Introduction

Other Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) had existed before the advent of the

Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in Nigeria. These EMBs with

similar powers as INEC were reflections of Nigeria’s political life. The number, to

a large extent, underscores Nigeria’s ability or inability to develop a political

culture. What is clear, however, is that each time democracy is truncated by way of

military intervention, the yearning for democracy increases and prompts the

country to seek recourse in a new EMB. The first Election Management body was

the defunct Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN), which conducted the pre-

independence elections of 1959. With the advent of independence, the government

of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa set up the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC),

which conducted the 1964 and 1965 elections. Following the first military coup

d’état of 15 January 1966, the FEC was dissolved. It was not until 1978 that the

Obasanjo military administration set up another electoral body; the Federal

Electoral Commission (FEDECO). FEDECO conducted the transitional elections

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that ushered in Nigeria’s Second Republic with Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the

National Party of Nigeria (NPN) emerging as the President. Hardly had democratic

rule taken off than it was extirpated in 1983 and FEDECO was promptly dissolved

in 1987, when the administration of General Ibrahim Babangida began one of

Nigeria’s longest transitions to civil rule programmes. He set up the National

Electoral Commission (NEC). NEC worked assiduously until the annulment of the

presidential election in June 1993.

Electoral Commissions and Elections in Nigeria

Most Nigerians believe that electoral commissions are central to the problems

associated with the conduct of elections in Nigeria. The Electoral Commission of

Nigeria (ECN) conducted the 1959 elections that led to the first neo-colonial

civilian government in Nigeria. The outcome of the election was controversial and

it led to the controversial 1964 regional elections in the Western Region. The

controversies surrounding the 1964 elections were the basis for which the military

decided to overthrow the civilian government in 1966 (Iyayi 2006:11). In 1979,

FEDECO conducted elections that gave rise to the famous two-thirds of nineteen

states’ crisis. This controversy escalated because the military were alleged to be in

favour of a particular group of people that they wanted to hand over power to

(Iyayi 2006:11). In 1983, FEDECO was seen as instrumental to the return of NPN,

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the ruling party, into power by announcing that the number of registered voters had

increased from 48, 499,07 in 1971 to 65, 304,818, in spite of the fact that the 1979

figure was considered to be highly inflated (Iyayi 2006:11). Similarly, the results

of the 1999 elections were seen to have been prearranged with INEC so as to make

the electoral process and results legitimate (Iyayi 2006:11). Again INEC was seen

as part and parcel of the enormous fraud that characterised the 2003 and 2004

elections. According to the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), INEC

contributed its own fair share of electoral problems in the 2003 elections. The lack

of clearly designated compartments for thumb-printing undermined the secrecy of

the vote and exposed the voters to machinations of those that would have preferred

‘community voting’. INEC also did not make adequate arrangements for the

transportation of sensitive election materials to the polling stations and collation

centres. Result sheets disappeared and re-appeared in different forms at collation

centres whilst corrupt party agents simply sold unused ballot papers to the highest

bidder. Following the reversal of the process for the order of the elections by

INEC, voters deserted the state House of Assembly elections. Thus no voting took

place in these elections, although winners emerged from the process.

INEC and its Institutional Framework

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 The commission is made up of a chairman and 12 national commissioners.

The commission was established in accordance with section 153 (f ) of the

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The functions of the

Commission, as stipulated in part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999

Constitution, are as follows:

 Organize, conduct, and supervise all elections and matters pertaining to

elections into all elective offices provided in the Constitution of the Federal

Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended or any other enactment or law.

 Register political parties in accordance with the provision of the relevant

enactment or law.

 Monitor the organisation and operation of the political parties, including

their finances.

 Arrangefor the annualexamination and auditing of thefunds and accounts of

political parties and publish a report of such examination and audit for

public information.

 Conduct registration of persons qualified to vote and the preparation,

maintenance and revision of the register of voters for the purpose of any

election.

 Monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations, which shall

govern the political parties.

Going through various copies of the Electoral Magazine, an INEC

publication, collected from the INEC offices, Professor Iwu is described as a

man who introduced a lot of innovations into the electoral process, the

Electoral Institute, now Electoral Institute of Nigeria, being one of them.

Although the man has been castigated, vilified and abused, INEC strongly

believes that the myriad of negative comments by people after elections is

due to not having correct information. However, the facts remain that Iwu

should bear responsibility for the bastardization of Nigeria’s electoral

process between 2005 and 2010. His intransigence in defending the

indefensible – rigging of elections, ballot box stuffing, imposition of

candidates, doctoring of election results and outrightly imposing those who

never won primaries within their parties as elected cannot be forgotten. He

was indeed, the face of Nigeria’s democracy in its most decadent state.

However, for INEC, the panacea for election rigging is the electronic voting

system, which has four major components: electronic voter register, voter

accreditation and authentication, electronic balloting and electronic

transmission of results. These would eliminate violence, money laundering,

ballot box stuffing, fraudulent counting of votes and resultant manipulation

in elections. Going through the official report of the 2007 general election by

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INEC, some issues are highlighted as having hindered the elections and

INEC’s performance in particular. These include:

• Lack of financial autonomy was a major problem, which resulted in undue

delays with ultimately detrimental consequences.

• Electoral constituency delimitation. This did not allow for a proper level

playing field for political participation in elections.

• The deployment of appropriate technology i.e. electronic voting machines

were proposed and not approved by the National Assembly.

• The majority of the political parties were not represented at the polling

centres so as to minimize complaints and irregularities.

• TheConstitution does not specifically providethe power for the commission

to disqualify candidates whose submitted claims are found to be false.

• The Commission’s resort to receiving electoral logistic support from the

state and local government. Although, this is good in itself, it needs to be

investigated to ensure that INEC staff are not blackmailed or compromised

at the grassroots level by politicians.

• Producing sensitive election materials abroad result in delivery delays, thus

crippling logistic plans.

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References
Akogun, Kunle, 2007, ‘April Polls: Voting for Another Impasse’, Thisday,
June 3.
Aluko, Mobolaji, 1999, Monitoring Nigeria’s Elections-The Carter
Formula, Buttosville, MD.USA, Ayorinde, Olujun, 2009, ‘Thinkering
With A Report’, Views, 10:56.368
Derbyshire, J.N., and Derbyshire I., 1993, World Political Systems,
Chambers.
Iwu, Maurice, 2008, ‘Electronic Voting and the Future of the Electoral
System in Nigeria’, The Nigerian Electoral Journal, Vol.2., No.1.,
May.
Iyayi, Festus, 2006, Elections, INEC and the Problems of Elections in
Nigeria, Abuja: INEC. Kwaja, Chris.2007, ‘INEC and Management of
Elections: Lessons from Nigeria’, retrieved from
(http://www./afrimap.org/english/image/paper/kwaja-inec-nigeria-EN-
0pdf) 05 May 2009.
Ogunsanwo, Alaba, 2003, ‘Keynote Address’, in Remi Anifowose and
Tunde Babawale, eds, 2003 General Elections and Democratic
Consolidation in Nigeria. Lagos: Friedrich Stif- tung.
Okaisabor, Thompson, 2001, ‘INEC and 2003’, Daily Times, 9 Sept.

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Okoye, Festus, 2003, ‘Do the Votes Count?’ Final Report of the 2003
General Elections of Nigeria. Olutola, Bello, 2007, ‘Elections and the
Challenges of Nation-building’, The Punch, April 13, INEC, 2009.