Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 119 (2012) 15–26

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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdp

Vicarious dishonesty: When psychological closeness creates distance

from one’s moral compass
Francesca Gino a,⇑, Adam D. Galinsky b
a
Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Boston MA 02163, United States
b
Kellogg School Of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: In four studies employing multiple manipulations of psychological closeness, we found that feeling con-
Received 27 December 2010 nected to another individual who engages in selfish or dishonest behavior leads people to behave more
Accepted 28 March 2012 selfishly and less ethically themselves. In addition, psychologically connecting with a scoundrel led to
Available online 9 May 2012
greater moral disengagement. We also establish that vicarious justification is the mechanism explaining
Accepted by Madan Pillutla
this effect: When participants felt psychologically close to someone who had behaved selfishly, they were
more likely to consider the behavior to be less shame-worthy and less unethical; it was these lenient
Keywords:
judgments that then led them to act more unethically themselves. These vicarious effects were moder-
Ethics
Dishonesty
ated by whether the miscreant was identified with a photograph and by the type of behavior. Impor-
Interdependence tantly, we establish a general process of vicariousness: psychological closeness produced both
Perspective taking vicarious generosity and selfishness depending on the behavior of the person one feels psychologically
Psychological closeness connected to. These findings suggest an irony of psychological closeness: it can create distance from one’s
Unethical behavior own moral compass.
Vicarious self-justification Ó 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Vicarious dishonesty

Introduction to justify that person’s actions and thus more likely to behave
unethically themselves in subsequent situations.1 More broadly,
In the summer of 1993, Quincy, Illinois was one of many we propose that the bonds that bind, even when those connections
towns who was overrun by rising tides along the Mississippi Riv- are minimal and modest, lead people to vicariously re-enact and rep-
er and suffered extensive and systemic damage. Upon hearing of licate another person’s traits and behaviors. Further, we propose that
this town’s precarious situation, Quincy, Massachusetts leaped these vicarious processes are robust across domains and valences,
into action, sending a lifeline of supplies (Miller, Downs, & just as likely to occur when the observed behavior is negative as
Prentice, 1998). As this example illustrates, even small cues such when it is positive.
as sharing the same name can psychologically bond us to others
and are sufficient to inspire acts of altruism and helping towards From an isolated to a social moral self
them.
Now consider the case of finding out that a peer who shares Over the past two decades, an increasing number of researchers
your birthday is inflating their expense reports. As you learn about have invoked the concept of a ‘‘moral self’’ to describe an interior
these dishonest behaviors, how would you react? You might view psychological state that is integral to the definition of the self
them critically and choose to distance yourself from this morally (Noam & Wren, 1993). In this research, morality has mostly been
tainted individual. In this paper, we make the opposite prediction: discussed by examining the self in isolation. For instance, Zhong
when a person feels psychologically close to someone who engages and Liljenquist (2006) have shown a link between physical and
in dishonest behavior, they will become vicariously motivated moral purity by demonstrating that cleansing behavior can ‘‘wash

1
Throughout the paper, we use the terms ‘‘dishonest (honest)’’, ‘‘unethical
(ethical)’’, and ‘‘immoral (moral)’’ interchangeably. We study both dishonest (honest)
behaviors, as well as selfish (generous) ones. Although different in nature, both types
of behavior share the common feature of advancing one’s own self-interest at the
⇑ Corresponding author. Fax: +1 617 495 5672. expense of others and involve a conflict between a short-term monetary benefit and a
E-mail addresses: fgino@hbs.edu (F. Gino), agalinsky@kellogg.northwestern.edu longer-term social benefit (e.g., having a better reputation or behaving consistently
(A.D. Galinsky). with the goal of being moral and good).

0749-5978/$ - see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.03.011
16 F. Gino, A.D. Galinsky / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 119 (2012) 15–26

away one’s sins.’’ Related research has found a link between linger (2009) found that when the parental role is primed parents
immorality, physical self-punishment, and moral redemption. For express more moral disapproval of harmless but offensive actions
instance, Wallington (1973) demonstrated that people who violate than nonparents. In a similar vein, Fitzsimons and Bargh (2003)
moral rules actively cause themselves to suffer physically. Consis- found that priming different types of relationship partners (e.g.,
tent with these findings, Blasi (1984) suggested that the link be- best friend or mother vs. coworker) produced prime-consistent
tween moral self-judgment and subsequent actions lie in the behavior such as helping. These streams of research identify two
degree to which morality and moral concerns are integrated into important mechanisms through which others’ moral behavior
the person’s sense of self. According to Blasi (1993), people are influences our own: establishing the norms for appropriate behav-
motivated to make their actions consistent with their ideals of a ior, or reminding people of how role models act through priming.
moral self, and self-consistency motivates moral action. Similarly, In this paper, we focus on a third mechanism that operates also
Aquino and Reed (2002) proposed that people possess a cognitive in cases in which the norm for appropriate behavior is clear. We
schema of the moral self that is organized around a set of moral propose that individuals perceive questionable behaviors exhibited
trait associations. They developed a method for measuring the by another person to be more acceptable when they feel psycho-
self-importance of moral identity based on the assumption that logically close to rather than distant from the person. Even when
its cognitive salience within a person’s overall self-schema has very subtle bonds exist between individuals, we suggest that the
some temporal stability. That is, moral identity is more chronically ethical actions of one person influence those of another, providing
accessible for some people than others across situations. Support- evidence for a ‘‘social moral self.’’ Even when the connection to this
ing this argument, moral identity predicted morally relevant other person is the minimalist of connections, the influence of that
behaviors (i.e., donating food to the needy, donating money to person’s actions can be strong enough to produce vicarious behav-
out-groups) over a period of several weeks (Aquino & Reed, ior, both dishonest and honest.
2002; Reed & Aquino, 2003). What follows from Blasi’s work and
Aquino and Reed’s research on moral identity is that a motive for
moral action results from one’s desire to act in ways consistent Psychological closeness and vicarious dishonesty
with one’s own sense of self as a moral being.
Building on the idea that morality is a defining and fundamental Aron and Aron’s (1986) self-expansion theory argues that peo-
dimension of the self, we propose that morality also has a social ple’s sense of self can be broadened to include others, and that this
component: Whether individuals behave unethically or ethically is likely to occur when these others are people we feel close to
depends on the actions of those around them. In particular, draw- (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991). We define psychological close-
ing on vicarious self-perception theory (Goldstein & Cialdini, ness as feelings of attachment and perceived connection toward
2007), we suggest that feeling psychologically close to another per- another person or people. People feel close to others not only when
son is enough for this person’s behavior (whether the behavior is they share a common group membership or identity (Tajfel, 1982;
ethical or unethical) to affect our own. We examine both vicarious Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), but also when they share
dishonesty and vicarious generosity. In doing so, we both establish subtler similarities. For example, people experience a sense of psy-
a general principle of vicariousness but also identify an interesting chological closeness to another person when they share common
asymmetry in the effects of psychological closeness. attributes, such as a similar name (Pelham, Carvallo, & Jones,
2005) or the same birthday (Cialdini & DeNichols, 1989; Finch &
The influence of others’ moral behavior Cialdini, 1989; Miller et al., 1998). People also feel psychologically
close to others when they are asked to take their perspective and
The (un)ethical behavior of others can influence our own put themselves in their shoes, or when they are from an interde-
through various mechanisms. First, especially in situations where pendent culture or in an interdependent mindset (e.g., Gunia, Siva-
there is ambiguity about the appropriate way of behaving, we nathan, & Galinsky, 2009).
may look to others and use their behavior to understand the pre- Once psychological closeness forms, people take on the proper-
vailing norms. Others’ behavior thus defines the social norm or ties of the person they feel close to and psychologically afford them
provides the social proof that then leads us to behave in a similar ‘‘self’’ status (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; Galinsky & Moskowitz,
manner as those around us (e.g., Cialdini, 1993; Goldstein, Martin, 2000). As a result, when individuals perceive another person to
& Cialdini, 2008b). For instance, Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevi- be part of the self, actor–observer perspective differences are re-
cius (2008a) found that hotel guests who learned that most other duced and this other person’s characteristics become one’s own
guests had reused their towels (the social-proof appeal) were (Aron & Aron, 1986; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Building on re-
26% more likely to recycle their towels than were those who were search suggesting that one’s own self-concept can expand to in-
only exposed to a general prosocial environmental-protection clude others, Goldstein and Cialdini (2007) proposed that when
message. Furthermore, hotel guests who learned that most other people observe the behavior of a person they feel psychologically
guests who had stayed in the same room had reused towels were close to, they make inferences about that person’s attributes and
even more likely to do so themselves (a 33% increase) than were these inferences can carry over to inferences about one’s own attri-
guests who learned the reuse percentage for the hotel in general. butes as if one had engaged in the same behavior. This vicarious
Related research has found similar effects on behavior as a result self-perception processes can then lead individuals to behave in
of observing somebody else’s misconduct. When people are ex- ways that are consistent with the behavior they observed initially,
posed to an in-group member’s unethical behavior, they align with and this is more likely to occur the closer one feels to the initiator
the behavior and behave dishonestly themselves since the in- (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007; Kouchaki, 2011). Thus, feelings of psy-
group member’s behavior provides information about what’s chological closeness create vicarious possibilities, even when those
appropriate in the given context (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009a; Gino, feelings are subtly induced.
Gu, & Zhong, 2009b). When people feel connected to others they experience their
Second, when people are already aware of the normative behav- emotions (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994), including joy (Mur-
ior in a given situation thanks to the presence of a clear role model, ray, Holmes, Bellavia, Griffin, & Dolderman, 2002), embarrassment
they follow this person’s actions automatically. In fact, just the (Miller, 1987), and pain (Batson, 1991; Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff, &
priming of a role model helps people regulate their moral behavior Decety, 2006). In addition, people tend to vicariously justify the ac-
and influences their judgment. For instance, Eibach, Libby, and Ehr- tions of those to whom they feel psychologically close (Gunia et al.,
 F. Gino, A.D. Galinsky / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 119 (2012) 15–26 17

2009). For instance, Gunia et al. (2009) found that when a creates a distance from one’s own moral compass by measuring
person felt psychologically close to another, they escalated their moral disengagement. Finally, in Experiment 4 we compare the
commitment by investing further in a failing program orchestrated effects of psychological closeness on selfish and generous behavior
by the initial actor, even when such investments were personally and find evidence both for a general principle of vicariousness and
costly to the participant. Thus, psychological closeness blurs the for an asymmetry: psychological closeness ironically produced
boundaries between the self and others, and, as a result, can lead stronger effects when the actions of the person one feels psycho-
individuals to experience and behave more consistently with logically close to are selfish rather than generous.
others’ internal states.
Drawing on vicarious self-concept theory (Goldstein & Cialdini, Manipulating psychological closeness
2007), we propose that psychological closeness, however subtle, to
another person who engages in selfish or dishonest behavior cre- The clouding of self and other that occurs through psychological
ates distance from one’s own moral compass. Similarly, psycholog- closeness is common in close relationships (Aron et al., 1991; Cial-
ical closeness to another person who engages in generous or dini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997) but it can also result
honest behavior brings one closer to one’s own moral compass. Be- from people’s cognitive orientation or mindsets. For instance, indi-
cause of psychological closeness, we predict that individuals will viduals who construe the self as interdependent define themselves
be motivated to vicariously justify the other person’s actions and in terms of their groups’ attributes and are thus likely to experi-
to judge their selfish or unethical behavior as less morally prob- ence a sense of relatedness toward others (e.g., Brewer & Gardner,
lematic, but more morally righteous when the other person’s ac- 1996; Kuhnen, Hannover, & Schubert, 2001; Markus & Kitayama,
tions are generous or ethical. In the case of unethical or selfish 1991). Similarly, perspective-takers psychologically take on the
behavior, this vicarious self-justification of nefarious deeds and characteristics of others, seeing others’ central attributes as more
dismissal of its moral components will lead people who have self-descriptive (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Galinsky,
formed a psychological connection with a wrongdoer to behave Ku, & Wang, 2008, 2010). Taking the perspective of others com-
less ethically themselves. In the case of ethical or generous behav- monly lead people to treat the actions of those as their own (Galin-
ior, instead, it will result in vicarious honesty. sky et al., 2008) and to experience the same outcomes such as
The current research provides several contributions to the exist- cognitive dissonance (e.g., Norton, Monin, Cooper, & Hogg, 2003)
ing literature. First, we propose and find that subtle psychological or specific emotions (e.g., Jackson et al., 2006). Thus, psychological
connections with wrongdoers can lead us to behave unethically, closeness can be triggered through perspective taking or by prim-
even when there is no ambiguity about the norm of appropriate ing an interdependent mindset. In addition, it can also be invoked
behavior. We also investigate the mechanism explaining why this through more subtle manipulations like sharing common features
occurs, showing that experiencing feelings of psychological close- like the same first name or birthday (Cialdini & DeNichols, 1989).
ness influences our perception of the unethicality of others’ behav- Although these various forms of psychological closeness likely
ior and our emotional reactions to it. Second, we establish the produce different fine-grained effects on moral behavior, here we
influence of psychological closeness by employing different opera- focus on an attribute that we believe all of these manipulations
tionalizations of this construct, including perspective taking, share in common: they produce feelings of relatedness and create
shared characteristics, and priming of an interdependent mindset. greater self-other overlap. As a result, we predict that these seem-
Although these different factors may produce different fine- ingly disparate manipulations have similar capacities to create
grained effects on moral behavior, they all share a common effect vicarious processes. Thus, across our studies, we manipulate psy-
by changing how we view and judge the ethically questionable chological closeness in different ways to establish the robustness
behavior of those we feel close to. Finally, although unethical and of vicarious morality.
ethical behaviors are generally studied independently and in sepa-
rate literatures, here we examine the effects of psychological close-
ness on both vicarious dishonesty and vicarious honesty. Our Experiment 1: perspective taking and vicarious selfishness
results show that psychological closeness produces both vicarious
generosity and immorality depending on whether the psychologi- Our first study manipulated psychological closeness through
cally close individual behaved unethically rather than ethically. perspective taking and measured vicarious selfishness. Specifically,
we tested whether taking the perspective of a person who acted
selfishly would lead the perspective-taker to show greater inten-
Overview of experiments tions to act selfishly themselves. Through perspective taking, a per-
ceiver attempts to put him- or herself in the shoes of an actor,
We tested our main hypotheses in four experiments that em- thereby imagining that person’s behaviors, thoughts, and feelings.
ployed multiple forms of psychological closeness and different out- One of the benefits of perspective taking is that it creates social
come measures. In Experiment 1, we tested whether psychological bonds (Galinsky et al., 2005).
closeness manipulated through perspective taking would influence In the study, participants learned that another person had cho-
one’s own intentions to behave selfishly, and whether it would sen to behave selfishly during a previous experiment. Participants
lead participants to view the selfish behavior as less unethical first were asked to take this person’s perspective or were assigned
and shame-worthy. In Experiment 2, we examined the impact of to a control condition, and then to indicate how selfishly they
a more generalized form of psychological closeness by activating would behave if they found themselves in the same situation. Par-
an interdependent mindset through priming. We also introduced ticipants also evaluated the ethicality of the person’s actions and
a second manipulation, whether the person behaving selfishly indicated the extent to which they found them shameful.
was identified or not, to test whether identifiability increased
vicarious dishonesty or moderated the effect of the interdependent Perceived shame-worthiness and unethicality of others’ actions
mindset.
In Experiment 3, we extended our investigation by considering We predicted that taking the perspective of the person who be-
real, unethical behavior and by manipulating psychological close- haved selfishly would lead participants to be less critical of that
ness in a more subtle way, i.e., sharing the same birth date with person’s behavior and thus to report they would behave the same
the wrongdoer. Further, we test whether psychological closeness way if they were in that person’s shoes. That is, we expected par-
18 F. Gino, A.D. Galinsky / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 119 (2012) 15–26

Perceived Selfish /
Psychological Perceived
shame - unethical
closeness unethicality
worthiness behavior

Fig. 1. Theoretical model tested in Experiment 1.

ticipants’ intentions to act selfishly to be affected by psycho- Perspective-taking manipulation

logical closeness. We also expected participants’ judgments of Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimen-
the person’s actions (i.e., their perceived shame-worthiness and tal conditions: perspective taking vs. control. We manipulated per-
unethicality) to mediate this relationship. In particular, we ex- spective taking by using the same instructions employed by Gunia
pected psychological closeness to lead participants to perceive et al. (2009). Participants in both conditions were shown a picture
the actions as less shameful and more morally appropriate. As a of an alleged recent participant and were asked to write about a
result, these judgments would increase participants’ intentions typical day in his life. Those in the perspective-taking condition
to behave selfishly themselves. Emotional reactions to ethical/ were instructed to imagine and describe a typical day in his shoes,
unethical behavior, in fact, form the basis for moral judgment looking at the world through his eyes. Those in the control condi-
(e.g., Caruso & Gino, 2011; Haidt, 2001). We suggest that when tion received no additional instructions.
people feel psychologically close to another person who engaged
in morally questionable behavior, they are likely to judge the Pilot study. We conducted a pilot study on a non-overlapping
actions of the other person as more morally appropriate. Thus, group of participants to test the validity and effectiveness of our
we predicted that participants in the perspective-taking condition perspective taking manipulation of psychological closeness. Sev-
would judge the selfish behavior as less shame-worthy and less enty-six individuals (Mage = 27.39, SDage = 5.17; 36 male) partici-
morally wrong than would participants in the control condition. pated in this pilot study for $4. They were randomly assigned to
In addition, we predicted that these judgments would explain either the perspective taking condition or the control condition.
the link between psychological closeness and participants’ decision They first engaged in the same writing task used in the main study
to act selfishly, as depicted in Fig. 1. and then answered a series of questions. We asked them to indi-
cate the extent to which they took the target’s perspective during
the writing task on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = to a great ex-
tent). Next, they indicated the extent to which they felt similar, re-
lated, and psychologically close to the target. We averaged these
Method three items into a single measure of psychological closeness
(a = .89). We also asked participants to indicate how closely they
One-hundred three students from local universities in the felt to the target using the common self-other overlap measure
southeastern United States (Mage = 23.29, SDage = 5.20; 45 male) (see Fig. 2). Finally, participants completed the short version of
participated in the study for $6. Participants read a scenario the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; see Watson,
describing the behavior of a male, college-aged student who alleg- Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), asking them to report, at the present mo-
edly participated in a previous experiment and behaved selfishly; ment, the extent to which they felt 10 positive emotions (a = .93)
next, they were asked to answer a few questions about the sce- and 10 negative emotions (a = .91). The results are summarized
nario. The instructions read, ‘‘In this study, you will read a descrip- in Table 1. As Table 1 shows, our manipulation effectively pro-
tion of something that happened to a college student. His picture is moted feelings of psychological closeness but did not influence
below.’’ participants’ positive or negative affect.

Fig. 2. Self-other overlap measure included in the pilot studies.

Table 1
Summary of results for pilot study 1. The table includes means, standard deviations in parentheses and t-tests.

Took NS’s perspective Psychological closeness Self-other overlap Positive affect Negative affect
Perspective taking 5.45 (1.48) 3.37 (1.68) 2.85 (1.62) 2.77 (1.01) 1.34 (0.64)
Control 4.16 (1.76) 2.69 (1.21) 2.14 (1.19) 2.54 (0.87) 1.26 (0.44)
t-Test t(74) = 3.40, p = .001 t(74) = 2.06, p = .043 t(74) = 2.20, p = .031 t(74) = 1.05, p = .30 t(74) = 0.66, p = .51
 F. Gino, A.D. Galinsky / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 119 (2012) 15–26 19

Experimental scenario [1.21, .11]). Next, we regressed amount left for the counterpart
Next, participants read the following scenario (adapted from on our psychological closeness manipulation, shame-worthiness
Gino et al., 2009b, Experiment 3): (the ‘‘stage 1’’ mediator), and unethicality ratings (the ‘‘stage 2’’
mediator). Participants’ perceived unethicality of NS’s behavior
Please consider the following description of a research study,
predicted the dollar amount they reported they would leave for
which was conducted in a lab at UNC a while back. At the begin-
their counterpart (from b = .51, p < .001), and the direct effect of
ning of the session, the experimenter explained that the study
our psychological closeness manipulation on this amount was only
goal was to understand how people make decisions. In the task,
marginally significant when the mediators were included in the
NS had been randomly paired with another participant who was
model (b = .14, p = .06; 95% bias-corrected CI, [0.92, 0.03]). Ta-
in another room in the lab (who would not be identified at that
ken together, these findings are consistent with our theoretical
moment, nor later). NS was given $10 to divide between himself
model depicted in Fig. 1.
and the participant in the other room he had been paired with
(i.e., his counterpart). The experimenter told NS that he could
offer his counterpart any portion of the $10, from nothing to Discussion
the entire amount, or any amount in between. The counterpart
would keep whatever amount NS decided to offer, and NS These findings provide evidence that psychological closeness –
would keep whatever he didn’t offer. The counterpart knew in this case manipulated through perspective taking – leads peo-
all of the rules and all of the information that NS knew. ple to report they would follow the example of one bad apple.
When participants felt psychologically close to another person
After explaining the study procedure, the experiment gave NS who had engaged in selfish behavior, they reported being more
an envelope with 9 $1 coins and four quarters. The experi- likely to behave selfishly themselves. In addition, they judged
menter instructed NS to take the amount of money he wanted the selfish behavior as less shame-worthy and as less morally
to keep for himself, and leave the rest of the money in the enve- inappropriate, and these judgments explained the relationship be-
lope to be sent to his counterpart in the other room. Not too tween psychological closeness and the amount of money partici-
long after hearing the instructions, NS made up his mind: He pants indicated they would leave for their counterpart.
poured all the money on the desk and then started putting all Psychological closeness reduced ratings of perceived shame-wor-
the money in his own pocket. thiness and unethicality, which, in turn, increased intentions to
behave selfishly.
After reading this scenario, participants evaluated NS’s behavior
(see below).
Experiment 2: interdependent mindset and vicarious
Dependent variables dishonesty
Judgments of target’s behavior. Participants indicated the extent to
which they thought the target’s behavior was shameful and was We designed a second study to extend the findings of Experi-
embarrassing using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). ment 1 by examining the impact of a generalized form of psycho-
We averaged these two emotions into a composite measure of logical closeness. Instead of manipulating psychological closeness
shame-worthiness (a = .90). Using a similar 7-point scale, partici- through perspective taking, in Experiment 2 we activated an inter-
pants then indicated how wrong, morally inappropriate and uneth- dependent mindset through priming.
ical they found the behavior to be (a = .90). In addition, in Experiment 2, we further explore the link be-
tween psychological closeness and dishonest behavior by manipu-
Behavioral intentions. Finally, participants completed our main lating whether the person behaving selfishly was identified or not.
dependent variable. They indicated how much money they would In this way, we can examine whether identifiability increase vicar-
leave in the envelope. ious dishonesty directly or moderates the relationship between
psychological closeness and vicarious dishonesty. Research on
Results the ‘‘identifiable victim effect’’ has found that people tend to be
far more concerned about and show more sympathy toward iden-
As predicted, participants in the perspective-taking condition tifiable victims than statistical victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a; Loe-
reported they would leave less money (M = $3.41, SD = $2.25) than wenstein, Small, & Strnad, 2006; Small & Loewenstein, 2003).
those in the control condition (M = $4.54, SD = $1.66), t(101) = Simply telling people that a specific victim exists increases caring,
2.94, p < .01. Further, participants in the perspective-taking condi- even when no personalizing information about the victim is avail-
tion judged the target person’s selfish behavior as less shame- able. Identification decreases the social distance between victim
worthy (M = 3.53, SD = 1.65) and less unethical (M = 3.63, and responder (Small & Loewenstein, 2005) and changes the affec-
SD = 1.82) than did participants in the control condition (M = 4.39, tive reactions the responder shows to the victim (Kogut & Ritov,
SD = 1.93, t(101) = 2.37, p < .02, and M = 4.37, SD = 1.90, 2005b).
t(101) = 2.01, p < .05, respectively). These findings suggest that individuals are more likely to expe-
rience psychological closeness to others who are identifiable rather
Path analysis than unidentifiable. In addition, we predict that identifying the
To test the set of relationships specified by our theoretical mod- wrongdoer would moderate the relationship between psychologi-
el (Fig. 1), we conducted a three-path mediation model (Taylor, cal closeness and vicarious selfishness. Specifically, we hypothesize
MacKinnon, & Tein, 2008). First, we regressed perceived unethical- that priming interdependence will motivate participants to follow
ity on our psychological closeness manipulation (1 = perspective the selfish actions of another person even more strongly when this
taking, 0 = control) and shame-worthiness. The extent to which person (i.e., the wrongdoer) was identified than when he was not.
participants rated NS’s behavior as shame-worthy significantly af- As suggested earlier, different forms of psychological closeness
fected their ratings of unethicality (b = .77, p < .001), and the effect likely produce various fine-grained effects on moral actions. Show-
of psychological closeness on unethicality was no longer statisti- ing that interdependence only leads to vicarious selfishness when
cally significant when we added shame-worthiness to the model wrongdoers are identified provides evidence supporting the
(from b = .20, p = .047 to b = .02, p = .77; 95% bias-corrected CI, hypothesis that psychological closeness, rather than other aspects
20 F. Gino, A.D. Galinsky / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 119 (2012) 15–26

of an interdependent mindset, induces assimilation to another per- omy?) using a 7-point scale (1 = very little control to 7 = a great
son’s moral transgressions. deal of control) (a = .81; from Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galin-
sky, 2009). Second, we told participants to imagine they could win
Method additional money depending on the outcome of a die roll, and to
also imagine they could chose whether to roll the die themselves
One-hundred forty-seven students from local universities in the or have the experimenter roll it for them. As in previous studies
southeastern United States (Mage = 20, SDage = 0.81; 92 male) par- employing this measure (e.g., Langer, 1975), this choice measured
ticipated in the study. They received class credit in their introduc- feelings of control. Third, we assessed locus of control by using the
tory organizational behavior class for their participation. Rotter’s (1966) Internal–External control scale, a 29-item, forced-
Participants were randomly assigned to either an interdependent choice scale (which includes six filler items) which measures peo-
prime condition or independent prime condition (i.e., our control ple’s generalized expectancies for internal vs. external control of
condition). At the beginning of the study, the experimenter told reinforcement. People with an internal locus of control believe that
participants that they would participate in two separate experi- their own actions determine the rewards that they obtain, while
ments: a writing task followed by a judgment task. those with an external locus of control believe that their own
behavior does not matter much and that rewards in life are gener-
ally outside of their control.
Interdependence manipulation The results of this pilot study are summarized in Table 2. As Ta-
We used the writing task to manipulate psychological closeness ble 2 shows, priming participants with an interdependent mindset
by activating an interdependent mindset (see Experiment 4, Gunia promoted feelings of psychological closeness but did not influence
et al., 2009 for a similar manipulation). For the writing task, partic- participants’ affect or their perceived level of control. These results
ipants in the interdependent condition were instructed to spend suggest that our manipulation effectively triggers a sense of psy-
five-to-ten minutes writing about a situation in which they worked chological closeness.
with others to complete a task, focusing on the collaboration pro-
cess. Those in the independent condition were instructed to spend
Dependent variables
five-to-ten minutes writing about a situation in which they worked
Identifiability manipulation. We manipulated identifiability of the
alone to complete a task.
person behaving selfishly by including a picture of his in the iden-
Upon completion of the writing task, participants read the same
tified-wrongdoer condition. There was no picture in the unidenti-
scenario as in our first study. The instruction read, ‘‘You will now
fied-wrongdoer condition (see Gino, Shu, & Bazerman, 2010).
read a scenario describing a college student’s behavior during a re-
cent lab study conducted at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill and then will be asked to evaluate it.’’ Judgments of ethicality. Participants then indicated how wrong,
inappropriate and unethical they found the person’s behavior to
be using a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 = not at all, to 7 = very
Pilot study. To test the validity and effectiveness of priming an
much (a = .90). We note that given the high, positive correlation
interdependent mindset to manipulate psychological closeness,
between judgments of shame-worthiness and judgments of uneth-
we conducted a pilot study on a non-overlapping group of partic-
icality we found in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we decided to
ipants (N = 73; Mage = 30.44, SDage = 11.08; 32 male). Participants
focus only on moral judgments of others’ actions.
were randomly assigned to either the interdependent-mindset
condition or the control condition as in the main study. They com-
pleted the writing task with our manipulation and then answered Selfish behavior. Finally, participants were asked to indicate the
various questions. First, they indicated the extent to which they amount of money they would leave in the envelope for their anon-
felt it would be easy to take the perspective of another person ymous counterpart.
using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Next, they indi-
cated the extent to which they felt similar, related, and psycholog- Results
ically close to other people. We averaged these three items into a
single measure of psychological closeness (a = .89). We also asked As predicted, participants primed with interdependence re-
participants to indicate how closely they felt to other people using ported they would leave less money than did participants primed
the self-other overlap measure. Finally, participants completed the with independence, F(1, 143) = 20.78, p < .001, gp2 = .13. The effect
short version of the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988), assessing both of identifiability was not significant (p = .26). We also found a sig-
positive (a = .92) and negative emotions (a = .95). nificant interaction between interdependence and identifiability,
In addition, we included three measures of perceived control to F(1, 143) = 4.20, p < .05, g2 = .03 (depicted in Fig. 3). Participants
test whether priming an interdependent mindset increases partic- in the interdependent-mindset condition reported they would
ipants’ sense of control. First, participants indicated their perceived leave less money when the wrongdoer was identified than when
control on five hard-to-control outcomes (e.g., To what extent are he was not (t(79) = 2.44, p < .02), whereas participants in the
you able to have some control over what happens in the econ- independent condition reported they would leave about the same

Table 2
Summary of results for pilot study 2. The table includes means, standard deviations in parentheses and t-tests.

Perspective taking Psychological closeness Self-other overlap Positive affect Negative affect
Interdependence 5.47 (1.22) 5.06 (0.97) 4.13 (1.56) 2.73 (1.01) 1.38 (0.68)
Control 4.83 (1.41) 4.46 (1.24) 3.44 (1.31) 2.98 (0.84) 1.27 (0.46)
t-Test t(71) = 2.04, p = .045 t(71) = 2.25, p = .028 t(71) = 2.05, p = .045 t(71) = 1.14, p = .26 t(71) = 0.84, p = .41
Self rolls die Perceived control Internal locus of control
Interdependence 81.3% 3.04 (1.19) 11.75 (4.61)
Control 80.5% 2.74 (1.00) 11.41 (4.66)
t-Test v2(1, N = 73) < 1, p = .94 t(71) = 1.15, p = .25 t(71) = 0.31, p = .76
 F. Gino, A.D. Galinsky / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 119 (2012) 15–26 21

$5.00 Method
Amount of money left for the counterpart

$4.50

$4.00
Eighty-two students from local universities in the southern Uni-
ted States (Mage = 22.07, SDage = 2.45, 45 male) participated in the
$3.50
study for a maximum payment of $12. Participants received a $2
$3.00
show-up fee and could earn an extra $10 during the study. Partic-
$2.50 ipants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions upon arri-
$2.00 val: shared attributes or control condition.
$1.50
Pre-experimental survey
$1.00
A week prior to the lab session, all participants answered an on-
$0.50
line questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of many questions
$4.27 $3.92 $1.76 $2.97
$- and included a scale measuring moral disengagement about cheat-
Independent mindset Interdependent mindset
ing. This scale, developed by Shu, Gino, and Bazerman (2011), in-
Identified wrongdoer Unidentified wrongdoer
cludes six items measuring people’s attitudes about cheating
Fig. 3. Amount of money left for the counterpart, Experiment 2. Error bars (e.g., ‘‘Sometimes getting ahead of the curve is more important
represent standard errors. than adhering to rules,’’ and ‘‘Cheating is appropriate behavior be-
cause no one gets hurt’’). Participants indicated their agreement
amount of money regardless of whether or not the selfish person with each of the six items using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly dis-
was identified (t(64) < 1, p = .55). agree, 7 = strongly agree). We averaged participants’ responses
Participants primed with interdependence considered the per- across the six items into a single moral disengagement about
son’s behavior as less unethical than did participants primed with cheating score (a = .88). The higher the score, the higher the level
independence, F(1, 143) = 5.28, p < .03, gp2 = .04, but this was not of moral disengagement (i.e., participants think cheating is morally
moderated by identifiability, F < 1. We examined whether per- appropriate).
ceived unethicality mediated the effect of interdependence on
the amount of money left in the envelope (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The experiment
When perceived unethicality was included in the equation, the ef- We conducted each session with only one participant, plus a
fect of interdependence was reduced (from b = .36, p < .001 to confederate. The confederate made it clear to the participants at
b = .24, p < .001) and perceived unethicality predicted selfishness the onset of the study that cheating to the maximum extent was
(b = .61, p < .001). The 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for possible and did not produce consequences. As instructed, the con-
the size of the indirect effect did not include zero federate clearly cheated and he did not get caught for his dishonest
(1.074, 0.115), suggesting a significant indirect effect (MacKin- behavior.
non, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007).
Shared-attributes manipulation
In each session, when participants (i.e., each real participant
Discussion and the confederate) first arrived at the study location, they an-
swered a short questionnaire with several demographic questions.
These findings indicate that if an individual feels psychologi- They then learned that they would engage in an anonymous prob-
cally close to another person who engaged in selfish behavior, they lem-solving task under time pressure and that another participant
become vicariously motivated to judge the actions of the other per- would work on the same task in the same room.
son as morally appropriate and is thus likely to behave less ethi- In the shared-attributes condition, once the confederate and the
cally themselves. This effect of psychological closeness on participant returned their filled-out questionnaire to the experi-
vicarious selfishness is even stronger when the person is identified menter, the experimenter commented, ‘‘Interesting: you two were
through a photograph. Identifiability only mattered when the per- born in the same month, [hmonthi], and are of the same school
son already had a psychological closeness mindset activated. Thus, year, [hschool yeari]. Well, let’s go to the main task of the study.’’
an interdependent mindset combined with an identified miscreant (The experimenter mentioned the participant’s birthday month
created a toxic brew of selfish intentions. However, identifiability in place of hmonthi, and their school year in place of hschool yeari.)
did not moderate the effects on judgments of ethicality and ethi- Thus, participants in this condition learned that the confederate
cality mediated the direct, un-moderated effect of interdependence shared two attributes with them: their birthday month and school
on vicarious dishonesty. year.
In the control condition, the experimenter did not make any
comment.

Experiment 3: same birthday, same dishonest behavior Cheating opportunity

For the problem-solving task, participants received a brown
In Experiment 3, we seek to further demonstrate the robustness envelope that contained 10 dollars (nine one-dollar bills and four
of the relationship between psychological closeness and dishonesty quarters) and an empty white envelope, along with two sheets of
by examining a different and more subtle form of psychological paper (see Gino et al., 2009a for a similar procedure). The first
connection – a shared attribute in the form of the same birthday sheet was a worksheet with 20 matrices, each with a set of 12
– and by using a behavioral measure of unethical behavior. In this three-digit numbers (e.g., 4.78; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). The
study, participants had the opportunity to lie by over-reporting task second was a collection slip on which participants were to report
performance, thus earning money they did not deserve. In addition, their performance. On the back of the collection slip we included
this study examines whether psychological closeness creates a instructions for the task and a different matrix as an example.
distance from one’s own moral compass by measuring participants’ Participants had 5 min to find two numbers per matrix that
general views of dishonesty before and after having the opportunity added up to 10. For each pair of numbers correctly identified, they
to cheat. would keep $0.50 from their supply of money; they had to transfer
22 F. Gino, A.D. Galinsky / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 119 (2012) 15–26

the remaining amount to the white envelope and drop it in a des-

ignated box along with the collection slip. Note that 5 min is not
enough time to solve all 20 matrices. In previous studies (Mazar
et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2009a), people were able to find 7 of the
20 pairs on average. In addition, there was no apparent identifying
information anywhere on the two sheets, so results seemed anon-
ymous. Thus, participants had both an incentive and opportunity
to over-report their performance to earn more money.
However, we used a method that at the end of the study would
allow us to match the worksheet with the collection slip of each
participant and compute the difference between self-reported per-
formance and actual performance. One of the three-digit numbers
of the matrix used as an example on the back of the collection slip
was different for each participant and was equal to one of the three-
digit numbers of a matrix in the test sheet. Positive differences be-
tween self-reported and actual performance indicate that the par- Fig. 4. Performance on the problem-solving task, Experiment 3. Error bars
represent standard errors.
ticipants over-reported their performance and cheated on the task.

Confederate declaration Moral disengagement about cheating

About 1 min after the problem-solving task started (such a short We conducted an ANOVA to test whether the manipulation of
time that it would have been clear to the participant who was in psychological closeness affected participants’ moral disengage-
the room with the confederate that the person was lying or cheat- ment score at Time 2. Controlling for Time 1 moral disengagement
ing), the confederate stood up and said loudly: ‘‘I’ve solved every- scores, participants reported higher levels of moral disengagement
thing. My envelope for the unearned money is empty. What should at Time 2 in the shared-attributes condition (M = 4.67, SD = 1.64)
I do with it?’’ The experimenter reminded him about the proce- than in the control condition (M = 4.22, SD = 1.61), F(1, 79) = 4.02,
dure, and then asked the confederate to just wait patiently for p < .05, g2 = .05, demonstrating that psychological closeness cre-
the other participant to finish. ated a distance from one’s own moral compass. Note that the effect
of the covariate was also significant, F[1, 79] = 10.26, p = .002,
Dependent variables g2 = .12, suggesting that participants’ moral disengagement score
Actual and reported performance. Once the 5-min task ended, the at Time 1 predicted their moral disengagement score at Time 2.
experimenter asked participants to write down the number of cor- To investigate this result further, we examined how partici-
rectly solved matrices on the collection slip and drop it with the pants’ view of cheating changed due to psychological closeness
remaining money in the designated box prior to leaving the room. and their decision to overstate performance on the problem-solv-
This comprised our measure of reported performance. Afterwards, ing task. We computed the difference between participants’ score
the experimenter scored the actual performance of each partici- of moral disengagement about cheating at Time 2 (at the end of
pant. Thus, we could compare reported to actual performance. the lab session) and their score on the same measure at Time 1
(a week before the lab session). Positive values indicate an increase
in moral disengagement, while negative values indicate an in-
Final questionnaire. As their last task, participants completed a
crease of moral stringency. We used this difference as the depen-
short questionnaire that included the six-item measure of moral
dent measure in a 2 (psychological closeness: shared-attributes
disengagement about cheating (a = .91).
vs. control)  2 (overstated performance on the problem-solving
task: yes vs. no) between-subjects ANOVA. Overstating perfor-
Results mance on the problem-solving task led to increases in moral disen-
gagement (F[1, 78] = 45.35, p < .001, g2 = .37), whereas there was
Cheating on the problem-solving task no main effect of shared attributes on changes in moral disengage-
We conducted an ANOVA with participants’ real and self-re- ment (F[1, 78] = 2.50, p = .12, g2 = .03). More interestingly, we
ported performance as a within-subjects factor and psychological found a significant interaction (F[1, 78] = 6.24, p = .015, g2 = .07).
closeness as a between-subjects factor. Self-reported performance Participants’ changes in moral disengagement as a result of cheat-
was higher than real performance (F[1, 80] = 73.39, p < .001, ing were higher in the shared-attributes condition (M = 1.31,
g2 = .48), indicating that cheating occurred. The effect of psycho- SD = 1.12) than in the control condition (M = 0.02, SD = 2.19),
logical closeness was also significant (F[1, 80] = 6.25, p = .014, F(1, 78) = 19.08, p < .001. Yet, the changes in moral disengagement
g2 = .07). More interestingly, we found a significant interaction for participants who did not cheat did not significantly differ
(F[1, 80] = 15.10, p < .001, g2 = .16), depicted in Fig. 4. Participants depending on our psychological closeness manipulation
reported higher levels of performance in the shared-attributes con- (M = 1.61, SD = 1.04 vs. M = 1.32, SD = 1.19, F(1, 78) < 1, p = .47.
dition than in the control condition, t(80) = 3.33, p = .001. Yet, real
performance did not differ between conditions, t(80) < 1, p = .62.
Furthermore, the average number of matrices by which partic- Discussion
ipants overstated their performance was higher in the shared-attri-
butes condition than in the control condition (M = 3.86, SD = 3.31 These results provide strong support for the predicted relation-
vs. M = 1.45, SD = 2.15, t[80] = 3.89, p < .001), and the percentage ship between psychological closeness and unethical behavior. Even
of participants who overstated their performance was also higher when psychological closeness was subtle and born out of shared
(64.3% vs. 37.5%, v2[1,N = 82] = 5.88, p = .015). These results held birth month and year, it influenced participants’ behavior and their
even when controlling for individual differences in moral disen- tendency to cross ethical boundaries. Furthermore, psychological
gagement: the nature and significance of the results did not change closeness created a distance from one’s own moral compass: psy-
when we conducted the same analyses and added participants’ chological closeness led to higher levels of moral disengagement
score of moral disengagement at Time 1 as a covariate. about cheating. In addition, it changed the most when they (a)
 F. Gino, A.D. Galinsky / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 119 (2012) 15–26 23

shared attributes with a cheater and (b) they cheated themselves. Results and discussion
After vicarious cheating promoted by psychological closeness, par-
ticipants considered cheating as less morally wrong compared to A 2 (psychological closeness)  2 (initiator’s behavior) ANOVA
before having the opportunity to cheat. using participants’ reported amount as the dependent measure re-
vealed a significant interaction between our two manipulations
(F[1, 205] = 8.98, p = .003, g2 = .04), depicted in Fig. 5. The effect
Experiment 4: an asymmetry in the effects of psychological of psychological closeness was significant for both vicarious self-
closeness ishness, F(1, 205) = 5.74, p = .018 and for vicarious generosity,
F(1, 205) = 3.76, p = .054.
So far, we have found that psychological closeness leads to vicar- Further analyses using simple effects also demonstrated that
ious selfishness or dishonesty by affecting individuals’ judgment of there was no difference in the amount participants indicated they
the shame-worthiness and unethicality of the initiator’s actions. In would leave for their counterpart in the control condition depend-
Experiment 4, we examine whether psychological closeness pro- ing on the type of the target’s behavior, F(1, 205) = 1.39, p = .24. As
duces similar effects when the behavior in question is generous expected, however, in the psychological closeness condition, the
rather than selfish behavior. Prior research suggests that a shared amount specified was higher when the target was generous rather
identity or similarity with others who behaved prosocially can moti- than selfish, F(1, 205) = 29.83, p < .001.
vate positive and altruistic behavior (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2008a). Interestingly, in the psychological closeness condition, the dif-
However, no prior work has examined the effects of such shared ference between the amount of money participants indicated they
identity on both moral and immoral behaviors. We do so in Experi- would leave for their counterpart and the amount the target left
ment 4 by manipulating not only psychological closeness but also (either $0 or $10) was smaller in the case of selfish behavior
the nature of the behavior in question (i.e., selfish vs. generous). (M = 3.25, SD = 2.13) than it was in the case of generous behavior
(M = 4.80, SD = 1.26), t(104) = 4.55, p < .001. These results suggest
that the effects of psychological closeness were stronger when the
Method target was selfish rather than generous.

Two-hundred nine individuals from a representative pool of

participants in United States (Mage = 30.59, SDage = 8.34; 87 male) General discussion
participated in the study for $5. The study employed a 2 (psycho-
logical closeness: perspective taking vs. not)  2 (initiator’s behav- Four experiments investigated the consequences of various
ior: selfish vs. generous) between-subjects design. forms of psychological closeness on people’s ethical judgments,
emotional reactions, intentions, and real behavior. We observed a
consistent pattern of results. Our findings show that taking the
Experimental manipulations perspective of a person who behaved selfishly led people to report
We manipulated psychological closeness through perspective being more likely to behave selfishly themselves, and that judg-
taking as in Experiment 1. To manipulate the initiator’s action, ments of shame-worthiness and perceived unethicality mediated
we used an adapted version of the scenario employed in Experi- this effect (Experiment 1). Feeling psychologically close to a selfish
ment 1 and varied what participants were told about the student’s person led participants to view that selfish behavior as less shame-
action. In the selfish-behavior condition, the scenario ended by worthy and, as a result, also less unethical or wrong. We replicated
saying ‘‘Not too long after hearing the instructions, NS made up these results in Experiment 2, where we manipulated psychologi-
his mind: He poured all the money on the desk and then started cal closeness by activating an interdependent mindset through
putting all the money in his own pocket.’’ Instead, in the gener- priming. Psychological closeness also led to higher levels of dishon-
ous-behavior condition, the ending informed participants that esty in Experiment 3, in which we considered real, unethical
‘‘Not too long after hearing the instructions, NS made up his mind: behavior. We found that when participants shared attributes with
He left all the money in the envelope for the other participant and a confederate who cheated, they were more likely to behave dis-
took no money for himself.’’ honestly by inflating their task performance and thus earning
After reading the scenario, participants indicated the amount of undeserved money. Importantly, the results of this behavioral
money they would leave in the envelope for their counterpart if study show that psychological closeness creates a distance from
they were in the same situation. one’s own moral compass: Participants’ views of how wrong cheat-
ing is changed the most when they shared small attributes with a
wrongdoer and acted unethically themselves. Finally, in Experi-
ment 4 we compared the effects of psychological closeness on self-
ish and generous behavior and we found that psychological
closeness produced both vicarious selfishness and vicarious gener-
osity. Interestingly, the effect of vicarious dishonesty was stronger
for vicarious selfishness than for vicarious generosity.
Taken together, these studies provide convincing evidence that
even subtle forms of psychological closeness lead individuals to
vicariously justify the actions of the person they feel close to and
thus to be more likely to behave less ethically themselves.

Theoretical contributions and implications

The research presented here contributes to the field of moral

psychology and ethical decision making in various ways. Prior work
Fig. 5. Amount of money left for the counterpart, Experiment 4. Error bars has treated morality as a defining dimension of the self. Blasi (1983,
represent standard errors. 2004) has argued that how central morality is to a person’s self-
24 F. Gino, A.D. Galinsky / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 119 (2012) 15–26

identity greatly influences whether her moral actions align with her others may increase our moral awareness and, as a result, reduce
moral judgments. Building on this work, other scholars have sug- the influence of psychologically close wrongdoers. Even when peo-
gested that there are stable differences among individuals that ple are told their actions are anonymous, they respond to subtle
can help us predict their moral actions (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Colby cues of being watched, such as the presence of eye-like spots on
& Damon, 1992; Walker & Frimer, 2007; Walker & Hennig, 2004). the background of the computer on which they complete a task
Although we agree that this focus on enduring characteristics (Burnham & Hare, 2007; Haley & Fessler, 2005). Future research
in the moral self can provide useful insights into the study of moral could employ similar manipulations to counteract the effects of
behavior and ethical decision making, we have proposed a view of psychological closeness on vicarious dishonesty.
the moral self that extends to the actions of others. Our view is Another direction for future research is to examine whether
consistent with Monin and Jordan’s (2009) concept of dynamic individuals realize that their judgments and actions are influenced
self-regard (see also Jordan & Monin, 2008). As these scholars by the (dis)honest behavior of others to whom they feel close. Re-
suggest, ‘‘people’s thoughts and behavior are often guided by a cent work has suggested that individuals often fail to recognize
‘‘working’’ level of moral self-regard that fluctuates from moment the ethical challenge inherent in a situation or decision (Chugh,
to moment according to situational influences.’’ Consistent with Banaji, & Bazerman, 2005). Feelings of psychological closeness
this view, our research shows that subtle manipulations of psycho- may be one situation in which people’s ethicality becomes further
logical closeness can lead people to take on the internal states of a compromised.
wrongdoer, justify this person’s unethical actions, and behave Finally, future research could examine in more details the po-
dishonestly themselves. tential asymmetry in the effects psychological closeness has on
Our research also extends prior work on the factors that moti- vicarious honesty and dishonesty. The results of our last experi-
vate well-intentioned people to cross ethical boundaries. This work ments indicated that the effects of psychological closeness were
has shown that codes of ethics and ethical culture are important stronger in the case of vicarious dishonesty than in the case of
predictors of unethical behavior in organizations (for a review, vicarious honesty. This result may be driven by the fact that self-
see Loe, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000). Although such macro-compo- interest adds to the pressure to conform to another person’s behav-
nents are certainly important, micro-elements such as feelings of ior in the case of dishonest behavior. Future work testing this pos-
psychological closeness can also have large consequences. sibility would further our understanding of how psychological
Finally, the present work contributes to existing work on ethical closeness can lead to vicarious behavior.
and unethical behavior. These two behaviors are often examined in
independent literatures. Our research highlights the importance of Conclusion
considering them both within the same theoretical framework so
as to examine similarities and potential asymmetries in factors As John Donne (1975) once suggested, ‘‘No man is an island.’’
predicting or explaining these behaviors. Not only are people motivated to form and maintain bonds with
others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), but such social bonds form eas-
Future directions ily. Being randomly assigned to a group (Sherif, Harvey, White,
Hood, & Sherif, 1988) or sharing attributes, even when they are
An important direction for future research is the investigation superficial (e.g., a birth date) (Miller et al., 1998), is sufficient to
of factors that may help reduce or even eliminate vicarious dishon- create ‘‘ties’’ among individuals that bind them together psycho-
esty. For instance, one effective way to improve the objectivity of logically. When a person feels psychologically close to someone
one’s judgments of others’ behaviors and reduce the potential neg- else, this bond produces various benefits. For instance, taking an-
ative influence of their selfish actions on one’s own may be to high- other person’s perspective – a form of psychological closeness – in-
light the salience of group membership and the presence of creases the likelihood of helping (Batson, 1994) or conflict
outsiders. When a group member’s transgression is witnessed resolution (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008; Paese & Yon-
not only by in-group members but also by an out-group, then peo- ker, 2001), and reduces egocentric biases in judgment (Savinsky,
ple are likely to engage in compensatory behavior (Gino et al., Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005). We have consistently shown
2009b). It seems that the presence of an out-group increases indi- the reverse effect, that psychological closeness can lead people
viduals’ tendency to question the norms set by in-group members. down an alley of disrepute.
The possibility that out-group members may evaluate and judge Topical stories in the media exposing unethical practices in
the actions of in-group peers can heighten our awareness of the business and broader society have highlighted the gap between
potential moral consequences of those actions (Schwartz, 1968). the decisions people actually make vs. the decisions people believe
In addition, the presence of out-group observers is likely to trigger they should make. In recent decades, a large body of work across
a self-categorization process that leads people to feel responsible many disciplines has tried to tease out why people behave in ways
for not only their own wrongdoing but also for that of their in- inconsistent with their own ethical standards or moral principles.
group members. Future research exploring these possibilities In the current research, we examined the ethical consequences of
would further our understanding of effective ways to combat the a previously overlooked factor, one’s own feelings of psychological
influence of psychological closeness on vicarious dishonesty. closeness to another person who has behaved selfishly, dishonestly
Future research could also examine the role of other forms of or generously. Across four studies, we found that even the subtlest
observation or monitoring that may improve our objectivity. Re- of psychological connections, such as sharing the same birthday,
search has shown that the mere physical presence of others can can influence the likelihood that an individual will act dishonestly.
highlight group norms (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Reno, Cial- Our results show that psychological closeness can lead to vicarious
dini, & Kallgren, 1993) and restrict the freedom of individuals to dishonesty by creating distance from one’s moral compass.
categorize their unethical actions in positive terms. In one extreme
test of this idea, Bateson, Nettle, and Roberts (2006) used the image Acknowledgments
of a pair of eyes to watch over an ‘‘honesty box’’ for contributions
in a shared coffee room to give individuals the sense of being mon- The authors greatly appreciate the support and facilities of the
itored; this image in itself was sufficient to produce a higher level Center for Decision Research at the University of North Carolina
of ethical behavior (i.e., it increased the level of contributions to at Chapel Hill, where the studies were conducted. This research
the honesty box). These results suggest that being monitored by
 F. Gino, A.D. Galinsky / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 119 (2012) 15–26 25

was supported by a grant from the University Research Council at Galinsky, A. D., Maddux, W. W., Gilin, D., & White, J. B. (2008). Why it pays to get
inside the head of your opponent: The differential effects of perspective-taking
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
and empathy in negotiations. Psychological Science, 19(4), 378–384.
Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Perspective taking: Decreasing stereotype
expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 708–724.
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