VOL.

465, JULY 29, 2005 117

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

11

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST

CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK), petitioner, vs. DEL
MONTE MOTOR
1 WORKS, INC., NARCISO G.
MORALES, AND SPOUSE, respondents.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Specific Denials; To

deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable
document, the defendant must declare under oath that he did
not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or
fabricated.—In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan
Bank v. Mariano Velarde, this Court held that—. . .
Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note
as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein,
and the loan documents do not express the true intention of
the parties. Respondent reiterated these allegations in his
“denial under oath,” stating that the “promissory note sued
upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine
signature of herein defendant, the same does not

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

1 “Narciso O. Morales” in the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) vs.

Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention
of the parties as stated in the defenses . . . Respondent’s
denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as
contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs. Sellner,
the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and
due execution of an actionable document, viz.: . . . This means
that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not
sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated.
Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that
the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation
raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the
contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness
and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the
instrument upon a ground not affecting either.
Same; Same; Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; The “best
evidence rule,” according to Professor Thayer, first appeared
in the year 1699-1700 when in one case involving a
goldsmith, Holt, C.J., was quoted as stating that they should
take into consideration the usages of trade and that “the best
proof that the nature of the thing will afford is only
required.”—The “best evidence rule,” according to Professor
Thayer, first appeared in the year 1699-1700 when in one
case involving a goldsmith, Holt, C.J., was quoted as stating
that they should take into consideration the usages of trade
and that “the best proof that the nature of the thing will
afford is only required.” Over the years, the phrase was used
to describe rules which were already existing such as the rule
that the terms of a document must be proved by the
production of the document itself, in preference to evidence
about the document; it was also utilized to designate the
hearsay rule or the rule excluding assertions made out of
court and not subject to the rigors of cross-examination; and
the phrase was likewise used to designate the group of rules
by which testimony of particular classes of witnesses was
preferred to that of others.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rationale; According to
McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, “the only
actual rule that the ‘best evidence’ phrase denotes today is the
rule requiring the production of the original writing”; In light
of the dangers of mistransmission, accompanying the use of
written copies or of recollection, largely avoided through
proving the terms by presenting the writing itself, the
preference for the original writing is justified.—According to
McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, “the only
actual

119

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Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) vs.

Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

rule that the ‘best evidence’ phrase denotes today is the rule
requiring the production of the original writing” the rationale
being: (1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact
words of the writing is of more than average importance,
particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments,
such as deeds, wills and contracts, since a slight variation in
words may mean a great difference in rights, (2) that there is
a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of
making a copy by handwriting or typewriting, and (3) as
respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the
terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater
than in the case of attempts at describing other situations
generally. In the light of these dangers of mistransmission,
accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection,
largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting the
writing itself, the preference for the original writing is
justified.
 Same; Same; Same; Denials; Where defendant fails to
deny specifically the execution of the promissory note, there is
no need for the plaintiff to present the original of the
promissory note—when the defendant fails to deny
specifically and under oath the due execution and
genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff
need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by the
defendant.—Respondents failed to deny specifically the
execution of the promissory note. This being the case, there
was no need for petitioner to present the original of the
promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with
respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory
note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner
regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the
original of said note. Indeed, when the defendant fails to
deny specifically and under oath the due execution and
genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the
plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted
by the defendant.
Same; Courts; Judges; Bias and Partiality; In order for
the Supreme Court to sustain a charge of partiality and
prejudice brought against a judge, there must be convincing
proof to show that he or she is, indeed, biased and partial.—
In order for this Court to sustain a charge of partiality and
prejudice brought against a judge, there must be convincing
proof to show that he or she is, indeed, biased and partial.
Bare allegations are not enough. Bias and prejudice are
serious charges which cannot be presumed particularly if
weighed

120

120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) vs.

Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.
against a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to person and do equal
right to the poor and the rich. There must be a showing of
bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source
resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other
than what the judge learned from his participation in the
case.
Same; Demurrer to Evidence; Words and Phrases; A
demurrer to evidence abbreviated judicial proceedings, it
being an instrument for the expeditious termination of an
action; If the defendant’s motion for judgment on demurrer to
evidence is granted and the order is subsequently reversed on
appeal, judgment is rendered in favor of the adverse party
because the movant loses his right to present evidence—the
reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceeding
but render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by
the plaintiff.—A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial
proceedings, it being an instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action. Caution, however, must be
exercised by the party seeking the dismissal of a case upon
this ground as under the rules, if the movant’s plea for the
dismissal on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order of
dismissal is reversed on appeal, he loses his right to adduce
evidence. If the defendant’s motion for judgment on demurrer
to evidence is granted and the order is subsequently reversed
on appeal, judgment is rendered in favor of the adverse party
because the movant loses his right to present evidence. The
reviewing court cannot remand the case for further
proceedings; rather, it should render judgment on the basis
of the evidence presented by the plaintiff.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Delos Reyes, Banaga, Briones & Associates for
petitioner.
Eduardo E. Francisco for Narciso Morales.
121
 VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005 121
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is 2 a petition for review on certiorari of the

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
16886 entitled, “The Consolidated Bank & Trust
Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Works,
Inc., Narciso O. Morales and Spouse” promulgated on
25 November 1999 and of the Resolution of the
appellate court dated 11 May 2000 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. Said decision and
resolution affirmed the order dated 28 December 1987
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Manila.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On 13 June 1984, 3petitioner filed before the RTC of
Manila a complaint for recovery of sum of money
against respondents, impleading the spouse of
respondent Narciso O. Morales (respondent Morales)
in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains.
Petitioner, a domestic banking and trust corporation,
alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it extended in
favor of respondents a loan in the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a
promissory note executed by respondents on the same
date. Under the promissory note, respondents Del
Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent corporation) and
Morales bound themselves jointly and severally to pay
petitioner the full amount of the loan through twenty-
five monthly installments of P40,000.00 a month with
interest pegged at 23% per annum. The note was to be
paid in full by 23 May 1984. As respondents defaulted
on their monthly installments, the full amount of the
loan became due and demandable pursuant to the
terms of the promissory note. Petitioner likewise
alleges that it made oral and written demands upon
respondents to settle their obligation but
notwithstanding these demands, respondents still
failed to pay

_______________

2 Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole with

Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Demetrio G. Demetria
concurring; Rollo, pp. 9-26.
3 Records, pp. 1-6.

122

122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

their indebtedness which, as of 09 March 1984, stood

at P1,332,474.55. Petitioner attached to its complaint
as Annexes “A,” “B,” and “C,” respectively, a photocopy
of the promissory note supposedly executed by
respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent
respondents dated 20 January 1983, and statement of
account pertaining to respondents’ loan.
On 31 October 1984, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Declare the Defendants in Default which
was opposed by the defendants upon the ground that
they were never served with copies of the summons
and of petitioner’s complaint.
On 23 November 1984, respondent corporation filed
before the trial court a manifestation attaching thereto
its answer to petitioner’s complaint which states the
following:

2- That it denies generally and specifically the

allegations contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
and 8 thereof for lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the matters therein alleged, the truth
being those alleged in the Special and
Affirmative Defenses hereinbelow contained;
 3- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a first
special and affirmative defense, defendant
herein states that the promissory note in
question is void for want of valid consideration
and/or there was no valuable consideration
involved as defendant herein did not receive
any consideration at all;
4- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a
second special affirmative defense, defendant
herein alleges that no demand has ever been
sent to nor received by herein defendant and if
ever demands were made, denies any liability
as averred therein.
5- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a
third special and affirmative defense,
defendant herein avers that the complaint
states no cause of action and has no basis
either in fact or in law; . . .

VERIFICATION

I, JEANETTE D. TOLENTINO, of legal age, after having

been duly sworn to in accordance with law, depose and state:
That I am the Controller of Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.,
one of the defendants in this case.

123

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Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

That for and in behalf of the defendant corporation, I caused

the preparation of the above-narrated answer.
That I have read the contents thereof and they are true of
my own knowledge. 4

(SGD.) JEANNETTE D. TOLENTINO

On 06 December 1984, respondent Morales filed his

manifestation together with his answer wherein he
likewise renounced any liability on the promissory
note, thus:

1. He ADMIT[S] paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the complaint with

a qualification in paragraph 3 thereof that he has long been
separated from his wife and the system governing their
property relations is that of complete separation of property
and not that of conjugal partnership of gain[s];
2. He [DENIES], generally and specifically, the allegations
contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 thereof, for lack of
knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief and as
to the truth of the matter therein averred, the truth being
those alleged in the Special And Affirmative Defenses
hereinbelow pleaded;
...

SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

4. He has never signed the promissory note attached to

the complaint in his personal and/or individual capacity as
such;
5. That the said promissory note is ineffective,
unenforceable and void for lack of valid consideration;
6. That even admitting, argumenti gratia, the validity and
execution of the questioned promissory note, still, defendant
herein cannot be bound personally and individually to the
said obligations as banking procedures requires, it being a
standard operating procedure of all known banking
institution, that to hold a borrower jointly and severally
liable in his official as well as personal capacity, the borrower
must sign a Suretyship Agreement or at least, a continuing
guaranty with that of the corporation he represent(s) but
which in this case is wanting;

_______________

4 Records, pp. 20-21.

124

124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

7. That transaction/obligation in question did not, in any

way, redound/inure to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of gain, as there is no conjugal partnership of gain to speak
with, defendant having long been separated from his wife
and their property relation is governed by the system of
complete separation of property, and more importantly, he
has never signed the said promissory note in his personal
and individual capacity as such;
...

VERIFICATION

That I, NARCISO MORALES, after having been duly

sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and declare
that: I am one of the named defendant[s] in the above-
entitled case; I have cause[d] the preparation of the foregoing
Answer upon facts and figures supplied by me to my retained
counsel; have read each and every allegations contained
therein and hereby certify that the same are true and correct
of my own knowledge and information.
(SGD.) NARCISO MORALES5
Affiant

On 26 December 1984, the trial court denied

petitioner’s motion to declare respondents
6 in default
and admitted their respective answers.
During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner
presented as its sole witness, Liberato A. Lavarino
(Lavarino), then the manager of its Collection
Department. Substantially, Lavarino stated that
respondents obtained the loan, subject of this case,
from petitioner and due to respondents’ failure to pay a
single monthly installment on this loan, petitioner was
constrained to send a demand letter to respondents;
that as a result of this demand letter, Jeannette
Tolentino (Tolentino), respondent corporation’s
controller, wrote a letter to petitioner requesting for
some consideration because of the unfavorable
business atmosphere then buffeting their business

_______________

5 Records, pp. 26-27.

6 Records, p. 34.

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Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

operation; that Tolentino enclosed to said letter a

check with a face value of P220,020.00 to be discounted
by petitioner with the proceeds being applied as partial
payment to their company’s obligation to petitioner;
that after receipt of this partial payment, respondents’
obligation again became stagnant prompting petitioner
to serve respondents with another demand letter
which, unfortunately, was unheeded by respondents.
Lavarino also identified the following exhibits for
petitioner: photocopy of the duplicate original of the
promissory
7 note attached to the complaint as Exhibit
“A”; petitioner’s 20 January
8 1983 demand letter
marked as Exhibit “B;” Tolentino’s letter to petitioner9
dated 10 February 1983 and marked as Exhibit “C”;
and the 09 March 1984 statement 10of account sent to
respondents marked as Exhibit “D.”
On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal
offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of
Exhibit “A” could no longer be found, petitioner instead
sought the admission of the duplicate original of the
promissory note which was identified and marked as
Exhibit “E.”
The trial court initially admitted into evidence
Exhibit “E” and granted respondents’ motion that they
be allowed to amend their respective
11 answers to
conform with this new evidence.
 On 30 September 1985, respondent corporation 12 filed
a manifestation and motion for reconsideration of the
trial court’s order admitting into evidence petitioner’s
Exhibit “E.” Respondent corporation claims that
Exhibit “E” should not have been admitted as it was
immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified and
hearsay evidence. Respondent corporation insists that
Exhibit “E” was not properly identified by

_______________

7 Records, p. 72.
8 Records, p. 73.
9 Records, p. 75.
10 Records, p. 76.
11 Records, p. 79.
12 Records, pp. 80-83.

126

126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

Lavarino who testified that he had nothing to do in the

preparation and execution of petitioner’s exhibits, one
of which was Exhibit “E.” Further, as there were
markings in Exhibit “A” which were not contained in
Exhibit “E,” the latter could not possibly be considered
an original copy of Exhibit “A.” Lastly, respondent
corporation claims that the exhibit in question had no
bearing on the complaint as Lavarino admitted that
Exhibit “E” was not the original of Exhibit “A” which
was the foundation of the complaint and upon which
respondent corporation based its own answer.
Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation
with motion13 to reconsider order admitting as evidence
Exhibit “E” which, other than insisting that the due
execution and genuineness of the promissory note were
not established as far as he was concerned, essentially
raised the same arguments contained in respondent
corporation’s manifestation with motion for
reconsideration referred to above.
On 06 December 1985, the trial court 14 granted
respondents’ motions for reconsideration. Petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of this order which15 was
denied by the court a quo on 20 December 1985.
On 26 December 1985, respondents separately filed
their motions to dismiss on the similar ground that
with the exclusion of Exhibits “A” and “E,” petitioner
no longer possessed
16 any proof of respondents’ alleged
indebtedness. 17

On 08 April 1986, petitioner filed a motion praying

that the presiding judge, Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of the
court a quo inhibit himself from this case maintaining
that the latter rushed into resolving its motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s order of 06
December 1985 thereby depriving it

_______________

13 Records, pp. 84-90.

14 Records, p. 118.
15 Records, p. 148.
16 Records, pp. 150-165.
17 Records, pp. 195-200.

127

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Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

the opportunity of presenting proof that the original of

Exhibit “A” was delivered to respondents as early as 02
April 1983. Such haste on the part of the presiding
judge, according to petitioner, cast doubt on his
objectivity and fairness. This motion to inhibit
18 was
denied by the trial court on 06 August 1987.
19
 In an order dated 28 December 1987, the case
before the trial court was dismissed, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the instant case against defendants Del

Monte Motor Works, Inc. and Narciso O. Morales and spouse,
is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against the plaintiff.”

The trial court’s finding was affirmed by the Court of

Appeals in the assailed decision now before us. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision
reads:

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of

the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27, dated
December 28, 1987 dismissing plaintiff-appellant[’s]
complaint is20 hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against the plaintiff-

appellant.”

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration

dated 14 December 1999 which was denied for lack of
merit in a resolution of 21the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 11 May 2000.
Aggrieved by the appellate court’s ruling, petitioner
now seeks redress from this Court imputing the
following errors on the Court of Appeals:

_______________

18 Records, pp. 233-238.

19 Records, pp. 244-252.
20 Rollo, p. 25.
21 Rollo, p. 28.

128

128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS DENIED THE MATERIAL
ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANK’S
COMPLAINT, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF
INDUBITABLE FACTS CLEARLY POINTING TO THE
FACT THAT SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ADMITTED
THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE
SUBJECT PROMISSORY NOTE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE EXCLUSION OF
EXHIBIT ‘E’, THE SECOND ORIGINAL OF THE
PROMISSORY NOTE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
ORIGINAL OF EXHIBIT ‘A’ (XEROX COPY OF THE
DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE)
WAS ACTUALLY IN THE POSSESSION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS, THUS WARRANTING THE ADMISSION
OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE
SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF FROM TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF AND FROM TRYING AND DECIDING
THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING HIS PERCEIVED
AND MANIFEST BIAS AND PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO THE 22 GRAVE
PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANK.

The petition is meritorious.

In resolving the case against petitioner, the
appellate court held that contrary to petitioner’s
stance, respondents were able to generally and
specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the promissory note, thus:

There can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations in the

answer (Record, p. 20, 26-27), of both defendants, they denied
gener-

_______________

22 Rollo, p. 42.

129

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Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) vs.
Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

ally and specifically under oath the genuineness and due

execution of the promissory note and by way of special and
affirmative defenses herein states that he (MORALES) never
signed the promissory note attached to the complaint (Exh.
“A”) in his personal and/or individual capacity. Moreover,
what appears in the record (Record, p. 20) was an admission
of paragraphs 1 & 2 but they deny generally and specifically
the rest of the allegations. It would be considered that there
is a sufficient 23compliance of the requirement of the law for
specific denial.

We hold otherwise.
The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the
matter provides:

SEC. 8. How to contest such documents.—When an action or

defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth
what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an
oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear
to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an 24

order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.

In the case of Permanent

25 Savings and Loan Bank v.
Mariano Velarde, this Court held that—
. . . Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory
note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated
therein, and the loan documents do not express the true
intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these
allegations in his “denial under oath,” stating that the
“promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and
bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same
does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real
intention of the parties as stated in the defenses . . .”

_______________

23 Rollo, p. 18.
24 Rule 8, Section 8, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
25 G.R. No. 140608, 23 September 2004, 439 SCRA 1.

130

130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

Respondent’s denials do not constitute an effective specific

denial as
26 contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs.

Sellner, the Court expounded on how to deny the

genuineness and due execution of an actionable document,
viz.:

. . . This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he
did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated.
Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the
instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any
issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a
plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution
thereof, since it27seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not
affecting either.

In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of

Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were able to
specifically deny the allegations in petitioner’s
complaint in the manner specifically required by the
rules. In effect, respondents had, to all intents and
purposes, admitted the genuineness and due execution
of the subject promissory note and recognized their
obligation to petitioner.
The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of
the trial court that the “best evidence rule or primary
evidence must be applied as the purpose of the proof is
to establish the terms of the writing—meaning the
alleged promissory note as it is the basis of the
recovery of the money allegedly 28 loaned to the
defendants (respondents herein).”
The “best evidence rule” is encapsulated in Rule
130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.—

When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:

_______________

26 G.R. No. 11513, 04 December 1917, 37 Phil. 254.

27 Supra, note 25, pp. 8-9.
28 Records, p. 250.

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(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed,

or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under
the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
 (c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.

The “best evidence rule,” according to Professor

Thayer, first appeared in the year 1699-1700 when in
one case involving a goldsmith, Holt, C.J., was quoted
as stating that they should take into consideration the
usages of trade and that “the best proof that29the nature
of the thing will afford is only required.” Over the
years, the phrase was used to describe rules which
were already existing such as the rule that the terms
of a document must be proved by the production of the
document itself, in preference to evidence about the
document; it was also utilized to designate the hearsay
rule or the rule excluding assertions made out of court
and not subject to the rigors of cross-examination; and
the phrase was likewise used to designate the group of
rules by which testimony of particular 30 classes of
witnesses was preferred to that of others.
According to McCormick, an authority on the rules
of evidence, “the only actual rule that the ‘best
evidence’ phrase denotes today is the 31rule requiring
the production of the original writing” the rationale
being:

_______________

29 IV Evidence in Trials at Common Law, John Henry Wigmore, p.

399 (1972 Ed.).
30 Id., at p. 400.
31 Handbook of the Law of Evidence, Charles T. McCormick, p. 409
(1954 Ed.).

132
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

(1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact words

of the writing is of more than average importance,
particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments,
such as deeds, wills and contracts, since a slight variation in
words may mean a great difference in rights, (2) that there is
a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of
making a copy by handwriting or typewriting, and (3) as
respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the
terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater
than in the case of attempts at describing other situations
generally. In the light of these dangers of mistransmission,
accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection,
largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting the
writing 32 itself, the preference for the original writing is
justified.

Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the

contents of a writing is the justification for the “best
evidence rule,” we declare that this rule finds no
application to this case. It should be noted that
respondents never disputed the terms and conditions
of the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that
as far as the parties herein are concerned, the wording
or content of said note is clear enough and leaves no
room for disagreement. In their responsive pleadings,
respondents’ principal defense rests on the alleged lack
of consideration of the promissory note. In addition,
respondent Morales also claims that he did not sign
the note in his personal capacity. These contentions
33

clearly do not question the “precise wording” of the

promissory note which should have paved the way for
the application of the “best evidence rule.” It was,
therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to sustain
the decision of the trial court on this point.
Besides, the “best evidence rule” as stated in our
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. As
quoted earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of
which is when the original of the subject document is
in the possession of the adverse party. As pointed out
by petitioner in its motion to inhibit, had it

_______________

32 Id., at p. 410.
33 Evidence, Edward W. Cleary, p. 416 (4th Ed.).

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VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005 133

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

been given the opportunity by the court a quo, it would

have sufficiently established that the original of
Exhibit “A” was in the possession of respondents which
would have called into application one of the
exceptions to the “best evidence rule.”
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents
failed to deny specifically the execution of the
promissory note. This being the case, there was no
need for petitioner to present the original of the
promissory note in question. Their judicial admission
with respect to the genuineness and execution of the
promissory note sufficiently established their liability
to petitioner regardless of the fact that
34 petitioner failed
to present the original of said note.
Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically
and under oath the due execution and genuineness of a
document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not
prove that35 fact as it is considered admitted by the
defendant. In the case36 of Asia Banking Corporation v.
Walter E. Olsen & Co., this Court held that—

Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the

lower court took into consideration the documents attached
to the complaint as a part thereof, without having been
expressly introduced in evidence. This was no error. In the
answer of the defendants there was no denial under oath of
the authenticity of these documents. Under Section 103 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the authenticity and due
execution of these documents must, in that case, be deemed
admitted. The effect of this is to relieve the plaintiff from the
duty of expressly presenting such documents as evidence.
The court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should
con-

_______________

34 Supra, note 25 at p. 10; Hornales v. The National Labor Relations

Commission, et al., G.R. No. 118943, 10 September 2001, 364 SCRA 778;
SCC Chemicals Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 128538, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA 70.
35 VII The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines (Evidence), Vicente J.
Francisco, p. 9 (1997 Ed.)
36 G.R. No. 24488, 28 December 1925, 48 Phil. 529.

134

134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) vs.
Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

sider, without the introduction

37 of evidence, the facts
admitted by the parties.

Anent petitioner’s allegation that the presiding judge

of the court a quo should have inhibited himself from
this case, we resolve this issue against petitioner.
In order for this Court to sustain a charge of
partiality and prejudice brought against a judge, there
must be convincing proof to show that he or she is,
indeed, biased and partial. Bare allegations are not
enough. Bias and prejudice are serious charges which
cannot be presumed particularly if weighed against a
judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect 38to person and do
equal right to the poor and the rich. There must be a
showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an
extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the
merits on some basis other than what 39 the judge
learned from his participation in the case.
In this case, as petitioner failed to proffer any
evidence indicating that Judge Diaz was guilty of bias
and prejudice, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding
that there was no cogent reason for him to disqualify
himself from this case.
Finally, Rule 33, Section 1, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure states the rule on the effect of
judgment on demurrer to evidence. It reads:

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has

completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant
may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence.
If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal
is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.

_______________

37 Id., at p. 532.
38 People v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 129120, 02 July 1999,
309 SCRA 705.
39 Soriano v. Angeles, G.R. No. 109920, 31 August 2000, 339
SCRA 366.

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Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
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A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial

proceedings, it being an instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action. Caution, however, must be
exercised by the party seeking the dismissal of a case
upon this ground as under the rules, if the movant’s
plea for the dismissal on demurrer to evidence is
granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on
appeal, he loses his right to adduce evidence. If the
defendant’s motion for judgment on demurrer to
evidence is granted and the order is subsequently
reversed on appeal, judgment is rendered in favor of
the adverse party40because the movant loses his right to
present evidence. The reviewing court cannot remand
the case for further proceedings; rather, it should
render judgment 41 on the basis of the evidence presented

by the plaintiff.
Under the promissory note executed by respondents
in this case, they are obligated to petitioner in the
amount of One Million Pesos, this being the amount of
loan they obtained on 23 April 1982. In addition, they
also bound themselves to pay the 23% interest per
annum on the loan; and a penalty charge of 3% per
annum on the amount due until fully paid.
Respondents likewise agreed to pay attorney’s fees
equivalent to 10% of the total amount due, but in no
case less than P200.00, plus costs of suit with both
these amounts bearing a 1% interest per month until
paid. Costs against respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of
Appeals’ decision dated 25 November 1999 as well as
its Resolution of 11 May 2000, affirming the order of
the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27, dated 28
December 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents are ordered to pay One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) plus 23% interest per annum,
penalty charge of 3% interest per annum, and 10% of

_______________

40 Quebral v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101941, 25 January 1996,

252 SCRA 353.
41 Radiowealth Finance Company v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739,
06 July 2000, 335 SCRA 288.
 136

136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.

the amount due as attorney’s fees together with a 1%

interest per month until fully paid. The sum of
P220,020.00 which was the value of the postdated
check given by respondents to petitioner as partial
payment should be deducted from the amount due
from respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo,

Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.

Notes.—A secondary evidence can only be admitted

if it is shown that the original has been lost or
destroyed or cannot be produced in court or that it is in
the custody of the adverse party. (People vs. Dismuke,
234 SCRA 51 [1994])
Where the answer does not contain any specific
denial under oath of the letters of credit, sight drafts,
trust receipts and comprehensive surety agreement
upon which the complaint is based, the same gives rise
to the implied admission of the genuineness and due
execution of said documents, which documents are also
admissible in evidence despite absence of documentary
stamps thereon. (Filipinas Textile Mills, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, 415 SCRA 635 [2003])

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