PROPERTY LAW

Atty. Jord Jharoah B. Valenton

May 14, 2023

SCRIBES TEAM: Sam Alvarez, James Anthony Delk, Joseph Millado, Sherry Jane Pagay, Karla Marie Santos, Quim
Ranchez, Faith Rodriguez
Checked by: HANNAH MORALES (Chairperson for ALD)| LORRAINE SANTOS (Deputy for ALD) | POHL GUARIN (Deputy for ALD)

MOVABLE AND IMMOVABLE PROPERTIES

I. MOVABLE AND IMMOVABLE PROPERTIES

In the preparation of this bar lecture, I took into account the 2023 Bar Syllabus prepared by the
Bar Committee, as well as the decisions penned by the Bar Chairman Honorable Justice Mon
Hernando. I also took into consideration frequently asked bar questions, the different books on
property law, as well as the recent decisions rendered by the Supreme Court which are within the
coverage. So let us immediately jump in.

● Property law starts with Art. 414 which provides that all things which are or may be the
subject of appropriation are considered either immovable or movable properties.

Art. 414. All things which are or may be the object of appropriation
are considered either:

(1) Immovable or real property; or

(2) Movable or personal property.

● Art. 415 however does not define what an immovable property is. It instead enumerates
what are considered immovable properties.
○ Thus anything that falls within the enumeration is an immovable property, and
anything that falls outside of the enumeration is movable.

Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the
soil;

(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the
land or form an integral part of an immovable;

(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a

way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object;

(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or

ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the owner of the
 immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach
them permanently to the tenements;

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by

the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works;

(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding

places of similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or
preserves them with the intention to have them permanently attached
to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals in these
places are included;

(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;

(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms
part of the bed, and waters either running or stagnant;

(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their
nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;

(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights
over immovable property.

● Although take note of Art. 416 par. 2 which provides that a property falling under Art. 415
may just the same be considered as a movable property by special provision of law.

Art. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property:

(1) Those movables susceptible of appropriation which are not

included in the preceding article;

(2) Real property which by any special provision of law is considered as

personal property;

(3) Forces of nature which are brought under control by science; and

(4) In general, all things which can be transported from place to place
without impairment of the real property to which they are fixed.

○ Thus while you can see in the slide that Art. 415 par. 2, which provides growing
fruits as immovable properties, we know very well from the very old case of Sibal
v. Valdez, citing the Chattel Mortgage Law, that for the purpose of implementing
the then effective Chattel Mortgage Law, because as you know we already have the
PPSA and that was discussed yesterday.
○ So under the Chattel Mortgage Law, the same growing fruits are not immovable
properties, but as personal properties for the purpose of implementing that law.
 ○ So while it is under, while growing fruits are under Art. 415, they are movable
properties by special provision of law.
○ Also, animals in breeding places are immovable properties under Art. 415 par. 6
which you can see on the slide, however under the PPSA that I mentioned a while
ago, which amended the Chattel Mortgage Law, livestock are movables which can
be the subject not of a real estate mortgage, but of a property security transaction
under the PPSA.
● But we must be asking, why are we harping on this distinction?
● The distinction between an immovable and a movable property is important, this is for the
reason that the law applicable is dependent upon the classification under which the
property falls.
○ Thus, for one, on the matter of acquisitive prescription with claim of title, take
note of this by the way, for prescription only happens if the possession is in the
concept of an owner, whether in good faith or bad faith.
■ Ownership over a movable through prescription is through uninterrupted
possession for four years in good faith, or for eight years if otherwise.
■ On the other hand, ordinary acquisitive prescription for immovable sets in
through possession of 10 years if in good faith, and 30 years if in bad faith,
through extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

Acquisitive Prescription

Movables Immovables

● 4 years — if in good faith ● 10 years — if in good faith

● 8 years — if in bad faith ● 30 years — if in bad faith

[Art. 1140, in relation to Art. 1132]

○ The distinction is also relevant in determining the formalities of a simple or

remuneratory donation. We will be discussing donation extensively towards the
end, and we know from oblicon, obligations and contracts, that a contract like
donation is a solemn contract.
■ It requires formalities for it to be valid, unlike a contract of sale which is
perfected by mere consent.
■ The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.
■ If the value of the movable property donated exceeds 5,000 pesos, the
donation and the acceptance should be in writing.
■ But if the property donated is real property, the donation and acceptance
must be in a public instrument.
○ The determination of what property security law is applicable depends also on the
classification of the properties.
■ If the encumbered property is considered a real property, then it is covered
by the rules on real estate mortgage, otherwise it is covered by the PPSA.
● Notably, in the case of PRUDENTIAL BANK v. PANIS, and as early as in the case of LEUNG
YEE v. STRONG MACHINERY, a building is by itself a real property, separate and distinct
from the land on which, from which it is separated.
○ This is pursuant to Article 415 par. 1 of the Civil Code. An encumbrance of that
building is subject to the rules on real estate mortgage, whether or not that
building is erected on a land owned by another.
● Also in LADERA v. HODGES, it was held that the levy and sale of a building should not have
been the subject merely of posting a notice, posting of a notice, but also of publication
which is appropriate for a real property, the failure to publish renders the execution sale
void.
○ Now this is notwithstanding how the parties have treated the property subject of
their transaction.
● So what we are trying to say is that the distinction between movable and immovable
properties is based on law, and not on the agreement of the parties.
○ We are however aware of some exceptions.
■ We can see some exceptions in Navarro and Tumalad cases, where the
characterization by the parties of the property subject of their transaction
was held to be binding on them. It was not about the law, it was their
agreement.
● In said cases, a house was erected belonging to a third person.
● Now we understand from Art. 415 par. 1, which was flashed on the
screen a while ago, that buildings, like lands, roads, and
constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil are immovable
properties.
● Nonetheless, the buildings in these cases of Navarro and Tumalad
were the subject not of a real estate mortgage, but of a chattel
mortgage.
● NAVARRO v. PINEDA: So in Pineda, Pineda executed a chattel
mortgage in favor of Navarro over a building belonging to another.
Navarro foreclosed the property, Pineda opposed stating that the
property should have been the subject of a real estate mortgage,
and in as much as it was a chattel mortgage that covered that
building, it’s said that the mortgage, the foreclosure and everything
else that followed are void.
● TUMALAD v. VINCENCIO: Now, in Tumalad, Vicencio and Simeon
likewise executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Tumalad over a
house of strong materials situated on a rented land, so on a land
belonging to another.
○ Thus, the house were foreclosed and sold at public auction,
again there was opposition on the basis of our proposition
that the distinction between immovable and movable is
relevant, very important, as indispensable, especially insofar
as validity of transactions. So one of the parties to the
chattel mortgage impugned the validity of the chattel
mortgages in this particular case.
 ● I will go back to that later. In the meantime, let us go to TSAI v.
COURT OF APPEALS, where the subject of the chattel mortgage
were machineries heavily bolted or cemented on the ground.
○ We can see that in Art. 415 par. 3, the machines could have
been covered by Art. 415 par. 3 which refers to properties
rendered immovable by incorporation.
■ Art. 415 (3) speaks of properties attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner. So these machines could
have been covered by Art. 415 (3) and considered
immovable.
■ Another alternative is for these machines to be
covered not by Art. 415, par. 3, but par. 4 and 5,
which refers to machineries immobilized not by
incorporation, but by destination, as they are utilized
for an industry or work carried on in the real property
to meet the needs of said industry or work.
○ Yet in this Tsai v. Court of Appeals, they were treated as
chattels, that’s why contrary to what we have been telling,
saying, that it’s all about the law, it’s not the intention.
○ But here the Supreme Court said again, like in the case of the
Navarro and Tumalad cases, it looked into the intention of
the parties not the law.
● In SERG’S PRODUCTS v. PCI LEASING, the Court held that the
machines are proper subjects of a writ of replevin.
○ We know from our remedial law that replevin is only available
for personal properties, but here the Supreme Court held
that the machines are proper subjects of a writ of replevin.
○ Again, because they have treated them, because the parties
in that case have treated them as personal properties. Again,
intention not law.
● But how do we now reconcile all these things that we have said?
○ In the Tumalad, Navarro, Tsai, and Serg case, what was favored and considered was
the intention or agreement of the parties to treat such properties as immovable
properties and not the law defining them as real properties. In these cases, the SC
did not have to determine the character of the property and the validity of the
chattel mortgage in accordance with article 415. It was unnecessary because there
is another way the issue could be resolved and that is by estoppel.

● Estoppel prohibits a party not only from assuming inconsistent positions, but also
precludes them from repudiating an obligation voluntarily assumed after accepting
benefits therefrom.
● PIANSAY v. DAVID: The Supreme Court had to determine the character of the
property and the validity of the transaction because the challenge was raised not
by a party to the transaction who can be held in estoppel but by a third person.
● In other words, there are exceptional circumstances where the issue could be
resolved other than how the law determines the character of the property but this
 is only when the dispute is exclusively between the party to the agreement and
estoppel could set in.

II. BUNDLE OF RIGHTS

A. Ownership

The Civil Code does not define ownership but enumerates those that are included therein:

1. Jus Possidendi (right to possess)

● Right to hold the thing and does not necessarily include the right to use
(e.g., contract of deposit)
2. Jus Utendi (right to use and enjoy)
● Includes the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof
● Limitation: use in such a manner as not to injure the rights of a third person
3. Jus Fruendi (right to fruits)
● Right to the fruits
● Kinds of Fruits: (NIC)
○ Natural
○ Industrial
○ Civil
4. Jus Abutendi (right to consume)
● Includes the right to transform or abuse or destroy by its use
5. Jus Disponendi (right to dispose)
● Also includes the right not to dispose, or to alienate
6. Jus Vindicandi (right to vindicate or recover)
● Includes the right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in
order to recover it
7. Jus Accesionis (right to accessories)

● DOCTRINE OF SELF-HELP
○ The first thing in the bundle of rights. Let’s connect this with the right to enjoy the
thing and/ or right of action in relation to article 428 and 429 which provide:

“Article 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law. The owner has also a right of action
against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.

Article 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.”

○ Requisites of the Principle of Self-help

1. Reasonable force used;
 2. Such force is used by the Owner or lawful possessor;
3. There is no Delay; and
4. Actual or threatened physical invasion or usurpation of the property.

○ This doctrine is a justifying circumstance found under Article 11 of the RPC.

○ Take note of the words “prevent” or “repel” for the doctrine to apply. In other
words, for this doctrine to apply, there must be an actual or threatened act of
dispossession. When possession is lost you cannot take the law in your hands and
the right you can exercise is the right of action to recover possession.

● RIght to Recover

○ There are three remedies in exercising the right to recover which are as follows:

1. Accion Interdictal

■ It could either be forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Take note of the

elements of these actions; failure to allege or prove any of the elements
will lead to dismissal.

■ DAYRIT v. NORQUILLAS: the SC that first level courts have jurisdiction on

ejectment cases even if the land is public in character as long as the case is
not an agrarian dispute.

■ PALAJOS v. ABAD: Justice Hernando penned that Forcible entry should be

filed within one (1) year from the time the plaintiff learned of his
deprivation of the physical possession of the property, except that when the
entry is through stealth, the one (1) year period is counted from the time
the plaintiff-owner or legal possessor learned of the deprivation of the
physical possession of the property.

■ Note that the inquiry in a forcible entry case is the prior possession,
possession de facto not de jure, much less ownership. Based on thois
premise, the issue of ownership of property may only be provisionally
determined.

■ In TINA v. CLARA ESTATE, INC.: the Court held that the sole issue in
ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject property,
independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. Section 16, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court provides the exception to the rule in that the issue of
ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the
question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to
an action between the same parties involving title to the property.

■ HEIRS OF MAGSAYSAY v. SPS. PEREZ: The person who claims a better right
of ownership to the property sought to be recovered must prove two things-
first, the identity of the land claimed, and second, his title thereto.
 ■ Distinction Between Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Forcible Entry Unlawful Detainer

As to when possession became unlawful

Possession of the defendant is unlawful from Possession is inceptively lawful but becomes
the beginning as he acquired possession by: illegal from the time defendant unlawfully
1. Force; withholds possessions after the expiration or
2. Intimidation; termination of his right thereto.
3. Strategy;
4. Threat; or
5. Stealth.

As to necessity of demand

No previous demand for the defendant to Demand is jurisdictional if the ground is

vacate is necessary. nonpayment of rentals or failure to comply
with the lease contract.

As to necessity of proof of prior physical possession

Plaintiff must prove that he was in prior Plaintiffs need not have been in prior physical
physical possession of the premises until he possession.
was deprived thereof by the defendant.

As to when one-year period is counted from

One-year period is generally counted from the One-year period is counted from the date of
date of actual entry of the land. last demand or last letter of demand.

■ SPS LIU v. ESPINOSA: The Supreme Court reiterated the requisites of

unlawful detainer – (i)possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff and eventually, (ii) such
possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession.

○ BAR QUESTION: In an ejectment case filed by Don against Cesar, can the latter ask
for the cancellation of Don's title considering that he (Cesar) is the rightful owner
of the lot? Explain. (2005 Bar)

■ It is suggested that the request should be denied since PD 1529, Section 48

provides that a Certificate is not subject to collateral attack. A certificate
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The ejectment proceeding does not provide the proper forum for the
cancellation of title but title may be determined provisionally if the issue of
ownership is intertwined with the issue of possession.

■ Stealth is mentioned in relation to forcible entry; while tolerance in so far

as unlawful detainer is concerned. We have to distinguish them. There is
 tolerance when the possessor knew and consented to the possession of the
respondent without going to the extent as to formalize it with an express
contract of lease.

■ PLDT v. CITI APPLIANCE M.C. CORPORATION: In cases of forcible entry

through stealth, there can be no possession by tolerance precisely because
the owner could not have known beforehand that someone else possessed
his or her property; thus, he or she could not have tolerated the possession
of the intruder.

2. Accion Publiciana

■ It is the second mode of recovering possession.

■ Accion Publiciana is a plenary action to recover the right of possession. If

any of the strict requirements of accion interdictal is absent, you may file
this action.

■ It is not the MTC which has original jurisdiction.Action may be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, since Under RA 11575 if the property subject of the
recovery has an assessed value that exceeds Php 400,000.00, the action is
within the jurisdiction already of the RTC.

■ Not a summary proceeding

■ The issue is not limited to the question of possession de facto, but it

extends to possession de jure. Thus, if forcible entry is just about who had
prior possession; Accion publiciana is about who had better possession.

■ HEIRS OF CULLADO v. GUTIERREZ: The issue in an accion publiciana is the

"better right of possession" of real property independently of title, as
mentioned This "better right of possession" may or may not proceed from a
Torrens title.

RTCwas without any power or jurisdiction to order the reconveyance of the

land in dispute because that can be done only upon a definitive ruling on
the said issue — something that cannot be done in an accion publiciana. The
SC said that the court did not then have jurisidction to act on the claim for
reconveyance raised in the answer.

3. Accion Reivindicatoria

■ Has for title or ownership as the basis of the recovery of possession,

because possession is an attribute of ownership.

■ Must be availed of within 10 years from dispossession.

■ GEMINA v. HEIRS OF ESPEJO: The identity of the property and the title of
the claimant must be ascertained in an action to recover possession of real
property pursuant to Article 434 of the Civil Code.
 ● ACTION TO QUIET TITLE

○ This is not necessarily an action to recover possession of property because the

person filing it might be the one possessing thereof

○ HEIRS OF ENANO v. SAN PEDRO CINEPLEX PROPERTIES: In an action for quieting of

title, the objective is for the competent court to remove the cloud by determining
the rights of the parties so that the ones entitled to the subject property may
exercise said rights without fear, disturbance, or interference from those who have
no right over the same. From the foregoing provisions, two requisites must be
established in order that a complaint for quieting of title may prosper. First, the
plaintiff must have a legal or equitable title or interest in the property subject of
the complaint. Second, the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding allegedly
casting doubt over one's title must be proven to be in truth invalid, void or
inoperative despite the prima facie appearance of validity.

○ RUBRIANO v. VERA: Petitioner could not validly maintain an action for quieting of
title since she failed to redeem the foreclosed property within the one - year
period.

Here, the first requisite is absent so there is no title to speak of.

○ HEIRS OF MALAGGAY v. HEIRS OF EWAY: Under Art 447, title, does not necessarily
denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the person filing the suit. It can
connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner thereof.

○ Note that the Plaintiff need not be in possession of the property subject of the
action to quiet the title. If he is not in possession thereof, the action prescribed in
30 years. But if he is in possession, the action is imprescriptible because the owner
of the real property who is in possession thereof may wait until his title is
vindicated or attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right so he does not
have to file an action to quiet title.

III. USUFRUCT
● Technical description cannot stand alone because of fool proof evidence. Identity of
dispute may be established by a survey plan of the property.
● Remove the clouds by determining rights of the parties without fear, disturbance and
interference from those

ACTION TO QUIET TITLE

HEIRS OF ENANO V. SAN PEDRO CINEPLEX PROPERTIES

G.R. NO. 2366, APRIL 6, 2022, HERNANDO, J.

In an action for quieting of title, the objective for the competent court to remove the cloud by
determining the rights of the parties so that the ones entitled to the subject property may
exercise said rights without fear, disturbance, or interference from those who have no right
over the same. From the foregoing provisions, two requisites must be established in order that
a complaint for quieting of title may proper. First, the plaintiff must have a legal or equitable
title or interest in the property subject of the complaint. Second, the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding allegedly casting doubt over one’s title must be proven to be in
truth invalid, void or inoperative despite the prima facie appearance of validity.

1. Legal and equitable title

2. Subject deed claim casting doubt must be truth valid, void and inoperative despite prima
face evidence of invalidiity

ACTION TO QUIET TITLE

RUBRIANO V. VERA
G.R. NO. 243896, JULY 15, 2020, CARANDANG, J.

Petitioner could not validly maintain an action for questing of title since she failed to redeem
the foreclosed property within the one year period.

ACTION TO QUIET TITLE

HEIRS OF MALAGGAY V. HEIRS OF EWAY

G.R. NO. 228033, APRIL 14, 2021, HERNANDO, J.

Under Article 447, title does not necessarily denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the
person filing the suit. It can connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an
owner thereof.

● The plaintiff need not be in possession of property subject to the quieting title. IIf he is
not in possession 30 years under 1141 of Civil Code
● If in possession, action is imprescriptible, do not file action to quiet the title.
We started with the word.

PRESCRIPTION/LACHES OVER REGISTERED LAND

May one have better title over a registered land against a registered owner?

RA NO. 496, SECTION 46. No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

● No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription and laches cannot set in to give another
person other than the owner a better right. This is not without an exception.

PRESCRIPTION/LACHES OVER REGISTERED LAND

 LORENZO V. EUSTAQUIO
G.R. NO. 209435, AUGUST 10, 2022, HERNANDO, J.

Although acquisitive prescription cannot set in over registered land, it can be lost by laches, by
a party’s failure for a considerable length of time to institute an action to enforce his or her
claim.

● Presented a deed of adjudication not only to the children of Delfin but also to children of
Trinidad. Ernesto, one of the children of Trinidad, said that he has a copy of the title for
quieting title by virtue of donation propter nuptias. It was actually void because it was not
notarized since it was a public instrument.
● But here comes the exception: Nonetheless, the basis of adverse possession of public
documents if there is clear and convincing evidence of possession.
● Could not ripen into ownership.

Acquisitive prescription cannot be set into registered land.

PRESCRIPTION/LACHES OVER REGISTERED LAND

ELEMENTS OF LACHES

1. Conduct on the part of defendant or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation complained of;
2. Delay in asserting complainant’s right after he had knowledge of the defendant’s
conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue;
3. Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he based his suit; and
4. Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.

● Could not present evidence that they can assert right to the land.
● Can be lost by laches, by the party's failure to enforce his claim.

POSSESSION

Article 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.

SPOUSES PONCE V. ALDANESE

G.R. NO. 216587. AUGUST 4, 2021, HERNANDO, J.

The Supreme Court that while the tax declaration is not conclusive proof of ownership of one
over the subject land, it is an indication however that he possesses the property in the concept
of an owner for nobody in his or her right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his or her actual or constructive possession.

● He possessed the property in the concept of an owner. Now, possession is in the concept of
an owner.
● We have different concepts of an owner. We will have to go thru those.
POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER

Possession in the concept of an owner Possessor in the concept of a holder

May be the owner himself or one who claims Acknowledges a superior right with respect to
to be. He does acknowledge any superior the thing itself.
right.

● Possessor may be the owner himself

● Does not acknowledge superior right
● Article 541 of the Civil Code - By reason of the lease, contract, consent.

PRESCRIPTION/LACHES OVER REGISTERED LAND

BUKIDNON DOCTORS HOSPITAL V. METROPOLITAN BANK TRUST & CO.

G.R. NO. 161882, JULY 8, 2005, DAVIDE, JR. C.J.

Where a lease agreement, whether express or implied, is subsequently entered into by the
mortgagor and the mortgagee after the expiration of the redemption period and the
consolidation of title in the name of the latter, a case for ejectment or unlawful detainer, not a
motion for a writ of possession, is the proper remedy in order to evict from the questioned
premises a mortgagor–turned-lessee. The rationale for this rule is that a new relationship
between the parties has been created.

● There was a failure to pay the mortgage obligation so the MBTC foreclosed. Period of
redemption lapsed without the property being redeemed. The hospital has these facilities
in the property, under a contract of lease. The lease period however expired and
terminated but the hospital refused to vacate.
● MBTC filed an application for Ex parte for an issuance of writ of possession. You do not ask
for what you already have. Possession has already been transferred
● When the party entered into a contract of lease, MBTC already took possession of the
property. MBTC cannot transfer what it does not have. The hospital started to recognize
superior right possession to a mere holder. Contract of lease MBTC occupied property thru
the hospital. After the contract of lease MBTC occupied the property but through the
hospital.
● Possession in one’s name under the name of MBTC through Bukidnon.
● It was not writ of possession but unlawful detainer
PRESCRIPTION IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER

LORENZO WILLY V. JULIAN

G.R. NO. 207051, DECEMBER 1, 2021, HERNANDO, J.

The Supreme Court said that Ricardo possessed the property through Lorenzo, and the delivery
of the harvest by the latter to Ricardo was a recognition that Lorenzo was only holding the
property in the concept of a holder.
 ● The Supreme Court said that Ricardo possessed the property through the son of the seller.
It was a recognition that the son of the seller was only holding the property.
● A 2021 case decided by Justice Hernando.

POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH AND BAD FAITH

KASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ
G R. NO. 46623 DECEMBER 7, 1939, IMPERIAL, J.

A mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.

● Possessor in bad faith. Possessor in the concept of owner doesnt imply possessor in good
faith
● Good faith is always presumed.
● Proof to the contrary must be reasonable and not capricious.

POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH AND BAD FAITH

KASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ
G R. NO. 46623 DECEMBER 7, 1939, IMPERIAL, J.

A mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.

● Had the possession been in good faith it will be shortened to 10 years for immovable and 4
years for movable.

POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH AND BAD FAITH

RELEVANCE OF DISTINCTION

PRESCRIPTION
Periods

Movables
● 4 years - If in good faith; and,
● 8 years - If in bad faith [Art. 1140 in relation to Art. 1132, Civil Code]

Immovables
● 10 years - If in good faith
● 30 years - If in bad faith

POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH AND BAD FAITH

RELEVANCE OF DISTINCTION
ON THE MATTER OF FRUITS

I. A possessor in good faith is entitled to civil fruits from the start of the possession until
legal interruption, while the possessor in bad faith is not, and is even obliged to pay
damages as rental from time of possession.

II. A possessor in good faith is entitled to retain gathered natural and industrial fruits. A
possessor in bad faith, on the other hand, must account for gathered fruits and return
the value of such gathered fruits as well as those which the legal possessor could have
received with due care and diligence. He must further pay damages as reasonable rent
for the term of possession.

● Not just what he has gathered but what he could have gathered
● This case is entitled the necessary expenses for preservation,

POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH AND BAD FAITH

RELEVANCE OF DISTINCTION

ON THE MATTER OF FRUITS

I. A possessor in good faith is entitled to civil fruits from the start of the possession until
legal interruption, while the possessor in bad faith is not, and is even obliged to pay
damages as rental from time of possession.

II. A possessor in good faith is entitled to retain gathered natural and industrial fruits. A
possessor in bad faith, on the other hand, must account for gathered fruits and return
the value of such gathered fruits as well as those which the legal possessor could have
received with due care and diligence. He must further pay damages as reasonable rent
for the term of possession.

● Prorating expenses
● Allow possessor of good faith until all has been gathered
● Not even reimbursement for cultivation

POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH AND BAD FAITH

RELEVANCE OF DISTINCTION

MOVABLE PROPERTY

Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.
 ● Equivalent to title
● Second part Reinvindicability - need for compensation, right for recovery without need for
compensation Whether the person is in possession good faith or bad faith

POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH AND BAD FAITH

RELEVANCE OF DISTINCTION - MOVABLE PROPERTY

AZNAR V. YAPDIANGCO
G.R. NO. L-18536, MARCH 31, 1965, REGALA, J.

The Supreme Court said that Santos could recover the car from Aznar, even if it is in the
possession of a third party, who had acquired the same in good faith. "No man can transfer to
another a better title than he had himself. The exception of irrevindicability. Santos was
unlawfully deprived of the car under Article 559, entitling him to recover the car from the third
person, Aznar.

● Agreed to buy from Santos only after Santos caused the registration of car
● Transfer ORCR without paying
● Marella got the paper and showed to lawyer without paying the purchase price
● May Santos recover the car from Aznar?
○ The Supreme Court ruled that Santos recover the car from Aznar, no man can
transfer to another the better title that has for himself
○ Santos was unlawfully deprived under Article 559
○ Article 559 - the owner could actually recover the property without compensation

POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH AND BAD FAITH

RELEVANCE OF DISTINCTION - MOVABLE PROPERTY

EDCA PUBLISHING VS SANTOS

G.R. NO. 80298, APRIL 26, 1990, CRUZ, J.

The Supreme Court held that the Edca was not unlawfully deprived in the context of Article
559, since there was a perfected contract of sale between EDCA and the Impostor, Professor
CRUZ, there was just a breach of contract, as the impostor's check bounced. More than that
there was already delivery of the subject books in favor of the impostor. The impostor acquired
ownership, which he could validly transfer to the Santos couple. The dishonor of the check did
not impair the title acquired by the couple.

● Take note of EDCA Publishing v. Santos. Where there is a contract of sale between two
persons and the buyer fails to pay the purchase price, He however was able to sell the
property to a third person. In this case there was a person who falsely represented himself
to be a professor, he bought the property, issued the check and then this said professor
was able to sell the property. To sell the books to a third person – however the check
bounced.
 ● Now the Supreme Court held that EDCA, the bookstore from which the professor bought
the property, was not unlawfully deprived in the context of Article 559. Since there was a
perfected contract of sale between EDCA and the impostor Professor Cruz there was just a
breach of contract as the imposter check bounced
● More than that there was already delivery of the subject books in favor of the imposter
and we know from sales that delivery transfers ownership. The impostor acquired
ownership which he could validly transfer to the Santos couple. That the dishonor of the
check did not impair the title acquired by the couple.
● Notably, in the Aznar case, there was no transfer of title from Santos to Marela which title
he could validly transfer to Aznar. In this particular case however there was a valid
transfer from the EDCA publishing house to the impostor whose ownership the impostor
was able to transfer in favor of spouses.
● The Supreme Court further noted that EDCA was far from being diligent. It did not verify
the identity of the professor. It also did not wait for the check to be honored before
delivering the books. It also issued an invoice showing that the books have been indeed
paid and it is this invoice on which the third person rely. EDCA thus could not recover
possession of the books under article 559 because he has not been deemed unlawfully
deprived.

USUFRUCT

DERIVATIVES

2. He cannot also transform the property,

3. He may make useful improvements, provided he does not alter its form and substance.

Article 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful
improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not
alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may,
however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the
property.

Article 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property
against any damage to the same.

● Article 579
● Note however while he may remove the improvements he is not required to remove such
improvements;
● Usufructuary may not sell the property for he alone can transfer the property.

We can proceed with another marker which is in the Bar Syllabus which is the Usufruct.

● In Usufruct, the usufructuary is allowed by the owner to enjoy his property with the
obligation however of preserving its form and substance.
● There are some certain points one can readily derive from the definition under Article
562.
○ First, is that since the right to enjoy the property is with the use of a usufructuary
not the owner, the owner cannot lease the property to a third person.
 Usufructuary on the other hand may personally enjoy the thing, lease it or alienate
his right to usufruct under article 572. There's only one qualification you can see
under Article 572, saving leases of rural lands - all such contracts shall terminate
upon the expiration of the usufruct. This is logical since the usufruct is a temporary
character and the transferee of the usufruct cannot have a longer and better right
than the usufructuary - the spring cannot rise above its source.
○ A second thing that you can derive from the simple definition that we gave is that
the usufructuary cannot also transform the property. This is because as mentioned
the usufructuary has to preserve the form and substance of the property. Third, for
the same reason, he may make useful improvements provided he does not alter its
form and substance. Note though, that he does not have the right to be
indemnified therefore otherwise he might be able to improve the owner out of the
property which is contrary to the usufructuary being temporary.
● So imagine, usufructo putting up a multibillion building in the property subject of the
usufruct and there's some obligation on the part of the owner to indemnify him for that.
It's not the case that the owner might be improved out of the property. The usufructuary
may however remove such improvements should it be possible to do so without damage to
the property and you can see that under article 579.
● Note however that while he may remove the improvement, he cannot be required to
remove such improvements. He may also set off the improvements against any damage he
caused the property held in usufruct under Article 580.

USUFRUCT

DERIVATIVES

4. The usufructuary may not sell the property

Article 581. The owner of property the usufruct of which is held by another, may alienate it,
but he cannot alter its form or substance, or do anything thereon which may be prejudicial to
the usufructuary.

5. The usufructuary shall be entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits of the property
in usufruct.

Article 566. The usufructuary shall be entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits of
the property in usufruct. With respect to hidden treasure which may be found on the land or
tenement, he shall be considered a stranger.

● The usufructuary takes care of the things of the usufruct required to take care of the
usufruct.
○ The fourth thing you can derive from the definition is that usufructuary may not
sell the property for only the use has been transferred. Ownership is retained by
the owner and he alone can transfer the property but even if we say that the
owner can sell the property he can only do so provided that neither he nor the
transferee can alter the form and substance and do anything that will be
prejudicial to the usufructuary.
 ○ Fifth, enjoyment of the property having been transferred to the usufructuary, the
usufructuary should be entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits on the
property in usufruct.

● Later we will be discussing fruits, accessions and you would note that one of the attributes
of ownership is that he’s entitled to the fruits. This is one exception.
● The usufructuary shall take care of the things given in usufructuary as the good father of
the family that is under article 589. Of course, because he is required to preserve the
property, its form and substance. Thus, a usufructuary who alienates or leases his right
shall answer for any damage which the thing in usufruct may suffer through the fault of or
negligence of the person who substitutes him.

USUFRUCT

DERIVATIVES

7. The usufructuary is obliged to make the ordinary repairs. Extraordinary repairs shall be at
the expense of the owner. But the usufructuary is obliged to notify the owner when the need
for such repair is urgent. Article 592. The usufructuary is obliged to make the ordinary repairs
needed by the thing given in usufruct.

Ordinary repairs are understood as are required by the wear and tear due to the natural use of
the thing and are indispensable for its preservation. Should the usufructuary fail to make them
after demand by the owner, the latter may make them at the expense of the usufructuary.

Article 593. Extraordinary repairs shall be at the expense of the owner. The usufructuary is
obliged to notify the owner when the need for such repairs is urgent.

○ Seventh, since he has the obligation to preserve the property, the usufructuary is
obliged to make the ordinary repairs. Extraordinary repair shall be at the expense
of the owner but usufructuary is obliged to notify the owner when the need for
such repair is urgent. Should the owner not make the extraordinary repairs when
they are indispensable for the preservation of the thing the usufructuary may make
them but he shall have a right to demand at the determination of the usufructuary
in the increase in value.

EXTINGUISHMENT OF USUFRUCT
 Article 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any
resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription.

Extinguishment of the usufruct.

● The Civil Code enumerates the cost of the extinguishment of the contract of usufruct, so
the usufruct is only meant as lifetime grant thus the death of the usufructuary
extinguishes the usufruct unless there's a contrary intention or in case of multiple
usufructs.

Another exception was the subject of a bar question in 1997. Let's discuss the question:

EXTINGUISHMENT OF USUFRUCT

BAR QUESTION (1997)

QUESTION: On January 1 1918, Minerva the owner of the building granted Petronilla until June
1 1998, when Manuel, son of Petronilla would have reached his 30th birthday, Manuel however
died on June 1 1990 when he was only 26 years old. Minerva the owner notified Petronilla that
the usufruct had been extinguished by the death of Manuel and demanded that the latter
vacate the premises and deliver the same to the former. Petronilla, the usufructuary refused to
vacate the place on the ground the usufruct in her favor would expire only on June 1, 1998
when Manuel would have reached his 30th birthday and that the death of Manuel before the
30th birthday did not extinguish the usufruct whose contention should be accepted.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Petronilla’s contention is correct. Under Article 606 of the Civil Code, a
usufruct granted for the time that may elapse before the third person reaches a certain age
shall subsist for the number of years specified even if the third person should die unless there's
an expressed relation in the contract that states otherwise. In the case at bar there is no
expressed relation that the consideration for the usufruct is the existence of Petronilla’s son.
Thus, the general rule and not the exception should apply in this case.

● There is unity of the object not materially divided

● There are two kinds of ownership that exist
○ Ideal share of co-owner but not physically identified yet in partition
○ joint ownership= co-owners over the whole kind that is shared by everyone, the
co-owners
● Another reason for the extinguishment of usufruct:
 ○Loss on the thing extinguishes the usufruct is the loss is only partial the use of
supporting us with the remaining part.
● Prescription, can there be prescription in favor of usufruct?
○ Yes, as an exception but this should require a repudiation of the usufruct while the
usufructuary recognizes the usufruct, the prescriptive period here does not start
to run since possession as we mentioned is not in the concept of an owner but of a
mere holder.
● The usufructuary recognizes a better right.
○ In 1995 there was a question on the distinction between usufruct and easement,
you may distinguish usufruct from easement in these two main ways: Usufruct
grants full enjoyment and use of the property, easement does not grant that. It
only imposes a burden or encumbrance without the right to use.

Co-ownership.

● You have Article 484. It provides that co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons; thus, there is the unity of the
object, there is a single object, which has not been materially divided and there is
plurality of subjects who are the co-owners. What is also unique about co-ownership is
that there are two kinds of ownership that exist. One is the ownership of the ideal share
of the co-owner. A portion which is definite in amount but not physically and actually
identified yet. Since that will only be identified in the partition. Now, the second kind of
ownership and co-ownership is the joint ownership with the other co-owners over the
whole. So, this is the co-ownership, the kind of ownership that is shared by everyone, by
all the co-owners.

CO-OWNERSHIP

Article 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons.

In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the

provisions of this Title.

A. KINDS:
1. Ownership over the ideal share
2. Joint ownership with the other co-owners over the whole

You have the sources. There are different sources of co-ownership. One is through law. You have
Article 147 of the Family Code that states that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, there is co-ownership.
 CO-OWNERSHIP

B. SOURCES

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his
or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.

We litigated this 2016 case of Anson vs. Salgado. A marriage was celebrated between Severina de
Asis and Luis Anson. They separated and during that separation, Severina sold a property to our
client. Upon the death of Severina, Anson filed an action for declaration of the sale of the
property, since it is allegedly conjugal property and it was sold without his consent. The Supreme
Court quoted my cross-examination, which showed that the marriage was celebrated without a
license and we know that a marriage celebrated without a license, and it was shown that there
are no exceptional circumstances; thus, the marriage is void. And if the marriage is void, there
was then a mere co-ownership. It was thereafter that we represented the partition agreement. It
should be noted that co-ownership may be extinguished by partition under Article 494, no
co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.

CO-OWNERSHIP - SOURCES

ANSON V. SALGADO
G.R. NO. 204494, JULY 27, 2016, REYES, J.

The Supreme Court held that the marriage was celebrated without a license. Thus the marriage
is void, and there was then a mere co-ownership. It should be noted that a co-ownership may
be extinguished by partition. Under Article 494, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
 co-ownership; each co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in
common.

Each co-owner may demand anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, In that
partition agreement, the subject property was allocated to Severina. She then had all the right to
transfer it to our client. Had the sale however been made prior the partition, the sale would have
been totally void under the special co-ownership under Article 147.

CO-OWNERSHIP - SOURCES: VOID SALE

PEREZ V. PEREZ SENERPIDA

G.R. NO. 233365, MARCH 24, 2021, CAGUIOA, J.

The Supreme Court said that if under Article 147, the disposition of one’s share in the
co-ownership without the consent of the other, with more reason should the disposition of the
entire property without the consent of the other party be considered void.

The Supreme Court said in Perez vs Senerpida, a 2021 case, the Supreme Court said that if under
Article 147, the disposition of one’s share in the co-ownership without the consent of the other, is
void, with more reason should the disposition of the entire property without the consent of the
other party be considered void. That is the 2021 case of Perez vs. Perez Senerpida.

CO-OWNERSHIP - SOURCES: VALID SALE

REYES V. SPS GARCIA

G.R. NO. 225159, MARCH 21, 2022, HERNANDO, J.

A co-owner may alienate an inchoate portion of the subject property which belongs to him or
her. However, as a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners.

Valid sale, that is however just for the special co-ownership under Article 147. For under ordinary
co-ownership, the disposition of the entire property shall be considered valid although at least to
the extent of the interest of the co-owned property. The disposition will not be totally nullified.
The Supreme Court Justice Hernando affirmed the same in the case of Reyes vs. Garcia. In this
case, Isidoro as one of the heirs sold ½ of the subject property. This sale however will only affect
his own undivided share but not those of other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. The
buyer, thus, will get Isidoro’s undivided share and the buyer will now be the co-owner. But take
note that the buyer cannot claim a specific portion of the subject property prior to its partition,
with the subsistence of the co-ownership, the buyer only owns Isidoro’s aliquot share of the
subject property. The buyer cannot adjudicate to himself or herself title to any definite portion of
the subject property until its actual partition, by agreement or judicially. Justice Hernando
reiterated this in the 2021 Silva vs. Lo case.

CO-OWNERSHIP - SOURCES: VALID SALE

SILVA V. LO
G.R. NO. 206667, JUNE 23, 2021, HERNANDO, J.
 Basic principle in co-ownership is that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite
portion of the land or thing owned in common until the partition thereof. Prior to that time, all
that the co-owner has is an ideal, or abstract, quota or proportionate share in the entire thing
owned in common by all the co-owners.

Allegedly, basic principle in co-ownership is that no individual co-owner can claim title to any
definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until the partition thereof. Prior to that
time, all that the co-owner has is an ideal, or abstract, quota or proportionate share in the entire
thing owned in common by all the co-owners. He added that each co-owner may use and enjoy
the co-owned property with no other limitation than the purpose for which the property is
intended. And in such a way, as to injure the interest of the co-owb=nership or prevent the other
co-owners from using it, according to the right. Before we go to Pardell vs. Bartolome, we have to
emphasize that each co-owner may use the co-owned property, that is his right. The only
limitation is the purpose that may have been agreed upon because this is a contract. Or the other
limitation is that you do not injure the rights of the co-owner. We have the case of Pardell vs.
Bartolome. This is a very old case but it still reflects the concept of the use by the co-owner of
the co-owned property.

CO-OWNERSHIP - SOURCES: USE

PARDELL VS BARTOLOME
G.R. NO. L-4656, NOVEMBER 18, 1912, TORRES, J.

Notwithstanding the joint-ownership rights which entitled the defendants to live in the upper
story of the said house, yet in view of the fact that the record shows it to have been proved
that the defendant Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or
a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice
of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice, requires
that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said quarters
could have produced, had they been leased to another person.

● In the old Pardell vs. Bartolome case, with regard to the portion on the ground floor,
which was occupied by the spouse of the co-owner, when that portion is intended to be
leased to other people, that co-owner must pay to the other co-owner half of the rentals,
which said portion could and should have produced, had they been rented by the
strangers. Because we take note of the purpose. And the purpose is for it to generate
income. So, for the co-owner to use it exclusively, the co-owner is using it, not, or in
violation of the contract of co-ownership; thus,he has to pay rentals. Although, of course,
just half, because, as a co-owner, he is also entitled to the other half. So, it’s just ½ that
will be going to the other co-owner. That is with respect to the portion on the ground floor
of the co-owned property. But for the upper floor which was used as dwelling by the
co-owner and his spouse, said co-owner does not have to pay rentals for such is an
exercise of the co-owner’s right to use. It was used as agreed upon by other co-owners for
dwelling. It does not matter that the other co-owner does not reside therein, for as long
he is not being prevented from doing so.
CO-OWNERSHIP - SOURCES: SUCCESSION

BAILON-CASILAO V. CASILAO
G.R. NO. 78178 APRIL 15, 1988, CORTEZ, J.

Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with
respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers, which culminated in the
sale to Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land. From
the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not
null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owners-seller are transferred, thereby making
the buyer a co-owner of the property.

● Another source of co-ownership is succession.

● We discussed law as a source of co-ownership, another one is succession. The property
may be conjugal during the lifetime of the spouses but upon the death of one spouse, a
new property regime is created. This time, it will be co-ownership, involving the surviving
spouse with his or her undivided share as a conjugal owner and as an heir on one hand,
which he or she shares with co-heirs, and this could be their children. So, in other words,
this surviving spouse is wearing two hats as a conjugal owner and as an heir, in that
co-ownership that has been created upon death. We don't talk anymore of conjugal
property because the conjugal property had already been dissolved by death. This was the
rule in the case of Bailon-Casilao vs. Casilao.
● If there be a case of the whole property co-owned, if there be a sale of the whole
property co-owned, it shall be valid but only to the extent of the co-heirs who transferred
the whole property. This is the principle that we mentioned awhile ago on the ordinary
co-ownership - the co-owner may sell the whole property, it will be valid even without the
consent of the other party but only to the extent of the disposing co-heir.

● But take note of the case of Spouses Rol - Spouses Benny and Normita Rol vs Isabel Urds
Racho (GR No. 246096, January 13, 2021), where there was an extrajudicial partition to
the exclusion of the other heirs and the definite portion of the co-owned property was
sold. The Supreme Court held that the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner
cannot sell but this time we’re talking about a definite portion of the land, without
consent from his or her co-owners. He or she could only sell the undivided interest of the
co-owned property but not a definite portion. If he is the owner of the undivided half of a
tractor land, he has the right, he has a right to sell and convey an undivided half but he
has not the right to divide the two lots into parts and convey the whole of one part by
metes and bounds. The sale of a specific portion of land to petitioners then in this case
was declared to be of no legal effect whatsoever, following the maxim: “nemo dat quod
non habet,” he could not give what he did not have. The owner did not have a right over
a definite portion. So, there’s a distinction among the sale of the whole property, a
portion of the whole property and a definite portion. A co-owner may sale an undivided
portion, you may sell the whole property but it will only be valid to the extent of your
undivided portion but you cannot sell a specific portion.
CO-OWNERSHIP - SOURCES: PARTITION

LANUZA V. LUNA
G.R. NO. 229775, MARCH 11, 2019, J. REYES JR., J.

Between the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an inherent element of a
contract of partition.Since registration serves as constructive notice to third persons, an oral
partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors, are affected. Moreover, even the requirement of a
written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the
heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of
property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part
which belongs to each heir.

● In Lanuza vs. Luna, the Supreme Court clarified that the requisite partition may even be
oral because as we mentioned there, you cannot sell a definite portion unless there’s
partition but in Lanuza vs. Luna, the Supreme Court said that partition doesn’t even have
to be in writing, it may be oral. Here, this case after such partition, you could know that
after such partition, the heirs possessed and exercised dominion over their respective
portions. In accordance with such partition, the object of the complaint to annul the
extrajudicial settlement to recover the shares thereafter, which are present in the hands
of petitioner are likewise already barred by laches - by their failure to assert the right and
we can even see estoppel here because each benefited from that partition.

CO-OWNERSHIP - SOURCES: PARTITION

CLEMENTE VS REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 220008, FEBRUARY 20, 2019, CARPIO, J.

There is no need for the settlement of the estate before one of the heirs can institute an action
on behalf of the other co-heirs. Although an heir's right in the estate of the decedent which has
not been fully settled and partitioned is merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the
heir the right to exercise acts of ownership.28 Thus, even before the settlement of the estate,
an heir may file an action for reconveyance of possession as a co-owner thereof, provided that
such heir recognizes and acknowledges the other co- heirs as co-owners of the property as it
will be assumed that the heir is acting on behalf of all the co-heirs for the benefit of the
co-ownership.

● In the 2019 case of Clemente vs. Republic, a co-heir filed an action against the revocation
of the donation by his father and his siblings of a property, for the failure of the state to
comply with the condition that it be used only for hospital site. Now, the Republic
questioned the heirs’ personality to file a case. Allegedly, it was premature. Allegedly, it
cannot be presumed until full liquidation of the estate that said property shall form part
of the estate and that said heir will have any part therein. WQe know that from
Succession, we know that from Special Proceedings, that inheritance will be, is defined as
that such which is left after all debts are covered. So, the Republic is saying: “why are you
claiming to be an heir when the inheritance has not been defined, it could even be that
nothing is left for the heirs, and why are you asserting your right, when you don't even
 know whether that particular property will go to you.” Now, the Supreme Court said that
there’s no need for the settlement of the estate before one of the heirs can institute an
action on behalf of the other co-heirs. Although an heir’s right in the estate of the
decedent which has not been fully settled, and partition is merely inchoate, Article 493 of
the Civil Code gives the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership, well, provided that he
recognized as co-ownership. We go to another matter that is in the - give me if I take up a
pause to take some water. Let’s go to accession as another matter in the Bar Syllabus.

ACCESSION

ACCESSION

DEFINITION

It is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is merely an attribute of ownership, which gives the
owner of a property the right to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated
or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.

Accession is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is merely an attribute of ownership, which

gives the owner of a property the right to everything which is produced thereby - this is accession
discreta; or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially - this is
accession continua. We go to the next slide.

ACCESSION:
FRUITS

General Rule: All fruits belong to the owner of a thing. (Art. 441)

Exceptions:

● Possession in good faith by another; (Art. 554 (1))

● Usufruct; (Art. 566)
● Lease of rural lands; (Art. 1654)
● Pledge;
● Antichresis. (Art. 2132)

Okay, there is accession continua for movable or immovable properties. What is included in the
Syllabus is accession continua for immovable properties, either industrial or natural.

Industrial accession takes place through artificial means, that is by building, planting or sowing.
Natural accession has four forms: alluvion, avulsion, change of course of river, and formation of
islands. There however are exceptions to the rule that the fruits belong to the owner. The
exceptions are in usufruct, possession in good faith by another, lease, antichresis, and fruits
naturally falling upon an adjacent land.
ACCESSION: ALLUVION

REPUBLIC V. CA
G.R. NO. L-61647. OCTOBER 12, 1984., GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.

The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.

The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited
by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of
his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the
destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to
incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may
prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v.
City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions
to his land caused by special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion.
When the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were
meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of
the waters of the river.

● The more popular topic in natural accession is alluvion.

○ There are 3 requisites:
a. First, is the accumulation of soil be gradual and imperceptible.
b. Second, that if there be result of the action of the river.
c. And third, is that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of the river.

● Let us deal with some cases. One is flashed on the screen: Republic vs. Court of Appeals.
○ It was ruled that alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not artificial,
not man-made.
■ The reason behind the law is to compensate the riparian owner for the
danger of loss he suffered.
○ Estates bordering on rivers, exposed to floods and other kinds of easements, the
Water Code provides this kinds of easements, the right to navigation, the right to
recreation, the right to fishing.
■ Now, alluvion covers lands by the way, covers lands by the rivers and not by
the sea.
■ Lands added to the shores of the sea forms part of the public dominion.
● You have that in Lanzar vs. Director of Lands.

ACCESSION: ALLUVION

LANZAR VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS,

G.R. NO. L-31934 JULY 29, 1977., FERNANDEZ, J.

Lands added to the shores by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by action of the sea, form
part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the water of the sea and are not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for
coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
Also, the rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions to lands that adjoin
canals or esteros.

ACCESSION: ALLUVION

RONQUILLO, VS CA
L-43346, March 20, 1991, REGALADO, J.

The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions to lands that adjoin
canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems.

● Now, we also have De los Reyes vs. Kalibo, 2021 case.

○ The Supreme Court held that an accretion does not - this is very important, this has
been appearing in different Bar Exams.
○ The Supreme Court held that an accretion does not automatically become
registered land just because the lot that receives such accretion is covered by a
Torrens title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, registration is another.

ACCESSION: ALLUVION

DE LOS REYES VS KALIBO

G.R. NO. 214587, FEBRUARY 26, 2018, PERALTA,J.

An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot that receives
such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing,
registration is another.

● In Reynante vs. Court of Appeals, failure to register the acquired alluvial deposit by
accretion for 50 years subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by third
persons. We mentioned a while ago that acquisitive prescription cannot run over a
registered land. Now, what about this accretion, even if this accretion is attached to the
registered land, the accretion does not become a registered land; thus, acquisitive
prescription can be set in there when a third person comes in, in the concept of an owner.

ACCESSION: ALLUVION

REYNANTE V. CA,
G.R. NO. 95907 APRIL 8, 1992, PARAS,J.

Failure to register the acquired alluvial deposit by accretion for 50 years subjected said
accretion to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

● You have Viajar vs. Court of Appeals, registration under the Torrens System does not
protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his registered land
through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream. So, accession happens
whether the property involved is registered or unregistered.
● Now, take note of the distinction between alluvion, which we have been talking about and
avulsion.
ACCESSION: ALLUVION

VIAJAR V. CA
G.R. NO. 77294 DECEMBER 12, 1988, MEDIALDEA,J.

Registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against the
diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an
adjoining stream.

● Take note of the distinction between them.

○ Accretion which takes place when the current of a river segregates.
○ Avulsion involves an accretion which takes place when the current of a river, creek
or torrents segregates from an estate, on his bank unknown portion and transfers it
to another estate. In which case, the owner of the estate, to which the segregated
portion belong, retained the ownership, provided he removes the same within two
years.

ACCESSION:
ALLUVIUM VS. AVULSION

ALLUVIUM AVULSION

Deposit of soil is gradual and imperceptible. Deposit of soil is sudden or abrupt.

Soil cannot be identified. Soil is identifiable and verifiable.

Deposit of soil belongs to the owner of the Deposit of soil belongs to the owner from
property to which it is attached. whose property it was detached provided he
removes the same within two years

● So, in alluvium, it’s the owner of the property to which the deposit was attached or
receives ownership of the property.
● In avulsion, the person who owned the property from which unknown land had been
transferred, retains ownership of the property, provided he moves the segregated portion
within two years.

Change in the Course of RIvers

ACCESSION:
CHANGE IN THE COURSE OF RIVERS

REQUISITES:

● There must be a natural change in the course of the waters of the river.
● The change must be abrupt or sudden. (Art. 461)

● Requisites in the change in the course of rivers,

 ○ There must be a natural change in the course of the waters of the river;
○ The change must be abrupt or sudden.
● The old bed is ipso facto, the old bed of the river is ipso facto owned by the owner of the
land occupied by the new river, in proportion to the area lost.
○ On the other hand, the owner of the land adjoining the old bed may acquire the
same by paying its value but its value should not exceed the value of the area
occupied by the new bed.

ACCESSION:
CHANGE IN THE COURSE OF RIVERS

Water Code, Article 58. When a river or stream suddenly changes its course to traverse private
lands, the owners of the affected lands may not compel the government to restore the river to
its former bed; nor can they restrain the government from taking steps to revert the river or
stream to its former course. The owners of the land thus affected are not entitled to
compensation for any damage sustained thereby. However, the former owners of the new bed
shall be the owners of the abandoned bed in proportion to the area lost by each.

The owners of the affected lands may undertake to return the river or stream to its old bed at
their own expense; Provided, That a permit therefor is secured from the Secretary of Public
Works, Transportation and Communication and work pertaining thereto are commenced within
two years from the change in the course of the river or stream.

● Just on this point, as to the right to the old bed being vested ipso facto, in favor of the
land occupied by the new river, we can connect this to property of public dominion
because under the Water Code, the river is composite term, you have the old bed, you
have the river bank, and the river.
○ Each of this is a property of public dominion. Such that, when the river bed is dried
up, the river bed is still a property of public dominion.
● Now, this appears to be an exception because in this particular piece, where there is
change in the course of the river bed, the old river bed is ipso facto owned by the owner
of the land occupied by the new river.
○ So, from property of public dominion, it became a private property.
○ But take note of the elements of the change in the course of rivers.
● Now, let’s take note of industrial accession.

ACCESSION:
INDUSTRIAL ACCESSION

PERSONS INVOLVED:

● The landowner
● The builder, planter or sower,
● The owner of the materials
 ● It takes place through artificial means that is by building, planting or sowing.
● There are three possible persons involved in industrial accession.
○ The land owner; the builder, planter or sower; and the owner of the materials.
● In the determination of rights is necessary, that good faith or bad faith be considered, we
already know what good faith or bad faith is.
● There are different scenarios involving industrial accession. Let me just deal with Article
448, which is most popular.
○ It is involving the owner of the land and a builder acting in good faith.

ACCESSION:
INDUSTRIAL ACCESSION

DIFFERENT SCENARIOS

Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.

● The same rule applies when both are in bad faith, since the bad faith of one party
neutralizes the bad faith of the other.
● So, in the end, they shall be considered in good faith.
○ For a builder to be in good faith, he must have believed that he had the right to
build because he thought he owned the land.

ACCESSION:
INDUSTRIAL ACCESSION

OPTIONS OF LANDOWNERS

● Appropriate as his own the building, planting or sowing, after payment to the builder,
planter, or sower the necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses
for pure luxury or mere pleasure.
● To oblige the builder, planter or sower to pay the price of the land, so there is a forced
sale

● Again, We’re talking about accession. Industrial accession takes place through artificial
means that is by building, planting or sowing.
● And as I mentioned, there are three possible persons involved in industrial accession, the
land owner; the builder, planter or sower; and the owner of materials.
 ○ In the determination of rights, it is necessary the good faith or bad faith be
considered. And there are different scenarios involving industrial accession.
● Let me just deal with Article 448. Now, for the builder to be in good faith, he must have
believed that he had the right to build because he thought he owned the land.
○ Nonetheless, the land owner is the one given the option to either appropriate, so,
there’s a forced purchase, as his own, the building, planting, or sowing, after
payment to the builder, planter or sower, the necessary and useful expenses. And in
the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure.
■ Note that, unless paid, builder, planter or sower has the right of retention
of the subject property. The builder does not have an obligation to pay
rentals, for that will render nugatory to the right of retention.
■ So, the first option of the land owner is to appropriate.
● While there is no payment, there’s right of retention on the part of
the builder.
■ The other option is for the land owner to oblige the builder, planter or
sower to pay the price of the land.
● So, in the first option, there is a forced purchase. Here, there’s a
forced sale.
■ But this is if the land is not considerably more than that of the building
purchased, otherwise, there will be a forced lease. So, there will be no
forced co-ownership in those instances. It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise this option because his rights are older. And there’s
another principle of accession, that the accession follows this principle.
● Note however, that the land owner does not have any option to compel the builder,
planter or sower in good faith to remove. The owner’s only entitled to remove theron, if
after choosing to sell the land, the party fails to pay the same.

ACCESSION:
INDUSTRIAL ACCESSION

BAR QUESTION (2000 BAR)

In good faith, Pedro constructed a five-door commercial building on the land of Pablo who was
also in good faith. When Pablo discovered the construction, he opted to appropriate the
building by paying Pedro the cost thereof. However, Pedro insists that he should be paid the
current market value of the building, which was much higher because of inflation.
1. Who is correct Pedro or Pablo?
2. In the meantime, that Pedro is not yet paid, who is entitled to the rentals of the
building, Pedro or Pablo?

● There’s a 2000 Bar question, where the facts show that the landowner and the builder,
both of good faith, and the landowner opted to acquire the building.
○ The builder however insist that he paid the market value of the improvement. Note
that it is not the market value of the improvement that is required to be paid by
the landowner under Article 448, in relation to Article 546. The builder is entitled
to refund of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by him.
 ● The next question is, who is entitled to the rentals?
○ On the contractor lease of the building with third persons, while the builder
remains unpaid. Admittedly, the owner of the land is the owner of the building,
which is an accession of the land.This is specially true since the owner of the land
opted to acquire the building.
○ Note however that the right of retention of the builder, while remains unpaid, he
may then collect the rentals but he has to apply such rentals to the indemnity
payable to him after deducting reasonable cost of repair and maintenance, if any.

ACCESSION:
INDUSTRIAL ACCESSION

BAR QUESTION (2001 BAR)

Mike built a house on his lot in Pasay City. Two years later, a survey disclosed that a portion of
the building actually stood on the neighboring land of Jose, to the extent of 40 square meters.
Jose claims that Mike is a builder in bad faith because he should know the boundaries of his lot,
and demands that the portion of the house which encroached on his land should be destroyed
or removed. Mike replies that he is a builder in good faith and offers to buy the land occupied
by the building instead.

1. Is Mike a builder in good faith or bad faith? Why?

2. Whose preference should be followed? Why?

● There’s a 2001 Bar question, which is a reiteration of the ruling in the 1997 Technogas case
(Tecnogas Phils, vs. CA, G.R. No. 108894).
○ It was ruled that there was no showing that when the builder built his house, he
knew that a portion thereof encroached on another person’s land, unless one is
versed in the science of surveying, he cannot determine the precise boundaries or
locations of his property by merely examining his title. In the absence of concrete
proof, the law presumes that the encroachment was done in good faith.
 VI. EASEMENTS

EASEMENTS:
DEFINITION

Article 613, CIVIL CODE. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an

immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.

The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate;
that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.

You can also see the kinds.

EASEMENTS:
KINDS

As to recipient of the benefit

● Real
● Personal

As to manner of exercise
● Continuous
● Discontinuous

As to whether their existence is indicated

● Apparent
● Non-apparent

As to the duty of the servient owner

● Positive
● Negative

As to the right given

● Right to partially use the servient estate;
● Right to get specific materials or objects from the servient estate;
● Right to participate in ownership; and
● Right to impede or prevent the neighboring estatefrom performing a specific act of
ownership.

As to source
● Legal
● Voluntary
● Mixed
And you can also see the characteristics. Let's discuss the characteristics.
● Article 613 provides that an easement is encumbrance imposed upon an immovable. That
is the servient estate, for the benefit of another immovable, belonging to a different
owner, that is the dominant estate.

EASEMENTS:
CHARACTERISTIC
________________________________
BOGO MEDELLIN CO. V. CA,
G.R. NO. 124699. JULY 31, 2003, CORONA,J.

1. It is enjoyed over another immovable

An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of

another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do,
something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or person. It exists only when the
servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of the
easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an
acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another.

The characteristics of easement are mentioned in the syllabus, so let’s dwell on them. We have
three characteristics, which can be seen in the definition.
● One is that it is enjoyed over another immovable. So, we’re always talking about two
properties. It is enjoyed over another immovable, never on one’s own property. Likewise,
it involves two neighboring estates, the dominant estate, to which the right belongs and
the servient estate, upon which an obligation rests.
○ And we have an interesting case, a 2003 case of Bogo Medellin Co. vs CA, the
owner of the property filed an action to recover the property possessed by the
petitioner company. The company asserted that the owner cannot recover the
property anymore because it has acquired ownership over the property by
prescription, having exercised a right of way over the same. So, the owner of the
property filed an action for recovery, the company said: “no, you cannot anymore,
because prescription has set in. ”
■ And in support of that prescription, he claimed a right of way and it even
pointed out that rail tracks in the subject property. But given the
characteristic that I mentioned awhile ago, how could the company acquire
the property by acquisitive prescription, by claiming a right of way, which is
an easement. You are recognizing somebody else’s ownership over the
property.
■ An easement is an encumbrance over another property that totally
contradicts your claim of easement. You cannot have your own easement on
your own property.
○ Another thing that can be derived therefrom, is that there cannot be acquisitive
prescription because when you claim an easement, your claim is not a claim of
ownership.
 ■ So the Supreme Court said in Bogo Medellin, your claim of acquisitive
prescription, in support of a right of way, cannot stand. Your claim of
easement is totally contradictory. The claim of possession in the concept of
an owner.

EASEMENTS:
CHARACTERISTIC
________________________________
SPOUSES ABRAHAM VS. GOLDEN VILLAGE,
G.R. NO. 180808. AUGUST 15, 2018, 2003, CAGUIOA,J.

2. Limitation on the servient owner’s rights of ownership

CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and
without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth
which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement;
neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden.

Hence, the owner of the lower lands [cannot] erect works that will impede or prevent such an
easement or charge, constituted and imposed by the law upon his estate for the benefit of the
higher lands belonging to different owners; neither can the latter do anything to increase or
extend the easements

● Another characteristic is that easement is a limitation on the servient owner’s rights of

ownership.
○ Well, one of the attributes of ownership is the right to enjoy the thing owned, it is
limited by easement and we have the case of Spouses Abraham vs. Golden Village,
which provides, well, in this case, it provides interference between right of
ownership and easement.
○ Article 637 of the Civil Code provides, lower estates are obliged to receive the
waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the
higher estates. Now, in this case, Hilltop City Subdivision is found at the upper
portion of Alco Homes. Golden Village is beside Alco Homes, which make them both
lower estates, in so far as Alco Homes is concerned. Now, this Golden Village
changed their grilled fence to concrete.
○ So, when there was - this Golden Village is in the lower estate, so when there was
a heavy downpour, waters from Hilltop Subdivision came rushing down but because
the fence of the Golden Village was already concrete, said waters did not enter the
village and were diverted to other subdivision where plaintiffs live, damaging their
fence, furnitures and others.
■ Here, the Supreme Court affirmed the right of Golden Village. Well, there is
the easement of the water going down, the Supreme Court affirmed the
right of Golden Village to fence its subdivision. It did not matter whether
 the fence is now concrete when the fence was changed recognizably at the
scene, that any harm occur to the complainants.

EASEMENTS:
CHARACTERISTIC
________________________________
SOLID MANILA CORP. VS. BIO HONG TRADING CO
G.R. NO. 9059 APRIL 8, 1991, SARMIENTO,J.

3. It is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs. It cannot be alienated

independently

Albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property –– including the disputed
alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or
otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a
servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.

● Another characteristic is that it is inseparable to the estate to which it belongs. It cannot

be eliminated independently.
○ There might be other things that I will be skipping in the interest of time, because
we only have 1 hour left, so I do hope you could just see for yourself the certain
cases or certain provisions that I would be referring to.
● And on the matter of easement being inseparable from the estate to which it belongs and
it cannot be alienated independently, please see Solid Manila Corp. Now, another
characteristic of an easement is that it is a right limited or dictated by the Needs of the
dominant owner or estate, without possession.

EASEMENTS:
CHARACTERISTIC
________________________________
ENCARNACION V. CA
G.R. NO. 77628 MARCH 11, 1991, FERNAN,J.

4. It is a right limited or dictated by the Needs of the dominant owner or estate, without
possession.

The owner of the dominant estate should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery
business.

We have to discuss this because right of way is very much popular in the Bar exam.
 ● So, we can discuss this characteristic in the context of an easement of right of way
because the existence of a right of way, as well as the width of the right of way is
dictated by the needs of the dominant estate.
○ The law significantly states adequate outlet.
● Article 651 states that he width of the easement of the right of way shall be that which is
sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate and may accordingly change each, from
time to time.
● Flashed in the screen is an old case of Encarnacion vs. Court Of Appeals, where you have
a nursery plant and then right of way was previously given but the plant, the nursery
operation grew and later on, it was necessary that the width of way be extended since
vehicle was already needed in the operation.
○ The Supreme Court allowed the expansion of the right of way. Take note of the
requisites of a right of way:

EASEMENTS:
CHARACTERISTIC
________________________________
ENCARNACION V. CA
G.R. NO. 77628 MARCH 11, 1991, FERNAN,J.

4. It is a right limited or dictated by the Needs of the dominant owner or estate, without
possession.

The requisites for right of way are:

● The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway;
● The isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
● There should be proper indemnity;
● The right of way claimed is at the point lease prejudicial to the servient estate, and
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

● The estate, the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; you can see the requisites out there, on the screen.
○ In Villanueva vs. Velasco, it was the contention of the servient estate that it is not
bound by the right of way, since it was not annotated in the title, and there was
also a notice of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement, and there
was no notice of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement, which was
recorded with the Registry of Deeds but servient estate is actually legally bound to
provide the dominant estate the ingress to and egress from the public highway
despite the fact that, there’s no notice of right of way annotated, this is required
by law.
EASEMENTS:
CHARACTERISTIC
________________________________
VILLANUEVA VS. VELASCO
G.R. NO. 130845. NOVEMBER 27, 2000, QUISUMBING, J.

4. It is a right limited or dictated by the Needs of the dominant owner or estate, without
possession.

It is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to
provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and egress to the
public highway.

● There are two criteria for the choice of the right of way; short distance and least damage.
If these two do not concur in a single tenement, the Supreme Court held in the past that
the least prejudiced criteria must prevail over the short distance criteria.

EASEMENTS:
CHARACTERISTIC

4. It is a right limited or dictated by the needs of the dominant owner or estate, without
possession.

TWO CRITERIA FOR THE CHOICE OF RIGHT OF WAY

● Shortest distance
● Least damage

● As mentioned, the easement is about the needs of the dominant estate, such is relevant to
the existence, as well as the extinguishment of the easement.
○ That cannot be more true in the easement of the right of way.
○ Thus, if a new road is opened, thereby giving access to the isolated estate, or the
dominant estate has joined it to another abutting on a public highway, and such
public highway substantially meets the needs of the dominant estate, the owner of
the servient estate may demand for the release of his estate from the servitude by
returning what he may have received by way of indemnity without an interest.

EASEMENTS:
CHARACTERISTIC
4. It is a right limited or dictated by the needs of the dominant owner or estate, without
possession.

EXTINGUISHMENT

If a new road is opened thereby giving access to the isolated estate or the dominant estate has
joined it to another abutting on a public highway, and such public highway substantially meets
the needs of the dominant estate, the owner of the servient estate may demand for the
release of his estate from the servitude by returning what he may have received by way of
indemnity without interest.

● Well, there’s an interesting 2021 Spouses Buot vs. CA case, involving a right of way but
one that is under the Public Land Act, Section 112 thereof, which states that lands granted
by patents shall be subject to a legal easement of right of way, which may be enforced by
a government, free of charge, that was allowed, in favor of the National Transmission
Commission, which filed an expropriation case was over properties for tower and
transmission lines. So, tower and transmission lines. So, we’re talking about airspace.

EASEMENTS:
CHARACTERISTIC
______________________________
SPOUSES BUOT V. NTC
G.R. NO. 240720. NOVEMBER 17, 2021, INTING, J.

4. It is a right limited or dictated by the needs of the dominant owner or estate, without
possession.

In this particular case, the right of way that was allowed in favor of the National Transmission
Commission, which filed an action for expropriation case, was over properties for tower and
transmission lines

● In this particular case, the right of way that was allowed in favor of the National
Transmission Commission, which filed an action for expropriation case, was over properties
for tower and transmission lines, so we’re talking about air space. It is a case allowing a
right of way under the Public Land Act.
○ It vest to ask, if the right of way under the Civil Code could also cover the air space
of another property, so as to give the property, private owner of the dominant
estate, the right to put cables and wires over the lots of another, if such cables and
wires be needed for his or own business.
○ I would like to believe that the Civil Code does not contemplate the right of way of
this kind, as it speaks of an outlet of public highway, which then presupposes the
use of servient estate as a passageway.
EASEMENTS:
CHARACTERISTIC
______________________________
SPOUSES BUOT V. NTC
G.R. NO. 240720. NOVEMBER 17, 2021, INTING, J.

4. It is a right limited or dictated by the needs of the dominant owner or estate, without
possession.

PUBLIC LAND ACT, SEC. 112. Said land shall further be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding
sixty (60) meters on width for public highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts,
telegraph and telephone lines, airport runways, including sites necessary for terminal
buildings and other government structures needed for full operation of the airport, as well as
areas and sites for government buildings for Resident and/or Project Engineers needed in the
prosecution of government-infrastructure projects, and similar works as the Government or any
public or quasi- public service or enterprise, including mining or forest concessionaires, may
reasonably require for carrying on their business, with damages for the improvements only.

Government officials charged with the prosecution of these projects or their representatives
are authorized to take immediate possession of the portion of the property subject to the lien
as soon as the need arises and after due notice to the owners. It is however, understood that
ownership over said properties shall immediately revert to the title holders should the airport
be abandoned or when the infrastructure projects are completed and buildings used by project
engineers are abandoned or dismantled, but subject to the same lien for future improvements.

● But anyway, since we touch on the air space as within the property rights of the owner, we
can quickly mention of the right of the owner, of the surface owner, the right of the owner
extends not only to the surface but also the airspace, and so is the subsoil.
● The Supreme Court however clarified in Napocor vs. Ibrahim ( G.R. No. 168732, June 29,
2007), the land owner’s rights extends to such height or depth, only where it is possible
for them to obtain such benefit or enjoyment. And it extinguish beyond said limit, as there
would be no more interest protected by law.
○ Given that, there could also be taking of the property in the context of eminent
domain if the owner is deprived of the use of the subsoil. Because of the right of
the subsoil, if we can add the owner of the surface as rights to the hidden
treasure, but take note that the right to subsoil does not cover mineral resources,
for they belong to the state under the Regalian Doctrine.
○ We will not, the coverage given to me does not cover Land, Titles and Deeds but I
would have discussed more on the Regalian Doctrine but maybe next time.
○ In the meantime, let us go to acquisition and the last hour would be about
acquisition and donation. Oh, this is acquisition first of easement.
 EASEMENTS:
MODES OF ACQUISITION
________________________
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC. V. CA
G.R. NO. 124699. JULY 31, 2003., INTING ,J.

MODES OF ACQUISITION

1. By Title
2. By Prescription

An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of

another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do,
something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or person. It exists only when the
servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of the
easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an
acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another.

So, let us go back to legal easements and how they are acquired.
● There are two modes of acquiring easements: by title and by prescription.
○ So all easements may be acquired by title, so by contract, where its
continuous/discontinuous, apparent/non-apparent, negative or positive, but take
note that only continues and apparent easements, sorry to pause, but only
continues and apparent easements may be acquired by prescription.
■ An easement of right of way is apparent since there is a mark there.
○ In Bogo-Medellin, there was a rail track there. It is apparent but it is not
continuous because it is used at intervals; hence, a right of way is not acquired by
prescription. Now, let’s go to Bogo-Medellin.
■ What I mentioned awhile ago, if the dominant estate cannot acquire did not
acquire the property, or did not acquire ownership by prescription, since by
claiming that there’s a right of way, there's an admission that there's a
better right.
■ So he could not have the company possess the property in the concept of an
owner.

So, if he did not acquire ownership, did he at least acquire easement by prescription?

EASEMENTS:
MODES OF ACQUISITION
________________________
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC. V. CA
G.R. NO. 124699. JULY 31, 2003., INTING ,J.
Having held the property by virtue of an easement, petitioner cannot now assert that its
occupancy since 1929 was in the concept of an owner. Neither can it declare that the 30-year
period of extraordinary acquisitive prescription started from that year.

● That was discussed on the second part of the decision. So, but we said an easement can
only be acquired by prescription if the easement is continuous and apparent.
○ In Bogo-Medellin, we were talking of easement of right of way, which is apparent
but it is not continuous. So, in Bogo-Medellin, the easement could not also be
acquired by prescription.
○ Now, if the easement is both continuous and apparent, it may be acquired by
prescription within a period of 10 years. The commencement of the 10-year period
of prescription will depend now on whether it is positive or negative.

EASEMENTS:
BY PRESCRIPTION

CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE 621. In order to acquire by prescription the easements referred to in the
preceding article, the time of possession shall be computed thus: in positive easements, from
the day on which the owner of the dominant estate, or the person who may have made use of
the easement, commenced to exercise it upon the servient estate; and in negative easements,
from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate forbade, by an instrument
acknowledged before a notary public, the owner of the servient estate, from executing an act
which would be lawful without the easement.

● So, this is another kind of easement that we have to contend with or we take note of when
we’re talking of easement.
● Awhile ago, we talked about it should be continuous,it should be apparent. Now, this time,
we will be talking if it’s positive or negative, to determine the commencement of the
10-year period of prescription.
○ If the easement is positive,the 10-year period is counted from the day on which
the owner of the dominant estate, or the person who may have used, who made
use of the easement commenced to exercise it upon the servient estate.
■ So, it is upon the day of commencement of exercise.
○ If the easement is negative, the 10-year period is counted from the day on which
the owner of the dominant estate forbade by public instrument the servient estate
from performing an act which would be lawful without easement. So, in a positive
easement, the mere use triggers the commencement of the 10-year period. The
easement is negative.
■ It’s not enough that you exercise the easement, you have to forbid the
servient estate from executing it, from performing an act. It’s not enough
that you stay put, you have to forbid in a public instrument. This is best
described in an easement of light and view.
EASEMENTS:
LIGHT AND VIEW

CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE 668. The period of prescription for the acquisition of an easement of
light and view shall be counted:

1. From the time of the opening of the window, if it is through a party wall; or
1. From the time of the formal prohibition upon the proprietor of the adjoining land or
tenement, if the window is through a wall on the dominant estate.

● If you open a window of your building, there will be a negative easement.

● If you open a window in your building, there will be a negative easement by prescription
because the window is in your building. That is your right.
○ And if you open a window in your building, there will be a negative easement
prescription where you can prevent the owner of the adjacent property from
building to a height that will obstruct the window, only if ten years have passed
since the time you have prohibited said owner from making such building by a
public instrument.
○ It’s only from said prohibition that you have deemed to put up on notice the other
person of the adverse claim of the one, of your adverse claim.
■ Okay. So, if you open up a window in your building, there will be a negative
easement. And if that be the case, you have to forbid.
● If, however you open a window in a party wall, this time, the easement will be positive
and the 10-year period commences from the time of the opening. It is because from said
opening, the owners deemed to have consented or tolerated said opening.
○ So, please look at the difference when you open the window in your building, it is
negative easement, if you open a window in party wall, it is a positive easement,
and it is from that time that you have made known your adverse claim.
○ So,the 10-year period already starts to run. So, that is acquisition of easement.
 MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

We now go to the modes of acquiring ownership, which is the last part of Property Law and it will
end with the discussion on Donation. Well, a prescription is one of modes of acquiring ownership
but we have lengthily discussed it.

So, the first mode of acquiring ownership is occupation.

OCCUPATION

The acquisition of ownership by seizing corporeal thing that have no owner, made with the
intention of acquiring them, and accomplished according to legal rules.

REQUISITES

● There must be seizure of a thing;

● Which must be a corporeal personal property;
● Which must be susceptible of appropriation by nature;
● The thing must be without an owner;
● There must be an intention to acquire ownership; and
● The requisites or laid down by law must be complied with.

● Take note that it is thru seizure that of a corporeal personal property,which is susceptible
of appropriation by nature and without an owner. You can see the requisites.
● You can see there the requisites that are, that need to be complied with, before an
occupation can be a mode of ownership. It has to be emphasized there, that there must
be an intention to acquire ownership.

May an ownership of land be acquired by occupation?

No. It is because, it always has an owner.

● Considering, we can answer in the negative. Because first of all, as we mentioned a while
ago, occupation can only happen when the subject property is a movable property and
secondly, which is most important, there can only be occupation when the property,
subject of occupation, does not have an owner.
● A property, a real property or a land, always has an owner.
○ It may not be owned by a private person but under the Regalian Doctrine, it is
owned by the state, so it cannot be the subject of occupation.
Requisites of Donation

Let’s go now to the last part of the topic.

DONATION

ARTICLE 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing
or right in favor of another, who accepts it.

REQUISITES

1. Donor must have Capacity to make the donation

2. He must have donative Intent (animus donandi)
3. There must be Delivery in certain cases
4. Donee must accept or consent to the donation during the lifetime of the donor and of
the done in case of donation inter vivos; whereas in case of donation mortis causa,
acceptance is made after the donor’s death because they partake of a will.

We start with the requisites of donation.

● The donor must have capacity to make the donation; he must have donative Intent, intent
to let go of the property; and there must be delivery in certain cases, we say certain cases
because delivery is not essential for the perfection of the contract, there’s only one
instance where delivery is essential.
○ Delivery is not even essential in the transfer of ownership, as we will see later.
Then, the donee must accept or consent to the donation and must accept it during
the lifetime of the donor and of the done in case of donation inter vivos.
● So again, there must be an acceptance, the rationale is that none is obliged to receive of
anything against the will.
○ Acceptance of the donation must be done during the lifetime of the donor and of
the donee, as I said in the case of donation inter vivos, and in case of donation
mortis causa, acceptance is made after the donor’s death. That is very clear that
acceptance is made after the donor’s death because donation mortis causa is a
form of succession and succession only happens in case of death.
○ Prior to the death, there’s nothing to accept. And prior to the death, there’s no
right to,in fact, even if the party, even if the donee waives the right to that, it's
not valid because there’s nothing to waive yet at that point of time. Again,
succession only happens after death.

PERFECTION

ARTICLE 734 The donation is perfected from the moment the donor
CIVIL CODE knows of the acceptance by the donee.

ARTICLE 746 Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the

CIVIL CODE donor and the donee
 ● We reiterate Article 734, which provides that donation is perfected from the moment the
donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.
● So, the donation follows the theory of cognition.
○ Thus, if before the donor knows of the acceptance of the donee, the donor has
already become insane or has in fact to revoke the donation,there’s no more
donation to speak of.
○ Note also, that if by the time the donor knows of the acceptance of the donation,
the donee has already passed away, then, no donation is also perfected because
under Article 746, which we already cited awhile ago, acceptance must be made
during the lifetime of the donor and the donee.

KINDS

ACCORDING TO MOTIVE OR CAUSE:

● Simple;
● Remuneratory (first kind);
● Remuneratory (second kind):
● Conditional or Modal donations; or
● Onerous donations.

AS TO PERFECTION OR EXTINGUISHMENT:

● Pure
● With a condition; or
● With a term

ACCORDING TO EFFECTIVITY:

● Inter vivos; (Art. 729, NCC);

● Mortis causa; (Art. 728, NCC); or
● Propter nuptias.

● We have different kinds of donation. We already mentioned in passing - inter vivos and
mortis causa. We have to dwell on this more clearly.
○ If the donation is intended to become effective and is intended to transfer
ownership over the related property, during the lifetime of the donor, then, it is a
donation inter vivos.

KINDS

DONATION INTER VIVOS ⚬ Effective during the lifetime of the donor

⚬ Should be done in accordance with Articles 748 and
749
DONATION MORTIS CAUSA ⚬ Effective only upon his death of the donor
⚬ Shall be done in the forms of wills

● Accordingly, we have Article 729, which we are going to flash on the screen.
● When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the
donor, though the property shall not be delivered till after the donor’s death, this shall be
a donation inter vivos.
○ So, you can see, donation is effective, made effective during the lifetime of the
donor but it’s delivered after death. But, take note, it’s all about that intention.
■ So, intention to transfer ownership - that perfects the donation, that she
has the donation, but of course, provided that there's an acceptance. Even
if an attribute of ownership is withheld, for it is the transfer of ownership
and not the transfer of attribute that is relevant to the characterization as
mentioned awhile ago.
■ Delivery is generally not necessary to perfect the donation unlike in
deposit. Delivery is not necessary to transfer ownership in donation unlike
in sales. But note, while it may end actually transferred, it may, in the end,
actually transfer ownership, only after the death of the donor, it will still be
a donation inter vivos.
○ Again, if the transfer was intended to be independent of the donor’s death and was
not because of prior contemplation of death,this was the situation contemplated in
Article 730, which we have to clarify.
■ It says there, the fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive
condition, which may take place beyond the natural expectation of life of
the donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as a donation inter vivos,
unless, only a contrary intention appears.

KINDS

ARTICLE 729 When the donor intends that the donation shall take
CIVIL CODE effect during the lifetime of the donor, though the
property shall not be delivered till after the donor’s
death, this shall be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of
the property from the time of the acceptance of the
donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor
provides otherwise.

ARTICLE 730 The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive

CIVIL CODE condition, which may take place beyond the natural
expectation of life of the donor, does not destroy the
nature of the act as a donation inter vivos, unless a
contrary intention appears.

● So, let us say, the Deed of Donation states that the donation shall be effective, provided
that Carlo pass the Bar. Carlo was still in College at that time.
 ○ Passing the Bar was a suspensive condition that may happen beyond the natural
expectation of the life of the already aged and sickly donor. But if by the time
Carlo passed the Bar, that the donor has already passed away, it’s still a donation
inter vivos, since the donation does not happen by reason of or because of, or in
contemplation of death, but because of the Deed of Donation.
■ The controlling factor of the effectivity of the donation is not the death.
The death is immaterial to the donation. It just so happen that the donation
by reason of suspensive condition, took effect after the death. But that
donation was not intended to take necessarily in effect only upon the death
of the donor. It just so happened.
○ Now, if the donation was actually intended to be effective, only upon the death of
the donor, then, the donation becomes mortis cause. It’s all about the intention.
Again, also, it's not about the label.
■ If the deed is coined as mortis causa, but the donation is effective during
the lifetime of the donor, as shown in the deed, it’s still a donation inter
vivos.
■ It's not about the label. It's all about the intention as shown in the deed.

Now, why are we concerned with the distinction between donation mortis causa and inter
vivos donation?

KINDS

ARTICLE 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally

REQUISITES OF DONATION or in writing.

An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the

thing or of the document representing the right donated.

If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five

thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be
made in writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void.

ARTICLE 749. In order that the donation of an immovable

may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation

or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect
unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the

donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this
step shall be noted in both instruments.
It’s because of Article 748 and 749. While donation mortis causa shall be in the form of wills, we
have two kinds of wills: notarial and holographic will.

KINDS

NOTARIAL WILL ARTICLE 805. Every will, other than a holographic will,
_______________________ must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator’s name written by some other
Article 804. Every will must be in person in his presence, and by his express direction,
writing and executed in a and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
language or dialect known to the witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
testator. another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write

his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page
thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used

upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to

the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

HOLOGRAPHIC WILL ARTICLE 810. A person may execute a holographic will

which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

● A donation inter vivos shall not be done in accordance with wills and you have that under
Article 748.
● So, for donation mortis causa, it must comply with the formalities of the last will and
testament, otherwise, it would be void and produce no effect.
 KINDS
___________________________
Maglasang v. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan
G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

A donation mortis causa must comply with the

DONATION MORTIS CAUSA formalities of a last will and testament otherwise; it
would be void and would produce no effect.

Simple and Remuneratory Donation vs. Onerous Donations

Now, we also have simple and remuneratory donations. You have on the slide, that one. Mortis
causa, now we have simple and remuneratory donations, compared to onerous donations. In an
onerous donation, basically, there is a burden imposed upon the donee.

KINDS

SIMPLE AND → Illegal or impossible conditions in simple and

REMUNERATORY remuneratory donations shall be considered as not
imposed

ONEROUS → illegal or impossible conditions in simple and

remuneratory donations shall annul the donation

(1) As to the conditions imposed

● We need to distinguish the two. Simple and remuneratory donations on one hand, and
onerous donations, on the other hand, under Article 727.
○ Illegal or impossible conditions in simple and remuneratory donations shall be
considered as not imposed. So, as if there’s no condition.
○ But if those kinds of conditions are imposed in an onerous donation, the donation
itself is set aside.
■ Since the onerous donations are governed by the law on contracts and under
Article 1183, impossible or illegal, we have that, which makes the donation
itself or the contract itself void.
● In the first, the condition is set aside, in the other, the donation itself is set aside.

(2) As to the form

● Also, for simple and remuneratory donations, the form required is as provided under
Article 748 or 749.
● But as mentioned in the case of Danguilan vs. IAC, where there is an onerous condition for
the donation, which was for the donee to take care of the donor for the rest of his life and
to provide for his burial, then it did not matter, that the donation was not in a public
instrument. The donation was valid.
 ONEROUS DONATION
____________________________
Danguilan vs IAC
G.R. No. L-69970 November 28, 19, CRUZ, J.

Where there is an onerous condition for the donation, which was for the donee to take care of
the donor for the rest of his life and to provide for his burial, then it did not matter, that the
donation was not in a public instrument. The donation was valid.

So, it is only in simple and remuneratory donation that we apply Article 748 and 749 because for
an onerous donation, it is governed by the law on contracts. Now, the general provision of
contracts.

Donation Propter Nuptias

DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS

____________________________
Lorenzo v. Eustaquio
G.R. No. 209435, August 10, 2022, HERNANDO, J.

Although acquisitive prescription cannot set in over registered land, it can be lost by laches, by
a party’s failure for a considerable length time to institute an action to enforce his or her
claim.

● We have Donation Propter Nuptias, which is a donation by reason of marriage, made

before the celebration, in consideration of the same, in favor of one or both of the future
spouses and we discussed the case of Lorenzo vs. Eustaquio, decided by the Supreme
Court Justice Hernando, which we already discussed awhile ago.
○ And the donation of a parcel of land should be in public instrument; hence, it is
void. In this case, as we mentioned, the Deed of Donation Propter Nuptias is not in
a public instrument; hence, it is void.
○ But as we mentioned awhile ago, while acquisitive prescription is inapplicable in
cases of registered land, still, laches may set in, preventing, by reason of equity, a
registered owner and any successor in interest from assailing the rights of the
occupants for failure to recover possession of the subject property and had not
offered an explanation for such inaction.
■ Again, while there is no acquisitive prescription, there is extinctive
prescription by laches.

Donation as a Solemn Contract

Okay, let’s discuss the other recent cases. We have the 2020 Spouses Devisfruto vs. Greenfell
(G.R. No. 227725, July 01, 2020) and the 2021 Doris Marie Lopez vs. Saludo (G.R. No. 233775,
September 15, 2021) case, which both discussed the formalities of donation of a movable
property under Article 748 of the Civil Code.

FORMATION OF DONATION OF MOVABLE PROPERTY

________________________________________
Lopez v. Saludo
G.R. No. 233775, September 15, 2021, HERNANDO, J.

ARTICLE 748 Since petitioner, in this case, insists that the purchase money for the
CIVIL CODE properties was gratuitously furnished by respondent, the formalities
of a valid donation under Article 748 of the Civil Code should have
been complied with, failing which, there could be no donation to
speak of.

● This highlights again the donation as being solemn contract.

● Generally speaking, under Obligations and Contracts, contracts are valid and enforceable
in whatever form they may have but here, we have an exception, donations.
○ Article 748 states that an oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of a
thing or the document that represents the right donated.
■ If the value of the property donated however, movable property, exceeds
Php5,000.00, the donation and the acceptance shall be in writing.
○ You can see that in this Lopez case, a classic case of ghosting and budul-budol at
the same time. The parties were sweethearts. The girlfriend convinced the
boyfriend to provide the Php50 million to purchase two parcels of land in Pasig,
with the promise that the title to this property shall be registered in the name of
the boyfriend, and the manifestation that “the seller will not entertain anybody
but me, the girlfriend, so you just have to trust me.” But when the boyfriend
provided the Php50 million, the girlfriend started avoiding the boyfriend, ghosting,
the latter discovered the property was registered not in his name budul-budol, but
in the name of the girlfriend. The boyfriend took possession of the properties,
made improvements in the amount of Php9 million, paid the real property tax and
association dues. Thereafter, he filed an action for reconveyance against the
girlfriend. The girlfriend countered that the Php50 million she received was a
donation, on the account of their being girlfriend and boyfriend.
■ The Supreme Court disagreed that there was a valid donation. The
donation, assuming that there was a donative intent, should have been in
writing, since the subject thereof was in excess of Php 5,000.00.

FORMATION OF DONATION OF MOVABLE PROPERTY

________________________________________
Sps Devisfruto v. Greenfell
 G.R. No. 227725, July 01, 2020, LEONEN, J.

ARTICLE 748 Although petitioners repeatedly insisted that the purchase money for
____________ the properties was gratuitously given, it appears that they did not, at
CIVIL CODE any stage, present evidence that this donation complied with the
formal requirements under Article 748 of the Civil Code. The Court
noted that donations of purchase money must follow the formal
requirements mandated by law.

● In Spouses Devisfruto vs. Greenfell, Greenfell financed the purchase of a house and lot
from Spouses Magisa. The lots were registered in the name of Devisfruto, her niece. As
soon as Greenfell reacquired Filipino citizenship, she demanded reconveyance of the
properties in her favor, on a basis of a trust relationship. We can see that in trust, when
the purchase money was given to another but the property was registered in the person, in
whose favor the money was given.
○ In this case, the Supreme Court said reconveyance was proper but what about the
defense of the niece, the defense of Ruth and her spouse. According to her and her
spouse, the purchase money was a donation.
○ The Supreme Court rejected, assuming again that there was a donation, assuming
that there was a donative intent, there was non-compliance with the requirements
as regards form, we again say that donation is solemn contract.
Donation with a Condition

Now, let’s talk about recent decisions on donations, with a condition. There is that 2017 case of
Province of Camarines Sur and 2022 case of Estate of Susano Rodriguez, penned by Justice
Hernando.

DONATION WITH A CONDITION

____________________________
Province of Camarines Sur v. Bodega Glassware
G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017, Jardeleza, J.

At the risk of repetition, the breach of the condition in the donation causes the automatic
revocation. All the donor has to do is to formally inform the donee of the revocation. Judicial
intervention only becomes necessary if the donee questions the propriety of the revocation.
Even then, judicial intervention is required to merely confirm and not order the revocation.
Hence, there can be no 10-year prescriptive period to file an action to speak of. When the
donee does not contest the revocation, no court action is necessary.

● Let’s go on the first case, Province of Camarines Sur.

● In this case, the Province donated to the Camarines Sur Teacher’s Association a parcel of
land, which shall be used for no other purpose than construction of its building to be
 owned and to be constructed by the donee to house its offices. It is likewise stipulated
that the donee shall not sell, mortgage or encumber the properties.
○ Most importantly, there is an automatic rescission clause, in case of violation of the
donation, allowing the donor to just, without judicial intervention, rescind the
donation. The Province invoked said clause when the Association leased the
property to respondent. Thereafter, the Province filed a case for unlawful detainer
against respondent to recover possession of the property.

DONATION WITH A CONDITION

____________________________
Province of Camarines Sur v. Bodega Glassware
G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017, Jardeleza, J.

The Supreme Court, however, clarified that the other party may contest the extrajudicial
rescission in court in case of abuse or error by the rescinder. It is only in this case where a
judicial resolution of the issue becomes necessary. Citing the case of De Luna which provides
that:

“It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of
obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an
agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to
determine whether or not the rescission was proper. “

The Supreme Court started with reiterating the validity of an automatic revocation clause as held
in De Luna v. Abrigo (G.R. No. L-57455, January 18, 1990), you might remember that in De
Luna case, the Court found that the donation was an onerous contract, as it required the donee
to build a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten.
● The Court then went on to explain that, what we mentioned awhile ago, that an onerous
donation is governed by the law on contracts, and not governed by the law on donations.
And in the law of contracts, we have Article 1306 of the Civil Code which harps on the
mutuality of contracts – parties can stipulate, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient. And if they stipulated the right to rescind, so be it.
● Now, this right to rescind a contract unilaterally is akin to an automatic revocation clause
in an onerous donation. Thus, this provision is applicable or is allowed in an onerous
donation, is valid in an onerous donation. And thus, the donation may be rescinded
without judicial intervention
○ And the Supreme Court citing De Luna, maintained that: “it’s clear; however, that
judicial intervention is necessary not for purpose of obtaining a judicial
declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an
agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention.“ So, it is
not necessary to rescind the contract. It might be necessary in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper. Okay, so you can rescind, without judicial
intervention. But it does not prevent the other party, the donee, from questioning
that rescission. And it is only there that there will be judicial intervention but not
in the rescission because the automatic revocation clause is valid, it can be cited,
 it can be invoked without judicial intervention. Again, because in De Luna, onerous
donations are governed by the law on contracts.

● Now, however, you can take note of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (G.R. No.
77425, June 19, 1991), and in this case, the Supreme Court explained that this
automatic revocation clause is not only valid for onerous donations, but all kinds of inter
vivos donations.
○ And the explanations that the Supreme Court held in Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, does by way of a side matter, in relation to De Luna, the Supreme Court
explained in the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, that Article 1372 of the
Civil Code states that the general provisions on Obligations and Contracts shall
govern donations inter vivos in all matters not determined in Title 3, Book 3 on
Donations. Significantly, Title 3, Book 3 on Donations has no explicit provisions for
instances where there are donations with automatic revocation clause.
● So, in De Luna, automatic revocation clause is valid because onerous contracts are not
governed by the Law on Donations, but in the case of Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, the scope has been extended so as to cover any kind of inter vivos donation.

DONATION WITH A CONDITION

____________________________
Province of Camarines Sur v. Bodega Glassware
G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017, Jardeleza, J.

At the risk of repetition, the breach of the condition in the donation causes the automatic
revocation. All the donor has to do is to formally inform the donee of the revocation. Judicial
intervention only becomes necessary if the donee questions the propriety of the revocation.
Even then, judicial intervention is required to merely confirm and not order the revocation.
Hence, there can be no 10-year prescriptive period to file an action to speak of. When the
donee does not contest the revocation, no court action is necessary.

● Let’s now go back to prescription, as discussed in the case of Province of Camarines Sur.
Article 764 provides for a prescriptive period to file an action to revoke the donation in
case of breach of a condition. T
○ he Supreme Court held that this applies only in an instance where the deed of
donation does not contain an automatic revocation clause.

But what if there is an automatic revocation clause?

● Again, if a contract of donation provides for an automatic rescission or revocation in case
of a breach of condition and the donee violates it, the property donated automatically
reverts back to the donor without the need of any judicial declaration.
○ It is only when the donee denies the rescission or challenges its propriety that the
court can intervene, to conclusively settle whether the dissolution was proper.
Okay.
○ However, in this case of Province of Camarines Sur, though, the donee association
already accepted the revocation. So, we are not anymore talking about an action
to question the revocation under the automatic revocation clause.
 ● Now, so there was no need for judicial intervention either in the rescission or in the
determination, whether the rescission was proper, or to confirm the propriety of the
rescission. Now here, the donee already accepted the donation, and the donor wanted the
return of the property.
○ And the donor sourced its right of possession, in this case, on its right of ownership,
because under Article 48 of the Civil Code, which we discussed awhile ago, the
owner has a bundle of rights – the right to own, the right to fence, the right to
recover. We talk about the three kinds of actions to recover possession. And in this
case, the right to file an ejectment suit was filed. And the question is “has this
prescribed?”
○ Under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, a party, which we discussed awhile
ago, or is seeking to eject another from a property for unlawful detainer must file
the action for ejectment, within 1 year from the last demand to vacate. In this
particular case, the action for unlawful detainer was filed within the 1-year period.

DONATION WITH A CONDITION

____________________________
Estate of Rodriguez vs. Republic
G.R. No. 214590. April 27, 2022, Hernando, J.

Supreme Court affirmed that donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts, under article 733. This allows the parties to stipulate such terms and conditions, as
they find convenient. Thus an automatic recscission clause is valid.

The next case penned by J. Hernando appears to be more interesting.

● Here, there was a condition in the donation in favor of the State. It was the state that
was, the property was donated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines to the
Department of Health, for a 32-hectare property was donated to the Department of Health
to be utilized for the establishment of a mental health facility. Further, the State was
prevented from leasing, conveying, disposing or encumbering the property. Here, the state
allowed a portion of the donated property, in violation of the condition, to be used for
residential or commercial purposes.
○ The Supreme Court Justice Hernando affirmed that the donations with an onerous
cause shall be governed by the Rules on Contracts, under Article 733. This allows
the parties to stipulate such terms and conditions, as they find convenient. Thus,
an automatic rescission clause is valid.
● But let us take note of the qualifications.

DONATION WITH A CONDITION

____________________________
Estate of Rodriguez vs. Republic
G.R. No. 214590. April 27, 2022, Hernando, J.
 QUALIFICATION

● While such clause is valid, a party is not precluded from going to court to
determine the propriety of the rescission.
● The prohibition upon the State to let or convey the property, without specifying
the duration of the restriction is undue restriction on the right of ownership of the
donee.
● As regards prescription of the action. It referred to Article 1144, which provides for 10
years from the failure of the state to comply with the conditions.

● First, while such clause is valid, a party is not precluded from going to court to determine
the propriety of the decision. We know that. But here, that action to question the
propriety is warranted. Since the revocation is only allowed when the breach is
substantial.
○ Here, the Supreme Court said that the state has substantially complied with the
condition specially that the deed of donation dod not specify the extent of the area
of the 32-hectare property that must be occupied by the buildings and
infrastructure, also the mental hospital continues to operate. It did not compel the
Deed of Donation, did not compel the state to erect building on every square inch.
■ Meaning to say, automatic revocation clause allowed, the other party may
contest because while the automatic revocation clause is allowed, rescission
can only be allowed if there is substantial breach and the Supreme Court, as
said by Justice Hernando, there is no substantial breach yet.

● Second, the prohibition upon the state to let or convey the property without specifying
the duration of the restriction, is undue restriction on the right of ownership of the donee.
○ It then, is an illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article
727, as it is contrary to public order, public policy, that duration, that condition, by
the way, is deemed not imposed.
■ Okay. So, there’s no condition, there’s no burden that has been breached
then, because the condition is illegal.

● Now, third, as regards prescription of the action, it referred, the Supreme Court referred
to Article 1144, which provided that all actions upon a written contract shall be brought
within 10 years from accrual of the right of action.

Now, the question is, the question here is when do we start counting the 10-year period?
● The 10-year period, as regards prescription of the action, here the state was able to
develop 5 hectares of the whole property. Notably, the state was not able to develop the
remainder because of the informal settlers. The state had to file an ejectment case still,
then later, it secured a favorable judgment but that was appealed to the Regional Trial
Court. It was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court but it was still appealed to the Court of
Appeals. However, the State was unable to cause the enforcement of the decision for 10
years, which is required under Rule 39.
 ○ Let’s just quickly mention Rule 39. Under Rule 39, you can file,you can force a final
judgment by motion for 5 years, after that, you can file an action, you can enforce
it by action up to the 10th year.
● In this case, the state was not able to cause the enforcement of the judgment, affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the next 10 years.

Now, the question is, has the period lapsed?

● The Supreme Court said that the 10-year period, prescriptive period only runs from the
lapse of said 10-year period to enforce the judgment. Okay. It was only then.
○ Significantly, the 10-year period provided in Article 44, which this could guide us,
was not counted from the date of donation on September 12, 1968, not even from
the time ejectment judgment decided by the MTC, affirmed by the RTC and the CA
became final on March 27, 1995.Thus, the prescriptive period runs from lapse of
the 10-year period from the finality of that decision of the CA case, ejectment
case. So, that means, only after 2005, and the 10-year period will run from 2005 to
2015. And we’re talking about a donation that was made in September 12, 1968.
Here, the complaint was filed in 2007.
○ The estates complaint filed in 2007 is well within the prescriptive period, which is
10 years from the lapse of the period within which the period, within which the
Republic could have filed a revival of judgment.And Supreme Court said, as
correctly ruled by the CA, the cause of action accrued only from the time of the
alleged violation of the Republic.
○ That is the failure to comply with this obligation to not lease, discover, encumber
or dispose, and the Supreme Court clarified that such failure would only be
counted, that failure is that failure to move for execution, or revival of judgment,
which resulted in the continuous occupation of the informal settlers on a portion of
the donated property.
○ So, look at the 10-year period and look at when it started to run in this particular
case.

RESCISSION OF DONATION
____________________________
Patenia-Kinatac-an v. Patenia-Decena
G.R. No. 238325, June 15, 2020, Lopez, J.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the donation of a real property is a solemn contract. It should
be through a public instrument.

A defect in the notarization renders the donation void. However, the Supreme Court did not
declare the donation void despite the fact that the parties failed to sign the notarial register
since the requirement under 2004 rules of notarial practice was not yet applicable when the
deed was notarized in 2002.

● In the 2020 Kinatac-an case, were almost done.

 ○ In the 2020 KInatac-an case, the Supreme Court affirmed the donation of real a
property as solemn contract. It should be through a public instrument.
○ We mentioned that in Perez vs. Senerpida, we also mentioned that. And the
Supreme Court took note of a prohibition under Article 147 upon the cohabiting
parties to donate an undivided portion of the co-owned property without the
consent of the parties.

RESCISSION OF DONATION
____________________________
Perez v. Perez-Senerpida
G.R. No. 233365, March 24, 2021, CAGUIOA, J.

Nicxon correctly cites Article 147 of the Family Code as the applicable provision and the rules
on co-ownership govern the property acquired during the cohabitation or "common law"
marriage of Eliodoro and Adelita. Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

“When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.”

● The Supreme Court however extended the prohibition to donate, donation of the whole
property.
○ The Supreme Court said if the portion of the property is being prohibited from
being donated without the consent of the property, more so is the donation of the
whole property.
○ The rule on ordinary donation that it should be valid to the extent of the donating
co-owners’ interest was not adopted. Well, for it will not secure the object of the
Family Code of encouraging the parties to legalize their union someday - meron
lang silang pinagdadaanan, so hayaan na natin sila. So let us now talk about
limitations on donations.

LIMITATIONS OF DONATIONS

Excessive, Inofficious, donation A donor may not donate more than what he can give by
will. If he donates more than what he cannot give by
will, the donation will become excessive and to insist on
it, the legitime of the compulsory heirs will be impaired.
Legitime is reserved for the compulsory heirs and the
same cannot be impaired or disposed of by the testator

In fraud of creditors The creditors may rescind the donation to the extent of
their credits. The action is known as accion pauliana.
 (Art.1381, NCC) The law establishes a presumption when
the donation is apparently in fraud of creditors, namely
failure to reserve sufficient property (at time of
donation) to pay previous debts.

● You have the limitations on donations, excessive, inofficious, donation, you cannot donate
more than what you can give by will. So, we have a reference on legitime and the legitime
we know from succession is not impaired, you have untouchability of the legitime.
● You also have donation in fraud of creditors and you have the presumption that at the time
of donation, there is no sufficient property to cover credits, then, the presumption is
donation in fraud of creditors and this action is known as the action to rescind this
donation - is called accion pauliana.
○ Now you also have donations prohibited by law. This was the subject of Bar
Questions in 1990 and in 2000, please take note of them.

DONATIONS PROHIBITED BY LAW

1. By persons guilty of Adultery or 8. By Spouses to each other during the

concubinage at the time of donation; marriage or to persons of whom the
2. The action for declaration of nullity may other spouse is a presumptive heir;
be brought by the spouse of the donor or (Art. 87, FC);
donee; and the guilt of the donor and 9. To Relatives of such priest, etc. within
donee may be proved by preponderance of the fourth degree, or to the church to
evidence; which such priest belongs;
3. Those made between persons found guilty 10. To an Attesting witness to the
of the same Criminal offense, in execution of donation, if there is any,
consideration thereof; (Art.739, NCC); or to the spouse, parents or children or
4. Those made to a public Officer or his wife, anyone claiming under them;
descendants and ascendants, by reason of 11. To the Priest who heard the confession
his office; of the donor during the latter’s last
5. Relative incapacity to succeed; illness, or the minister of the gospel
6. By individuals, associations or corporations who extended spiritual aid to him
not permitted by Law to make donations during the same period); or
Art. 1027, NCC); 12. To a Physician, surgeon, nurse, health
7. By a Ward to the guardian before the officer or druggist who took care of the
approval of accounts; (Art. 1027, NCC) donor during his/her last illness. (Art.
1027, NCC)

And then, we have conditions. We already talked about conditions, in relation to automatic
rescission, automatic revocation clause. And then, we also have the matters that can affect the
validity of donation that may be then be the subject of rescission.

RESCISSION OF DONATION
 ____________________________

Birth. adoption, reappearance of a child

CIVIL CODE

ARTICLE 760. Every donation inter vivos, made by a person having no children or descendants,
legitimate or legitimated by subsequent marriage, or illegitimate, may be revoked or reduced
as provided in the next article, by the happening of any of these events:
1. If the donor, after the donation, should have legitimate or legitimated or illegitimate
children, even though they be posthumous;

2. If the child of the donor, whom the latter believed to be dead when he made the
donation, should turn out to be living;
3. If the donor should subsequently adopt a minor child.

● Birth, adoption, reappearance of a child, which are the grounds for revocation and
reduction.
○ So, it applies when the donor, at the time the donation did not have any child or
decedent, or erroneously thought so.
● Donation may be revoked or reduced when the donor should have any children after
donation, even though they be posthumous.
○ Donor’s child whom to be believed dead when he made the donation, should turn
out to be living. Okay. And donor subsequently adopt a minor child. I’m sorry about
that interruption.

Now, there is this donation that may be revoked by reason of ingratitude. Please take note of
those. We just have to consider some points on ingratitude

RESCISSION OF DONATION
____________________________

INGRATITUDE

CIVIL CODE

ARTICLE 765. The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of
ingratitude in the following cases:
1. If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property
of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority;

2. If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral
turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been
 committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under his authority;
3. If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give
support to the donor

● The period to within which it shall prescribe, the period for revocation, the period fto file
an action for revocation shall prescribe within 1 year, counted from the time the donor
have knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action.
● Now, the action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude may not be renounced in
advance and may also not be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, that a right of action,
there whoever is, there whoever are exceptions to the rule on transmissibility of action.

RESCISSION OF DONATION
____________________________

Exception to Rule on Intransmissibilty of Action with Regard to Revocation Due to

Ingratitude

CIVIL CODE

GENERAL RULE:

Personal to the donor; heir cannot file an action to revoke if donor did not file an action to
revoke.

EXCEPTIONS:
● Donor has instituted proceedings but dies before bringing civil action for revocation

● Donor already instituted civil action but died, heirs can substitute
● Donee killed donor or his ingratitude caused the death of the donor
● Donor died without having known the ingratitude done
● Criminal action filed but abated by death

So, since we are not anymore tackling Land, Titles and Deeds. So, this ends the lecture on
Property Law. Thank you.

-DONE-