A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy - (6 George W. Bush)

Chapter Six
George W. Bush
A New Direction for U.S. Foreign Policy? 2001–2009
The administration of George W. Bush started in controversy when the con-

tested presidential election of 2000 was decided by the Supreme Court, and it
ended in controversy as well because of the results of decisions that were
made in the wake of 9/11. While few would dispute the trauma of September
11, 2001, many have debated and continue to debate the wisdom of the
administration’s decisions to go into Afghanistan and especially Iraq for the
disruption that those attacks caused in each of the two countries, the resulting
regional instability that contributed to the growth of terrorist groups such as
Copyright © 2017. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. All rights reserved.
ISIS, 1 and the economic impact these wars had on the United States. The
decision to attack Iraq in 2003 was especially suspect in light of the uncertain
evidence provided about alleged weapons of mass destruction. A 2016 biog-
raphy of President Bush is extremely critical in its assessment when the
author writes in the first sentence that “Rarely in the history of the United
States has the nation been so ill-served as during the presidency of George
W. Bush.” 2 And he concludes the book by stating, “Whether George W.
Bush was the worst president in American history will be long debated, but
his decision to invade Iraq is easily the worst foreign policy decision ever
made by an American President.” 3
While the Bush administration initially came into office with a call for a
neo-unilateralist, almost isolationist foreign policy, it took the attacks of 9/11
to forge a new direction for U.S. foreign policy. Suddenly, the United States
was actively involved internationally, following an “either you are with us or
against us” brand of foreign policy. Relatively quickly the United States went
from trying to remain disengaged to an almost Wilsonian brand of interven-
tionism tied to the imposition of democracy around the world. When Bush
141
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142 Chapter 6
pursued policies that he felt were in the best interest of the United States,
including the decision to go into Iraq and after Saddam Hussein in March
2003 without UN approval, it created rifts with NATO allies and also shifted
world opinion against the United States. While few argued the wisdom of, or
justification for, the war with Afghanistan, alleged to be harboring Al Qaeda
and those who were behind the 9/11 attacks, many saw the war with Iraq as
an unnecessary diversion. Others, however, saw it as evidence of a more
muscular and militarized United States once again. That decision remains
controversial more than ten years later. 4
The foreign policy of George W. Bush can be divided into two parts:
before and after September 11, 2001. The implications of the shift in foreign
policy were far-reaching, as the United States, in seeking to establish itself as
a global leader following 9/11, ended up pursuing policies that alienated
many of its traditional allies. The post 9/11 period was also characterized by
the growing threat from terrorism, which, as we will see, was a difficult one
for the United States to counter as it was not tied to any nation-state but to a
group that was harder to define—and to fight. Some argue that the decisions
made in the wake of 9/11 contributed to the growth of terrorist groups, such
as ISIS, that bedeviled the Obama administration. Further, how to deal with
this elusive nonstate actor played into the rhetoric of the 2016 presidential
election.
FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11
During the presidential campaign of 2000, then-candidate George W. Bush

made it clear that the United States would chart its own course in foreign
policy. Bush indicated that under his administration, the United States would
return to a more unilateralist policy characterized by actions consistent with
what the president perceived to be in the national interest. He stressed his
desire to strengthen ties south of the border (especially to Mexico), rather
than look primarily to the traditional allies in Europe. And he made it clear
that the United States should not be in the business of “nation building,”
stating his intention to pull U.S. troops out of places like the Balkans. In
short, candidate Bush outlined a marked shift in the direction of U.S. foreign
policy, especially compared with that of his predecessor, Bill Clinton, and
even his father, George H. W. Bush.
In the January/February 2000 volume of Foreign Affairs, Condoleezza
Rice, then a Stanford University professor who had become part of the Bush
inner circle and who would become Bush’s national security advisor and
then secretary of state, laid out what she saw as the priorities of the United
States in a Republican (George W. Bush) administration. She began by stat-
ing that “the United States has found it exceedingly difficult to define its
George W. Bush 143
‘national interest’ in the absence of Soviet power.” But she also noted that
such times “of transition” are important because “one can affect the shape of
the world to come.” 5 While many of the subsequent Bush administration
policies were affected by the events of September 11, the article is instructive
for the priorities and policies it outlined.
Rice foreshadowed Bush administration policy when she stated, “The
president must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal,
and it is meant to be. . . . [I]t is certainly not designed to build a civilian
society.” Rather, in her estimation, “[m]ilitary force is best used to support
clear political goals, whether limited, such as expelling Saddam from Ku-
wait, or comprehensive, such as demanding the unconditional surrender of
Japan and Germany during World War II” (emphasis added). 6 At the time of
the publication of this article, Rice, and presumably the entire Bush defense
and foreign policy team, appeared to be focused on defining U.S. national
interest in the absence of the Soviet threat. 7
The events of 9/11 significantly altered the priorities of the Bush adminis-
tration, creating the “global war on terror” and making this the highest
foreign policy priority. From that time forward, all aspects of Bush adminis-
tration foreign and security policy stemmed from, and were justified by, the
need to support the war on terror. It is therefore instructive to go back to the
Rice article and note the attention that she paid to U.S. national interest,
which she defined “by a desire to foster the spread of freedom, prosperity and
peace.” 8 It was the desire to spread freedom and democracy that ultimately
was used to justify the United States decision for war in Iraq, eclipsing the
initial rationale for the attack, which was “regime change” and the desire to
eliminate the spread of weapons of mass destruction allegedly found in Iraq.

And despite his willingness to use military force, a realist characteristic,
Bush’s emphasis on spreading freedom and democracy is inherently idealist
in perspective. 9
Contested Election and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy
In order to put the Bush administration’s decisions into broader perspective,

it is necessary to go back to the election of 2000, which was fraught with
controversy. Marked by questions about election fraud in Ohio, a critical
swing state, and the “hanging chads” and “butterfly ballots” in Florida, the
election was characterized by accusations of irregularities in voting proce-
dures as well as the ways in which ballots were counted. The Florida issue
was especially contentious, and ultimately the issue of a recount went to the
U.S. Supreme Court for a decision. On December 12, 2000, by a vote of 5 to
4, the members of the Court ordered a halt to a recount, thereby overruling
the verdict of the Florida Supreme Court and effectively ensuring the elec-
tion of George W. Bush as president.
144 Chapter 6
Despite—or because of—his disputed victory in the presidential election,

Bush moved quickly to fulfill the campaign promises he made, many of
which involved a reversal in the patterns of foreign policy set by the Clinton
administration. In June 2001, over the objections of the European allies as
well as many environmentalists in the United States, Bush declared that the
1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
“was fatally flawed in fundamental ways,” and that the United States would
not participate in that agreement but would offer an alternative. The United
States, Bush said, was committed to “work within the United Nations frame-
work and elsewhere to develop with our friends and allies and nations
throughout the world an effective and science-based response to the issue of
global warming.” 10 These statements left other countries wondering how the
United States was going to live up to this commitment or to others that had
been made by previous administrations, as the Bush reaction seemed to be
especially negative toward anything done by the Clinton administration.
Bush also withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Mis-
sile Treaty so that the United States would not be constrained by its terms in
developing new weapon systems, especially a ballistic missile defense sys-
tem. He said that the United States would limit continued engagement in the
Middle East peace process, which had been a hallmark of U.S. foreign policy
since the Carter years. In effect, Bush halted the Oslo process that had been
pursued by Clinton. In another repudiation of his predecessor’s policies,
Bush also suspended talks with North Korea and criticized the agreement
signed in 1994 by the United States and North Korea under the Clinton
administration. 11 He said that the United States would not send additional
troops to the Balkans as part of the peacekeeping force deployed there in

1995 following the end of the war, and implied that he would withdraw those
which were there. And he made it clear that the United States should not be
in the business of “nation building,” a direct slap at previous administrations’
foreign policy decisions, including his father’s.
These early policy decisions led to criticism domestically and internation-
ally about the direction of U.S. foreign policy. The European allies charged
that this policy of unilateralism was undermining the basis of U.S. (and
European) national security. They also raised concerns not only about the
apparent destruction of the existing foreign policy framework, but about
what (if anything) Bush was putting in its place. To many opponents both
within and outside the United States, the perception was that the Bush admin-
istration’s policies were tied to the desire to please special interests and were
made for domestic political reasons rather than in the greater national inter-
est. These criticisms stopped abruptly on September 11, 2001.
George W. Bush 145
SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE RESPONSES
Using the military actively as an instrument of foreign policy was the hall-
mark of Bush administration foreign policy after September 11. On that day
hijackers captured four aircraft, crashing two into the World Trade Center in
New York and one into the Pentagon in Washington. The fourth, which by
all accounts was also headed to Washington, crashed in Pennsylvania after
passengers wrestled control of the aircraft from the hijackers and diverted it
from its target. The responses to these events are instructive as they pertain to
U.S. foreign policy.
One of the most immediate effects of September 11 was that NATO
invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history. The North Atlantic Council
issued a press release on September 12, 2001, affirming that Article 5 “stipu-
lates that in the event of attacks falling within its purview, each Ally will
assist the Party that has been attacked by taking such action as it deems
necessary. Accordingly, the United States’ NATO Allies stand ready to pro-
vide the assistance that may be required as a consequence of these acts of
barbarism.” 12 By early October, under the framework of Article 5, NATO
had started to deploy Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (AWACS) to the
United States. However, it should be noted that this was the only act that
NATO took in support of the United States at that time, not because NATO
did not want to do more—in its role as a collective security alliance, NATO
was prepared to work with the United States to formulate a response to the
attack—but because the United States, under the Bush administration, pre-
ferred to work outside the NATO framework, or any other formal alliance, in
determining next steps.
Acting unilaterally, the Bush administration thereby determined how to

respond to the attacks. 13 The administration quickly began exploring military
options, including “a strike against al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, where
Osama bin Laden had been given sanctuary by the country’s Taliban govern-
ment, led by Muslim fundamentalists who had imposed a rigid Islamic re-
gime.” 14 The decision to attack Afghanistan was to be part of a larger “global
war on terror” that would not end “until every terrorist group that had at-
tacked Americans in the past, up to and including the 9/11 assaults, or might
launch attacks in the future, had been destroyed.” 15 As political scientist
Peter Irons described it, perhaps the more important point about the decisions
that Bush made was that “the 9/11 attacks created abrupt, far-reaching
changes in the nation’s political and military situation—changes that would,
in turn, raise significant constitutional issues” (emphasis added). 16 These
issues pertained to the decision to prosecute the war not only with Afghani-
stan but also with Iraq, and especially in the expansion of the role of the
executive branch to make decisions not only about military and foreign poli-
146 Chapter 6
cy, but also about domestic issues—all justified under the broad umbrella of
the war on terror.
War with Afghanistan
After gathering intelligence information that linked the hijackers to the ter-
rorist group Al Qaeda, based in Afghanistan, the Bush administration made
the decision to send military forces to attack that country and oust the Tali-
ban government, which supported and harbored terrorists. Consistent with
the terms of the War Powers Act, 17 the president consulted with Congress
and got its support for this venture. According to the president, this was a
clear-cut case of an attack on the United States and a military response to that
attack. The draft joint resolution was sent to the leaders of the House and
Senate on September 12, 2001. It was passed by the Senate on September 14
by a vote of 98 to 0, and in the House later that same day by a vote of 420 to
1. 18
According to a Congressional Research Service report, the floor debates
surrounding the resolution “make clear that the focus of the military force
legislation was on the extent of the authorization that Congress would pro-
vide to the President for use of U.S. military force against the international
terrorists who attacked the U.S. on September 11, 2001 and those who direct-
ly and materially assisted them in carrying out their actions” (emphasis in
original). 19 The resolution that was passed includes five “whereas clauses,”
“expressing opinions regarding why the joint resolution is necessary.” 20 But
the critical part is Section 2, “Authorization for Use of United States Armed
Forces,” which states that “the President is authorized to use all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he

determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,
in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” The document also
makes it clear that “[n]othing in this resolution supersedes any requirement
of the War Powers resolution.” 21 (See chapter 4 for a description of the War
Powers Resolution.)
In the signing statement that accompanied his signature, Bush asserted
that S.J. Res. 23 “recognized the authority of the President under the Consti-
tution to take action to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the United
States.” He also stated that “in signing this resolution, I maintain the long-
standing position of the executive branch regarding the President’s constitu-
tional authority to use force, including the Armed Forces of the United
States” (emphasis added). 22 Although the president made it clear that he was
complying with the terms of the War Powers Resolution and that the military
action requested was necessary to protect the American people and home-
George W. Bush 147
land, he clearly was also asserting what he saw as the authority of the presi-
dent to make these decisions. This is an example of the way in which Bush
used “signing statements” to insert his opinion and interpretation of bills
passed by Congress and is also another example of the way in which the
Bush administration expanded the power of the executive branch in general,
and the president in particular.
However, some in Congress were already concerned about the broad
scope of the war on terror envisioned by Bush. In fact, both Democratic
Senate majority leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) and Senator Robert Byrd (D-
WV), the senior member of the Senate, urged the president to “choose his
words carefully” in a proposed speech to Congress and the nation. “Dis-
turbed by the sweeping language [of the resolution initially proposed], con-
gressional negotiators finally persuaded the president to accept a resolution
that limited him to retaliating only against those nations, organizations, or
persons responsible for the 9/11 attacks.” 23 After some compromise, Bush
signed the resolution into law on September 18, 2001, and less than three
weeks later, on October 7, 2001, the United States launched ground and air
strikes against Afghanistan. 24
Despite the reservations expressed by some in Congress, few argued with
the president’s decision to respond to the attacks of September 11 by attack-
ing Afghanistan. In fact, Bush’s public approval rating hit a high of 90
percent following September 11, the highest popularity rating ever re-
corded. 25 The swift military victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan proved
that the Bush administration was willing to take a decisive stand militarily
when it mattered, reinforcing the confidence of both the allies and the
American public in the president and his policies. What Bush did not take
into account at that time was the fact that removing the Taliban from office
was not going to end the war in Afghanistan.
The initial decision to attack Afghanistan, one of the known homes for Al
Qaeda bases, was seen as justified and, on the whole, was received positively
both at home and abroad. British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that “even
if no British citizens had died [in the attacks of September 11], it would be
right to act. This atrocity was an attack on us all.” 26 Within a few months the
war expanded and ultimately became a NATO mission. The International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created as a UN-mandated, NATO-led
international force in December 2001 after the United States had ousted the
Taliban regime. It was created initially to assist the Afghan Transitional
Authority to reconstruct the country. Although other countries joined in this
NATO mission, the United States had the largest number of troops deployed.
Despite the lofty goals of ousting the Taliban, confronting Al Qaeda,
mounting a serious NATO mission, and rebuilding the country, the war in
Afghanistan did not go as planned. In fact, between 2001, when the war with
Afghanistan started, and January 2009, when the Obama administration came
148 Chapter 6
into office, attention given to Afghanistan by the United States became sec-
ondary to what became the major foreign policy issue of the Bush years: the
war with Iraq. 27
The Bush Doctrine and the War with Iraq
By early 2002, Bush made it clear that the United States would not stop with
the attack on Afghanistan but would expand the war on terror. In his State of
the Union speech in January 2002, Bush identified Iraq, Iran, and North
Korea as an “axis of evil,” and he stated that “some governments will be
timid in the face of terror. . . . If they do not act, America will.” 28 He
followed that up with a speech on March 11, 2002, the six-month anniversary
of September 11. At that time, he said, “Our coalition must act deliberately,
but inaction is not an option” (emphasis added). 29 In other words, President
Bush was sending notice to the American public and the world that the war
on terror was going to expand beyond Afghanistan.
The Bush Doctrine, as it was popularly known, became the basis for the
decision to go to war against Iraq in March 2003 and to do so without the
formal backing of the international community. Formally titled the “National
Security Strategy of the United States,” this document, which was issued in
September 2002, puts forward a new direction for American foreign policy:
“While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the
international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to
exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively” (emphasis add-
ed). 30
This doctrine states clearly and unequivocally that the United States is
justified in going to war preemptively against any group that potentially

threatens the country or its allies, and that it will do so alone if necessary.
This is a departure from the policies that the United States followed since the
end of World War II, when much of its foreign policy was tied to formal
alliances and the belief that security is best achieved if countries work to-
gether against a common enemy, rather than trying to defeat the enemy
alone. Furthermore, it is a marked departure from the stated idealistic goals
for the Bush administration that now made clear it would be relying on U.S.
hard power to do whatever it thought was necessary. For the first time since
the Cold War, the United States was again relying on its military might to
pursue its foreign policy goals. And, once again, foreign and security policy
became inextricably linked.
The Rise of the “Neocons”
One of the other important points to note about the Bush Doctrine and the
decision to go to war against Iraq that followed is that, to a large extent, it
George W. Bush 149
was the product of the thinking of a group of foreign policy analysts collec-
tive known as the “Neoconservatives,” or Neocons. Exemplified most not-
ably by high-level decision-makers such as Vice President Dick Cheney,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz, as well as a number of pundits and supporters, this group
started with the assumption of the United States as a great power that needs
to be more assertive in promoting its ideals, including using its military
might. Inherent in the Neocons’ ideology are: concern with democracy, al-
though that might be equated with the imposition of American values; the
belief that U.S., power “can be used for moral purposes”; and skepticism of
international law and organizations. 31 The Neocons who had been around
during the administration of George H. W. Bush, including Cheney, Rums-
feld, and Wolfowitz, were adamantly opposed to the decision made at the
end of the first Persian Gulf War to end hostilities and allow Saddam Hussein
to remain in place. According to one political scientist, from the time of the
election of George W. Bush the Neocons were determined to revisit Iraq. The
fact that Dick Cheney became vice president and had a significant role in the
appointment of other Neocons to high-level positions helped ensure that not
only was Iraq a high priority but so were other policies that they deemed
important. And the approaches that they advocated were consistent with
President Bush’s worldview. Thus, September 11 provided an opportunity
for the Bush administration to enact policies that were long in the making. 32
The Path to War with Iraq
The path to war in Iraq can clearly be traced back to the first Persian Gulf
War and the unsatisfactory outcome according to a number of members of

the George W. Bush administration. Further, it became “the first test case in
the Bush administration’s new foreign-policy doctrine of America’s right not
only to preeminence in world affairs, but to preemption, by military might if
necessary, of whatever threats it perceives to its security at home and
abroad.” 33 The decision to go into Iraq was not without dissenters even
within the administration. Then–Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had
been the military director of the first Persian Gulf War, warned of the pos-
sible dangers of such a mission and at a meeting with the president in August
2002 was quoted as saying “‘We’d own a country,’ he told the president.”
And he also made the case that building international support would be
essential “not only to legitimize any war in the eyes of the world, but also to
lay the groundwork for the postwar reconstruction of Iraq.” 34
Despite the suspicion that Bush and the Neocons had of international
organizations like the UN, Bush was persuaded of the necessity of going to
that organization. In a speech before the General Assembly in September
2002, Bush made it clear that unless Iraq complied with the UN Security
150 Chapter 6
Council Resolutions to allow weapons inspectors back into the country, ac-
tions would be taken, and he also left no doubt that the United States would
go it alone if necessary. But Germany was already voicing opposition to any
war in Iraq, as was France, which was pushing for the need to focus on the
inspectors and only later on the threatened consequences. In other words, it is
clear that six months before the war with Iraq there were already disagree-
ments brewing between the United States and some of its closest European
allies as to next steps. Only Great Britain was showing complete support.
While Bush was pressing the international community through the UN, he
was already building support in Congress for a military action. On September
19, he sent a draft of a resolution to Congress asking for authority “‘to use all
means he determines to be appropriate, including force’ to disarm and dis-
lodge Saddam Hussein.” 35 Aware of the 2002 Congressional election cam-
paign and the need to build support for its position both domestically and
internationally, the administration continued to use this same story line about
weapons of mass destruction through the fall. On October 2, 2002, Bush
submitted to Congress a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.
The resolution itself includes a litany of all of Saddam Hussein’s wrongdo-
ings for more than a decade, going back to the first Persian Gulf War and
even earlier. It describes an Iraq that was building weapons of mass destruc-
tion and demonstrated willingness to use such weapons in the past; the clear
implication is that it will do so again, this time against the United States. And
it suggests that Iraq was somehow involved in the attacks of 9/11—“Whereas
the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the
gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
by international terrorist organizations”—although it does not mention Iraq

by name in that particular clause. 36
The resolution then concludes with these important clauses: “Whereas the
President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate
actions against terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations,
organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such per-
sons or organizations”; and then, “Whereas the President has authority under
the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of interna-
tional terrorism against the United States” the “President is authorized to use
the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and
appropriate” (emphasis added). 37 It is also interesting to note that this resolu-
tion refers explicitly to Public Law 107-40, which authorized the use of force
“against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United
States” 38 and was used to authorize the war with Afghanistan.
On October 11, 2002, the resolution was passed by both houses—in the
Senate by a vote of 77 to 23 and in the House by a vote of 296 to 133—and it
was signed into law by President Bush on October 16, 2002. All the dissent-
George W. Bush 151
ers were Democrats with the exception of Republican Senator Lincoln Chaf-
fee of Rhode Island, who subsequently was voted out of office. The U.S.
attack against Iraq began on March 19, 2003.
The administration also started a concerted public campaign to make the
case for military action against Iraq. Directed at both the American public
and U.S. allies, the administration put forward two interrelated arguments:
“One was that Iraq had ominous, if still largely unspecified and unproven
ties, to Al Qaeda. The other was that Saddam remained determined to build a
nuclear weapon that could directly threaten the United States and the
world.” 39 It should be noted that both of these allegations had been debated
within the government.
The political pressure by the United States and some of its allies was
enough for Iraq to authorize the return of the weapons inspectors, but under
pressure from the United States in November, the Security Council also
passed Resolution 1441, which gave Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with
its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council” or “it
will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its
obligations.” 40 Although Iraq allowed inspectors back into the country and
released thousands of pages of files on its weapons program, the Bush ad-
ministration was quick to announce that Iraq was not fully in compliance.
Early in 2003, the governments of France and Germany noted that Iraq was
complying and should be given additional time. What seemed to be happen-
ing was that the United States was pushing for war while many of the allies
were willing to wait.
Bush took the opportunity of the State of the Union message in January
2003 to make the implicit case for war:
Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the last casual-
ty in a war he had started and lost. To spare himself, he agreed to disarm of all
weapons of mass destruction.
For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pur-
sued chemical, biological and nuclear weapons even while inspectors were in
his country.
Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons: not
economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise
missile strikes on his military facilities. 41
Then in February, Powell went to the United Nations to make the case
against Saddam Hussein and to persuade other countries of the need to go to
war. France, Russia, and China all defied the United States, arguing that the
inspectors needed more time, while Bush ordered troops and combat helicop-
ters to the Persian Gulf in anticipation of a conflict. As the various sides tried
to reach a diplomatic solution to this impasse, the United States continued to
deploy troops to the region. A UN Resolution that had been pending was
152 Chapter 6
withdrawn in the face of mounting opposition, and UN Secretary General

Kofi Annan warned that without the support of the Security Council, the
legitimacy of any military action would be questioned. Nonetheless, the deci-
sion was made and on March 19, 2003, President Bush announced to the
American public that “at this hour American and coalition forces are in the
early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to
defend the world from grave danger.” 42
In authorizing that attack without United Nations approval, Bush charted
another new course for U.S. foreign policy. The war against Iraq became the
defining moment for the Bush administration. Unlike his father, who was
able to build a strong international coalition before mounting the 1991 Per-
sian Gulf War, George W. Bush had the support of only a few major nations
and, perhaps more important, that action was directly opposed by many of
the United States’ traditionally strongest allies, such as France and Germa-
ny. 43 This resulted in a significant schism between the United States and its
allies, which proved to be especially damaging at a time when the United
States was building support for, and needed to sustain allied commitment to,
the ongoing war in Afghanistan.
The War with Iraq and Its Aftermath
Where the first Persian Gulf War in 1991 was covered widely in the media
(the “CNN effect”), the 2003 invasion was characterized by reporters “em-
bedded” with troops, thereby enabling the U.S. public to watch the progress
of the war in virtually real time and with first-person commentary. The
course of the first phase of the war—“shock and awe”—was swift and appar-
ently successful. The initial military attack was sufficient to bring about the
end of the regime of Saddam Hussein. In a show of victory aboard the USS
Abraham Lincoln on May 2, 2003, Bush spoke under a banner that declared,
“Mission Accomplished.” However, that declaration of victory proved to be
premature. What Bush did not count on was the difficulty of both ending the
war and building the peace. 44
Much has been written about the issues and problems associated with the
war in Iraq, 45 and we are not going to review or critique the decision here.
Suffice it to say, the decision to invade Iraq without UN or allied support had
a devastating impact on perceptions of the United States internationally. It
also divided the country domestically. 46 Further, the longer the war contin-
ued, the more skeptical the American public and especially the allies became.
But this did not stop George W. Bush from winning a second term in the
election of 2004. When it comes right down to it, the American public does
not like to change leaders during a war. And, as Bush kept reminding the
American public, he was a wartime president. It was not until later in Bush’s
George W. Bush 153
second term and then after Obama took office as president in January 2009
that the full impact of many of Bush’s decisions started to be felt.
The Iraq War and the Economy
In his State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002, Bush made it clear that
“it costs a lot to fight this war [in Afghanistan]. We have spent more than a
billion dollars a month—over $30 million a day—and we must be prepared
for future operations.” And, he continued, “My budget includes the largest
increase in defense spending in two decades—because while the price of
freedom and security is high, it is never too high. Whatever it costs to defend
our country, we will pay.” 47 What was not, and could not, have been antici-
pated at the time of that speech was the additional costs of fighting two wars
simultaneously, one in Afghanistan and the other in Iraq, or the longer-term
costs to deal with the veterans of the two wars. According to a nonpartisan
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report released in 2011, the estimated
costs for Iraq from fiscal year 2003, when the war started, through fiscal year
2011, when the report was compiled, was $805.5 billion. 48 According to an
analysis in Bloomberg News, “Direct federal spending on the war through
2012 will reach $823 billion” and that does not include the resulting payment
on the debt accumulated for the war or ongoing costs for veterans of that
war. 49 The actual costs of the war are far greater than economic forecasts
made by the Bush administration; a projection made by Lawrence Lindsey,
Bush’s Director of the National Economic Council, that the war could cost
between $100 and $200 billion was dismissed by Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld as “baloney.” Lindsey was subsequently forced from the posi-
tion. 50 When the costs for Afghanistan are included, the economic costs of
the wars on terror go up considerably.
While it is also true that the U.S. economy has grown, the economic drain
has been significant, especially the decision to pay for the war by borrowing
and budget deficits rather than by raising taxes. This had a longer-term
impact on the economy that succeeded the Bush administration. The major
point here is that the decision to expand the war on terror, while popular with
many Americans, also had longer-term economic consequences as the coun-
try had to pay the price for the “guns versus butter” decisions that had been
made.
Freedom and Democracy for All
As George W. Bush started his second term in office in January 2005, public
opinion polls showed an increasing number of Americans were skeptical
about the mission in Iraq and whether the goal of establishing a truly demo-
cratic Iraq would succeed. At that time, polls found an overall approval
154 Chapter 6
rating for Bush of 50 percent, versus a disapproval rating of 43 percent. A

poll taken in May 2004, about six months prior to the election and just about
a year after the war in Iraq started, indicated that overall, 50 percent thought
that the war was going well, while 46 percent thought it was not. What this
suggests is a country that was deeply divided. 51
Despite candidate Bush’s claim that the United States should not engage
in nation building, a direct criticism of the Democrats, as President Bush
began his second term, not only was the United States engaged in doing so in
Iraq, but Bush’s inaugural address suggested that the United States would
continue its involvement globally, pursuing the Wilsonian ideals of freedom
and democracy for all. The war on terror in general and the war in Iraq in
particular were part of President Bush’s broader policy agenda to spread
freedom and democracy. He articulated this concept in his second inaugural
address when he said, “There is only one force of history that can break the
reign of hatred and resentment, and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and
reward the hopes of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human
freedom.” And in language reminiscent of an earlier era, he continued, “So it
is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democrat-
ic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate
goal of ending tyranny in our world.” 52
In his foreign policy decisions following September 11, and especially
going into his second term, Bush appeared to be drawing on Wilsonian
idealism using America’s military might to accomplish his goal. 53 The term
coined by the administration to describe this foreign policy direction was
“practical idealism,” which refers to “the policy’s underlying premise that in
a post-Sept. 11 world, America’s national security is tied directly to the

spread of free and open societies everywhere, including the Middle East.” 54
In his book Winning the Right War, foreign policy analyst Philip Gordon
notes that the Bush administration, early in its second term, started to recog-
nize the reality that an America “that is popular, respected, reliable, and
admired has a far better chance of winning needed cooperation than an
America that is not.” He also contends that the administration was aware of
the high price it paid “for gratuitously alienating allies and that diplomatic
efforts to repair relations were worthwhile.” 55 This awareness resulted in an
effort by then–Secretary of State Rice to attempt to mend relations with the
allies by traveling to Europe. President Bush made similar trips, including
one to European capitals in June 2008, dubbed his “farewell tour.” According
to one account of that visit, “[t]he question of his legacy hangs over his eight-
day visit to Europe.” But this account also notes the fact that the war in Iraq
“did more to strain relations with Europe—not to mention with the Muslim
world—than any issue since Ronald Reagan deployed intermediate missiles
in Europe in 1984 at the height of the cold war. As a result, he [Bush]
remains deeply unpopular in Europe, as he does at home.” 56
George W. Bush 155
What is clear is that during most of its tenure, the Bush administration
was trying to define a new direction for U.S. foreign policy in the post–Cold
War world and that despite the administration’s protestations to the contrary,
this policy was formulated in response to external events. In many ways,
these events and the Bush administration’s reactions to them defined the
direction of U.S. foreign policy for the early part of the twenty-first century.
They are also further proof that regardless of how much a president might try
to initiate a particular course of action, ultimately he or she will be forced to
react to the most immediate and pressing issues that arise.
Shortly before he left office, December 2008 polls show that Bush’s
approval rating had dropped to 24 percent and his disapproval rating had
gone up to 68 percent. The only group that overwhelmingly remained sup-
portive was conservative Republicans. 57
It is important to note that it was not just his decisions about Iraq that
undermined Bush’s popularity at home. Domestic events, such as his han-
dling of Hurricane Katrina and the failure to enact some of his signature
policies such as Social Security and immigration reform, combined with
skepticism about what was going on in the prison at Guantanamo in the wake
of Abu Ghraib and the deteriorating situation in Iraq and Afghanistan con-
tributed to rising doubts among the American people about Bush’s leader-
ship. The lack of consultation and the perception of abuse of prisoners as
well as apparent abuses of the rights of citizens through legislation such as
the Patriot Act also undermined U.S. moral leadership both at home and
abroad.
President Bush and Wilsonian Idealism

Even though the Bush administration initially justified the war with Iraq
based on the need to find weapons of mass destruction, it quickly morphed
into the need for “regime change” to get rid of a nasty dictator who used such
weapons against his own people and who posed a threat to the United States
and its allies. There was talk of the ways in which the United States would be
greeted as “liberators” who freed the Iraqi people from their dictator, and the
assumption was that tribal differences within the country would be swept
aside as the people of Iraq worked together to rebuild their country as a
democracy. Using religious terms, Bush often spoke of America’s mission to
“‘rid the world of evil’ and to promote ‘God-given values’ around the world.
The ability of the United States to ‘shape events’ added to that mission a
license to depose ‘evil’ leaders such as Saddam Hussein.” 58
In writing about Bush and the influence of the Neocons, one political
scientist writes that “the problem with the Bush reaction to 9/11 was not
merely in its unilateral and comprehensive nature. It was also in the adminis-
tration’s insistence on discussing the challenges in moralistic, religious, and
156 Chapter 6
even missionary terms (rather than in political ones)” (emphasis in original).

In so doing, Bush defined the terrorist challenge as a “biblical struggle of
good versus evil” that resulted in the loss of support both at home and
abroad, despite the overwhelming sympathy that the United States got imme-
diately following the attacks. 59
In that regard, Bush is often equated with Wilson in the zeal with which
he pursued the ideals of promoting democracy and pursuing a foreign policy
based on values. However, Bush did not learn all the lessons of history,
specifically, that values such as “democracy” and “freedom” cannot be im-
posed; nor will the rest of the world see the distinction and the fight in quite
the same way. For example, after becoming president in 1913, Wilson
boasted “that he could transform Latin America, if not the rest of the world,
into constitutional democracies in America’s image.” He was vocal in his
opposition to Mexican dictator Victoriano Huerta, but, as he discovered,
“attempts to instill American-style constitutional democracy and capitalism
through force were destined to fail. . . . In Mexico, Wilson came to under-
stand in practice what he had written in his theories of government—that
‘self-government is not a thing that can be “given” to any people’” (emphasis
added). 60
In the Bush administration, the forces of the neoconservatives, who had
been pushing for war with Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein since
the end of the first Persian Gulf War, adopted Wilson’s values but “insisted
upon employing McKinley’s and Theodore Roosevelt’s means to achieve it.
They believed in transforming the world in America’s image, but sought to
do so through the unimpeded use of American power rather than through
international cooperation and organization.” 61 As author John Judis notes, “If
the administration’s experience in Iraq increasingly resembles past American

imperial ventures, Bush’s experience was remarkably similar to McKinley’s
in the Philippines more than a century before.” 62
Wilson had changed the underlying framework of American foreign poli-
cy to inject values, such as democracy, which he saw as a universal given.
However, Bush tempered that set of values with his own beliefs of the United
States as an imperial power with a preordained role to play in the world.
These values guided his decisions to go to war with Iraq. But as one political
scientist notes, “As the Iraq war turned into a protracted and costly struggle,
both the rationale for the American presence in Iraq and the aim of the war
shifted substantially. The Iraq war was less about relinquishing Iraq of its
weapons of mass destruction than about bringing freedom and democracy to
the Middle East.” 63
Clearly, Bush’s foreign policy embodies some of the idealism of Wilson
with the imperialism of McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. In understanding
the impact of this blend of foreign policy orientations, Judis summarizes it
well when he states that “America’s true power has always rested not only in
George W. Bush 157
its economic and military strength, but in its determination to use that
strength in cooperation with others on behalf of the equality of individuals
and nations” (emphasis added). 64
The Iraq War: A Postscript
On November 17, 2008, just after the election that would bring Barack Oba-
ma to the White House, the governments of the United States and Iraq signed
a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would govern the withdrawal of
American troops from Iraq. Under the terms of this agreement, all U.S.
forces “shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31,
2011.” The agreement also specifies clearly that “[a]ll United States combat
forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi cities, villages and localities no later than
the time at which Iraqi Security Forces assume full responsibility for security
in an Iraqi province, provided that such withdrawal is completed no later
than June 30, 2009” (emphasis added). 65 In other words, according to the
terms of the agreement, while the government of Iraq acknowledges the need
to look to the United States to “support” Iraq “in its efforts to maintain
security and stability in Iraq,” the primary responsibility would fall to the
government of Iraq.
As the time got closer for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, con-
cerns mounted in both countries. An article in the New York Times on June
26, 2009, summarized the ambivalence surrounding this withdrawal. On the
one hand, to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the event was seen as a
“great victory” and one that “he compares to the rebellion against British
troops in 1920.” The Americans, for their part, have been willing “to suspend
virtually all American operations—even in support roles—for the first few

days in July to reinforce the perception that Mr. Maliki desires: that Iraq’s
security forces are now fully in control of Iraq’s cities.” However, according
to this news report, “the deadline has provoked uncertainty and even dread
among average Iraqis, underscoring the potential problems that Mr. Maliki
could face if bloodshed intensifies.” 66 The concern, clearly, is a return to the
sectarian violence that characterized much of the war prior to the increase in
the number of American troops, known as “the surge,” early in 2007. In light
of the violence that has been occurring in Iraq as this goes to press, that
concern was prescient.
Under the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement, there would not be a
total withdrawal of U.S. troops; thousands would remain in Iraq but with
their role shifted from combat to support—primarily training and advising.
They would also conduct operations “that the Iraqis could not yet do on their
own, like emergency medical evacuation.” 67 A paramount goal for both Iraq
and the United States was to stress the importance of Iraq as a sovereign
nation headed by a democratically elected leader (Mr. Maliki), and to ensure
158 Chapter 6
that, eventually, a sense of “normalcy” returns to that country. The SOFA

allows for continued U.S. assistance “to strengthen the political and military
capabilities of the Republic of Iraq to deter threats against its sovereignty,
political independence, territorial integrity, and its constitutional federal
democratic system.” 68
The last U.S. combat forces left Iraq prior to the December 2011 date
negotiated in the SOFA; although an American military presence remains in
that country, sectarian violence continues. Despite the goal of replacing Sad-
dam Hussein with a democratic form of government, that has not yet hap-
pened. “By the time the American military left, Iraq had still not passed a
major milestone in the life of any successful new democracy: the peaceful
handover of power to an opposition party.” 69
In July 2016 the issue of the veracity of the claims of weapons of mass
destruction that were the alleged justification for the war in Iraq came to the
forefront again, when a British independent Iraq Inquiry Committee released
a report that concluded that “Britain, like the United States, used flawed
intelligence to justify the invasion, that Iraq posed no immediate national
security threat, that the allies acted militarily before all diplomatic options
had been exhausted and that there was a lack of planning for what would
happen once Mr. Hussein was removed.” 70 Despite the fact that Prime Minis-
ter Blair was advised by diplomats and ministers of their concern about the
U.S. plan, Blair chose to override their objections and support Bush’s deci-
sion to invade Iraq. The results of the decision to invade Iraq continue to
haunt both Britain and the United States, and have affected both countries’
foreign policy decisions subsequently. “The legacy of Iraq kept Britain from
joining the United States in bombing Syria over its use of chemical weapons.
It was also a factor in President Obama’s decision to back away from a
military strike on Syria’s chemical weapons facilities, and to delay military
activity there against the Islamic State.” 71
When he came into office in January 2009, President Obama inherited the
situation created by Bush: disarray in Iraq, instability in Afghanistan, and the
growth of terrorist groups, especially ISIS. How to handle these became part
of the discussion and debate in the presidential election of 2008. How to
actually address them became part of the foreign policy decisions that the
new administration had to make.
If foreign policy is a continuous process, as we indicated in chapter 1,
then how could an Obama administration turn aside or reverse the course of
Bush administration policy? Or how could the new administration enact
policies that would better reflect the changing political and security realities?
In the next chapter, we will explore the policies of the Obama administra-
tion in order to draw some lessons for the future of American foreign policy,
bearing in mind that it is still too soon to understand the long-term implica-
tions of Obama’s foreign policy decisions. Then, based on some of the gener-
George W. Bush 159
al conclusions about American foreign policy, we will reiterate some of the

basic themes and see whether some conclusions can be drawn about the
future of U.S. foreign policy.
APPLYING FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPTS:

RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11
In this chapter, we looked at the decisions made by the Bush administration

based on its understanding of the events of September 11. We now have a
more complete understanding of what happened and why, as well as who was
behind the awful events. However, at the time, the Bush administration felt
that it had to respond, which it did based on what was then known, the advice
of those within the administration, and also the underlying ideological per-
spective that was guiding the administration at that time. If you were an
advisor to President Bush, and you knew then what you know now, what
would you have recommended, and why?
In order to determine this, you need to identify the critical players at the
time (e.g., the terrorist groups involved and the role of Congress, the military,
the public, the allies, etc.), what position or positions each of them took on
this issue, and what you think was in the national interest at the time. This all
must be put into the framework of the proposed Bush administration U.S.
foreign policy direction (unilateralist versus expansionist) as well as your
own understanding of resources available to the United States, specifically,
the use of hard versus soft power. Put another way, would you have resorted
to the use of military power against either Afghanistan and/or Iraq or pursued
a different option, and why?
The Case
On September 11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four aircraft. They crashed
two into the World Trade Center in New York and one into the Pentagon, and
the fourth crashed in Pennsylvania, short of its target in Washington, D.C.,
when passengers fought back. Approximately three thousand people lost
their lives in those attacks. One of the highest priorities of the Bush adminis-
tration was to find out what happened and then formulate a response to the
event.
The United States’ allies rallied behind the country and invoked Article 5
of the NATO treaty for the first time in the history of the alliance. But
outside of allowing AWACS aircraft to help patrol the skies over the United
States in case of further attack, the United States chose not to seek an allied
response.
Investigations into the attacks found that the hijackers were all part of the
Al Qaeda terrorist network founded and led by Osama bin Laden. The men,
160 Chapter 6
all of whom were from the Middle East, were believed to have been part of a
group trained in the radical madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to
have received their terrorist training at camps in those countries. Through its
investigations, the United States also learned that bin Laden probably was in
Afghanistan, but the Taliban government refused to turn him over to U.S.
authorities.
The period immediately following September 11 was a time of confusion
and uncertainty for much of the United States. For the president, however,
the attacks “confirmed what Bush already believed: The world was a danger-
ous place. Terrorists bent on doing harm were not stopped by a smile and an
open hand, but by grim determination and a closed fist. International agree-
ments and institutions could not protect the American people; only the might
of the American military could.” And for President Bush, “foreign policy, or
more precisely, the war on terrorism, became the defining mission of his
presidency.” 72
President Bush was determined that the United States had to respond
forcefully to those attacks. But the question was where and how to respond.
Any response would have to send a signal to future groups or even countries
that the United States was a major force to be reckoned with. Clearly, the
terrorists came from a number of different places and relied on different
countries for support. Further, Al Qaeda, a nonstate organization, was the
“bad guy” rather than any single country. The American public looked to the
president for direction, and the polls showed that he had the support of the
public. The Congress understood that this was a direct attack on the country
and looked to the executive for a response, albeit with congressional approv-
al. It would be up to the president to determine what to do next and to be sure

that Congress and the public supported him.
What Would You Do If . . .
The time is October 2001. George W. Bush has been president for nine
months, and he came into office after a disputed election. His priority was to
begin to withdraw the United States from some of its commitments abroad
and refocus the country’s priorities. Rather than looking toward the tradition-
al European allies, Bush felt that the United States should be strengthening
its ties to Central and Latin America. Initially Bush was accused of pursuing
an isolationist foreign policy, as he refused to endorse the Kyoto Protocol,
and he withdrew the United States from the 1972 ABM Treaty as an example
of how the United States would chart its own foreign policy course. Septem-
ber 11 changed the direction of U.S. policy, and the responses to that event
would define U.S. foreign policy for the Bush administration and beyond.
What would you do if you were a close advisor to President Bush and he
looked to you for recommendations about how to respond to the attacks of
George W. Bush 161
September 11? By late September and early October, you have some essen-
tial information about the attacks, but there is still a lot that is not yet known.
What are the options available to you? You know that you would have the
support of the American people and Congress as well as allies for a military
response, but against which country should the attack be directed? What
should be the short- and long-term goals, and how will you achieve them?
Given what you know now, including the consequences (both intended and
unintended), what would you recommend that President Bush do, and why?
And finally, although we can never know this for certain, speculate as to
whether you think the outcome would have been different if Al Gore, Bill
Clinton’s vice president, had won the contested presidential election of 2000
rather than George W. Bush.

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Chapter Six

The administration of George W. Bush started in controversy when the con-

FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11

During the presidential campaign of 2000, then-candidate George W. Bush

eliminate the spread of weapons of mass destruction allegedly found in Iraq.

Contested Election and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

In order to put the Bush administration’s decisions into broader perspective,

Despite—or because of—his disputed victory in the presidential election,

troops to the Balkans as part of the peacekeeping force deployed there in

SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE RESPONSES

Acting unilaterally, the Bush administration thereby determined how to

War with Afghanistan

and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he

The Bush Doctrine and the War with Iraq

justified in going to war preemptively against any group that potentially

The Rise of the “Neocons”

The Path to War with Iraq

War and the unsatisfactory outcome according to a number of members of

by international terrorist organizations”—although it does not mention Iraq

2003 to make the implicit case for war:

withdrawn in the face of mounting opposition, and UN Secretary General

The War with Iraq and Its Aftermath

The Iraq War and the Economy

Freedom and Democracy for All

rating for Bush of 50 percent, versus a disapproval rating of 43 percent. A

a post-Sept. 11 world, America’s national security is tied directly to the

President Bush and Wilsonian Idealism

even missionary terms (rather than in political ones)” (emphasis in original).

the administration’s experience in Iraq increasingly resembles past American

The Iraq War: A Postscript

virtually all American operations—even in support roles—for the first few

that, eventually, a sense of “normalcy” returns to that country. The SOFA

al conclusions about American foreign policy, we will reiterate some of the

APPLYING FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPTS:

In this chapter, we looked at the decisions made by the Bush administration

a different option, and why?

al. It would be up to the president to determine what to do next and to be sure

What Would You Do If . . .

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