RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED AT THE TRIAL

1. PEOPLE V. SY
 Under our Constitution, an accused enjoys the presumption of innocence. And this presumption
prevails over the presumption of regularity of the performance of official duty.
 In dealing with prosecutions for the illegal sale of drugs, what is material is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited
or regulated drug as evidence. Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements
in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited
drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.
 In the instant case, the Court finds that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses adequately
establish these elements.
Facts:
 Jason Sy was charged before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 47, with illegal
sale of shabu. in violation of Section 15, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425.
 On or about December 3, 2000, JASON SY, not having been previously licensed, authorized
and/or permitted by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell one (1)
carton box methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) weighing nine hundred eighty-seven and
thirty-two thousand two hundred sixty-five hundred thousandth (987.32265) grams, a regulated
drug, to a poseur-buyer.
 Prosecution: At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO3 Ricardo L. Amontos
(member, Special Action Team), Police Inspector Maria Luisa David Gundran (Crime
Laboratory Forensic Officer), PO2 Christian Ventura Trambulo and PO Senior Inspector Julieto
Culili. The first witness to testify was PO3 Ricardo L. Amontos. He declared that he was a
member of the Special Action Team 3rd CIDG, Camp Olivas, City of San Fernando, Pampanga.
At about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 2, 2000, he reported to Camp Olivas on
instructions of their team leader, Major Julian Caesar Mana. The latter told them that PO2
Christian Trambulo, together with a civilian informant, were negotiating a drug-deal with a
certain person allegedly named Jason Sy. Consequently, at around 2:00 o’clock of the next
morning, December 3, 2000, Major Mana conducted a briefing regarding a possible buy-bust
operation. Those presents (sic) were Major Mana, Captain Julieto Culili and six (6) other police
officers. He was designated as back-up of PO2 Trambulo. His duty was to assist in
apprehending the suspect. After the briefing, they proceeded to the designated area at the
Chowking Food Chain located at the Gapan-Olongapo Road, Dolores, City of San Fernando,
Pampanga. The proceeded thereat in four (4) vehicles. Two vehicles were parked at the
parking lot located in front of Chowking Fast Food. One used by PO2 Trambulo and the
informer while the other was used by him and PO3 Vasquez. They were ten to fifteen meters
away from Trambulo. The two other vehicles were parked along Gapan-Olongapo Road within
viewing distance. The place was well-lighted. Lights emanated from the Chowking Fast Food
and from a spotlight in the building beside the restaurant. Witness narrated further that at
around 3:00 o’clock of the said morning, a color red Nissan Altima arrived at the parking lot. A
male person, who was later identified as accused Jason Sy, alighted and walked towards the
car where PO2 Trambulo was. Jason Sy and PO2 Trambulo talked for awhile. Then PO2
Trambulo removed his bull cap, which was the pre-arranged signal that the sale has already
been consummated. As soon as he saw the signal, he immediately rushed to the place where
PO2 Trambulo was standing. At this moment, PO2 Trambulo has already placed Jason Sy
under arrest by holding the latter’s hand. He recovered the Php5,000.00 marked money and
the boodle money from the possession of Jason Sy and apprised him of his constitutional rights.
He then turned over possession of the boodle money to PO2 Trambulo. Subsequently, they
brought Jason Sy to their office at Camp Olivas. PO2 Trambulo turned over custody of Jason
Sy, the buy-bust money and a transparent plastic packed inside of which was a paper bag with
the label Jacob Fish cracker, allegedly containing shabu, to the police investigator. He also
identified the join-affidavit (x x x) which he and PO2 Trambulo executed.
 PO2 Trambulo prepared the boodle money.
 At the time PO2 Trambulo removed his bull-cap, he, Amontos, was standing beside their car
while Narciso Valdez was inside the vehicle. Their superior officers, Julius Caesar Mana and
Julieto Culili, who were in two separate cars, later joined them. He informed Jason Sy of his
 constitutional rights in English because according to the informant Jason is a Chinese National.
He asked Jason whether he understand (sic) English and the latter nodded his head.
 During cross examination he (PO2 Trambulo) disclosed that the team were (sic) composed of
eight (8) members and one informant. He stressed that during the briefing[,] Captain Mana told
them that the suspect was a Chinese person operating in the 3rd Regional area, within their
immediate area of jurisdiction and he is fluent in Tagalog. He was able to prove this because
he talked with accused personally over the phone. Accused informed him that he, Jason, will
be arriving in a car. The informant told him that accused can speak English and Tagalog. The
deal for a kilo of shabu, which had a street value of Php2 Million, was made in two to three
minutes. He clarified that it was Major Mana who gave him the genuine and boodle money.
 During cross-examination, defense counsel made reference to the case of People vs. Go Lip
Tse, where the witnessed (sic) participated in a buy-bust operation. Defense counsel
confronted Culili with a decision of the court acquitting the accused therein because based on
the video taken of the incident, it appears that accused Go was merely abducted and there was
really no buy-bust. Culili also admitted that he was informed about a criminal case pending
against him, Senior Inspector Mana, Medel Pono, Inspector Carlito Dimalanta and Francisco
Villaroman for violation of Section 19 of RA 7659 for planting of evidence in order that a person
may be charged for violation of RA 7659.
 The defense sought to establish its "hulidap" theory.
 Defense: On that day, at dawn, accused was illegally abducted while in his car, stalled in
momentary traffic, along EDSA in Caloocan City, in form of Max Restaurant and about a
hundred (100) meters to the Bonifacio Monument. A witness, Jose Pepito, saw two (2) persons
commandeered (sic) accused’s car, forced him to move to the back seat, and sped away with
him. Accused was initially brought to a place which looks like a cemetery. While the accused
could not name the cemetery, he recalled that it was near a toll gate going to the North
Expressway. At the cemetery, his vehicle was ransacked and his person searched, divesting
him and his car of his sample RTW products, cash amounting to ₱4,000.00 to ₱5,000.00 and
his cellular phone, among others. Thereafter, he was brought to his house at Polyteach Street,
University Hills, Caloocan City, where the place was likewise pillaged by these persons
numbering about ten (10) by that time. They took all his stock merchandise or inventory and
carted them away to their own vehicles. Fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes later they left with
the accused in his car, and in two (2) other cars. The accused had no idea where they were
going. While on board his car, he was asked to call his relatives through his mobile phone. But
not having any relatives in the Philippines, he instead called up his mother’s friend whom he
addresses as "Auntie Kim Ying." He was instructed by his abductors to ask his auntie to raise
One Million Five Hundred Thousand (P1.5M) Pesos in ransom. The phone was immediately
taken from him after delivering the message. Thereafter, he was blindfolded and they kept on
driving, making only a short stop to take lunch. It was getting dark when they finally arrived at
their destination. The accused had no idea where they were at that time.Unknown to the
accused then and while he was being driven by his abductors, Mrs. Co Kim Eng (Kim Ying),
upon receiving the call from the accused, had frantically raised the amount of P1.5 Million
Peson from her relatives, business associates and friends. She then contacted Mrs. Andrea
Co ("Aning" "Annie") in the evening of 2 December 2003 to deliver the money to accused’s
abductors. Andrea Co arrived at the Total Gas Station in San Fernando City, Pampanga and
waited there for about 30 minutes. Thereafter, she received another call, instructing her to
proceed to the dark corner of the street fronting a McDonald’s Restaurant along McArthur
Highway. Upon arrival at the designated place, she was ordered to alight from the taxi cab and
to bring the money with her. She noticed an L-300 Mitsubishi van slowly parking behind them.
Thereafter, several persons alighted from the van and took the money from her. She noticed
several persons inside the van carrying Armalite rifles when its sliding door was opened. She
was then instructed to go back to the Total Gas Station to wait for the accused.
 Back at the Total Gas Station, she received another call ordering them to leave the place. While
she complied and left the gas station, she asked the taxi cab driver to wait again at the San
Fernando toll gate’s entrance to the expressway. While there she tried to call accused’s
kidnappers. The line was dead.
  Trial Court: Jason Sy is guilty. Trial Court gave credence to the clear and straightforward
manner of the testimonies of the prosecution witness. Entrapment operation was held in
Chowking not in Mcdonalds.
 CA: Sustained the finding of the Trial Court.
Issues:
 Whether the prosecution discharged its burden to support accused-appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged. (YES)
Ruling:
 After a painstaking review of the records of the case, we find no merit in the appeal.
 An accused in criminal prosecutions is to be presumed innocent until his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. This constitutional guarantee cannot be overthrown unless the prosecution
has established by such quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption of
innocence and prove that a crime was committed and that the accused is guilty thereof. Under
our Constitution, an accused enjoys the presumption of innocence. And this presumption
prevails over the presumption of regularity of the performance of official duty.
 In dealing with prosecutions for the illegal sale of drugs, what is material is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited
or regulated drug as evidence. Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements
in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited
drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.
 In the instant case, the Court finds that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses adequately
establish these elements. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be
accorded the highest respect, because it had the advantage of observing their demeanor and
was thus in a better position to discern if they were telling the truth or not.
 A scrutiny of the accounts of PO3 Ricardo Amontos, PO2 Christian Trambulo and Senior
Inspector Culili, detailing how PO2 Trambulo negotiated, thru cellphone, with accused-
appellant on the purchase price and the amount of shabu to be delivered, actual delivery of the
shabu, the giving to the accused the marked and boodle money and the subsequent arrest of
the accused show that these were testified to in a clear, straightforward manner. Their
testimonies are further bolstered by the physical evidence consisting of the shabu presented
as evidence before the court.
 The case at bar presents a predicament considering that the RTC found evidence to support
that the police officers exacted money from accused-appellant after his arrest in order to
facilitate his immediate discharge. In the same case, however, the RTC still found accused-
appellant guilty of the crime charged, based on the totality of evidence adduced by the
prosecution. The Court of Appeals, however, did not give credence to accused-appellant’s
allegations of extortion. This notwithstanding, we examined the entirety of the prosecution
evidence and find the same sufficient to convict accused-appellant. In a similar case, People
v. So, this Court has ruled that the police extortion does not necessarily negate the fact that
accused-appellant committed the offense.
 Accused-appellant claims that the failure of the prosecution to present the informer in court
only demonstrates that the informer is fictitious. According to the defense, this gives rise to the
presumption that his testimony would be adverse if produced. In People v. Doria,18 this Court
expounded on the rule in determining whether the informer should be presented for a
successful prosecution in cases involving buy-bust operations, to wit: “[E]xcept when the
appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material consistencies in
the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the arresting
officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant, or that only the informant was the
poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, the testimony of the informant may
be dispensed with as it will be merely corroborative of the apprehending officers’ eyewitness
testimonies. There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually
witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.”
 None of the foregoing circumstances are present in the case at bar. As shown from the
evidence adduced by the prosecution, the sale was actually witnessed and proven by the
prosecution witnesses.
 Equally without merit is accused-appellant’s contention that the failure of the operatives to
record the buy-bust in the police blotter and their failure to apply fluorescent powder to the buy-
 bust money are signs of irregularities. Firstly, a prior blotter report is neither indispensable nor
required in buy-bust operations. Secondly, there is no rule requiring that the police must apply
fluorescent powder to the buy-bust money to prove the commission of the offense. The failure
of the police operatives to use fluorescent powder on the boodle money is not an indication
that the buy-bust operation did not take place. The use of initials to mark the money used in
the buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court.20 Similar to a prior blotter report, the
use of fluorescent powder is not indispensable in such operations, for the prerogative to choose
the manner of marking the money to be used in the buy-bust operation belongs exclusively to
the prosecution.
 On Chain of Custody: The same has no merit. The integrity of the chain of custody of the
evidence was not compromised. This Court has explained in People v. Del Monte, that what is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. SPO2 Trambulo, the poseur-buyer, testified that upon
confiscation of the box with the shabu, he affixed his initials CVT and the date of confiscation
of the box. Thereafter, he placed the evidence in his car until they reached the CIDG office,
whereupon he showed the same to P/Inspector Culili and the evidence was inventoried as well.
Culili then instructed him to bring the evidence to the crime laboratory for examination.
 Thus, the penalty to be imposed is based on the quantity of the regulated drug involved.
 Accused-appellant sold the police operatives a substance weighing 987.32265 grams, which
amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams required by law for the imposition of either
reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating circumstances, the death penalty.
 NOTE: Sec 15 and Sec 20 of the drug law. If the victim is a minor or the victim died and the
proximate cause was the drugs  maximum penalty.
 Thus, the penalty imposed by the RTC, as modified by the Court of Appeals is proper. The
decision of RTC and CA is AFFIRMED.

2. PEOPLE V. LAGARDE
 In rape cases, courts are governed by the following principles: (1) an accusation of rape can
be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) due to the nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Due to the nature
of this crime, only the complainant can testify against the assailant. Accordingly, conviction for
rape may be solely based on the complainant’s testimony provided it is credible, natural,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
Facts:
 December 27, 2001: In the municipality of San Miguel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, Sergio Lagarde, with deliberate intent with lewd designs
and by use of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with [AAA], 11 years old, against her will to her damage and prejudice.
 Witnesses: AAA (Victim), Drs. Felix P. Oyzon and Karen Palencia-Jadloc. According to the
prosecution, on December 27, 2001, around 12 noon, AAA and her mother were at the house
of Lolita Lagarde-Sarsosa, which was about 500 to 600 meters away from the victim’s house,
to attend the death anniversary celebration of Lolita’s mother. Accused-appellant was also
present in that occasion, being the nephew of Lolita. Accused-appellant is a neighbor of AAA
and the father of her classmate.
 After lunch, AAA’s mother, accused-appellant, and the other visitors started drinking tuba
(coconut wine). AAA remained inside the house until her mother ordered her to pick a jackfruit
at around 4:00 p.m. AAA obliged and went outside towards the jackfruit tree which was about
150 meters away from the house. When she was near the tree, she sensed the presence of
somebody behind her who suddenly placed his hand over her mouth and dragged her to the
loonan or copra dryer which was about eight meters away from the jackfruit tree. There, AAA
recognized the attacker as accused-appellant.
  After lunch, AAA’s mother, accused-appellant, and the other visitors started drinking tuba
(coconut wine). AAA remained inside the house until her mother ordered her to pick a jackfruit
at around 4:00 p.m. AAA obliged and went outside towards the jackfruit tree which was about
150 meters away from the house. When she was near the tree, she sensed the presence of
somebody behind her who suddenly placed his hand over her mouth and dragged her to the
loonan or copra dryer which was about eight meters away from the jackfruit tree. There, AAA
recognized the attacker as accused-appellant. On December 28, 2001, AAA was brought to
the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center, Tacloban City for physical examination. Drs.
Oyzon and Palencia-Jadloc, the attending medical examiners. The pertinent testimony of Dr.
Oyzon tended to prove that there was apparently no struggle on the part of the victim because
there was no hematoma on her body, although it is possible for injuries to be concealed. Dr.
Palencia-Jadloc, on the other hand, established the fact that the victim had sexual intercourse/
 Defense: Lolita testified that on December 27, 2001, during the celebration of her mother’s
death anniversary, accused-appellant was drinking tuba with other visitors on the ground floor
of her house. Most of the time, AAA played with Lolita’s niece, Jennilyn, around 10 meters
away from the house. AAA went to see her mother a few times on the second floor of the house
until they left around 7:00 p.m. Lolita asserted that at no time did accused-appellant leave his
seat until he left around 5:00 p.m. On cross-examination, Lolita stated that prior to the incident,
there was no altercation between AAA’s mother and accused-appellant, and she did not know
why they would file a case against her nephew.
 RTC: Found the accused guilty. lower court dismissed accused-appellant’s denial and alibi.
Lolita’s testimony was likewise disbelieved not only because she was related to accused-
appellant but also because she herself was busy drinking tuba in another part of the house.
She could not categorically say, the RTC added, that accused-appellant did not leave his seat
and molest AAA. Thus, the trial court convicted accused-appellant of rape aggravated by
minority of the victim, use of bladed weapon and force, and uninhabited place in view of the
location of the offense.
 CA: Upheld the findings of the RTC. With regard to the penalty, however, the CA ruled that the
trial court erred when it imposed the death sentence on the basis of the following aggravating
circumstances: minority, use of bladed weapon, and uninhabited place. Aside from the abolition
of the death penalty, the CA held that:
 It is basic in criminal procedure that the purpose of the information is to inform the accused of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him or the charge against him so as to enable
him to prepare a suitable defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed
of the charges against him, and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with
simple rape and convicted of its qualified form punishable by death although the attendant
circumstances qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment were not set forth in
the indictment on which he was arraigned.
Issue:
 Whether the court a quo gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the
crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. (NO)
Ruling:
 The appeal has no merit. In rape cases, courts are governed by the following principles: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) due to the nature of the crime of rape in
which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense. Due to the nature of this crime, only the complainant can testify against the
assailant. Accordingly, conviction for rape may be solely based on the complainant’s testimony
provided it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things.
 The trial court observed that AAA’s testimony was credible, straightforward, clear, and
convincing. She ably identified accused-appellant as her attacker and described in detail how
she was sexually assaulted. There is no reason a child would fabricate such a serious
accusation such as rape and risk public humiliation if not to seek justice. It is for this reason
 that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credence, since when minors
say they were raped, they say in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.
 For alibi to prosper, the accused persons must establish, by clear and convincing evidence,
(1) their presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (2) the
physical impossibility of their presence at the scene of the crime.
 As regards the second assigned error, we agree with the appellate court that the death penalty
is not warranted by the alleged aggravating circumstances, i.e., victim’s minority, use of bladed
weapon, and uninhabited place. First, the death penalty was abolished under Republic Act No.
(RA) 9346. Second, the use of a bladed weapon and uninhibited place cannot be appreciated
here because these were not specifically alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. – Designation of Criminal Offense.
 It is a basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against them. It would be a denial of accused-appellant’s basic right to due
process if he is charged with simple rape and consequently convicted with certain qualifying
circumstances which were not alleged in the information.
 COURT: The Accused is guilty. Thus, the applicable penalty is only reclusion perpetua and
not death, the imposition of which has been abolished. Without the qualifying circumstances,
the indemnity should also be reduced.

3. PEOPLE V. ANONAS –(SPO4 Emiliano Anonas)

 The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation of an accused violates his
constitutional right to due process. The preliminary investigation of the respondent for the
offenses charged took more than four years. He was apprehended for the offenses charged on
November 19, 1996. Having been arrested without a warrant of arrest and not having been
afforded a formal investigation, he prayed for reinvestigation of the cases. The trial court, in an
Order dated January 28, 1997 ordered a reinvestigation which was terminated only on February
16, 2001. In fact, even the Solicitor General admitted "it took some time for the City Prosecutor
to terminate and resolve the reinvestigation. There can be no question that respondent was
prejudiced by the delay, having to be confined for more than four oppressive years for failure
of the investigating prosecutors to comply with the law on preliminary investigation. As aptly
held by the Court of Appeals, respondent’s right to due process had been violated.
Facts:
 SPO4 Emiliano Anonas, respondent, assigned at the Western Police District, was
apprehended by his colleagues during a raid in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The apprehending police
officers claimed that he and four other persons were sniffing methamphetamine hydrochloride,
more popularly known as shabu, a regulated drug; and that he was in possession of an
unlicensed .38 caliber revolver. No bail was recommended.
 On April 14, 1998, Prosecutor Virgilio Patag, designated to conduct the reinvestigation, was
appointed judge of the RTC in Iloilo. Apparently, he did not inform the prosecutor who took his
place about the pending reinvestigation. Meanwhile, respondent has remained in detention.
 On January 4, 2001, respondent filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the Informations,
contending that the delay in the reinvestigation violated his right to due process.
 On January 12, 2001, the trial court heard the motion to dismiss. It turned out that Prosecutor
Danilo Formoso, who took over the case, was not aware of the pending reinvestigation. The
trial court then directed him to terminate the reinvestigation within thirty (30) days.
 On February 16, 2001, Prosecutor Formoso manifested before the trial court that the
reinvestigation had been terminated and that evidence exist to sustain the allegations in the
Informations against respondent.
 On August 9, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying respondent’s motion to dismiss the
Informations. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order dated September
7, 2001.
 On October 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the Order of the
trial court dated August 9, 2001 and dismissed the criminal charges against respondent.
 The Court of Appeals ruled that having been made to wait for the resolution of his motion for
reinvestigation for almost five years while being detained, violated his right to due process. The
Court of Appeals then ordered that respondent be released from custody.
 The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, moved for reconsideration.
Issue:
 Whether the appellate court erred in holding that respondent’s right to due process has been
violated. (NO)
Ruling:
 Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy his right to a speedy trial. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "All persons shall have the right to speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This is reinforced by Section 3(f), Rule 112 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which requires that "the investigating
officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the conclusion of the investigation." To
ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Republic Act No. 8493 (The Speedy
Trial Act of 1998) was enacted on February 4, 1998. To implement its provisions, the Court
issued SC Circular No. 38-98 dated September 15, 1998 setting a time limit for arraignment
and pre-trial for thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the accused.
 We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in
the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for
the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of due
process clause, but under the constitutional guaranty of "speedy disposition" of cases as
embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner’s constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3)
years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in
the case at bar.
 We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling
scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the first
place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically
rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged
failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act 3019, which
certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking
and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the
preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving
[of] unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual
issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan
to resolve the case.
 Court: AFFIRMED the decision of the CA.

4. DANILO URSUA V. REPUBLIC

 The right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law
concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any
proceedings conducted by state agencies. Thus, in Licaros the Court dismissed the criminal
case against the accused due to the palpable transgression of his right to a speedy trial.
 In the instant case, the appropriate right involved is the right to a speedy disposition of cases,
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth being a civil suit.
 An examination of the petitioners’ arguments and the cited indicia of delay would reveal the
absence of any allegation that petitioners moved before the Sandiganbayan for the dismissal
of the case on account of vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays that attended the
proceedings. Following Tello, petitioners are deemed to have waived their right to a speedy
disposition of the case. Moreover, delays, if any, prejudiced the Republic as well. What is more,
the alleged breach of the right in question was not raised below. As a matter of settled
jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue not raised before the trial court
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
Facts:
 Defendants Maria Clara Lobregat and Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. were [PCA] Directors during the
period 1970 to 1986. Plaintiff admits the existence of the agreement of May 1975 between
Pedro Cojuangco and Eduardo Cojuanco for the sale and purchase of contract shares and the
agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers of
the Philippines between Eduardo Cojuangco and Philippine Coconut Authority.
 Defendants Maria Clara Lobregat and Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. were [PCA] Directors during the
period 1970 to 1986. Plaintiff admits the existence of the agreement of May 1975 between
Pedro Cojuangco and Eduardo Cojuanco for the sale and purchase of contract shares and the
agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers of
the Philippines between Eduardo Cojuangco and Philippine Coconut Authority. Defendants
Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the (PCA) was the "other
buyers" represented by Cojuangco, Jr. in the May 1975 Agreement entered into between Pedro
Cojuangco (on his own behalf and in behalf of other sellers listed in Annex "A" of the
agreement) and Cojuangco, Jr. (on his own behalf and in behalf of the other buyers). Defendant
Cojuangco insists he was the "only buyer" under the aforesaid Agreement. Defendants
Lobregat, et al., and COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al. admit that in addition to the 137,866
FUB shares of Pedro Cojuangco, et al. covered by the Agreement, other FUB stockholders
sold their shares to PCA such that the total number of FUB shares purchased by PCA
increased from 137,866 shares to 144,400 shares, the OPTION SHARES referred to in the
Agreement of May 25, 1975. Defendant Cojuangco did not make said admission as to the said
6,534 shares in excess of the 137,866 shares covered by the Agreement with Pedro
Cojuangco.
 Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the Agreement
dated July 29, 1975 as the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit
of Coconut Farmers" executed by the Philippine Coconut Authority" refers to the
"AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A COMMERCIAL BANK FOR THE BENEFIT OF
THE COCONUT FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES" dated May 25, 1975 between defendant
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and the PCA. Defendants also admit that the PCA used public
funds, in the total amount of P150 million, to purchase the FUB shares amounting to 72.2% of
the authorized capital stock of the FUB, although the PCA was later reimbursed from the
coconut levy funds and that the PCA subscription in the increased capitalization of the FUB,
which was later renamed the UCPB, came from the said coconut levy funds.
 On May 11, 2007, in CC 0033-A, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Lobregat’s
and COCOFED’s separate motions to set the case for trial/hearing, noting that there is no
longer any point in proceeding to trial when the issue of their claim of ownership of the
sequestered UCPB shares and related sub-issues have already been resolved in PSJ-A.
COCOFED et al., in G.R. Nos. 177857-58, impute reversible error on the Sandiganbayan for
(a) assuming jurisdiction over CC Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F despite the Republic’s failure to
establish below the jurisdictional facts, i.e., that the sequestered assets sought to be recovered
are ill-gotten in the context of E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (b) declaring certain provisions of
coco levy issuances unconstitutional; and (c) denying the petitioners’ plea to prove that the
sequestered assets belong to coconut farmers. Specifically, petitioners aver: “IV. The
voluminous records of these ill-gotten wealth cases readily reveal the various dilatory tactics
respondent Republic resorted to…. As a result, despite the lapse of almost twenty (20) years
of litigation, the respondent Republic has not been required to, and has not even attempted to
prove, the bases of its perjurious claim that the sequestered assets constitute ill-gotten wealth
of former President Marcos and his crony, Cojuangco. In tolerating respondent Republic’s
antics for almost twenty (20) years…, the Sandiganbayan so glaringly departed from procedure
and thereby flagrantly violated COCOFED, et al.’s right to speedy trial.”
Issue:
 Whether the petitioners’ rights to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases were violated.
Ruling:
 It must be clarified right off that the right to a speedy disposition of case and the accused’s right
to a speedy trial are distinct, albeit kindred, guarantees, the most obvious difference being that
a speedy disposition of cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution, obtains
regardless of the nature of the case.
  The right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law
concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any
proceedings conducted by state agencies. Thus, in Licaros the Court dismissed the criminal
case against the accused due to the palpable transgression of his right to a speedy trial.
 In the instant case, the appropriate right involved is the right to a speedy disposition of cases,
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth being a civil suit. Nonetheless, the Court has had the occasion
to dismiss several cases owing to the infringement of a party’s right to a speedy disposition of
cases. Dismissal of the case for violation of this right is the general rule.
 An examination of the petitioners’ arguments and the cited indicia of delay would reveal the
absence of any allegation that petitioners moved before the Sandiganbayan for the dismissal
of the case on account of vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays that attended the
proceedings. Following Tello, petitioners are deemed to have waived their right to a speedy
disposition of the case. Moreover, delays, if any, prejudiced the Republic as well. What is more,
the alleged breach of the right in question was not raised below. As a matter of settled
jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue not raised before the trial court
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The sporting idea forbidding one from pulling
surprises underpins this rule. For these reasons, the instant case cannot be dismissed for the
alleged violation of petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of the case.
Others:
 For consideration: Respondent claims that the Court, in its September 4, 2012 Resolution, has
not included as part of its assets to be reconveyed to it the 25.45 million San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) shares subject of the Compromise Agreement dated March 20 and 22, 1990 entered
into by and between the SMC Group and the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Group
that SMC subsequently converted to treasury shares.
 On March 26, 1986, the Coconut Industry Investment Fund Holding Companies ("CIIF") sold
33,133,266 SMC common shares to Andres Soriano III of the SMC Group for
P3,313,326,600.00, payable in four (4) installments.
 On April 1, 1986, the SMC Group paid the initial purchase price of P500 million to the UCPB
as administrator of the CIIF (the "UCPB Group"). The sale was transacted through the stock
exchange and the shares were then registered in the name of Anscor-Hagedom Securities,
Inc. (AHSI).
 On April 7, 1986, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) sequestered the
shares of stock. Due to the sequestration, the SMC Group suspended payment of the balance
of the purchase price of the subject stocks. In retaliation, the UCPB Group attempted to rescind
the sale by filing a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The complaint, however,
was eventually ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
 On June 18, 1990, the PCGG joined the OSG in praying that the SMC and UCPB Groups' Joint
Petition be treated as an incident of Civil Case (CC) No. 0033, a case for the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth instituted by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan against former President
Ferdinand Marcos, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. ("Cojuangco"), et al. on July 31, 1987. PCGG,
however, interposed no objection to the implementation of the Compromise Agreement subject
to some conditions.
 The PCGG, for its part, manifested that it has no objection to the action thus taken by the SMC
and UCPB Groups.
 On February 2, 2004, SMC filed in CC No. 0033-F a Complaint- in-Intervention praying that
any judgment forfeiting the CIIF block of shares should exclude the "treasury shares." Herein
respondent opposed the SMC's motion to intervene in said case. By Resolution of May 6, 2004,
the graft court denied the desired intervention.
 RULING: No Jurisdiction over SMC since it is not a party to the case
 It is elementary that every person must be heard and given his day in court before a judgment
involving his life, liberty or property issues against him. This rule is enshrined no less in the
very first section of the Bill of Rights of our Constitution.
 Corporate persons, needless to stress, are entitled to the due process protection.
 As a corollary rule, this Court has held that execution may issue only upon a person who is a
party to the action or proceeding, and not against one who did not have or was denied his
day in court.
  We said as much in Atilano v. Asaali: It is well-settled that no man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by a
judgment rendered by the court. Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one
who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party thereto, did not have
his day in court. Due process dictates that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation
and not against innocent third parties.
 As it were, SMC was never made a party. This view, however, fails to consider that SMC's
interests over these 25.45 million shares have not yet been addressed precisely because SMC
was not impleaded in the case when its legal presence is an absolute prerequisite before a
prejudicial and confiscatory decision can be issued against it. In other words, the non-joinder
of SMC as a party in CC 0033-F did not confer upon this Court jurisdiction over the juridical
person of SMC and so the Court is without power to order SMC to comply with any
pronouncement made in the case involving, adversely at that, its property.
 Indeed, it is but in keeping with fair play that parties are allowed to present their
respective claims in a full-blown trial regarding the "sale" of the 25.45 million SMC
shares for P500 million. This is not, at the first instance, the appropriate case to make a final
judgment over the ownership of the 25.45 million shares.
 The Republic participated in the Compromise Agreement: Per this Court's January 2012
Decision, beneficial ownership of the shares pertains to the Republic. But as things stood, the
Republic was actually involved in the Compromise Agreement and its implementation.
 Unjust Enrichment and Estoppel bar the Republic's Motion: There is nothing on record that
says that the government offered to return the P500 million to the SMC Group. That is to say,
while the· respondent Republic is asking for the delivery and reconveyance of the 25.45 million
shares, it has not intimated its intention to return the P500 million it received (through the CIIF
Companies now declared as government-owned) for the same shares. The inevitable
conclusion that can be made is the Republic plans to keep the P500 million along with the
25.45 million shares. Such retention and acquisition of the P500 million would, in context,
amount to a flagrant and arbitrary deprivation of SMC's property in violation of the company's
due process right. This act definitely trenches on the sacred Constitutional guarantee of due
process. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or
capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing;
andi subject to limitations ..., the doctrine of equitable estoppel mall be invoked against
public authorities as well as against private individuals

5. HILARIO V. PEOPLE
 It cannot be overstressed therefore, that in criminal cases, as held in Telan, the right of an
accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable; otherwise, there would
be a grave denial of due process. Cases should be determined on the merits after full
opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality
or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better. While
as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within the 15-day
reglementary period fixed by law rendered the resolution final and executory, we have on some
occasions relaxed this rule. Petitioner claims that he actually received the CA Resolution
dismissing his petition for certiorari only on September 4, 2003 even as the same Resolution
was earlier received on September 1, 2003 at the address written in his petition by a certain
Leonora Coronel. Apparently, Bacuraya is not a lawyer. Ordinarily, petitioner being detained at
the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, the CA should have also sent a copy of such Resolution
to his place of detention. Considering that petitioner only received the Resolution on September
4, 2003, we find the two days delay in filing his motion for reconsideration pardonable as it did
not cause any prejudice to the other party.
 Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and
other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules that would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided.
Facts:
 John Sibal Hilario, together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid), was charged with two counts of
Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City to which petitioner, assisted
by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.
  During trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), counsel of Alijid, took over
representing petitioner in view of the death of the latter's counsel.
 RTC: Found the Petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
 Petitioner argued that he was meted a total of 16 years imprisonment or almost equal to the
previous capital punishment of 20 years which was given an automatic review by the Supreme
Court, thus it is of greater interest of justice that his case be reviewed by the appellate court;
and that no damage will be sustained if the appeal is given due course since he continues to
languish in jail while the Petition for Relief is pending.
 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 28, 2003
for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, in violation of Section 1, Rule 52
of the Rules of Court and for failure to attach to the petition, the relevant and pertinent
documents. The CA also stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled simply because
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights.
 Hence, herein recourse filed by petitioner, still unassisted by counsel, raising the following
issues:
Whether the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance of the petitioner's
counsel de oficio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal, constitutes excusable negligence
to entitle the undersigned detention prisoner/ petitioner to pursue his appeal?

Whether pro hac vice, the mere invocation of justice warrants the review of a final and
executory judgment?
Issue:
 Whether the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance of the petitioner's counsel
de oficio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal constitutes excusable negligence to entitle the
undersigned detention prisoner/petitioner to pursue his appeal.
Ruling:
 Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on him for
the latter's defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary relationship
between counsel-client and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced; that this breach
of trust cannot easily be concocted in this situation considering that it was a counsel de oficio,
a lawyer from PAO, who broke the fiduciary relationship; that the assailed CA Resolutions both
harped on technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the RTC of his petition for relief; that reliance
on technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner who is serving 14 years imprisonment for a crime
he did not commit is an affront to the policy promulgated by this Court that dismissal purely on
technical grounds is frowned upon especially if it will result to unfairness; and that it would have
been for the best interest of justice for the CA to have directed the petitioner to complete the
records instead of dismissing the petition outright.
 In his Comment, the OSG argues that the mere invocation of justice does not warrant the
review of an appeal from a final and executory judgment; that perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and
failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment sought to be reviewed final and not
appealable; and that petitioner's appeal after the finality of judgment of conviction is an exercise
in futility, thus the RTC properly dismissed petitioner's petition for relief from judgment. The
OSG further claims that notice to counsel is notice to clients and failure of counsel to notify his
client of an adverse judgment would not constitute excusable negligence and therefore binding
on the client.
 We grant the petition.
 The CA is of the view that additional pleadings, documents or order should have been
submitted and appended to the petition, the following are its options: (a) dismiss the petition
under the last paragraph of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; (b) order the petitioner to submit the
required additional pleadings, documents, or order within a specific period of time; or (c) order
the petitioner to file an amended petition appending thereto the required pleadings, documents
or order within a fixed period.
 As we held in Telan v. Court of Appeals:The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as
forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is
subjected to restraint or in danger of loss. In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to
be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of
 due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be
recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.
 The filing of the petition for certiorari by petitioner without counsel should have alerted the CA
and should have required petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of his counsel. Although
the petition filed before the CA was a petition for certiorari assailing the RTC Order dismissing
the petition for relief, the ultimate relief being sought by petitioner was to be given the chance
to file an appeal from his conviction, thus the need for a counsel is more pronounced. To repeat
the ruling in Telan, no arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position
that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the
pursuit of the appeal.15 It is even more important to note that petitioner was not assisted by
counsel when he filed his petition for relief from judgment with the RTC.
 While as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within the
15-day reglementary period fixed by law rendered the resolution final and executory, we have
on some occasions relaxed this rule. Thus, in Barnes v. Padilla: However, this Court has
relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor
or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case,
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
 Moreover, in Basco v. Court of Appeals, we also held:

Nonetheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the
former must yield to the latter. Recognizing this, Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that:

SECTION 2. Construction. — These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.

 Petitioner claims that he actually received the CA Resolution dismissing his petition
for certiorari only on September 4, 2003 even as the same Resolution was earlier received on
September 1, 2003 at the address written in his petition, i.e., c/o Robert S. Bacuraya, No. 9 Iris
St., West Fairview, 1118, Quezon City, by a certain Leonora Coronel. Apparently, Bacuraya is
not a lawyer. Ordinarily, petitioner being detained at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, the
CA should have also sent a copy of such Resolution to his place of detention.
 The RTC denied the petition for relief as it found petitioner's claim that his counsel did not heed
his instruction to file an appeal to be unsubstantiated and self serving; and that if there was
indeed such omission committed by the counsel, such negligence is binding on the client.
 Petitioner insists that the failure of his counsel to timely file a notice of appeal of his judgment
of conviction despite his explicit instruction to do so constitutes excusable negligence and so
his petition for relief should have been granted.
 We find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's petition for
relief from judgment.
 Petitioner was represented in the RTC by Atty. Rivera of the PAO. Section 1, Article IV of PAO
Memorandum Circular No.18 series of 2002, the Amended Standard Office Procedures in
Extending Legal Assistance (PAO Memorandum Circular), provides that all appeals must be
made upon the request of the client himself and only meritorious cases shall be appealed; while
Section 2, Article II of PAO Memorandum Circular provides that in criminal cases, the accused
enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven, hence cases of
defendants in criminal actions are considered meritorious and therefore, should be appealed,
upon the client's request.
 In this case, petitioner claims he had instructed the PAO lawyer to file an appeal. Under the
PAO Memorandum Circular, it was the duty of the latter to perfect the appeal. Thus, in
determining whether the petition for relief from judgment is based on a meritorious ground, it
was crucial to ascertain whether petitioner indeed gave explicit instruction to the PAO lawyer
to file an appeal but the latter failed to do so.
  To determine the veracity of petitioner's claim, it was incumbent upon the RTC to have required
the PAO lawyer to comment on the petition for relief. However, it appears from the records that
the RTC only required the City Prosecutor to file a comment on the petition.
 It is a well-settled rule that negligence of counsel is binding on the client.
 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner prescribed
by law. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized
in Castro v. Court of Appeals where we ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial
system and trial courts are advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the
right to appeal and instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities. While this right is statutory, once it is granted by law, however, its
suppression would be a violation of due process, a right guaranteed by the Constitution.
Thus, the importance of finding out whether petitioner's loss of the right to appeal was due to
the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at all attributed to petitioner.

6. LUMANOG ET.AL V. PEOPLE

 The rights of persons under custodial investigation are enshrined in Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution.
 Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trialstage when the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as a
suspect. Police officers claimed that appellants were apprehended as a result of "hot pursuit"
activities on the days following the ambush-slay of Abadilla. There is no question, however,
that when appellants were arrested they were already considered suspects: Joel was
pinpointed by security guard Alejo who went along with the PARAC squad to Fairview on June
19, 1996, while the rest of appellants were taken by the same operatives in follow-up operations
after Joel provided them with the identities of his conspirators and where they could be found.
Facts:
 The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former Chief of the Metropolitan
Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary, now the Philippine
National Police (PNP), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla ("Abadilla"), who was ambushed in broad
daylight while driving his car along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City.
 On June 13, 1996, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, Abadilla left his house at Soliven I,
Loyola Grand Villas, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Soon after he left, his wife Susan Abadilla
received a phone call from him and they briefly talked. Just a few minutes after their
conversation, she received another phone call from Abadilla's tailor who was asking about her
husband because, according to him, he heard a radio broadcast report that Abadilla met an
accident.
 The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The victim's identity was confirmed
by Susan Abadilla who had rushed to the hospital. Chief Insp. Villena escorted her in bringing
the victim's body to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame for the autopsy requested by
the CPDC, PNP-NCR, Camp Karingal.
 As a result of follow-up operations, Joel de Jesus, alias "Tabong," was apprehended on June
19, 1996 at his house at Dahlia St., Fairview, Quezon City. He executed his Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated June 20, 1996 and Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 21, 1996.
 In his first statement, Joel de Jesus narrated that on June 13, 1996 at 6:30 in the morning after
parking his tricycle at the corner of Regalado and Camaro Streets, Fairview, he was fetched
by Lorenzo "Larry" delos Santos who was his neighbor at Ruby St. Larry was accompanied by
his nephew Ogie, and a certain "Tisoy" who drove the owner-type jeep. Larry told him they
were going to kill a big-time personality ("may titirahin na malaking tao"), whose name was
Abadilla, and that they were going to ambush the latter at Katipunan Avenue. The ambush
would be carried out by Joel, Larry, Tisoy, Ram (de Jesus), Cesar who was a policeman, and
four (4) others.
 According to Joel, he only acted as lookout; Lorenzo, Ram and Cesar were the ones who fired
shots, while Tisoy focused on a security guard at a store. After the shooting, they separated
ways: the ownertype jeep he was riding in headed towards Santolan; Cesar's group split so
that three (3) of them rode the L-300 van and the three (3) others boarded a car stolen from a
woman driver. Upon reaching Commonwealth Avenue and Tandang Sora, they stopped at
 Glori Supermarket where all the firearms used were returned to the group, including the
revolver earlier given to Joel. It was already dusk when Lorenzo dropped him off at the tricycle
parking area at Camaro St.
 The afore-named suspects identified by Joel were apprehended during further follow-up
operations conducted on June 20, 1996 by "Task Force Rolly" subsequently formed by the
PNP after the lead initially provided by him.
 The prosecution presented the testimonies of police officers who conducted the investigation
and follow-up operations up to the actual apprehension of suspects in the killing of Abadilla.
The witness declared that the constitutional mandate and requirements under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7438 had been complied with because he secured the services of a counsel during
the interrogation of then suspect Joel de Jesus when his sworn statement was taken on June
20, 1996.
 On the same day, witnesses Cesar F. Espiritu (who was driving his car ahead of the victim),
Aurora Urbano (Metro Aide), Ani C. Icot (house gardener of the Abadilla family, Freddie Alejo
(security guard posted at Eliscon Electrical Supply store located at 211 Katipunan Avenue) and
Minella Alarcon (college professor at Ateneo de Manila University) gave their respective
statements before the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Police District Command
(CID-CPDC)
 He had informed the said suspect of his right to counsel in the presence of CID personnel and
when he brought him to the office of Atty. Confesor R. Sansano of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). located at the second floor of the Hall of Justice, Quezon City Hall. Asked
why it occurred to him to bring the suspect to the IBP, the witness replied that he believed IBP
was a private, not a government, institution. He also asked Joel -- who was allowed to make a
telephone call, although he was not aware if Joel made any such call -- whether he had his
own lawyer. He recalled asking Joel if he was willing to go with them to the City Hall, because
he had asked to secure the services of counsel.
 On September 26, 1996, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the place where the
shooting incident took place, in the presence of the prosecutors, defense counsel, Alejo and
Maj. Villena. Alejo was asked to demonstrate his exact location, the relative positions of the
assailants and the victim’s car, and the entire incident he had witnessed in the morning of June
13, 1996.
 P/Insp. Castillo, on re-direct examination testified that Atty. Sansano actively assisted Joel de
Jesus during the time the latter’s Sinumpaang Salaysay was being taken by SPO2 Garcia, Jr.
There were questions propounded to Joel which Atty. Sansano had told Joel not to answer,
and advice was given by said counsel. They left Quezon City Hall at about 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon and returned to the CPDC headquarters. He maintained that all the accused were
brought before the City Prosecutor for inquest proceedings prior to the filing of the information
in court.
 All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and
fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of police officers and denial
of constitutional rights during custodial investigation. The trial court was firmly convinced that
the prosecution succeeded in establishing the identities of accused Joel, Rameses, Lumanog,
Fortuna and Augusto as the perpetrators in the fatal shooting of Abadilla in the morning of June
13, 1996. It found that both security guards Alejo and Herbas confirmed the presence of Joel
de Jesus in the crime scene. The trial court also found that the statements of Joel, in which he
admitted his participation in the crime assisted by Atty. Sansano and in the presence of the IBP
personnel and police investigators, were not flawed by intimidation or violence when obtained
and sworn to before the fiscal. The common defense of alibi put up by all the accused was
rejected by the trial court.
 The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the credible eyewitness
testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted before the trial court their respective positions and
participation in the fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they
committed the crime
Issue:
 Whether the rights of the accused during custodial investigation were violated.
Ruling:
 No. Once again, this Court upholds the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons
under custodial investigation. But while we strike down the extrajudicial confession extracted
in violation of constitutionally enshrined rights and declare it inadmissible in evidence,
appellants are not entitled to an acquittal because their conviction was not based on the
evidence obtained during such custodial investigation. Even without the extrajudicial
confession of appellant Joel de Jesus who was the first to have been arrested, the trial court’s
judgment is affirmed, as the testimonial and documentary evidence on record have established
the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt
 The rights of persons under custodial investigation are enshrined in Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:

“Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof (right against
self-incrimination) shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as
compensation for the rehabilitation of victims of tortures or similar practices, and their families.”
 Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as a
suspect. Police officers claimed that appellants were apprehended as a result of "hot pursuit"
activities on the days following the ambush-slay of Abadilla. There is no question, however,
that when appellants were arrested they were already considered suspects: Joel was
pinpointed by security guard Alejo who went along with the PARAC squad to Fairview on June
19, 1996, while the rest of appellants were taken by the same operatives in follow-up operations
after Joel provided them with the identities of his conspirators and where they could be found
 Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his constitutional rights
to remain silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he had
the right to a competent and independent counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he
cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided with one (1). However, since these
rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have
been such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office,
Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he
was brought to said counsel.
 P/Insp. Castillo admitted that the initial questioning of Joel began in the morning of June 20,
1996, the first time said suspect was presented to him at the CPDC station, even before he
was brought to the IBP Office for the taking of his formal statement. Thus, the possibility of
appellant Joel having been subjected to intimidation or violence in the hands of police
investigators as he claims, cannot be discounted. The constitutional requirement obviously had
not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions
or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. The
purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-
state practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating
statements.
 Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joel’s execution of his statement
before Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be invalidated. To be
acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A
confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of
the rights of persons under custodial investigation.
  Since Joel was provided with a lawyer secured by CPDC investigators from the IBP-Quezon
City chapter, it cannot be said that his right to a counsel "preferably of his own choice" was not
complied with, particularly as he never objected to Atty. Sansano when the latter was presented
to him to be his counsel for the taking down of his statement. The phrase "preferably of his own
choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys
from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in
the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by
simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation
cannot afford the services of counsel – or where the preferred lawyer is not available – is
naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject
the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsel’s
appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to
the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.
 The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress
and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The lawyer’s
role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared
confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The
accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel. Where the prosecution failed
to discharge the State’s burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the accused
had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the
extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value.
 With respect to the other appellants, they were likewise entitled to the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution when they were brought to the police station as suspects and were, therefore
under custodial investigation. However, they cannot simply rely on those violations of
constitutional rights during custodial investigation, which are relevant only when the conviction
of the accused by the trial court is based on the evidence obtained during such investigation.
As for the matters stated in the extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel, these were not the
basis for appellants’ conviction. It has to be stressed further that no confession or statement by
appellants Fortuna, Lumanog, Augusto and Rameses was used as evidence by the
prosecution at the trial. After a thorough and careful review, we hold that there exists sufficient
evidence on record to sustain appellants’ conviction even without the extrajudicial confession
of appellant Joel de Jesus. Appellants further cite the comment made by the United Nations
Human Rights Committee in its Communication No. 1466/2006 that under the circumstances,
there was, insofar as the eight (8)-year delay in the disposition of their appeal in the CA was
concerned, a violation of Article 14, paragraph 3 (c) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966).
 Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "all persons shall have the right to
a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
This protection extends to all citizens and covers the periods before, during and after trial,
affording broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees merely the right to a speedy
trial. It must be stressed that in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of
cases has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be
sufficient. Under the circumstances, we hold that the delay of (4) four years during which the
case remained pending with the CA and this Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive.

7. PEOPLE V. DEL CASTILLO

 While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the
property is under appellant’s control or possession. The prosecution must prove that the
petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his
control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution's failure to prove
that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt
 as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting
perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent
of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Facts:
 Eden del Castillo appeals from the decision dated June 27, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-54778, finding her guilty of violation of Section
16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended;
and imposing on her the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 Said accused, with deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, did then and there
have in her possession and control or use the following: A Three (3) big heat sealed plastic
packs of white crystalline substance weighing 294.86 grams; B Eight (8) medium heat sealed
plastic packs of white crystalline substance weighing 12.33 grams; C Fifty three (53) heat
sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance weighing 4.75 grams locally known as
"shabu", containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license or prescription.
 The prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO3 Leopoldo Bauzon, PO3 Alfredo
Petallar, P/Insp. Mutchit Salinas and PO2 Brazilio Borinaga.
 Prosecution: On July 21, 2000, a search warrant was issued by Judge Isaias Dicdican of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City, authorizing the search and seizure of shabu and
its paraphernalias in the house of appellant located in M. Borgonia Street, Hayco, Mabolo,
Cebu City. At about 10:30 in the morning of July 31, 2000, a team composed of Police
Chief/Insp. Pablo Gacayan Labra II, Bauzon, Petallar and Borinaga, PO2 Ricardo Baclayon,
Jr. and PO1 Jeric Cuyos Toring, went to the subject house to implement the search warrant.
The police officers accompanied by three barangay tanods, namely: Wilfredo Wasawas,
Mansueto Toong and Leonico Sagosa, entered the house, saw appellant and served the
warrant on her. At that time, appellant was with her grandmother Elena Rivaral Garcia, the
registered owner of the house, and Servando del Castillo, appellant's brother, in the living room.
The police officers "pressed" them by telling them not to move and they were asked to just sit
down while the search was on-going. The raiding team divided themselves into two searching
groups. The first group composed of Bauzon, Toring and one barangay tanod searched the
upper portion of the house and found three large plastic packs of white crystalline substance.
The second group, composed of Baclayon and Borinaga, searched the ground floor and found
eight medium heat-sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance and fifty-three heat-
sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance; two disposable lighters, one pair of
scissors, one tooter, one puller and an improvised hacksaw. Servando voluntarily surrendered
five small packs of white crystalline substance. Appellant was arrested and informed of her
constitutional rights, specifically, the right to counsel to which she replied that she has a lawyer
who will represent her. Petallar then prepared an inventory of the seized articles and appellant
was made to sign the same. PO3 Bauzon and PO3 Petallar explained that the inventory receipt
was dated July 24, 2000 although the raid was conducted on July 31 because their office had
earlier prepared the blank form. A copy of the inventory was given to a tanod and thereafter
appellant and Servando were brought to the police station while the items seized were brought
to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.
 The defense presented the following witnesses: Elena R. Garcia, Jaime Garcia and appellant
herself.
 Defense: On July 31, 2000, Elena, who was in the upper portion of the house with her son,
Jaime, who happened to sleep in her house the night before because he had a drinking spree
with some friends, went downstairs because of the thudding sound from their door. Appellant,
who was in the house to visit her grandmother, was having breakfast when the door was
opened. Several men entered the house and instructed them to sit down. Two of these men
carrying an envelope went upstairs and woke up Jaime Garcia. Jaime then went downstairs
and these two men without the envelope followed two minutes later. Appellant and the other
occupants were told to wait for the arrival of the tanods. Then, the same two men who earlier
went upstairs went up again with a tanod and when they came down, they had with them an
 envelope, the contents of which were spread on the table and were listed down. Appellant was
then asked to sign a paper where a listing of the contents of the envelope was made but she
requested to contact her lawyer which was denied. She was forced to sign otherwise she would
be handcuffed. The list of the inventory was neither read to her nor did they leave a copy for
her or to any of the occupants. Appellant declared that the search warrant was served on her
but she never read it nor was it read to her.
 Trial Court: CONVICTED Eden del Castillo. The seized or confiscated items are declared
forfeited in favor of the government and the same shall be disposed of in the manner allowed
by law.
Issue:
 Whether petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425 beyond reasonable doubt.
(NO).
Ruling:
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of appellee's
brief praying that the decision under consideration be reversed and set aside and that the
appellant be acquitted. aACHDS We agree with the OSG. The appeal is meritorious.
 Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, provides: SEC. 16.
Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
 The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the following: (a) the
accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or
by duly constituted authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a
regulated drug.
 The concept of possession was explained in People v. Tira: This crime is mala prohibita, and
as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that
the accused had the intent to possess (animus possidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the
law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession
exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the
other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of
the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it
is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid
conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is
located, is shared with another.
 Prosecution witnesses failed to establish that the house where theshabu and other shabu
paraphernalias were found belongs to appellant. On the other hand, defense evidence clearly
showed that the subject house belongs to appellant's grandmother, Elena Garcia.
 The evidence of the prosecution failed to establish by competent evidence that appellant is the
owner or at least shared the ownership of the house where the shabu was found. PO3 Petallar
testified that based on their own casing operation, appellant frequented the subject house to
eat meals; that they were not sure that the house was owned by appellant but only believed
that she had belongings therein since she frequented the same. PO2 Borinaga testified it was
a public knowledge that appellant was living in the subject house since she was a child. Thus,
there is no competent evidence that appellant had control and dominion over the place where
the shabu was found. The claim of appellant that she has her residence in San Vicente Village,
Wireless, Mandaue City and that she was only a visitor in the house that belongs to her
grandmother at the time of the search was not rebutted by convincing evidence.
 The prosecution likewise failed to prove appellant's possession of the shabu at the time of her
arrest. It bears stressing that at the time the raiding team conducted the search, appellant and
the other occupants were asked to stay in the living room. PO3 Petallar did not find any drugs
on appellant's body nor was there anything unusual or suspicious noted in her person.
 Notably, the policemen testified that they found theshabu in the upper portion of the house,
however, it was not shown at all in whose room it was found. In fact, the defense evidence
showed that at the time the two policemen went upstairs, Jaime Garcia, appellant's uncle, was
asleep and was awakened by the policemen who asked him to go down. This was corroborated
 by PO2 Borinaga who testified on cross-examination that while he was downstairs, there was
a person upstairs who came down.
 Moreover, it was appellant's grandmother and the latter's grandson, Brent, who were staying
in the upper portion of the house. Also, the shabu found at the ground floor of the house does
not conclusively establish that it belongs to appellant since it was not found together with the
other things of appellant. To reiterate, she was not the only person who had access to the entire
house. In fact, it was also shown by the prosecution that a certain Servando, appellant's
brother, voluntarily surrendered five small plastic packs of white crystalline substance. We find
that the prosecution failed to prove convincingly that the seized shabu belonged to appellant.
 Moreover, the manner in which the search was conducted on the subject house failed to comply
with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly Section 7), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses. —
No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence
of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter,
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
 Clearly, the search of the house must be done in the presence of the lawful occupants and it
is only in the absence of the former that two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing
in the same locality may be called upon to witness the search. While appellant and the other
occupants of the house were present during the search, they were not allowed to actually
witness the search of the premises. They were in the words of the policemen "pressed," i.e.,
they were asked to stay put in the sala where they were seated while the simultaneous search
was on-going in the upper and lower portions of the house.
 We also find that the raiding team failed to comply with the procedures on search and seizures
provided under Sections 11 and 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 11. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer seizing the property under the
warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in
whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant,
must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to the court. — The officer must
forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a
true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
 Clearly, the detailed receipt of the inventory must be given to the lawful occupant. In this case,
however, PO3 Petallar admitted that the inventory receipt was given to the barangay tanod
despite the presence of the appellant and her grandmother which is a violation of the rule.
 Likewise, the police officers failed to deliver the seized items to the court which issued the
search warrant. It was commanded in the search warrant that the seized articles be brought to
the court which issued it to be dealt with as the law directs. Under the rule, the seized property
must be delivered by the officer to the judge who issued the warrant. It must be accompanied
with a true inventory thereof duly verified.
 Moreover, the inventory receipt was not certified under oath by any of the members of the
raiding team as required by the rule but was signed only by appellant and her brother.
 The trial court erred in relying on the receipt of confiscated articles to establish that the raiding
team had actually seized the listed items therein. First, it is highly irregular that the inventory
receipt was dated July 24, 2000 when the actual raid was conducted on July 31, 2000. We find
the explanation unacceptable given that the receipt was already prepared earlier than the
search. Such discrepancy affects the integrity of the inventory receipt. Second, appellant
signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel. It was established that at the time she
signed the receipt, she was already under custodial investigation
 While PO3 Petallar testified that appellant was read her constitutional right, it was not clearly
shown that she was informed of her right not to sign the receipt and that it can be used as an
evidence against her. If appellant was indeed informed of her constitutional right, it is unusual
for her to sign the receipt acknowledging ownership of the seized items without the assistance
of counsel considering that she wanted to get a lawyer.
 Assuming arguendo that appellant did waive her right to counsel, such waiver must be
voluntary, knowing and intelligent. To insure that a waiver is voluntary and intelligent, the
 Constitution requires that for the right to counsel to be waived, the waiver must be in writing
and in the presence of the counsel of the accused. There is no such written waiver in this case,
much less was any waiver made in the presence of the counsel since there was no counsel at
the time appellant signed the receipt. Clearly, appellant affixed her signature in the inventory
receipt without the assistance of counsel which is a violation of her right under the Constitution.
 Court: The decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE on the ground that the
prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant Eden del Castillo. She is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged against her and her immediate release from confinement is
hereby ordered unless she is lawfully held in custody for another cause.

8. PEREZ V. PEOPLE
 The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of an accused to speedy trial. Both the 1973
Constitution in Section 16 of Article IV and the 1987 Constitution in Section 16 of Article III, Bill
of Rights, are also explicit in granting to the accused the right to speedy disposition of his case.
 In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court was confronted for the first time with two
"rigid approaches" on speedy trial as "ways of eliminating some of the uncertainty which courts
experience protecting the right."
 The first approach is the "fixed-time period" which holds the view that "the Constitution
requires a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time period." The second
approach is the "demand-waiver rule" which provides that "a defendant waives any
consideration of his right to speedy trial for any period prior to which he has not demanded trial.
 The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the "balancing test," in which "the conduct of
both the prosecution and defendant are weighed." Philippine jurisprudence has, on several
occasions, adopted the balancing test. We rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to
a speedy disposition of his case.
 More important than the absence of serious prejudice, petitioner himself did not want a speedy
disposition of his case. Petitioner was duly represented by counsel de parte in all stages of the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. From the moment his case was deemed submitted for
decision up to the time he was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan, however, petitioner has not
filed a single motion or manifestation which could be construed even remotely as an indication
that he wanted his case to be dispatched without delay.
Facts:
 PETITIONER Zenon R. Perez seeks a review of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan for
malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
 On December 28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin, Provincial
Auditor’s Office, Bohol, conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was
then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol.
 Petitioner was absent on the first scheduled audit at his office on December 28, 1988. A radio
message was sent to Loon, the town where he resided, to apprise him of the on-going audit.
The following day, the audit team counted the cash contained in the safe of petitioner in his
presence. In the course of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of
petitioner.
 The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination, which also
contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have
on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage
of P72,784.57.
 When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally
explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion
was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine.
 As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated January 13, 1989
addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal
case against petitioner.
 Later, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds,
defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
 On March 1, 1990, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of "not guilty."
 Pre-trial was initially set on June 4-5, 1990 but petitioner’s counsel moved for postponement.
The Sandiganbayan, however, proceeded to hear the case on June 5, 1990, as previously
 scheduled, due to the presence of prosecution witness Arlene R. Mandin, who came all the
way from Bohol.
 On said date, the Sandiganbayan dispensed with pre-trial and allowed the prosecution to
present its witness. Arlene R. Mandin testified as narrated above.
 The defense presented evidence through petitioner Zenon R. Perez himself. He denied the
contents of his first Answer to the administrative case filed against him by the audit team. He
claimed it was prepared without the assistance of counsel and that at the time of its preparation
and submission, he was not in peak mental and physical condition, having been stricken with
diabetes mellitus.
 Sandiganbayan: CONVICTED the accused.
 On January 13, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the prosecution
opposed on January 28, 2004.Petitioner replied to the opposition. On August 6, 2004,
petitioner’s motion was denied with finality. On September 23, 2004, petitioner resorted to the
instant appeal.
Issue:
 Whether the Honorable Sandiganbayan by unduly and unreasonably delaying the decision of
the case for over thirteen (13) years violated the petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of his
case and due process. (NO)
Ruling:
 Petitioner was correctly convicted of malversation: Malversation is defined and penalized
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The acts punished as malversation are: (1)
appropriating public funds or property, (2) taking or misappropriating the same, (3) consenting,
or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take such public funds
or property, and (4) being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds
or property.
 There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the crime.
They are:
(a) That the offender be a public officer;
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) That those funds or property involved were public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and
(d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment
or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
 Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. At the time of the commission
of the crime charged, petitioner was a public officer, being then the acting municipal treasurer
of Tubigon, Bohol. By reason of his public office, he was accountable for the public funds under
his custody or control.
 The question then is whether or not petitioner has appropriated, took or misappropriated, or
consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take such
funds.
 We rule in the affirmative.
 In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession
public funds; that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession; and
that he could not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An accountable public officer
may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation
and the only evidence is shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain
satisfactorily.
 The sudden turnaround of petitioner fails to convince Us. To Our mind, petitioner only changed
his story to exonerate himself, after realizing that his first Answer put him in a hole, so to speak.
It is contended that petitioner’s first Answer of February 22, 1989 should not have been given
probative weight because it was executed without the assistance of counsel.
 There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be assisted by
counsel in an administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying
that assistance of counsel is not indispensable in administrative proceedings.
 The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence
of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or accused during custodial investigation. It is not an
 absolute right and may be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason,
in an administrative inquiry.
 While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may
or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondent’s
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel.
 Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service.
 There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be
bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable.
The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the
participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen
is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.
 More than that, petitioner’s first Answer may be taken against him, as he executed it in the
course of the administrative proceedings below. This is pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the
Rules of Court which provides that the "act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given against him."
 There is no violation of the rights to a speedy disposition of the case and to due process
of law: Petitioner asserts that his right to due process of law and to speedy disposition of his
case was violated because the decision of the Sandiganbayan was handed down after the
lapse of more than twelve years. The years that he had to wait for the outcome of his case
were allegedly spent in limbo, pain and agony.
 We are not persuaded. Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings has been
interpreted to mean "a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and
renders judgment only after trial."
 In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court was confronted for the first time with two
"rigid approaches" on speedy trial as "ways of eliminating some of the uncertainty which courts
experience protecting the right."
 The first approach is the "fixed-time period" which holds the view that "the Constitution requires
a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time period." The second approach
is the "demand-waiver rule" which provides that "a defendant waives any consideration of his
right to speedy trial for any period prior to which he has not demanded trial.
 The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the "balancing test," in which "the conduct of both
the prosecution and defendant are weighed." Philippine jurisprudence has, on several
occasions, adopted the balancing test. We rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to
a speedy disposition of his case.Mr. Justice Powell, ponente, explained the concept, thus:
 A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in
determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might
express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for
the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
 The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay
which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go
into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length
of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar
circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an
ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.
 Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay.
Here, too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to
delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the
government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility
for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally,
 a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. We have
already discussed the third factor, the defendant’s responsibility to assert his right. Whether
and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned.
The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the
reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily
identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant
is to complain. The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We
emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he
was denied a speedy trial.
 A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the
light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This
Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense
will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or
disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses
are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not
always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown.
 The law relied upon in convicting petitioner is not cruel and unusual. It does not violate
Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights: In his last ditch effort to exculpate himself,
petitioner argues that the penalty meted for the crime of malversation of public funds "that
ha[ve] been replenished, remitted and/or returned" to the government is cruel and therefore
unconstitutional, "as government has not suffered any damage.
 The argument is specious on two grounds. First. What is punished by the crime of malversation
is the act of a public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent,
or through abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds
or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property. Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for
exoneration in malversation; it may only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is
because damage is not an element of malversation.
 Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes. It is established
doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in
violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate
the specific purpose of the law.83 It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its
constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly
accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.
 Court: The Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 24, 2003 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty.

9. OMBUDSMAN V. JURADO
 It bears stressing that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition
of cases, it is a flexible concept. Due regard must be given to the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,
is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured,
or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the party having his case tried. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial," "speedy
disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
delays which render rights nugatory.
 We find that respondent’s right to the speedy disposition of cases has not been violated. There
were no vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays because he was not made to undergo
any investigative proceeding prior to the report and findings of the FFB. Simply put, prior to the
report and recommendation by the FFB that respondent be criminally and administratively
 charged, respondent was neither investigated nor charged. That respondent was charged only
in 1997 while the subject incident occurred in 1992, is not necessarily a violation of his right to
the speedy disposition of his case. The record is clear that prior to 1997, respondent had no
case to speak of – he was not made the subject of any complaint or made to undergo any
investigation.
Facts:
 Sometime in 1992, Maglei Enterprises Co., (Maglei), a partnership owned by Rose Cuyos and
John Elvin C. Medina, filed an application before the Bureau of Customs for the operation of a
Customs Bonded Warehouse (CBW)-Manufacturing Warehouse. As part of the evaluation of
Maglei’s application, CBW Supervisor Juanito A. Baliwag conducted an inspection of Maglei’s
compliance with structural requirements. Baliwag submitted a report recommending approval
of the application.
 On March 16, 1992, respondent Ben C. Jurado, who was then the Chief of the Warehouse
Inspection Division, adopted the recommendation of Baliwag. Then he indorsed the papers of
Maglei to the Chief of the Miscellaneous Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse Division
(MMBWD).
 Maglei’s application was submitted to Rolando A. Mendoza, Chief of the MMBWD for his
comment and recommendation. In a Memorandum (for the District Collector of Customs) dated
March 20, 1992, Mendoza reported that Maglei has substantially complied with the physical
and documentary requirements relative to their application for the operation of a Customs
Bonded Warehouse. Mendoza further recommended that Maglei’s application be approved.
 On June 25, 1992, Maglei was finally granted the authority to establish and operate CBW No.
M-1467 located at 129 J. Bautista, Caloocan City. By virtue of such authority, Maglei imported
various textile materials which were then transferred to the said warehouse. The textiles were
to be manufactured into car covers for exportation.
 MMBWD Senior Storekeeper Account Officer George O. Dizon was tasked by MMBWD Chief
Mendoza to check and verify the status of Maglei’s CBW. Dizon reported that the subject CBW
was existing and operating. However, upon further verification by the Bureau of Customs, it
was discovered that the purported CBW of Maglei did not exist at the alleged site in Caloocan
City. Rather, what was reported located at the site was a School of the Divine Mercy. Only a
small signboard bearing the name "Maglei Enterprises Company" was posted inconspicuously
in the corner of the lot. Further investigation revealed that Maglei’s shipment of textile materials
disappeared, without proof of the materials being exported or the corresponding taxes being
paid.
 Ombudsman: e Bureau of Customs initiated a complaint against George P. Dizon, Rose Cuyos
and John Elvin C. Medina for prosecution under the Tariff and Customs Code. After receiving
a copy of the resolution, the Ombudsman conducted the investigation on the complaint.
 On February 13, 1996, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office
of the Ombudsman (OMB) recommended that the Resolution of the Bureau of Customs be
reversed. The EPIB further recommended that the complaint against George P. Dizon be
dismissed and another one be filed against Emma Rosqueta and Atty. Rolando Mendoza,
subject to further fact-finding investigation by the Fact Finding Bureau (FFB) of the OMB. With
regard to the case against Rose Cuyos and John Medina, the EPIB recommended that the
charges be taken up together with those of Rosqueta and Atty. Mendoza. The case was then
forwarded to the FFB.
 The OMB dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents and violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs
Code filed against respondent. The complaint was dismissed on the ground of lack of prima
facie evidence to charge respondent of the crime.
 On the other hand, on August 16, 1999, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the
OMB rendered judgment finding respondent administratively liable, penalizing him with
suspension for six (6) months without pay. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of his
suspension was likewise denied by the Ombudsman.
 Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA. In his appeal, respondent argued, among others,
that his right to a speedy disposition of his case had been violated; that the administrative case
against him should have been dismissed following the dismissal of the criminal charges against
him; and that there is no substantial evidence on record to make him administratively liable.
  CA: The CA reversed and set aside the questioned decision and resolution of the OMB.
 In ruling in favor of respondent, the appellate court ratiocinated:Indeed, we are in accord with
Petitioner’s arguments that his right to speedy disposition of cases had been violated. To be
sure, Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. In the case at bench, the incident which
gave rise to the complaint against Petitioner happened on March 16, 1992. And yet it was only
on November 20, 1997 or a lapse of more than five (5) years that the case relative to the said
incident was filed against him. Records disclose that on August 11, 1992, the complaint only
charged George O. Dizon and 2 others. Then on February 13, 1996 or after almost 4 years,
the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB made another
recommendation which ultimately included Petitioner as among those to be charged. From
February 13, 1996 to November 20, 1997 or a period of more than one (1) year, what took
them so long to decide that Petitioner be included in the charges?
 From the foregoing unfolding of events, it is quite clear that it took the Ombudsman almost six
(6) years to decide that a case be filed against Petitioner. Under such circumstances, We
cannot fault Petitioner for invoking violation of his right to speedy disposition of his case.
 More importantly, We do not agree that Petitioner, under attendant facts and circumstances
can be held liable for negligence. First of all, Petitioner as, Deputy Commissioner for
Assessment and Operation, did not have the duty to make inspection on the alleged
warehouse. Such duty belongs to other personnel/officers.
Issues:
 #1: Whether the respondent’s right to speedy trial was violated.
 #2: Whether the respondent was negligent in the performance of his duty, as the chief of the
warehousing inspection division, despite the fact that he did not ensure that the supposed
warehouse was not in existence.
Ruling:
 #1: No violation of respondent’s right to speedy disposition of cases. In determining
whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has
laid down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by
the delay.
 First. It is undisputed that the FFB of the OMB recommended that respondent together with
other officials of the Bureau of Customs be criminally charged for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 and Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The same bureau also
recommended that respondent be administratively charged. Prior to the fact-finding report of
the FFB of the OMB, respondent was never the subject of any complaint or investigation
relating to the incident surrounding Maglei’s non-existent customs bonded warehouse. In fact,
in the original complaint filed by the Bureau of Customs, respondent was not included as one
of the parties charged with violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. With respect to
respondent, there were no vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays because he was not
made to undergo any investigative proceeding prior to the report and findings of the FFB.
 Simply put, prior to the report and recommendation by the FFB that respondent be criminally
and administratively charged, respondent was neither investigated nor charged. That
respondent was charged only in 1997 while the subject incident occurred in 1992, is not
necessarily a violation of his right to the speedy disposition of his case. The record is clear that
prior to 1997, respondent had no case to speak of – he was not made the subject of any
complaint or made to undergo any investigation
 Second. Even if We were to reckon the period from when respondent was administratively
charged to the point when the Ombudsman found respondent administratively liable, We still
find no violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases. In making a determination of what
constitutes a violation of the right to the speedy disposition of cases, this Court has time and
again employed the balancing test.
 To reiterate, there is a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases when the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
 Here, the circumstance attendant in Tatad and Angchangco are clearly absent. Records reveal
that on September 29, 1997, the FFB of the OMB recommended that respondent be criminally
 and administratively charged. Subsequently, the OMB approved the recommendation on
October 17, 1997. Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit on February 2, 1998 and motion
to dismiss on October 8, 1998 before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the OMB. On
August 16, 1999, the AAB rendered a decision finding petitioner administratively liable for
neglect of duty. More or less, a period of two (2) years lapsed from the fact-finding report and
recommendation of the FFB until the time that the AAB rendered its assailed decision.
 To our mind, the time it took the Ombudsman to complete the investigation can hardly be
considered an unreasonable and arbitrary delay as to deprive respondent of his constitutional
right to the speedy disposition of his case. Further, there is nothing in the records to show that
said period was characterized by delay which was vexatious, capricious or oppressive. There
was no inordinate delay amounting to a violation of respondent’s constitutional rights. The
assertion of respondent that there was a violation of his right to the speedy disposition of cases
against him must necessarily fail.
 Here, the circumstance attendant in Tatad and Angchangco are clearly absent. Records reveal
that on September 29, 1997, the FFB of the OMB recommended that respondent be criminally
and administratively charged. Subsequently, the OMB approved the recommendation on
October 17, 1997. Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit on February 2, 1998 and motion
to dismiss on October 8, 1998 before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the OMB. On
August 16, 1999, the AAB rendered a decision finding petitioner administratively liable for
neglect of duty. More or less, a period of two (2) years lapsed from the fact-finding report and
recommendation of the FFB until the time that the AAB rendered its assailed decision.
 To our mind, the time it took the Ombudsman to complete the investigation can hardly be
considered an unreasonable and arbitrary delay as to deprive respondent of his constitutional
right to the speedy disposition of his case. Further, there is nothing in the records to show that
said period was characterized by delay which was vexatious, capricious or oppressive. There
was no inordinate delay amounting to a violation of respondent’s constitutional rights. The
assertion of respondent that there was a violation of his right to the speedy disposition of cases
against him must necessarily fail.
 #2: Respondent administratively liable for neglect of duty. It is elementary that the
dismissal of criminal charges will not necessarily result in the dismissal of the administrative
complaint based on the same set of facts. The quantum of evidence in order to sustain a
conviction for a criminal case is different from the proof needed to find one administratively
liable. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that for criminal cases, conviction is
warranted only when the guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt is defined as moral certainty, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. On the other hand, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual
administratively liable is substantial evidence. Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. – In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a

fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
 Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary
civil cases, but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the
conduct of their affairs.
 It is undisputed that respondent was the Chief of the Warehousing Inspection Division (WID)
of the Bureau of Customs. The WID is the inspection and audit arm of the District Collector of
Customs.
 The CA, in its decision, declared that respondent cannot be held liable for negligence for the
simple reason that it was not respondent’s duty to make the inspection and verification of
Maglei’s application. We cannot agree. As adverted to earlier, the Warehousing Inspection
Division is the inspection and audit arm of the Bureau of Customs. Respondent Jurado, as
chief of the said division, was duty-bound to verify the accuracy of the reports furnished by his
subordinates. We agree with the Ombudsman that respondent failed to validate the report of
Baliwag and initiate, institute or recommend the conduct of appropriate investigation
immediately upon discovery of the irregularity. As a supervisor, respondent was clearly
negligent in the performance of his duties.
  Neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a task expected of him,
signifying "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. We are of course
not unaware that as a general rule, superior officers cannot be held liable for the acts of their
subordinates. However, there are exceptions, viz.: (1) where, being charged with the duty of
employing or retaining his subordinates, he negligently or willfully employs or retains unfit or
improper persons; or (2) where, being charged with the duty to see that they are appointed and
qualified in a proper manner, he negligently or willfully fails to require of them the due conformity
to the prescribed regulations; or (3) where he so carelessly or negligently oversees, conducts
or carries on the business of his office as to furnish the opportunity for the default; or (4) and a
fortiori where he has directed, authorized or cooperated in the wrong.
 Court: The petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-97-0656 finding respondent guilty of neglect
of duty is REINSTATED.

10. PEOPLE V. BESONIA

 We cannot subscribe to Jonathan Besonia’s claim that his confession and admissions during
the searching inquiry were elicited in violation of his constitutional right not to be compelled to
testify against himself. The right against self-incrimination is intended to prevent the State, with
all its coercive powers, from extracting from the suspect testimony that may convict him and to
avoid a person subjected to such compulsion to perjure himself for his own protection. It does
not apply where, as in these cases, the testimony was freely and voluntarily given by the
accused himself without any compulsion from the agents of the State. There is nothing in the
records that would indicate that Besonia was forced, intimidated, or compelled by the trial court
or by anybody into admitting the crimes. At any rate, his plea of guilty and confession or
admissions during the searching inquiry cannot be the sole basis for his conviction.
Facts:
 The Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23, emanates the fiat sentencing appellant
Jonathan Besonia to two counts of the most severe penalty of death for having committed two
counts of murder.The decision leaves much to be desired. More than half of it was devoted to
the narration about Besonias plea of guilty and the consequent searching inquiry conducted by
the trial court.After that narration is a statement that he was not authorized to carry the fatal
weapon recovered from him.
 The identities of the victims Ernesto Mospa Nie[l]es and Jerry Sampiano as well as that of the
accused Jonathan Besonia. That the weapon used during the incident which resulted to the
killing of the victims Ernesto Mospa Nie[l]es and Jerry Sampiano was an unlicensed firearm
 On 6 March 2001, before the start of the trial, Besonia, through his counsel Atty. Calixto Perez,
manifested that he would enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide after a medical
operation on his gall bladder.
 The trial court promulgated judgment which is now the subject of this automatic review. In the
Appellants Brief, Besonia, through his new counsel de parte Atty. Jose B. Tiangco, prays for
the reversal of the judgment of conviction and his acquittal.
Issue:
 Whether the Trial court erred by violating the constitutional right of [the] accused not to be
compelled to testify against himself, and having so compelled him, rendered judgment
sentencing him to death
Ruling:
 Besonia argues that the finding of guilt by the trial court was based mainly on his confession,
which is inadmissible for having been obtained in gross violation of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.Moreover, the prosecution endeavored to prove the charges for
murder by evidence other than the testimonies of the proclaimed eyewitnesses.In the absence
of evidence proving his guilt, he should be acquitted.
 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that Besonias voluntary
confession in open court is valid in all respects. There is no indication that he was forced,
intimidated, coerced, or lured by anybody into admitting the crimes.His judicial confession is
buttressed by the prosecution evidence that the .38 caliber revolver taken from him was the
same gun that fired the two slugs recovered from the cadaver of Nieles.However, his admission
 that he planned the killing a couple of months before its perpetration is insufficient to prove the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
 Besonia claims that his re-arraignment was notoriously flawed in that despite his endeavor to
plead guilty to the lesser crime of homicide, the trial court paid no attention to it, thus depriving
him of the opportunity to make such plea.Moreover, there is no basis for the recommendation
of the OSG to hold Besonia guilty of the lesser crime of homicide because of the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his culpability. The only support for
such recommendation is the testimony of Besonia himself, which was obtained in gross
violation of his right not to be compelled to testify against himself. He then prays that the
judgment in these cases be set aside and that the cases be remanded to the trial court for re-
arraignment and further proceedings.
 We cannot fault the trial court for not acting on the manifestation of Besonia before the start of
the trial on 6 May 2001 that he would plead guilty to the lesser crime of homicide.
 It must be recalled that the intended change of plea was still subject to a suspensive condition,
i.e. after the operation on Besonias gall bladder, which nobody knew when.The trial court could
not afford to hold the trial in abeyance for an indefinite period of time.Besides, under Section 2
of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a plea to a lesser offense
that is necessarily included in the crime charged must be with the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor.And as can be gleaned from the use of the word may in the second
sentence of that Section, it is discretionary upon the trial court whether to allow him to make
such plea.
 A searching inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension by
the accused of the consequences of the plea so that the plea of guilty can truly be said to be
based on a free and informed judgment:
 We declared in People v. Aranzado, citing a plethora of cases, that it would be well for the
court to do the following:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated
during the investigations.These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the
accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress by actual threats of physical
harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters.

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of
his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the
law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence.Not infrequently indeed an accused
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises
of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It
is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken
impressions.

(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him
or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply
missing details of significance.

 Clearly, the trial court has substantially followed the aforementioned parameters for the conduct
of a searching inquiry.
 In these cases, the trial court did not comply with the second requisite mentioned in Section 3
of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is to order the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. It only required the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt or degree of culpability of the accused for
 the use of [an] unlicensed firearm. Thus, the evidence presented by the prosecution were
merely the testimonies of the police officers on the aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime, apart from those of the doctors on the
injuries sustained by the victims.Doubtless, they are insufficient to establish the guilt of
Besonia.
 There was neither a discussion on the guilt of the appellant, the reasons for the appreciation
of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, the penalty, and the civil liabilities.
 Apparently, the trial court and the prosecution unduly relied on Besonias plea of guilty and his
admissions made during the searching inquiry.The prosecution did not discharge its obligation
as seriously as it would have had there been no plea of guilt on the part of Besonia.
 Additionally, we observe that Besonias defense counsel Atty. Perez merely performed a
lackadaisical and perfunctory representation of the appellant before and during the trial.First,
he failed to question before the arraignment the legality of Besonias arrest, which failure is
deemed as a waiver of the right to raise that question once an accused enters a plea. Second,
he failed to object to the admissibility of the firearm seized after Besonias arrest.Third, there is
no showing that he advised Besonia of the consequences of his plea of guilty to the crimes of
murder. Fourth, he remained silent throughout the searching inquiry.Fifth, he did not cross-
examine the police officers, and his cross-examination of the two doctors was limited to only
two questions each. Lastly, he did not present any evidence on behalf of Besonia.These are
all indicative of his failure to effectively provide Besonia with qualified and competent
representation.
 The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to
the cause for the defense and acts accordingly.The right assumes an active involvement by
the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind
of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence.The right of an accused to
counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn fidelity to his
client.Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation.
 Court: The Decision of the RTC was set aside and remanded for further reception of evidence
and rendition of a new judgement.

11. PEOPLE V. OLVIS

 Forced re-enactments, like uncounseled and coerced confessions come within the ban against
self-incrimination. Here, the accused is not merely required to exhibit some physical
characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal responsibility against his will. It is a
police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounseled confession. Accordingly, we hold
that all evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in violation of the Constitution and hence,
incompetent evidence. It should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants
were in police custody when they took part in the re-enactment in question. It is under such
circumstances that the Constitution holds a strict application
 The case was certified to this Court on January 19, 1985 following the death sentences
imposed on each of the three accused-appellants, Romulo Villarojo, Leonardo Cademas, and
Dominador Sorela (the accused first-named, Anacleto Olvis, was acquitted), over which, under
the Constitution then in force, we exercised exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
 This appeal stemmed from an information dated November 11, 1976 charging all four accused
with the murder of Discredit Bagon.
 The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, as principal
by inducement, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA,
as principals by direct participation, of the crime of murder.
 September 7, 1975: In the Municipality of Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, e above-named
accused, consprising and confederating with one another and acting upon the direction and
instruction of ANACLETO Q. OLVIS who mastermind the bizarre plot and directly induced
ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA to execute the
conspiracy and who, armed with boloes and a hunting knife, with intent to kill by means of
 treachery and evident premeditation, and for a consideration of a price or reward, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab one DISCREDIT
BAGON, thereby inflicting upon him multiple inc. (hack) and stab wounds which caused his
instantaneous death.
 CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstances of superior strength, nighttime and
in consideration of a price or reward.
 Trial Court: FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and on the part of accused ANACLETO Q. OLVIS,
SR., there being no evidence, direct or indirect, whether testimonial, documentary or physical
evidence, that tend to establish his complicity in this case, said accused has to be, as he hereby
is, ACQUITTED.
 On the part of the three (3) remaining accused ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO
CADEMAS, and DOMINADOR SORELA, the degree of moral, certainty establishing their
authorship of the crime is irreversibly positive. The three (3) accused conspired and
confederated with one another to successfully achieve their ghastly, evil ends. Their guilt has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
 Treachery and evident premeditation are qualifying circumstances in this case of MURDER.
But said offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of superior strength and
nighttime. No mitigating circumstance has been shown to offset the two (2) aggravating
circumstances, as a consequence of which, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the
accused ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS, and DOMINADOR SORELA, to
suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH.
 Alfredo and Estrella Bagon, brother and sister, arrived at the local Integrated National Police
station of Barrio Polanco, in Zamboanga del Norte, to report their brother, Deosdedit Bagon,
missing. The station commander, Captain Ruperto Encabo, received their report.
 Bagon had been in fact missing since two days before. He was last seen by his wife in the
afternoon of September 7, 1975, on his way home to Sitio Sebaca where they resided. She did
three probable places, but her efforts were in vain.
 It was Captain Encabo himself who led a search party to mount an inquiry. As a matter of police
procedure, the team headed off to Sitio Sebaca to question possible witnesses. There, Captain
Encabo's men chanced upon an unnamed volunteer, who informed them that Deosdedit Bagon
was last seen together with Dominador Sorela, one of the accused herein. Encabo then
instructed one of his patrolmen to pick up Sorela.
 Sorela bore several scratches on his face, neck and arms when the police found him. According
to him, he sustained those wounds while clearing his ricefield. Apparently unconvinced.
Captain Encabo had Sorela take them to the ricefield where he sustained his injuries. But half
way there, Sorela illegally broke down, and, in what would apparently crack the case for the
police, admitted having participated in the killing of the missing Bagon
 It was then that Villarojo allegedly attacked Bagon with a bolo, hacking him at several parts of
the body until he, Bagon, was dead. Moments later, Sorela fled, running into thick cogon
grasses where he suffered facial and bodily scratches.
 The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together with Sorela, they were turned over
to the custody of Captain Encabo.
 The police thereafter made the three re-enact the crime. Patrolman Dionisio Capito directed
Sorela to lead them to the grounds where Discredit Bagon was supposed to have been buried.
But it was Villarojo who escorted them to a watery spot somewhere in the ricefields, where the
sack-covered, decomposing cadaver of Bagon lay in a shallow grave.
 The actual exhumation of the body of the victim was witnessed by Polanco policemen and
Civilian Home Defense Forces volunteers, numbering about thirty.
 The necropsy report prepared by the provincial health officer disclosed that the deceased
suffered twelve stab and hack wounds, six of which were determined to be fatal.
 Based on these subsequent statements, the court a quo rendered separate verdicts on the
three accused on the one hand, and Anacleto Olvis on the other. As earlier stated Olvis was
acquitted, while the three were all sentenced to die for the crime of murder.
 In acquitting Olvis, the trial court rejected the three accused's earlier confessions pointing to
him as the mastermind, and denied the admissibility thereof insofar as far as he was concerned.
It rejected claims of witnesses that the three accused-appellants would carry out Olvis' alleged
 order to kill Bagon upon an offer of a reward when in fact no money changed hands. It likewise
noted that Olvis had, two days after the murder, been in Cebu City, and who, upon arriving in
Dipolog City, was in fact informed by the Philippine Constabulary that he was a "wanted" man,
"to which said accused (Olvis) meekly complied"
 The court repudiated claims that Olvis had motives to do away with the deceased arising from
alleged attempts on his (Olvis') part to eject the deceased from his landholding (the deceased
having been a tenant of his), the case in fact having reached the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform. It dismissed insinuations that his children had a score to settle with the victim, who
had earlier brought a physical injuries suit against the former, that case having been dismissed.
It observed, furthermore, that he was not questioned by the police after the killing,
notwithstanding efforts by the three herein accused-appellants to implicate him. It relied, finally,
on the retraction of the accused themselves, absolving Olvis of any liability. It was satisfied,
overall, that he had a "clean bill of health" in connection with the murder case.
 With the acquittal of Olvis, we are left with the murder cases against the three accused-
appellants. The accused-appellants subsequently repudiated their alleged confessions in open
court alleging threats by the Polanco investigators of physical harm if they refused to
"cooperate" in the solution of the case. They likewise alleged that they were instructed by the
Polanco police investigators to implicate Anacieto Olvis in the case. They insisted on their
innocence. The acused Romulo Villarojo averred, specifically, that it was the deceased who
had sought to kill him, for which he acted in self-defense.
 The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other person. The police of Polanco had
but the three accused-appellants' statements to support its claiming.
Issue:
 Whether these statements, as any extrajudicial confession confronting us, can stand up in
court. (NO).
Ruling:
 We hold that, based on the recorded evidence, the three accused-appellants' extrajudicial
confessions are inadmissible in evidence.
 It was on May 7, 1987 that we promulgated People v. Decierdo. In that decision, we laid down
the rule with respect to extrajudicial confessions: Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant, may waive effectuation of indicates in any manner and at any stage
of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not
wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him
of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has converted with an
attorney and thereafter consent to be questioned.
 In People v. Galit: No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the dead trainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.
 But the accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not once, but twice. We refer to
the forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after their
apprehension.
 Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against
self- incrimination. The 1973 Constitution, the Charter prevailing at the time of the proceedings
below, says: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
 This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion,
but this has since been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature" acquired under
circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the
repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of competing a person, in a
criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This
was the lesson learned from the ancient days of the inquisition in which accusation was
equivalent to guilt. Thus, an act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to
disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution.
  It should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants were in police custody
when they took part in the re-enactment in question. It is under such circumstances that the
Constitution holds a strict application. As for the accused Dominador Sorela, we cannot accept
the trial judge's finding that he acted "with unexpected spontaneity"
 Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may
be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will disable
him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would
in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling
lips of the defendant.
 Moreover, the victim was transferred to the municipal hand building and then subsequently, to
the parish church, again, for a photographing session — unusual procedure — when the
perfunctory police procedure should have been to bring the corpse to the health officer for
autopsy.
 We likewise find the authorities' haste in securing the accused Anacleto Olvis' acquittal, at the
expense of the present three accused, quite disconcerting. It should be noted that the three
appellants had initially implicated Olvis as the mastermind. Yet, Olvis was never invited for the
usual questioning. While we do not challenge the verdict by acquittal rendered in favor of Olvis,
for it is not within our power to overturn acquittals, what is our concern is the apparent design
to use three ill-lettered peasants, the three herein accused, as fall guys in an evident network
of political intrigue.
 In finding that Villarojo did take the life of the victim, we cannot, however, appreciate superior
strength or nocturnity. These qualifying circumstances were considered by the court a quo on
the basis of the extrajudicial statements executed by the accused, statements we reject for the
reasons earlier discussed. In the absence of any other proof, the severity and number of
wounds sustained by the deceased are not, by themselves, sufficient proof to warrant the
appreciation of the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Hence,
Villarojo should be liable for plain homicide.
 Court: The accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are ACQUITTED
on the ground of reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant Romulo Villarojo is found guilty of
homicide, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty.

12. MARCELO V. SANDIGANBAYAN

 The use of specimen handwriting in Beltran is different from the use of petitioner’s signature in
this case. In that case, the purpose was to show that the specimen handwriting matched the
handwriting in the document alleged to have been falsified and thereby show that the accused
was the author of the crime (falsification) while in this case the purpose for securing the
signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelopes as the ones
seized from them. However, this purpose and petitioner’s signatures on the envelope, when
coupled with the testimony of prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from petitioner
were those given to him and Romero, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of petitioner. Since
these signatures are actually evidence of admission obtained from petitioner and his co-
accused under circumstances contemplated in Art. III, §§12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they
should be excluded. For indeed, petitioner and his co-accused signed following their arrest.
Hence, they were at the time under custodial investigation.
 However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters were validly
seized from petitioner and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that petitioner’s
admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion is
inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters
themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized during
a lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the possession of petitioner and his
companion and seized from them was shown by the testimonies of witnesses. Indeed,
petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found
on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other
prosecution witnesses.
Facts:
 This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Lito Marcelo from a decision of the
Sandiganbayan convicting him and two others of qualified theft.
 February 17, 1989: In the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, the accused, ARNOLD
PASICOLAN, a public officer, being then an Emergency Laborer assigned as bag opener at
the printed matters section of Makati Central Post Office, and taking advantage of his official
position by having access to the mail matter in conspiracy with accused RONNIE S. ROMERO
and LITO MARCELO, both private individuals, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with grave abuse of confidence, and with intent of gain and without the consent of
the owners thereof, take, steal and carry away from the Central Post office of Makati one bag
containing assorted mail matters some of them containing U.S. Dollar Bills in the aggregate
amount of $500, or its peso equivalent in the amount of P11,000.00. Philippine Currency, to
the damage and prejudice of the different addressee (sic) or the government in the aforesaid
mentioned (sic) amount.
 On Februay 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office,
disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage
of mail matter in the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan,
an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor
Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. Merete likewise described the modus
operandi of the group.
 For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office.
 On Februay 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village
following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan
accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents
in a private car. They arrived at Lepaspi Village at about 1:00 p.m. They stayed at the corner
of Adelantado and Gamboa Streets, while two other teams of NBI agents waited at Amorsolo
Street, near the Esguerra Building.
 Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the jeep.
Pasicolan then passed through an alley between Esguerra and Montepino Buildings going
towards Amorsolo St. 6 Montepino Building is adjacent to Esguerra Building. The two are
separated by the alley. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two
persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter
transferred the contents of the mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a travelling bag. The two
then secured the bag to the back of their motorcyle.
 Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo
St., moved their car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan
handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero.
 The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. They also
brought along with them the motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail
found in their possession.
 The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted of 622 letters.
 NBI Director Ranin allegedly saw US dollar bills in various denominations of 20, 50, and 100
dollars.
 Arnold Pasicolan, Ronnie Romero, and herein petitioner Lito Marcelo were charged with
infidelity in the custody of documents. The case was later withdrawn and another information
for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
 Petitioner says that since the subject of the alleged pilferage was mail matter, only a
government employee may be held guilty of qualified theft unless a private individual was
shown to have been inconspiracy with him. He contends that since he is not a government
employee, then he cannot be charged or held guilty of the crime as there is no proof that he
conspired with a postal employee.
 This much is clear from Art. 310 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Qualified theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a
domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
  Thus, as long as the thing stolen is one of those enumerated in Art. 310, the crime is qualified
theft. In this case, it is mail matter. Hence, it is not necessary that petitioner be shown to have
been in conspiracy with a government employee in order to hold him liable for qualified theft.
 The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbavan erred in admitting in evidence the letters
signed by him because he was asked to sign them during custodial investigation without the
assistance of counsel. The following provisions of the Constitution
Issue:
 Whether the letters that the accused were made to sign during custodial investigation without
the assistance of counsel are admissible in evidence. (NO)
Ruling:
 Petitioner's counsel says that the signing of petitioner's and his co-accused's names was not a
mere mechanical act but one which required the use of intelligence and therefore constitutes
self-incrimination. Petitioner's counsel presumably has in mind the ruling in Beltran v. Samson
to the effect that the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against himself
extends to any attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting for the
purpose of comparing it with the handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification.
"Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a
purely mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and attention," so it
was held.
 To be sure, the use of specimen handwriting in Beltran is different from the use of petitioner's
signature in this case. In that case, the purpose was to show that the specimen handwriting
matched the handwriting in the document alleged to have been falsified and thereby show that
the accused was the author of the crime (falsification) while in this case the purpose for
securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelopes
as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. However, this purpose and petitioner's
signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the testimony of prosecution witnesses that the
envelopes seized from petitioner were those given to him and Romero, undoubtedly help
establish the guilt of petitioner. Since these signatures are actually evidence of admission
obtained from petitioner and his co-accused undercircumstances contemplated in Art. III,
§§12(I) and 17 of the Constitution, they should be excluded. For indeed, petitioner and his co-
accused signed following their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under custodial
investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.
Under the Constitution, among the rights of a person under custodial investigation is the right
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, that he must be provided with one.
 However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The Letters were validly
seized from petitioner and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that petitioner's
admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion on
February 17, 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence
of the letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of the crime validly
seized during a lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the possession of
petitioner and his companion and seized from them was shown by the testimonies of Vela and
Tumagan. Indeed, petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the
signatures found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents
and other prosecution witnesses.
 Court: Decision of Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.

13. PEOPLE V. ORTILLAS

 As the Court held in People vs. Rivera, to wit:

The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution
which provides that the accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to face and in
Rule 115, §1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront and cross-examine the witness
against him. The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose
falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies
 may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which
create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the
constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him
 Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that appellant had not
been given the opportunity to cross-examine the lone prosecution witness. In the absence of
cross-examination, which is prescribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept, the direct
examination of the witness should have been expunged from the records.
Facts:
 An information was filed against Marlon Ortillas for the crime of murder. On the trial on the
merits, the prosecution presented Russel Guiraldo. The only other hearing that took place after
the testimony of Guiraldo was on September 5, 1995 when NBI Medico-Legal Officer Roberto
Garcia testified for the prosecution. All in all, the continuation of the hearing was postponed 13
times when the prosecution finally rested its case with the submission of its documentary
evidence. Witness Guiraldo was never presented for cross-examination. The last time he was
subpoenaed was for the hearing set on November 6, 1995, but records do not show that he
appeared on said date. Although several hearings were scheduled thereafter, Guiraldo was not
subpoenaed anymore. The RTC convicted the accused.
Issue:
 Whether the RTC deprived accused of his constitutional right to meet the witness face to face.
(YES)
Ruling:
 Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the then prevailing Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SECTION 1. Rights of the accused at the trial. – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be entitled to the following rights: (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him
at the trial.
 Section 6, Rule 132 of the then prevailing Rules on Evidence provides:
SEC. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. – Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated
in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom from
interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
 As the Court held in People vs. Rivera, to wit:
The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution
which provides that the accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to face and in
Rule 115, §1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront and cross-examine the witness
against him. The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose
falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies
may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which
create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the
constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.
 Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that appellant had not
been given the opportunity to cross-examine the lone prosecution witness. In the absence of
cross-examination, which is prescribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept, the direct
examination of the witness should have been expunged from the records.

14. PEREZ V. OMBUDSMAN (Lilybeth R. Perez)

 In all criminal proceedings, the Court has the duty to balance the State's interest in prosecuting
charges with an individual's rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. To
guarantee these constitutionally protected rights, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are
enjoined to judiciously exert compliance with the prescribed time periods in resolving the
complaints filed before them. Any perceived delay must be justified by the complexity of the
issues or volume of evidence presented and must not be prejudicial to the accused. Otherwise,
the proceedings will be construed as oppressive for having forced the accused to endure an
unnecessarily protracted criminal prosecution indefinitely.
 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the December 15,
2015 Joint Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Facts:
 On December 5, 2005, the General Investigation Bureau-A (complainant) of the Ombudsman filed
several Criminal and Administrative Complaints against petitioner in her capacity as Revenue
Officer I of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)-Tax Fraud Division. Petitioner, together with a
certain Amelita E. Abad and Aguinaldo L. Miravalles, was charged in relation to her Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the years 1994 to 2002.
 In particular, complainant alleged that petitioner: (1) failed to file her 1999 SALN; (2) acquired
properties manifestly out of proportion to her lawful income since her assets increased by
P2,782,000.00 in a span of eight years despite her legitimate annual income as a Revenue Officer
being merely P772,800.00; (3) falsely declared in her 1997 SALN that she bought a parcel of land
in Limay, Bataan, but which transaction was consummated in 1998; (4) increased the acquisition
cost of her Bataan property in her 2001 and 2002 SALNs; (5) declared a false market value in her
1994 to 2000 SALNs for the parcel of land located in Valenzuela City; (6) made over declarations
of her liabilities with Fatima Credit Cooperative (FCC) in her 1997 and 1998 SALNs; and (7) failed
to disclose that she had a child in her SALNs for the years 1995 to 1998.
 Petitioner argued that all her properties were legitimately acquired. She asserted that the increase
in her assets can be explained by the loans she made from the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) and FCC to acquire some properties from 1994 to 1998. She revealed that aside
from her salary, she also earned annual additional income of P294,000.00 from the rentals of her
seven small apartment units in Valenzuela City, which she acquired from her parents through
donation. The fair market value of her jewelry and her Valenzuela lot also increased, as duly
reflected in her SALNs for the years 1995 to 1998. In her 2001 and 2002 SALNs, petitioner declared
her time deposits with FCC and placed it under the heading "Cash and cash substitutes,
investments, furniture and fixtures, jewelries, legal and accounting books and references, motor
vehicles, appliances." Lastly, to explain why her SALN for the year 1999 was not submitted to the
BIR National Office, petitioner averred that she filed the same with the Administrative Section of
Revenue District No. 27 because she was detailed at said district office during that time.
 Ombudsman ruling: The Ombudsman issued a joint resolution finding probable cause to indict
petitioner for six counts of the offense under Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 6713.
 Foremost, the Ombudsman only considered the SALN violations for the years 1997 to 2002 since
the alleged violations committed by petitioner in her 1994 to 1996 SALNs had already prescribed.
Nonetheless, it found that petitioner failed to disclose her seven apartment units in Valenzuela City
and the rental income she earned from said property in her SALNs for the years 1997 to 2002. The
Ombudsman also opined that petitioner violated the legal requirements pertaining to the
submission of her SALN when she failed to disclose the existence of her child in her 1997 and 1998
SALNs. The Ombudsman, however, dismissed the other criminal and administrative charges
against petitioner, and ruled that she could not be guilty of perjury since there was no showing that
she deliberately asserted falsehoods in her SALNs for the years 1994 to 2002.
 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration asserting that (1) her right to speedy
disposition of cases was violated. She argued that the Ombudsman violated such right when it took
10 years from the time of the filing of the complaints to issue the joint resolution; (2) e exercised
good faith in filing her SALNs for the years 1997 to 2002; (3) she declared the Valenzuela property
in her SALNs and claimed that the apartment units were mere improvements thereon; (4) petitioner
alleged that she was denied due process of law since such allegation was not included in the
complaints, which deprived her of the right to rebut the same by competent evidence; (5) she was
not obliged to declare the existence of her child since the requirement under the law specified that
the public officer is required to disclose his or her unmarried child only if the latter has assets,
liabilities, business interests or financial connections.
 Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. The
Ombudsman also held that it is not precluded from finding her guilty of the offense under Sec. 8 of
R.A. No. 6713 on the basis of her failure to disclose the rental income from her apartment units in
Valenzuela City, despite not being alleged in the original complaint.
Issues:
 #1: The rights of the accused guaranteed under the constitution were violated.
 #2. The alleged undeclared items are not required to be disclosed in the SALN.
 #3. The denial of the motion for reconsideration must be reversed in the interest of substantial
justice.
Ruling:
 Petition is meritorious.
 The Ombudsman correctly pointed out that petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its joint
resolution was belatedly filed. Petitioner also admitted the late filing, albeit arguing that her counsel
erroneously applied Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 07, or the Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, and used 15 days in filing the motion for reconsideration, instead of five
days.Petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration 10 days later than the allowable period to do
so. In effect, the December 15, 2015 Joint Resolution issued by the Ombudsman already attained
finality and had become immutable. According to petitioner, her former counsel misapplied the
Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman and followed a 15-day reglementary period, which was the
rule before being amended by A.O. No. 15 dated February 16, 2000.
 Time and again, the Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to advance substantial
justice. Where a rigid application of the rules will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
technicalities should be disregarded in order to resolve the case. The Court has, in several cases,
relaxed the doctrine of immutability of judgments in the interest of substantial justice.
 Republic v. Dagondon: Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Upon finality
of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
 XPN to the doctrine of finality and immutability and finality of judgments – Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance
Corporation: this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice
considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor[,] or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
 Besides, the doctrine of immutability of judgments is not an iron-clad rule as it is subject to the
following exceptions: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. The present
case falls under the third exception. The Court has held that where there is an apparent denial of
the fundamental right to due process, a decision that is issued in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction, in view of the cardinal precept that in cases of violations of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction.
 Sec. 12, Art. XI of the Constitution also specifically enjoins the Ombudsman to exercise promptness
in the resolution of complaints filed before it. R.A. No. 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, echoed
the constitutional mandate of the Ombudsman to expedite its proceedings and investigation.
 The right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale
for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions
against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before
any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial.
 the Ombudsman, as a quasi-judicial body, must conform to the period provided by law in order to
protect the accused's constitutional rights. Its failure to strictly follow the time periods is a violation
of the accused's right to due process of law and shall cause the burden of proof to shift to the
prosecution.
 In the present case, the complaints were filed on December 5, 2005. Meanwhile, petitioner filed
her counter-affidavits on March 10, 2006. The decision dismissing the charge regarding the failure
to file the 1999 SALN was issued on June 8, 2007, while the assailed joint resolution was issued
on December 15, 2015.
 The declaration in the SALN of all minor children living with the public officer or employee proceeds
from the likelihood that the public officer or employee may use his or her child to conceal the full
extent of his wealth. Thus, petitioner's explanation, i.e., that she did not declare her newborn child
in the 1995 to 1997 SALNs because her child had no assets, liabilities, business or financial
interests, is well taken. Significantly, petitioner declared the existence of her child in the SALN she
submitted for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. This further negates any bad faith or malicious intent
on her part to violate the provisions of R.A. No. 6713.
  Moreover, income or sources of income is not required to be declared or explained in the SALN.
R.A. No. 6713 requires only a declaration of the assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and
business interests of the public officer or employee, including those of their spouses and of
unmarried children under 18 years of age living in their households.
 Court: Petition is GRANTED.

15. MIÑAO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Facts:
 In 2005, the instant case stemmed from a letter-complaint from Aurelio Cadavedo (Cadavedo)
pertaining to the alleged anomalous purchase of guardrails and guardrail posts worth
P5,500,000.00 sometime in 2004 made by the 1st Engineering District of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) in Sta. Isabel, Dipolog City. The audit team of the Commission on
Audit Regional Office No. IX (COA-IX), which was duly constituted to investigate the letter-
complaint of Cadavedo, submitted an audit investigation report (AIR).
 The AIR provided that the 1st Engineering District of the DPWH in Sta. Isabel, Dipolog City
committed splitting of contracts in procuring guardrails and guardrail posts amounting to
P5,500,000.00 under the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) issued by DBM.
 In particular, the AIR alleged that the 1st Engineering of DPWH in Sta. Isabel, Dipolog City: (1)
resorted to splitting of contracts by awarding 11 purchase orders worth P500,000.00 each to AUF
Enterprises without public bidding; (2) purchased overpriced guardrails and guardrail posts from
AUF Enterprises; and (3) left guardrails and guardrail posts at the project site resulting in wastage
of government resources in the amount of P40,110.00.
 Petitioner: Denied the allegations. They further maintained that they could not have violated
Republic Act No. (RA) 9184. Since RA 9184 took effect shortly before the issuance of the SARO,
they insisted that the procurement of materials for the projects should be governed not by RA 9184
but by the old procurement law.
 Ombudsman Ruling: Found petitioner, together with Abapo and Tabiliran, administratively liable for
Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of Service, and meted the penalty of dismissal from government service.
Issues:
 #1 The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in disregarding the
actions taken by Petitioner's Office in the interpretation and implementation of SARO No. RO-IX
2003-353 from the Department of Budget & Management (DBM).
 #2 The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in finding Petitioner
administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Serious Dishonesty and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for not applying the provisions of R.A. 9184
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations in the implementation of SARO No. RO-IX 2003-353.
Ruling:
 The petition lacks merit.
 Petitioner is accused of violating RA 9184 when he resorted to splitting of government contracts,
failed to conduct public bidding as required by law, and according to the COA, procured
substandard and overpriced materials from AUF Enterprises.
 At the outset, petitioner does not question in his petition and memorandum the factual findings of
the OMB-Mindanao and the COA as to his alleged procurement of substandard and overpriced
materials from AUF Enterprises for the rehabilitation and improvement of the National Roads.
Hence, the Court affirms these findings following the salutary rule that factual findings of
administrative bodies are accorded great respect by this Court.
 Notably, the alleged acts of petitioner – splitting of government contracts and failure to conduct
public bidding as required by law – were committed pursuant to the SARO for the National Roads,
which was issued by the DBM on December 16, 2003. Moreover, procurements by petitioner's
office for the rehabilitation and improvement of the National Roads were initiated on July 12, 2004.
As such, RA 9184, the governing law at that time, is controlling.
 It should be understood, however, that there could only be one procurement contract for all sub-
sections of the project. As correctly observed by the OMB-Mindanao, the project was merely
divided or "split" into sub-sections or phases in Annex "A" of the SARO for the convenience of
DPWH that was tasked to implement the project. In fact, whether or not the project was split into
 11 sub-sections, the same materials of the same specifications should still be procured for the
eleven (11) sub-sections.
 From the foregoing recitals, petitioner cannot escape liability by claiming that he merely relied on
DBM's directive supposedly embodied in the SARO. Petitioner's acts should not have been guided
by any such directive, if such was even the case, but by the relevant provision of law. Petitioner
was duty-bound to take the necessary steps, which would ensure that the SARO was properly
carried out by the proper office or agency and in compliance with applicable laws or regulations.
 Moreover, if this Court accepts petitioner's arguments, this will set a precedence for future cases
where the implementation and administration of SAROs made in accordance to a public official's
own interpretation, albeit erroneous, shall be considered valid despite the mandatory nature of RA
9184, and that the stand alone defense of "good faith" will exculpate him or her from liability. This
we cannot countenance as it would lead to confusion and seriously hamper the proper enforcement
of RA 9184, and other related laws, rules and regulations.
 We now address the next issue – whether the splitting of contracts as discussed above was done
to circumvent or evade the legal and procedural requirements under RA 9184 and its IRR.
 Petitioner maintains that he did not commit splitting of contracts since he did not circumvent or
avoid the requirements of public bidding under RA 9184 or its IRR. Moreover, he merely resorted
to the use of the simplified bidding process under the old procurement law.
 There is no question at this point that the DBM issued the SARO on December 16, 2003, while
procurements were initiated by petitioner's office on July 12, 2004 – all of which were done after
the effectivity date of RA 9184 and its IRR in January and October 2003, respectively.
 Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the OMB-Mindanao's
conclusions, more so in this case when such findings and conclusions are affirmed by the CA.
 ACQUITTED: Petitioner and his co-defendants for violating Section 65 (A) (4), Article XXI of RA
9184 in relation to Section 56.1.4. IRR of RA 9184 for -taking advantage of their respective official
positions by conspiring together and helping one another in splitting a single procurement
contract amounting to P5,500,000.00 for guardrails and accessories into eleven (11) P500,00.00
contracts to avoid competitive public bidding and to circumvent Department Order No. 319 series
of 2002
 Petitioner claims that the dismissal of the criminal aspect of this case by the RTC in its January 11,
2015 Joint Resolution should absolve him from any administrative liability.
 We disagree. The dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 18879 and 18880 of the RTC does not have
any bearing on the administrative case against petitioner as different degrees of evidence are
required in these actions. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas
only substantial evidence will suffice in administrative proceedings. Accordingly, petitioner's
acquittal in the criminal aspect of this case does not affect the decision reached in the instant
administrative case nor carry with it relief from administrative liability.

RIGHTS OF THE PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

16. PEOPLE V. SUNGA
 Like Exhibit “A,” Sunga’s second extrajudicial admission-Exhibit “I” is inadmissible, due to the
absence of counsel to assist him when he executed it before the NBI. Although Sunga declared in
open court that he made such admission in connection with his desire to apply as state witness
which admission he later repudiated, this does not make Exhibit “I” admissible. Sunga was at the
time still under detention at the NBI office and had been languishing in jail since his arrest. His
desire to regain his freedom is not difficult to understand, he having lost it once due to his conviction
for another crime. His admission which was done without the benefit of counsel consisted of
answers to questions propounded by the investigating agent of the NBI and not of a unilateral
declaration of his participation in the crime. To this Court, these conditions are constitutive of an
atmosphere pervading that of a custodial investigation and necessitating the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel of Sunga’s choice as a matter of right but which he had none.
 Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or
innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel must be struck
down as inadmissible. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth or even if it had been
voluntarily given, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible.
Facts:
 In the afternoon of July 12, 1994, the mutilated body of Jocelyn Tan (Jocelyn), 15 years of age, a
minor and a high school student of Palawan Integrated National School, (PINS), was found at a
coffee plantation in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
 The hunt for the possible killers of Jocelyn was swift, several arrests having been made in a span
of days, followed by the conduct of the requisite preliminary investigation by the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) in Puerto Princesa City which culminated in the filing before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto Princesa City of the information for rape with homicide against the
suspects.
 Accused in the Information were Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac
as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice.
 SPO2 Janoras recalled that he was on duty at the Puerto Princesa City police precinct in the
morning of July 18, 1994 when SPO4 Boy Pantollano and patrolman Bolos arrived together with
Sunga. The two brought Sunga inside a room and asked him questions pertaining to Jocelyn’s
death and after about thirty minutes, Sunga was presented before him (SPO2 Janoras) for
investigation. He initially asked Sunga whether he knew anything about Jocelyn’s death and Sunga
replied affirmatively, prompting him to inform him of his rights under custodial interrogation. After
Sunga signified his desire to avail of the services of a lawyer, Sunga chose Atty. Rocamora to be
his counsel from among the names of lawyers mentioned by him (SPO2 Janoras). He thereupon
fetched Atty. Rocamora from his residence. Atty. Rocamora briefly conferred with Sunga, asking
him if he wanted to give a confession and informing him of the consequences thereof. Thereafter,
the investigation proceeded with Sunga voluntarily giving his answers to questions he (SPO2
Janoras) propounded at the end of which investigation Sunga and Atty. Rocamora affixed their
respective signatures on the recorded statement.
 Upon the other hand, all the accused proffered alibi.
 Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted for robbery with homicide, denied
having anything to do with the rape and killing of Jocelyn. He branded as false the testimony of
Locil whom he claimed is a prostitute and a pimp and was always seen loitering at Mendoza Park.
 Confronted with his sworn statement-Exhibit "A," Sunga explained the circumstances behind his
execution thereof as follows: After having been arrested without a warrant by the police in the
evening of July 15, 1994 at the corner of Rizal and Valencia streets while "picking up passengers,"
he was brought to the police station where he was subjected to violence and intimidation by SPO2
Pantollano and a certain Ka Ronnie to coerce him to "pinpoint to anybody", and he involuntarily did.
After being mauled and kicked, he was made to appear before police investigator Janoras on that
same night of July 15, 1994 during which he signed the second and third pages of a three paged
affidavit embodying his questioned extrajudicial confession without the assistance of counsel and
under threats and intimidation from SPO2 Pantollano. He was later brought on July 18, 1994 to the
Capitol building where he signed the first page of his confession after which Atty. Agustin Rocamora
also signed the same.
 As to his other sworn statement-Exhibit "I" executed before the NBI, Sunga initially affirmed having
given the answers to questions propounded therein by the NBI Investigator and having executed
the "confession" for the purpose of applying to become a state witness in the case.36 He
subsequently retracted his acknowledgement of Exhibit "I" as his own confession.
 Trial Court: Convicted Sunga and Lansang as principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and
sentenced each to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape/
Issue:
 Whether Sunga’s admissions are admissible in evidence against him. (NO)
Ruling:
 After examining the record of the proceedings prior to the trial court’s questioned issuance of the
order discharging Locil to become, as she did, a state witness, this Court is satisfied that there was
nothing irregular therewith. Her discharge was ordered in the course of what originally were
hearings on the petition of the accused for bail and after the prosecution had presented several of
its witnesses and submitted Locil’s sworn statement. Contrary to accused’s counsels’ argument
that a motion for discharge could only be filed during trial on the merits, it could be done at any
stage of the proceedings, and discharge can be effected from the filing of the information to the
time the defense starts to offer any evidence
  From the records, it appears that the following conditions for Locil’s discharge under Section 9,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court were satisfied:
1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state witness;
2. his testimony is absolutely necessary;
3. no other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed except
his testimony;
4. his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
5. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and
6. he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
 It is undisputed that at the start of the trial, the prosecution did not have direct evidence, testimonial
or otherwise, to establish the culpability of the accused.
 Appellant Sunga’s two extrajudicial confessions, which strictly speaking were admissions for they
referred to statements of fact which did not directly involve an acknowledgement of guilt or of the
criminal intent to commit the offense with which he was charged could have lent corroborative
support to Locil’s testimony, having likewise given details of how the crime took place. Contrary,
however, to the trial court’s ruling, this Court finds Sunga’s admissions to be inadmissible in
evidence not only against him but also against his co-accused appellants.
 A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed the following rights by
the Constitution: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right to have competent and independent
counsel of his own choice, and to be provided with one if he cannot afford the services of counsel;
and (3) the right to be informed of these rights
 The right to counsel was denied Sunga during his execution of Exhibit "A" - admission before the
police on the ground that the counsel who assisted him, Atty. Agustin Rocamora, was the City
Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa.
 In People v. Bandula: this Court made it sufficiently clear that the independent counsel for the
accused in custodial investigations cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor,
counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.
A legal officer of the city, like Atty. Rocamora, provides legal aid and support to the mayor and the
city in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, which includes maintenance of
peace and order and, as such, his office is akin to that of a prosecutor who unquestionably cannot
represent the accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of interest. hat Sunga chose
him to be his counsel, even if true, did not render his admission admissible. Being of a very low
educational attainment, Sunga could not have possibly known the ramifications of his choice of a
city legal officer to be his counsel. The duty of law enforcers to inform him of his Constitutional
rights during custodial interrogations to their full, proper and precise extent does not appear to have
been discharged.
 Notatu dignum is the fact that nothing in the records shows that Atty. Rocamora exerted efforts to
safeguard Sunga’s rights and interests, especially that of his right not to be a witness against
himself. In fact, glaringly, Atty. Rocamora was not even made to testify so he could have related
the extent of legal assistance he extended to Sunga at the police station.
 As for the circumstances testified to by the other witnesses, they do not, by and in themselves, rise
to the level of circumstantial evidence which warrant appellants’ conviction. In the appreciation of
circumstantial evidence, there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete
sequence lead to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused.
 Court: WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
appellants Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang and Inocencio Pascua in Criminal Case No. 11984 the
decision therein is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and said appellants are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

17. PEOPLE V. RAPEZA

 The standards of "competent counsel" were not met in this case. Although Atty. Reyes signed the
confession as appellant's counsel and he himself notarized the statement, there is no evidence on
how he assisted appellant. The confession itself and the testimonies of SPO2 Gapas and SPO2
Cuizon bear no indication that Atty. Reyes had explained to appellant his constitutional rights. Atty.
Reyes was not even presented in court to testify thereon whether on direct examination or on
rebuttal. It appears that his participation in the proceeding was confined to the notarization of
 appellant's confession. Such participation is not the kind of legal assistance that should be
accorded to appellant in legal contemplation.
 Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not appellant's counsel of choice but was picked out by the police
officers allegedly through the barangay officials. Appellant's failure to interpose any objection to
having Atty. Reyes as his counsel cannot be taken as consent under the prevailing circumstances.
As discussed earlier, appellant was not properly informed of his rights, including the right to a
counsel preferably of his own choice.
Facts:
 In the afternoon of October 21, 1995 (Culion, Palawan) Jerry Rapeza (appellant) and Mike Regino
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, with evident premeditation,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill and while armed with bladed weapons,
did then and there wilfully, [sic] unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with their bladed
weapons, to wit: knives, CESAR GANZON, hitting him in the different vital parts of his body and
inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds which causes hypovolemic shock which were the direct
and immediate cause of his instantaneous death.
 As Mike Regino was at large, only appellant was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Forthwith,
joint trial ensued which resulted in the judgment of guilt against appellant as co-principal for two (2)
counts of murder, with conspiracy and evident premeditation attending the commission of the
felonies.
 In the afternoon of 21 October 1995, an unidentified woman went to the Culion Municipal Station
and reported a killing that had taken place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Barangay Osmeña, Culion,
Palawan. The officer-in-charge, SPO2 Ciriaco Gapas, sent to the victims’ house which was the
scene of the crime an investigating team led by SPO2 Crisanto Cuizon, Jr. and PO2 Isidro
Macatangay. There they saw two bloodied bodies, that of a woman lying on the floor of the sala
and that of a man inside the bedroom. The investigating team wrapped the bodies in blankets and
loaded them in a banca to be brought to the morgue. The victims were later identified as Priscilla
Libas and Cesar Ganzon.
 The Autopsy Reports show that the common cause of death of both victims was hypovolemic shock
secondary to massive bleeding secondary to multiple stab wounds and that both bodies were in
the early stages of decomposition. The medico-legal officer testified that Ganzon sustained six (6)
wounds on different parts of his body while Libas bore sixteen (16) wounds. All the wounds of the
victims were fatal and possibly caused by a sharp instrument.
 Appellant was then brought to the police station after which SPO2 Gapas requested Kagawad Arnel
Alcantara to provide appellant with a lawyer. The following day, appellant was brought to the house
of Atty. Roberto Reyes, the only available lawyer in the municipality. The typewriter at the police
station was out of order at that time and Atty. Reyes could not go to the police station as he was
suffering from rheumatism. In the house of Atty. Reyes, in the presence of Vice-Mayor Emiliano
Marasigan of Culion, two (2) officials of the Sangguniang Barangay, SPO2 Cuizon and an
interpreter, SPO2 Gapas proceeded with the custodial investigation of appellant who was assisted
by Atty. Reyes. Appellant was expressly advised that he was being investigated for the death of
Libas and Ganzon.
 An interpreter was provided appellant as he was not well versed in Tagalog being a native of Samar.
As he is illiterate, appellant affixed only his thumbmark on the statement above his printed name.
Bonifacio Abad, the interpreter, and Atty. Reyes, as the assisting counsel, also signed the
statement. Atty. Reyes signed again as the notary public who notarized the statement.
 Appellant testified that he did not know the victims and that he had nothing to do with their deaths.
He was a native of Samar and he did not know how to read or write as he never attended school.
He arrived in Culion as a fisherman for the Parabal Fishing Boat. As his contract had already
expired, he stayed in Culion to look for work. He lived with Regino as the latter was his only friend
in Cawa-Cawa. Regino’s house was about 40 meters away from the victims’ house.
 Several days after appellant’s arrival, the killings took place. Appellant, along with Regino and
another man named Benny Macabili, was asked by a police officer to help load the bodies of the
victims in a banca. Shortly thereafter, appellant was arrested and brought to the municipal hall
where he was mauled by PO2 Macatangay and placed in a small cell.
 On the basis of appellant’s extrajudicial confession, the RTC found him guilty of both crimes. The
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court.
Issue:
 Whether appellant’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence. (NO)
Ruling:
 There is no direct evidence of appellant’s guilt except for the alleged confession and the corpus
delicti. Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the testimony of the witnesses, we
hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be discarded.
 A confession is admissible in evidence if it is satisfactorily shown to have been obtained within the
limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 12, Art. III.
 Republic Act No. 7438, approved on 15 May 1992, has reinforced the constitutional mandate
protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation.
 Appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights in custodial investigation: A person under
custodial investigation essentially has the right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice and the Constitution requires that he be informed
of such rights.
 We note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was "invited" by SPO2 Gapas
to the police station. There he was detained from 11 o’clock in the morning of 22 October 1995 up
to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken. At this
juncture, appellant should have been informed of his constitutional rights as he was already
considered a suspect, contrary to the finding of the trial court that the mandatory constitutional
guidelines only attached when the investigators started to propound questions to appellant on 23
October 1995 in the house of Atty. Reyes.
 Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
According to PO3 Palmero, right after appellant’s arrest, the latter already insinuated to him that
he would confess his participation in the killing.
 Even supposing that the custodial investigation started only on 23 October 1995, a review of the
records reveals that the taking of appellant’s confession was flawed nonetheless.
 It is stated in the alleged confession that prior to questioning SPO2 Gapas had informed appellant
in Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used in evidence for
or against him, that he has a right to counsel of his own choice, and that if he cannot afford the
services of one, the police shall provide one for him. However, there is no showing that appellant
had actually understood his rights. He was not even informed that he may waive such rights only
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
 In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful
communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine,
peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant
personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation.
 In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate and was
not well versed in Tagalog. This fact should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in determining
whether he understood his rights as allegedly communicated to him, as well as the contents of his
alleged confession.
 The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the person of Abad to buttress its
claim that appellant was informed of his rights in the dialect known to him. However, the presence
of an interpreter during the interrogation was not sufficiently established. Although the confession
bears the signature of Abad, it is uncertain whether he was indeed present to assist appellant in
making the alleged confession.
 For another, the prosecution did not present Abad as witness. Abad would have been in the best
position to prove that he indeed made the translation from Tagalog to Waray for appellant to
understand what was going on. This significant circumstance lends credence to appellant’s claim
that he had never met Abad.
 Confession was not made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel of appellant’s
choice: Appellant denies that he was ever assisted by a lawyer from the moment he was arrested
until before he was arraigned. On the other hand, the prosecution admits that appellant was
provided with counsel only when he was questioned at the house of Atty. Reyes to which appellant
was allegedly taken from the police station.
  SPO2 Gapas testified that he "talked" to appellant when they got to the police station at 11 o’clock
in the morning of 22 October 1995 and the result of their "talk" was that appellant would give his
confession in the presence of a lawyer. Appellant was then held in the police station overnight
before he was allegedly taken to the house of Atty. Reyes.
 The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the
moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a
suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in
writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant did not make any such waiver.
 The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to end,
i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused
that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
 Confession is not voluntary: It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary
is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary. The trial court found that
appellant’s bare denials failed to overcome this presumption. However, several factors constrain
us to hold that the confession was not given under conditions that conduce to its admissibility.
 First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the
investigators themselves. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such
that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt
upon its integrity, it being replete with details—which could only be supplied by the accused–
reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary. The trial court applied this
rule but without basis. On closer examination of the evidence, the key details in the alleged
confession were provided not by appellant but by the police officers themselves. The prosecution
failed to establish the actual date of the killings. This is disturbing, to say the least.
 While the prosecution insists through the recitals of the Informations and the testimony of its
witnesses that the killings took place on 21 October 1995, the totality of its evidence shows
otherwise, i.e. the killings took place earlier. When the bodies were discovered on 21 October 1995,
they were already decomposing, a factor that indicates that the victims had been dead long before
then. How then could appellant have killed the victims at 4 o’clock in the afternoon of 21 October
1995 as expressly stated in the confession, when that was the same date and time when the bodies
were discovered? Had appellant voluntarily confessed and had he really been the killer, he would
have given the correct date and time when he committed the horrid acts. The only sensible way to
sort out the puzzle is to conclude that the police officers themselves supplied 21 October 1995 and
four o’clock in the afternoon as the date and time of the killings in appellant’s statement, a barefaced
lie on which the prosecution based its allegations in the Informations and which SPO2 Gapas
repeated on the witness stand.
 As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness who testified
thereto refers as having been present at the time the confession was made or by any other
evidence. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any lingering doubt
as to the credibility of appellant’s statement could have been laid to rest by the testimonies of Atty.
Reyes, of Abad, and of those allegedly present during the custodial investigation. However, they
were not presented in court.
 No motive could be ascribed to appellant: For the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity
of the perpetrator.
 Court: Appellant Jerry Rapeza y Francisco is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence
leading to reasonable doubt.

18. PEOPLE V. TOLENTINO

 Without firm basis is appellant’s claim that his rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution
were violated when he was made to join the police line-up. In Gamboa v. Cruz, the SC held that a
police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, inasmuch as the accused therein was not yet
being investigated and hence, the right to counsel had not yet attached. This ruling was affirmed in
People v. Loveria and People v. De Guzman. Both held that where the accused was not being
investigated by the police, when the witness was in the process of identifying him, his right to
counsel was not violated. The reason is that at that stage, he was not entitled to the constitutional
guarantee invoked.
Facts:
 In the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela, appellant Tolentino was charged
with rape. In identifying appellant, he was asked to join the line-up. He was then identified by victim
Mylene Mendoza. The RTC found the prosecution’s evidence weighty and worthy of belief, and
accordingly convicted appellant of the offense charged.
 Tolentino avers that his identification by Mylene at the police line-up is unreliable since she was
merely coached into pointing at him by her aunt. He also contends that his constitutional rights
were violated when the police required him to join the line-up.
Issue:
 Whether appellant’s rights were violated when the police required him to join the line-up without
the assistance of counsel. (NO)
Ruling:
 Without firm basis is appellant’s claim that his rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution
were violated when he was made to join the police line-up. In Gamboa v. Cruz, the SC held that a
police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, inasmuch as the accused therein was not yet
being investigated and hence, the right to counsel had not yet attached. This ruling was affirmed in
People v. Loveria and People v. De Guzman. Both held that where the accused was not being
investigated by the police, when the witness was in the process of identifying him, his right to
counsel was not violated. The reason is that at that stage, he was not entitled to the constitutional
guarantee invoked. Appellant attaches great emphasis on his identification at the police line-up.
Yet, there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. In this case,
any doubt as to his identification at the police line-up was dispelled by Mylene who identified in
open court the appellant as the malefactor
Others from FT:
 That on or about 6:00 o’clock in the evening of February 06, 1996, at Barangay Namnama, Batal,
City of Santiago, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by means of violence and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant MYLENE R. MENDOZA, a 7
year old girl against her will.
 Mylene declared that her Lola Asiang was not around when she arrived at the latter’s house.7
Mylene then noticed that there was a man standing at the terrace of the adjacent house looking at
her. Mylene later identified this man in open court as herein appellant Warlito Tolentino.
 For the State, the Solicitor General submits that an application of the "totality of circumstances test"
governing the admissibility of out-of-court identification, the identification of the appellant by the
victim at the police station must be sustained. It is irrelevant whether she knew or could not mention
his name when she regained consciousness since persons are identified not solely through their
names. Nor can the appellant claim that he was denied the protection of the safeguards under the
Bill of Rights when he was made to join the police line-up, since it is settled that a police line-up is
not part of the custodial investigation.
 In determining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, we have adopted the
totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into consideration: (1) the
witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure
 Appellant insists that Mylene failed to disclose the name of the person who raped her to her parents
or to the barangay officers, so that his identification later should be considered dubious.
Identification of a person, however, is not solely through knowledge of his name. In fact, familiarity
with physical features, especially those of the face, is the best way to identify a person, for one may
be familiar with the face but not necessarily the name. It does not follow, that to be able to identify
a person, one must necessarily know his name.
 But did the trial court correctly impose the death penalty? The Court agrees with the Solicitor
General. The Information in the present case does not state that the rape of Mylene was
committed with the use of a deadly weapon. The prosecution also failed to come up with the
requisite proof during the trial that the appellant did indeed use a deadly weapon at the time of
the incident. Hence, such circumstance cannot be appreciated against the appellant. Accordingly,
 the appellant can only be convicted of statutory rape, as stated, for which the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Court: Finding appellant WARLITO TOLENTINO guilty of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant is found GUILTY of statutory rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

19. PEOPLE V. DEL CASTILLO, supra

 The appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make her sign these alleged receipts which in effect
are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. It is unusual for appellant to be
made to sign receipts for what were taken from her. It is the police officers who should have signed
such receipts. This is a violation of the constitutional right of the appellant to remain silent whereby
she was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing her of his right. The
Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative of appellant’s
custodial right to remain silent, it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the manner by which the
raiding team conducted the search of appellant’s residence.

20. PEOPLE V. JONAS GUILLEN

 Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the accusation of "AAA" at the police
station, he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence
should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that
appellant’s silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel and any admission obtained in violation of
this rule shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Facts:
 AAA was in her room playing cards while waiting for her husband when their neighbor Guillen
knocked on the door. The latter poked a balisong on her neck and raped her. After the incident,
AAA sought the help of her sister-in-law. Guillen was immediately arrested. The RTC found the
accused guilty based on his silence at the police station which was deemed to be an implied
admission of guilt
Issue:
 Whether Guillen’s silence is an implied admission of guilt. (NO)
Ruling:
 When appellant was brought to the police station, he was a suspect for rape and was already under
custodial investigation. As such, he was already under custodial investigation. Section 12, Article
III of the Constitution explicitly provides, viz:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
 Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the accusation of "AAA" at the police
station, he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence
should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that
appellant’s silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel and any admission obtained in violation of
this rule shall be inadmissible in evidence.
 In any case, we agree with the Decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, finding appellant
guilty of the crime of rape. The trial court’s Decision convicting appellant of rape was anchored not
solely on his silence and so-called implied admission. More importantly, it was based on the
testimony of "AAA" which, standing alone, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Others from FT:
 On appeal is the November 2009 decision of CA which affirmed the June 10, 2008 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court RTC) of Manila, finding appellant Jonas Guillen y Atienza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
 May 20, 2002 (12 midnight): the said accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, by
entering the room of "AAA", poking a balisong at her neck, forcing her to lie down on the floor,
pressing her with his thighs and removing her duster and panty and thereafter pulling down his brief
 and shorts, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously [insert] his penis into her vagina
and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of "AAA" against the latter’s will and consent, thereby
gravely endangering her growth and development to the damage and prejudice of the said "AAA".
– 2 storey house in Sampaloc, Manila.
 Per request for a medico legal examination prepared by P/Sr. Supt. Amador Serrano Pabustan of
the Western Police District, "AAA" was brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
physical examination. Dra. Annabelle Soliman, NBI medico-legal officer, conducted medical and
genital examinations on "AAA". The Preliminary Report dated May 20, 2002 issued by Dra. Soliman
shows the following findings: 1) With extragenital physical injury noted; 2) Healed hymenal
laceration present; and 3) Pending laboratory examination result.
 The Medico-Legal Report issued by Dra. Soliman shows that private complainant’s hymen had
"deep healed laceration at 7 o’clock position;" positive for spermatozoa; and that there was "evident
sign of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of the examination.
 Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he had a drinking spree at Galas, Quezon
City and went home to Sampaloc, Manila at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning of May 20, 2002.
He surmised that "AAA" filed the charge against him because of his prior altercation with "AAA’s"
husband.
 Anent appellant’s contention that "AAA’s" healed hymenal laceration does not prove rape, we find
the same irrelevant and immaterial. Hymenal laceration, whether fresh or healed, is not an element
of the crime of rape. Even a medical examination is not necessary as it is merely corroborative. As
we mentioned before, the fact of rape in this case was satisfactorily established by the testimony
of "AAA" alone.
 All the elements of rape having been established beyond reasonable doubt, both the trial court and
the CA properly found appellant guilty as charged and correctly imposed on him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

21. CARLOS TANENGGE V. PEOPLE

 The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained
in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the
OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation. The right to counsel "applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation." Here,
petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his
employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and
in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional
impediment to its admissibility.
Facts:
 Petitioner Carlos Tanenggee was the manager of a Branch of Metrobank. He prepared and filled
up a Metrobank Promissory Note in the name of Romeo Tan forging on top of said name the
signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own signature at the left bottom thereof purportedly to show
that he witnessed the alleged signing of the said note by Romeo Tan. He also prepared a
Metrobank cashier’s check with Romeo Tan as payee. He forged at the back thereof the signature
of said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear that Romeo Tan had participated in the preparation,
execution and signing of the said Promissory Note and the signing and endorsement of the said
check.
 He handed the checks to the Loans clerk for encashment. He obtained from Metrobank the
proceeds of the alleged loan and misappropriated the same to his use and benefit.
 After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was conducted and an administrative
investigation was held in the Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written
statement in the form of questions and answers. The accused was charged with estafa through
falsification. The RTC found the accused guilty of five counts of estafa through falsification.
 While he admits signing a written statement, petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof and
alleges that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that said
written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution,
particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two
rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence. (YES)
Ruling:
 The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained
in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the
OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
 The right to counsel "applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those
made in an administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in
the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission:
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary
rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made
in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
 Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his
employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and
in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment
to its admissibility.
Others from FT:
 March 27. 1998: Five separate information for estafa through falsification of commercial documents
were filed against petitioner. Accused, being then the Manager of the COMMERCIO BRANCH OF
METROBANK located at the New Divisoria Market Bldg., Divisoria, Manila, and taking advantage
of his position as such, prepared and filled up or caused to be prepared and filled up METROBANK
Promissory Note, typing or causing to be typed at the right bottom thereof the name reading
"ROMEO TAN", feigning and forging or causing to be feigned and forged on top of said name the
signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own signature at the left bottom thereof purportedly to show
that he witnessed the alleged signing of the said note by Romeo Tank, as authorized signatories,
and finally affixing, feigning and forging or causing to be affixed, feigned and forged four (4) times
at the back thereof the signature of said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear, as it did appear
that Romeo Tan had participated in the preparation, execution and signing of the said Promissory
Note and the signing and endorsement of the said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK and that he
obtained a loan of ₱16,000,000.00 from METROBANK, when in truth and in fact, as the said
accused well knew, such was not the case in that said Romeo Tan did not obtain such loan from
METROBANK, neither did he participate in the preparation, execution and signing of the said
promissory note and signing and endorsement of said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK, much
less authorize herein accused to prepare, execute and affix his signature in the said documents;
that once the said documents were forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the said
accused released, obtained and received from the METROBANK the sum of ₱15,363,666.67.
 RTC and CA: Found the accused guilty.
 Petitioner’s argument: refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleges that he was only forced
to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that said written statement was taken in
violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right to
remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same
should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
 On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), maintains that petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence since the
constitutional proscription invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context of
private employment but is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus prays
for the affirmance of the appealed CA Decision.
 We find the Petition wanting in merit. Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence. The
constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG,
is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
 The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the
loans covered by the promissory notes and the cashier’s checks were personally transacted by
Tan against his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his signature
thereto. Again, this allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not supported by established
evidence. "It is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are
 negative and self-serving evidence. They merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters."
 Elements of falsification of commercial documents established. Falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers to
falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee, who did not take advantage of
his official position, of public, private or commercial document. The elements of falsification of
documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private
individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) that
he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and, (3) that the
falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.
 Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or
by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable
of pecuniary estimation. The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By falsely representing that
Tan requested him to process purported loans on the latter’s behalf, petitioner counterfeited or
imitated the signature of Tan in the cashier’s checks.
 Court’s Ruling: The Petition is DENIED.