Posen 1993

Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power
Author(s): Barry R. Posen

Source: International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall, 1993), pp. 80-124
Published by: The MIT Press
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Nationalism,the BarryR. Posen
Mass Army,and
Militry Power
The collapse of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have precipitatedan epidemic of
nationalistconflicts.Nationalism was hardlyquiescent duringthe last forty-
five years: it played a key role in the decolonization process, fuelingboth
revolutionaryand inter-statewarfare. But students of strategyconcerned
themselves with the dynamics of superpower conflictand its effectson
regionalenmitiesmore than with the dynamicsof nationalistrivalries.Thus,
we lack sufficientanalysis to explain our currentpredicament;instead, we
invoke folk theories about ancient hatreds, or sorcererleaders who have
miraculouslycalled them forth.
We fear nationalism because of its close association with the destructive
warfareof the firsthalf of the century.Many believe that nationalismper-
mitted or even compelled leaders to conduct reckless foreignpolicies that
produced wars; prolonged the wars by promotingescalation of war aims;
increased the destructivenessof war by providingdistilledindustrialpower
in the formof vast quantities of armaments;and sustained the most intense
combat imaginable with the energies and the blood of millions of young
men.' Although these widely held propositionsabout the dangerous conse-
quences of nationalismare by no means proven, when we express concerns
today about the re-emergenceof long-suppressed nationalism,this is what
we fear.
Given that so much curiosityabout nationalismis driven by its apparent
association with war, it is noteworthythat few scholars have tried directly
to connect the two phenomena. Most scholarship on the originsof nation-
BarryR. Posen is Professor

ofPoliticalScienceat MIT and a member
of its Defenseand ArmsControl
StudiesProgram.
The author would like to thank Omer Bartov,Liah Greenfeld,JackSnyder, and Stephen Van
Evera forcommentson earlierdrafts.The Committeeon InternationalConflictand Cooperation
of the National Research Council arranged for several helpful reviews. The Levitan Prize and
the Carnegie Corporationof New York provided financialsupport.
1. For an example of such views, see Michael Howard, War in EuropeanHistory(New York:
Oxford UniversityPress, 1976), pp. 109-115; Carlton J.H. Hayes, Nationalism:A Religion(New
York: Macmillan: 1960), pp. 120-124.
Security,Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124

Internationial
?D1993 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.
80

Nationalism,theMass Army,and MilitaryPower| 81
alism addresses the political, social, and economic development processes

thathave affectedthe formationof national identities.This literatureis strik-
ing in its richness,but it pays littleattentionto war. Most scholarshipon the
originsand conduct of the great wars we associate with nationalism,espe-
cially the two world wars, traces only impreciselytheir connection with
nationalism.
In this articleI argue that nationalismincreases the intensityof warfare,
and specificallythe abilityof states to mobilize the creativeenergies and the
spiritof self-sacrificeof millions of soldiers. Several of the elements of na-
tionalismlong stressed by scholars of the subject are caused or intensified
by the task of preparation for warfare,and by the experience of warfare,
particularly"mass mobilization" warfare.It is not merely coincidentalthat
nationalism seems to cause intense warfare;I argue that it is purveyed by
states forthe express purpose of improvingtheirmilitarycapabilities.
and MilitaryImitation
SecurityCompetition
I definenationalismas the propensityofindividualsto identifytheirpersonal

interestwith that of a group that is too large to meet together;to identify
that intereston the basis both of a "culture" that the group shares, and a
purportedhistorythatthe group purportedlyshares; and to believe thatthis
group must have a state structureof its own in orderto thrive.2Nationalism
would thus help generate the individual commitmentand the organized
cooperationthatmake forcombatpower on the battlefield.Once nationalism
is in place, the kind (although not necessarilythe incidence) of warfarethat
we have seen since the French Revolution follows. Most of the interesting
questions arise as to how both the beliefsand the shared culturecome to be,
and how theycome to be in many statesmore or less simultaneously.Usually
the answer to these questions is presumed to lie at the level of individual
2. This definitionis consistentwith that offeredby ErnstHaas, "What is nationalismand why

should we study it?," InternationalOrganization,Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer 1986), p. 709. It also
draws on Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalismand Social Communication: An InquiryintotheFoundations
of Nationality,
2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), chap. 4, "Peoples, Nations, and
Communication," pp. 86-105. I have also borrowed fromErnest Gellner, who posits that a
shared "high" or literarycultureis the fundamentalelement of nationalism.Because he views
cultureas the glue that holds industrialcapitalismtogether,he sees the spread of capitalismas
the main cause of modern nation,alism.Below I develop a differentargument.Gellner,Nations
and Nationalism(Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1983); fora useful summary,see pp. 139-143;
and forelaboration,pp. 35-38.

Security18:2 | 82
International
societies; if nationalism emerges in many neighboring societies simulta-

neously, then it is assumed that they are all experiencingsimilarpolitical,
social, economic, or demographicchanges.
By contrast, my argument stresses the causal role of the international
system;structuralrealism deduces fromthe anarchicalconditionof interna-
tional politics that states that wish to remain autonomous will compete for
security.Militarycapabilities are a key means to such security,and thus
states will pay close attentionto them. States will be concerned about the
size and effectivenessof theirmilitaryorganizationsrelativeto theirneigh-
bors. As in any competitivesystem, successful practices will be imitated.
Those who fail to imitateare unlikelyto survive.3The development of the
professionalofficercorps in the 1600s was one such practice,which provided
modern states with a permanentorganizationdedicated to the improvement
of war-makingcapacity, and to the observation of such improvementsby
prospectiveadversaries.4
The mass army is a successful practice fromthe point of view of state
survival in internationalpolitics. The mass armymakes land powers much
more capable of aggression. It is difficultto oppose a mass armywithout a
mass army. Once the French Revolution, and later Napoleon, proved the
efficacyof this pattern of militaryorganization, others who valued their
sovereigntywere stronglyencouraged to imitate this example. It is this
imitation,I argue, that helped to spread nationalismacross Europe.
THE MASS ARMY

Although historians,militaryand otherwise,speak of the rise of the "mass
army"in the FrenchRevolution,and its subsequent spread across the world,
3. The standardwork is Kenneth Waltz, TheoryofInternational Politics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-

Wesley, 1979); see esp. pp. 123-128. "Contending states imitatethe militaryinnovations con-
trivedby the countryof greatestcapabilityand ingenuity,"p. 127. This is also the theme of
Charles Tilly,ed., Formation ofNationalStatesin WesternEurope(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1975). The essays in Tilly's collectionstresscompetitionand imitationin the development
of the whole administrativeapparatus of states, including their military;they address the
developmentof nationsless directly.See also StanislavAndreski,MilitaryOrganization and Society
(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1971), pp. 68-71.
4. William H. McNeill, The PursuitofPower(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1982), pp.
123-124, views the ThirtyYears War as the event markingthe institutionalization of a "profes-
sional" officercorps in the sense of a Europe-wide, self-consciousgroup of technicalexpertsin
the "management" of violence, dedicated to the improvementof theircraft.Afterthe Thirty
Years War, the institutionof the standing army spread throughoutEurope, providing regular
employmentforthese professionals.As noted elsewhere in thisarticle,the notion thatone plied
one's trade fora single state throughoutone's career had not yet caught on.

Nationalism,theMass Army,and MilitaryPowerj 83
clear definitions,as well as explanations of its emergence and spread, are

hard to find. The essence of the mass armyis only partlyits size, although
it is a great deal larger than most of its predecessors.5The essence of the
mass army is its abilityto maintainits size in the face of the rigorsof war:
the attritionexacted by the unhealthfulconditions of the campaign, the
temptationof individuals to desert, and the firepowerof the enemy. Its
second essential quality is that it can also to a very large extentretain its
"combatpower." Replacementscan be armed, trained,and organized rapidly
so that they can be maneuvered over great distances and employed in en-
gagements.Thus the recruitsmustarrivewitha certainwillingnessto become
soldiers, a certaineducability,and a certaincommitmentto the outcome of
the battle. This makes political motivation,and ultimatelyliteracy,key ele-
ments of the mass army.
The development of the mass army depended physically on a general
increase in population and wealth, so that society could provide fromits
surplus the reserves of manpower, weapons and supplies necessary to its
effectiveness.The army needed the spread of literacy,initiallydown to the
level of the non-commissionedofficer,to facilitatecommand, training,and
politicalmotivation.The firstmass armydepended ultimatelyupon a political
revolutionwhose ideology,redolentof nationalism,stressedthe equalityand
communityof all Frenchmen;6the firstcoalition's invasion of France in 1793
forceda beleagured leadership to order mass conscription.
Finally,the politicallymotivatedmass armywas a response to a "techno-
logical" problem-a constraint.(Developments in militarytechologyreward
some behaviors and penalize others, but they seldom directlydetermine
militarypractice.) By the mid-1700simprovementsin firearmsmade infan-
5. Louis XIV put the largest ancienregimearmy into the field; at 450,000 it representeda feat
unequalled by his royal successors. Russell F. Weigley,TheAge ofBattles(Bloomington:Indiana
UniversityPress, 1991), p. 260. By late 1793, the revolutionarygovernmenthad 700,000soldiers.
Jean-PaulBertaud, The Armyof theFrenchRevolution,trans. R.R. Palmer (Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress, 1988), p. 243. Under Napoleon strengthfluctuated,but between 1800 and
1812, 1.3 millionconscriptswere reportedlyabsorbed. McNeill, ThePursuitofPower,p. 200.
6. The germ of this argumentis found in Carl Von Clausewitz, On War,ed. and trans.Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1976, 1984), pp. 591-593. Of
France he notes, "in 1793 a forceappeared that beggared all imagination.Suddenly war again
became the business of the people ... all of whom considered themselves to be citizens....
The full weight of the nation was throwninto the balance." Of the consequences, he wrote,
"Since Bonaparte, then, war, firstamong the French and subsequently among theirenemies,
again became the concern of the people as a whole.... There seemed no end to the resources
mobilized; all limitsdisappeared irtthe vigor and enthusiasm shown by governmentsand their
subjects."

International
Security18:2 184
trymenpotent killers on their own and, combined with improvementsin

artillery,made it dangerous for more than a few infantrymento cluster
together. Dispersal would improve the odds for survival. Since the 1700s,
professional soldiers have understood that the motivation,command, and
controlof dispersed infantryon the battlefieldare extremelydifficult.8The
problem becomes how to keep these dispersed, scared, lonely individuals
risking their own lives, and cooperating to take the lives of others. An
importantrelated problem is how to replace the high casualties that may
arise fromarmed clashes using these technologies. The deliberate sponsor-
ship of both the cultural and ideological components of nationalism was
perceived by many as a criticalelement,sometimesas thecriticalelement,of
the solution. Those states who do this better,all other thingsbeing equal,
will be more competitivethan others.9
States, therefore,act purposefullyto produce nationalismbecause of its
utilityin mass mobilization warfare. Two aspects of nationalism-literacy
and ideology-are subject to state action throughschools, media, and indoc-
7. Most historiansdate the problem to the appearance of muzzle-loadingpercussion-firedrifles

in the mid-1800s,but I find evidence that the problem emerged and was recognized a century
earlier.
8. By the end of the Napoleonic wars, fightingin open order, or skirmishing,had become
common practice in many European armies. Three differentmethods had been developed to
produce troops who could use these tactics.The firstwas to trainthem frombirth,as on the
border of the Austro-Hungarianempire or the Americanfrontier.This method was unavailable
to centralEuropeans. The second was to drilland trainthe troopsmeticulously,as was pioneered
by the British.This could not produce large numbers of troops, nor replacements for high
attrition.It was uniquely suited to an offshoreseapower which could controlthe size of its land
commitmentand the pace of battle, as did Wellingtonin Spain. The final mechanism was to
improve the political motivation,solidarity,and learning skills of the average recruit,as pi-
oneered by the French Revolution. This method spread throughoutcontinentalEurope, and
ultimatelythe world, in the formof the mass army.For a superb introduction,see David Gates,
The BritishLightInfantry Arm,1790-1815 (London: Batsford,1987), esp. chap. 1.
9. Since the publicationin the west of certainSecond World War studies of the German Army,
and particularlysince the Vietnam War, the U.S. securitystudies communityhas stressed the
impact of "small unit cohesion" on the combat power of infantryunits. Much of this work was
stimulatedby E.A. Shils and MorrisJanowitz,"Cohesion and Disintegrationin the Wehrmacht
in World War II," PublicOpinionQuarterly,Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1948), pp. 280-315. See also
Martin van Creveld, FightingPower: Germanand U.S. ArmyPerformance, 1939-1945 (Westport,
Conn.: Gieenwood, 1982). The impact of ideology, patriotism,or nationalismon combat power
has until recentlybeen derogated. There is, however, new literaturethat goes some way to
restoresensitivityto the impact of these "wholesale" factorson combat power. Cited at length
below is JohnA. Lynn, The BayonetsoftheRepublic,Motivationand Tacticsin theArmyofRevolu-
tionaryFrance,1791-94 (Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press, 1984). See also Omer Bartov,Hitler's
Army:Soldiers,Nazis, and Warin theThirdReich(New York: OxfordUniversityPress, 1991); John
Dower, War WithoutMercy:Race and Powerin thePacificWar (New York: Pantheon, 1986). All
threeof these works stress the conscious systematicmanipulationof soldiers' attitudes.

trinationwithin the military.States promote compulsoryprimaryeducation

to spread literacyin a standard version of the spoken language to enhance
the technical militaryutilityof their soldiers. In doing so, they spread the
"culture" and the version of historythat are centralto the national identity.
Culture means mainly a writtenlanguage, but also a shared set of symbols
and memories. Both formallanguage and these shared symbols and memo-
ries facilitatecommunication,training,and geographicaland social mobility. 10
Although Ernest Gellner believes these arise fromeconomic requirements,
any argumentthat one can make forthe economic functionof literacyand a
shared culture is at least as plausible fora militaryfunction,particularlyin
mass warfare.11The militaryfate of armies composed of several distinct
communitiesand faced by relativelyhomogeneous armies tells the tale; the
Austro-Hungarianarmy was nearly the least successful army of the First
World War.12
The regimentedpresence of boys and young men in classrooms and in
militaryunits is also exploited to spread crude nationalistideology among
them. Schools, militarytraining,and the newspapers spread the idea that
the group has a shared identityand fate that can only be protectedby the
state. A highly patrioticand militarizedversion of the group's historyis a
criticalbuilding block of this idea.
States institutecompulsoryeducation and engage in propaganda because
militaryand politicalleaders believe thatsuch ideas enhance the commitment
of the troops to the purposes of the war, increase theirwillingnessto sacrifice
theirlives, and improve theirsolidaritywith one another.Wars provide new
incentives for both the winners and the losers to purvey the elements of
10. Gellner,Nationsand Nationalism,p. 57. "It [nationalism]means the generalized diffusionof

a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirementsof reasonably
precisebureaucraticand technologicalcommunication.It is the establishmentof an anonymous,
impersonal society,with mutuallysubstitutableatomized individuals, held togetherabove all
by a shared cultureof this kind."
11. "There seems to be in most countriesa direct proportionbetween the degree of popular
literacyand that of unquestioning national loyalty."CarltonJ.H. Hayes, Nationalism:A Religion
(New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 87. He goes on to note the differencein resiliencebetween the
illiterateRussian conscriptsof 1914-18 and the literateones of 1941-45.
12. Max Weber, commentingon the Austro-HungarianArmyduring World War I, argues this
position: "Consider the fundamentaldifficulty confrontingAustrianofficers,which stems from
the fact that the officerhas only some fiftyGerman words of command in common with his
men. How will he get on with his company in the trenches?What will he do when something
unforeseen happens, that is not covered by this vocabulary: What in the event of a defeat?"
Weber,quoted in David Beetham, Max Weberand theTheony ofModernPolitics(Cambridge,U.K.:
PolityPress, 1985), p. 129.

International
Security18:2 86 J
nationalism,if the wars demonstratethe militaryadvantages thatcome with

literacyand solidarity.War also provides new ammunition,fromdisastrous
militaryhistoryas well as glorious, for subsequent purveyorsof national-
ism.13
Below, I focus largelyon developments in land warfarefrom1750 to 1914
and how they affectedthe development of nationalismin Prussia (and ulti-
matelyGermany) and in France. The patternsidentifiedin this limitedcase
study suggest that nationalismwill be found to be part and parcel of prep-
arationformass mobilizationwarfareof any kind.
THE CASE
To evaluate the plausibilityof the argumentoutlined above, I examine the
competitiverelationshipbetween France and Prussia/Germanyduring the
period fromthe Seven Years War (1756-63) to the eve of the FirstWorldWar.
The purpose here is not to test the theorysystematicallyagainst any of its
competitors;rather it is to establish its plausibility.This case should be
relativelyeasy for the theoryto pass: France and Germany share a gentle
border and a long historyof securitycompetition;theirstrugglesfromthe
late 18th throughthe 20th centuryare oftenassociated with an obvious and
intense nationalism; the professional militariesof the two countries devel-
oped more or less simultaneously;and theirliteratureswere easily accessible
to each other.There is a vast secondary literatureon this competition.Thus
both substantivelyand bibliographicallyI am, in the parable ofthe drunkard's
search,lookingunder the light.But ifthiscase does not lend some plausibility
to the theoryin this militarycompetition,then it probablyis a "criticalcase":
if the theorycannot survive here, it probablywould not elsewhere, and so
we should spend littleadditional time on it.
The purpose of my argumentis not to deny the influenceof otherpolitical,
social, and economic phenomena on the development of nationalism. It is,
rather,to stressa causal chain thatI believe has receivedinsufficient
attention
in studies of nationalismand war, and one thatI believe has a great deal of
potentialto explain the spread of nationalismand variationsin its virulence.
13. Liah Greenfeld,Nationalism:Five Roads to Modernity(Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress,

1992), pp. 159, 180. Greenfeldnotes thatFrance's defeatin the Seven Years War stimulatedthe
growthof nationalistsentimentin the French elite, quoting R.R. Palmer, "The National Idea in
France beforethe Revolution,"JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas,Vol. 1 (1940), p. 100. Simon Schama
offersa similarjudgment in Citizens:A Chronicle
oftheFrenchRevolution (New York:Knopf, 1989),
pp. xv, 32-34, 858.

An effortto weigh the power of these militarycauses, relativeto othertypes

of causes, will have to await furtherresearch. Nevertheless,ifthe argument
is persuasive, then it suggests that nationalism can be expected to persist
whereverthe militarysecurityof states depends on mass mobilization,and
thatwe must expect futuremilitaryorganizerswith even a mediocreknowl-
edge of militaryhistoryto imitatethis militaryformat.14
THE PREDICTIONS
From the theoryI have developed follow certainpredictionsabout the case.
First,we should expect to find that the explanations offeredby importaint
actors, such as statesmen and soldiers, of what they do are made in terms
that are consistentwith the theory.Since the theorypredicts change over
time in importantpractices,and since change is never easy, someone has to
argue for it. If they argue for it for the reasons I have specified, then the
theoryis strengthened.
Second, we should find that changes in a given state's militaryor educa-
tional policies often follow the big wars that demonstratethe effectiveness
of alternativepolicies, especially if they are successfullydemonstratedby a
potentialadversary.For example:
* We should see states adopting mass armies if they have been beaten by
mass armies, or they expect to have to confrontone.
* We should see states embarking on literacycampaigns for the explicit
purpose of producing bettersoldiers.
* We should find that educational materialsused in primaryschools have
both a high nationalistcontentand a high militarycontent.
Our purpose is to see whether states consciously imitatethe successful

practicesof others,whetherthe mass armyis deemed to be such a successful
practice,whether nationalismcorrelateswith the success of the mass army,
whetherthe intensificationof nationalismin one's own countryis viewed as
an essential component of a mass army,and whetheractors connectliteracy
to militarysuccess and sponsor literacyto improve militaryeffectiveness.
14. The concept of a "militaryformat"is borrowed fromSamuel E. Finer,"State- and Nation-

Buildingin Europe: The Role of the Military,"pp. 89-90, in Tilly,ed., Formation
ofNationalStates,
pp. 84-163. He includes, in the con,ceptof format,the "service basis" of the militaryforce,its
compositionin termsof main arms, and its social stratification. Finer's general approach in the
essay helped inspire my own treatmentbelow.

International
Security18:2 | 88
Third, if we find that states do these things even when they have other
reasons not to, the theory is strengthened.And indeed, there are such
reasons: narrow elites, such as the Prussian elite during the period in ques-
tion,have good reason to avoid the mass armybecause it legitimatespopular
claims for political participation.Nationalist ideology does the same. By
recruitingfromevery class, the mass armyloses its utilityas an instrument
of domestic repression, and thus changes the balance of power between
rulersand ruled. (It also diffusessome militaryskill throughoutthe society,
as trainedconscriptsreturnto civilianlife.) Increases in literacyalso change
the domestic balance of power by improving the political organizational
abilitiesof the newly literate.Thus narrow elites should be opposed to the
mass army, to nationalist ideology, and to compulsory education. If they
neverthelessopt for the mass army and its necessary supports for security
reasons, it strengthensmy claim that systemicforcesare a powerfulcause
of the diffusionof nationalism.
Narrow elites will wish to dispense withthe mass armyand its educational
and ideological supports as soon as the national emergency passes, but
according to realist theory,this is extremelydifficultto do. The problem is
somewhat akin to unilateraldisarmament:since states cannot easily predict
when and whether their neighbors can returnto this successful offensive
format,they must preserve a capabilityto returnto it themselves, even if
they would rathernot do so forother reasons. Clausewitz summarized the
lessons of mass mobilizationin the Napoleonic wars: "once barriers-which
in a sense consist only in man's ignorance of what is possible-are torn
down, they are not so easily set up again. At least when major interestsare
at stake, mutual hostilitywill express itselfin the same manner as it has in
our own day."'15
An alternativetheoryargues that narrow elites purvey nationalism as a
kind of "false democracy" when theyare under internalassault.16National-
ism is viewed as a confidencegame in which elites tryto convince the lower
15. Clausewitz, On War,p. 593. Elsewhere (p. 220) he observes, "All these cases have shown
what an enormous contributionthe heart and temperof a nation can make to the sum total of
its politics,war potential,and fightingstrength.Now thatgovernmentshave become conscious
of these resources, we cannot expect them to remain unused in the future,whetherthe war is
foughtin self-defenseor in order to satisfyintense ambition."
16. This argumentis implicitin many historicalanalyses of WilhelmineGermany.For example
see V.R. Berghahn, Germanyand theApproachofWar in 1914 (New York: St. Martin's: 1973) pp.
29-31. Stephen Van Evera develops it brieflyin "Primed forPeace: Europe Afterthe Cold War,"
International Security,Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter1990-91), pp. 28-29.

orders that they are all members of the same community;inequalities of

power and wealth are deliberatelyobscured. But even if these same elites
promotenationalism,however, they should avoid the mass armyand com-
pulsory education, since these would shiftthe internalbalance of power.
One could argue that nationalist ideology is a mechanism to counter-
balance the democratizingforce of conscriptionand compulsoryeducation
when the internationalsystemforcesthese expedientson narrowelites. Still,
if this were the case, one would expect to find more democratic states
purveyingnationalismless intensivelythanless democraticstates:the French
state should purveya less virulentnationalistideology,and do so less inten-
sively,than the German state. Such a fine-grainedmeasurementis beyond
the scope of this article,but the case describedbelow does permitthe reader
to make a crude comparison; I see no obvious differences.
Theories of nationalism that stress its internalcultural sources seem to
suggest the unlikelihood that successful militarypracticeswill be borrowed
from abroad, although no theory explicitlyadvances this proposition. If
nationalismwas largelythe organic result of a special internalprocess, bor-
rowing of even successful enemy militarypracticeswould be taboo. Where
states might argue their own national uniqueness and the complete "non-
importability"of foreignmodels, but instead imitatethe militaryinstitutions
and practices of those who have defeated them, repackaged with a veneer
of indigenousness, credibilityis lent to the argumentthat militarycompeti-
tion is an importantcause of the spread of nationalism.
The Eve ofRevolution
Fromthe close of the ThirtyYears' War to the end of the eighteenthcentury,

the monarchs of Europe made war with small long-servicearmies, the rank
and fileof which were oftenat least partly"foreign,"commanded by a mix
of aristocrats,profiteers,and free-lanceprofessionals.These armies tended
to fightas relativelycompact formations.Combat performancedepended in
part on drillingthe individual soldiers until they could performelaborate
tacticalmaneuvers and shoot theirweapons more or less automatically.Dis-
cipline was fierce. Frederick the Great of Prussia was the acknowledged
master of this kind of war, and he is noted to have asserted that his troops
had to feartheirofficersmore than the enemy.
Already at roughly mid-ceritury, some professionalsoldiers had become
dissatisfiedwith customarymilitarypractices. This is sometimes attributed

Security18:2 | 90
International
to a generalized spilloverfromthe Enlightenmentto militarythought.Rather

than quarrel with this position I would add that a practicalproblem had
emerged: European armies had become too good at making war the old-
fashioned way.17State financialand administrativeapparatuses were strong
enough to stay at war forseveral years at a time. But the combinationof pre-
war drill,improvementsin firepowertechnology,and battlefieldleadership
had made actual combat almost too costly to sustain.18Casualties of 20
percentor more per battlebecame common in the Seven Years War, and the
war lasted long enough fora numberofbattlesto be fought.19 Yet the infantry
casualties could not be replaced at the pace theywere incurred.Recruitment
in wartime was difficult,and there was no time for the intensive training
required to produce new infantrymencapable of the elaborate tacticalcom-
binations that officerspreferred.The usual expedient was to add more and
more artilleryto the forces, but given the sheer weight of the guns, this
impairedboth large-scaleand small-scalemaneuver.20
Priorto the FrenchRevolution,Frenchand German militarythinkerswere
writingabout the need fora bettermotivatedsoldier,and particularlyfora
soldier who had some loyalty to the state. The Count de Guibert's Essai
Generalde Tactiqueof 1772 is cited as the main theoreticalwork of the period
thatargues forthe greatmilitaryutilityofa committedcitizenarmy.21 Perhaps
of equal influencewas the German Count Wilhelm zu Schaumburg-Lippe-
Buckeburg,chief of a small German state the energies of which were dedi-
cated totallyto the count's avocation, "militaryorganizationand training."
17. McNeill, The Pursuitof Power,pp. 158-166, views the Seven Years War as an immediate
catalystof a new round of innovativethinkingin European armies thathad performedpoorly,
particularlythe French,and imitativebehavioron the partofmanyothers,particularlyofPrussia.
He also posits a host of other "causes" of strainforthe warfarestates of Europe.
18. Even Frederickthe Great, whom historiansconsider noteworthyforhis willingnessto risk
battles,neverthelessviewed them as chancy affairs,oftenforcedupon him by the exigenciesof
the situation.See Hans Delbriick,HistoryoftheArtofWarWithintheFramework ofPoliticalHistory,
Vol. IV: TheModernEra, trans.WalterJ.Renfroe(Westport,Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985; first
published Berlin: 1920), pp. 369-383.
19. Weigley,TheAge ofBattles,pp. 179-195.
20. Dennis Showalter, "Weapons and Ideas of the Prussian ArmyfromFrederickthe Great to
Moltke the Elder," in JohnA. Lynn, ToolsofWar(Urbana: Universityof IllinoisPress, 1990), pp.
186-191.
21. R.R. Palmer,"Frederickthe Great, GuibertBulow: FromDynastic to National War," in Peter
Paret, ed., MakersofModernStrategy:FromMachiavellito theNuclearAge (Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress, 1986), pp. 107-108. Guibertwas also an exponent of mobility,although this
was not inconsistentwith Frederick's militarypractice. Guibert did not expect an imminent
politicalrevolutionthatwould provide the kind of soldiers he wanted, and laterrepudiated his
argumentsas to theirutility.

Nationalism,theMass Army,and MilitaryPowerI 91
The count, who had instituteduniversal militaryservice in his littlestate,

also operated a militaryacademy and enjoyed an "internationalreputation
as a soldier." Gerhard von Scharnhorst,who led the reformof the Prussian
Armyafterits defeat at the hands of Napoleon, was educated in this acad-
emy, fromwhence he derived many of his ideas about the value of an army
thatwas representativeof the population.22
Reformswere also proposed to improvethe treatmentof the soldier in the
ranks,which were rationalizedon the grounds of increased combat power.23
In Prussia in the 1770s, the regimentsof the armybegan to set up theirown
schools to educate soldiers and theirdependents. The main impetus was to
improve their economic lot, not their militaryutility,but the movement
representeda shiftin attitudetoward the soldier.24
Similarlythere was considerable debate about the utilityof skirmishers-
dispersed infantryfightingindependentlyof the long, tightly-controlledlines
thentypicalof European armytactics.The purpose ofthe line was to generate
volume of fire,not accuracy; commanders aimed the whole line by maneu-
vering it into range of the enemy (50-100 meters) at well-chosen points.
Skirmishers,in contrast,were meant to fightas individuals and to pick their
own targets. The debate was well underway at mid-century,although his-
toriansdo not quite agree on its causes. The main inspirationseems to have
been the extensive use, in the Hapsburg armies, of irregulartroops raised
and recruitedfromthe disputed lands borderingthe Ottomanempire.25There
soldiers seem to have been bred ratherthan trained,and they spent much
of theireverydaylifein a war of small-unitactions and raids. When attached
22. PeterParet,Clausewitzand theState:TheMan, His Theories, and His Times(Princeton:Princeton

UniversityPress, 1985), pp. 60-62. Scharnhorstwas born in Hanover, served firstin thatarmy
of that state, and as was the custom of the time, was recruitedby Prussia in 1801 on the basis
of his established reputationas a soldier.
23. Peter Paret, Yorckand theEra ofPrussianReform, 1807-1815 (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1966), pp. 18-19. By the 1790s thereis some evidence that the treatmentof the common
soldier was beginningto improve; see ibid., p. 107.
24. Paret, Clausewitz,pp. 46-51. Clausewitz spent his early years in a regimentknown forits
interestin education.
25. The flintlockmusket with socket bayonet made the lone infantrymena potent weapon.
Arguably this weapon was not trulyperfecteduntil the mid-1700s,and most soldiers were
trainedforrapidityof fireratherthan accuracy. If trainedin aimed fire,a soldier could hit and
kill individuals at ranges up to 80 yards, and clusters of individuals at 160 yards, while with
the bayonet he could still defend himselfin the clinches. With traininghe could firethree or
fourrounds a minute. It was now possible, where terrainpermitted,to disperse infantrymen
to fightalone, and in the rightterrain,unseen. Compressed groups of men, the tacticalcom-
binationsof the precedingcentury,were vulnerableto these skirmishers,and to artillery.If they
failed to disperse, they too would be vulnerable.

International
Security18:2 | 92
to regularunits forwar in CentralEurope, theyproved useful forreconnais-

sance, flank security,and combat in close terrain.As similar units were
organized in the Prussian and French armies, they were trained foraimed
fire,and oftenarmed with the rifle,ratherthan the cheaper, less accurate,
but faster-loadingsmoothboremusket.26Such troopswere slightlyexpanded
in the Prussian Armypriorto the FrenchRevolution;expanded yet again in
the last decade of the century;and yet again afterthe defeats of 1806. Light
infantrymade up 5 percent of the army in 1786, 14 percentin 1800, and 31
percentby 1812.27
While the reformsattemptedbefore the French Revolution were meager,
they suggest that an importantmilitaryproblem had emerged even before
the revolutionfacilitatedthe implementationof solutions.
As the early successes of the Frenchrevolutionaryarmies were studied in
Prussia after1795, theirwidespread employmentof skirmishers-tirailleurs-
became the central issue. Moreover, the connection between these tactics
and the nature of the soldier was clearlyunderstood. Peter Paret deserves
quotation in full:
To a remarkable,possibly unique, degree all problems concentratedin this
issue. If skirmishingwas to be more generallyemployed, the soldier's edu-
cation, discipline, and drill-all of which bore directlyon his abilityto fight
in open order-would need to be changed. Nor could the old methods of
recruitment,exemption, and reliance on mercenariesbe retained; a more
reptesentativecross-sectionof the population in the ranks would turn the
army into a more national body; the relationshipbetween officerand man,
soldier and citizen,and between soldier and sovereignwould be modified.28
The FrenchRevolutiongave Europe its firstmodern mass army.This mass
army depended on nationalism for its combat power. Those who subse-
quentlyimitatedthe mass armywere also forcedto imitateits nationalism.
THE BIRTH OF THE MASS ARMY

From 1792 to 1815, France was at war with much of Europe. Historiansagree
that the French Revolution marked a transformation in the conduct of war.
The most importantfactorwas the involvementof the French people. The
armies became mainlyFrench; they grew in size; and theirabilityto replace
26. Paret, Yorck,pp. 23-25; 28-30; 40-42. The cited pages only provide the outlines of these
developments. Light forcesand skirmishingare one of the main themes of the book.
27. Ibid., p. 269.
28. Ibid., p. 76.

casualties throughlevies on the population at largemade itpossible to engage

in frequentbattles of greatviolence. The population took an interestin these
wars, providing much directmaterialsupport in the early years of the rev-
olution. Their commitmentalso undoubtedly enhanced the morale of the
troops. Lengthymovements at greaterspeed became possible. The baggage
trains could be slimmed substantially,since troops could be permittedto
foragewithout too great a risk of the desertions that plagued the armies of
the ancienregime.The democraticideals of the army,and the departure of
much of the aristocraticofficercorps, reduced a good deal of the "life-style"
baggage that had formerlyslowed movementsin the field.29
Tactically,the Frencharmies foughtwith a mix of line, column, and skirm-
ishers. Conventional militaryhistoriesof the revolutionview deploymentof
skirmishersas the principal mode of combat in the Revolutionaryarmies
(probablynot true), and as a natural adaptation by politicallymotivatedbut
poorlytrainedmilitarynovices (probablytrue). The widespread employment
of skirmishersin "open order" seems to have spread fairlyquicklyafterthe
revolution,and persisted to some degree in most European armies.30It was
hard to fightthe French withoutadopting theirmethods.
Reformsinitiated before but not completed by the revolution were ex-
tended. These depended not on politicalrevolutionbut on the departureof
many aristocraticofficers,and their replacementwith ambitious non-com-
missioned officers(NCOs) and volunteerswould have changed the organi-
zational balance between traditionalistsand innovatorsin favorof the latter.
The stressof constantcombat no doubt eased the way forreformsby testing
and proving their utility.French artillerywas vastly improved in terms of
mobilityand range. The "division," now a relativelystandardarmyformation
mixingartillery, infantry,and cavalryto permiteffectiveindependentcombat
operations, became a regular organizational form. It improved the overall
mobilityof the armyby permittingmovementalong separate parallel routes,
29. For briefaccounts see McNeill, PursuitofPower,pp. 185-206; and Hew Strachan,European
Armiesand theConductofWar (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 36-42.
30. The open order persisted, at least in the French Army.See Ardant Du Picq, BattleStudies,
Ancientand ModernBattle,trans. Colonel John N. Greely and Major Robert C. Cotton (New
York: Macmillan, 1921), p. 238. Writingon the eve of the Franco-PrussianWar, he observed,
"Since these wars, our armies have always fought as skirmishers."He also reports that the
Prussians foughtlargelyas skirmishersin 1866. Paret, Yorck,p. 37, "The decisive innovationin
infantryfightingthat was to occur at the end of the eighteenth century consisted in the
acceptance of open-ordertacticsby the line infantry."

International
Security18:2 | 94
with a considerable diminutionof the risk of defeat in detail. At the same

time, divisions could be quicklyrecombinedinto largerforces.
While it is commonplace to attributethe size and energy of the French
revolutionaryarmies to the political revolutionitself,a closer look at these
armies reveals that there was a sustained politicalcampaign to educate and
motivatethe armies aftertheywere formed,and to forgepowerfulemotional
bonds between the armyand the civilianpopulation.31The high-watermark
of these efforts,and theirsuccess, seems to have occurredby roughly1794.32
The identificationof the army with the nation was facilitatedfirstby the
greaterrepresentativenessachieved in the patternof recruitment.33 The com-
binationof the firstwaves of volunteersand the firstconscriptsproduced an
armythatwas by 1794 representativeof the societyas a whole. This, coupled
with a host of othermeasures, encouraged those withinthe armyto believe
that the whole countrywas behind them. Similarly,recruitmentfrommany
parts of the countryput large numbers of previously sedentarypeople on
the roads of France. They learned that there was a France, and those who
witnessed their passing understood that a great collective experience was
underway.34The frequentsinging of patrioticsongs, many of which were
commissioned for the purpose, helped reinforcethese feelings on a daily
basis.35
Politicalpropaganda was disseminated in the armycamps in the formsof
pamphlets and journals, much of it regularlyread aloud. Cowardice was
punished and heroismrewardedin public ceremonies.Civic festivalsbrought
togethersoldiers and civilians to celebrate the ideals of the revolution.36In
contrastto the old regime,and to the practicein the rest of Europe, soldiers
31. On these issues, see the very fine work of Jean-Paul Bertaud, The Armyof the French
Revolution:FromCitizenSoldiersto Instrument ofPower,trans. R.R. Palmer (Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress, 1988); and JohnA. Lynn, The BayonetsoftheRepublic:Motivationand Tacticsin
theArmyofRevolutionary France,1791-94 (Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press, 1984).
32. Peter Paret seems to agree. "Ratherthan reflectingattitudesalready widely held in 1793 or
1814-loyalty to a cause, hatred of the foreigner,patriotism-conscriptionhelped create and
diffusethese attitudes." Paret, UnderstandingWar(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1992),
p. 73.
33. Bertaud, TheArmyoftheFrenchRevolution,p. 132.
34. Ibid., pp. 73, 127.
35. A single sentence cannot do justice to the importanceof song. See Bertaud, TheArmyofthe
FrenchRevolution, pp. 137-141; Lynn, BayonetsoftheRepublic,pp. 141-150. Tens if not hundreds
of thousands of song books were distributedto the army in 1793 and 1794. The government
subsidized patriotic-songwriters.Even the act of singingtogetherhelped build a certaincollec-
tive consciousness. Patriotfestivals,marches, and even battleswere occasions forsinging. No
one who has seen filmsof Nazi rallies fromthe 1930s can doubt theirimpact.
36. Bertaud, TheArmyoftheFrenchRevolution,pp. 205-210.

Nationalism,theMass Army,and MilitaryPower 95 J
were portrayed as honored members of society.37Class-based barriers to

promotionwere largely eliminated. Withinthe constraintsof militarydisci-
pline, the social distance between officersand enlisted men was reduced.
A minortheme of the period was an increased emphasis on literacywithin
the army as a criterionforpromotion.38In early 1794 an abilityto read and
writewas made compulsoryforcommissioned and non-commissionedoffi-
cers alike.39NCOs were required periodicallyto read The RightsofMan and
the militarylaws aloud to their squads.40 Startingin September 1792, the
National Conventionbegan to publish a dailyjournal especiallyforthe army.
These appear to have been read aloud regularlyto squads of the Armee du
Nord, one of the largestin the field.41Four hundred thousand copies of the
draftconstitutionofJune24, 1793,were distributedto the armies. The armies
occasionally distributedprintedpropaganda in enemy territory as well.
In his remarkablestudy of the Armee du Nord, JohnLynn concludes that
these effortswere highlysuccessful.Not only did theycontributeto the well-
known elan of these French troops, but theyencouraged a "rise in self-and
group-imposed standards of performanceand sacrifice."These standards
facilitatedthe rapid trainingof these Frenchtroops,which he concludes was
criticalto theirdeveloping combat power. "Withoutstrongnormativecom-
pliance, large-scale reliance on open-ordercombat would have been out of
the question."42
PRUSSIAN MILITARY REFORMS

Many foreignmilitaryobserversunderstood the connectionbetween French
tacticalinnovations,particularlythe widespread employmentof skirmishers,
37. Lynn, BayonetsoftheRepublic,pp. 177-182.

38. As early as 1787 the army had opened schools to teach non-commissionedofficershow to
read and write.Armiesincreasinglyemployed trainingmanuals, personnel records,and written
orders, and were doing so with a frequencythat required literatecorporals and sergeants.
McNeill, PursuitofPower,p. 187. This of course had the effectof making revolutionarypropa-
ganda accessible to the army.
39. Bertaud, The Armyof theFrenchRevolution,pp. 174, 189. At that time nearly 85 percent of
the NCOs could read and write; more than half also knew some arithmetic.Given that the
Armyascribed to promotionon the grounds of merit,it seems likelythat the militaryliteracy
programsbegun in 1787 survived into the revolution.France had quite a high literacyrate at
the time of the Revolution. Simon Schama, Citizens(New York: AlfredKnopf, 1989), p. 180-
181.
40. Bertaud, TheArmyoftheFrenchRevolution, p. 199.
41. Lynn, BayonetsoftheRepublic,pp. 122, 136. It is Lynn's judgment thatthe primarypurpose
of this political propaganda was to instillobedience to legitimatepolitical authorities;combat
motivationwas of secondary importance.
42. Ibid., p. 283.

International
Security18:2 96 J
and the politicalsystemthatproduced them.43The laterPrussian reformers,

especially Scharnhorst,were quick to point out the impact of the French
although others challenged theirviews.44Field Marshal von dem
tirailleurs,
Knesebeck, a later opponent of Scharnhorst,neverthelessunderstood the
French quite well: "It is here that the education of the individual is of such
great benefitto the Republicans, because situationstoo oftenoccur during
the combat of light forces in which the officer'scontrolceases completely
... in which each man acts on his own."45The Prussians worriedabout the
large number of men the Frenchcould throwinto the field,and some began
to advocate expanded reliance on a militiato beef up theirown forces.46
The catastrophicdefeats of Prussia at Jenaand Auerstedtin 1806, and the
humiliatingpeace termsimposed by Napoleon, gave new impetus to those
who advocated militaryreformin Prussia.47Under the pressure of defeat,
King FrederickWilliam was open not only to militaryreformproposals, but
to reformsof all kinds.48While Scharnhorst,as chair of the MilitaryReor-
ganization Commission, spearheaded the militaryreformers,Heinrich von
Stein guided the effortto reformthe politicaladministrationof the country.
Both civilians and soldiers were workingfromideas developed priorto the
defeat, but defeat was a major impetus to theirefforts.49 And for soldiers,
such as Scharnhorst's collaboratorAugust von Gneisenau, these political
reformshad the purpose of releasing militaryenergy.50
43. Paret treatsthis debate extensivelyin Yorck,Chapter III, "The Last Years of the Old Mon-
archy,"pp. 47-110. As early as 1796 Scharnhorstdeclared that, "we shall be victoriouswhen
one learns to appeal, like the Jacobins, to the spirit of the people"; quoted in Gunther E.
Rothenberg,TheArtofWarfarein theAge ofNapoleon(London: Batsford,1977), p. 190.
44. Paret, Yorck,p. 77; Paret, Clausewitz,pp. 32-33.
45. Paret, Yorck,pp. 78-79.
46. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
47. William 0. Shanahan, PrussianMilitaryReforms 1786-1813 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1945), is stillwidely cited, but should be read in conjunctionwith Paret, Yorck.
48. Liah Greenfeldargues that German "national consciousness" barely existed prior to 1806,
but was a "formidablepresence" by 1815; Greenfeld,Nationalism, p. 277. Elsewhere (p. 372) she
comments that, "France gave Germany the Enemy, against whom all strata of the disunited
German societycould unite.... Hatred of France inspired the uncertainpatriotismwithinthe
German breasts. . . . Without the decade of collectiveeffervescenceand common effort,the
vital enthusiasm which was sustained by the persistenceof the French menace, German na-
tionalism would not have survived its birth." Her definitionof nationalism is more complex
than my own, but thereis sufficientcommonalityto make her observationrelevant.
49. On the politicalreformsand the impetus given to themby the defeat see Hans Rosenberg,
Bureaucracy, Aristocracy,and Autocracy:ThePrussianExperience, 1660-1815 (Boston: Beacon, 1958),
pp. 202-205.
50. GerhardRitter,ThePrussianTradition, 1740-1890:Vol. I, TheSwordand theScepter,TheProblem
ofMilitarismin Germany,trans. Heinz Norden (Coral Gables, Florida: Universityof Miami Press,

Although Frederickthe Great had considered the possible improvements

in his militarypower that public education could provide, and had issued a
set of General School Regulations in 1763, his fears of the socially destabil-
izing potential of education diluted his support of his own rules.51His suc-
cessors were similarlyimmobilized. Littleprogresswas made in developing
public education untilafterthe defeatat Jena.Effortsto improvethe Prussian
school systemfocused largelyon the problem of trainingteachersin a com-
mon pedagogical method, which itselfhad to be arrivedat throughdebate
and experimentation.Officialsappointed to improve existingschools seem
to have agreed that their primarypurpose was "to educate to nationhood
'the entireundifferentiatedmass'."52The Prussian militaryreformersshowed
a keen interestin the debate on public education. They considered adapting
the then-popularPestalozzi pedagogical methods to the trainingof recruits.
A Prussian educational officialdelivered a lectureto seventyofficerson the
"Influenceof the Volksschule [primaryschool] on MilitaryPreparedness."53In
1812 a prominenteducational officialadvised thatelementaryschools should
teach "the historyof the Germans, not merely . . . that of the Prussians."54
In spite of the progress made in the education of teachersand the develop-
mentof curriculum,the povertyborn of war probablycaused the numberof
elementaryschools and pupils to diminish.55The end of the war with Na-
poleon freedresources to expand and improve the educational system,but
was ultimatelyto produce very conservativepolicies regardingthe structure
and the curriculum.
Prussian militaryreformsinitiallyfocused on how betterto organize the
small (42,000 men) army permittedunder the Convention of Paris. Officers
most clearlyassociated with the defeatwere purged. The ranks of the officer
corps were formallyopened to the middle class, although aristocratscontin-
ued to dominate. Corporal punishment was abolished, as was the recruit-
ment of foreigners.A host of administrativereformscentralizedand ration-
alized militaryadministration,purgingthe last elementsof "freeenterprise"
1969), pp. 70-74. See also Paret, Claiusewitz,pp. 137-146. Clausewitz was another member of
the reformcircle,and in a letterto Fichtein 1809noted the connectionof"politicalarrangements"
and "education" to the "warlike spirit";ibid., p. 177.
51. Karl A. Schleunes, Schoolingand Society:ThePoliticsofEducationin Prussiaand Bavaria,1750-
1900 (Oxford,U.K.: Berg, 1989), pp. 14-16, 45-49.
52. Ibid., p. 74, quoted a reportfrom1809.
53. Ibid., pp. 68-69, 75.
54. Ibid., p. 78, quoted a reportfrom1812.
55. Ibid., p. 79.

International
Security18:2 98 J
fromthe army.The systemof officereducation was improvedand extended,

and greaterscope forpromotionby abilityratherthansenioritywas provided.
A War Academy forsenior officerswas established in Berlinin 1810.56
The Frenchdivisional systemwas imitatedand formalized,albeitin smaller
brigade-sizedunits. A small numberof reservistswere trainedin the regular
army and sent back to civilian society to give the army some personnel
reserves to replace attritionif and when warfareresumed. A much higher
proportionof the infantrywas trainedto fightas skirmishers.57
But the reformof greatestlong-termimportforthe peace of Europe was
the introductionof a universal militaryobligation. Actual conscriptionwas
adopted only with great reluctance, and Prussia conscripted only a small
percentageof its young men afterthe defeatof Napoleon. Nevertheless,the
reformsafterJena,and the factthat mobilized Prussian citizen-soldiershad
participatedin the finaldefeatof France, createdboth the militaryinfrastruc-
ture and the legitimatingexperience that set the stage for the victoriesof
1866 and 1870.
As early as 1808 the MilitaryReorganizationCommission had proposed
broadening the methods of recruitmentto the Army,including combining
conscriptsand volunteersin the regulararmy,and the formationofvolunteer
militia.Even thisproposal, which fellwell shortof genuine universalmilitary
obligation,was opposed by the king and a broad spectrumof aristocratsand
the middle class. Undeterred,the ReorganizationCommission in 1810 rec-
ommended universal conscriptionwith no exemptions. Both domestic op-
position, and the limitationson army size imposed by Napoleon, rendered
the issue moot until the emperor's defeat in Russia created an opening for
Prussian revolt.
In 1813, universal conscriptionwas implemented. Volunteer units were
organized forthe wealthy and educated, who were obliged to provide their
own equipment. The Landwehr,a local militiaorganizationthat enrolled all
able-bodied males, was formed,and the Landsturm, a regionaldefense militia
forall other males, was also organized. The lattersaw littleaction, but the
regulars,the volunteers,and the Landwehr all saw actionagainst the French.58
56. Paret, Yorck,pp. 170-171.

57. For shortsummaries see Rothenberg,TheArtofWarfare in theAge ofNapoleon,pp. 190-194;
Delbriick,HistoryoftheArtofWar,Vol. IV: TheModernEra,pp. 449-455. For a lengthiertreatment
see Paret, Yorck,pp. 11-153.
58. Paret, Yorck,pp. 133-138. Paret reportsthatduringthe 1700s the Prussian armyhad drawn
its recruitsfromforeigners,and fromdraftdistrictsor militarycantons withinthe country.But

The Armygrew from60,000 in December 1812 to 130,000threemonthslater,

and to 270,000 by the fall.59These measures were not met with universal
acclaim, and popular supportforthe risingagainst the Frenchdoes not seem
to have equalled the level of public support achieved by the Frenchin 1793-
94.60 Nevertheless,thereis reason to believe thatthe combinationof technical
reforms,broader recruitment,and the fact of political rebellion against ex-
ternaldomination provided the Prussian Army of 1813-15 with motivation
and combat power that was vastlyincreased over its predecessor of 1806.61
SUMMARY OF THE REFORM PERIOD

The securityrelationshipbetween France and Prussia fromthe mid-seven-
teenthto the earlyeighteenthcenturyillustrateseveryaspect of the argument
developed at the outset of this essay. Militaryprofessionalsfaced witha host
of battlefieldconstraints,many of them technologicalin nature, theorize
about ways to solve theirproblems. The development of greateremotional
commitmentto the state is widely perceived to be essential to a solution.
This is particularlyclear in the identificationof success at open-ordertactics
withpoliticalcommitment.Education becomes interestingboth in the narrow
technical sense of the facilitationof militaryadministration,and in the
broader sense of creatingpoliticalawareness and commitment.Innovations
that produce vast increases in the combat power of the French Army,both
of a narrow tacticalnature and of a more diffusepoliticalnature,are closely
studied by Prussian professionals.Imitationis recommended,and to a con-
siderable extentachieved, includingpoliticalreforms.The extentof imitation
is of course limitedby internalpoliticalresistancein Prussia, and the degree
of necessity;neverthelessit happens. This period of war, crisis,and political
change is followed by a period of "reaction"afterNapoleon's defeat. Many
of the militarychanges discussed above are suppressed to a considerable
degree. Much survives, however, and a second cycle of mass mobilization
and militaryinnovationbegins in the last thirdof the nineteenthcentury.
there was a strongbias in local recruitmentthat put the burden largelyon the poorest of the
ruralpopulation. Moreover, the percentageof foreignersvaried during the 1700s; Frederickthe
Great stronglyfavored reliance on them, proposing a ratio of 2 foreignersto every native. For
a lengthiertreatmentof this hybridsystem,see Delbruck, HistoryoftheArtofWar,Vol. IV: The
ModernEra, pp. 247-252.
59. Paret, Clausewitz,pp. 234-237., See also Rothenberg,ArtofWarfare, pp. 194-196.
60. Paret, Clausewitz,p. 236; Paret, Yorck,p. 218.
61. I believe thisto be a fairsummaryofParet's judgment,in spite ofhis cautionaryobservations
noted above. See forexample Paret, Yorck,p. 219.

International
Security18:2 | 100
Reaction,1815-1870
AfterNapoleon's defeat, the statesmenof Europe triedto restorethe status

quo both domesticallyand internationally. Since domesticpoliticalrevolution
in France was closely linked to more than two decades of Frenchexpansion-
ism, the restorationof monarchicalpower in France was seen as a key to
peace. Similarly,political reformsthat had been made in the societies that
opposed the Frenchforthe instrumentalpurpose of beating them were to a
great extentreversed. With the lessons of two decades of painful war still
fresh,Europe's statesmen strove formoderationin theirexternalrelations.
The need for highly motivated mass armies was removed; and monarchs
were happy to see an ebbing of the domestic politicalenergies thatwar had
released.
Nevertheless, in Prussia and in France several militaryinnovations asso-
ciated with the Revolutionaryand Napoleonic wars were preserved. In both
countries, the principle of homogeneous national armies, without foreign
units or foreignprivatesoldiers, was retained.62Both also retainedthe form,
although not quite the fact,of a general militaryobligationof the citizenry
to the state.
In France the Bourbons abolished conscriptionin 1814, but found it nec-
essary to implement a highly unfair system of "selective service" in 1818.
Eatchyear roughly20,000-30,000men were chosen by lotteryfromthe 300,000
eligible for a seven-year term of service.63Those drawing "bad" numbers
could hire a substitute,or after1855 simplypay a fee to the state, so military
service was actually the obligation of the poor. Troops oftenre-enlistedin
the armyaftertheirfirstlengthytermof service;now unsuited forthe civilian
world, they sold their services as substitutesto those rich enough to pay.
More than halfof the officercorps in thisperiod was drawn fromthe ranks./4
The 1818 Law continued the revolutionarytraditionof conditioningpromo-
62. Unlike the earlyRevolutionaryarmies, Napoleon did relyin his latercampaigns on foreign
units to a considerable degree, and recruitsfromborder areas often had a differentmother
tongue.
63. This discussion relies on Richard Challener, The FrenchTheoryof theNationin Arms,1866-
1939 (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1955), pp. 10-28; and David B. Ralston, TheArmy
oftheRepublic:The Place of theMilitaryin thePoliticalEvolutionofFrance,1871-1914 (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 9-25.
64. Richard Holmes, The Road to Sedan: The FrenchArmy1866-70 (London: Royal Historical
Society,1984), pp. 90-100.

tion to officerrank (non-commissionedand commissioned) on literacy.65 A

study of incoming conscriptsin the late 1820s revealed that only about half
could read, which helped prompt national reformsin primaryeducation in
1833.66Regimentalschools were also institutedto teach the necessaryskills.67
To the extentthat regimentaleducational materialscommunicatedany mes-
sage, it seems to have stressed martialvirtuesand heroic episodes of French
militaryhistory,but not explicit nationalism.68The army was keenly con-
cerned with fitness,tactical training,and marksmanship.69An interestin
athletics,especially gymnasticsand fencing,developed in the regiments.
In sum, although the FrenchArmywas much less representativeof society
as a whole than it had been during Napoleon's reign-no longer the revo-
lutionary"Nation in Arms"-it was more representativeand homogeneous
than it had been priorto the Revolution.
Frenchofficersdeveloped a strongbeliefthatlong serviceproduced l'esprit
militaire,a powerful sense of discipline and militaryidentity,which were
presumed to contributeto superior battlefieldperformance.70 The precise
source of this belief, which persisted well into the twentiethcentury,is
unclear. I speculate that it was in part a returnto pre-revolutionaryprofes-
sional militaryattitudes.It is likelythat many early nineteenth-century offi-
cers were veteranswho had bittermemoriesof theirexperienceswithhastily
raised, ill-trainedtroops duringthe last years of Napoleon's rule.71Constant
warfareagainst greatcoalitionsdecimated the experiencedcadre of the army,
65. Ibid., pp. 189-192, notes that the quality of the education received in these schools was
questioned even then.
66. Paddy Griffith, MilitaryThoughtin theFrenchArmy,1815-51 (Manchester,U.K.: Manchester
UniversityPress, 1989), p. 103.
67. Eugen Weber,PeasantsIntoFrenchmen (Stanford,Calif.: StanfordUniversityPress, 1976), p.
298. The Armyalso taughtFrenchto the many provincialFrenchrecruits,such as Bretons,who
still spoke theirown native language; ibid., p. 299. The state's general interestin literacywas
growing. The 1833 law required every commune to organize at least one elementaryschool,
and that the school be certifiedby the state. Every departmentwas obliged to organize or help
organize a "normal" (secondary) school forthe trainingof teachers.Compliance was not always
enthusiastic,but in at least one coastal province local political leaders stronglysupported the
school because local young men tended to serve in the armyand the navy where literacywas
necessary for advancement. Ibid., pp. 307-308, 327. For a lengthy discussion of regimental
education, see Griffith,MilitaryThought,pp. 101-113.
68. Griffith,MilitaryThought,p. 105.
69. Ibid., pp. 114-130.
70. Holmes, TheRoad to Sedan,pp. 90-91.
71. See Griffith,MilitaryThought;pp. 8-9.

International
Security18:2 1102
and populated the ranks with inexperienced,teen-aged recruits.72Combat

effectivenessdeterioriated.73
From 1815-60 the organization of the Prussian Army,including the re-
cruitment,training,and organizationofthe rankand file,and the recruitment
and education of the officercorps, was a centralmatterof domestic political
dispute. The king and the Junkeraristocracymistrustedthe Landwehrand
aimed to destroyits autonomy; they hoped to preserve and expand aristo-
craticdominance of the officercorps. The purpose was to secure the army
as a defense of monarchicalpower against the growingpoliticalpower of the
middle and working classes. At the same time, however, considerationsof
securitywere also accommodated. By 1866 Prussia had achieved a compe-
tentlycommanded, highly motivated mass army, which was at the same
time politicallyreliable.
Concern about the politicalreliabilityof the Armyduring this period had
its counterpartin the question of primaryschool curriculum.From the end
of the Napoleonic Wars Prussia developed an increasinglyeffectivesystem
of compulsory education for males.74The proportionof children enrolled
reportedlyincreased to nearly 80 percent by 1837. The organizationof the
schools was calculated to divide people into distinctsocial classes and to
restrictupward mobility.Reading, writing,arithmetic,religion,and singing
were the main primaryschool subjects. The purpose of the lattertwo was
apparently to instill "discipline, order, and obedience to authority."75
The
impetus was primarilyto instillloyaltyto the monarchy,not national iden-
tity.76ExplicitGerman nationalismplayed a minorrole, if any, in the curric-
ulum prior to the victoriesof 1866 and 1870.7 The factthat statisticswere
72. David G. Chandler, The Campaignsof Napoleon(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967),
pp. 333-334.
73. Presumed political reliabilitywas also an attractionof long-servicetroops, both in France
and in Prussia.
74. Gordon A. Craig, Germany1866-1945 (New York: OxfordUniversityPress, 1978), pp. 186-
187.
75. Craig, Germany,pp. 188-189. The School Regulations of 1854 placed religionat the center
of the curriculumforprimaryschool, where it apparentlyinfluencedthe teaching of reading,
writing,a'nd arithmetic.Verylittletimewas given over to historyor science. Schleunes, Schooling
and Society,p. 153.
76. Craig, Germany,pp. 157-158. Religious instructionwas apparentlyincreased forthe same
reason in 1879.
77. Schleunes, Schoolingand Society,pp. 97-98, 109. Teachers themselves, however, became
somewhat politicizedand were blamed forthe revolutionof 1848. One suspects thatin spite of
the formalcurriculum,teachers must have found it difficultto avoid including some political
contentin theirteaching. Ibid., pp. 129-130.

collected on the literacy of recruits suggests that the original reform-era

militaryinterestin education was sustained.78In 1844 it was suggested that
retiredArmy NCOs be recruitedas primaryschool teachers to remedy a
chronicshortage.7
There was littlechange in Prussian militaryinstitutionsfrom1815 to 1860.
The standing army was kept small, roughly200,000, largelyforbudgetary
reasons. Conscripts served three years with the colors and two with the
reserve,then joined the Landwehr.80 Those not called up joined the Landwehr
directly.Landwehrofficerswere chosen from the local elite, and included
many members of the middle class.81
In two major mobilizations to provide militarymuscle for international
crises in 1831 and 1859, Landwehrtroops made a poor showing. In combat
against the Poles in 1831, and against the Danes in 1848, the Armyon the
whole did not performwell. In civil disturbancesassociated with the brief
liberal revolution of 1848, both Landwehrand regular infantrytroops had
proven weak supports of the crown.82Napoleon III's victoryin Italyin 1859,
and the incompetence of the concomitantPrussian mobilization,provided
the finalimpetus forfurtherreform.83
The purpose of the reformswas to expand the regulararmyand establish
its completedominance of the Landwehr.The ArmyBillof 1860was ultimately
to double the size of the standing army,and preserve the three-yearterm.84
Conscriptswould then serve fouryears withthe reserves,and only afterthat
pass into the Landwehr.The regulararmywas to become the only source of
Landwehrrecruits;the Landwehrwould fall entirelyunder its administration.
The army could now draw upon seven annual classes of trained men at
mobilization.The Prussians were thus able to field 355,000 soldiers against
the Austrians, and, with the allies of the North German Confederation,a
millionin 1870.85
78. Schleunes, ibid., p. 109, notes that by 1841 only one Prussian recruitin ten had never
attended school. 40 percentof the recruitsfromthe annexed Polish provinceof Posen had never
attended school. Ibid., p. 100.
79. Ibid., pp. 112, 122-123.
80. In practice,conscriptsapparentlyserved only two years with the colors. Michael Howard,
TheFranco-Prussian War (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 20.
81. Ibid., pp. 8-12.
82. AlfredVagts, A HistoryofMilitarism,Civilianand Military,rev. ed. (New York: Free Press,
1959), p. 191.
83. Howard, TheFranco-Prussian War,p. 20.
84. Vagts, A HistoryofMilitarism,pp. 192-193.
85. Howard, The Franco-Prussian War,p. 22; Gordon Craig, The BattleofKoniggratz(New York:

International
Security18:2 | 104
This commitmentto the development of a rapidly mobilizable, well-

trained, professionally-officered mass army was seen to depend in some
measure on widespread basic literacyamong the common soldiers.86Much
progresshad been made in Prussia, more than in any othercountry;by 1850
the adult literacyrate was reportedly80 percent.87And the Prussian officer
corps, even prior to 1806, considered itselfto have a special "educational
mission."88In Gerhard Ritter'swords, "If the Landwehrof 1814 had meant a
partial civilianizationof the army,the royal mass army of 1860 already dis-
played a marked inclinationtoward militarizationof the whole nation."89
In one of the formativedomestic crises of modern Germany,the Prussian
parliamentdeclined to fund the reformsproposed in 1860. But the govern-
mentimplementedthemin any case over the nexteightyears,and ultimately
extended them to the North German Confederation.90
Officerquality also improved. Warfarewas perceived to be increasingin
complexityas the products of the industrialrevolution,particularlythe rail-
road and telegraph,began to find militaryemployment.Education was ex-
pected to have a greaterimpact on combatperformance.Futureofficerswere
obliged to studyin highermilitaryschools or to have a universityeducation.
Candidates forthe initialofficerentranceexaminationwere requiredto dem-
onstratecompetence in grammarand spelling,apparentlya problemarea for
some of the Junkerapplicants. On the whole, officerquality did improve.91
The General Staffunder Helmuth von Moltke's leadership skimmedoffthe
iritellectualcream of the German War Academy and subjected it to additional
exacting trainingin the problems of wartime command of the very large
forcesthat would now become available.92
The victoryof the Prussians over the Austriansin 1866impressedobservers
all over Europe, particularlyNapoleon III, Emperorof the French. The fully
Lippincott,1964), p. 17. It is likelythatthisfigure,which is close to thatused by most historians,

refersto the field army; more troops were probably available in garrison,in fortresses,and
along lines of communication.
86. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the GreatPowers(New York: Random House, 1987), p.
184.
87. Schleunes, Schoolingand Society,p. 109.
88. Vagts, A HistoryofMilitarism,p. 172. "Far frombeing alienated fromthe people, this army
was to be a great national school in which the officerwould be an educator in the grand style,
a shaper of the people's mind"; Ritter,Swordand Scepter,p. 118.
89. Ritter,Swordand Scepter,p. 119.
90. Howard, TheFranco-Prussian War,pp. 18-22.
91. Vagts, A HistoryofMilitarism,pp. 194-195.
92. Howard, TheFranco-Prussian War,pp. 24-25.

Nationalism,theMass Army,and MilitaryPower1105
mobilized Prussian Army was expected to outnumberthe Frenchby 2 to 1

as of 1866, without even counting Prussia's allies.93Napoleon III could see
the meritsof short-serviceconscriptionbacked by a large reserve organiza-
tion. The Frenchmilitaryattachein Berlinpointed out thatthe Prussians had
perfectedthe "nation in arms" that the Frenchhad invented,and enhanced
its effectivenesswith the addition of universal primaryeducation.94Indeed,
Frencheducators were beginningto articulatea keen sense of inferiority vis-
a-visPrussia.95But the French officercorps forthe most part remained wed-
ded to its preferencefor long-service troops, and the French legislature,
which had gained considerablepower by thistime,was unwillingto support
trulylarge scale conscription.In January1868 a compromisebill was passed.
Active army service was reduced to fiveyears, but it was to be followed by
a four-yearreserve obligation. More conscriptswere to be called up each
year, but a substantialnumber would serve only five months in the active
forces,the remainderof theirnine-yearobligationin the reserves or in the
anemic French counterpart to the old Prussian Landwehr,in the Garde
Nationale.96 Ultimately,these changes were expected to produce a mobilizable
forceof 800,000 men or more.
Otherreformeffortsincluded Napoleon's futileattemptto induce theArmy
to imitatethe Prussian General Staff;modest progress in the development
of an efficientrailroadmobilizationplan; and the re-equipmentof the French
Armywith the Chassepot breech-loadingrifle,then the finestin the world.97
Several lessons emerge fromthis relativelyquiet period in European poli-
tics. First,reactionaryelites clearlyunderstood the relationshipbetween an
expanded militaryand expanded politicalparticipation.Opposed to the sec-
ond, theysuppressed the first.Second, the militaryadvantages of a relatively
homogeneous national armywere not forgotten,and the basic notion of the
state's legitimaterightto conscriptcitizens for the militarywas preserved.
As quiet as European internationalpoliticswere during these years, such a
useful securityasset was not thrownaway, even given domestic incentives
to do so. Third, as Prussian ambitionsbegan to grow at mid-century,and
again in the face of considerable aristocraticresistance,the state adopted a
93. Holmes, TheRoad to Sedan, p. 92.

94. Allan Mitchell,Victorsand Vanquished:TheGermanInfluence on Armyand Churchin Franceafter
1870 (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press, 1984), p. 4.
95. Mitchell,Victors,pp. 143-148.
96. Howard, The Franco-Prussian War,pp. 29-34.
97. Ibid., pp. 35-38.

International
Security18:2 | 106
professionallycontrolledmass army.Conservativesbegan to believe thatthe

armyitselfmightprove a useful tool to socialize young men to theirpolitical
image of Prussia. Fourth, although they feared its social consequences, the
Prussian governmentexpanded and improved compulsoryeducation faster
than any othercountryin Europe. Fifth,the Frenchperceived themselvesto
be the most affectedby Prussian reforms,and moved ratherquickly after
1866 to develop a response in kind, albeit somewhat paler.
Finally,an observation on militarytechnologyis in order. Improvements
in firepowerwere seen to necessitate even more battlefielddispersion than
had evolved in the Napoleonic wars, and even more dependence on the
individual commitmentof the soldier.98The deploymentof the muzzle-load-
ing percussion militaryrifle,the later widespread adoption of the breech-
loader after1866, and analogous improvementsin artilleryposed new tactical
problems forEuropean soldiers. Increased range and rate of firemeant that
when fightingoccurred,soldiers tended to disperse automatically,regardless
of the intentionsof theirofficers.To preserve some semblance of battlefield
order,officersin France and Prussia placed a greaterweight on trainingand
length of service as a source of combat motivationthan on the political
commitmentof the preceding period.99At the same time, however, thereis
a good deal of scatteredevidence that the leaders of the armies were con-
cerned about the education level and politicalattitudesof the conscriptsthat
ca,meto them, and paid some attentionto their"patriotic"education in the
military.These somewhat muted concerns become much more explicitafter
the Franco-PrussianWar.
98. Showalter, "Weapons and Ideas," pp. 198-199. See also the influentialessays by Colonel
Ardant Du Picq, BattleStudies:Ancientand ModernBattle(New York:Macmillan, 1921), pp. 100-
101, 151-169.
99. Du Picq, BattleStudies,p. 96. Du Picq is oftentaken to advocate long service, although to
the extentthathe offersa figure,he seems to view threeor fouryears as sufficient(p. 131). His
main point, however, is that soldiers can be kept fightingunder the conditions of modern
firepoweronly with tremendous internalizedself-discipline.This he believed came fromlong
"mutual acquaintanceship" of men and officers.In this he anticipated the modern military
emphasis on small-unitcohesion. Interestingly, however, he also stressed somethingelse that
individuals broughtto the small unit: "Frenchsociabilitycreatescohesion in Frenchtroopsmore
quicklythan could be secured in troops in other nations. Organization and discipline have the
same purpose. With a proud people like the French, a rational organizationaided by French
sociabilitycan often secure desired results without it being necessary to use the coercion of
discipline"(p. 225). One suspects thatPrussian officerswould substitutesome perceivedpositive
attributeof theirown young soldiers, such as "respect forauthority,"forFrench "sociability."I
would substitute"shared culture" more generally.

Nationalism,theMass Army,and MilitaryPower1107
TheFranco-Prussian
Warand Its Aftermath
The immediate cause of the Franco-PrussianWar was the Spanish attempt

to recruita minor prince of the Hohenzollern familyto assume the Spanish
throne.The blow to Frenchprestigeand power precipitatedtheirimmediate
opposition, which actually encouraged the prince to withdraw. But clumsy
diplomacy by the French, and clever exploitationof theirmistakes by Bis-
marck,ended in a clash of arms with France widely viewed in Europe as the
guiltyparty.100The underlyingcause of the war, however, was the growing
power of Prussia, the declining position of France, and the inabilityof the
two states to establish their relative diplomatic weight in Europe through
any measures other than war.101
The magnitude of the initialFrench defeatswould probablyhave sufficed
to cause a new wave of militaryreformin postwar France. The French
legislature ordered mobilization on July14. By August 19, its best army,
155,000 strong,was bottled up in Metz by about 170,000 Germans. (It was
to surrender on October 29.) On September 2, Napoleon III surrendered
France's "reserve" armyof 100,000at Sedan. In roughlysix weeks, the cream
of the French long-servicetroops and their senior commanders had been
eliminated. The French had succumbed to superior numbers, organization,
tactics,commanders,and-in the case of artillery-evenweaponry.102 By any
criterionthe Prussian victorywas extraordinary. The Prussian armies now
103
marched on Paris.
In Paris, then a heavily fortified
cityfullof mobilized troops,the remnants
of Napoleon's governmenttook steps to form a Governmentof National
Defense, even as moderate and extremeleft-wingpolitical forcesmoved to
100. See Howard, Franco-Prussian War,pp. 48-57, fora lucid summaryofthisconvolutedmatter.

101. Ibid., p. 40; In terms of population and wealth, Prussia and its German allies did not
overmatchFrance. The Prussians won due to greatlysuperior militaryorganization. Had the
French militaryreformsprogressed unhindered for another five years, a war with Prussia in
1875 might not have produced quite so lopsided an outcome. For a materialassessment, see
Kennedy, Rise and Fall, pp. 149, 171, 187.
102. Here I include both tactics,the method of fightingat the level of small and medium-sized
units, and "operational art," the method of orchestratingthe movement of corps and armies
movingindependentlyto tryto achieve a single militarygoal. In the latter,the Prussians vastly
outclassed the French; in the formerthe superioritywas less marked,and depended largelyon
the exploitationof technicallysuperiorartillery.
103. I rely forthe preceding and subsequent analysis on the classic work by Michael Howard,
TheFranco-Prussian War.

International
Security18:2 | 108
overthrowthe old regime altogether.The moderate left took control and

proceeded to establishits writthroughoutunoccupied France. Since the new
government'sclaim to legitimacywas based on national defense,it met little
political resistance. Informal peace overtures foundered on Prussia's de-
mands forAlsace and Lorraine.104
The new governmentintended that Paris would be the decisive battle of
the war. Two weeks of freneticactivitystrengthenedits fortifications and
armaments, and assembled some 200,000 largely untrained soldiers. The
Prussians opted fora siege, however. Then the scene of action shiftedto the
rest of France, much to the surpriseof the Prussians.
The agent of this shiftwas 32-year-oldLeon Gambetta,the Ministerof the
Interior,who had been smuggled out of Paris in a balloon. He organized
resistance in the rest of the country,assisted by Charles de Freycinet,a
professionalengineer. Together they not only led the organizationof new
armies, theymobilized the whole apparatus of the stateand relevantcivilian
professions.Theoretically,the Law of 1868 lefta millionmen with some kind
of militaryobligation for Gambetta to exploit (not counting the soldiers in
Paris, surroundedin Metz, or surrenderedto the Germans). Witha superior
navy intact,imports of weapons and equipment fromabroad helped arm
these soldiers. The industrialresources of unoccupied France were pressed
into the business of manufacturingweapons. Time and the availabilityof
both officersand NCOs were short,so forthe mostpartthe soldiersremained
poorlytrainedand poorly led. But, in Michael Howard's words, the "ampli-
tude" of this national mobilization"far surpassed anythingon the German
side," and "was not to be seen again until the First World War was far
advanced on its course."105 In a vain hope to relieve Paris, the armies thus
organized foughta series of bloody and unsuccessfulcampaigns against the
Prussians; the battles raged across northernFrance and drew the Prussians
deeper and deeper into the country.By the end of January,however, Gam-
betta's improvised forces had all been defeated and driven fromthe field.
This regular,ifincompetent,resistancewas accompanied by Frenchpartisan
activityin the Prussian rear.106 These actions usually elicited retaliation
against the local population, and captured partisanswere generallyshot.107
104. Ibid., pp. 224-228.

105. Ibid., p. 245.
106. Ibid., pp. 249-256.
107. Ibid., pp. 378-381. In the words of one German officer,"The war is graduallyacquiringa

On January28, aware that the militarysituationwas hopeless, the Gov-

ernment of National Defense signed an armisticewith Prussia; following
elections that returneda majorityof peace advocates to the FrenchNational
Assembly,German termswere accepted. This included the cession of Alsace
and Lorraine and a 5-billion-franc indemnityto be paid over fouryears. On
March 1 the National Assembly ratifiedthe agreement.
The effectsof the Franco-Prussian War on subsequent French military
planning, indeed on militaryplanning throughoutEurope, were profound.
Michael Howard wrote that,"any continentalpower which wished to escape
annihilationas swiftand overwhelmingas that which overtookthe Second
Empire had to imitatethe German patternand create a Nation in Arms-a
nation whose entireman-power was not only trainedas soldiers, but could
be mobilized, armed, and concentratedon the frontierswithin a very few
days."108France set out to rebuild its own military,and in many respects
relied on the Prussian model. While they never matched Germanyin terms
of mobilizable troops, armament, and organization, they nevertheless
achieved a major transformation in theirarmy.109
To this importantmilitarylesson was added the living symbol of two lost
provinces; the experience of a large scale national mobilization;the factthat
public support for the mobilizationhad been erratic,particularlyin the in-
terior,and the memoryof a German occupation thathad been anythingbut
gentle.These were to provide the initialimpetusfora wave ofFrenchmilitary
reforms,and later a set of largersocial reforms.
The firstpillar of Frenchmilitaryregenerationwas a commitmentto oblig-
atory militaryservice for nearly the entire male population.110The 1872
debates on new militarylegislationbroughtrepeated allusions to the lesson
offeredby the Prussian reformistresponse to theirdefeat at Jenain 1807.111
Along with a better ability to field a large and well-trainedarmy, many
hideous character.Murder and burning is now the order of the day on both sides, and one
cannot sufficiently beg AlmightyGod finallyto make an end of it"; p. 379.
108. Ibid., p. 455.
109. Mitchell,Victorsand Vanquished,argues thatthe Frenchconsciouslyimitatedmuch German
militarypractice.Yet he judges them harshlyforthe measured pace and limitedextentof their
imitationand improvement,especially on the breadth of conscriptionof the adult male popu-
lation,and the organizationof men who had completed theirtermof serviceinto reserveunits.
I am struckby what was done and thus I judge the evidence as supportingmy theory.
110. The Army itselfinstituteda number of reforms,most prominentlythe institutionof a
General Staffand the permanent peacetime organizationof all large militaryunits, including
ArmyCorps of several tens of thdusands of men.
111. Challener, The FrenchTheoryoftheNationin Arms,pp. 33-36.

Security18:2 j 110
International
conservativedelegates thoughtthatconscriptionwould instilldisciplineand

solidarityin the youth of France.112 The initial law, however, did include
exemptionsforteachers,priests,and those studyingforcertainprofessions,
who committedthemselves to ten years of service to the state. University
students could volunteerforone year in the military,if theypaid theirown
way and passed an exam to prove theirmilitarycompetence. Everyone else
was theoreticallyvulnerable to the five-yearterm,although a lotterywould
divide them into two groups, one servinga year with the colors, the other
servingfive.113Militaryconservativeshad been able to preservethis lengthy
term of service on the strengthof the pre-1870 arguments, seen both in
France and in Prussia, that long service imparted a special discipline and
cohesion that would produce a high-qualitysoldier.
In actual practice,the distinctionbetween the one-yearand five-yearactive
troops was gradually eroded. French militarycriticsregularlyargued for
reducingthe termof service to threeyears, and thus increasingthe percent-
age of the annual class of eligible young men who would receive extensive
militarytraining.But until 1889, such argumentswere rebuffedon the basis
of the professionalofficercorps' preferenceforthe longertermof service. In
reality,however, most recruitsto the infantryserved at most fortymonths,
which was codified in 1880.114 The nominallylong term of service, carried
out against overall active-servicemanpower ceilings, meant that perhaps
200,000 eligible young men did not receive militarytrainingin the 1870s.115
Legislationin 1889 and 1905 furtherequalized theburdens ofmilitaryservice.
The Army was increasinglyconsidered "a school in which French youth
acquired basic principles of citizenship."1116Those from provinces where
French was not the mother tongue learned the language of their country-
men.117 Until roughly 1890, French troops did not serve close to home, so
militaryserviceintroducedvast numbersof ruraland small town young men
to the rest of the countryas a whole.118 Many simplydid not returnto their
112. These hopes had theirparallels in Prussia, priorto the war. Apparently,the effortto use
the army to inculcate these "conservative"values evaporated by 1877-78. Ralston, TheArmyof
theRepublic,p. 48.
113. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
114. Mitchell,Victorsand Vanquished,p. 79.
115. Ibid., p. 80.
116. Challener, TheFrenchTheoryoftheNationin Arms,p. 47.
117. Weber,PeasantsintoFrenchmen, p. 299.
118. Ralston says thatafterabout 1890, forreasons of economy,the FrenchArmydid regularly
stationsoldiers close to home; Ralston, TheArmyoftheRepublic,p. 284.

villagesaftertheirmilitaryservice.Eugen Weberconcludes, "the armyturned

out to be an agency foremigration,acculturation,and in the finalanalysis,
civilization,an agency as potent in its way as the schools."119Indeed, the
Law of 1872 provided additional advantages to conscriptswho could read
and write,and threatenedthe illiteratewith an additional year of service.120
What of the schools? In the words of Peter Paret, there developed "the
collaboration of the elementary schools and the conscript army to teach
nationalismto the masses."'121 Contemporaryanalyses ofthe Prussian success
gave considerable creditto the Prussian system of primaryeducation.122A
series of laws passed between 1880-82 made education compulsoryand free
forchildrenaged six-thirteen,and defined the contentof the curriculunt123
This contentwas decidedly patriotic.124 One academic remarkedearlyin the
Third Republic, "If the schoolboy does not become a citizen fullyaware of
his duties, and a soldier who loves his gun, the teacherwill have wasted his
time."125The late nineteenthcenturyalso saw the beginningof Frenchinter-
est in physical education in the schools, an interestfirstdrivenby the con-
nectionto fitnessformilitaryservice.126
As part of the FreycinetPlan (a huge public works programaimed at jump-
startingthe French economy), plenty of money went to the constructionof
schools. More went to the constructionof roads and railroads, particularly
119. Weber,PeasantsintoFrenchmen, p. 302. See also Ralston, TheArmyoftheRepublic,p. 48.

120. Weber,PeasantsintoFrenchmen, p. 327.
121. Peter Paret, "Nationalism and the Sense of MilitaryObligation," MilitaryAffairs, Vol. 34,
No. 1 (Winter1970), p. 5. He asserts that the explicitteachingof nationalismin school and in
the armywas a directimitationof the Prussians.
122. Holmes, The Road to Sedan, p. 192.
123. Carlton Hayes, France:A Nationto Patriots(New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1930),
pp. 35-36. The main theme of this book is the mannerin which Frenchpatriotismwas system-
aticallysupported by the educational system, the army,and a host of culturalinstitutionsin
post-WorldWar I France.
124. In addition to Weber,PeasantsintoFrenchman, see Hayes, France,pp. 38-40.
125. The quotation is fromErnest Lavisse, who in the 1880s wrote several widely used civics
and historytextbooks;see John Schwarzmantel,"Nationalism and the French WorkingClass
Movement 1905-1914," pp. 65-80, in Eric Cahm and VladimirFisera, eds., Socialismand Nation-
alismin Contemporary Europe1848-1945 (Nottingham:Spokesman, 1979), p. 68. Schwazmantel's
theme is thatnational feelingremained quite strongin the Frenchworkingclass.
126. JamesAlbisetti,"The debate on secondaryschool reformin Franceand Germany,"in Detlef
K. Muller,FritzRinger,and Brian Simon, eds., TheRiseoftheModernEducationSystem:Structural
Changeand SocialReproduction 1870-1920 (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1987), p. 187;
Mitchell,Victorsand Vanquished,pp. 151-152, writes: "In addition to a popular mystiqueabout
the armybecoming the school of the nation ... , the inversepropositionconsequentlydeveloped
that the schools should prepare pu;pils formilitaryservice." He observes thatby the late 1870s
some progress in physical education had been made in the secondary schools, but littlein the
primaryschools.

Security18:2 1112
International
intoruralareas. This plan was thatofthe Freycinetwho had helped Gambetta

organize the mobilizationof French society against the Germans, and who
had seen the representativesof ruralFrance end the war in 1871 even though
Gambetta wanted to continue the fight.Given Freycinet'spersonal experi-
ence, I am inclined to agree with those who have seen the FreycinetPlan as
a deliberate effortto integratethe more backward parts of France into the
largersociety.127 Freycinet'ssubsequent politicalcareer suggests his lifelong
concern forthe improvementof French mobilizationcapability.As Defense
Ministerforan unprecedented fiveyears, beginningin April 1888, Freycinet
led the successfulbattleforthe three-yearterm-of-service law passed on July
15, 1889. 128
Eugen Weber declares that the main functionof the new French schools
was to teach a "new patriotism."Children were taughtthat theirfirstduty
was to defend the countryand, returningto themeswe saw in Revolutionary
propaganda, schools reminded the students that the Army was now com-
posed of people just like them. The teachingof historyand geographywas
a vehicle forinstillingpatriotism.New teachingmaterialswere made avail-
able to facilitatethis task, includingmaps that showed the lost provinces of
Alsace and Lorraine as part of France. In the words of one student of
education, "The French elementary schools after 1870 became notorious
breeding grounds of chauvinism."'129 The long-establishedconnection be-
tween basic literacyand the effectivenessof subsequent militarytrainingalso
figuredprominently.130
The precise connections between all of this state-sponsoredactivityand
the behavior of French troops in World War I are difficult to demonstrate.It
would be surprisingif poilu afterpoilu had leftus diaries noting that they
were sustained each day by some specificthingtheyhad learned in school,
127. Weber,PeasantsintoFrenchmen, pp. 209-210, 309-310. Weber doubts thatthe plan had this
purpose, stressingits stimulativeeconomic aspects.
128. Mitchell,Victorsand Vanquished,p. 106; "The measures passed under Freycinetcannot be
understood simplyas productsof a self-generatedreformmovement.The accumulated evidence
shows that both the motive and the measurement of reformderived fromcomparison with
Germany"(p. 109). Germany'sseven-yeardefensebudget of 1888 had lengthenedthe obligation
of its reserviststo reportformobilizationto age 45.
129. Albisetti,"The debate on secondary school reform,"p. 195. Even textbooksproduced by
liberals "extolled militaryvirtues, praised France's services to the world, and provided very
littleinformationabout other countries." Queried on the purpose of studyinghistory,80% of
the candidates for the baccalaureate (secondary school completionexam) are reportedto have
effectively replied "to exalt patriotism."
130. Weber,PeasantsintoFrenchmen, pp. 333-336.

or some bitofpre-warpropaganda. Nevertheless,Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau

concludes, fromhis insightfulstudy of soldier-publishedtrenchnewspapers
duringthe war, that a profound sense of national feeling,"deeply rooted in
the republican patriotismof pre-wardays," and "moulded by theirprimary
education" was the primarysource of emotional sustenance.131 This national
feelingabandoned the extremesof pre-war chauvinism and was not reani-
mated by wartimepropaganda, particularlyof the type directedat the home
front.But as the war dragged on, the daily act of "defence of theirsoil" and
remembranceof the comrades who died forit creatednew sources of resolve.
He concludes that, "even in the war's worst moments, the impossibility
[unthinkability]of causing the defeatof theirown nation by collectiveweak-
ness constituteda psychologicalbarrierthan nothingcould overcome."
GERMANY
As the victor in the war of 1870, Prussia/Germanylacked the impetus to
innovate that was experienced by the French. But with the ascension of
Wilhelm II to the throne in 1888 there was a noticeable increase in the
nationalist content of the primaryand secondary school curriculum.The
main explanation forthis offeredby most historiansis a concern forloyalty
to the regime,particularlyin the domesticpoliticalfightwith growingliberal
and social-democraticforces.The view that concernabout militaryeffective-
ness was an importantmotivatingfactoris less common, although there is
evidence to support it. The contentof the motivationaleffortsalso suggests
thatcombat motivationwas an importantconcern.
Both the Prussian War Ministerand the Education Ministerhad believed
that the Prussian Volksschuleteacher deserved much of the credit for the
victoryover the Austriansin 1866, and so informedthe firstKaiser Wilhelm.
Bismarck similarly credited them for their role in the victory over the
French.132 During the 1870 war, many pupils in the primaryschool teacher-
trainingseminarsvolunteeredformilitaryservice,suggestingthatnationalist
sentimentwas already deeply embedded in this importantgroup.133All of
this suggests that in spite of its officialstress on religionratherthan nation-
131. Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau, Men at War,1914-1918:NationalSentiment and TrenchJournalism

in FranceduringtheFirstWorldWar(Providence: Berg, 1992); see chap. 6, "National Sentiment,"
esp. pp. 176-177, 184.
132. Schleunes, Schoolingand Society,pp. 160, 191.
133. Ibid., pp. 172-173.

Security18:2 | 114
International
alism, the Prussian primaryschool curriculumof the 1850s and 1860s must
have informallyincluded at least some politicalcomponent.
New effortsto reformPrussia's schools quicklyfollowed the victory.The
officialadministrativerole of the church was eliminatedin the Inspection
Law of 1871. The role of religionin the curriculumwas drasticallyreduced
in new regulations in 1872. "History and the German language and its
literaturewere to replace religion as the core of the curriculum,"and the
curriculumin the teacher trainingschools followed suit.134Textbookswere
standardized with a particularemphasis on the enhancement of national
consciousness. For example, a new historytextfromthe mid-1870sexplained
the Franco-Prussianwar this way: "The only cause was France's envy and
jealousy of Prussia's growing greatness and Napoleon's desire to stabilize
his quaking throneby a war of conquest."1135 Some of the educational reforms
must be attributedto Prussian domestic political developments, but the
timingof the reforms,the sudden emergenceof high-levelofficialrespectfor
Prussia's schoolmasters,and the contentof the new curriculumall suggest
thatmilitarypreparedness provided much of the impetus.136
Wilhelm II's interestin the content of primaryand secondary education
was driven initiallyby the desire to instillregime loyalty;social democracy
was to be explicitlyaddressed as the main enemy. This idea seems to have
occurredto him in 1888 and was given impetus by a wave of strikesin 1889.
But the new kaiser favored the addition of an even more distinctivelyna-
tionalistcontentto the conservativereligiousapproach thathad maintained
some hold on the curriculumin spite of the 1870 reforms.137He was partic-
ularly interestedin fosteringthe study of Prussian history.138 The goal of
teachinghistoryforthe twin purposes of combattingsocial democracyand
instillingpatriotismwas furtheredby a Cabinet Order of May 1, 1889, and
by the kaiser's personal participationin the school conferenceof 1890.139
134. Ibid., pp. 177-178.

135. Quoted in ibid., p. 190.
136. Schleunes, ibid., suggests that it was at this juncturethat the Prussian schools effectively
became apostles of Germannationalismas a means to legitimatethe conquests of the preceding
wars; pp. 160-161. It is also noteworthythata debate emerged on the possibilityof centralizing
all the schools in Germany,but that was deemed too greata politicalfight.
137. Walter C. Langsam, "Nationalism and Historyin the Prussia ElementarySchools Under
William II," in Edward M. Earle, ed., Nationalismand Internationalism (New York: Columbia
UniversityPress, 1950), pp. 241-261, is the most widely cited English language essay on this
subject.
138. Craig, Germany,p. 189.
139. Albisetti,"The debate on secondary school reform,"p. 194.

There was apparently wide consensus among educators that the study of
historyshould replace religionas the source of social cohesion.140The Army
welcomed the kaiser's initiative,although in subsequent years there were
complaintsby Army officersthat the schools were not doing a good job.141
Close supervision was also exercised over Prussian teachers, who were
viewed as state officials;particulareffortswere made to exclude socialists.142
It was more difficultto controlthe curriculumand the personnel elsewhere
in Germanydue to the federalcharacterof the Empire.
While many historianshave stressed the domestic problems that the na-
tionalistcurriculumwas meant to solve, a specificallymilitarymotivationfor
and content of the curriculumis evident. In 1890 Prussian districtschool
inspectorswere directedthatthe primaryschools must trainthe children"as
activemembersof German society,as self-denyingsubjects,and as men who
will be glad to pay the supreme sacrificeforking and country."'143 Prussian
pedagogues and writers frequentlyechoed these themes. The two most
popular textson historicalmethod stressed the importanceof militarystrug-
gle and militarypower in the historyof Prussia, and the special role of
historyteaching as a source of futurewillingness to risk all on the field of
battle.144Prussian national history,particularlymilitaryhistory,dominated
the curriculum.There was also a strongemphasis on currentmilitaryaffairs,
in termsofboth techniqueand strategicissues.145Textbookwritersand school
teachersmay, indeed, have overfulfilled the expectationsof the government
in theiremphasis on militarymatters.
The militaryitselfwas another vehicle for the development of national
consciousness in post-unificationGermany. Although German conscripts
tended to serve close to home, serviceneverthelessproduced an acquaintance
with people fromdifferentparts of Germany,and oftenwith different parts
140. Schleunes, Schoolingand Society,pp. 226-228. "New textsand readers glorifying the Kaiser
and the Fatherland had been introduced. The great deeds of the wars of liberationand unifi-
cation, of Prussia's kings, of Bismarck,and of the Kaiser were being offeredas the fundamental
elements of a new national consciousness" (p. 228).
141. Martin Kitchen, The GermanOfficer Corps 1890-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp.
175-176.
142. Paul Kosok, ModernGermany: A StudyofConflictingLoyalties(Chicago: Universityof Chicago
Press, 1933), p. 161. He notes that in Prussia therewas very littleinstructionon the workings
of governmentand society.
143. As quoted in Langsam, "Nationalismand Historyin the Prussian ElementarySchools," p.
243.
144. Ibid., pp. 245-252.
145. Ibid., pp. 252-258.

Security18:2 116
International J
of the countryitself.146 Discipline was quite rigorous; indeed sometimes it

deterioratedinto outrightabuse, which may have had the effectof alienating
many conscripts.147
The officercorps thatmanaged the conscriptarmybecame somewhat more
heterogeneousthan it had been. Priorto 1870 it was populated by politically
reliablearistocrats.In the expansion after1870, it became necessaryto bring
more middle-class officersinto the active and especially into the reserve
forces. Propaganda addressed to these officersstressed theirpersonal rela-
tionship to the crown, warned against the dangers of domestic subversion,
and reminded them of the army's role in blocking such subversion. The
politicalbehavior of reserve officerswas surveyed,and liberalsfound them-
selves deprived of theircommissions.148 But self-policingwas the most pow-
erfulenforcementmechanism. The prestige of the militarywas so high in
Wilhelmine Germany, and so much elite political energy was directed at
keeping it high, that middle-class officersand reserve officerswere pleased
to have theircommissions, and willing to take on the politicalcolorationof
theirsocial "betters."The Armyidentifieditselfas a key player in the cam-
paign against social democracyand directedconsiderableenergyat the prob-
lem.149Indeed, up to the outbreakof World War I influentialsenior officers
feared, and in some cases hoped, that they mighthave to suppress social
democracymilitarily.
Many measures also aimed at the inculcationofpatriotismand nationalism.
Religious instructionwas stressed withinthe army,and sermons tended to
have a high patrioticcontent. Like the schools, Armyofficersattemptedto
instructsoldiers in the glories of Prussian history.The militarypublished
and distributednewspapers and books with patrioticthemes. Officerswere
enjoined to attack social democracy directlyin teaching sessions with the
troops. This apparently proved embarrassing,as officersunaccustomed to
talkingpolitics found themselves bested by enlisted men who were. After
1907, the politicalcontentshiftedto simplerpatrioticappeals.
MartinKitchen doubts the effectivenessof any of this in combatingsocial
democracy,and it is certainlytrue that it did not stop the growth of the
Social Democraticpartyin Germany.But as late as 1911 some 64 percentof
146. Kosok, ModernGermany,p. 136.

147. Ibid., p. 135.
148. Craig, Germany,pp. 159-160.
149. The account that follows relies largelyon Kitchen,GermanOfficer
Corps,pp. 168-186.

the recruitsto the German army came fromrural areas, and were unlikely
to have had social-democraticsympathies.150 They were probably quite re-
ceptive to army propaganda and it is likely that many returned to their
homes well-indoctrinated.The conscriptsfromurban areas contained the
greatestnumberof social-democraticsympathizers,and these likelyremained
unconverted.On the otherhand, the propaganda may have had some diffuse
effecton the patrioticsentimentsof the soldiers. Interestingly, Social Dem-
ocratswho did serve in the armywere enjoined by theirpartyto be exemplary
soldiers.151 It is difficultforhuman beings to pursue seriouslythe purposes
of an organizationwithoutcomingto identifywithit somewhat. "Even many
of the older Social Democraticworkers,sittingtogetheraround theirglas'ses
Social Democrats
of beer, took pride in relatingtheirmilitaryexperiences."'152
readilyidentifiedbackward Russia as the enemy of Germany,and one prom-
inent Social Democratic theoristshared the officercorps' preferenceforthe
offensive.And we must rememberthatin 1914, the socialistsmarched.153
Bothregimeloyaltyand combateffectiveness were motivesforthe growing
nationalistcontent of German public education, officereducation, and in-
service indoctrinationof conscriptsthrough the outbreak of World War I.
Students of the period stress the impact of regime loyalty.The appearance
of both motives in Prussia weakens somewhat my argumentthat military
capability was a primary impetus to the spread of nationalism, but the
presence of the same nationalisteducation in France, where regime loyalty
was of less immediate concern,preserves the viabilityof the hypothesis.154
The EvolutionofMilitaryTechnology,
1870-1914
By 1870, major advances in firepowerhad been achieved over the weapons

of the Napoleonic wars. The importanceof firepower,particularlyin thwart-
ing the old-fashionedbayonet assault, was already quite clear.
150. Ibid., pp. 147-148. In 1907, the German socialist leader Bebel observed thatabout a third
of the mobilized German troops would be Social DemocraticPartymembers.Talmon, TheMyth
oftheNationand theVisionofRevolution(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1981), p. 395.
151. Kitchen,The GermanOfficer Corps,p. 167.
152. Kosok, ModernGermany,p. 136.
153. Talmon, TheMythoftheNationand theVisionofRevolution, pp. 109-110.
154. Albisetti,"The debate on secondaryschool reform,"p. 195, notes thatthe secondaryschool
curriculain the Second Reich and ThirdRepublic were actuallyquite similar,withboth stressing
nationalistand anti-socialistthemes. During this period, however, a much smaller percentage
of both populations attended secondary school.

International
Security18:2 1118
Developments after 1870 were to be even more profound.155Repeating

riflesthat fired small-calibrebullets impelled by smokeless powder were
widely used by 1890. The accuracy,range, rate, and volume of infantryfire
increased markedly.But a prone, entrenched,or camouflagedriflemanwas
now much harder to detect. Second, the true automaticmachine gun made
its appearance in the late 1880s. Third, "quick-firing"
fieldguns appeared in
the late 1890s. Recoil mechanisms made it unnecessary to re-aim the gun
aftereach shot and permitteda firingrate of ten shrapnel shells per minute.
A four-gunbatterycould mow down any clusterof exposed infantryout to
fivethousand meters.
Many professionalmilitarycommentatorsrecognized that these develop-
ments favored the tactical defender. They also understood more generally
that for offensiveor defensive action, troops would have to fightin small
units, widely dispersed. Command would have to devolve to lower levels.
No longer could a single junior platoon lieutenant hope to keep 80 men
withinsight and sound of his voice, and controltheirmovementsin battle.
Any platoon so deployed could be annihilated. The Boer War and Russo-
Japanese War at the turnof the centuryconfirmedthese lessons formany.
But other professional officers,who increasinglycame to dominate the
European militariesbetween 1880 and 1914, recoiled fromthese lessons.156
While the improvementsin firepowerwere recognized, theirtacticalimpli-
cations were denied. Already in the 1880s, French and German military
manuals proposed to counter improvementsin firepowerwith a stress on
morale and the positive moral effectof the attack. The notion was that the
battle was a strugglefor moral ascendancy, and that firepowertechnology
could not compensate for the moral advantage that would redound to the
side on the attack. Similarly,therewas a strongdisinclinationto accept the
utilityof dispersal. Officerswanted to keep theirmen closer togetherin order
to maintain command and order, which were perceived to be necessary to
the ultimateestablishmentof moral ascendancy.
155. Sece Hew Strachan, EuropeanArmiesand the Conductof War (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1983), pp. 113-119, forthese firepowerdevelopments.
156. For the following discussion see ibid., pp. 115-117; Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop
Tactics:Innovationin the GermanArmy,1914-1918 (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 1-25 on the
debate in the German Army;T.H.E. Travers,"Technology,Tactics,and Morale: Jean de Bloch,
the Boer War, and BritishMilitaryTheory,1900-1914,"JournalofModernHistory,Vol. 51 (June
1979), pp. 264-286, on analogous developments in the BritishArmy;JackSnyder, The Ideology
oftheOffensive:MilitaryDecisionMakingand theDisastersof1914 (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress,
1984), pp. 63-67, 77-81, on the French Army.

This tacticalcult of the offensivereflectedthe widespread notion among

European soldiers that the battlefieldwas a place of psychologicalas well as
physical struggle,and that the psychologicalaspects were dominant.157 But
the effortto win the psychological battle did not begin and end with the
order to attack;this was merelyits most visible and most idioticmanifesta-
tion. In France and Prussia (and in Britainas well), the preparationof the
individual began earlier. French officersstressed the cohesion believed to
arise froma lengthytermof service. French officersunsuccessfullyopposed
the government'splan to reduce the termof servicefromthreeyears to two
in 1905, and lobbied for restorationof the third year until they achieved
success in 1913.158 Prussia went over to a two-yeartermin 1893, although
some Prussian officershad agreed with theirFrenchcounterparts.But Prus-
sia's three-yeartermwas traded away fora major expansion in the size of
the standing army,necessitatedby the budding Franco-Russianalliance.159
A directconnectionbetween the increasinglethalityofweaponryand state-
sponsored nationalism between 1870 and 1914 is difficultto document.160
Professionalofficersunderstood thatfirepowerimprovementspresented sig-
nificantnew problems that demanded a better-motivated soldier. The long-
service solution was gradually lost after1870, even as firepowerimproved.
The principal professional militaryproponent of the offensiveand its con-
nection to morale, Ferdinand Foch, was prone to characterizefuturewar as
"more and more national in its originand aims, more and more powerfulin
157. For a generaldiscussion ofthese problemsas theyemergedthroughoutEurope, see Michael

Howard, "Men Against Fire, Expectations of War in 1914," in Steven E. Miller, ed. Military
Strategy and theOriginsoftheFirstWorldWar:An InternationalSecurity,Reader (Princeton:Prince-
ton UniversityPress, 1985), pp. 41-57.
158. Ralston, TheArmyoftheRepublic,pp. 301-302, 350-359. The fightto restorethe three-year
term,however, seems to have been motivatedas much, if not more, by a desire to increase the
size of the French standing army,as by its moral qualities. Gerd Krumreichargues that more
troopswere perceived as necessary to protectthe forwardconcentrationareas against a German
spoiling attack that would wreck the Plan XVII offensive.To protectthe plan's secrecy,more
ambiguous arguments were made in public, including the long-servicecohesion argument.
Krumreich,Armaments and Politicsin Franceon theEve oftheFirstWorldWar,trans.Stephen Conn
(Warwickshire:Berg, 1984), pp. 44-52, 107-108.
159. Craig, Germany,pp. 257-259;
160. This period saw a wholesale emergence of intense nationalismand social-darwinistideas
in public discourse, which scholars trace to diverse causes. See, forexample, Bernard Brodie,
Warand Politics(New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 262-270; Snyder,IdeologyoftheOffensive; and
Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive,"in Miller,MilitaryStrategy,pp. 58-63. Travers,
"Technology,Tactics, and Morale," suggests that BritishArmy officersbecame exponents of
these ideas in part because of their great concern with how they would deal with the new
firepowertechnologywithoutchanging the nature of the soldiers recruited.

International
Security18:2 | 120
its means, more and more impassioned."'161 German theoristsat the timealso
argued the connection between combat performanceand the morale and
commitmentof the troops, and stressed the value of patriotism.162
Conclusions
Three basic conclusions emerge from this survey of nearly 150 years of
military,political,and social developmentsin Prussia, Germany,and France.
First,professional assessments of the potentialitiesof militarytechnology,
compulsoryeducation foran ever-broadeningsegment of the militaryman-
power pool, the developmentand promulgationof nationalistideology,com-
pulsory militaryservice and the mass army,and actual experiences of war-
timewere closely connected in both countries.
Developments in militarytechnologythatfavordispersal on the battlefield
prompta constantconcern forthe motivationof soldiers. These same devel-
opments may make it difficultto relyon lengthytrainingand lengthyterms
of service to create this motivation,since improved weaponry kills these
"custom-made" soldiers too fast. Developments in militarytechnologythat
increase the human costs of war increase the state's propensityto prepare
people to pay those costs, and the sponsorship of nationalismis one solution
to tlie problem.
Developments in militarytechnology,organization, or tactics may also
increase the militaryutilityof literacyin conscripts;this causes the state to
promotemass literacyforreasons of technicalmilitaryefficiency. The spread
of literacymakes it possible forstates to trainlargerarmies in peacetime and
mobilize them in wartimewith greaterspeed.
161. Stefan T. Possony and Etienne Mantoux, "Du Picq and Foch: The French School," in
Edward M. Earle, ed. MakersofModernStrategy (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1971), p.
222, quoting fromFerdinand Foch, Principlesof War,trans. Hilaire Belloc (New York: 1920), p.
41. See Foch's original,Des Principesde la Guerre,4th ed. (Paris: Berger-Levrault,1917), pp. 39-
40. In a priorpassage he connects effectivetacticaldispersal to nationalistfeelingsin the troops,
and expresses doubts as to whether either long-serviceprofessionaltroops or multi-national
armies could successfullypracticesuch tactics;p. 39.
162. Travers, "Technology,Tactics, and Morale," p. 277. See also General Friedrichvon Bern-
hardi, Germany and theNext War,trans. Allen Powles (New York:Longmans, 1914), p. 242: "For
while the demands which modern war makes have increased in every direction,the term of
service has been shortened in order to make enlistmentin very great numbers possible. Thus
the full consummation of militarytrainingcannot be attained unless recruitsenter the army
well equipped physicallyand mentallyand bringingwith them patrioticsentimentworthyof
the honourable professionof arms."

Mass literacyalso makes soldiers more accessible to propaganda, both as

childrenand as adults, which facilitatesthe spread of nationalistideology.
The factof a shared writtenlanguage and historypromulgatedin the schools
makes nationalistideology "self-confirming": it becomes true that the mem-
bers of the group share special traits.
Second, the internal power of these causes is vastly intensifiedby the
pressureof internationalcompetition.Neitherpoliticalelites nor professional
officers"embrace" the mass army.To varyingdegrees, they are driven to it
by the exigencies of internationalcompetition.The French revolutionaries
were forced to innovate by the magnitude of the militarychallenges they
faced. Others were forcedto imitatethe French success. As each combatant
stumbled into ways to improve the mass army "militaryformat,"each suc-
cessive combat demonstratedto others the new tricksto imitate.Literacyof
the officers,NCOs, and enlisted personnel was one such trick.Anotherwas
motivation through systematic indoctrinationinto nationalist ideologies,
which stressed the uniqueness and inclusiveness of one's own collectivity,
relativeto the one next door. And yet anotherwas continuingexpansion in
the sheer size of the mobilized force.These fed on each other,both within
boundaries and across them.
Even if one believes that any of these variables is itselfdependent largely
on other causes, they may nonetheless have the consequences I have de-
scribed. For example, ifliteracyis promotedforeconomic reasons, it stillhas
militaryeffects.If the mass armyis an historicalaccidentin one country,and
if it is effective,it should stillpromote imitationby others. If nationalismis
a consequence of entiresocial transformations in one society,it nonetheless
provides the motive power forthe mass army,which othersmust imitateif
they wish to survive. Imitation of the mass army requires literacyand a
nationalistideology, and thereforethese elements will travelwith the mass
army,and thus nationalism will spread with it. More literacyprobably in-
creases the abilityof armies to absorb new technology,and thus makes them
morelethal,causing a greaternecessityfortacticaldispersal,and the potential
forhighercasualties, which will need to be replaced. A more literatepopu-
lation also makes the trainingand organizationof very large forces easier,
facilitatingmass mobilization.
Third, the argument sheds some light on two persistentmysteriesabout
nationalism and conflict.Nationalism is often posited as a cause of great
wars. But the closer we,look at the great wars they are oftensaid to have
caused, the more complicated the relationshipappears. This is because na-

Security18:2 | 122
International
tionalismis as oftena consequence of conflictas it is a cause. Leaders use

nationalismto mobilize public supportformilitarypreparationand sacrifices.
When war seems imminent,for any reason, the intensityof propaganda
increases. The same is true when wars last forany length of time. Thus it
will oftenbe difficultto show that nationalismcaused any conflict,because
it will generally be accompanied and accentuated by other causes of the
conflict.(It may also intensifythese othercauses.)
The speed and intensitywithwhich nationalismcan emergefromapparent
dormancy is another mystery.My theory suggests that it is a rational re-
sponse, not only by elites but also by followers,whenever the geostrategic
conditions outlined above seem to hold. States or stateless groups, drifting
into competitionforwhatever reason, will quicklyturnto the reinforcement
of national identitybecause of its potency as a militaryresource. And since
states cannot wait fortroubleto prepare theircitizens forwar, much of the
preparationis "hidden away" in the schools or in the militaryexperienceof
conscripts. It is hidden away in the home in long repressed multi-ethnic
societies such as Yugoslavia. This materialis there for leaders to tap with
more open and ubiquitous means of communicationsin times of threatand
crisis.
TASKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The preceding discussion suggests that a number of criticalissues remain.
The firsttask is a more extensiveexaminationofthe plausibilityof the theory.
The remainingmilitarycompetitorsin Europe during this period should be
subjected to a similaranalysis.
A structuralrealistwould argue that the propensityof states to engage in
these activitiesshould vary with the threatsthat they face. States protected
by high mountains or deep moats should be less inclined to opt for mass
armies, and less dependent on nationalism. States withoutpowerfulneigh-
bors depend less on mass armies, and hence depend less on nationalism.
States defended by nuclear weapons should be less nationalistic.
In contrast,nationalismshould be more intense in continentalstates with
topographicallygentle borders, which thereforeneed their ground forces
more. States with powerful neighbors depend more on their armies, and
should be more inclined towards nationalism. Where enhanced firepower
makes forhigh casualties, the incentivesto purveynationalismalso go up.
It may be that the theory as posited thus far is too limited. Perhaps it
applies more generallyto any securitycompetitionthat involves "mass mo-

bilization," that is, requires of societya large-scalefinancial,organizational,

and industrialeffortto produce a great militaryforceof any kind, on sea or
even in the air as well as on land.
Anotherline ofinquirywould take the theoryout ofEurope to hold cultural
influencesconstantand thus to improve the focus on the causal influenceof
the instrumentalfactorsthat I have highlighted.
But since many of the non-European conflictsthat one could study have
occurred among nation-stateswhere socio-economicdevelopments roughly
parallel those of late nineteenth-century Europe, this stillwould not permit
an assessment of the independent power of securityvariables relative to
socio-economicones. Thus a carefulsearch must be mounted forthose mod-
ern nation-statesthat find themselves in difficultnon-nuclearsecuritycom-
petitions.Are theydrivento "create" nationalism?There are few such cases.
Israel suggests itself.A systematiccomparison of the militaryorganizations
of the non-nuclearEuropean Cold-Warneutrals,Finland, Sweden, and Swit-
zerland, might prove useful. Ukraine may prove an illuminatingcase if it
relinquishesits nuclear weapons and a rivalrywith Russia emerges.
Although I have advanced a theoryof nationalismbased largelyon inter-
national militarycompetition,clearlydomestic factorsalso affectthe devel-
opment of nationalism. An importantif perhaps intractabletask is to weigh
domestic social, political,and economic influencesrelativeto strategicinflu-
ences. It is clear, forexample, thatimitationof the mass armylends itselfto
the reductionof social inequality,perhaps even to democratization.163 Where
elites do not wish to democratize,powerfultensions arise between the dic-
tates of externaland internalsurvival. Generally,I believe elites will have
strongincentives to adopt mass armies and purvey literacyand nationalist
ideology when externalevents warrant.How the tensions between external
and internalconstraintsare resolved may influencethe specificcontent of
the nationalistideology that is purveyed by an elite. And sometimes those
tensions cannot be resolved; inferiormass armies will take the field and
sufferdefeat. These defeats can have major social consequences.
Finally,of course, an examinationof the question I have largelybegged is
essential. How mightnationalismcause war? My preliminaryhypothesisis
thatnationalismis a cause of intense widespread public concernfornational
security,and a public predispositionto accept the judgments of civilian or
163. Andreski,MilitaryOrganizationand Society,pp. 73-74.

International
Security18:2 1124
military"threatinflators"of militarydangers fromabroad. Since the profes-

sional military,in particular,is likelyto favorsolutions to perceived threats
that stress the utilityof offensivedoctrinesand plans, a pressure is created
for the adoption of national militarypolicies that will cause or exacerbate
conflictswith neighbors. The defensive impulses of nationalism may thus
help cause international"spirals" of insecurity.164
I would go furtherand speculate that the mobilizationof nationalismfor
offensivewar is dependent to some degree on the intensityof the "security
dilemma,"the frequentconditionin internationalpoliticswhere statescannot
make themselves secure without making others insecure. Thus aggressive
nationalism is to be most often found in nation-statesthat have difficulty
ensuringtheirnational securitythroughlargelydefensivemilitarymeans.
It is thus reasonable to examine the course of state-sponsorednationalism
in formerlynationalisticnation-statesthat have leftconventional"mass mo-
bilization" militarycompetitionsbehind them. It is noteworthythat many
WesternEuropean states have systematicallyendeavored to purge national
stereotypesfrom their educational systems.165The theoryI have outlined
suggests that the U.S. nuclear umbrella and the devaluation of non-nuclear
forcesin the East-Weststrugglein Europe was a criticalpermissivecondition
for the decline of nationalist history.If so, and if one also believes that
nationalismis an independent cause of conflict,then nuclear disarmament
may not be an unalloyed good, and nuclear proliferation may not always be
bad, since it is conventional competitionsthat depend on the greatestre-
serves of human courage and commitment.
164. A briefif floridversion of this argumentis found in Carleton Hayes, Essayson Nationalism
(New York: Macmillan, 1928), pp. 187-195.
165. See, e.g., Paul Kennedy, "The Decline of NationalisticHistory in the West, 1900-1970,"
JournalofContemporary History,Vol. 18, No. 1 (January1973), pp. 77-100.


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Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power

Author(s): Barry R. Posen

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BarryR. Posen is Professor

Security,Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124

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alism addresses the political, social, and economic development processes

I definenationalismas the propensityofindividualsto identifytheirpersonal

2. This definitionis consistentwith that offeredby ErnstHaas, "What is nationalismand why

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societies; if nationalism emerges in many neighboring societies simulta-

THE MASS ARMY

3. The standardwork is Kenneth Waltz, TheoryofInternational Politics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-

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clear definitions,as well as explanations of its emergence and spread, are

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trymenpotent killers on their own and, combined with improvementsin

7. Most historiansdate the problem to the appearance of muzzle-loadingpercussion-firedrifles

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trinationwithin the military.States promote compulsoryprimaryeducation

10. Gellner,Nationsand Nationalism,p. 57. "It [nationalism]means the generalized diffusionof

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nationalism,if the wars demonstratethe militaryadvantages thatcome with

13. Liah Greenfeld,Nationalism:Five Roads to Modernity(Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress,

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An effortto weigh the power of these militarycauses, relativeto othertypes

Our purpose is to see whether states consciously imitatethe successful

14. The concept of a "militaryformat"is borrowed fromSamuel E. Finer,"State- and Nation-

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orders that they are all members of the same community;inequalities of

The Eve ofRevolution

Fromthe close of the ThirtyYears' War to the end of the eighteenthcentury,

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to a generalized spilloverfromthe Enlightenmentto militarythought.Rather

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The count, who had instituteduniversal militaryservice in his littlestate,

22. PeterParet,Clausewitzand theState:TheMan, His Theories, and His Times(Princeton:Princeton

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to regularunits forwar in CentralEurope, theyproved useful forreconnais-

THE BIRTH OF THE MASS ARMY

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casualties throughlevies on the population at largemade itpossible to engage

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with a considerable diminutionof the risk of defeat in detail. At the same

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were portrayed as honored members of society.37Class-based barriers to

PRUSSIAN MILITARY REFORMS

37. Lynn, BayonetsoftheRepublic,pp. 177-182.

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and the politicalsystemthatproduced them.43The laterPrussian reformers,

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Although Frederickthe Great had considered the possible improvements

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fromthe army.The systemof officereducation was improvedand extended,

56. Paret, Yorck,pp. 170-171.

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The Armygrew from60,000 in December 1812 to 130,000threemonthslater,

SUMMARY OF THE REFORM PERIOD

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