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SPRING 1998 29
dency for rising powers to alter the global balance of power in poten-
tially dangerous ways, especially as their growing influence makes them
more ambitious. From another perspective, the key to China's future
conduct is whether its behavior will be modified by its integration into
world markets and by the (inevitable?) spread of democratic principles.
From yet another viewpoint, relations between China and the rest of
the world will be shaped by issues of culture and identity: Will China
see itself (and be seen by others) as a normal member of the world com-
munity or a singular society that deserves special treatment?
In the same way, the debate over NATO expansion looks different
depending on which theory one employs. From a "realist" perspective,
NATO expansion is an effort to extend Western influence-well beyond
the traditional sphere of U.S. vital interests-during a period of Russ-
ian weakness and is likely to provoke a harsh response from Moscow.
From a liberal perspective, however, expansion will reinforce the
nascent democracies of Central Europe and extend NATO'S conflict-
management mechanisms to a potentially turbulent region. A third
view might stress the value of incorporating the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, and Poland within the Western security community, whose mem-
bers share a common identity that has made war largely unthinkable.
No single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary
world politics. Therefore, we are better off with a diverse array of com-
peting ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy. Competition
between theories helps reveal their strengths and weaknesses and
spurs subsequent refinements, while revealing flaws in conventional
wisdom. Although we should take care to emphasize inventiveness
over invective, we should welcome and encourage the heterogeneity
of contemporary scholarship.
30 FOREIGN POLICY
Realism
Realism was the dominant theoretical tradition throughout the Cold
War. It depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-
interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for
eliminating conflict and war. Realism dominated in the Cold War years
because it provided simple but powerful explanations for war, alliances,
imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenom-
ena, and because its emphasis on competition was consistent with the
central features of the American-Soviet rivalry.
Realism is not a single theory, of course, and realist thought evolved
considerably throughout the Cold War. "Classical" realists such as Hans
Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr believed that states, like human
beings, had an innate desire to dominate others, which led them to fight
wars. Morgenthau also stressed the virtues of the classical, multipolar,
balance-of-power system and saw the bipolar rivalry between the Unit-
ed States and the Soviet Union as especially dangerous.
By contrast, the "neorealist" theory advanced by Kenneth Waltz
ignored human nature and focused on the effects of the international
system. For Waltz, the international system consisted of a number of
great powers, each seeking to survive. Because the system is anarchic
(i.e., there is no central authority to protect states from one another),
each state has to survive on its own. Waltz argued that this condition
would lead weaker states to balance against, rather than bandwagon
with, more powerful rivals. And contrary to Morgenthau, he claimed
that bipolarity was more stable than multipolarity.
An important refinement to realism was the addition of offense-
defense theory, as laid out by Robert Jervis, George Quester, and
Stephen Van Evera. These scholars argued that war was more likely
when states could conquer each other easily. When defense was easier
than offense, however, security was more plentiful, incentives to expand
declined, and cooperation could blossom. And if defense had the
advantage, and states could distinguish between offensive and defensive
weapons, then states could acquire the means to defend themselves
without threatening others, thereby dampening the effects of anarchy.
For these "defensive" realists, states merely sought to survive and great
powers could guarantee their security by forming balancing alliances and
choosing defensive military postures (such as retaliatory nuclear forces).
Not surprisingly, Waltz and most other neorealists believed that the
United States was extremely secure for most of the Cold War. Their
SPRING 1998 31
principle fear was that it might squander its favorable position by adopt-
ing an overly aggressive foreign policy. Thus, by the end of the Cold War,
realism had moved away from Morgenthau's dark brooding about human
nature and taken on a slightly more optimistic tone.
Liberalism
The principal challenge to realism came from a broad family of liber-
al theories. One strand of liberal thought argued that economic inter-
dependence would discourage states from using force against each
other because warfare would threaten each side's prosperity. A second
strand, often associated with President Woodrow Wilson, saw the
spread of democracy as the key to world peace, based on the claim that
democratic states were inherently more peaceful than authoritarian
states. A third, more recent theory argued that international
institutions such as the International Energy Agency and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund could help overcome selfish state behavior,
mainly by encouraging states to forego immediate gains for the greater
benefits of enduring cooperation.
Although some liberals flirted with the idea that new transnational
actors, especially the multinational corporation, were gradually
encroaching on the power of states, liberalism generally saw states as the
central players in international affairs. All liberal theories implied that
cooperation was more pervasive than even the defensive version of real-
ism allowed, but each view offered a different recipe for promoting it.
Radical Approaches
Until the 1980s, marxism was the main alternative to the mainstream
realist and liberal traditions. Where realism and liberalism took the
state system for granted, marxism offered both a different explanation
for international conflict and a blueprint for fundamentally transform-
ing the existing international order.
Orthodox marxist theory saw capitalism as the central cause of inter-
national conflict. Capitalist states battled each other as a consequence
of their incessant struggle for profits and battled socialist states because
they saw in them the seeds of their own destruction. Neomarxist
"dependency" theory, by contrast, focused on relations between
advanced capitalist powers and less developed states and argued that the
former-aided by an unholy alliance with the ruling classes of the
developing world-had grown rich by exploiting the latter. The solu-
32 FOREIGN POLICY
Domestic Politics
Not all Cold War scholarship on international affairs fit neatly into the
realist, liberal, or marxist paradigms. In particular, a number of impor-
tant works focused on the characteristics of states, governmental orga-
nizations, or individual leaders. The democratic strand of liberal theory
fits under this heading, as do the efforts of scholars such as Graham
Allison and John Steinbruner to use organization theory and bureau-
cratic politics to explain foreign policy behavior, and those of Jervis,
Irving Janis, and others, which applied social and cognitive psycholo-
gy. For the most part, these efforts did not seek to provide a general the-
ory of international behavior but to identify other factors that might
lead states to behave contrary to the predictions of the realist or liber-
al approaches. Thus, much of this literature should be regarded as a
complement to the three main paradigms rather than as a rival
approach for analysis of the international system as a whole.
34 FOREIGN POLICY
Realism Redux
Although the end of the Cold War led a few writers to declare that
realism was destined for the academic scrapheap, rumors of its demise
have been largely exaggerated.
A recent contribution of realist theory is its attention to the problem
of relative and absolute gains. Responding to the institutionalists' claim
that international institutions would enable states to forego short-term
advantages for the sake of greater long-term gains, realists such as Joseph
Grieco and Stephen Krasner point out that anarchy forces states to
worry about both the absolute gains from cooperation and the way that
gains are distributed among participants. The logic is straightforward: If
one state reaps larger gains than its partners, it will gradually become
stronger, and its partners will eventually become more vulnerable.
Realists have also been quick to explore a variety of new issues. Barry
Posen offers a realist explanation for ethnic conflict, noting that the
breakup of multiethnic states could place rival ethnic groups in an anar-
chic setting, thereby triggering intense fears and tempting each group to
use force to improve its relative position. This problem would be par-
ticularly severe when each group's territory contained enclaves inhabit-
ed by their ethnic rivals-as in the former Yugoslavia-because each
side would be tempted to "cleanse" (preemptively) these alien minori-
ties and expand to incorporate any others from their ethnic group that
lay outside their borders. Realists have also cautioned that NATO,
absent a clear enemy, would likely face increasing strains and that
expanding its presence eastward would jeopardize relations with Russia.
Finally, scholars such as Michael Mastanduno have argued that U.S.
SPRING 1998 35
36 FOREIGN POLICY
SPRING 1998 37
COMPETING
REALISM LIBERALISM
PARADIGMS CONSTRUCTIVISMI
Main Theoretical Self-interested states Concern for power State behavior shaped
Proposition compete constantly for overridden by economic/ by l61ite beliefs,
power or security political considerations collective norms,
(desire for prosperity, and social identities
commitment to
liberal values)
Main Limitation Does not account for Tends to ignore the Better at describing the
international change role of power past than anticipating
the future
38 FOREIGN POLICY
humankind had now reached the "end of history." History has paid lit-
tle attention to this boast, but the triumph of the West did give a
notable boost to all three strands of liberal thought.
By far the most interesting and important development has been the
lively debate on the "democratic peace." Although the most recent
phase of this debate had begun even before the Soviet Union collapsed,
it became more influential as the number of democracies began to
increase and as evidence of this relationship began to accumulate.
Democratic peace theory is a refinement of the earlier claim that
democracies were inherently more peaceful than autocratic states. It rests
on the belief that although democracies seem to fight wars as often as
other states, they rarely, if ever, fight one another. Scholars such as
Michael Doyle, James Lee Ray, and Bruce Russett have offered a number
of explanations for this tendency, the most popular being that democra-
cies embrace norms of compromise that bar the use of force against
groups espousing similar principles. It is hard to think of a more influen-
tial, recent academic debate, insofar as the belief that "democracies don't
fight each other" has been an important justification for the Clinton
administration's efforts to enlarge the sphere of democratic rule.
It is therefore ironic that faith in the "democratic peace" became the
basis for U.S. policy just as additional research was beginning to identify
several qualifiers to this theory. First, Snyder and Edward Mansfield
pointed out that states may be more prone to war when they are in the
midst of a democratic transition, which implies that efforts to export
democracy might actually make things worse. Second, critics such as
Joanne Gowa and David Spiro have argued that the apparent absence of
war between democracies is due to the way that democracy has been
defined and to the relative dearth of democratic states (especially before
1945). In addition, Christopher Layne has pointed out that when
democracies have come close to war in the past their decision to remain
at peace ultimately had little do with their shared democratic character.
Third, clearcut evidence that democracies do not fight each other is con-
fined to the post-1945 era, and, as Gowa has emphasized, the absence of
conflict in this period may be due more to their common interest in con-
taining the Soviet Union than to shared democratic principles.
Liberal institutionalists likewise have continued to adapt their own
theories. On the one hand, the core claims of institutionalist theory have
become more modest over time. Institutions are now said to facilitate
cooperation when it is in each state's interest to do so, but it is widely
SPRING 1998 39
agreed that they cannot force states to behave in ways that are contrary
to the states' own selfish interests. [For further discussion, please see
Robert Keohane's article.] On the other hand, institutionalists such as
John Duffield and Robert McCalla have extended the theory into new
substantive areas, most notably the study of NATO. For these scholars,
NATO'S highly institutionalized character helps explain why it has been
able to survive and adapt, despite the disappearance of its main adversary.
The economic strand of liberal theory is still influential as well. In par-
ticular, a number of scholars have recently suggested that the "globaliza-
tion" of world markets, the rise of transnational networks and
nongovernmental organizations, and the rapid spread of global commu-
nications technology are undermining the power of states and shifting
attention away from military security toward economics and social wel-
fare. The details are novel but the basic logic is familiar: As societies
around the globe become enmeshed in a web of economic and social
connections, the costs of disrupting these ties will effectively preclude
unilateral state actions, especially the use of force.
This perspective implies that war will remain a remote possibility
among the advanced industrial democracies. It also suggests that bring-
ing China and Russia into the relentless embrace of world capitalism is
the best way to promote both prosperity and peace, particularly if this
process creates a strong middle class in these states and reinforces pres-
sures to democratize. Get these societies hooked on prosperity and com-
petition will be confined to the economic realm.
This view has been challenged by scholars who argue that the actu-
al scope of "globalization" is modest and that these various transactions
still take place in environments that are shaped and regulated by states.
Nonetheless, the belief that economic forces are superseding tradition-
al great power politics enjoys widespread acceptance among scholars,
pundits, and policymakers, and the role of the state is likely to be an
important topic for future academic inquiry.
Constructivist Theories
Whereas realism and liberalism tend to focus on material factors such as
power or trade, constructivist approaches emphasize the impact of ideas.
Instead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks
to survive, constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as
a highly malleable product of specific historical processes. They pay
close attention to the prevailing discourse(s) in society because dis-
40 FOREIGN POLICY
course reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes accepted
norms of behavior. Consequently, constructivism is especially attentive
to the sources of change, and this approach has largely replaced marx-
ism as the preeminent radical perspective on international affairs.
The end of the Cold War played an important role in legitimating
constructivist theories because realism and liberalism both failed to
anticipate this event and had some trouble explaining it. Construc-
tivists had an explanation: Specifically, former president Mikhail
Gorbachev revolutionized Soviet foreign policy because he embraced
new ideas such as "common security."
Moreover, given that we live in an era where old norms are being
challenged, once clear boundaries are dissolving, and issues of identi-
ty are becoming more salient, it is hardly surprising that scholars have
been drawn to approaches that place these issues front and center.
From a constructivist perspective, in fact, the central issue in the
post-Cold War world is how different groups conceive their identities
and interests. Although power is not irrelevant, constructivism
emphasizes how ideas and identities are created, how they evolve, and
how they shape the way states understand and respond to their situa-
tion. Therefore, it matters whether Europeans define themselves pri-
marily in national or continental terms; whether Germany and Japan
redefine their pasts in ways that encourage their adopting more active
international roles; and whether the United States embraces or rejects
its identity as "global policeman."
Constructivist theories are quite diverse and do not offer a unified
set of predictions on any of these issues. At a purely conceptual level,
Alexander Wendt has argued that the realist conception of anarchy
does not adequately explain why conflict occurs between states. The
real issue is how anarchy is understood-in Wendt's words, "Anarchy
is what states make of it." Another strand of constructivist theory has
focused on the future of the territorial state, suggesting that transna-
tional communication and shared civic values are undermining tradi-
tional national loyalties and creating radically new forms of political
association. Other constructivists focus on the role of norms, arguing
that international law and other normative principles have eroded ear-
lier notions of sovereignty and altered the legitimate purposes for
which state power may be employed. The common theme in each of
these strands is the capacity of discourse to shape how political actors
define themselves and their interests, and thus modify their behavior.
SPRING 1998 41
42 FOREIGN POLICY
national behavior; and some constructivists admit that ideas will have
greater impact when backed by powerful states and reinforced by enduring
material forces. The boundaries of each paradigm are somewhat perme-
able, and there is ample opportunity for intellectual arbitrage.
Which of these broad perspectives sheds the most light on contem-
porary international affairs, and which should policymakers keep most
firmly in mind when charting our course into the next century?
Although many academics (and more than a few policymakers) are
loathe to admit it, realism remains the most compelling general frame-
work for understanding international relations. States continue to pay
close attention to the balance of power and to worry about the possi-
bility of major conflict. Among other things, this enduring preoccupa-
tion with power and security explains why many Asians and Europeans
are now eager to preserve-and possibly expand-the U.S. military
presence in their regions. As Czech president Vaiclav Havel has
warned, if NATO fails to expand, "we might be heading for a new glob-
al catastrophe ... [which] could cost us all much more than the two
world wars." These are not the words of a man who believes that great
power rivalry has been banished forever.
As for the United States, the past decade has shown how much it likes
being "number one" and how determined it is to remain in a predominant
position. The United States has taken advantage of its current superiori-
ty to impose its preferences wherever possible, even at the risk of irritat-
ing many of its long-standing allies. It has forced a series of one-sided arms
control agreements on Russia, dominated the problematic peace effort in
Bosnia, taken steps to expand NATO into Russia's backyard, and become
increasingly concerned about the rising power of China. It has called
repeatedly for greater reliance on multilateralism and a larger role for
international institutions, but has treated agencies such as the United
Nations and the World Trade Organization with disdain whenever their
actions did not conform to U.S. interests. It refused to join the rest of the
world in outlawing the production of landmines and was politely unco-
operative at the Kyoto environmental summit. Although U.S. leaders are
adept at cloaking their actions in the lofty rhetoric of "world order," naked
self-interest lies behind most of them. Thus, the end of the Cold War did
not bring the end of power politics, and realism is likely to remain the sin-
gle most useful instrument in our intellectual toolbox.
Yet realism does not explain everything, and a wise leader would
also keep insights from the rival paradigms in mind. Liberal theories
SPRING 1998 43
identify the instruments that states can use to achieve shared inter-
ests, highlight the powerful economic forces with which states and
societies must now contend, and help us understand why states may
differ in their basic preferences. Paradoxically, because U.S. protec-
tion reduces the danger of regional rivalries and reinforces the "liber-
al peace" that emerged after 1945, these factors may become relatively
more important, as long as the United States continues to provide
security and stability in many parts of the world.
Meanwhile, constructivist theories are best suited to the analysis of
how identities and interests can change over time, thereby producing
subtle shifts in the behavior of states and occasionally triggering far-
reaching but unexpected shifts in international affairs. It matters if
political identity in Europe continues to shift from the nation-state to
more local regions or to a broader sense of European identity, just as it
matters if nationalism is gradually supplanted by the sort of "civiliza-
tional" affinities emphasized by Huntington. Realism has little to say
about these prospects, and policymakers could be blind-sided by
change if they ignore these possibilities entirely.
In short, each of these competing perspectives captures important
aspects of world politics. Our understanding would be impoverished
were our thinking confined to only one of them. The "compleat diplo-
mat" of the future should remain cognizant of realism's emphasis on the
inescapable role of power, keep liberalism's awareness of domestic forces
in mind, and occasionally reflect on constructivism's vision of change.
44 FOREIGN POLICY
SPRING 1998 45
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