Assignment Submission Cover Sheet

Programme Title: M.Sc. Operations & Supply Chain

Management
Module Code and Title: BU7710 – Project Management
Assessment Title: James Webb Space Telescope Project
Group Report
Group Number: Group 1

Student Name and % %

Contribution

1. Tori Nardoni 4. Robin Smeds

2. Javier Pla Almendros 5. Juan Beukes

3. Kevin Albert 6. Jehan-Guillaume de

Sénépart

For group work – individual % contributions need to be stated only where they are not
equal.

Please read the plagiarism provisions in the General Regulations of the University Calendar
for the current year, found at: http://www.tcd.ie/calendar

Online Tutorial on avoiding plagiarism ‘Ready, Steady, Write’, is located at

http://tcd-ie.libguides.com/plagiarism/ready-steady-write
Declaration

I/We declare that this work has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at

this or any other university and it is entirely my own work.

I have read and I understand the plagiarism provisions in the General Regulations of

the University Calendar for the current year, found at http://www.tcd.ie/calendar.

Generative AI Declaration

Please choose A or B with regards to your use of ChatGPT & other generative AI tools in this
project:

A. Nothing to declare. I did not use ChatGPT or any other generative AI software. (see
note)

B. I used ChatGPT or other generative AI software (see note)

NOTE:

● If you answer A and the corrector/supervisor, finds evidence that you have indeed
used ChatGPT, this behaviour will be considered as unethical and you will be penalized
accordingly with reference to the TCD policy on plagiarism.
● If you answer B, please clearly explain for which chapters or parts of your dissertation
you used ChatGPT and how it helped you to improve your learning process within
ethical guidelines. You may include your answer – 300 to 600 words approx.- in the
appendix.

Signed: Tori Nardoni (print name) ID No. 23350896e

Date: 18 October 2023

Signed: Javier Pla Almendros (print name) ID No. 23363073e

Date: 18 October 2023

Signed: Kevin Albert (print name) ID No. 23339860e

Date: 18 October, 2023

Signed: Robin Smeds (print name) ID No. 23341816e

Date: 18 October 2023

Signed: Jehan-Guillaume Desénépart (print name) ID No. 23339956e

Date: 18 October,= 2023

Signed: Juan Beukes ID No. 23366058e

Date: 18 October 2023

Table of Contents
Introduction.............................................................................................................................. 2
Figure 1. Construction Milestones of James Webb Space Telescope
https://webbtelescope.org/news/milestones/mission-timeline....................................... 3
Overarching project goal:.....................................................................................................3
Table 1. Deliverables of the JWST Project.................................................................... 4
Table 2. Technological advancements required for project completion (NASA, n.d.).. 4
Risks and Issues........................................................................................................................ 5
What Went Wrong................................................................................................................... 6
How Challenges Were Managed............................................................................................. 7
What Went Well....................................................................................................................... 8
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................9
References................................................................................................................................11
Appendix A............................................................................................................................. 13
Project Diamond / NTCP Model........................................................................................ 13
Appendix B..............................................................................................................................14
Power/Interest Matrix.........................................................................................................14
 2

Introduction

Exploring and understanding deep space has always been an essential factor when looking
into the history of Humans. The first astronomical observations date back to 1OOO BC when
the Assyro-Babylonians recorded the periodic motions of stars and Earth. After that,
countless discoveries and theories, either proven right or wrong, led to the development of the
current space age, where high-resolution imagery is obtainable.

The curiosity of Humans in the cosmos resulted in an area of science dedicated to the study
of anything beyond the Earth's atmosphere. Astronomy has enabled humans to answer
age-old questions about Earth and the Universe.

The James Webb Telescope (JWST) project can help scientists answer questions about the
universe that previously seemed impossible to consider. The mission became a concept in
September 1989. After over 30 years of design, research, planning, and external and internal
reviews, on 25 December 2021, it was launched. The figure below (Figure 1) illustrates a
chronological list of the milestones achieved over the project's lifespan.

The first image was taken by the JWST on 12 July 2022, furthering the human knowledge of
space and time and contributing to the mission of NASA, "...exploring(s) the unknown in air
and space, innovating(s) for the benefit of humanity, and inspiring(s) the world through
discovery."

This report aims to provide an overview of the JWST project and highlight the issues and
risks faced by project management and how those issues were addressed and solved.
 3

Figure 1. Construction Milestones of James Webb Space Telescope

https://webbtelescope.org/news/milestones/mission-timeline

Overarching project goal:

The JWST project built the largest and most powerful telescope in history, with the technical
ability to produce images and data that can answer fundamental astrophysical theories and
questions. This highly complex project involved multiple space agencies and technological
advancements, which caused risks and issues within the project management.

The overall scientific goals of the Telescope involve addressing questions and topics such as
the end of the Dark Ages (first light and reionisation), the assembly of galaxies, the birth of
stars and protoplanetary systems, and planetary systems and the origins of life (NASA, 2007).
 4

Technological advancements implemented on the telescope also provide the ability to answer
questions regarding the theorised "Big Bang" (P. A., Sabelhaus & J. Decker, 2007).

Table 1 lists the critical deliverables identified in the project, while Table 2 provides an
overview of the technical requirements defined at the beginning of the project.

Objective

Final Telescope Assembly

Final Spacecraft Assembly

Final Development of Instruments

Organised Science and Operation Centre

Organised Flight Plan and Systems

Organised General Systems Team

Launch Vehicle Acquisition

Launch Site Preparation

Launch

Table 1. Deliverables of the JWST Project

Lightweight Cryogenic Mirrors

Wavefront Sensing and Control Mirrors

Infrared Detectors for Light Detection and Conversion to Electronic Signal

Cryogenic Data Acquisition ASIC (Freeze Resistant Micro-Computer)

Micro-Shutters

Sunshield Coating

Table 2. Technological advancements required for project completion (NASA, n.d.)

 5

Risks and Issues

As with managing large-scale projects, especially ones that deal with daunting tasks such as
space exploration, risks and issues are bound to arise, and the James Webb Space Telescope
Project (JWST) was no different (W. Connely, 2004). Spanning across decades, industries,
and countries, this historical project and its management have faced many risks and issues
throughout its duration. Two of the most significant project management issues dealt with
throughout this project were communication and technological problems. Because this
project, considered an array project (see Appendix A), dealt with many different stakeholders
(see Appendix B) and involved various organisations, there was bound to be at least some
miscommunication along the way. As for technological issues, this super-high-tech project
(see Appendix A) had an ambitious scope and many unknowns that the project management
team had to consider during the telescope's construction.

Communication was an issue from the very beginning of this project, especially between the
three most significant contributors to this project, the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC),
the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) at NASA's headquarters, and Northrop Grumman
Aeronautics Systems (NGAS). Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) is an essential
laboratory for developing and operating crewless spacecraft such as the Hubble Telescope
and the JWST; the lab was in charge of project management for the JWST. Throughout the
project, communication problems arose between the GSFC, SMD and NGAS, leading to
delays, overspending, and miscommunications between all three entities (ICRP, 2010).

Poor communication and differing priorities caused many misunderstandings within NASA
and between project team members. For example, there was a significant contrast between
the views of project management and those of SMD and the Astrophysics Division, with
SMD and the Astrophysics Division claiming to have been responsive to all project needs
while project management was simultaneously saying that they had never been funded
adequately and had little to no reserves to deal with issues. Additionally, the JWST Project
Manager reported to the vice president of Civil and Military systems, which is four levels
down from the CEO of Northrop Grumman, too low of a level at NGAS for the importance of
the JWST Project to NASA (ICRP, 2010). This low-level reporting also contributed to the
widespread opinion throughout NASA that NGAS was heavily to blame for issues within the
JWST project when, in reality, GSFC problems were at the same level as those at NGAS.
These miscommunications between entities led to delays in executive decisions, which led to
 6

high-cost impacts. With an expenditure rate of $1 million per day and a low NGAS incentive
for cost control versus the high value of cost control placed by NASA on the JWST Project,
the lack of effective communications between entities caused high-cost impacts on the project
overall.

In addition to the communication problems faced throughout the management of the JWST
project, there were also technological issues that came into play and needed to be considered
and addressed by project managers. One of management's most considerable challenges was
that the telescope observatory could not be tested in its final flight configurations. Testing
would have required deploying a 21-metre by 12-metre sunshade without gravity under
extreme range and distribution on thermal conditions, which was impossible in any facility
being used. Instead, the project managers tested individual elements and then integrated them
later (C. Chaplain (GAO), 2020). Furthermore, because of the sheer scale and complexity of
the telescope, there were many questions regarding technological feasibility and applicability
that management had to consider. These technical considerations included things such as the
fact that the mirror was over six times the collecting area of the Hubble Space Telescope,
calibrations needed to be specific to less than millions of a metre, instrument functionality
and temperature required to be maintained at about -270 degrees celsius, and precision
control needed to be kept at a farther distance than ever before (R. Pettis Jr., 2022).

These various technological requirements and challenges posed project managers with an
arduous task. Because of the issues faced, the JWST project used more schedule reserves than
outlined. These schedule extensions, in turn, resulted in more extended contract workforce
employment than was initially planned. The additional contract lengths and extra time
required to address all technological issues also led to additional costs for the project.

What Went Wrong

Since its launch in December of 2021, the James Webb Space Telescope has proven to be a
success. However, the project faced several challenges that nearly led to its cancellation.

Regarding budget, the project needed to be more adequately stated from its inception
(Harwood, 2010). With an initial budget of $1 billion in 2000, the amount quickly rose to
$4.5 billion by 2005. Another flawed budget was presented in 2008 (W. Harwood, 2010), and
due to project mismanagement, a replan was carried out in 2011, leading to both a change in
 7

the organisational structure and an intensification of its monitoring and control (P. Smith,
n.d.). Despite the replan, miscommunication between the three main stakeholders mentioned
previously, and a lack of defined lines of authority (ICRP, 2010) caused continued difficulty
in detecting and solving problems on time, leading to continued cost growth up to the final
figure of $9.7 billion (J. Martin, 2022).

Budget mismanagement also largely impacted the duration of the project. Initially supposed
to be launched in 2014, low reserves in the budget (ICRP, 2010) to tackle the problems that
arose during the telescope's development caused delays that accumulated over time. Issues
encountered were also a primary cause of the project's high cost, as many were derived from
the high technical requirements, leading to an increase in the workforce and resources needed
to overcome the above-mentioned technological challenges. The more problems emerged, the
more delays they faced, and by extension, more resources were required.

In short, the inability to understand the requirements of the project and the poor monitoring
and frequent misunderstandings between the main stakeholders were the two main problems
of the delays and budget overruns.

How Challenges Were Managed

The previously mentioned issues were identified in an independent, comprehensive review in

which two main issues, budget understatement and miscommunication, were identified in the
project. Specifically, the budget could have been a bottom-up approach, and the lack of
identification of potential cost threats led to below-standard cost and program analysis. These
issues caused budget flaws to remain undetected, creating year-to-year budget increases
without recognising the actual predicted price. Additionally, frequent miscommunication
between influential stakeholders added additional issues (Ballhaus, et. al., 2010).

The comprehensive independent review advised the JWST project and primary stakeholders
(defined in Appendix B) to make changes to reduce cost-related issues, including
restructuring the project organisation at GSFC to focus on reducing costs and identifying
threats. Further, the project reporting should be done directly to the science associate
administrator, increasing the project's oversight capability. Advice was also given to improve
the project site's cost and program analysis capabilities. The panel also advised improving the
communication, including clarification of the governance structure (Ballhaus et al, 2010).
 8

This initial review estimated that the JWST would launch in September 2015, with a total
budget of $6.5 billion.

After further delays, an independent review board, the Webb Independent Review Board
(WIRB), was established in April 2018. The focus areas of WIRB were to evaluate all the
factors influencing mission success and reinforce the space agency's plan to complete tasks
such as testing the launch campaign and investigating the feasibility of NASA's next flagship
telescope (NASA, 2018).

On 31 May 2018, WIRB released a review of the project, and NASA responded by agreeing
to several improvement points identified by WIRB. These agreements included budgeting
improvements based on the confirmation of the evaluation of the severely understated project
budget. Additionally, several communication improvements were agreed to, including clear
and frequent communication with stakeholders, a mission status update given by GSFC and
NGAS with consistent and factual data and sources, the development of a communication
plan for the JWST project by NASA, and the use of the same criticality and assessment charts
across JWST reviews (James Webb Space Telescope Independent Review Board, 2018).

The 2018 review indicated that the project would be completed in early 2021 but was delayed
by the Covid-19 pandemic (New Scientist, 2020). Despite this delay, independent reviews
and the WIRB allowed for project completion without extra unforeseen risks and costs.

What Went Well

The JWST project was a monumental undertaking in astronomy and space exploration. While
it encountered its fair share of challenges and delays, several aspects of the project have
excelled from inception to completion.

Firstly, a critical success of the JWST project lies in the adept development and integration of
cutting-edge technologies. The telescope boasts numerous technological advancements,
notably its segmented primary mirror, comprising 18 hexagonal segments constructed from
ultra-lightweight beryllium. These segments were meticulously manufactured and precisely
aligned, ensuring the telescope's mirror is exceptionally accurate and capable of capturing
high-resolution images of distant celestial objects. The innovation and precision applied in
creating this mirror assembly were instrumental in the project's triumph, enabling the JWST
to fulfil its primary mission of studying the universe in unprecedented detail (NASA, 2023).
 9

Secondly, the JWST project has served as a prominent model of international collaboration
among space agencies, scientists, and engineers from across the globe. NASA, the ESA, and
the CSA worked in unison to design, build, and launch the telescope. This international
collaboration helped distribute the financial burden and leveraged diverse expertise and
perspectives. The result of this collaboration is evident in the successful development of the
telescope's scientific instruments, which were contributed to by various countries and
institutions. The synergy of these international contributions ensured that the JWST could
achieve its ambitious scientific goals and objectives (NASA, 2023).

Conclusion

The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project embodies the combination of
technological advancement and human interest in understanding the universe and cosmos.
From its origination in 1989 to its successful launch on 25 December 2021, the project faced
daunting challenges, primarily rooted in technological, budget mismanagement, and
communication issues, resulting in delays and cost overruns.

While project management faced no shortage of issues, the turning point in this project came
in 2010, when a comprehensive independent review identified budget underestimation and
communication breakdowns as primary concerns. Following this review, the Webb
Independent Review Board (WIRB) was formed in 2018, and its recommendations aided in
the overcoming of these issues. Improved communication, refined budgeting, technological
adjustments, and enhanced oversight ensured the successful completion of the project, though
some minor delays happened due to the unexpected impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Despite these challenges, the JWST project epitomises human technological advancement. Its
segmented primary mirror and sizable observatory are engineering feats that underline the
scale of its innovation. Further, the collaboration between international space agencies and
scientific communities has demonstrated the power and impact of the drive to advance space
exploration.

From concept to a fully operational space telescope, the JWST now promises to unravel
mysteries about the universe. It stands as an inspiration for future generations, showcasing
human dedication to overcome limitations to our understanding of the cosmos.
 10

References

Ballhaus et al. (2010) Final report, James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Independent
Comprehensive Review Panel

C. Chaplain. (28/01/2020). James Webb Space Telescope: Technical Challenges Have

Caused Schedule Strain and May Increase Costs. U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO). Retrieved 2 October 2023, from
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-224

ICRP. (29/10/2010). Final Report. James Webb Space Telescope, Independent

Comprehensive Review Panel. Retrieved 30 September 2023, from
https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/499224main_jwst-icrp_report-fina
l.pdf

J. Martin. (22/08/2023). How Much did the James Webb Telescope cost?. Retrieved 3 October
2023, from How Much Did the James Webb Telescope Cost? - History-Computer

J. Shenhar & D. Dvir (2007). Reinventing Project Management: The diamond approach to
successful growth and innovation. (6 ed.) Harvard Business School Publishing.

L. Thamma (2023). Stakeholder Analysis using the Power Interest Grid. Retrieved 17.
September 2023, from
hhttps://www.projectmanagement.com/wikis/368897/Stakeholder-Analysis--using-the
-Power-Interest-Grid

NASA. (2018). NASA completes Webb Telescope Review, commits to launch in early 2021
Available at:
https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-completes-webb-telescope-review-commits-t
o-launch-in-early-2021

NASA. (n.d.). Learning from NASA: James Webb Space Telescope. Retrieved 11 May 2023,
from
https://www.pmi.org/learning/publications/pm-network/digital-exclusives/learning-fro
m-nasa-james-webb-space-telescope
 11

NASA. (n.d.). Technologies for the James Webb Space Telescope. James Webb Space
Telescope. Retrieved 29 September 2023, from
https://www.webb.nasa.gov/resources/2008techflyer.pdf

NASA. (n.d.). Webb Space Telescope. Webb Space Telescope. Retrieved 29 September 2023,
from https://webbtelescope.org/home

P. Smith. (n.d.). James Webb Space Telescope. Retrieved 02 September 2023, from James
Webb Space Telescope (energy.gov)

R. Pettis Jr. (14/07/2022). Webb Is a Reminder of America’s Technical Prowess in Future

Global Competition and Cooperation. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 4
October 2023, from
https://www.cfr.org/blog/webb-reminder-americas-technical-prowess-future-global-co
mpetition-and-cooperation#:~:text=It%20took%20twenty%20years%20to,the%20inst
rument%20temperature%20at%20450

W. Connely. (01/01/2004). Integrated Risk Management Within NASA Programs/Projects.

NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. Retrieved 2 October 2023, from
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20040082140/downloads/20040082140.pdf

W. Harwood. (10/11/2023). Management blamed for space telescope cost overrun. Retrieved
3 October 2023, from Management blamed for space telescope cost overrun - CNET

James Webb Space Telescope Independent Review Board. (2018). Final report. National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. Washington DC.

New Scientist. (16/07/2020). Launch of the James Webb Space Telescope delayed again due
to covid-19. New Scientist. Retrieved October 10, 2023, from
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2249244-launch-of-the-james-webb-space-teles
cope-delayed-again-due-to-covid-19/
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Appendix A

Project Diamond / NTCP Model

The diamond model helps to categorise the project according to the four characteristics:
Novelty, Technology Pace, and Complexity (A. J. Shenhar & D. Dvir, 2007). Based on its
improvements and upgrades compared to its predecessor, the Hubble Telescope, arguments
for the James Webb Space Telescope being a platform project in terms of novelty can be
made. Additionally, universities and space agencies from different countries had to work
together to develop instruments and tools that did not exist before, classifying this project as
super-high-tech. Defined as an array project, the Telescope consists of many systems and
sub-projects, from developing scientific instruments to constructing a spacecraft or ground
centre. The fact that many different project offices were formed specifically for the project
further underlines this position. Finally, as there was no competition from other space
agencies to create a similar telescope, this project can be categorised as a regular project.

Considering the characteristics above, the illustration below indicates that the design freeze
should have occurred late in the project because of its categorisation as a super-high-tech and
platform project. Furthermore, this illustration provides insight into the communication
between project stakeholders and decision-making processes. The project is in the array
group, meaning the communication should be formal. Lastly, the regular pace indicates that
the project manager may have had little autonomy (Y. Huang, 2023 →Slide 34).

Figure 2. Project Diamond / NTCP Model (A. J. Shenhar & D. Dvir, 2007)
 13

Appendix B

Power/Interest Matrix

Figure 3. Power/Interest Matrix (L. Thamma, 2023)

The above figure shows a power/interest matrix for the JWST project. The identification and
categorisation of stakeholders in the matrix can create the following benefits (L. Thamma,
2023):
- Identify essential stakeholders who can bring early-stage input and shape the quality
of the project.
- Gaining support from the most critical stakeholders can help secure resources for the
project.
- Early and frequent communication with stakeholders can ensure their understanding,
allowing them to support the project when necessary.
Governments of participating countries were placed in the group “Keep Satisfied” because
although they have power in that they could disband the project, they have lower interest.
There is no need to update them regularly. Because project success depends on the suppliers,
project team, partnering space agencies, and partnering universities, their actions can heavily
impact the project, and they need to be informed regularly to foster cooperation. The
scientists, research universities, and the media must be informed often because they have a
legitimate interest in the project. The media wants to cover the success or failure of the
project while the scientists, research universities, and other space agencies build upon the
 14

findings of the JWST. Taxpayers and the wider public may not be aware of the ongoing
project and can, therefore, be categorised with the lowest priority.
 15

Gantt Chart