports: Although, none of the jail manuals provide for compulsory post mortem
to be conducted on death convicts after the execution, we think in the light of the repeated
arguments by the petitioners herein asserting that there is dearth of experienced hangman in the
country, the same must be made obligatory.
—————

Quashing of Criminal Proceedings on the Ground of
Compromise between the Parties
State of Madhya Pradesh versus Laxmi Narayan
[2019 (4) SCALE 200: 2019 Cri LJ 1862: AIR 2019 SC 1296: 2019 (5) SCC 688
Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2019 with Criminal Appeal No. 350 of 2019]
Dated: 05-03-2019
Bench: Justices AK Sikri, Abdul Nazeer, and MR Shah
“While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect
of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on
society, on the ground that there is a settlement or compromise between the victim and the offender,
the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused,
namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with
the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.”
The Supreme Court has issued the following guidelines.
1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings
for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial
transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties
have resolved the entire dispute among themselves.
2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the
offender.
4. Offences under Section 307, IPC, and the Arms Act, etc., would fall in the category of heinous
and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against
the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307,
IPC, and/or the Arms Act, etc., which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in
exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved
their entire dispute among themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely
because there is a mention of Section 307, IPC, in the FIR or the charge is framed under this
provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307, IPC, is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if
proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307, IPC, For this purpose, it would be
open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on
the vital or delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by
the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the
chargesheet is filed or charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible
when the matter is still under investigation;
5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in
respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious

impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement or compromise between the victim and
the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct
of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he
had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.
Relevant cases: Narinder Singh versus State of Punjab [(2014) 6 SCC 466]; State of Rajasthan versus
Shambhu Kewat [(2014) 4 SCC 149]; Parbatbhai Aahir versus State of Gujarat [(2017) 9 SCC 641].
—————
Powers under Section 482

Narinder Singh versus State of Punjab
[2014 (4) SCALE 195: 2014 (6) SCC 466: 2014 Cri LJ 2436: 2014 (137) AIC 1
Criminal Appeal No. 686/2014, SLP (Criminal) No. 9547 of 2013]
Dated: 27-03-2014
Bench: Justices KS Radhakrishnan and AK Sikri
“Offences under Section 307, IPC, fall in the category of heinous and serious crimes and are generally
treated as crimes against the society.”
The Supreme Court observed that the High Court should examine whether there is a strong possibility
of conviction or not.
Certain principles were laid down by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment
to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while
accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with
direction to continue with the criminal proceedings.
I. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies
in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section
482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in
those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between
themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
II. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two
objectives.
III. Such a power is not exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature
and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under
special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely based on compromise between the
victim and the offender.
IV. On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship
or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among
themselves.

V. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction
is remote and bleak, and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
VI. Offences under Section 307, IPC, would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual
alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307, IPC, in the FIR, or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the
High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307, IPC, is there for the sake of it
or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the
charge under Section 307, IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital or delegate parts of the
body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim
can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can
examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction, or the chances of conviction
are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the
criminal proceedings, while in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept
the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this
stage, the court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going
to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.
VII. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of
settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after
the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may
be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings or investigation. It is
because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the chargesheet has
not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or
the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers
favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances or material mentioned above.
On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of
the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a
position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307, IPC, is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is
already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court,
mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in
acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here, charge is proved
under Section 307, IPC, and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime, and therefore, there
is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.
—————

Sexual Harassment at Workplace
Vishaka versus State of Rajasthan
[AIR 1997 SC 3011: (1997) 6 SCC 241: 1997 (5) SCALE 453: 1997 SCR 404]
Dated: 13-08-1997
Bench: Justices Sujata V Manohar and BN Kirpal
The court directed that below stated guidelines and norms would be strictly observed in all work
places for the preservation and enforcement of the right to gender equality of the working women.
These directions would be binding and enforceable in law until suitable legislation is enacted to
occupy the field.
The guidelines and norms prescribed herein are as under.
It was found necessary and expedient for employers in workplaces as well as other responsible persons
or institutions to observe certain guidelines to ensure the prevention of sexual harassment of women.
1. Duty of the employer or other responsible persons in workplaces and other institutions: it shall
be the duty of the employer or other responsible persons in work places or other institutions to
prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for
the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment by taking all steps required.
2. Definition: for this purpose, sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually determined
behaviour (whether directly or by implication) as:
(a) physical contact and advances;
(b) a demand or request for sexual favours;
(c) sexually coloured remarks;
(d) showing pornography;
(e) any other unwelcome physical verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature.
Where any of these acts is committed in circumstances where under the victim of such conduct
has a reasonable apprehension that in relation to the victim’s employment or work whether
she is drawing salary or honourarium or voluntary, whether in government, public, or private
enterprise such conduct can be humiliating and may constitute a health and safety problem.
It is discriminatory for instance when the woman has reasonable grounds to believe that her
objection would disadvantage her in connection with her employment or work including recruiting
or promotion or when it creates a hostile work environment. Adverse consequences might be
visited if the victim does not consent to the conduct in question or raises any objection thereto.
3. Preventive steps: all employers or persons in charge of workplace whether in the public or private
sector should take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment. Without prejudice to the
generality of this obligation they should take the following steps.
(a) Express prohibition of sexual harassment as defined above at the workplace should be notified,
published and circulated in appropriate ways.
(b) The rules or regulations of government and public sector bodies relating to conduct and
discipline should include rules or regulations prohibiting sexual harassment and provide for
appropriate penalties in such rules against the offender.
(c) As regards private employers’ steps should be taken to include the aforesaid prohibitions in
the standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.

(d) Appropriate work conditions should be provided in respect of work, leisure, health and hygiene
to further ensure that there is no hostile environment towards women at workplaces and no
employee woman should have reasonable grounds to believe that she is disadvantaged in
connection with her employment.
4. Criminal proceedings: where such conduct amounts to a specific offence under the IPC or under
any other law the employer shall initiate appropriate action in accordance with law by making a
complaint with the appropriate authority.
In particular, it should ensure that victims, or witnesses are not victimised or discriminated against
while dealing with complaints of sexual harassment. The victims of sexual harassment should have
the option to seek transfer of the perpetrator or their own transfer.
5. Disciplinary action: where such conduct amounts to misconduct in employment as defined by
the relevant service rules, appropriate disciplinary action should be initiated by the employer in
accordance with those rules.
6. Complaint mechanism: whether or not such conduct constitutes an offence under law or a breach
of the service rules, an appropriate complaint mechanism should be created in the employer’s
organisation for redress of the complaint made by the victim. Such complaint mechanism should
ensure time bound treatment of complaints.
7. Complaints Committee: the complaint mechanism, referred to in (6) above, should be adequate to
provide, where necessary, a Complaints Committee, a special counsellor or other support service,
including the maintenance of confidentiality.
The Complaints Committee should be headed by a woman and not less than half of its member
should be women.
Further, to prevent the possibility of any under pressure or influence from senior levels, such
Complaints Committee should involve a third party, either NGO or other body who is familiar with
the issue of sexual harassment.
The Complaints Committee must make an annual report to the government department concerned
of the complaints and action taken by them. The employers and person in charge will also report
on the compliance with the aforesaid guidelines including on the reports of the Complaints
Committee to the government department.
8. Workers’ initiative: employees should be allowed to raise issues of sexual harassment at workers
meeting and in other appropriate forum and it should be affirmatively discussed in employer–
employee meetings.
9. Awareness: awareness of the rights of female employees in this regard should be created in
particular by prominently notifying the guidelines (and appropriate legislation when enacted on the
subject) in suitable manner.
10. Where sexual harassment occurs as a result of an act or omission by any third party or outsider,
the employer and person in charge will take all steps necessary and reasonable to assist the
affected person in terms of support and preventive action.
11. The central government or state governments are requested to consider adopting suitable measures
including legislation to ensure that the guidelines laid down by this order are also observed by
employers in the private sector.
12. These guidelines will not prejudice any rights available under the Protection of Human Rights Act,
1993.
—————

Legal Maxims
y Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea means the act does not constitute guilt unless done with a
guilt intent or the act alone does not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so.
y Actus me invito factus non est mens actus means an act done by me against my will is not my act.
y Crimen trahit personam means the crime carries the person.
y Communis hostis omnium means they are common enemies of all.
y De minimis non curat lex means law does not notice trifles.
y Doli incapax means incapable of understanding what is right and what is wrong.
y Doli capax means capable of understanding what is right and what is wrong.
y Ignorantia fact excusat means ignorance of fact is excusable.
y Ignorantia juris non excusat means ignorance of law is not excusable.
y Necessitas non habet legem means necessity knows no law.
y Furiosis furore suo punier means a madman is best punished by his own madness.
y Furiosis nulla voluntas est means a mad man has no will.
y Furiosis absentis loco est means a madman is like one who is absent.
y Qui peccat ebrius luat sobrius means let him sins when drunk be punished when sober.
y Volenti non fit injuria means one who consents suffers no injury.
y Respondeat superior means let the principal answer.
—————
Words and Phrases: Legally Defined
Act of Counterfeiting
Counterfeit is a process by which one thing is caused to resemble another thing. It supposes that
there is an original. The act of counterfeiting is the effect of producing another so as to resemble the
original and the object of which is to practise deception on knowing it to be likely that the deception
will thereby be practised. In other words, counterfeit does not connote an exact reproduction of the
original counterfeited. The difference between the counterfeit and the original is not therefore limited
to a difference existing only by reason of faulty reproduction. For the purpose of the Code there can
be counterfeiting even though the imitation is not exact and though there are differences in detail
between the original and the imitation so long as the resemblance is so closed that the deception
may thereby be practised. The pith of the offence under Section 489A, IPC, is that it is not necessary
to show the deception actually took place rather the intention to practice deception by causing one
thing to resemble another is quite sufficient and the counterfeit must be of such a character that it
would be possible to palm it of as genuine; [Golo Mandla Ram Rao versus State of Jharkhand (2004
Cri LJ 1738)].
Actus non reum facit nisi mens sit rea

Act does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intention. Section 84 of the IPC embodies
the fundamental maxim of criminal law, i.e., actus non reum facit nisi mens sit rea (an act does not
constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intention).

In order to constitute an offence, the intent and act must concur; but in the case of insane persons,
no culpability is fastened on them as they have no free will (furios is nulla voluntas est); [Siddhapal
Kamala Yadav versus State of Maharashtra {Criminal Appeal No. 1602 of 2008: SLP (Crl.) No. 509 of
2008}].
Common Intention
Common intention implies prearranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the prearranged plan.
Under this Section a pre-concert in the sense of a distinct previous plan is not necessary to be proved.
The common intention to bring about a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a
number of persons, with reference to the facts of the case and circumstances of the situation. Though
common intention may develop on the spot, it must, however, be anterior in point of time to the
commission of offence showing a prearranged plan and prior concert; See Krishna Govind Patil versus
State of Maharashtra [AIR 1963 SC 1413].
In Amrit Singh versus State of Punjab [1972 Cri LJ 465 (SC)], it has been held that common intention
pre-supposes prior concert. Care must be taken not to confuse same or similar intention with common
intention; the partition which divides their bonds is often very thin, nevertheless the distinction is real
and substantial, and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice. To constitute common intention,
it is necessary that intention of each one of them be known to the rest of them and shared by them.
Undoubtedly, it is a difficult thing to prove even the intention of an individual and, therefore, it is all
the more difficult to show the common intention of a group of persons. But however difficult may be
the task, the prosecution must lead evidence of facts, circumstances and conduct of the accused from
which their common intention can be safely gathered.
In Magsogdan versus State of UP [AIR 1988 SC 126], it was observed that prosecution must lead
evidence from which the common intention of the accused can be safely gathered. In most cases it
has to be inferred from the act, conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case in hand. The
totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at a conclusion whether the
accused had a common intention to commit offence for which they can be convicted. The facts and
circumstances of cases vary and each case has to be decided keeping in view of the facts involved.
Whether an act is in furtherance of the common intention is an incident of fact and not of law.
In Bhaba Nanda Barma versus State of Assam [AIR 1977 SC 2252], it was observed that prosecution
must prove facts to justify an inference that all participants of the acts had shared a common intention
to commit the criminal act which was finally committed by one or more of the participants. Mere
presence of a person at the time of commission of an offence by his confederates is not, in itself
sufficient to bring his case within the purview of Section 34, unless community of designs is proved
against him; See Malkhan versus State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1975 SC 12].
Furtherance
In the Oxford English Dictionary, the word ‘furtherance’ is defined as “action of helping forward”.
Adopting this definition, Russel says that “it indicates some kind of aid or assistance producing an
effect in future” and adds that any act may be regarded as done in furtherance of the ultimate felony
if it is a step intentionally taken, for the purpose of effecting that felony (Russel on Crime 12th Edn. Vol.
I pp. 487 and 488).
In Shankarlal Kacharabhai versus State of Gujarat [AIR 1965 SC 1260], the court has interpreted the
word ‘furtherance’ as ‘advancement or promotion’; [Dani Singh versus State of Bihar {(2004) 13 SCC
203}].

Common Object
Common object is different from common intention, as it does not require a prior concert and a
common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough if each has the same object in view and their
number is five or more and that they act as an assembly to achieve that object.
The common object of an assembly is to be ascertained from the acts and language of the members
composing it, and from a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. It may be gathered from
the course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly.
What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage of the incident is essentially
a question of fact to be determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by the
members, and the behaviour of the members at or near the scene of the incident. It is not necessary
under law that in all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common object, the same must be
translated into action or be successful. Under the Explanation to Section 141, an assembly which was
not unlawful when it was assembled, may subsequently become unlawful. It is not necessary that
the intention or the purpose, which is necessary to render an assembly an unlawful one comes into
existence at the outset. The time of forming an unlawful intent is not material. An assembly which, at
its commencement or even for some time thereafter, is lawful, may subsequently become unlawful.
In other words, it can develop during the course of incident at the spot eo instanti; [Dani Singh versus
State of Bihar {(2004) 13 SCC 203}].
Consent
The concept and dimensions of consent in the context of Section 375, IPC, has been viewed from
different angles. The decided cases on the issue reveal different approaches which may not necessarily
be dichotomous. Of course, the ultimate conclusion depends on the facts of each case. The IPC does
not define consent in positive terms, but what cannot be regarded as consent under the Code is
explained by Section 90. Section 90 reads as follows.
Consent known to be given under fear or misconception. A consent is not such a consent as is
intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a
misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows or has reason to believe, that the consent
was given in consequence of such fear or misconception.
Consent given firstly under fear of injury and secondly under a misconception of fact is not consent
at all. That is what is enjoined by the first part of Section 90. These two grounds specified in Section
90 are analogous to coercion and mistake of fact which are the familiar grounds that can vitiate a
transaction under the jurisprudence of our country as well as other countries.
The factors set out in the first part of Section 90 are from the point of view of the victim. The
second part of Section 90 enacts the corresponding provision from the point of view of the accused.
It envisages that the accused too has knowledge or has reason to believe that the consent was given
by the victim in consequence of fear of injury or misconception of fact. Thus, the second part lays
emphasis on the knowledge or reasonable belief of the person who obtains the tainted consent. The
requirements of both the parts should be cumulatively satisfied. In other words, the Court has to see
whether the person giving the consent had given it under fear of injury or misconception of fact and
the Court should also be satisfied that the person doing the act, i.e., the alleged offender, is conscious
of the fact or should have reason to think that but for the fear or misconception, the consent would
not have been given. This is the scheme of Section 90 which is couched in negative terminology.
Section 90 cannot, however be construed as an exhaustive definition of consent for the purposes

of the IPC. The normal connotation and concept of consent is not intended to be excluded. Various
decisions of the High Court and of this Court have not merely gone by the language of Section 90,
but travelled a wider field, guided by the etymology of the word ‘consent’. In most of the decisions in
which the meaning of the expression ‘consent’ under the IPC was discussed, reference was made to
the passages occurring in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Jowitt’s Dictionary on English Law, Words and
Phrases Permanent Edition, and other legal dictionaries. Stroud defines consent as “an act of reason,
accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side”.
Jowitt, while employing the same language added that “Consent supposes three things a physical
power, a mental power and a free and serious use of them. Hence it is that if consent be obtained
by intimidation, force, mediated imposition, circumvention, surprise, or undue influence, it is to be
treated as a delusion, and not as a deliberate and free act of the mind”; Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar
versus State of Bihar [(2005) 1 SCC 88 (97): 2004 AIR SCW 6479], also see Pradeep Kumar @ Pradeep
Kumar versus State of Bihar [SLP (Crl.) No. 3072 of 2006: Appeal (Crl.) 1086 of 2007].
Counterfeiting
Section 28 defines the word ‘counterfeiting’ in very wide terms. The main ingredients of counterfeiting
as laid down in Section 28 are: (1) causing one thing to resemble another thing, (2) intending by means
of that resemblance to practise deception, or (3) knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby
be practised. Thus, if one thing is made to resemble another thing and the intention is that by such
resemblance deception would be practised or even if there is no intention but it is known to be likely
that the resemblance is such that deception will thereby be practised there is counterfeiting.
Counterfeit in Section 28 does not connote an exact reproduction of the original counterfeited.
Explanation 2 of Section 28 is of great significance. It lays down a rebuttable presumption where
resemblance is such that a person might be deceived thereby; K Hashim versus State of Tamil Nadu
[Appeal (Crl.) 185 of 2004: 187 of 2004].
Court
The word ‘court’ was not defined in the Act and the expression ‘courts subordinate to the High Courts’
would prima facie mean the courts of law subordinate to the High Courts in the hierarchy of courts
established for the purpose of administration of justice throughout the Union. It would be relevant,
however, to notice the definitions of ‘court’ available elsewhere.
Coke on Littleton and Stroud defined the word ‘court’ as the place where justice is judicially administered.
According to Stephen, “In every court, there must be at least three constituent parts—the actor, reus,
and judex; the actor or plaintiff, who complains of an injury done; the reus, or defendant, who is called
upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex, or judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the
fact, and to determine the law arising upon that fact, and if any injury appears to have been done, to
ascertain, and by its officers to apply, the remedy”.
The word ‘court’ is not defined in the Contempt of Courts Act and the expression ‘courts subordinate
to the High Courts’ in Section 3(1) would prima facie mean the courts of law subordinate to the High
Courts in hierarchy of courts established for the purpose of administration of justice throughout the
Union. The definition of ‘court’ in Section 3 of the Evidence Act is not exhaustive but framed only
for the purpose of that Act and is not to be extended where such an extension is not warranted;
Brajnandan Sinha versus Jyoti Narain [AIR 1956 SC 66: 1955 (2) SCR 955].
Court, according to Halsbury’s Laws of England (Third Edition Vol. 9) at p. 342, is “Originally the term
‘court’ meant, among other meanings, the Sovereign’s palace; it has acquired the meaning of the

place where justice is administered and, further, has come to mean the persons who exercise judicial
functions under authority derived either immediately or mediately from the Sovereign. All tribunals,
however, are not courts, in the sense in which the term is here employed, namely to denote such
tribunals as exercise jurisdiction over persons by reason of the sanction of the law, and not merely
by reason of voluntary submission to their jurisdiction”; Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha versus Sitamarhi
Central Co-operative [AIR 1967 SC 1494: 1967 (3) SCR 163].
Criminal Conspiracy
When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,—(1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is
not illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy.
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal
conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement
in pursuance thereof.
The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been stated to be (a) an object to be accomplished, (b)
a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish the object, (c) an agreement or understanding
between two or more of the accused persons whereby, they become definitely committed to cooperate
for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual
means, and (d) in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act. The essence of a criminal
conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination is
framed. From this, it necessarily follows that unless the statute so requires, no overt act need be done
in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the object of the combination need not be accomplished,
in order to constitute an indictable offence. Encouragement and support which co-conspirators give
to one another rendering enterprises possible which, if left to individual effort, would have been
impossible, furnish the ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. The
conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any
member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design; K Hashim versus State of Tamil
Nadu [Appeal (Crl.) 185 of 2004: 187 of 2004].
Culpable Homicide
In the scheme of the IPC, culpable homicide is genus and murder its specie. All murder is culpable
homicide but not vice versa. Speaking generally, culpable homicide sans special characteristics of
murder is “Culpable homicide not amounting to murder”. For the purpose of fixing punishment,
proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of
culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the
gravest form of culpable homicide which is defined in Section 300 as murder. The second may be
termed as ‘Culpable homicide of the second degree’. This is punishable under the first part of Section
304. Then, there is ‘Culpable homicide of the third degree’. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide
and the punishment provided for it is, also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three
grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.
The academic distinction between murder and ‘Culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ has vexed
the courts for more than a century. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope
and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn
into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these
provisions seems to be to keep in focus the key words used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and
300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between

the two offences; State of Andhra Pradesh versus Rayavarapu Punnayya [AIR 1977 SC 45: 1977 (1) SCR
601].
Culpable Rashness and Culpable Negligence

Holloway J said “Culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal
consequences may follow, but with the hope that they will not, and often with the belief that the
actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening. The imputability arises from acting
despite the consciousness. Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal
and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised
the caution incumbent upon him and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The
imputability arises from the negligence of the civic duty of circumspection”; Nidamorti Nagabhusanam
case [7 Mad HCR 119], also see Rathnashalvan versus State of Karnataka [2007 (1) JCC 601: 2007 ACJ
782: 2007 (2) Crimes 51].
Custody
(a) The term ‘custody’ appears in a number of enactments. However, we are not giving an exhaustive
list of the provisions of enactments containing the said expression ‘custody’. In Sections 439, 442,
and 451 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Section 223 of the IPC, Sections 26 and 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act, Section 45 of the Customs Act, 1962, and Sections 19(c), 25(b) and (c), 29(2) and (3),
and 40 of the Tamil Nadu Children Act, etc., the said term is used. However, it may be noted that
the said word is not defined in any of these enactments.
(b) The meaning of the term ‘custody’ is given in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, as follows.
“1. Safe-keeping, protection, charge, care, guardianship.
2. The keeping of an officer of justice, confinement, imprisonment, durance.
3. Guardianship.”
(c) In Webster’s Third International Dictionary, Vol. I, at page 559, the word ‘custody’ is given the
following meanings.
1.a. The act or duty of guarding and preserving, safe-keeping
b. Judicial or penal safe-keeping, control of a thing or person with such actual or constructive
possession as fulfils the purpose of the law or duty requiring it; imprisonment or durance
of persons or charge of things. “The term ‘custody’ implies and signifies various meanings
dependent upon the context in which the term is used.”
(d) Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 25, at page 69, when it is applied to persons, it implies restraint
and may or may not imply physical force sufficient to restrain depending on the circumstances
and with reference to persons charged with crime, it has been defined as meaning on actual
confinement or the present means of enforcing it, the detention of the person contrary to his will.
Applied to things, it means to have a charge or safe-keeping, and connotes control and includes
as well, although it does not require, the element of physical or manual possession, implying a
temporary physical control merely and responsibility for the protection and preservation of the
thing in custody. So used, the word does not connote dominion or supremacy of authority. The said
term has been defined as meaning the keeping, guarding, care, watch, inspection, preservation, or
security of a thing, and carries with it the idea of the thing being within the immediate personal
care and control of the prisoner to whose custody it is subjected; charge; charge to keep, subject
to order or direction; immediate charge and control and not the final absolute control of ownership.

Therefore, it is clear that we have to take the meaning of the term ‘custody’ with reference to the
context in which it is used.
Black’s Law Dictionary also defines ‘custody’ as the care and control of a thing or person. The keeping,
guarding, care, watch, inspection, preservation, or security of a thing, carrying with it the idea of the
thing being within the immediate personal care and control of the person to whose custody it is
subjected Immediate charge and control, and not the final, absolute control of ownership, implying
responsibility for the protection and preservation of the thing in custody; Roxann Sharma versus Arun
Sharma [2015 (8) SCC 318].
In Black’s Law Dictionary by Henry Campbell Black, MA (Sixth Edn), the expression ‘custody’ has been
explained in the following manner.
The term is very elastic and may mean actual imprisonment or physical detention within statute requiring
that petitioner be ‘in custody’ to be entitled to federal habeas corpus relief does not necessarily man
actual physical detention in jail or prison but rather is synonymous with restraint of liberty.
In Black’s Law Dictionary, the said expression has been explained as follows: move: to make an
application to a court for a rule or order, or to take action in any matter. The term comprehends all
things necessary to be done by a litigant to obtain an order of the court directing the relief sought;
Sunita Devi versus State of Bihar [2004 Supp (6) SCR 707].
The terms ‘custody’, ‘detention’, or ‘arrest’ have not been defined in the CrPC, and one must resort to
few dictionaries to appreciate their contours in ordinary and legal parlance.
The Oxford Dictionary (Online) defines custody as imprisonment, detention, confinement, incarceration,
internment, captivity, remand, duress, and durance. The Cambridge Dictionary (Online) explains
‘custody’ as the state of being kept in prison, especially while waiting to go to court for trial.
Longman Dictionary (Online) defines ‘custody’ as “when someone is kept in prison until they go to
court, because the police think they have committed a crime”.
Chambers Dictionary (Online) clarifies that custody is “the condition of being held by the police; arrest
or imprisonment; to take someone into custody to arrest them”. Chambers’ Thesaurus supplies several
synonyms, such as detention, confinement, imprisonment, captivity, arrest, formal incarceration.
The Collins Corbulid English Dictionary for Advance Learners states in terms of that someone who is
in custody or has been taken into custody or has been arrested and is being kept in prison until they
get tried in a court or if someone is being held in a particular type of custody, they are being kept in a
place that is similar to a prison.
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary postulates the presence of confinement, imprisonment, durance,
and this feature is totally absent in the factual matrix before us.
Corpus Juris Secundum under the topic of “Escape and Related Offenses; Rescue” adumbrates that
“Custody, within the meaning of statutes defining the crime, consists of the detention or restraint of
a person against his will, or of the exercise of control over another to confine the other person within
certain physical limits or a restriction of ability or freedom of movement”.
As per Black’s Law Dictionary, (9th Edn 2009), custody is “The care and control of a thing or person. The
keeping, guarding, care, watch, inspection, preservation, or security of a thing, carrying with it the idea
of the thing being within the immediate personal care and control of the person to whose custody it
is subjected. Immediate charge and control, and not the final, absolute control of ownership, implying
responsibility for the protection and preservation of the thing in custody. The detainer of a man’s
person by virtue of lawful process or authority”.

The term is very elastic and may mean actual imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal
or physical, of imprisoning or of taking manual possession. The term ‘custody’ within statute requiring
that petitioner be ‘in custody’ to be entitled to federal habeas corpus relief does not necessarily mean
actual physical detention in jail or prison but rather is synonymous with restraint of liberty. US ex rel.
Wirtz versus Sheehan [DC Wis, 319 F Supp. 146, 147]. Accordingly, persons on probation or released
on own recognisance have been held to be ‘in custody’ for purposes of habeas corpus proceedings;
Sundeep Kumar Bafna versus State of Maharashtra [2014 AIOL 181: 2014 (2) Crimes 161 (SC)].
Habitual
In the IPC and the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981, the word ‘habitually’ connotes some degree
of frequency and continuity. ‘Habitually’ requires a continuance and permanence of some tendency,
something that has developed into a propensity, i.e., present from day-to-day; Stroud’s Judicial
Dictionary, 4th Edn, Vol. 2, p. 1204.
According to its ordinary meaning, the word ‘habitual’ as given in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,
Vol. 1, p. 910 is: “A. adj. (1) Belonging to the habit or inward disposition, inherent or latent in the mental
constitution; (2) of the nature of a habit; fixed by habit; constantly repeated, customary. B. A habitual
criminal, drunkard, etc.”.
A person is a habitual criminal who by force of habit or inward disposition, inherent or latent in him,
has grown accustomed to lead a life of crime. It is the force of habit inherent or latent in an individual
with a criminal instinct, with a criminal disposition of mind, that makes him dangerous to the society
in general. In strengthen language the word ‘habitually’ means ‘by force of habit’; Vijay Narain Singh
versus State of Bihar [AIR 1984 SC 1334: 1984 (3) SCR 435].
The word ‘habitual’ means constant, customary, or addicted to a special habit. The word ‘habit’ means
settled tendency or practise; physical constitution. It applies to a tendency or capacity resulting from
frequent repetition of the same acts; Vijay Narain Singh versus State of Bihar [1984 (3) SCC], also see
Deepak Khosla versus Montreaux Resorts Pvt. Ltd [Letters Patent Appeal No. 16/2012].
In Prosecution of Common Object

The expression ‘in prosecution of common object’ as appearing in Section 149 have to be strictly
construed as equivalent to “in order to attain the common object”. It must be immediately connected
with the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There must be community of object and
the object may exist only up to a particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of an unlawful assembly
may have community of object up to certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects and
the knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their
common object may vary not only according to the information at his command, but also according
to the extent to which he shares the community of object, and as a consequence of this the effect of
Section 149, IPC, may be different on different members of the same assembly.
Knew
The word ‘knew’ used in the second limb of the Section implies something more than a possibility
and it cannot be made to bear the sense of ‘might have been known’. Positive knowledge is necessary.
When an offence is committed in prosecution of the common object, it would generally be an offence
which the members of the unlawful assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of the
common object. That, however, does not make the converse proposition true; there may be cases
which would come within the second part but not within the first particle The distinction between

the two parts of Section 149 cannot be ignored or obliterated. In every case it would be an issue to be
determined, whether the offence committed falls within the first part, or it was an offence such as the
members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object and
falls within the second particle However, there may be cases which would be within the first part but
offences committed in prosecution of the common object would also be generally, if not always, be
within the second part, namely, offences which the parties knew to be likely to be committed in the
prosecution of the common object; Sunil Kumar versus State of Rajasthan [2005 Cri LJ 1402: 2005 AIR
SCW 589: JT 2005 (2) SC 1: 2005 (1) AICLR 360].
Modesty
The word ‘modesty’ has not been defined in the IPC. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
(Third Edition) modesty is the quality of being modest and in relation to woman means “womanly
propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech, and conduct”. The word ‘modest’ in
relation to woman is defined in the above dictionary as “decorous in manner and conduct; not forward
or lewd; shame fast”.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English language defines modesty as “freedom from
coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for propriety in dress, speech, or conduct”.
In the Oxford English Dictionary (1933 Edn) the meaning of the word ‘modesty’ is given as “womanly
propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reserve
or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions”; Rupan Deol
Bajajversus Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [AIR 1996 SC 309: 1995 (6) SCC 194].
Negligence
Negligence in common parlance mean and imply failure to exercise due care, expected of a reasonable
prudent person. It is a breach of duty and negligence in law ranging from inadvertence to shameful
disregard of safety of others. In most instances, it is caused by heedlessness or inadvertence, by which
the negligent party is unaware of the results which may follow from his act.
Negligence is thus a breach of duty or lack of proper care in doing something, in short, it is want of
attention and doing of something which a prudent and a reasonable man would not do (vide Black’s Law
Dictionary). Though, sometimes, the word ‘inadvertence’ stands and used as a synonym to negligence,
but in effect negligence represents a state of the mind which however is much serious in nature
than mere inadvertence. There is thus existing a differentiation between the two expressions, while
inadvertence is a milder form of negligence. Negligence by itself means and imply a state of mind
where there is no regard for duty or the supposed care and attention which one ought to bestow.
Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (18th Edn) sets out four several requirements of the tort of negligence and
the same reads as: (1) the existence in law of a duty of care situation, i.e., one in which the law attaches
liability to carelessness. There has to be recognition by law that the careless infliction of the kind of
damage in suit on the class of person to which the claimant belongs by the class of person to which
the defendant belongs is actionable; (2) breach of the duty of care by the defendant, i.e., that it failed
to measure up to the standard set by law; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s careless
conduct and the damage; (4) that the particular kind of damage to the particular claimant is not so
unforeseeable as to be too remote; MS Grewal versus Deep Chand Sood [AIR 2001 SC 3660: 2001 (8)
SCC 151].

Presume
In Black’s Law Dictionary, it has been defined to mean “to believe or accept upon probable evidence”.
In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, it has been mentioned that in law ‘presume’ means “to take as
proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming”. Stroud’s Legal Dictionary has quoted in this
context a certain judgement according to which “A presumption is a probable consequence drawn
from facts (either certain or proved by direct testimony) as to the truth of a fact alleged”; State of
Maharashtra versus Som Nath Thapa [AIR 1996 SC 1744: 1996 (4) SCC 659].
Punishment for Murder, Rarest of Rare Case

Pre-planned, calculated, cold-blooded murder has always been regarded as one of an aggravated kind.
If a murder is “diabolically conceived and cruelly executed”, it would justify the imposition of the death
penalty on the murderer.
1. The extreme penalty can be inflicted only in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
2. In making choice of the sentence, in addition to the circumstances of the offence, due regard must
be paid to the circumstances of the offender also.
a. The normal rule is that the offence of murder shall be punished with the sentence of life
imprisonment. The court can depart from that rule and impose the sentence of death only
if there are special reasons for doing so. Such reasons must be recorded in writing before
imposing the death sentence.
b. While considering the question of sentence to be imposed for the offence of murder under
Section 302, IPC; the court must have regard to every relevant circumstance relating to the
crime as well as the criminal. If the court finds, but not otherwise, that the offence is of an
exceptionally depraved and heinous character and constitutes, on account of its design and
the manner of its execution, a source of grave danger to the society at large, the court may
impose the death sentence; Bachan Singh versus State of Punjab [(1980) 2 SCC 684: AIR 1980
SC 898], also see Jagmohan Singh versus State of UP [AIR 1973 SC 947: 1973 Cri LJ 370].
Ransom
The term ‘ransom’ has not been defined in the Code. As a noun, ransom means “a sum of money
demanded or paid for the release of a captive”. As a verb, ransom means “to obtain the release of
(someone) by paying a ransom”, “detain (someone) and demand a ransom for his release”. ‘To hold
someone to ransom’ means “to hold someone captive and demand payment for his release” (Concise
Oxford English Dictionary, 2002; p. 1186).
Kidnapping for ransom is an offence of unlawfully seizing a person and then confining the person
usually in a secrete place, while attempting to extort ransom. This grave crime is sometimes made a
capital offence. In addition to the abductor a person who acts as a go between to collect the ransom
is generally considered guilty of the crime.
According to Advanced Law Lexicon, (3rd Edn, p. 3932), “Ransom is a sum of money paid for redeeming
a captive or prisoner of war, or a prize. It is also used to signify a sum of money paid for the pardoning
of some great offence and or setting the offender who was imprisoned”.
Stated simply, ransom is a sum of money to be demanded to be paid for releasing a captive, prisoner
or detenu; Suman Sood @ Kamal Jeet Kaur versus State of Rajasthan [JT 2007 (9) SC 453: 2007 (7)
SCALE 312: 2007 (5) SCC 634].

Rashness and Criminal Rashness
Rashness means doing an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil consequences will follow but
with the hope that it will not. Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law.
Criminal rashness means hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is dangerous
or wanton and the further knowledge that it may cause injury but done without any intention to cause
injury or knowledge that it would probably be caused; Rathnashalvan versus State of Karnataka [2007
(1) JCC 601: 2007 ACJ 782: 2007 (2) Crimes 51].
Sedition
Sedition is a crime against society, nearly allied to that of treason, and it frequently precedes treason by
short interval. Sedition in itself is a comprehensive term, and it embraces all those practices, whether
by word, deed or writing, which are calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the State, and lead ignorant
persons to endeavour to subvert the government and the laws of the empire. The objects of sedition
generally are to induce discontent and insurrection and stir up opposition to the government and bring
the administration of justice into contempt; and the very tendency of sedition is to incite the people to
insurrection and rebellion. Sedition has been described, as disloyalty in action and the law considers
as sedition all those practices which have for their object to excite discontent or dissatisfaction, to
create public disturbance, or to lead to civil war; to bring into hatred or contempt the sovereign or
the government, the laws or constitution of the realm, and generally all endeavours to promote public
disorder; Kedar Nath Singh versus State of Bihar [AIR 1962 SC 955: 1962 SCR Supp (2) 769].
Sodomy
The word is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Edn) to mean “A carnal copulation by human beings
with each other against nature, or with a beast”; State versus Young [140 Or. 228, 13 P. 2d 604,
607]. Sodomy is oral or anal copulation between persons who are not husband and wife or between
consenting adult members of the opposite sex, or between a person and an animal, or coitus with an
animal.
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines the word ‘sodomy’ to mean “An unnatural form of sexual
intercourse, especially that of one male with another”; Anil Kumar Mahsi versus Union of India [1994 (5)
SCC 704: JT 1994 (4) SC 409].
Soon before Her Death

The words ‘soon before her death’ occurring in Section 304B of the IPC are to be understood in a
relative and flexible sense. Those words cannot be construed as laying down a rigid period of time
to be mechanically applied in each case. Whether or not the cruelty or harassment meted out to the
victim for or in connection with the demand of dowry was soon before her death and the proximate
cause of her death, under abnormal circumstances, would depend upon the facts of each case. There
can be no fixed period of time in this regard; Deen Dayal versus State of UP [2009 (11) SCC 157].
‘Soon before’ or ‘Soon before Her Death’

A conjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B, IPC, shows that there must
be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment.
The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within
the purview of the “death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances”. The expression ‘soon
before’ is very relevant where Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B, IPC, are pressed

into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or
harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led in by
the prosecution. ‘Soon before’ is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each
case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before
the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance
of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption
under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The expression “soon before her death” used in the substantive
Section 304B, IPC, and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No
definite period has been indicated and the expression ‘soon before’ is not defined.
The determination of the period which can come within the term ‘soon before’ is left to be determined
by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that
the expression ‘soon before’ would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the
cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate
and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the
alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental
equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence; Raman Kumar versus State of
Punjab [2009 (16) SCC 35].
—————
Objective Type Questions
1. The Indian Penal Code was drafted by ______. (A) Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
(A) the Second Law Commission of India (B) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(B) the First Law Commission of India (C) Information Technology Act, 2000
(C) the Third Law Commission of India (D) None of the above
(D) Lord Macaulay Ans. (C)
Ans. (B) Some provisions of the IPC have been amended
The Indian Penal Code was drafted by the First Law by the Information Technology Act, 2000; for
Commission of India. The First Law Commission example, Section 4, Section 29A, Section 464,
was established in 1834 by the Charter Act of Section 466, etc.
1833. Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay prepared 4. In the Indian Penal Code, the pronoun ‘he’
the first draft of the Indian Penal Code. The draft and its derivatives are used for ______.
was submitted to the governor-general of India (A) male
Council in 1835. (B) female
(C) any person whether male or female
2. Doctrine of mens rea is NOT attracted to
(D) Such words are not used in the Code
which of the following categories of offences?
Ans. (C)
(A) Relating to fraud
The pronoun ‘he’ and its derivatives are used for
(B) Relating to bodily injury
any person, whether male or female (Section 8).
(C) Relating to offence against state
5. Which of the following match is wrong?
(D) Strict liability
(A) Wrongful gain — Section 23, IPC
Ans. (D)
(B) Dishonestly — Section 24, IPC
Doctrine of mens rea is not attracted to strict
(C) Fraudulently — Section 26, IPC
liability.
(D) Valuable Security — Section 30, IPC
3. Some provisions of the IPC have been (E) None of the above
amended by the ______. Ans. (C)

Section 26 speaks about ‘reason to believe’ that a to imprisonment for non-payment of fine, when
person is said to have ‘reason to believe’ a thing, imprisonment and fine awardable).
if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but 9. In case of an offence punishable with fine
not otherwise. only, imprisonment for non-payment of fine
6. The language of Part III of Section 105 of the ______.
IPC is similar to that of ______. (A) has to be simple
(A) Section 39 of the IPC (B) has to be rigorous
(B) Section 37 of the IPC (C) can be partly rigorous and partly simple
(C) Section 38 of the IPC (D) either has to be simple or has to be
(D) Section 40 of the IPC rigorous
Ans. (A) Ans. (A)
The language of Part III of Section 105 is similar If the offence be punishable with fine only, the
to that of Section 39. A person is said to cause an imprisonment which the court imposes in default
effect ‘voluntarily’ when he causes it by means, of payment of the fine shall be simple (Section
whereby he intended to cause it or by means 67).
which, at the time of employing those means, 10. A, a soldier, fire on a mob by the order of
he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to his superior officer in conformity with the
cause it (Section 39). commands of law. Here, A has ______.
7. Which of the following pairs is not correctly (A) committed an offence
matched under the Indian Penal Code? (B) committed no offence
(A) Section 93 – Communication made in (C) committed murder
good faith (D) None of the above
(B) Section 95 – Act causing slight harm Ans. (B)
(C) Section 55 – Commutation of sentence A has committed no offence. Illustration (a) of
of imprisonment for life Section 76, A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the
(D) Section 54A – Definition of ‘appropriate order of his superior officer, in conformity with
movement’ the commands of the law. A has committed no
Ans. (D) offence.
Section 55A defines appropriate government. 11. Which provision of the Indian Penal Code
Section 54A does not exist in the IPC. says “nothing is an offence which is done by
8. If offence is punishable with imprisonment accident”?
and fine both, then in default of payment of (A) Section 79
fine, the maximum term, may be _________ (B) Section 80
the prescribed maximum term. (C) Section 78
(A) equal to (D) Section 81
(B) half of Ans. (B)
(C) one-third of Section 80 provides accident in doing a lawful act.
(D) one-fourth of Nothing is an offence which is done by accident
Ans. (D) or misfortune, and without any criminal intention
The term for which the court directs the offender or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a
to be imprisoned in default of payment of a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper
fine shall not exceed one-fourth of the term of care and caution (Section 80).
imprisonment, which is the maximum fixed for 12. Nothing is an offence which is done by a
the offence, if the offence be punishable with person who at the time of doing it, was of
imprisonment as well as fine (Section 65, Limit unsound mind, because ______.

(A) he is unable of knowing the nature of the (C) Section 159
act (D) Section 160
(B) committed offence impulsively Ans. (C)
(C) Both (A) and (B) Section 159 defines ‘Affray’. Its elements are
(D) None of the above two or more persons, fighting in a public place,
Ans. (A) disturb the public peace.
Nothing is an offence which is done by a child 15. The landlord, knowing of the commission of a
above seven years of age and under 12, who has murder within the limits of his estate wilfully
not attained sufficient maturity of understanding misinforms the magistrate of the district that
to judge of the nature and consequences of his the death has occurred because of an asthma
conduct on that occasion (Section 83). attack followed with an attack of epilepsy. In
Nothing is an offence which is done by a such a situation, A is ______.
person who, at the time of doing it, by reason (A) liable for no offence
of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing (B) liable for the offence punishable under
the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is Section 177, IPC
either wrong or contrary to law (Section 84). (C) liable for the offence punishable under
13. Conspiracy to wage war against the Section 193, IPC
Government of India has been dealt with (D) liable for the offence punishable under
under Section _____ of the Indian Penal Code. Section 196, IPC
(A) 120 Ans. (B)
(B) 120A A is liable for the offence punishable under
(C) 120B Section 177, IPC. Whoever, being legally bound to
furnish information on any subject to any public
(D) 121A
servant, as such, furnishes, as true, information
Ans. (D)
on the subject which he knows or has reason to
Conspiracy to commit offences punishable by
believe to be false shall be punished with simple
Section 121, i.e., conspiracy to wage war against
imprisonment for a term which may extend to
the Government of India has been dealt under
six months, or with fine which may extend to
Section 121A of the Act.
1000 rupees, or with both; or, if the information
Whoever within or without India conspires
which he is legally bound to give respects the
to commit any of the offences punishable by
commission of an offence, or is required for the
Section 121, or conspires to overawe, by means
purpose of preventing the commission of an
of criminal force or the show of criminal force,
offence, or in order to the apprehension of an
the central government or any state government,
offender, with imprisonment of either description
shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or
for a term which may extend to two years, or with
with imprisonment of either description which
fine, or with both (Section 177).
may extend to 10 years, and shall also be liable
16. Uttering obscene words near a public place
to fine.
______.
Explanation. To constitute a conspiracy under this
(A) is not an offence
section, it is not necessary that any act or illegal
(B) is an offence under Section 294, IPC
omission shall take place in pursuance thereof.
(C) is an offence under Section 290, IPC
14. Which one of the following sections of the
(D) is an offence under Section 292(2)(b),
Indian Penal Code defines ‘Affray’?
IPC
(A) Section 146 Ans. (B)
(B) Section 148

Whoever, to the annoyance of others: (C) Section 304A
y does any obscene act in any public place, or (D) Section 300
y sings, recites, or utters any obscene song, Ans. (B)
ballad, or words, in or near any public place, The doctrine of ‘transfer of malice’ is contained
shall be punished with imprisonment of either in Section 301 of the IPC. If a person, by doing
description for a term which may extend to three anything which he intends or knows to be likely
months, or with fine, or with both (Section 294). to cause death, commits culpable homicide by
causing the death of any person, whose death he
17. The causing of death of child in the mother’s neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to
womb is not homicide under ______. cause, the culpable homicide committed by the
(A) Indian law only offender is of the description of which it would
(B) English law only have been if he had caused the death of the
(C) both English and Indian law person whose death he intended or knew himself
(D) neither Indian nor English law to he likely to cause (Section 301).
Ans. (C) 20. Assault or criminal force with intent to
The causing of the death of child in the mother’s outrage the modesty of women is dealt under
womb is not homicide under English as well as ______ of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Indian law. (A) Section 363
Explanation 3 of Section 299, the causing of (B) Section 509
the death of a child in the mother’s womb is (C) Section 354
not homicide. But it may amount to culpable (D) Section 511
homicide to cause the death of a living child, if Ans. (C)
any part of that child has been brought forth, Section 354 provides for the punishment for
though the child may not have breathed or been assault or criminal force with intent to outrage
completely born. the modesty of women.
18. X knows Y is suffering from a disease in his 21. Gang rape has been made punishable under
head and a blow to Y on his head is likely to which section of the IPC, 1860?
cause his death. X gives a fist blow to Y on his (A) Section 376A
head. Y died. X is guilty of ______. (B) Section 376B
(A) culpable homicide only (C) Section 376C
(B) murder (D) Section 376D
(C) causing hurt Ans. (D)
(D) no offence Gang rape is punishable in Section 376D.
Ans. (B) Punishment is rigorous imprisonment for a term
Here, in this situation, X is guilty of murder. which shall not be less than 20 years, but which
Section 300, except in the cases hereinafter may extend to life which shall mean imprisonment
excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act for the remainder of that person’s natural life,
by which the death is caused is done with the and with fine.
intention of causing death, or if it is done with 22. If a person entrusted with a property
the intention of causing such bodily injury as the dishonestly converts it to his own use, he
offender knows to be likely to cause the death of commits ______.
the person to whom the harm is caused. (A) fraud
19. The doctrine of ‘transfer of malice’ is (B) cheating
contained under in_______ the IPC. (C) criminal misappropriation
(A) Section 299 (D) criminal breach of trust
(B) Section 301 Ans. (D)

If a person entrusted with a property dishonestly (C) an offence as mere possession of such
converts it to his own use, he commits criminal document in such circumstances is
breach of trust (Section 405). penal
23. A falsely pretends to be in civil service, (D) None of the above
intentionally deceives Z, and thus, dishonestly Ans. (C)
includes Z to let him have on credit goods for Whoever forges a document which purports to be
which he does not mean to pay, A commits a valuable security or a will, or an authority to
the offence of ______. adopt a son, or which purports to give authority
to any person to make or transfer any valuable
(A) false representation
security, or to receive the principal, interest or
(B) cheating
dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any
(C) attempt of extortion
money, movable property, or valuable security, or
(D) attempt of theft
any document purporting to be an acquaintance
Ans. (B)
or receipt acknowledging the payment of money,
Illustrations (a) of Section 415, A, by falsely or an acquaintance or receipt for the delivery of
pretending to be in the civil service, intentionally any movable property or valuable security, shall
deceives Z, and thus, dishonestly induces Z to let be punished with imprisonment for life, or with
him have on credit goods for which he does not imprisonment of either description for a term
mean to pay. A is cheating. which may extend to 10 years, and shall also be
24. A prepares a mark sheet with an intention to liable to fine (Section 467).
get a job thereby he committed the offence 26. A man, by deceit, caused a woman, not
of ______. lawfully married to him, to believe that she is
(A) mischief lawfully married to him and to cohabit with
(B) cheating him in that behalf, is dealt under Section
(C) forgery ______ of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
(D) falsification of accounts (A) 497
Ans. (C) (B) 495
Whoever makes any false documents or false (C) 494
electronic record or part of a document or (D) 493
electronic record, with intent to cause damage Ans. (D)
or injury, to the public or to any person, or to A man by deceit caused a woman, not lawfully
support any claim or title, or to cause any person married to him, to believe that she is lawfully
to part with property, or to enter into any express married to him and to cohabit with him in that
or implied contract, or with intent to commit behalf, is dealt under Section 493 of the Indian
fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits Penal Code.
forgery (Section 463). Every man who by deceit causes any woman who
is not lawfully married to him to believe that she
25. P is found in possession of a document
is lawfully married to him and to cohabit or have
purporting to be a will of Q in favour of P,
sexual intercourse with him in that belief, shall be
bearing forged signatures of Q, intending that
punished with imprisonment of either description
the will shall be fraudulently used as genuine
for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall
after the death of Q. P has committed ______.
also be liable to fine (Section 493).
(A) no offence as it is mere preparatory to
lay a claim 27. The offence of cruelty in Section 498A of
(B) no offence till the will is used the Indian Penal Code punishes subjecting a
woman to cruelty by ______.

(A) the husband or relative of the husband act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit
of a woman to do any act which that person is legally entitled
(B) any person known to the woman to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of
(C) any person such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
(D) All of the above Explanation. A threat to injure the reputation
Ans. (A) of any deceased person in whom the person
The offence of cruelty in Section 498A of the threatened is interested, is within this section
Indian Penal Code punishes subjecting a woman (Section 503).
to cruelty by the husband or relative of the 30. Minimum punishment as imprisonment
husband of a woman. provided under the Indian Penal Code, 1860,
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the is ______.
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to (A) one week
cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for
(B) 24 hours
a term which may extend to three years and shall
(C) 12 hours
also be liable to fine (Section 498A).
(D) eight hours
28. Under the Indian Penal Code, which of the
(E) None of the above
following amounts to defamation?
Ans. (B)
(A) To convey a caution intended for good of
Minimum punishment as imprisonment provided
person, to whom conveyed or for public
under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, is 24 hours
good
under Section 510.
(B) To make an imputation concerning a
Whoever, in a state of intoxication, appears in any
company or an association or collection
public place, or in any place which it is a trespass
of persons as such
in him to enter, and there conducts himself in such
(C) Censure passed in good faith by person
a manner as to cause annoyance to any person,
having lawful authority over others
shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a
(D) Publication of reports of proceedings of
term which may extend to 24 hours, or with fine
court
which may extend to 10 rupees, or with both.
Ans. (B)
Explanation 2 of Section 499. It may amount to 31. For the purpose of application of Section
defamation to make an imputation concerning 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, offence
a company or an association or collection of should be an offence under a/the ______.
persons as such. (A) Indian Penal Code
29. An offence of criminal intimidation involves (B) special or local law

a/an _______. (C) Both (A) and (B)
(A) assault (D) None of the above
(B) battery Ans. (A)
(C) affray For the purpose of application of Section 511 of
(D) threat the Indian Penal Code, 1860, offence should be an
Ans. (D) offence under the Indian Penal Code.
An offence of criminal intimidation involves a 32. A makes an attempt to steal some jewels
threat. Whoever threatens another with any injury by breaking open a box, and finds after so
to his person, reputation or property, or to the opening the box, that there is no jewel in it.
person or reputation of any one in whom that Under the IPC, A has committed ______.
person is interested, with intent to cause alarm (A) no offence
to that person, or to cause that person to do any (B) theft

(C) attempt to theft (A) Abetment of an offence is an incomplete
(D) housebreaking offence.
Ans. (C) (B) Abetment of an offence is a continuing
A makes an attempt to steal some jewels by offence.
breaking open a box, and finds after so opening the (C) Abetment of an offence is a complete
box, that there is no jewel in it. A has committed offence.
attempt to theft. He has done an act towards the (D) Abetment of an offence is an offence
commission of theft. depending upon circumstances of the
33. The maxim ignorantia juris non excusat case.
means ______. Ans. (A)
(A) ignorance of law is no excuse Case reference: Shivcharan versus The State of
(B) ignorance of fact is no excuse Madhya Pradesh [2021]. The offence of abetment
(C) ignorance of law is an excuse falls in the category of ‘Inchoate Offences’. In
(D) ignorance of fact is an excuse criminal jurisprudence, inchoate offences are a
Ans. (A) species which are also known as incomplete or
The maxim ignorantia juris non excusat means incipient offences. Those guilty of the same fall
ignorance of law is no excuse. In simple words, under principals in the second or third degree
ignorance of law cannot be an excuse. (as in a conspirator or instigator, not present at
34. The essential ingredients of a crime are the scene of occurrence) and may be guilty even
______. where the principal offence intended has not
(A) motive, mens rea, and actus reus attained fruition. In such offences, what remains
(B) motive, intention, and knowledge inchoate or incomplete is the principal offence
(C) mens rea and actus reus intended. However, the abettor may still be liable
(D) knowledge, intention, and action for punishment as the offence of abetment is
Ans. (C) complete against the abettor. Besides the offence
Essential ingredients of crime are mens rea and of abetment, the other offence is ‘attempt’, which
actus reus. Mens rea means guilty mind and actus also falls under this category of offences.
reus means guilty act. 36. Common intention and similar intention was
To consider any action to be an offence, the basic distinguished in the famous case ______.
ingredient is mens rea. In other words, no crime is (A) Barendra Kumar Ghosh versus Emperor
committed if the mind of the person committing (B) Mahbub Shah versus Emperor
the offence in question is innocent. It is said that (C) Kripal Singh versus State of UP
intent and act must both concur to constitute (D) Rishidev Pandey versus State of UP
a crime (actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea)
Ans. (B)
[Sri Kumar Debasish versus State of Orissa (2008
Case reference: Mahbub Shah versus Emperor
CriLJ 2397, 2008 I OLR 721)].
[(1945) 47 Bom LR 941, AIR 1945 PC 118]. Common
Case reference: Director of Enforcement versus
intention and similar intention were distinguished
Mis. MCTM Corpn Pvt. Ltd [AIR 1996 SC 1100
in this case. Section 34 lays down a principle of
(1103)]. Mens rea is a state of mind. Under the
joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The
criminal law, mens rea is considered as the guilty
section does not say “the common intentions of
intention, and unless it is found that the accused
all”, nor does it say “an intention common to all”.
had the guilty intention to commit the crime, he
Under the section, the essence of that liability
cannot be held guilty of committing the crime.
is to be found in the existence of a common
35. Which one of the following statements is intention animating the accused leading to the
correct?

doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such 38. In which of the following cases did the
intention. Supreme Court make it clear that “mere
To invoke the aid of Section 34 successfully, it criticism or comments on government would
must be shown that the criminal act complained not amount to offence of sedition”?
against was done by one of the accused persons (A) Ranbir Singh versus State of Haryana
in the furtherance of the common intention of all; (B) Gyan Kaur versus State of Punjab
if this is shown, then the liability for crime may be (C) Kedarnath versus State of Bihar
imposed on any one of the persons in the same (D) Shreya Singhal versus Union of India
manner as if the act were done by him alone. Ans. (C)
Common intention within the meaning of the Case reference: Kedarnath Singh versus State of
section implies a prearranged plan, and to convict Bihar [AIR 1962 SC 955]. A citizen has a right to say
the accused of an offence applying the section it or write whatever he likes about the government,
should be proved that the criminal act was done or its measures, by way of criticism or comment,
in concert pursuant to the prearranged plan. so long as he does not incite people to violence
Care must be taken not to confuse same or against the government established by law or
similar intention with common intention; the with the intention of creating public disorder.
partition which divides ‘their bounds’ is often 39. Which of the following justices is not
very thin; nevertheless, the distinction is real associated with the judgement of the case R
and substantial, and if overlooked, will result in versus Govinda [(1877) ILR 1 Bom 342]?
miscarriage of justice.
(A) Justice Haridas
Lordships’ view, the inference of common
(B) Justice Melville
intention within the meaning of the term in
(C) Justice Sarkaria
Section 34 should never be reached unless it
(D) Justice Kimball
is a necessary inference deducible from the
Ans. (C)
circumstances of the case.
Case reference: Rversus Govinda, [(1877) ILR 1
37. In which of the following judgements did the Bom 342]. Bench: Justices Melville, Kimball, and
Supreme Court set aside the judgement of Haridas. Justice Sarkaria is not associated with
the High Court of Delhi which decriminalised the judgement of the case R versus Govinda.
Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860?
40. In which of the following case, the Supreme
(A) Sakshi versus Union of India [AIR 2004 Court of India set out the guidelines for
SC 3566] safeguarding the interests of death row
(B) Naz Foundation (India) Trust versus convicts?
Suresh Kumar Koushal [(2014) 3 SCC 220] (A) Sunil Batra versus Delhi Admin [1980 SC]
(C) PUCL versus Union of India [(2010) 14 SCC (B) Shatrughan Chauhan versus Union of
245] India [(2014) 3 SCC 1]
(D) Suresh Kumar Kaushal versus Naz (C) V Sriharan versus Union of India [(2014)
Foundation (India) Trust [(2014) 1 SCC 1] SCALE 505]
Ans. (D) (D) Mithu versus State of Punjab [AIR 1983
Case reference: Suresh Kumar Kaushal versus SC 473]
Naz Foundation (India) Trust [(2014) 1 SCC 1]. The Ans. (B)
Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the Case reference: Shatrughan Chauhan versus
High Court of Delhi which decriminalised Section Union of India [(2014) 3 SCC 1]. The Supreme Court
377. of India set out the guidelines for safeguarding
Note: homosexuality was decriminalised in India the interests of death row convicts.
by the Supreme Court in Navtej Singh Johar
versus Union of India [AIR 2018 SC 4321].

The Supreme Court framed the following there are instructions, there have been certain
guidelines for safeguarding the interest of the cases where the Department calls for those
death row convicts. records in piece-meal or one by one and in
y Solitary confinement: this court, in the Sunil the same way, the forwarding departments
Batra case, held that solitary or single cell are also not adhering to the procedure or
confinement prior to rejection of the mercy instructions by sending all the required
petition by the president is unconstitutional. materials at one stroke. This should be strictly
Almost all prison manuals provide necessary followed to minimise the delay. After getting
rules governing the confinement of death all the details, it is for the Ministry of Home
convicts. The rules should not be interpreted Affairs to send the recommendation or their
to run counter to the above ruling and violate views to the president within a reasonable
Article 21 of the Constitution. and rational time. Even after sending the
y Legal aid: there is no provision in any of the necessary particulars, if there is no response
prison manuals for providing legal aid, for from the office of the president, it is the
preparing appeals or mercy petitions or for responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs
accessing judicial remedies after the mercy to send periodical reminders and to provide
petition has been rejected. Various judgements required materials for early decision.
of this court have held that legal aid is a y Communication of rejection of mercy petition
fundamental right under Article 21. Since this by the governor: no prison manual has any
court has also held that a convict has Article provision for informing the prisoner or his
21 rights till his last breath, even after rejection family of the rejection of the mercy petition
of the mercy petition by the president, by the governor. Since the convict has a
the convict can approach a writ court for constitutional right under Article 161 to make
commutation of the death sentence on the a mercy petition to the governor, he is entitled
ground of supervening events, if available, and to be informed in writing of the decision on
challenge the rejection of the mercy petition that mercy petition. The rejection of the mercy
and legal aid should be provided to the convict petition by the governor should forthwith be
at all stages. Accordingly, the superintendent communicated to the convict and his family
of jails are directed to intimate the rejection of in writing or through some other mode of
mercy petitions to the nearest legal aid centre communication available.
apart from intimating the convicts. y Communication of rejection of the mercy
y Procedure in placing the mercy petition before petition by the president: many, but not all,
the president: the Government of India has prison manuals have provisions for informing
framed certain guidelines for disposal of mercy the convict and his family members of the
petitions filed by the death convicts after rejection of mercy petition by the president.
disposal of their appeal by the Supreme Court. All states should inform the prisoner and their
As and when any such petition is received family members of the rejection of the mercy
or communicated by the state government petition by the president. Furthermore, even
after the rejection by the governor, necessary where prison manuals provide for informing the
materials such as police records, judgements prisoner of the rejection of the mercy petition,
of the Trial Court, High Court, and Supreme we have seen that this information is always
Court, and all other connected documents communicated orally, and never in writing.
should be called at once fixing a time limit for Since the convict has a constitutional right
the authorities for forwarding the same to the under Article 72 to make a mercy petition to
Ministry of Home Affairs. Even here, though the president, he is entitled to be informed in

writing of the decision on that mercy petition. regular mental health evaluation of all death-
The rejection of the mercy petition by the row convicts and appropriate medical care
president should forthwith be communicated should be given to those in need.
to the convict and his family in writing. y Physical and mental health reports: all prison
y Death convicts are entitled to right to receive manuals give the prison superintendent the
a copy of the rejection of the mercy petition by discretion to stop an execution on account of
the president and governor. the convict’s physical or mental ill health. It
y Minimum 14-day notice for execution: some is, therefore, necessary that after the mercy
prison manuals do not provide for any petition is rejected and the execution warrant
minimum period between the rejection of the is issued, the prison superintendent should
mercy petition being communicated to the satisfy himself on the basis of medical reports
prisoner and his family and the scheduled by government doctors and psychiatrists that
date of execution. Some prison manuals have the prisoner is in a fit physical and mental
a minimum period of one day, others have a condition to be executed. If the superintendent
minimum period of 14 days. It is necessary that is of the opinion that the prisoner is not fit,
a minimum period of 14 days be stipulated he should forthwith stop the execution, and
between the receipt of communication of produce the prisoner before a medical board
the rejection of the mercy petition and the for a comprehensive evaluation and shall
scheduled date of execution for the following forward the report of the same to the state
reasons. government for further action.
⚪ It allows the prisoner to prepare himself y Furnishing documents to the convict: most
mentally for execution, to make his peace death-row prisoners are extremely poor and
with God, prepare his will and settle other do not have copies of their court papers,
earthly affairs. judgements, etc. These documents are must
for preparation of appeals, mercy petitions, and
⚪ It allows the prisoner to have a last and final
accessing post-mercy judicial remedies, which
meeting with his family members. It also
are available to the prisoner under Article 21
allows the prisoners’ family members to
of the Constitution. Since the availability of
make arrangements to travel to the prison,
these documents is a necessary prerequisite
which may be located at a distant place, and
to the accessing of these rights, it is necessary
meet the prisoner for the last time. Without
that copies of relevant documents should be
sufficient notice of the scheduled date of
furnished to the prisoner within a week by the
execution, the prisoners’ right to avail of
prison authorities to assist in making mercy
judicial remedies will be thwarted and they
petition and petitioning the courts.
will be prevented from having a last and
final meeting with their families. It is the y Final meeting between prisoner and his family:
obligation of the superintendent of jail to while some prison manuals provide for a final
see that the family members of the convict meeting between a condemned prisoner and
receive the message of communication of his family immediately prior to execution,
rejection of mercy petition in time. many manuals do not. Such a procedure is
intrinsic to humanity and justice, and should
y Mental health evaluation: it has been seen
be followed by all prison authorities. It is,
that in some cases that death-row prisoners
therefore, necessary for prison authorities to
have lost their mental balance on account of
facilitate and allow a final meeting between
prolonged anxiety and suffering experienced
the prisoner and his family and friends prior
on death row. There should, therefore, be
to his execution.

y Post mortem reports: although, none of the (A) cheating
jail manuals provide for compulsory post (B) defamation
mortem to be conducted on death convicts (C) dacoity
after the execution, we think in the light of the (D) extortion
repeated arguments by the petitioners herein Ans. (C)
asserting that there is dearth of experienced Case reference: Sonu Sardar versus State of
hangmen in the country, the same must be Chhattisgarh [2012]. It is a case related to dacoity.
made obligatory. It is a penalty imposed on the appellant under
41. Sarla Mudgal, President Kalyani versus Section 396 of the IPC.
Union of India is a case on which one of the 44. In which of the following cases the court
following? held that when an under-trial prisoner was
(A) Rape put in a separate cell only as a precautionary
(B) Adultery measure to ensure his non-mingling with
(C) Bigamy other prisoners and for his security, it did
(D) Kidnapping not amount either to solitary confinement or
Ans. (C) cellular confinement?
Case reference: Sarla Mudgal, President Kalyani (A) Perarivaalan versus IG Prisons, Madras
versus Union of India [AIR 1995 SC 1531]. The (B) Tula Ram versus State of Rajasthan
Supreme Court laid down the principles against (C) State of Punjab versus Sohan Singh
the practice of solemnising second marriage by
(D) Kehar Singh versus Union of India
conversion to Islam, with the first marriage not
Ans. (A)
being dissolved.
Case reference: Perarivaalan versus IG Prisons,
The issues in the case were whether a Hindu
Madras [1992 Cri LJ 3125]. Keeping the petitioner
husband, married under Hindu law, by embracing
and other accused in separate cells is a disciplinary
Islam, can solemnise second marriage. Whether
measure in order to avoid their mingling with
such a marriage without having the first marriage
other criminals and remand prisoners in the
dissolved under law, would be a valid marriage
Central Prison, Madras, or to ensure the proper
qua the first wife who continues to be Hindu?
security to the petitioner, himself in exercise of
Whether the apostate husband would be guilty of
the powers under Rule 215 of the Tamil Nadu
the offence under Section 494 of the IPC.
Prison Manual Vol. II, will not amount either to
42. The case of S Varadarajan versus State solitary confinement or separate or cellular
relates to which of the following provisions confinement.
of the IPC, 1860?
45. Which one of the following pairs is not
(A) Section 366
correctly matched?
(B) Section 365
(A) Keso Sahu versus Saligram — Section
(C) Section 364
79, IPC
(D) Section 363
(B) Sita Ram versus State of Rajasthan —
Ans. (D)
Section 80, IPC
Case reference: S Varadarajan versus State [1964].
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal as no (C) Southwark London Borough Council
offence under Section 363 has been established versus Williams — Section 81, IPC
against the appellant and was entitled to (D) Bablu versus State of Rajasthan —
acquittal. Section 89, IPC
Ans. (D)
43. Sonu Sardar versus State of Chhattisgarh, is
a case related to the offence of ______.

Case reference: Bablu versus State of Rajasthan The Hicklin Test is a legal test for obscenity
[2006]. Death sentence was awarded to the established in this case. In this case, Lord Chief
appellant for commission of offence punishable Justice Alexander Cockburn, writing for the Court
under Section 302 of the IPC, 1860. of Queen’s Bench, supplied a broad definition of
46. Which of the following case is known as obscenity, based on ascertaining “whether the
Nasik Conspiracy case? tendency of the matter is to deprave and corrupt
(A) Vinayak Damodar Savarkar’s case those whose minds are open to such immoral
(B) Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s case influences and into whose hands a publication of
(C) Madhu Limaye’s case this sort may fall”.
(D) None of the above 49. In which case did a five-judge Constitution
Ans. (A) Bench of the Supreme Court consider the
Case reference: Emperor versus Vinayak Damodar ambit and scope of Section 319 of the Code
Savarkar [(1911) 13 Bom LR 296]. It is also known of Criminal Procedure?
as Nasik Conspiracy case. (A) Hardeep Singh versus State of Punjab
Charges against the accused, Vinayak Damodar (B) Rajesh versus State of Haryana
Savarkar, were framed under Sections 121, 122, (C) Periyasamy versus S Nallasamy
and 123 of the IPC. (D) S Mohammed Ispahani versus Yogendra
47. In which case has the Hon’ble Supreme Court Chandak
directed to pay minimum compensation of Ans. (A)
Rs 300000 per acid attack victim. Case reference: Hardeep Singh versus State of
(A) Laxmi versus Union of India Punjab [1947]. The Supreme Court considers the
(B) Sujoy Mitra versus State of West Bengal ambit and scope of Section 319 of the Code of
(C) Vennagot Anuradha Samir versus Criminal Procedure.
Vennagot Mohandas Samir The following questions are to be answered by
(D) Indra Vijay Alok versus State of Madhya this Bench.
Pradesh y What is the stage at which power under
Ans. (A) Section 319, CrPC, can be exercised?
Case reference: Laxmi versus Union of India [(2014) y Whether the word ‘evidence’ used in Section
4 SCC 427]. The Supreme Court has directed to 319(1), CrPC, could only mean evidence
pay a minimum compensation of Rs 300000 per tested by cross-examination or the court can
acid attack victim. The rate of compensation is exercise the power under the said provision
not uniform in all states. The court has issued even on the basis of the statement made
guidelines for the betterment of acid attack in the examination-in-chief of the witness
survivors. The court imposed restrictions on the concerned?
sale of acid. y Whether the word ‘evidence’ used in Section
48. R versus Hicklin is related to ______. 319(1), CrPC, has been used in a comprehensive
(A) bribery sense and includes the evidence collected
(B) culpable homicide during investigation or the word ‘evidence’ is
(C) obscenity limited to the evidence recorded during trial?
(D) rape y What is the nature of the satisfaction required
Ans. (C) to invoke the power under Section 319, CrPC,
Case reference: R versus Hicklin [1868]. R versus to arraign an accused? Whether the power
Hicklin is related to obscenity. The Hicklin Test under Section 319(1) CrPC can be exercised
was laid down by the Queen’s Bench in R versus only if the court is satisfied that the accused
Hicklin. summoned will in all likelihood convicted?

y Does the power under Section 319, CrPC, (B) Dev Singh versus State of Punjab
extends to persons not named in the FIR or (C) Ratan Lal versus State of Madhya
named in the FIR but not charged or who have Pradesh
been discharged? (D) Sunil Kumar versus State of Bihar
Ans. (A)
50. The Supreme Court in 2018 observed that
Case reference: Lalit Yadav versus The State of
every attempt should be made by all the
Chhattisgarh [2018]. Every attempt should be
courts not to disclose the identity of the
made by all the courts not to disclose the identity
victim in terms of Section 228A, IPC, in the
of the victim in terms of Section 228A, IPC.
case of ______.
(A) Lalit Yadav versus The State of
Chhattisgarh
Previous Years’ Questions

51. Who prepared the first draft of the Indian (B) prosecuted in national capital New Delhi
Penal Code? only
[Uttarakhand JS (Pre.), 2014] (C) prosecuted in Mumbai only
(A) Canning (D) prosecuted at any place as per the
(B) Stephen request of French Government
(C) Bentinck (E) None of the above
(D) Macaulay Ans. (C)
Ans. (D) He can be prosecuted in Mumbai only (Section 4,
The first draft of Indian Penal Code was prepared Extension of Code to extra-territorial offences).
by Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay. The 54. Homicide cannot be defined as killing of a
Indian Penal Code was drafted by the First Law person by a person in view of the nature of
Commission of India. The First Law of Commission the definition of the word ‘person’ in ______.
was established in 1834. [Jharkhand Judicial Services (Pre.), 2016]
52. Section 1 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (A) Section 13 of the Indian Penal Code
deals with ______. (B) Section 11 of the Indian Penal Code
[Bihar APO (Pre.), Advt 39/2009] (C) Section 9 of the Indian Penal Code
(A) definition of crime (D) Section 7 of the Indian Penal Code
(B) title and extent of operation of the Code Ans. (B)
(C) title and jurisdiction of the Code Homicide cannot be defined as killing of a person
(D) None of the above by a person in view of the nature of the definition
Ans. (B) of the word ‘person’ in Section 11.
Section 1 of the Act deals with the “Title and The word ‘person’ includes any company,
extent of operation of the Code”. association, or body of persons, whether
53. An Indian citizen murdered a French citizen incorporated or not (Section 11).
in Paris and absconded. He is found by Indian 55. Section 29A of the IPC is related to ______.
police in Mumbai. He, with previous sanction [Chhattisgarh JS (Pre.), 2019]
of the central government, can be ______. (A) Documents
[HJS (Pre.), 2017] (B) Valuable security
(A) prosecuted in India at the place fixed by (C) Electronic record
the Foreign Ministry (D) None of the above
Ans. (C)

Section 29A of the IPC is related to electronic Rs 100, the imprisonment in default of payment
record. It was inserted by Act 21 of 2000, Section of fine shall not exceed six months (Section 67).
91 and the First Schedule. 59. If an offender is sentenced to an imprisonment
56. By which one out of the following Acts, for a term exceeding one year, the term of
the words ‘imprisonment for life’ were solitary confinement shall not exceed ______.
substituted for the words ‘transportation for [Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service (Pre.), 2016]
life’ in the IPC? (A) one month
[HPJS (Pre.), 2015] (B) two months
(A) Act XXV of 1955 (C) three months
(B) Act XXIV of 1955 (D) No limit
(C) Act XXVI of 1955 Ans. (C)
(D) Act XXVII of 1955 If an offender is sentenced to an imprisonment
Ans. (C) for a term exceeding one year, the term of solitary
‘Transportation for life’ was substituted by Act confinement shall not exceed three months.
XXVI of 1955. Substituted by Act 26 of 1955, s. 60. Act done in pursuance of order of court, if
117 and the Sch., for ‘Secondly.—Transportation’ done in good faith is coverable under General
(w.e.f. 01-01-1956). Exception under which of the following
57. Under Section 64 of the IPC, a sentence of sections of the IPC.
imprisonment for non-payment of fine shall [Chhattisgarh PSC CJ (Pre.), 2014]
______. (A) Section 76
[Karnataka CJ (Pre.), 2012] (B) Section 77
(A) be concurrent of any other imprisonment (C) Section 78
(B) be in excess of any other imprisonment (D) Section 79
to which an offender has been sentenced Ans. (C)
(C) not be in excess of any other Act done in pursuance of order of court, if done
imprisonment in good faith is coverable under Section 78 of the
(D) None of the above Act.
Ans. (B) Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or which
A sentence of imprisonment for non-payment of is warranted by the judgement or order of, a Court
fine shall be in excess of any other imprisonment of Justice; if done whilst such judgement or order
to which an offender has been sentenced (Section remains in force, is an offence, notwithstanding
64). the court may have had no jurisdiction to pass
58. In case of an offence punishable with fine such judgement or order, provided the person
only, an offender who is sentenced to pay a doing the act in good faith believes that the court
fine exceeding Rs 100, the imprisonment in had such jurisdiction (Section 78).
default of payment of fine shall not exceed 61. A hangman who hangs the prisoners pursuant
______. to the order of the court is exempt from
[Gujarat JS (Pre.), 2019] criminal liability by virtue of ______.
(A) one year [HJS (Pre.), 2021]
(B) six months (A) Section 77 of the IPC
(C) four months (B) Section 78 of the IPC
(D) two months (C) Section 79 of the IPC
Ans. (B) (D) Section 76 of the IPC
In case of an offence punishable with fine only, an Ans. (B)
offender who is sentenced to pay a fine exceeding

The hangman who hangs a prisoner pursuant to 64. Public servant disobeying a direction of the
an order of a court, is exempted from criminal law with intent to cause injury is dealt under
liability under the IPC under Section 78 of the IPC. ______.
Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or which [HJS (Pre.), 2021]
is warranted by the judgement or order of, a court (A) Section 164 of the IPC
of justice; if done whilst such judgement or order (B) Section 165 of the IPC
remains in force, is an offence, notwithstanding (C) Section 166 of the IPC
the court may have had no jurisdiction to pass (D) Section 167 of the IPC
such judgement or order, provided the person Ans. (C)
doing the act in good faith believes that the court Public servant disobeying a direction of the law
had such jurisdiction (Section 78). with intent to cause injury is dealt under Section
62. Whenever force or violence is used by an 166 of the Code.
unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly
in prosecution of the common object of such disobeys any direction of the law as to the way
assembly, every member of such assembly is in which he is to conduct himself as such public
guilty of the offence of ______. servant, intending to cause, or knowing it to be
[UK APO (Law), 2021] likely that he will by such disobedience, cause
(A) rioting injury to any person, shall be punished with simple
(B) affray imprisonment for a term which may extend to
(C) sedition one year, or with fine, or with both (Section 166).
(D) None of the above 65. A, puts jewels into a box belonging to Z, with
Ans. (A) the intention that they may be found in that
The term ‘rioting’ is defined in Section 146 of box, and that this circumstance may cause Z
the IPC. Whenever force or violence is used by to be convicted of theft. A has committed an
an unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, offence of ______.
in prosecution of the common object of such [Haryana ADA (Pre.), 2016]
assembly, every member of such assembly is (A) cheating
guilty of the offence of rioting (Section 146). (B) false representation
63. The essence of sedition is ______. (C) theft
[HJS (Pre.), 2011] (D) fabricating false evidence
(A) intention Ans. (D)
(B) benefits or gains of the accused A has committed an offence of fabricating false
(C) result evidence. Section 192 deals with fabricating false
(D) both intention and result evidence.
Ans. (A) Illustration (a) of Section 192, A puts jewels into
The essence of sedition is intention. In simple a box belonging to Z, with the intention that
words sedition is, whoever by words, either they may be found in that box, and that this
spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible circumstance may cause Z to be convicted of
representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts theft. A has committed fabricated false evidence.
to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or 66. Preventing a person from performing religious
attempts to excite disaffection towards, the worship and ceremonies is punishable under
government established by law in India (Section which of the following sections of the IPC?
124A). [Uttarakhand JS (Pre.), 2017]
(A) Section 295
(B) Section 296

(C) Section 297 69. Which of the following is an offence under
(D) Section 295A the IPC?
Ans. (B) [DJS (Pre.), 2018]
Whoever voluntarily causes disturbance to any (A) Purchasing acid
assembly lawfully engaged in the performance (B) Throwing act on a person with the
of religious worship, or religious ceremonies, intention of maiming or disfiguring
shall be punished with imprisonment of either (C) Manufacturing acid
description for a term which may extend to one (D) Selling acid
year, or with fine, or with both (Section 296). Ans. (B)
67. Which one of the following statements Throwing acid on a person with the intention of
correctly defines the term ‘murder’? maiming or disfiguring is an offence under the
[HJS (Pre.), 2010] IPC.
(A) Act by which the death is caused must Whoever throws or attempts to throw acid on
have been done with the intention of any person or attempts to administer acid to any
causing such bodily injury as is likely to person, or attempts to use any other means, with
cause death the intention of causing permanent or partial
(B) Death is caused with the knowledge that damage or deformity or burns or maiming or
he is likely to cause death by his act disfigurement or disability or grievous hurt to that
(C) Death is caused with the intention of person, shall be punished with imprisonment
causing such bodily injury as the offender of either description for a term which shall not
knows to be likely to cause death of the be less than five years but which may extend
person to whom the injury is caused to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine
(D) Death is caused under grave and sudden (Section 326B).
provocation 70. Sexual harassment of women is defined
Ans. (C) under which section of the IPC?
Death is caused with the intention of causing [Uttarakhand JS (Pre.), 2017]
such bodily injury as the offender knows to be (A) Section 354
likely to cause death of the person to whom the (B) Section 354A
injury is caused. (C) Section 354B
68. A had a stepchild whom he wanted to kill. (D) Section 509
For this purpose, he gave B, who was taking Ans. (B)
care of the child, a piece of cake, which had Sexual harassment of women is defined in Section
poison in it, and asked B to feed the child 354A. Section 354 deals with sexual harassment
the cake. B, however, ate the cake himself and punishment for sexual harassment.
and died as a result. Which of the following 71. What does Section 376D of the IPC relate to?
statements is accurate? [Chhattisgarh JS (Pre.), 2017]
[DJS (Pre.), 2018] (A) Custodial rape
(A) A will be liable for the offence of murder. (B) Gang rape
(B) A will not be liable for the offence of (C) Compensation to the victim of rape
murder. (D) Rape by husband
(C) A will be liable for abetment to murder. Ans. (B)
(D) A will be liable for conspiracy to commit Section 376D deals with gang rape. Where
murder. a woman is raped by one or more persons
Ans. (A) constituting a group or acting in furtherance of
A will be liable for the offence of murder. a common intention, each of those persons shall

be deemed to have committed the offence of (C) Documents or electronic record
rape. (D) Artistic work
72. Under the IPC, deceit is an ingredient of Ans. (C)
______. The offence of forgery is committed as regards
documents or electronic records.
[MPJS Class 2 (Pre), 2013 (Shift II)]
(A) criminal breach of trust 75. Which Section of the IPC is related to
‘property mark’?
(B) forgery
[Bihar APO (Pre.), Advt. 39/2009]
(C) cheating
(A) Section 478
(D) All of the above
(B) Section 476
Ans. (C)
(C) Section 479
Deceit is an ingredient of cheating. Whoever, by (D) Section 480
deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly Ans. (C)
induces the person so deceived to deliver any Section 479 is related to the ‘property mark’. A
property to any person, or to consent that any mark used for denoting that movable property
person shall retain any property, or intentionally belongs to a particular person is called a property
induces the person so deceived to do or omit to mark (Section 479).
do anything which he would not do or omit if he
76. The punishment for the harassment of a
were not so deceived, and which act or omission
woman by her husband or any of his relatives
causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to
with a view to coercing her or any person
that person in body, mind, reputation or property,
related to her for dowry is imprisonment for
is said to ‘cheat’ (Section 415).
a term which may extend up to ______.
73. A intentionally deceived B into a belief that A [HPJS (Pre.), 2016]
has performed A’s part of a contract which he (A) one year
has not performed, and thereby dishonestly (B) two years
induces B to pay money. A has committed (C) three years
______. (D) five years
[Karnataka CJ (Pre.), 2012] Ans. (C)
(A) the offence of cheating The punishment for the harassment of a woman
(B) the offence of criminal breach of trust by her husband or any of his relatives with a view
(C) the offence of extortion to coercing her or any person related to her for
(D) the offence of theft dowry is imprisonment for a term which may
extend up to three years.
Ans. (A)
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the
Illustration (h) of Section 415, A intentionally
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to
deceives Z into a belief that A has performed A’s
cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for
part of a contract made with Z, which he has not
a term which may extend to three years and shall
performed, and thereby, dishonestly induces Z
also be liable to a fine.
to pay money. A has committed the offence of
Explanation. For the purposes of this section,
cheating.
‘cruelty’ means:
74. The offence of forgery is committed with y any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as
regards to ______. is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide
[Maharashtra Judicial Service (Pre.), 2010] or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb
(A) Government currency notes or health (whether mental or physical) of the
(B) GC notes and documents woman; or

y harassment of the woman where such (A) assault
harassment is with a view to coercing her or (B) criminal trespass
any person related to her to meet any unlawful (C) attempt to commit house-breaking
demand for any property or valuable security (D) criminal intimidation
or is on account of failure by her or any person Ans. (D)
related to her to meet such demand (Section A is guilty of criminal intimidation.
498A). Illustration of Section 503: A, for the purpose of
inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit,
77. How many exceptions are provided in criminal
threatens to burn B’s house. A is guilty of criminal
defamation under the IPC?
intimidation.
[Uttarakhand JS (Pre.), 2018]
(A) Six 79. Criminal intimidation by anonymous
(B) Eight communication or having taken precaution
(C) Nine to conceal whence the threat comes, is dealt
(D) 10 under ______.
Ans. (D) [HJS (Pre.), 2021]
A total of 10 exceptions are provided in criminal (A) Section 506 of the IPC
defamation under Section 499. (B) Section 507 of the IPC
y First Exception. Imputation of truth which (C) Section 508 of the IPC
public good requires to be made or published. (D) Section 509 of the IPC
y Second Exception. Public conduct of public Ans. (B)
servants. Criminal intimidation by anonymous
y Third Exception. Conduct of any person communication or having taken precaution to
touching any public question. conceal whence the threat comes, is dealt under
y Fourth Exception. Publication of reports of Section 507 of the IPC.
proceedings of courts. Whoever commits the offence of criminal
y Fifth Exception. Merits of case decided in intimidation by an anonymous communication,
Court or conduct of witnesses and others or having taken precaution to conceal the name
concerned. or abode of the person from whom the threat
y Sixth Exception. Merits of public performance. comes, shall be punished with imprisonment of
y Seventh Exception. Censure passed in good either description for a term which may extend
faith by a person having lawful authority over to two years, in addition to the punishment
another. provided for the offence by the last preceding
y Eighth Exception. Accusation preferred in section (Section 507).
good faith to authorised person. 80. Which one of the following provisions of the
y Ninth Exception. Imputation made in good IPC, punishes to misconduct in public by a
faith by person for protection of his or other’s drunken person?
interests. [Uttarakhand JS (Pre.), 2018]
y Tenth Exception. Caution intended for good of (A) Section 507
person to whom conveyed or for public good. (B) Section 508
78. A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist (C) Section 509
from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to (D) Section 510
burn B’s house. A is guilty of ______ under Ans. (D)
the IPC, 1860. Section 510 provides for the punishment for
[PJS (Pre.), 2015] misconduct in public by a drunken person.

81. Section 511 of the IPC will apply to ______. basic reason as to why preparation is not
[MPJS (Pre.), 2016] punishable is that there ______.
(A) attempt to commit murder [HJS (Pre.), 2011]
(B) attempt to commit suicide (A) is no nexus between preparation and
(C) attempt to commit theft attempt
(D) attempt to commit robbery (B) can be chances of change of mind before
Ans. (C) commission of offence
Section 511 of the IPC will apply to attempt to (C) is absence of intention
commit theft. (D) is absence of attempt
82. Y inserts his hand into the pocket of Z with Ans. (B)
mala fide intention to take away his money. Case reference: State of Maharashtra versus Mohd
But the pocket was empty. What offence, if Yakub [AIR 1980 SC 1111: 1980 SCC (Cri) 513]. What
any Y committed under IPC, 1860? constitutes an attempt is a mixed question of law
[PJS (Pre.), 2017] and fact, depending largely on the circumstances
(A) No offence as the offence was not of the particular case. Attempt defies a precise
completed and exact definition. Broadly speaking, all
(B) Theft crimes which consist of the commission of
(C) Mischief affirmative acts are preceded by some covert or
(D) Extortion overt conduct which may be divided into three
(E) None of the above stages. The first stage exists when the culprit
Ans. (E) first entertains the idea or intention to commit
Y inserts his hand into the pocket of Z with mala an offence. In the second stage, he makes
fide intention to take away his money. But the preparations to commit it. The third stage is
pocket was empty. Y has committed an offence reached when the culprit takes deliberate overt
punishable under Section 511. steps to commit the offence. Such overt act or
step in order to be ‘criminal’ need not be the
83. The cardinal principle of criminal law ‘nullum
penultimate act towards the commission of the
crimen nulla poena sine lege’ means ______.
offence. In sum, a person commits the offence
[HJS (Pre.), 2014]
of ‘attempt’ to commit a particular offence’ when
(A) no crime or punishment can exist
(i) he intends to commit that particular offence;
without a pre-existing penal law
and (ii) he, having made preparations and with
(B) a man is presumed to be innocent until
the intention to commit the offence, does an act
proven guilty
towards its commission; such an act need not
(C) ignorance of law is no excuse
be the penultimate act towards the commission
(D) an act must be accompanied by a
of that offence but must be an act during the
criminal intent to constitute an offence
course of committing that offence.
Ans. (A)
85. Adultery, as defined under Section 497 of the
‘Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege’ means ‘No
IPC, is an offence against ______.
crime or punishment can exist without a pre-
existing penal law’. There is to be no penalty [Bihar APO (Pre.), Advt 39/2009]
without well-defined law. ‘Nullum crimen sine (A) wife
lege’ is Latin for ‘no crime without law’. (B) husband
(C) Both (A) and (B)
84. Preparation and attempt are two stages of
(D) Either (A) or (B)
commission of crime. Preparation is not
Ans. (B)
punishable generally but attempt is. One

Case reference: Joseph Shine versus Union of (C) Alan Summers
India [AIR 2018 SC 4321]. (D) George Peacock
Note: for Section 497 of the IPC, 1860, the following Ans. (B)
section shall be substituted, namely Amendment Case reference: Mahbub Shah versus Emperor
of Section 497 [Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, [(1945) 47 Bom LR 941].
2018]. 88. Section 303, IPC, was struck down as
The Supreme Court had in the case of Sowmithri unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the
Vishnu versus Union of India [1985] while dealing case of ______.
with the constitutional validity of the section [DJS (Pre.), 2018]
stated that it is for the legislature to decide the (A)Bachan Singh versus State of Punjab
policy of law with respect to adultery. A three- (B)Mithu versus State of Punjab
judge bench of the Supreme Court while dealing (C)Brij Mohan versus State of Rajasthan
with a petition regarding Section 497 [Joseph (D)Machhi Singh versus State of Punjab
Shine versus Union of India] had opined in its Ans. (B)
order the absence of gender equality in the Case reference: Mithu versus State of Punjab
criminal provision and stated that the time has [AIR 1983 SC 473: 1983 SCR (2) 690]. It
come for society to realise that a woman is equal was said that mandatory death penalty is
to a man in every field. unconstitutional. Section 303, IPC, is struck down
Extract from the IPC.—Whoever has sexual as unconstitutional.
intercourse with a person who is and whom Mandatory sentence of death for murder
he knows or has reason to believe to be the committed by life convicts is violative of rights
wife of another man, without the consent or guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21, Section 303,
connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse IPC, is unconstitutional and void.
not mounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of The court struck down Section 303 of the IPC
the offence of adultery, and shall be punished as unconstitutional and declared it void. It is
with imprisonment of either description for a needless to add that all cases of murder will
term which may extend to five years, or with fine, now fall under Section 302 of the IPC and there
or with both. In such case the wife shall not be shall be no mandatory sentence of death for the
punishable as an abettor (Section 497). offence of murder.
86. Grave and sudden provocation is a ______. 89. In which of the following cases did Supreme
[HJS (Pre.), 2021] Court issue directions for playing the national
(A) question of fact anthem in all cinema halls before start of a
(B) question of law feature film and making mandatory for all
(C) mixed question of law and fact in hall to stand up and show respect to the
(D) presumption under law national anthem?
Ans. (A) [Chhattisgarh JS (Pre.), 2017]
Case reference: KM Nanavati versus State of (A) Devika Biswas versus Union of India
Karnataka [1962]. Grave and sudden provocation (B) Shyam Narayan Chouksey versus Union
is a question of fact. of India
87. The judgement in case of Mahbub Shah (C) Bijoe Emmanuel versus State of Kerala
versus Emperor was given by which one of (D) MC Mehta versus Union of India
the following judges? Ans. (B)
[HPJS (Pre.), 2019] Case reference: Shyam Narayan Chouksey versus
(A) James Atkinson Union of India [2018]. The following directions
(B) Madhavan Nair were issued.

y Playing of the national anthem prior to the Case reference: Independent Thought versus
screening of feature films in cinema halls is Union of India [2017 (10) SCC 800]. The Supreme
not mandatory, but optional or directory. Court has interpreted Exception 2 to Section 375
y Citizens or persons are bound to show respect of the IPC as “Sexual intercourse or sexual acts
as required under executive orders relating to by a man with his own wife, the wife not below 18
the national anthem of India and the prevailing years, is not rape”.
law, whenever it is played or sung on specified 92. The ‘doctrine of joint liability’ as envisaged by
occasions. Section 34 of the IPC, 1860, is based on the
y The exemption granted to disabled persons decision of ______.
shall remain in force till the final decision of [Uttar Pradesh Judicial service (Pre.), 2018]
the competent authority with regard to each (A) Barendra Kumar Ghosh versus Emperor
occasion whenever the national anthem is (B) Mulcahy versus R
played or sung. (C) Pandurang versus State of Hyderabad
(D) Reg versus Cruise
90. The case R versus Dudley and Stephens is
Ans. (D)
related to the defence of ______.
Case reference: Reg versus Cruise. The concept
[HPJS (Pre.), 2015]
of joint liability was evolved in this case.
(A) insanity
93. The difference between Sections 34 and 149,
(B) intoxication
IPC, has been brought out in which one of the
(C) mistake of fact
following important cases by the Supreme
(D) necessity
Court?
Ans. (D)
[HPJS (Pre.), 2018]
Case reference: R versus Dudley and Stephens
(A) Nanak Chand versus State of Punjab
[(1884) 14 QBD 273 (DC)]. This case deals with the
(B) Basudev versus State of PEPSU
availability to defence of necessity for murder.
(C) Rishi Deo Pandey versus State of UP
This case established a precedent throughout the
(D) Sheoram Singh versus State of UP
common law world that necessity is not a defence
Ans. (A)
to a charge of murder. Killing an innocent life to
Case reference: Nanak Chand versus State of
save one’s own does not justify murder even if it
Punjab [1955]. Section 34 is merely explanatory.
under extreme necessity of hunger. Killing of one
individual in order to save the life of another on Several persons must be actuated by a common
intention and when in furtherance of that common
the basis that the killing is necessary to do.
intention a criminal act is done by them, each of
91. Recently, the Supreme Court has interpreted
them is liable for that act as if the act had been
the Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC as
done by him alone. This section does not create
“Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man
any specific offence.
with his own wife, the wife not below 18
There is a clear distinction between the provisions
years, is not rape”. The case is ______.
of Sections 34 and 149 of the IPC, and the two
[MPJS Class 2 Entry-Level (Pre.), 2018 (Shift II)]
sections are not to be confused. The principal
(A) Independent Thought versus Union of
element in Section 34 of the IPC is the common
India
intention to commit a crime. In furtherance of
(B) Youth Advocate Association versus Union
the common intention, several acts may be done
of India
by several persons resulting in the commission
(C) Lilly Thomas versus Union of India
of that crime. In such a situation, Section 34
(D) Alakh Alok Shrivastava versus Union of
provides that each one of them would be liable
India
for that crime in the same manner as if all the
Ans. (A)

acts resulting in that crime had been done by him is excused only if he did not know the nature
alone. There is no question of common intention and quality of his act or could not tell right from
in Section 149 of the IPC. An offence may be wrong. The McNaughten rule on criminal insanity
committed by a member of an unlawful assembly is named for Daniel McNaughten.
and the other members will be liable for that 96. The Supreme Court of India has observed a
offence although there was no common intention clear distinction between dishonestly and
between that person and other members of fraudulently in the case of ______.
the unlawful assembly to commit that offence [Jharkhand Judicial Services (Pre.), 2016]
provided the conditions laid down in the section (A) Nathu Lal versus State of MP
are fulfiled. Thus, if the offence committed by (B) Central Bank of India versus Ram Narain
that person is in prosecution of the common (C) Mobarik Ali versus State of Bombay
object of the unlawful assembly or such as the (D) Dr Vimla versus Delhi Administration
members of that assembly knew to be likely to be Ans. (D)
committed in prosecution of the common object, Case reference: Dr Vimla versus Delhi
every member of the unlawful assembly would be Administration [AIR 1963 SC 1572]. The Supreme
guilty of that offence, although there may have Court has observed a clear distinction between
been no common intention and no participation dishonestly and fraudulently. The meaning of
by the other members in the actual commission false document and forgery is discussed.
of that offence. The definition of ‘false document’ is a part of
94. Which one of the following pairs is correctly the definition of ‘forgery’, and both must be read
matched? together. If so read, the ingredients of the offence
[HPJS (Pre.), 2016] of forgery relevant to the present case are as
(A) Buta Singh versus State of Punjab follows.
— Extortion y Fraudulently signing a document or a part of
(B) State of Haryana versus Prabhu — Right a document with an intention of causing it to
to private defence be believed that such document or part of a
(C) Yusuf Abdul Aziz versus State of Bombay document was signed by another under his
— Adultery authority.
(D) Basudeo versus State of Pepsu y Making of such a document with an intention to
— Defamation commit fraud or that fraud may be committed.
Ans. (C)
The expression ‘fraud’ involves two elements,
Case reference: Yusuf Abdul Aziz versus State of
deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury
Bombay [AIR 1954 SC 321: 1954 SCR 930]. Section
is something other than economic loss, i.e.,
497 of the IPC (Act XLV of 1860), whether ultra
deprivation of property, whether movable or
vires the Constitution (Articles 14 and 15).
immovable, or of money, and it will include and
95. The McNaughten case is related to ______. any harm whatever caused to any person in body,
[Jharkhand APO (Pre.), 2019] mind, reputation, or such others. In short, it is a
(A) insanity non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit
(B) accident or advantage to the deceiver, will almost always
(C) necessity cause loss or detriment to the deceived. Even
(D) private defence in those rare cases where there is a benefit or
Ans. (A) advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding
Case reference: The McNaughten’s case [(1843) loss to the deceived, the second condition is
8 ER 718]. The McNaughten’s case is related to satisfied.
insanity. It was observed that an insane person

97. To which of the following offences the Apex in it. Therefore, the Community Standard Test is
Court judgement in Abhayanand Mishra applied, rather than the Hicklin Test, to determine
versus State of Bihar is related to? what is obscenity.
[Uttarakhand JS (Pre.), 2014] A bare reading of sub-section (1) of Section 292,
(A) Sections 420 and 511 of IPC makes clear that a picture or article shall be
(B) Section 511 of IPC deemed to be obscene (a) if it is lascivious, (b) it
(C) Section 420 of IPC appeals to the prurient interest, and (c) it tends
(D) None of the above to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely
Ans. (A) to read, see, or hear the matter, alleged to be
Case reference: Abhayanand Mishra versus The obscene.
State of Bihar [AIR 1961 SC 1698: 1962 SCR (2) 99. The case of S Varadarajan versus State of
241]. The appellant was convicted of the offence Madras [AIR 1965 SC 945] is associated with
under Section 420 read with Section 511, IPC. The which one of the following offences?
appellant was prosecuted and convicted under
[HPJS (Pre.), 2018]
Section 420 read with Section 511 of the IPC, of
(A) Kidnapping from India
the offence of attempting to cheat the university
(B) Kidnapping from lawful guardianship
by false representations by inducing it to issue the
(C) Kidnapping and abducting to compel a
admission card, which, if the fraud had not been
woman for marriage
detected, would have been ultimately delivered
(D) Kidnapping and abducting with intent
to him.
secretly and wrongfully to confine
98. Aveek Sarkar versus State of West Bengal Ans. (B)
[(2014) 4 SCC 257] deals with ______. Case reference: S Varadarajan versus State of
[Jharkhand APO (Pre.), 2019] Madras [AIR 1965 SC 945]. Where a minor girl,
(A) Section 153A alleged to be taken away by the accused person,
(B) Section 292A had left her father’s protection knowing and
(C) Section 292 having capacity to know the full import of what
(D) Section 354A she was doing and voluntarily joined the accused,
Ans. (C) it could not be said that the accused had taken
Case reference: Aveek Sarkar versus State of West her away from the keeping, of her lawful guardian
Bengal [(2014) 4 SCC 257]. The court found that no within the meaning of Section 361 of the IPC (Act
offence has been committed under Section 292, XLV of 1860).
IPC, and the question whether it falls in the first
100. The Supreme Court in 2015 had laid down that
part of Section 79, IPC, has become academic.
an amendment to a criminal complaint to
The court was of the view that the Hicklin Test is
cure a simple infirmity curable by means of a
not the correct test to be applied to determine
formal amendment not causing any prejudice
“what is obscenity”.
to the other side is permissible even though
Section 292 of the IPC uses the expression
there is no specific provision in the Code of
“lascivious and prurient interests” or its effect.
Criminal Procedure to amend a complaint
Later, it has also been indicated in the said
filed under Code of Criminal Procedure in the
section of the applicability of the effect and
case of ______.
necessity of taking the items as a whole and on
[DJS Set A (Pre.), 2018–2019]
that foundation where such items would tend to
(A) CREF Finance Ltd versus Shree Shanthi
deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having
Homes (P) Ltd
regard to all the relevant circumstances, to read,
(B) Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy
see, or hear the matter contained or embodied
versus V Narayana Reddy

(C) SR Sukumar versus S Sunaad Raghuram Thirdly, the amendment did not change the
(D) None of the above original nature of the complaint being one for
Ans. (C) defamation.
Case reference: SR Sukumar versus S Sunaad Fourthly, the publication of the poem
Raghuram [2015]. The magistrate allowed the ‘Khalnayakaru’, being in the nature of subsequent
amendment application mainly on the ground event created a new cause of action in favour of the
that no cognizance was taken of the complaint respondent which could have been prosecuted by
before the disposal of amendment application. the respondent by filing a separate complaint and
Firstly, the magistrate was yet to apply the judicial therefore to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the
mind to the contents of the complaint and had trial court allowed the amendment application.
not taken cognizance of the matter.
Secondly, since summons was yet to be ordered
to be issued to the accused, no prejudice would
be caused to the accused.
Recent and Relevant Cases

Ram Ratan versus State of Madhya Pradesh [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 14: 2021 SCC Online SC 1279]
Point/s to note: Section 397; weapon; use of weapon; offender.
Effect and Scope of Section 397
y The use of the weapon to constitute the offence under Section 397, IPC, does not require that the
offender should actually fire from the firearm or actually stab if it is a knife or a dagger but the mere
exhibition of the same, brandishing or holding it openly to threaten and create fear or apprehension
in the mind of the victim is sufficient.
y The other aspect is that if the charge of committing the offence is alleged against all the accused
and only one among the offenders had used the firearm or deadly weapon, only such of the offender
who has used the firearm or deadly weapon alone would be liable to be charged under Section 397,
IPC.
y Offender refers to only culprit who actually used deadly weapon. When only one has used the
deadly weapon, others cannot be awarded the minimum punishment. It only envisages the individual
liability and not any constructive liability. Section 397, IPC, is attracted only against the particular
accused who uses the deadly weapon or does any of the acts mentioned in the provision. But the
other accused are not vicariously liable under that section for acts of the co-accused [Dilawar Singh
versus State of Delhi {(2007) 12 SCC 641}].
—————
Mahendra versus State of MP [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 22; (2022) 7 SCC 157]
Point/s to note: Section 149; Section 141; essential ingredients; unlawful assembly; five or more persons
constituted an assembly.
Essential Ingredients of an Offence under Section 149
y Section 149 prescribes for vicarious or constructive criminal liability for all members of an unlawful
assembly where an offence is committed by any member of such an unlawful assembly in prosecution
of the common object of that assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely
to be committed in prosecution of that object.

y The essential ingredients of Section 149 are that the offence must have been committed by any
member of an unlawful assembly, and Section 141 makes it clear that it is only where five or more
persons constituted an assembly that an unlawful assembly is born, provided, of course, the other
requirements of the said section as to the common object of the persons composing that assembly
are satisfied. To say in other words, it is an essential condition of an unlawful assembly that its
membership must be five or more.
y At the same time, it may not be necessary that five or more persons necessarily be brought before
the court and convicted. Less than five persons may be charged under Section 149 if the prosecution
case is that the persons before the court and other number in all more than five composed an
unlawful assembly, these others being persons not identified and unnamed.
—————
Jasdeep Singh @ Jassu versus State of Punjab [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 19; 2022 SCC Online SC 20]
Point/s to note: Section 34; common intention; similar intention; substantive offence; proof of common
intention; in furtherance of a common intention; principle of joint liability.
Principle of Joint Liability under Section 34
y In order to attract Sections 34 to 39, IPC, a series of acts done by several persons would be related
to a single act which constitutes a criminal offense. Section 34, IPC, creates shared liability on those
who shared the common intention to commit the crime.
y Section 34, IPC, creates a deeming fiction by infusing and importing a criminal act constituting
an offence committed by one, into others, in pursuance to a common intention. Onus is on the
prosecution to prove the common intention to the satisfaction of the court. The quality of evidence
will have to be substantial, concrete, definite and clear. When a part of evidence produced by the
prosecution to bring the accused within the fold of Section 34, IPC, is disbelieved, the remaining part
will have to be examined with adequate care and caution, as we are dealing with a case of vicarious
liability fastened on the accused by treating him at par with the one who actually committed the
offence.
y The intendment of Section 34, IPC, is to remove the difficulties in distinguishing the acts of individual
members of a party, acting in furtherance of a common intention. There has to be a simultaneous
conscious mind of the persons participating in the criminal action of bringing about a particular
result. A common intention qua its existence is a question of fact and also requires an act “in
furtherance of the said intention”. One need not search for concrete evidence, as it is for the court
to come to a conclusion on a cumulative assessment. It is only a rule of evidence and thus does not
create any substantive offense.
y Normally, in an offense committed physically, the presence of an accused charged under Section 34,
IPC, is required, especially in a case where the act attributed to the accused is one of instigation or
exhortation. However, there are exceptions, in particular, when an offense consists of diverse acts
done at different times and places. Therefore, it has to be seen on a case-to-case basis.
y The word ‘furtherance’ indicates the existence of aid or assistance in producing an effect in future.
Thus, it has to be construed as an advancement or promotion.
y These ingredients would guide the court in determining whether an accused is liable to be convicted
with the aid of Section 34. (a) Criminal act is done by several persons; (b) such act is done in
furtherance of the common intention of all; and (c) each of such persons is liable for that act in the
same manner as if it were done by him alone.
—————

State of Madhya Pradesh versus Jogendra [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 37]
Point/s to note: Section 304B; ingredients; dowry death; pre-requisites for convicting an accused.
Pre-requisites for Convicting an Accused U/S 304B
y Section 304B was inserted in the IPC to combat the social evil of dowry demand that has reached
alarming proportions, it cannot be argued that in case of an ambiguity in the language used in the
provision, the same ought to be construed strictly as that would amount to defeating the very object
of the provision.
y The most fundamental constituent for attracting the provisions of Section 304B, IPC, is that the
death of the woman must be a dowry death. The ingredients for making out an offence under Section
304B have been reiterated in several rulings of this court.
y The four pre-requisites for convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304B are
as follows.
⚪ That the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise
than under normal circumstance
⚪ That such a death must have occurred within a period of seven years of her marriage
⚪ That the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment at the hands of her husband,
soon before her death
⚪ That such a cruelty or harassment must have been for or related to any demand for dowry
—————
State of Uttarakhand versus Sachendra Singh Rawat [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 131]
Point/s to note: Section 300; intention to cause death; Section 302; combination of a few or several
events.
Intention to Cause Death
y The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the
following, among other, circumstances.
⚪ Nature of the weapon used
⚪ Whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot
⚪ Whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body
⚪ The amount of force employed in causing injury
⚪ Whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight
⚪ Whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation
⚪ Whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger
⚪ Whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation
⚪ Whether it was in the heat of passion
⚪ Whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and
unusual manner
⚪ Whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows
y The above list of circumstances is not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances
with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention.

y As per Section 300, IPC, if the case falls within clauses thirdly and fourthly to Section 300, IPC,
culpable homicide can be said to be amounting to murder. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances
of this case, the High Court has committed a grave error in observing that culpable homicide did not
amount to murder, by applying exception fourth to Section 300, IPC.
—————
Bimal Chandra Ghosh versus State of Tripura [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 157]; also see, Krishnamurthy @
Gunodu versus State of Karnataka [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 220]
Point/s to note: Section 34; joint liability; common design or prearranged plan; common intention;
criminal act; mens rea; furtherance; act in furtherance of common intention.
Act in Furtherance of Common Intention—Section 34
Section 34, IPC, makes a co-perpetrator, who had participated in the offence, equally liable on the
principle of joint liability. For Section 34 to apply there should be common intention between the
co-perpetrators, which means that there should be community of purpose and common design or
prearranged plan. However, this does not mean that co-perpetrators should have engaged in any
discussion, agreement or valuation. For Section 34 to apply, it is not necessary that the plan should
be prearranged or hatched for a considerable time before the criminal act is performed. Common
intention can be formed just a minute before the actual act happens. Common intention is necessarily
a psychological fact as it requires prior meeting of minds. In such cases, direct evidence normally
will not be available and in most cases, whether or not there exists a common intention has to be
determined by drawing inference from the facts proved. This requires an inquiry into the antecedents,
conduct of the co-participants or perpetrators at the time and after the occurrence. The manner in
which the accused arrived, mounted the attack, nature, and type of injuries inflicted, the weapon used,
conduct or acts of the co-assailants or perpetrators, object and purpose behind the occurrence or
the attack, etc., are all relevant facts from which inference has to be drawn to arrive at a conclusion
whether or not the ingredients of Section 34, IPC, are satisfied.
Section 34, IPC, comes into operation against the co-perpetrators because they have not committed
the principal or main act, which is undertaken or performed or is attributed to the main culprit
or perpetrator. Where an accused is the main or final perpetrator, resort to Section 34, IPC, is not
necessary as the said perpetrator is himself individually liable for having caused injury or offence. A
person is liable for his own acts.
Section 34 or the principle of common intention is invoked to implicate and fasten joint liability on
other coparticipants. Further, the expression or term ‘criminal act’ in Section 34, IPC, refers to the
physical act, which has been done by the co-perpetrators or participants as distinct from the effect,
result or consequence. In other words, the expression ‘criminal act’, referred to in Section 34, IPC, is
different from ‘offence’. For example, if A and B strike lathi at X, the criminal act is of striking lathis,
while the offence committed may be of murder, culpable homicide, or simple or grievous injuries. The
expression ‘common intention’ should also not be confused with intention or mens rea as an essential
ingredient of several offences under the IPC. Intention may be an ingredient of an offence, and this is a
personal matter. For some offences, mental intention is not a requirement, but knowledge is sufficient
and constitutes necessary mens rea.
Section 34, IPC, also uses the expression “act in furtherance of common intention”. Therefore, in each
case when Section 34 is invoked, it is necessary to examine whether the criminal offence charged was
done in furtherance of the common intention of the participator. If the criminal offence is distinctly
remote and unconnected with the common intention, Section 34 would not be applicable. However, if

the criminal offence done or performed was attributable or was primarily connected or was a known or
reasonably possible outcome of the pre-concert or contemporaneous engagement or a manifestation
of the mutual consent for carrying out common purpose, it will fall within the scope and ambit of the
act done in furtherance of common intention. Thus, the word ‘furtherance’ propounds a wide scope,
but should not be expanded beyond the intent and purpose of the statute.
—————
State of Uttar Pradesh versus Subhash @ Pappu [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 336]
Point/s to note: Section 148; number of accused; rioting; Section 146.
Number of Accused
y As per Section 148 of the IPC, whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon, or with
anything which used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, can be punished under the
section. The term ‘rioting’ is defined under Section 146, IPC. As per Section 146, whenever force or
violence is used by an unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, in prosecution of the common
object of such assembly, every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence of rioting.
y It is the case on behalf of the respondent accused that in the facts and circumstance of the case,
Section 148 shall not be attracted as the number of accused chargesheeted or charged or tried were
less than five in number, the same had no substance. It to be noted that right from very beginning
and even so stated in the dying declaration six to seven persons attacked the deceased. Therefore,
the involvement of six to seven persons in commission of the offence has been established and
proved. Merely because three persons were chargesheeted or charged or tried, and even out of the
three tried, two persons came to be acquitted cannot be a ground to not to convict the respondent
accused under Section 148, IPC.
—————
State of Rajasthan versus Banwari Lal [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 357; 2022 SCC Online SC 428]
Point/s to note: Section 307; minimum punishment; interpretation.
No Minimum Sentence under Section 307
y As per Section 307, IPC, whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such
circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be
liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to
imprisonment for life or to such punishment as mentioned in Section 307, IPC.
y It was submitted on behalf of the accused that there is no minimum sentence under Section 307,
IPC, and that the sentence would be up to 10 years, the same is answered by holding that discretion
has to be exercised judiciously and the sentence has to be imposed proportionately and looking
to the nature and gravity of the offence committed and by considering the principles for imposing
sentence.
—————
Satbir Singh versus State of Haryana [(2021) 6 SCC 1; 2021 SCC Online SC 404]
Point/s to note: Section 304B; dowry death; ingredients; soon before death.
Essential Ingredients of Dowry Death
Section 304B (1) defines ‘dowry death’ of a woman. It provides that dowry death is where death of a
woman is caused by burning or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances,

within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, in connection with demand for
dowry. Sub-clause (2) provides for punishment for those who cause dowry death.
The first contentious part that exists in the interpretation of Section 304B, IPC, relates to the phrase
‘soon before’ used in the section. Being a criminal statute, generally it is to be interpreted strictly.
However, where strict interpretation leads to absurdity or goes against the spirit of legislation, the
courts may in appropriate cases place reliance upon the genuine import of the words, taken in their
usual sense to resolve such ambiguities.
Section 304B, IPC, is one among many legislative initiatives undertaken by the parliament to remedy
a longstanding social evil. The pestiferous nature of dowry harassment, wherein married women are
being subjected to cruelty because of covetous demands by husband and his relatives has not gone
unnoticed. The Parliament enacted the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, as a first step to eradicate this
social evil.
The second contentious part relating to Section 304B, IPC, is that it does not take a pigeonhole
approach in categorising death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental, as was done earlier. The reason
for such non categorisation is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal
circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal, suicidal, or accidental. However, the Section 304B, IPC,
endeavours to also address those situations wherein murders or suicide are masqueraded as accidents.
—————
Satbir Singh versus State of Haryana [(2021) 6 SCC 1; 2021 SCC Online SC 404]
Point/s to note: Section 306; interpretation; ingredients; suicide.
Interpretations of Section 306
y Section 306, IPC, relates to the abetment of suicide and is extracted that “if any person commits
suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall also be liable to fine”.
y A bare reading of the provision indicates that for the offence under Section 306, IPC, the prosecution
needs to first establish that a suicide has been committed. Secondly, the prosecution must also
prove that the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide, has played an active
role in the same.
—————
Anversinh versus State of Gujarat [(2021) 3 SCC 12]
Point/s to note: Section 361; interpretation; scope; presumption; kidnapping; act of enticing or taking.
Relevant Legal Provisions— Section 361
y A perusal of Section 361 of the IPC shows that it is necessary that there be an act of enticing or
taking, in addition to establishing the child’s minority (being 16 for boys and 18 for girls) and care or
keep of a lawful guardian. Such ‘enticement’ needs not be direct or immediate in time and can also
be through subtle actions like winning over the affection of a minor girl. However, mere recovery
of a missing minor from the custody of a stranger would not ipso facto establish the offence of
kidnapping. Thus, where the prosecution fails to prove that the incident of removal was committed
by or at the instigation of the accused, it would be nearly impossible to bring the guilt home.
y The consent of the minor is immaterial for purposes of Section 361 of the IPC. Indeed, as borne out
through various other provisions in the IPC and other laws like the Indian Contract Act, 1872, minors
are deemed incapable of giving lawful consent. Section 361, IPC, particularly, goes beyond this simple
presumption. It bestows the ability to make crucial decisions regarding a minor’s physical safety

upon his or her guardians. Therefore, a minor girl’s infatuation with her alleged kidnapper cannot
by itself be allowed as a defence, for the same would amount to surreptitiously undermining the
protective essence of the offence of kidnapping.
—————
Shatrughna Baban Meshram versus State of Maharashtra [(2021) 1 SCC 596]
Point/s to note: Section 375; Section 376; amendment of 2013; criminal law amendment act 2013;
Section 376A.
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013
y The offence under Section 375, as is clear from the definition of relevant provision in compartment,
could be committed against a woman. The situation was sought to be changed and made gender
neutral in compartment. However, the earlier position now stands restored as a result of provisions
in compartment.
y Before 03-02-2013, the sentence for an offence under Section 376(1) could not be less than seven
years but the maximum sentence could be life imprisonment; and for an offence under Section
376(2) the minimum sentence could not be less than 10 years, while the maximum sentence could
be imprisonment for life. Section 376A dealt with cases where a man committed non-consensual
sexual intercourse with his wife in certain situations.
y As a result of the ordinance, the sentences for offences under Sections 376(1) and 376(2) were
retained in the same fashion. However, a new provision in the form of Section 376A was incorporated
under which, if while committing an offence punishable under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 376,
a person “inflicts an injury which causes the death” of the victim, the accused could be punished
with rigorous imprisonment for a term “which shall not be less than 20 years but which may extend
to imprisonment for life, which shall mean the remainder of that person’s natural life or with death”.
Thus, for the first time, the death sentence could be imposed if a fatal injury was caused during the
commission of offence under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 376.
y Though the provisions of the Amendment Act restored the original non-gender-neutral position vis-
à-vis the victim, it made certain changes in sub-section (2) of Section 376. Now, the punishment
for the offence could be rigorous imprisonment for not less than 10 years which could extend to
imprisonment for life, “which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural
life”. It was, thus, statutorily made clear that the imprisonment for life would mean till the last
breath of that person’s natural life.
y Similarly, by virtue of the Amendment Act, for the offence under Section 376A, the punishment could
not be less than 20 years which may extend to imprisonment for life which shall mean imprisonment
for the remainder of that person’s natural life, or with death.
Practice Questions
1. What do you understand by mens rea? What 3. ‘A’, a surgeon, in good faith communicates to
is the importance of mens rea under the a patient, his opinion that the patient cannot
Indian Penal Code, 1860? Discuss. [Uttar survive. The patient dies in consequence of
Pradesh Judicial Services Examination, 2016] the shock. [Uttar Pradesh Judicial Services
2. Write a short note on the offence of stalking Examination, 2006 and 2015]
under the IPC. [Madhya Pradesh Judicial 4. “Mens rea is an essential element in every
Services Examination, 2015] crime.” Explain this rule and state to what

extent it is applicable to the offences under child. What offence has A committed
the IPC, 1860. [Jharkhand Judicial Services under the IPC? [Rajasthan Judicial Services
Examination, 2014] Examination, 2011]
5. Discuss and illustrate ‘mistake of fact’ as 18. Write a short note on common intention.
a defence in criminal law. [Delhi Judicial [Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services
Services Examination, 2014] Examination, 2011]
6. What is ‘wrongful gain’ as defined under 19. Briefly state the distinction between assault
the IPC? [Rajasthan Judicial Services and using criminal force. [Madhya Pradesh
Examination, 2014] Judicial Services Examination, 2009]
7. Write a short note on the distinction among 20. Critically examine the law relating to
motive, intention, and knowledge. [Delhi intoxication exoneration the accused from
Judicial Services Examination, 2014] criminal liability. [Uttar Pradesh Judicial
8. Write a short note on mens rea. [Madhya Services Examination, 2003]
Pradesh Judicial Services Examination, 2014] 21. What is force? Distinguish between ‘criminal
9. Explain and illustrate the distinction force’ and ‘assault’. [Haryana Judicial Services
between the stage of ‘preparation’ and Examination, 2003]
‘attempt’ in criminal law. [Delhi Judicial 22. ‘A’ instigates ‘B’ to murder ‘C’, but ‘B’ refuses
Services Examination, 2014] to do so. Has ‘A’ committed any offences?
10. Write a short note on the difference among If so, what? [Haryana Judicial Services
knowledge, intention, and motive. [Haryana Examination, 2001]
Judicial Services Examination, 2013] 23. What are the ingredients of the offence of
11. Discuss the limits within which the right rape? Explain with illustrations. [Haryana
of private defence may be exercised. [Uttar Judicial Services Examination, 2000]
Pradesh Judicial Services Examination, 2013] 24. Explain mens rea as an element of criminal
12. Write a short note on extortion. [Madhya liability. Is mens rea relevant in crimes
Pradesh Judicial Services Examination, 2013] of strict liability? Discuss. [Uttar Pradesh
13. Describe the essential elements of theft and Judicial Services Examination, 2000]
point out the distinction between theft and 25. Define and distinguish between kidnapping
extortion. [Uttar Pradesh Judicial Services and abduction. [Haryana Judicial Services
Examination, 2013] Examination, 2000]
14. Describe the offence of voyeurism and 26. Explain ‘common intention’ as used in
stalking. [Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services Section 34 of the IPC. [Haryana Judicial
Examination, 2013] Services Examination, 1999]
15. Critically examine the maxim ‘Actus non 27. Define dowry death. Explain. [Madhya
facit reum nisi mens sit rea’ and state its Pradesh Judicial Services Examination, 1998]
exception. [Uttar Pradesh Judicial Services 28. Define theft. What is the maximum sentence
Examination, 2012] for an offence of theft? [Rajasthan Judicial
16. Define the term ‘criminal conspiracy’? Services Examination, 1994]
What are its essential ingredients? What is 29. Define defamation and discuss its essential
difference between abetment and criminal elements. [Uttar Pradesh Judicial Services
conspiracy? [Madhya Pradesh Judicial Examination, 1992]
Services Examination, 2011] 30. Discuss the essential ingredients of dowry
17. A, a woman, throws her newly born female death. [Uttar Pradesh Judicial Services
child into a drain. A passer-by saves the Examination, 1992]

Solved Questions
Q. Discuss the essential ingredients of dowry death. [Uttar Pradesh Judicial Services Examination, 1992]
Or
Define dowry death. Explain. [Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services Examination, 1998]
Ans.
Dowry Death
Section 304B of the IPC, 1860, deals with dowry death. Sub-section (1) states “where the death of a
woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances
within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’ and such husband or relative shall be
deemed to have caused her death”. The explanation to the section states that dowry shall have same
meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961,
defines dowry as any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly
by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage, or by the parents of either party to a
marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to another person. Sub-section (2)
of Section 304B, IPC, states that “whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life”.
The most fundamental constituent for attracting the provisions of Section 304B, IPC, is that the death
of the woman must be a dowry death. Another aspect to attract the provisions of Section 304B, is
that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection with the
demand for dowry”. In order to bring a home charge under Section 304B, the prosecution is required
to establish that the death of the woman has been caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than
under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and soon before her death, the woman
is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative.
Essential Ingredients of Dowry Death

To convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304B these pre-requisites must be
fulfiled which are as follows.
y The death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than
under normal circumstances.
y Such a death must have occurred within a period of seven years of her marriage.
y The woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment at the hands of her husband, soon
before her death.
y Such cruelty or harassment must have been for or related to any demand for dowry.
When the above ingredients are fulfiled, the husband or his relative(s), who subjected her to such
cruelty or harassment, can be presumed to be guilty of offence under Section 304B.
Q. Write a short note on offence of stalking under the IPC. [Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services
Examination, 2015]
Ans.
Stalking
Section 354D, IPC, deals with stalking. The offence of stalking punishable under Section 354D of the
IPC appears to be an offence against the individual victim.

The first part of sub-section (1) of Section 354D provides that such conduct shall amount to stalking,
as any man who follows a woman and contacts or attempts to contact such woman to foster personal
interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman, or monitors the use by
a woman of the internet, email, or any other form of electronic communication, commits the offence
of stalking. The second part of sub-section (1) of Section 354D provided that such conduct shall not
amount to stalking if the man who pursued it proves that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing
or detecting crime and the man accused of stalking had been entrusted with the responsibility of
prevention and detection of crime by the state; or it was pursued under any law or to comply with any
condition or requirement imposed by any person under any law; or in the particular circumstances,
such conduct was reasonable and justified. Sub-section (2) of Section 354D provides that “whoever
commits the offence of stalking shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine; and be
punished on a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine”.
Sections 354A to 354D were inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013. A perusal of Section
354D would go to show that any man who follows a woman and contacts or tries to contact such
woman to foster personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such
woman. The main ingredient in the above provision would go to show that despite the fact that the
woman is disinterested, if the man goes on wooing her or keeps on sending messages against her will,
then the offence under Section 354D is attracted.


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1 Indian Penal Code, 1860

Objectives and Applicability of the Act