LOGICAL, CRITICAL AND CREATIVE:

TEACHING ‘THINKING SKILLS’ TO LAW

STUDENTS
NICK JAMES*

The Australian Learning and Teaching Council’s Bachelor of Laws

Learning and Teaching Academic Standards Statement sets out six
Threshold Learning Outcomes (TLOs) for the Bachelor of Laws degree.
These six TLOs represent what a Bachelor of Laws graduate is expected ‘to
know, understand and be able to do as a result of learning’. 1 TLO3 relates
to ‘thinking skills’, comprised of legal reasoning, critical thinking and
creative thinking skills. This article seeks to assist those law schools and
legal academics concerned about being called upon to demonstrate the
ways in which TLO3 is developed by their students. It does so by
summarising, analysing and synthesising the relevant academic literature,
and identifying helpful examples of the conceptualisation of, justification for
and teaching of thinking skills in the context of legal education.

I INTRODUCTION

In December 2010 the Australian Learning and Teaching Council (ALTC)

published the Bachelor of Laws Learning and Teaching Academic Standards
Statement (the LLB LTAS Statement). 2 The LLB LTAS Statement was the
outcome of the Learning and Teaching Academic Standards Project in Law
administered by Professors Sally Kift and Mark Israel as Discipline Scholars. It
sets out six Threshold Learning Outcomes (TLOs) for the Bachelor of Laws
degree. These six TLOs represent what a Bachelor of Laws graduate is expected
‘to know, understand and be able to do as a result of learning’. 3 They cover
knowledge (TLO1), ethics and professional responsibility (TLO2), thinking skills
(TLO3), research skills (TLO4), communication and collaboration (TLO5), and
self management (TLO6).

The principles informing the drafting of the TLOs required that they be ‘not too
general; not too prescriptive; ordered correctly; [able to] be implemented; [able
to] be assessed and measured; and consistent with the range of professional
contexts for law graduates,’ and an effort was made to strike a balance between a
‘minimalist’ and a ‘detailed’ approach. 4 Following a process of consultation with
members of the judiciary, admitting authorities, members of the legal profession,

* BCom LLB LLM PhD. Associate Professor, TC Beirne School of Law, University of
Queensland.
1
Sally Kift, Mark Israel and Rachael Field, ‘Bachelor of Laws Learning and Teaching
Academic Standards Statement’ (Australian Learning and Teaching Council, 2010)
<http://www.altc.edu.au/system/files/altc_standards_LAW_110211.pdf>.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid, citing the Australian Qualifications Framework.
4
Ibid, 5-6.

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regulators, academics, students and recent graduates, 5 the TLOs were endorsed by
the Council of Australian Law Deans in November 2010. 6

The TLOs for the discipline of law were developed as part of a larger ALTC
project that sought to develop Learning and Teaching Academic Standards for all
academic disciplines. Law was one of eight broad discipline groups that
participated in the ALTC project in 2010, the others being architecture and
building; arts, social sciences and humanities; business, management and
economics; creative and performing arts; engineering and ICT; health, medicine
and veterinary science; and science. 7

The TLOs are likely to form an important component in the Australian

Government’s Higher Education Quality and Regulatory Framework. The new
regulator, the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA), was
established in 2011. 8 TEQSA’s role includes the evaluation of teaching and
learning within Australian universities against academic standards, and while (as
at the date of writing) TEQSA has not yet issued an authoritative statement about
what those standards will be, 9 it seems likely that TEQSA will make use of the
various TLOs developed by the ALTC. 10

Universities, schools and individual academics, with awareness that at some point
in the near future they will be called upon to demonstrate the ways in which and
the extent to which they facilitate these learning outcomes, are likely to be
increasingly interested in clarifying the meaning of each of the TLOs and
ascertaining how they can best be taught. The LLB LTAS Statement itself
explicitly ‘makes no prescription about the suitability of any learning and
teaching activities for developing and supporting students to achieve the Bachelor
of Laws academic standards.’ 11 However, the academic literature contains a
wealth of relevant insights, suggestions and examples, and this article seeks to
assist law schools and legal academics interested in or concerned about the TLOs
for Law by reviewing this literature and offering some examples of best practice
in Australia and internationally. The focus of the article is upon TLO3, ‘thinking
skills’. 12

5
Ibid 1, 5-7. See also Mark Israel, Sally Kift and Rachael Field, ‘Drafting Standards for the
Bachelor of Laws’ (2010) (218) Ethos 14.
6
Kift, Israel and Field, above n 1, 6-7.
7
Ibid, 3.
8
TEQSA, Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Homepage (2011)
<www.teqsa.gov.au>. TEQSA commenced its regulatory function in January 2012.
9
TEQSA released a discussion paper, Developing a framework for teaching and learning
standards in Australian higher education and the role of TEQSA, in June 2011.
10
‘Teaching Standards Will Have Bite’, The Australian, 25 August 2011
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/teaching-standards-will-have-bite/story-
e6frgcjx-1226122282272.
11
Kift, Israel and Field, above n 1, 5.
12
This paper expands upon the work done by the author in writing the ‘Good Practice Guide’ for
TLO3: see Nick James, Good Practice Guide (Bachelor of Laws) – Thinking Skills (Threshold
Learning Outcome 3) (Australian Learning and Teaching Council, 2011).

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 II THINKING SKILLS

The following is TLO3 in full:

TLO3: Thinking skills

Graduates of the Bachelor of Laws will be able to:

(a) identify and articulate legal issues,

(b) apply legal reasoning and research to generate appropriate responses

to legal issues,

(c) engage in critical analysis and make a reasoned choice amongst

alternatives, and

(d) think creatively in approaching legal issues and generating appropriate

responses. 13

As explained in the LLB LTAS Statement, a ‘threshold’ learning outcome is a

minimum standard of performance, achievement or attainment. 14 It is a
‘foundational competency’, 15 a standard with which all graduating law students
are expected to be able to comply rather than a standard that is merely desirable or
aspirational.

The identification of ‘thinking skills’ as a minimum outcome of legal education is

unlikely to be seen as contentious or controversial. 16 The ability to ‘think like a
lawyer’ 17 is frequently identified as one of the most important outcomes of the
study of law. 18 (The term ‘think like a lawyer’ is accorded a wide range of
possible meanings, 19 although it is usually equated with ‘legal reasoning’).
13
Kift, Israel and Field, above n 1.
14
Ibid, 9.
15
Ibid, citing Task Force on the Canadian Common Law Degree, ‘Final Report’ (2009)
<www.flsc.ca/en/pdf/CommonLawDegreeReport.pdf>, 28.
16
On the other hand, the specific content of TLO3 has been the subject of criticism. One
academic had this to say about TLO3: ‘This is perhaps the most meaningless of all the
threshold learning outcomes. With no indicators as to the level of such skills, it adds little to
the sort of very general graduate outcomes that universities like to assert. And I have met few
law graduates or even law academics who are creative (whatever that means in this context).
But of course, in the modern world of academic excellence, buzzwords such as creative
thinking must be bandied about.’ Joachim Dietrich, ‘Law Threshold Lowers the Bar’, The
Australian 30 March 2011 <www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/opinion/law-
threshold-lowers-the-bar/story-e6frgcko-1226030258554>.
17
This is a phrase often attributed to the fictional Harvard law professor Charles W Kingsfield Jr,
who in the 1973 film The Paper Chase tells his class of first year law students: ‘You teach
yourselves the law. I train your minds. You come in here with a skull full of mush, and if you
survive, you’ll leave thinking like a lawyer.’ Twentieth Century Fox Film corporation.
18
Lee S Shulman, ‘Signature Pedagogies in the Professions’ (2005) 134(3) Daedalus 52.
19
Sanson surveyed the literature and identified various ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ interpretations of
the term ‘thinking like a lawyer’. The narrow interpretations include ‘spotting legal issues
from a complicated fact setting’; ‘pondering a given set of facts so as to perceive their
connection’; ‘the ability to analyze critically and to convey that analysis cogently’;
‘interpreting and using legal materials to serve clients’ interests’; asking ‘is there a law, has it
been violated, and what will be done about it’; ‘thinking analytically’; ‘research (“thorough”),
reasoning (“air tight”), [w]riting (“crystal clear”), reading (“careful”), and rhetoric (“facile”)’;

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‘Thinking skills’, ‘reasoning skills’, ‘critical judgement’ and the like are
frequently included in lists of desirable graduate attributes for law students. 20 For
example, the School of Law at University of Queensland has identified five
‘graduate outcomes’ for students completing their Bachelor of Laws program, the
fourth of which is ‘critical judgement’. Students completing the program are
expected to:

a) be able to identify, analyse, and define legal problems;

b) possess skills in legal research that will enable the graduate to apply
relevant legal materials;

c) be able to apply critical reasoning to legal issues through independent

thought and judgment informed by an understanding of legal
principles and the concepts, principles, policies, and values that
underpin and permeate the law; and

d) be able to evaluate opinions, make decisions, and reflect critically on

the justifications for decisions in the light of legal principles. 21

Graduates of the University of New South Wales Law School are expected to
have ‘transferable intellectual skills’, defined as ‘excellent intellectual skills of
analysis, synthesis, critical judgment, reflection and evaluation’ and incorporating
the ability to:

• collect and sort facts;

• identify and analyse legal issues;

• interpret legal texts;

• apply the law to real legal problems;

• invoke theory and inter-disciplinary knowledge to develop new and

creative solutions to legal problems;

• critique law and policy to develop new ideas about the law and law
reform;

• participate effectively in debates about the law. 22

and ‘the use of inductive and deductive reasoning to construct a valid logical legal argument’.
The broad interpretations include ‘ignoring common sense and focusing on manipulating
words to serve one’s own and one’s client’s interest’ and ‘understanding that “it depends” …
appreciating all the complexities and possibilities to even seemingly simple legal concepts and
questions’. Michelle Sanson, ‘Thinking Like a Lawyer’ (2006) International Bar Association
Conference Newsletter.
20
Nickolas James, ‘Embedding Graduate Attributes within Subjects: Critical Thinking’ in Sally
Kift et al (eds), Excellence and Innovation in Legal Education (LexisNexis, 2011) 70-71.
21
TC Beirne School of Law, Teaching Handbook (University of Queensland, 2011).
22
University of New South Wales, Faculty of Law Homepage (2011) <www.law.unsw.edu.au>.

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In 2009 the Council of Australian Law Deans (CALD) published its Standards for
Australian Law Schools. Section 2.3 relates to the content of the LLB curriculum,
and states that the curriculum must seek to develop, inter alia, ‘the intellectual
and practical skills needed to research and analyse the law from primary sources,
and to apply the findings of such work to the solution of legal problems.’ 23

TLO3 is accompanied in the LLB LTAS Statement by a set of explanatory Notes

intended to ‘offer non-prescriptive guidance on how to interpret the TLOs’. 24
Under the subheading ‘Background’, 25 the Notes state that TLO3 was drafted to
align with the Australian Qualifications Framework Level 7 (Bachelor Degree), 26
the United Kingdom QAA Subject Benchmark Statement for Law, 27 the United
Kingdom Joint Statement of the Law Society and the General Council of the
Bar, 28 the United States MacCrate Report, 29 the recommendations of the Task
Force on the Canadian Common Law Degree, 30 and the Scottish Accreditation
Guidelines. 31 These and other such statements about the expected learning
outcomes of the Bachelor of Laws confirm that the identification of ‘thinking

23
Council of Australian Law Deans, ‘Standards for Australian Law Schools’ (Council of
Australian Law Deans, 2009).
24
Kift, Israel and Field, above n 1, 11.
25
Ibid, 17.
26
The AQF requires graduates to be able to think creatively and critically ‘in identifying and
solving problems with intellectual independence’ and to have the ‘cognitive skills to critically
review, analyse, consolidate and synthesise knowledge’: Australian Qualifications Framework
Council, ‘Australian Qualifications Framework’ (2011)
<www.aqf.edu.au/Portals/0/Documents/Handbook/AustQuals%20FrmwrkFirstEditionJuly201
1_FINAL.pdf>.
27
The QAA Subject Benchmark Statement requires law graduates to be able to ‘make a critical
judgement of the merits of particular arguments’ and have an ability to ‘present and make a
reasoned choice between alternative solutions’ - United Kingdom Quality Assurance Agency,
‘Subject Benchmark Statement: Law’ (2007)
<www.qaa.ac.uk/academicinfrastructure/benchmark/statements/Law07.asp>.
28
The Joint Statement requires law graduates to be able to ‘recognise potential alternative
conclusions for particular situations, and provide supporting reasons for them’ - The Law
Society and the General Council of the Bar, ‘A Joint Statement Issued by the Law Society and
the General Council of the Bar on the Completion of the Initial or Academic Stage of Training
by Obtaining an Undergraduate Degree’ (2002)
<www.sra.org.uk/documents/students/academic-stage/academicjointstate.pdf>.
29
The MacCrate Report requires law graduates to ‘be familiar with the skills and concepts
involved in identifying and formulating legal issues’ - American Bar Association, ‘Legal
Education and Professional Development - An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task
Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap’ (1992)
<www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html>.
30
The Task Force on the Canadian Common Law Degree recommends that entrants to a
Canadian bar admission program be required to demonstrate skills in solving legal problems
including the ability to ‘a. identify relevant facts; b. identify legal, practical, and policy issues
and conduct the necessary research arising from those issues; c. analyse the results of research;
d. apply the law to the facts; and e. identify and evaluate the appropriateness of alternatives for
resolution of the issue or dispute’ - Task Force on the Canadian Common Law Degree, ‘Final
Report’ (2009) <www.flsc.ca/en/pdf/CommonLawDegreeReport.pdf>.
31
The Scottish Guidelines require law graduates to have a basic competence in ‘apply[ing]
knowledge and analysis ... creatively to complex situations in order to provide arguable
solutions to concrete problems by presenting a range of viable options from a set of facts and
law’ and the ability to ‘[t]hink critically and make critical judgements on the relative and
absolute merits of particular arguments and solutions’ - Law Society of Scotland, ‘Foundation
Programme (Scottish Exempting Degree): Accreditation Guidelines for Applicants’ (2010)
<www.lawscot.org.uk/media/39764/foundation_programme_guidelines_-_final.pdf>.

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skills’ as one such expected learning outcome is consistent with views within the
academic and professional legal communities in Australia and internationally. To
date, however, it is unlikely that Australian law schools have been called upon to
demonstrate in a substantial way the extent to which they ensure that this learning
outcome is in fact achieved. Australian admission authorities have traditionally
been more concerned with ensuring that law schools include in the curriculum
coverage of the areas of knowledge considered essential for the practice of law
(the ‘Priestley 11’). 32 The (likely) adoption of the TLOs by TEQSA is liable to
provoke law schools into paying much closer attention to demonstrating how they
develop legal skills, including the particular skills of which TLO3 is comprised:
legal reasoning skills, critical thinking skills and creative thinking skills.

III TLO3A AND TLO3B - LEGAL REASONING

TLO3a is the ability to ‘identify and articulate legal issues’. According to the
Notes in the LLB LTAS Statement:

Law graduates should be able to examine a text and/or a scenario (for example, a
set of facts, a legal document, a legal narrative, a statute, a case report, or a law
reform report), find the key issues (for example, unresolved disputes, ambiguities,
or uncertainties), and articulate those issues clearly as a necessary precursor to
analysing and generating appropriate responses to the issues. This skill includes
the ability to discriminate between legal and non-legal issues, and between relevant
and irrelevant issues. Graduates should know that not every issue is a legal issue,
and that not every legal issue warrants a legal response. 33

TLO3b is the ability to ‘apply legal reasoning and research to generate

appropriate responses to legal issues’. According to the Notes:

‘Legal reasoning’ is typically understood to be the practice of identifying the legal

rules and processes of relevance to a particular legal issue and applying those rules
and processes in order to reach a reasonable conclusion about, or to generate an
appropriate response to, the issue. Students are often introduced to the practice of
legal reasoning by being taught the ‘IRAC’ or ‘ILAC’ method: issue, rule/law,
application, conclusion. … The reference to ‘appropriate’ responses to legal issues
acknowledges that not every legal issue requires a legalistic or adversarial
response. Graduates should have an understanding of the full spectrum of
available and appropriate responses to legal issues (for example, conciliatory, non-
adversarial options, as well as adversarial, court-oriented options; and commercial
as well as legal options) and be able to choose amongst them. 34

TLO3a and TLO3b are considered together in this article because the
identification of issues and the application of the law to generate responses to

32
Contract law, tort law, real and personal property law, equity (including trusts), criminal law
and procedure, civil procedure, evidence, professional conduct (including basic trust
accounting), administrative law, federal and state constitutional law, and company law -
Consultative Committee of State and Territorial Law Admitting Authorities, Uniform
Admission Requirements: Discussion Paper and Recommendations (1992).
33
Kift, Israel and Field, above n 1, 17-18.
34
Ibid, 18.

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those issues are typically considered together in the literature and taught together
under the broad heading of ‘legal reasoning’. 35

Legal reasoning is taught implicitly and constantly throughout a law student’s

legal studies in the sense that they are called upon to engage in legal problem
solving in almost all of their law subjects. All law students also receive explicit
instruction in formal legal reasoning, usually in the first year of their legal studies
as a component of an introductory law subject. At ANU College of Law, for
example, legal reasoning is a component of the first year subject Foundations of
Australian Law; at Bond University it is a module in Legal Skills (a subject taught
in connection with other relevant substantive law subjects over a number of
semesters during the degree); at Charles Darwin University it is taught in the first
year subjects Introduction to Legal Studies and Legal Interpretation; at University
of Queensland it is taught in the first year subjects Legal Method and Law in
Society; and so on.

In the following description, analysis, and synthesis of the relevant academic

literature, the focus is upon explicit rather than implicit instruction in legal
reasoning. However many of the points about the scope of legal reasoning and
the form that instructions to students might take will be of relevance and of
interest to any law teacher who calls upon students to engage in legal reasoning
and solve problems.

A Legal reasoning texts

There is an abundance of academic literature concerned with the nature of legal

reasoning and the teaching of reasoning and problem-solving skills to law
students, including:

• texts addressed primarily to students that explain legal reasoning as an

essential skill for both the study and the practice of law;

• texts addressed primarily to legal academics as teachers that offer

techniques for teaching legal reasoning or argue in favour of extending
the scope of ‘legal reasoning’ beyond the traditional emphasis upon
formalistic reasoning; and

• texts addressed primarily to legal academics as scholars that are

concerned with clarifying the precise nature of ‘legal reasoning’ by
lawyers and judges, and determining the differences, if any, between
legal reasoning and other forms of reasoning.

Many Australian introductory law textbooks include chapters on basic legal

reasoning. Chapter 2 of the popular first year text, Connecting with Law by
Sanson, Anthony and Worswick, is titled ‘Learning Law: How Can I Develop a
Legal Mind?’36 It identifies the principal characteristics of ‘thinking like a
lawyer’ as non-assumptive thinking; facts over emotions; a tolerance of
35
In the author’s opinion, it would therefore have been more appropriate for the first two parts of
TLO3 to be drafted as a single part.
36
Michelle Sanson, Thalia Anthony and David Worswick, Connecting with Law (Oxford
University Press, 2nd ed, 2010).

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ambiguity; an ability to make connections between facts, documents and laws;
verbal mapping and ordering; and automatic devil’s advocacy. The chapter also
sets out brief explanations of inductive and deductive reasoning, critical thinking,
and the IRAC (issue – rule – application – conclusion) approach to legal problem
solving. Other introductory law texts that include coverage of legal reasoning
include Head and Mann’s Law in Perspective 37 and Hinchy’s The Australian
Legal System: History, Institutions and Method. 38

A good example of an Australian student text that focuses upon legal reasoning is
Keyzer’s Legal Problem Solving – A Guide for Law Students. 39 Keyzer explains
in detail the traditional method of legal problem solving - identifying the issues;
stating relevant legal authorities; applying the law; arguing the facts; and reaching
a conclusion - and demonstrates how the method can be applied in the solution of
examination questions. Sample answers prepared by students are analysed and
discussed, a feature of the text of considerable practical use to both law students
and law teachers.

Schauer’s Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning is a

student text from the US. 40 Schauer’s text is described as a primer on legal
reasoning written for law students. Many of the chapters in the book are
concerned with the traditional first year topics - the nature of law and of common
law, statutory interpretation, judicial reasoning, the doctrine of precedent and the
like - and the US focus makes these Chapters largely unhelpful for Australian
students. Chapters 3, 5 and 7, however, are more useful: Chapter 3 is about the
nature of authority, and the differences between legitimate and illegitimate
authorities when engaging in legal reasoning; Chapter 5 explains the relevance of
analogies to legal reasoning; and Chapter 7 presents the legal realist challenge to
traditional understandings of legal and judicial reasoning, as well as a brief
overview of the contribution made by the Critical Legal Studies movement to the
debate.

Another helpful US text for students is Romantz and Vinson’s Legal Analysis:
The Fundamental Skill. 41 Romantz and Vinson provide an overview of the
foundations of legal reasoning and of the different types of critical thinking
necessary to conduct a sophisticated analysis of legal problems. Their approach
to legal analysis is captured by the acronym ‘CREAC’: conclusion – rule –
explanation of the rule – application of the rule – conclusion. They insist that
legal analysis should begin with the conclusion because in legal practice that is
likely to be what the person the lawyer is advising is most interested in and wants
to see first. They offer a number of practical tips for engaging in effective legal

37
Michael Head and Scott Mann, Law in Perspective: Ethics, Society and Critical Thinking
(UNSW Press, 2005) – Chapter 2, ‘Legal reasoning’, is part of a broader analysis of the
relationships between logic, science and law in the first section of the book.
38
Russell Hinchy, The Australian Legal System: History, Institutions and Method (Pearson
Education Australia, 2007) – Chapter 8, ‘Legal reasoning’, contains some useful examples and
exercises for students.
39
Patrick Keyzer, Legal Problem Solving - A Guide for Law Students (LexisNexis, 2002).
40
Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Harvard
University Press, 2009).
41
David S Romantz and Kathleen Elliott Vinson, Legal Analysis: The Fundamental Skill
(Carolina Academic Press, 2nd ed, 2009).

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analysis, including justifying the conclusion with a clear, logical analysis;
weaving the law and the facts together; explaining the law before applying the
law; understanding the law before applying the law; analysing one issue at a time;
analysing the opponent’s argument; being concise; and remembering the
alternative arguments. The authors also emphasise the importance of applying the
law rather than mechanically memorising the law or relying too heavily on
formulaic analysis.

An example of a text intended to assist legal academics teaching legal reasoning

rather than law students learning legal reasoning is the recent article Deepening
the Discourse Using the Legal Mind’s Eye by Hillary Burgess. 42 Burgess presents
research that demonstrates how incorporating visual aids and exercises into
learning environments can help students to develop higher-order cognitive skills
such as ‘thinking like a lawyer’. Burgess begins by explaining what higher order
cognitive skills are and by mapping the various steps in legal reasoning onto
Bloom’s taxonomy of learning objectives (level 1 – remembering, level –
understanding, level 3 – applying, level 4 – analysing, level 5 – evaluating, and
level 6 – creating). Burgess argues that the legal curriculum traditionally teaches
the lowest four levels of learning but tests the highest four levels of learning. To
help law teachers to teach all six levels of learning, Burgess offers a neuroscience
and cognitive psychology perspective on how students learn legal reasoning. She
reviews research that indicates that students learn more, learn at deeper levels, and
retain information longer when they engage in ‘multimodal’ learning, especially
learning involving visual aids and visual exercises, and provides concrete
guidelines for law teachers interested in incorporating visual aids and visual
exercises effectively when teaching legal reasoning. 43

In Effects of Conceptual Knowledge and Availability of Information Sources on

Law Students’ Legal Reasoning, Nievelstein et al emphasise the importance of
conceptual knowledge when learning how to engage in legal reasoning. 44 For
newcomers to law school, legal reasoning is a difficult skill to learn because they
have not yet acquired the conceptual knowledge needed to distil the relevant
information from cases, determine applicable rules, and search for rules and
exceptions in external information sources such as textbooks. The authors discuss
the implications of their finding that in the absence of basic conceptual knowledge
about law, access to textbooks and the like does not assist law students to learn
legal reasoning skills. 45

Other texts offering assistance to those teaching legal reasoning include articles
by Hammond, 46 Wolff, 47 and Martin. 48

42
Hillary Burgess, ‘Deepening the Discourse Using the Legal Mind’s Eye: Lessons from
Neuroscience and Psychology That Optimize Law School Learning’ (2010) 29 Quinnipiac
Law Review 1.
43
Ibid.
44
Fleurie Nievelstein et al, ‘Effects of Conceptual Knowledge and Availability of Information
Sources on Law Students’ Legal Reasoning’ (2010) 38(1) Instructional Science 23.
45
Ibid.
46
Celia Hammond, ‘Teaching Practical Legal Problem Solving Skills: Preparing Law Students
for the Realities of Legal Life’ (1999) 10(2) Legal Education Review 191 – A description of
the development and teaching of the subject Legal Problem Solving at Notre Dame University,

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One example of the many texts about legal reasoning addressed to legal
academics as scholars rather than as teachers is Alexander’s Demystifying Legal
Reasoning. 49 Alexander takes the view that there is no distinct form of ‘legal’
reasoning’. 50 Rather, lawyers engage in ordinary forms of reasoning that are
familiar to most advisors and decision makers: deduction from authoritative rules,
empirical reasoning and open-ended moral reasoning.

Other recent examples of legal reasoning texts that take a more abstract,
theoretical approach to the topic include works by Scharffs, 51 Brozek and
Stelmach, 52 and Posner. 53

B Formalistic approaches

Legal reasoning is often taught to first year law students as a formalistic series of
steps labelled with an acronym such as:

• IRAC (issue – law – application – conclusion), 54

• HIRAC (heading – issue – rule – application – conclusion), 55

and how the subject was structured as closely as possible to simulate the real life world of
private legal practice.
47
Lutz-Christian Wolff, ‘Structured Problem Solving: German Methodology from a Comparative
Perspective’ (2003) 14 Legal Education Review 19 – A comparison of German and common
law approaches to legal problem solving.
48
Fiona Martin, ‘Teaching Legal Problem Solving: A Problem-Based Approach Combined with
a Computerised Generic Problem’ (2003) 14(1) Legal Education Review 77 – A description of
the process undertaken to develop a computer-based module designed to introduce law
students, through the use of problem-based learning, to legal problem solving.
49
Larry Alexander, Demystifying Legal Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
50
On this point, cf Soma Kedia, ‘Redirecting the Scope of First-Year Writing Courses: Towards
a New Paradigm of Teaching Legal Writing’ (2009-2010) 87 University of Detroit Mercy Law
Review 147, 159.
51
Brett G Scharffs, ‘The Character of Legal Reasoning’ (2004) 61(2) Washington and Lee Law
Review 733. According to Scharffs, legal reasoning is composed of three ideas or concepts,
each of which lies at the heart of Aristotle’s practical philosophy: (1) isphronesis, or practical
wisdom, (2) techne, or craft, and (3) rhetorica, or rhetoric. Only in combination do practical
wisdom, craft, and rhetoric create a balanced, complete, and compelling account of legal
reasoning.
52
Bartosz Brozek and Jerzy Stelmach, Methods of Legal Reasoning (Law and Philosophy
Library, 2006). Brozek and Stelmach describe and criticize four methods used in legal
practice, legal dogmatics and legal theory – logic, analysis, argumentation and hermeneutics –
and question the assumptions standing behind these methods, the limits of using them and their
usefulness in the practice and theory of law.
53
Richard Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press, 2008). Posner focuses upon
legal reasoning by judges, and argues that when judges can ascertain the true facts of a case
and apply clear pre-existing legal rules to them, they do so straightforwardly, but in non-
routine cases, judges draw upon their experience, emotions, and often unconscious beliefs. In
doing so, they take on a legislative role, though one that is confined by professional ethics,
opinions of colleagues, and limitations imposed by other branches of government.
54
See, for example, Jeffrey Metzler, ‘The Importance of IRAC and Legal Writing’ (2002-2003)
60 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 501; Soma Kedia, ‘Redirecting the Scope of First-
Year Writing Courses: Towards a New Paradigm of Teaching Legal Writing’ (2009-2010) 87
University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 147; Sanson et al, above n 36, Chapter 2. See also
LawNerds.com, ‘Learn the Secrets to Legal Reasoning’ (2003)
<http://www.lawnerds.com/guide/irac.html>.

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 • IREAC (issue – rule – explanation of rule – application – conclusion); 56

• MIRAT (material facts – issues – rules – arguments – tentative

conclusion), 57 or

• CREAC (conclusion – rule – explanation of rule – application of rule –

conclusion). 58

Students are taught how, when presented with a set of facts in the form of a
tutorial problem or an exam question, they should identify the legal issues and,
considering each issue carefully and logically, apply the relevant legal rules to the
facts in order to reach a rational and convincing conclusion about the legal
consequences of the particular situation.

Some writers praise such approaches to legal reasoning. According to Metzler,

for example, IRAC is much more than an organisational tool, it is an important
mental exercise that forces a lawyer to a deeper understanding of the legal issues
at stake, and an understanding of IRAC is the key to success on law school exams
and a successful career in law. 59 Other writers, however, are more critical of such
approaches. Taylor, for example, argues that step-by-step approaches emphasise
form over content and lead to a false picture of the nature of legal problem
solving. 60 Other criticisms of formalistic approaches to legal reasoning are set out
below. 61

The prevailing view in Australia appears to be that formalistic techniques such as

IRAC are useful for students new to the study of law, but as they progress through
their legal studies the ‘scaffolding’ offered by the step by step techniques should
recede into the background in favour of a greater emphasis upon ‘flow’ in the
student’s reasoning and consequent improvements in subtlety and
persuasiveness. 62

C Legal reasoning and logic

When judges and legal theorists synthesise numerous legal decisions into a
general legal principle they engage in inductive reasoning. When lawyers and

55
ANU Academic Skills and Learning Centre, ‘Legal Reasoning and HIRAC’ (2010)
<https://academicskills.anu.edu.au/resources/handouts/legal-reasoning-and-hirac>.
56
Mark E Wojcik, ‘Add an E to Your IRAC’ (2006-2007) 35 Student Lawyer 26.
57
John Wade, ‘Meet MIRAT: Legal Reasoning Fragmented into Learnable Chunks’ (1990-1991)
2 Legal Education Review 283.
58
David S Romantz and Kathleen Elliott Vinson, Legal Analysis: The Fundamental Skill
(Carolina Academic Press, 2nd ed, 2009). See also Bryan A Garner, ‘Although IRAC Works
for Exams, Avoid It in Practice’ (2004-2005) 33 Student Lawyer 10.
59
Jeffrey Metzler, ‘The Importance of IRAC and Legal Writing’ (2002-2003) 60 University of
Detroit Mercy Law Review 501.
60
Greg Taylor, ‘Structured Problem-Solving: Against the ‘Step-By-Step’ Method’ (2006) 11(1)
Deakin Law Review 89.
61
For an evaluation of the use of legal structures to teach legal reasoning see Duncan Bentley,
‘Using Structures to Teach Legal Reasoning’ (1994) 5(2) Legal Education Review 129.
62
Regarding the benefits of scaffolding generally for law students see Rachael Field and Sally
Kift, ‘Addressing the High Levels of Psychological Distress in Law Students through
Intentional Assessment and Feedback Design in the First Year Law Curriculum’ (2010) 1(1)
International Journal of the First Year in Higher Education 65.

QUT Law & Justice Volume 12 Number 1 2012 76

judges apply a general legal principle to a particular legal problem they engage in
deductive reasoning. When lawyers argue about whether or not a particular
precedent should be followed they engage in reasoning by analogy. An
understanding of the principles and standards of logic that support and legitimate
these various forms of reasoning and argument is an extremely useful tool for any
lawyer seeking to construct their own arguments or to understand, or undermine,
the arguments of others.

Law students therefore benefit from at least some training in basic logical
reasoning. US scholars such as Scott 63 and Luizzi 64 as long ago as 1968 called for
a greater emphasis upon explicit logic training in the law school curriculum.
More recently, Crowe has advocated the teaching of logical reasoning to law
students. 65 And as we saw earlier, first year textbooks such as that by Sanson et al
include some of the basic principles of logical reasoning in their explanation of
legal reasoning. 66

In Logic for Law Students: How to Think Like a Lawyer, Aldisert, Clowney and
Peterson argue that ‘thinking like a lawyer’ essentially means employing logic to
construct arguments. 67 They make a case for teaching all law students the
fundamentals of deductive reasoning, the principles of inductive generalisation,
and the process of reasoning by analogy. They also make the important point that
legal reasoning is not entirely logical: even if premises are true and logical
statements constructed properly, it is important to recognise that judges are
motivated by more than the mandates of logic. 68

D Legal reasoning and policy

Strict legal formalism as a model of legal reasoning has been criticised by

numerous legal theorists. 69 According to the critics of formalism, the use of
formalistic techniques such as IRAC does not produce ‘correct’ or even realistic
answers to legal problems. At best it assists in the identification of the range of
possible legal responses. 70 Other considerations come into play when judges and
other legal decision makers have to choose between these possible responses.
Often these other considerations are policy considerations, and a number of
writers have emphasised the importance of law students learning to engage in a
63
Michael F C Scott, ‘A Plea for the Study of Logic’ (1968) 21(2) Journal of Legal Education
206;
64
Vincent Luizzi, ‘Philosophy in Legal Education’ (1978) 29(4) Journal of Legal Education 613.
65
Jonathan Crowe, ‘Reasoning from the Ground Up: Some Strategies for Teaching Theory to
Law Students’ (2011) 21 Legal Education Review 49.
66
Sanson et al, above n 36; Chapter 2. Head and Mann address logical thinking in considerable
depth: Head and Mann, above n 37.
67
Ruggero J Aldisert, Stephen Clowney and Jeremy D Peterson, ‘Logic for Law Students: How
to Think Like a Lawyer’ (2007-2008) University of Pittsburgh Law Review 69.
68
See also Posner, above n 53, 348.
69
For critiques of strict legal formalism, see for example, Herbert LA Hart, The Concept of Law
(Oxford University Press, 1997); Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Model of Rules’ (1967) 35 University
of Chicago Law Review 14; and pretty much anything written by the legal realists. More
recently, see Scott J Shapiro, Legality (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011); and
Posner, above n 53.
70
See Nelson Miller and Bradley Charles, ‘Meeting the Carnegie Report’s Challenge to Make
Legal Analysis Explicit - Subsidiary Skills to the IRAC Framework’ (2005) 59 Journal of
Legal Education 192, 218-219.

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form of legal reasoning that takes into account not only the relevant legal rules but
also the various policies underlying those rules.

One such text is Vandevelde’s Thinking Like a Lawyer: An Introduction to Legal

Reasoning. 71 Vandevelde’s text is one of the more comprehensive yet accessible
studies of legal reasoning available. Although it is a US text, it is an enormously
useful resource for those looking to teach legal reasoning in a way that
emphasises understanding and use not only of legal rules but also the policies
underlying those rules. In that regard the text is consistent with the sentiments
expressed in the Notes accompanying TLO3 (above).

Vandevelde posits that the goal of legal reasoning or ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is to
identify the rights and duties of particular individuals in particular
circumstances. 72 This involves five steps:

(1) identifying the applicable sources of law, usually statutes and judicial
decisions;

(2) analysing these sources of law to determine the applicable rules of law
and the policies underlying those rules;

(3) synthesising the applicable rules of law into a coherent structure in

which the more specific rules are grouped under the more general
ones;

(4) researching the available facts; and

(5) applying the structure of rules to the facts to ascertain the rights or
duties created by the facts, using the policies underlying the rules to
resolve difficult cases. 73

Legal reasoning is essentially a process of attempting to predict or, in the event of

litigation, influence the decision of a court. It is structured as if based on logic but
in reality is impossible without reference to the underlying policies. These
policies are rarely consistent and frequently in conflict, and so legal reasoning
involves having to decide which of the underlying policies is to prevail. Since
legal reasoning can rarely predict an outcome or result with perfect accuracy, it
often involves identifying the range of possible outcomes and the relatively
likelihood of each.

Midson also writes about the importance of policy considerations in her article
Teaching Causation in Criminal Law: Learning to Think Like Policy Analysts.74
Like Vandevelde, for Midson the challenge for legal education is to teach legal
reasoning so that students are better able to identify and apply unarticulated policy
reasons. It is essential to draw students' attention to the fact that 'invisible factors'

71
Kenneth J Vandevelde, Thinking Like a Lawyer: An Introduction to Legal Reasoning
(Westview Press, 2010).
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.
74
Brenda Midson, ‘Teaching Causation in Criminal Law: Learning to Think Like Policy
Analysts’ (2010) 20 Legal Education Review 173.

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operate in legal decision-making, and to encourage students to look beyond the
legal principles or rules in a case to identify what those invisible factors are and
how to utilise them in problem-solving.

E Expanding the scope of legal reasoning

Recent legal reasoning scholarship has been critical of the traditional emphasis
upon logic and rationality when teaching students how to ‘think like lawyers’, and
called for greater emphasis to be placed on other factors such as the recognition of
commercial considerations, non-adversarial responses, concern for social justice
issues and empathy for others.

Formalistic methods such as IRAC are frequently inconsistent with commercial

considerations and the realities of legal practice. In law school, students are
presented with legal problems and instructed to resolve them in the manner of a
judge, considering both sides of the argument and identifying the best or most
likely conclusion. In practice, lawyers are often instructed to begin with a
particular position – one consistent with the desires of the client – and then work
‘backwards’ to construct legal arguments that support that position.75 This
suggests that law teachers should give some thought to the ways in which legal
problems are phrased, and what law students are instructed to do. 76

According to the Notes to TLO3 in the LLB LTAS Statement, the range of
possible legal responses identified as an outcome of legal reasoning should
include not only adversarial responses (eg, X can sue Y for breach of contract),
but also non-adversarial responses (eg, X should be encouraged to approach Y
and suggest mediation as means of resolving the dispute). This is a point affirmed
by, and expanded upon, in articles by Gutman, 77 King, 78 Finlay et al, 79 Kraemer
and Singer, 80 and others. 81 It is not the case that law students can only be
encouraged to consider such non-adversarial possibilities when being taught legal
reasoning for the first time. Non-adversarial solutions to legal problems can and
should be explored as part of the content of the various doctrinal law subjects.
King, for example, argues that the law school curriculum should include
‘therapeutic jurisprudence, restorative justice and other non‑adversarial
modalities not as components of separate units but as key components integrated

75
Regarding the ways in which the professional context impacts upon lawyers’ reasoning see
Miller and Charles, above n 70, 203.
76
The use by lawyers and law students of legal and policy arguments for the purposes of
advocacy is addressed extensively throughout Vandevelde, above n 71.
77
Judy Gutman, ‘The Reality of Non-Adversarial Justice: Principles and Practice’ (2009) 14(1)
Deakin Law Review 29.
78
Michael S King, ‘Restorative Justice, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rise of Emotionally
Intelligent Justice’ (2008) 32(3) Melbourne University Law Review 1096.
79
Susan Finlay et al, ‘Alternative Approaches to Problem Solving’ (2001-2002) 29(5) Fordham
Urban Law Journal 1981.
80
Karen D Kraemer and David Singer, ‘Teaching Mediation: The Need to Overhaul Legal
Education’ (1992) 47(3) Arbitration Journal 12.
81
Regarding the potential negative consequences of the traditional over-emphasis upon
adversarialism see Kath Hall, Molly Townes O’Brien and Stephen Tang, ‘Developing a
Professional Identity in Law School: A View from Australia’ (2010) 4 Phoenix Law Review
21, 51.

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into the teaching of core legal subjects’. 82 In her paper Facing Down the
Gladiators: Addressing Law School’s Hidden Adversarial Curriculum, Molly
Townes O’Brien critiques the traditional emphasis upon adversarialism in
Australian legal education, and calls upon law schools to better prepare students
for the wide variety of roles they will play as lawyers by incorporating more non-
adversarial processes and materials into the curriculum. 83

Other writers insist that the teaching of legal reasoning should include references
to social justice issues. In Thinking Like a Public Interest Lawyer: Theory,
Practice and Pedagogy, 84 Agarwal and Simonson argue that legal education
should foster in students the critical faculty to not only think logically but also to
ask and answer questions about what is ‘good, right and just’. Similarly Aiken, in
her article Provocateurs for Justice, calls upon law teachers to inspire their
students to commit to justice. 85

In Thinking Like Non-Lawyers: Why Empathy is a Core Lawyering Skill and Why
Legal Education Should Change to Reflect Its Importance, 86 Gallacher
recommends that law teachers change the way they teach legal reasoning,
especially to first year law students, in order to make them more empathetically
aware of the circumstances by which the court opinions they study arose and the
effects those opinions will have on others. He argues that such changes will not
only make lawyers better people, they will make them better lawyers. He
examines the dangers inherent in an overemphasis on the ‘logical’ form of
analysis taught in law schools, and explores real-life examples of logical thinking
that failed to persuade non-lawyers in the form of a jury. He also looks at a
successful example of empathetic lawyering to show how it can be more effective,
and offers specific proposals to help law schools ameliorate the dangers of an
over-emphasis on ‘thinking like a lawyer’. 87

These and similar texts make the point that the teaching of legal reasoning should
emphasise not only formalistic problem solving and logical reasoning but also
policy considerations, commercial realities, non-adversarial solutions and a
concern for social justice and the wellbeing of others. Treating these matters as
somehow separate from ‘legal reasoning’ may be tempting, but may not be
appropriate. It would send an inconsistent and troublesome message to law
students if they were told in some law subjects to strive to be logical, rational and
unemotional and in other subjects to aspire to be good, do good and care for
others. It would be better if these ideals could be reconciled in a more nuanced
approach to the development of legal reasoning skills from their very first class.

82
King, above n 78, 1124.
83
Molly Townes O’Brien, ‘Facing Down the Gladiators: Addressing Law School’s Hidden
Adversarial Curriculum’ (2011) 37 Monash University Law Review 43.
84
Nisha Agarwal and Jocelyn Simonson, ‘Thinking Like a Public Interest Lawyer: Theory,
Practice and Pedagogy’ (2010) 34 New York University Review of Law & Social Change 455.
85
Jane H Aiken, ‘Provocateurs for Justice’ (2001) 7 Clinical Law Review 287.
86
Ian Gallacher, ‘Thinking Like Non-Lawyers: Why Empathy is a Core Lawyering Skill and
Why Legal Education Should Change to Reflect Its Importance’ (2011) 8 Legal
Communication and Rhetoric
<http://www.alwd.org/LC&R/CurrentIssues/2011/Gallacher_1.html>.
87
Ibid.

QUT Law & Justice Volume 12 Number 1 2012 80

 IV TLO3C - CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

TLO3c is the ability to ‘engage in critical analysis and make a reasoned choice
amongst alternatives.’ According to the Notes in the LLB LTAS Statement:

‘Critical analysis’ is the practice of examining a text, claim or argument and

identifying the hidden structures: for example, legal and non-legal issues; premises
and hypothesis; factual, theoretical and ideological assumptions; undisclosed biases
and prejudices; and so on. The word ‘critical’ emphasises that analysis is a high-
level, conceptually analytical activity; it does not mean simply being
confrontational or negative – the outcome of critical analysis can be agreement
with the text, claim or argument.

Making a ‘reasoned choice among alternatives’ involves critical evaluation of a

text, claim, argument or response to a legal issue. It requires identification of the
strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages, accuracies and flaws in a
text, claim, argument or response (usually by comparing the text, claim, argument
or response with one or more criteria such as truth value, doctrinal correctness,
practicality, or consistency with an ideological standard such as the rule of law or
social justice).

The use of the word ‘reasoned’ emphasises that the choice must be justified,
supported by evidence, and consistent with the critical analysis. Graduates must be
able to explain the basis for adopting a particular point of view. 88

TLO3c is the ability to engage in critical analysis and evaluation. Analysis and
evaluation are two of the key skills associated with the ability to engage in
‘critical thinking’, and it is therefore appropriate to refer to the critical thinking
literature when determining what it means to teach law students how to analyse
and evaluate, and why it is so important that they learn to do so.

An excellent starting point is the American Philosophical Association report,

Critical Thinking: A Statement of Expert Consensus for Purposes of Educational
Assessment and Instruction (the APA Report). In 1990, under the sponsorship of
the American Philosophical Association, a cross-disciplinary panel of 46 experts
representing scholarly disciplines in the humanities, sciences, social sciences, and
education completed a two-year project which resulted in the following
conceptualisation of critical thinking as an outcome of university level education:

We understand critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which

results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation
of the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual
considerations upon which that judgment is based. Critical thinking is essential as
a tool of inquiry. As such, critical thinking is a liberating force in education and a
powerful resource in one's personal and civic life. While not synonymous with
good thinking, critical thinking is a pervasive and self-rectifying human
phenomenon. The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive, well-informed,
trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fair-minded in evaluation, honest in
facing personal biases, prudent in making judgments, willing to reconsider, clear
about issues, orderly in complex matters, diligent in seeking relevant information,
reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in inquiry, and persistent in seeking
results which are as precise as the subject and the circumstances of inquiry permit.

88
Kift, Israel and Field, above n 1.

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 Thus, educating good critical thinkers means working toward this ideal. It
combines developing critical thinking skills with nurturing those dispositions
which consistently yield useful insights and which are the basis of a rational and
democratic society. 89

The six critical thinking skills identified and described in the APA Report are
interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation and self-regulation.
The skills of direct relevance to TLO3 are the first four. The other two skills
relate to other Threshold Learning Outcomes: ‘explanation’ relates to TLO5
Communication and collaboration, and ‘self-regulation’ relates to TLO6 Self
management.

This conceptualisation of critical thinking skills reveals how critical thinking and
legal reasoning are not mutually exclusive. Instead, legal reasoning can be seen
as a specific application of critical thinking skills. When a lawyer identifies a
legal issue, they are exercising their interpretation skills to understand the facts
with which they are presented, and their analysis skills to separate the material
facts from the irrelevant facts and identify the underlying legal issue. When they
identify the relevant legal rules, they are exercising their interpretation skills and
analysis skills to recognise which legal principles are relevant. When they apply
the rules to the facts of the problem, they are exercising their evaluation skills by
assessing the facts in light of the rules. And when they reach a conclusion, they
are exercising their inference skills to draw a conclusion from the earlier exercise
of their other skills, their explanation skills to present a clear and well argued
conclusion, and their self-regulation skills to double check their reasoning.

The APA Report is not alone in its emphasis upon the importance of critical
thinking. Critical thinking is widely seen as a form of higher order thinking, and
is frequently referred to in lists of assessment criteria and standards across a range
of disciplines including law. 90 However, unlike legal reasoning, critical thinking
is rarely taught to law students explicitly, and it is usually something left for the
students to work out for themselves or is assumed to be something already
understood by the students by the time they arrive at law school. This is not a
phenomenon unique to the law school. Haas and Keeley question why so many
academics in a variety of disciplines are resistant to the teaching of critical
thinking, and posit that many academics have not experienced the critical thinking
approach as part of their own education, have not been specifically trained in

89
American Philosophical Association, Critical Thinking: A Statement of Expert Consensus for
Purposes of Educational Assessment and Instruction (California Academic Press, 1990)
<http://assessment.aas.duke.edu/documents/Delphi_Report.pdf>. The claim that critical
thinking is a general skill is however a contested one: see for example, Robert H Ennis,
‘Critical Thinking and Subject Specificity: Clarification and Needed Research’ (1989) 18(3)
Educational Researcher 4; Robert H Ennis, ‘The Extent to Which Critical Thinking Is Subject-
Specific: Further Clarification’ (1990) 19(4) Educational Researcher 13; John E McPeck,
‘Critical Thinking and Subject Specificity: A Reply to Ennis’ (1990) 19(4) Educational
Researcher 10; Victor Quinn, ‘In Defence of Critical Thinking as a Subject: If McPeck Is
Wrong He Is Wrong’ (1994) 28(1) Journal of Philosophy of Education 101; Tim Moore, ‘The
Critical Thinking Debate: How General Are General Thinking Skills?’ (2004) 23 Higher
Education Research and Development 3.
90
Nickolas James, ‘Embedding Graduate Attributes within Subjects: Critical Thinking’ in Sally
Kift et al (eds), Excellence and Innovation in Legal Education (LexisNexis, 2011).

QUT Law & Justice Volume 12 Number 1 2012 82

critical thinking, and are too busy providing information and helping students
understand models to worry about whether students can think critically. 91

There are many accessible sources of information about critical thinking and how
it can be taught, including:

• texts about critical thinking written for students and for anyone
seeking to develop their own critical thinking skills; and

• texts written for teachers about how best to teach others how to think
critically.

A good example of the first type of text is Cottrell’s Critical Thinking Skills -
Developing Effective Analysis and Argument, a guide to developing critical
thinking skills with an emphasis upon argument and logical reasoning. 92 Another
excellent resource for anyone interested in learning more about critical thinking is
Facione’s engaging (and periodically updated) online essay Critical Thinking:
What It Is and Why It Counts. 93

There is a relatively small number of critical thinking texts written explicitly for
law teachers. In Embedding Graduate Attributes within Subjects: Critical
Thinking, the author explains the meaning and importance of critical thinking
within the context of legal education and legal practice, and describes how the
graduate attribute of ‘the ability to engage in critical thinking about law’ can be
developed within a law subject by being embedded within the learning objectives,
the learning activities and the assessment activities for the subject. 94

Another, more practical, example of a critical thinking article written for law
teachers is Macduff’s Deep Learning, Critical Thinking, and Teaching for Law
Reform. 95 Macduff describes how the learning activities in an undergraduate
family law subject were designed to promote critical thinking and a deep
approach to learning. 96

91
Paul F Haas and Stuart M Keeley, ‘Coping with Faculty Resistance to Teaching Critical
Thinking’ (1998) 46(2) College Teaching 63.
92
Stella Cottrell, Critical Thinking Skills - Developing Effective Analysis and Argument
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). This is just one of dozens of critical thinking handbooks, manuals
and articles that are available.
93
Peter A Facione, Critical Thinking: What It Is and Why It Counts (2011)
<http://www.insightassessment.com/CT-Resources/Critical-Thinking-What-It-Is-and-Why-It-
Counts>.
94
James, above n 90.
95
Anne Macduff, ‘Deep Learning, Critical Thinking, and Teaching for Law Reform’ (2005) 15
Legal Education Review 125.
96
One of the learning goals for the subject was that the students should be able to use theory to
generate critical insight into their own thinking about marriage law reform. In the first class
the students were instructed to identify their views on same sex marriage and write a page of
supporting arguments. The following classes presented information covering the different
theoretical approaches to family law and the substantive law surrounding marriage formation
and divorce. The students were then asked to refer back to the statement they had made in the
first class and (1) analyse their arguments for any similarities with other theoretical positions
that had been covered, (2) with the knowledge they had gained from discussing the theoretical
frameworks, identify the discourse that would respond critically to their initial position and

QUT Law & Justice Volume 12 Number 1 2012 83

Other critical thinking texts of direct relevance to law teachers include those by
Fulcher, 97 Nagarajan and Parashar, 98 and James et al. 99

Most of the critical thinking literature identifies critical thinking as a combination

of certain skills (including analysis and evaluation) and a certain attitude or
disposition, and argues that students benefit from critical thinking being taught
explicitly rather than the ability to engage in critical thinking being assumed or
left to the students to teach themselves. At the very least explicit training in
critical thinking clarifies for students the meaning of terms such as ‘interpret’,
‘analyse’ and ‘evaluate’ that they are likely to encounter throughout their studies.

V TLO3D - CREATIVE THINKING

TLO3d is the ability to ‘think creatively in approaching legal issues and

generating appropriate responses.’ According to the Notes in the LLB LTAS
Statement:

‘Think creatively’ in this context builds on a graduate’s ability to diagnose the

specific requirements of a particular legal issue on its facts and determine the most
appropriate response from the spectrum of available responses. It requires a
capacity to think laterally and engage in transferable problem-solving; for example,
conceiving new responses to old problems using accepted legal reasoning
techniques. It includes an understanding of inductive and deductive reasoning.
This element of the TLO, therefore, requires graduates to be familiar with a range
of alternative dispute resolution processes, such as negotiation and mediation.
Graduates should be able to appreciate the benefits of alternative and non-
adversarial approaches, as well as formal adversarial approaches, and be able to use
that appreciation to generate tailored responses to a legal issue. 100

This explanation repeats the earlier emphasis upon adversarial versus non-
adversarial outcomes. The reference to ‘inductive and deductive reasoning’
affirms the points made earlier about the importance of logical reasoning. The
key skill in TLO3d is creativity: it is the ability to approach legal issues and
generate responses to those issues ‘creatively’, that is, with an awareness of the
full range of possible responses – legalistic and non-legalistic, adversarial and
non-adversarial - and with an ability and willingness to consider responses that

explain why, and (3) either develop counter arguments to the critique, or accept the critique
and modify their position. The activity did not attempt to persuade the students of a particular
outcome of law reform. Rather, the activities were structured so that students used their
critical thinking skills and recently acquired legal and theoretical knowledge to engage with
their own perspectives on issues relating to law reform and social change.
97
Alison Fulcher, ‘Teaching Analysis Skills in the Context of a Commercial Transaction’ (1997)
Journal of Professional Legal Education 181 - A description of an action research project
designed to assess and improve the teaching of analysis skills in the context of a commercial
transaction.
98
Vijaya Nagarajan and Archana Parashar, ‘An Empowering Experience: Repositioning Critical
Thinking Skills in the Law Curriculum’ (2006) 10 Southern Cross University Law Review 219
- A description of how to incorporate critical thinking skills into the law curriculum, equip
students with skills to make critical judgments, and connect politics to social responsibility.
99
Nickolas James, Clair Hughes and Clare Cappa, ‘Conceptualising, Developing and Assessing
Critical Thinking in Law’ (2010) 15 Teaching in Higher Education 285 – A description of the
embedding of critical thinking as a graduate attribute in a first year subject at the University of
Queensland.
100
Kift, Israel and Field, above n 1.

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are innovative, unorthodox, or unexpected. Like critical thinking, creative
thinking is closely related to legal reasoning: a lawyer uses their creative skills,
for example, when they construct an innovative yet persuasive legal argument, or
when they identify an unorthodox yet valid solution to a legal problem.

The importance of creativity has been acknowledged beyond the discipline of law:
in 2001 Bloom’s taxonomy of education objectives was revised to situate ‘create’
as the highest of higher-order learning skills. 101

The ability to think creatively is clearly of relevance and use to lawyers, whether
they are drafting a contract, negotiating a deal or arguing a case in court.
According to Weinstein and Morton, creative thinking is an essential component
of legal problem solving. 102 From the perspective of law practice, critical
thinking is useful when lawyers are engaged in traditional legal problem solving
in the adversarial context, particularly in litigation, but lawyers use creative
thinking when they, for example, help clients consider what alternatives might
exist for solving their problems. Weinstein and Morton call upon law teachers to
do a better job of incorporating and supporting creative thinking in legal
education. 103

Creativity is not something that is usually taught explicitly at law school. Legal
education has traditionally focused upon developing the ability to engage in
structured, logical and constrained forms of thinking, and creativity by law
students has not been encouraged.

According to Magone and Friedland, on the one hand law is a science based on a
finite body of decisions, statutes and other raw materials that can be studied and
from which new disputes can be resolved, but on the other hand, law is also an art
form ‘infused with imagination and creativity’ with rarely only a single
conclusion or only a single path to that conclusion, and it is difficult to reconcile
law as science and law as art in the context of legal education. 104 While in
practice legal reasoning often utilises a considerable degree of creativity, it is
usually taught to law students in a way that emphasises technical proficiency and
structural similarity over innovation and exploration, and the effort by law
teachers to develop analytical rigour in their students often leads to a
minimisation of creative talents and creative thinking. 105

The traditional distrust of creativity is reflected in the reassurance in the Notes to

TLO3 that:

The term ‘think creatively’ does not mean that it is appropriate to ignore precedent
and practice, and just ‘make things up’. Instead, it should be interpreted in the

101
Lorin Anderson and David Krathwohl (eds), A Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and
Assessing: A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy of Education Objectives (Longman, 2001).
102
Janet Weinstein and Linda Morton, ‘Stuck in a Rut: The Role of Creative Thinking in Problem
Solving and Legal Education’ (2003) 9 Clinical Law Review 835.
103
Ibid. See also Robin Yeamans, ‘Creativity and Legal Education’ (1971) 23(3) Journal of Legal
Education 381. Not everyone agrees, however, that creativity in the context of legal education
is important or even meaningful - see Dietrich, above n 16.
104
Kathleen Magone and Steven I Friedland, ‘The Paradox of Creative Legal Analysis: Venturing
into the Wilderness’ (2002) 79 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 571.
105
Ibid.

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 context of the Bachelor of Laws degree as relating to the development of
‘responses to legal issues’. 106

In order for law students to learn to think creatively in the manner envisaged by
TLO3, the curriculum must include the study of forms of alternative dispute
resolution and non-adversarial approaches to legal problem solving. Should it
also include instruction in creative thinking? In recent years a number of scholars
– from both within and beyond the discipline of law – have called for creativity to
be encouraged, and even explicitly taught, at university, and there is a small but
growing number of scholarly resources available to law teachers to assist them in
this endeavour.

Robinson argues that students can be taught generic skills of creative thinking,
just in the way they can be taught to read, write, and do math. 107 According to
Robinson, creativity can be taught to students by encouraging them to experiment
and to innovate, and by not giving them all the answers but giving them the tools
they need to find out what the answers might be. 108

In Stuck in a Rut: The Role of Creative Thinking in Problem Solving and Legal
Education, Weinstein and Morton examine the mental process of creative
thinking. They discuss what it is, why lawyers have difficulty engaging in it, and
how law teachers can overcome this difficulty through specific techniques and a
more conducive environment. 109

In Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal

Negotiation?, Carrie Menkel-Meadow explains the relevance of creativity to legal
problem-solving, and draws upon social science studies and literature on
creativity to explain how creative problem solving can be taught to students when
teaching them about negotiation and litigation. 110

In The Paradox of Creative Legal Analysis: Venturing into the Wilderness,

Magone and Friedland describe how they introduced creative thinking as a tool to
promote analytical thinking in a law subject. They experimented by using student
creativity in their classes in combination with, and as a supplement to, traditional
case analysis. 111 The use of the creative arts – such as painting, photography and
filmmaking – was incorporated as an optional part of student assignments and
examinations. The authors found that having students use creative arts in their
legal education promoted reasoning abilities and engaged them ‘actively,
frequently and happily’ in the learning process. It also emphasised and
illuminated an important aspect of the analytical enterprise, deliberation in

106
Kift, Israel and Field, above n 1.
107
Amy M Azzam, ‘Why Creativity Now? A Conversation with Sir Ken Robinson’ (2009) 67(1)
Teaching for the 21st Century 22.
108
Ibid.
109
Janet Weinstein and Linda Morton, ‘Stuck in a Rut: The Role of Creative Thinking in Problem
Solving and Legal Education’ (2003) 9 Clinical Law Review 835.
110
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable
in Legal Negotiation?’ (2001) 6 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 97.
111
Magone and Friedland, above n 104.

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thinking, because the students and teacher had more time to think about the
particular case or legal principle. 112

In Exceeding the Boundaries of Formulaic Assessment: Innovation and Creativity

in the Law School, Phillips et al describe how in their Land Law subject at
University of Greenwich the students were required to create a web page. The
topic of the assignment was ‘What is land?’ 113 The students were instructed to
take, or find, a photograph of an object or structure which may or may not form
part of the land, and to present an argument as to whether or not their chosen
object does or does not form part of the land. 114 The assessment task was
intended to bring out the creative side of the students and to engage them in the
subject.

Blythe and Sweet in Why Creativity? Why Now? focus upon two important
aspects of teaching creativity – the creative environment and the creative process.
115
Establishing a creative environment requires an open atmosphere where
students are free to take risks, bad guesses are not pounced on, every answer is not
necessarily right or wrong, and students are free to look at things in ways without
fear of punishment, condescension, or a bad grade. 116 Teaching the creative
process involves facilitating the development of certain skills by the students,
such as goal orientation (creativity often emerges when working towards a goal),
brainstorming, piggy-backing (building upon an existing idea), perception shifting
(looking at something from a different angle), synthesis, and meta-cognition. 117

While it is unlikely to be feasible for stand-alone subjects on creative legal

thinking to be made part of the law curriculum, it does appear possible for law
teachers to create more opportunities within existing subjects for creativity to
flourish, and for assessment tasks to recognise and reward creative thinking by
students.

VI CONCLUSION

This article has sought to assist those law schools and legal academics concerned
about being called upon to demonstrate the ways in which the Threshold Learning
Outcome ‘thinking skills’ is developed by their students. It has done so by
summarising, analysing and synthesising the relevant academic literature.
Consistent with the explanation of the TLO in the LLB LTAS Statement,
‘thinking skills’ have been conceptualised as a combination of legal reasoning,
critical thinking and creative thinking skills.

The emphasis in this article has been upon identifying a variety of explanations of
the nature and importance of each of these skills as well as, to a lesser extent, the
ways they can be taught to law students. Relatively little has been said, however,

112
Ibid.
113
Edward Phillips et al, ‘Exceeding the Boundaries of Formulaic Assessment: Innovation and
Creativity in the Law School’ (2010) 44(3) The Law Teacher 334.
114
Ibid.
115
Hal Blythe and Charlie Sweet, ‘Why Creativity? Why Now?’ (2010) 20(1) National Teaching
and Learning Forum Newsletter.
116
Ibid.
117
Ibid.

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about how these skills can and should be assessed. This is a topic for subsequent
exploration.

There are many other important questions that are suitable topics for further
consideration. Are ‘thinking skills’ something best taught as a discrete topic in a
discrete subject, or should they always be taught in the context of a particular
doctrinal area? Can the ability to identify issues be taught explicitly, and if so
how? When teaching legal problem solving, how much emphasis should be
placed upon developing the ability to identify and resolve (a) policy issues and (b)
factual issues? Should all law students be obliged to complete subjects/modules
on logic and critical thinking? When teaching legal reasoning, what is the most
appropriate balance between teaching students to be amoral and objective, and
encouraging them to be ethical and empathetic? Should creativity be taught
explicitly to law students, and if so, how?

The TLOs were not intended to be so prescriptive that they dictate the content of
particular law subjects or the use of particular methods of assessment, or lead to
inappropriate and unnecessary consistency across Australian law schools.118
There is nevertheless a pressing need for further academic conversation about
what kinds of ‘thinking skills’ are appropriate for law students in the 21st century,
how they can be taught, and how the effectiveness of our teaching efforts can be
demonstrated to the relevant regulatory bodies.

118
Kift, Israel and Field, above n 1, 5-6.

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