22

Is Prostitution Harmful?
Ole Martin Moen

A common argument against prostitution states that selling sex is harm-

ful because it involves selling something deeply personal and emotional.
More and more people, however, hold that sexual encounters need not
be deeply personal or emotional in order to be acceptable, as exempli-
fied by the general acceptability of casual sex. In this paper, Ole Martin
Moen argues that if casual sex is acceptable, then we have few or no
good reasons to reject prostitution. Moen first examines nine influential
arguments to the contrary. These arguments purport to pin down the al-
leged additional harm brought about by prostitution (compared to just
casual sex) by appealing to various aspects of its practice, such as its
psychology, physiology, economics, and social meaning. For each argu-
ment Moen explains why it is not convincing and then weighs the costs
against the benefits of prostitution. He argues that, in sum, prostitution
is no more harmful than a long line of occupations that we commonly
accept without hesitation.

Ole Martin Moen is professor of ethics at Oslo Metropolitan University. This article was originally
published in the Journal of Medical Ethics 40:2 (2014), 73–81. It is reprinted here, slightly revised, with
permission of the Journal of Medical Ethics and the author.

INTRODUCTION

Most of us believe that prostitution is harmful. We believe that we are

harmed if we sell sex and, perhaps, harmed if we buy sex. This harm,
moreover, we consider to be of serious proportions. Selling sex is not
regarded as on par with eating too much chocolate or getting a bad grade.
Rather, it is regarded as so harmful that if it is ever permissible and

481
482     Ole Martin Moen

appropriate to engage in prostitution, it must be as the last option avail-

able in a situation where the alternative is to suffer a life-threatening
harm (such as starvation). Opinion polls support this line of thought.1
The belief that prostitution is harmful shapes how, privately and pro-
fessionally, we approach the issue of prostitution. It also informs public
policy debates. Even people with widely diverging views on prostitution
legislation tend to share the underlying assumption that prostitution
harms those who engage in it.
In this paper, I aim to challenge this underlying assumption, and I
do so by arguing for the following conditional: if we accept the increas-
ingly common view that casual sex is not harmful, we should accept
that neither is prostitution. “Casual sex,” as I use the term, refers to sex
engaged in for the sake of enjoyment or recreation without long-term
commitments or emotional attachments. For all I argue here, casual sex
might well be harmful, and if it is, so is prostitution. If casual sex is not
harmful, however, I argue that prostitution—though, like most occupa-
tions, it has its downsides and is not for everyone—is not harmful either.
This conclusion, if correct, has far-reaching implications for how we
should approach the issue of prostitution in the healthcare sector and in
public policy.
What is “prostitution” and what is “harm”? “Prostitution,” accord-
ing to the Oxford English Dictionary, is “the practice or occupation
of engaging in sexual activity for payment.”2 For the purposes of this
paper, this is an apt definition. Admittedly, it has become increasingly
common, in recent years, to speak of “sex work” instead of “prostitu-
tion.” It should be noted, however, that “sex work” is a somewhat wider
category, because it also includes practices such as stripping and phone
sex. Since I do not discuss such practices here, I shall stick to the term
“prostitution,” and I trust that readers will understand that I do not use
the term in a derogatory way.
I use the term “harm” in a wide sense to refer to whatever is detri-
mental to well-being. While I shall not tie my argument to any specific
theory of well-being, I exclude from the group of things and actions that
are properly classified as harmful those things and actions that are det-
rimental to our well-being only because, and only to the extent that, we
believe they are bad and thus act and judge as if they were. The fact that
millions people might be torn by guilt if they eat food that is not halal,
for example, is not sufficient to establish the conclusion that it is harm-
ful to eat food that is not halal. I presuppose, in other words, a certain
objectivism about harm.
In what follows I will first briefly discuss two views of sexual eth-
ics: the view that casual sex is permissible and the view that it is not.
Thereafter, I examine nine arguments for the view that prostitution is
harmful. These arguments incorporate diverse aspects of the practice of
 Is Prostitution Harmful?     483

prostitution—its psychology, physiology, economics, social meaning,

and so on—and are meant to cover the ground of plausible arguments
against prostitution. For each argument I explain why it is not convinc-
ing. Thereafter, I briefly weigh the costs against the benefits of pros-
titution before I reply to two objections: first, that my argument runs
contrary to basic, observable facts; second, that my argument rests on
utopian presuppositions.

TWO VIEWS OF SEXUAL ETHICS

In the paper “Two Views of Sexual Ethics,” David Benatar draws a dis-
tinction between two different views on the necessary conditions for per-
missible sex. On one view, which Benatar calls “the significance view,”
sex is permissible only if it is “an expression of (romantic) love.” On the
other view, which Benatar calls “the casual view,” sex need not have this
significance in order to be permissible.3
This is an important distinction. I believe, however, that the labels
that Benatar has chosen—“the significance view” and the “the casual
view”—are misleading because they easily create the impression that
while one view holds that sex can be romantically significant, the other
view denies this. That, however, is not the case. “The casual view” does
not imply that sex is never romantically significant. It only implies that
sex need not always be romantically significant in order to be permis-
sible.
Clearly, proponents of what Benatar calls “the significance view”
might claim that “the casual view” reduces sex to mere wriggling of
meat, and thus makes all sex void of significance. That, however, is not
a claim that proponents of “the casual view” need to accept. They could
explain why by drawing a parallel to eating. When a romantic couple
dines at a lovely restaurant, their eating might well be romantically sig-
nificant for both parties. Then what is biologically the mere satisfaction
of a nutritional need is given deep personal meaning because of its social
and psychological setting. It is not clear, however, the advocate of the
“casual view” might argue, that one degrades eating as such and destroys
one’s capacity for appreciating romantic meals if one has earlier engaged
in “casual eating” or has been “eating around,” occasionally catching
a cheap hotdog on the run. If this is right, then casually engaging in an
activity that has the potential for romantic significance need not destroy
that activity’s romantic significance on other occasions. If we accept
this, then we would need a separate argument to explain why casual sex
destroys sex even though casual eating does not destroy eating.
Rather than speaking of “the significance view” and “the casual
view,” therefore, I will speak of “the strong significance view” and “the
484     Ole Martin Moen

weak significance view.” While both views hold that sex can be roman-
tically significant, only the strong significance view holds that all non-
significant sex is impermissible. I will nowhere use the term “casual
view,” though it could perhaps properly refer to the (implausible) view
that sex is always merely casual and is never romantically significant.
If the strong significance view is correct, it would be clear why prosti-
tution is problematic. Though there might be cases where romantic love
is present between a prostitute and a client (either one way or both ways),
these are exceptions, and for the sake of the argument, I will assume
that all sex between a prostitute and a client is sex without romantic
significance. If casual sex is problematic, therefore, so is prostitution. If
the strong significance view of sex is incorrect, however, it is no longer
equally clear what the problem is with prostitution. At least, prostitu-
tion cannot be categorically ruled out for being sex without romantic
significance, since sex without romantic significance is not per se a
problem. As such, other features of prostitution would have to account
for its alleged hazards. Let us now examine nine influential arguments
that purport to establish that such hazards exist.

NINE ARGUMENTS THAT PROSTITUTION IS HARMFUL

Argument 1: The Correlation with Psychological

Problems Argument
P1: That which leads to psychological problems is harmful.
P2: Prostitution leads to psychological problems.
C: Prostitution is harmful.

This is a common argument with strong intuitive appeal. P1 seems unde-

niable. P2 is an empirical claim, and to assess it, it seems that we should
consult psychological research on prostitution. When we do, we find that
a significant number of prostitutes suffer from panic attacks, eating dis-
orders, depression, and insomnia; that many experience guilt, regret, and
remorse after having sold sex; and that the suicide rate among prostitutes
is six times that of the average population.4 Since it is very implausible
that such correlations are accidental, P1 and P2 both seem to be true.
Thus we seem to have good reason to believe that prostitution is harmful
(C)—even if we accept the weak significance view of sex.
The problem with this argument is that accepting that prostitutes
often experience psychological problems, and that this correlation is not
accidental, does not imply accepting that prostitution leads to psycho-
logical problems.
 Is Prostitution Harmful?     485

To make this point clear, we may turn to the literature on, and the
debate over, homosexuality in the 1920s and 1930s. What we find in
this literature is that homosexuals in the early twentieth century also
experienced guilt, regret, and remorse; were significantly more prone to
depression, eating disorders, and insomnia than non-homosexuals; and
had a significantly higher suicide rate than the rest of the population.5
These figures were used by opponents of homosexuality as allegedly
scientific evidence that homosexuality is harmful. Today, however, most
of us would claim that they misinterpreted the data. Though we would
concede that many homosexuals did suffer from these problems, we
would argue that the statistics themselves were insufficient to establish
that there was anything inherently harmful in being a homosexual or
in engaging in homosexual practice, and that the correlation was most
likely due to the social treatment of homosexuals at the time. After all,
homosexuals were subject to significant stigma.
As long as we are merely spotting a correlation, therefore, we cannot
exclude the possibility that to a larger or smaller extent, the same is true
of prostitutes. Prostitutes, after all, are also subject to stigma. “Whore”
and “hooker” are highly derogatory terms, and Yolanda Estes, who used
to sell sex and who is now a philosophy professor at Mississippi State
University, claims in “Prostitution: A Subjective Position” that if she
had been open about her background all along, this would seriously have
damaged her career.6 Indeed, as prostitution researcher Teela Sanders
observes, we have a strong historical tradition for portraying people who
sell sex as “purveyors of disease, a social evil (and) a public nuisance.”7
I am not making the strong claim that homosexuality in the early
20th century and prostitution today are perfect parallels. For all I argue
(so far), it might well be that while there is nothing inherently harm-
ful in homosexual practice, there is something inherently harmful in
prostitution. As such, there might be excellent reasons why prostitutes,
even apart from the social stigma, naturally experience psychological
problems. The stigma might even be proper. What I argue is merely that
statistical correlation between prostitution and various psychological
problems is not alone sufficient to conclude that prostitution leads to
these problems. Since an argument from mere correlation with psycho-
logical problems alone fails to establish C, we will need additional argu-
ments to show that prostitution is harmful.

Argument 2: The Correlation with Danger Argument

P1: That which is dangerous is harmful.
P2: Prostitution is dangerous.
C: Prostitution is harmful.
486     Ole Martin Moen

This is an argument formally similar to Argument 1, and it seems equally

forceful. P1 seems obvious, at least if the danger in question is excessive.
P2, here as above, is an empirical claim—and consulting sociological and
criminological research, we find that prostitution intimately correlates
with venereal disease, criminal underground networks, drug abuse and
violence.8 For example, in a 1998 study, Melissa Farley and Howard Bar-
kan found that 82 percent of the sellers of sex whom they interviewed
had been physically assaulted.9 In 2008, Ulla Bjørndal and Bjørg Norli
found that 72 percent had been victims of acts such as slapping, punch-
ing, kicking, robbing, burning, biting, raping and choking.10 Being subject
to violence of this kind clearly seems dangerous (P2), and therefore, it
seems that prostitution is harmful (C).
Here again, however, we can use the history of homosexuality to
show that the argument, as it stands, does not necessarily tell us much
about the nature of prostitution. The reason is that homosexual practice,
when forbidden and condemned, also correlated strongly with venereal
disease, underground networks, drug abuse and various forms of violence,
and just as in the case above, these figures were used by opponents of ho-
mosexuality as allegedly scientific arguments supporting the view that
homosexuality is harmful.11 Today, however, most of us would claim,
again, that the data were misinterpreted. Though we would concede
that many homosexuals did suffer from these problems, we would argue
that the statistics were insufficient to establish that there was anything
harmful inherent in being a homosexual or in engaging in homosexual
practice. Rather, we would argue that the correlation most likely was due
to the social and legal treatment of homosexuals at the time. After all,
homosexuals were socially and legally oppressed.
Unless we wish to embrace a methodology that would have made us
conclude, 70 years back in time, that homosexuality is harmful, we can-
not conclude from these correlations alone that prostitution is harmful,
for the social and legal treatment could be the source of these correla-
tions as well. Indeed, it seems that this can be plausibly argued. In addi-
tion to the social stigma, the law (speaking here of current legislation in
my own country, Norway) prevents those who sell sex from joining labor
unions, organizing their work in brothels, renting a place where they can
work, hiring security agencies, advertising, and forming work contracts
(regarding salary, working hours, working conditions, health insurance,
retirement savings, and so on). It does not seem obviously wrong to hold
that such legal restrictions contribute to pushing people who sell sex
away from civil society and make their lives rougher.12
Again, there might be excellent reasons why a correlation with harm-
ful activities would be likely to occur across a wide spectrum of legal
treatments, or indeed, why a strict legal treatment is proper. To make the
case for this, however, no argument from mere correlation will suffice.
 Is Prostitution Harmful?     487

In order to argue, convincingly, that engaging in prostitution is harmful,

one will need to point to something intrinsic to the activity of buying
and selling sex, or to a natural consequence thereof, that is harmful. The
rest of this paper is concerned with arguments that seek to establish this.

Argument 3: The Objectification Argument

P1: That which involves objectification is harmful.
P2: Prostitution involves objectification.
C: Prostitution is harmful.

This argument purports to say something about the very nature of pros-
titution, and as with Arguments 1 and 2 above, it seems intuitively plau-
sible. It seems harmful to use people as objects (P1) and this seems to be
what goes on when a client uses a prostitute to satisfy his sexual desires
(P2). Thus it seems that prostitution is harmful (C).
Before we can assess this argument, we must—to avoid equivoca-
tion—get a clear understanding of what we mean by “objectification.”
Let us examine two different senses of the term “objectification” that
are in use in the academic prostitution debate, one narrow and one wide.
In a narrow sense, such as Thomas Mappes’s in “Sexual Morality
and the Concept of Using Another Person,” objectification means deal-
ing with other persons by means of force or fraud—that is, the practice
of using others as objects that one may manipulate and dispose of as one
pleases. In a broader sense, such as Howard Klepper’s in “Sexual Exploita-
tion and the Value of Persons,” objectification is not restricted to force
and fraud, but includes any treatment of another person as a means to
one’s ends without regard for that person’s own ends.13
On Mappes’s narrow account of objectification, P1 seems true, but
it is doubtful that P2 is true—that is, that prostitution involves objecti-
fication. However, even if prostitution might in some or in many cases
involve force or fraud, or both, it is not clear how this constitutes an ar-
gument against the very activity of buying and selling sex. It seems that
using force or fraud is always (or nearly always) harmful, and the fact that
it is harmful to force or defraud someone to φ is not a sufficient reason
to conclude that it is harmful to φ. The fact that it is harmful to force
someone to marry, for example, does not show that marrying is harmful.
Indeed, one could argue that in cases where force or fraud is used, we
should not even speak of prostitution, but of rape or sexual slavery. If
prostitution means buying and selling sex—and “buying” and “selling,”
to be applicable concepts, presuppose at least a thin notion of voluntari-
ness—it seems just as unreasonable to label sex slavery “prostitution”
as to label someone who is filmed while raped a “porn actress.” Thus
Mappes’s narrow account of objectification, though we should concede
488     Ole Martin Moen

that it identifies a harmful form of objectification, does not render P2

true and thus does not establish that prostitution is harmful.
On Klepper’s broader account, we face not just one problem but two.
The first problem is that on this account, P1 is doubtful, since many ac-
tions that we perform on a daily basis also qualify as objectification. I,
for one, use my newspaper delivery man as an object in Klepper’s sense
of the term. Though I hope my newspaper delivery man is doing well,
I cannot say that I do much to help him reach his goals. I use him as
an object—a newspaper delivery object—and as a consequence, he is
fungible to me. Since I am still in bed when he delivers my newspaper,
I would not notice it if he were replaced by another, equally punctual,
newspaper delivery man (or, indeed, by a newspaper delivery machine).
Thus it seems that I use him as an object on Klepper’s account. Unless
we should grant that we harm our newspaper delivery men, shoemakers,
baristas, and lawyers by doing ordinary business with them, it seems
that we cannot rationally regard all sorts of Klepperian objectification as
harmful—at least not in any significant way.
Even if we (generously) grant that P1 is true on Klepper’s account of
objectification, it is not clear how prostitution qualifies as such objec-
tification—or, at least, how prostitution qualifies as objectification to a
larger extent than activities that undeniably appear harmless. As Irving
Singer has pointed out, “there is nothing in the nature of sexuality as
such that necessarily . . . reduces persons to things,” and the reason for
this, Singer explains, is that there is something fundamentally reciprocal
to sex.14 Bordering to this, Thomas Nagel suggests in “Sexual Perver-
sion” that a crucial aspect of sex is that we tend to derive pleasure from
our sexual partner’s pleasure.15 If Singer and Nagel are right, it seems
that since a prostitute sells sex, it is not unlikely that, at least to some
extent, it matters to the client how she feels. Prejudice aside, it could be
argued that prostitution is one of the few trades where it is natural that
the buyer to some extent cares for the seller. Perhaps for this very reason,
it seems that people who sell sex are less fungible than sellers of most
other services. It seems that a buyer of sex would care more about what
prostitute he has sex with than I care about who delivers my newspaper,
and it also seems that a client would be more likely to build a personal
relationship with his long-term prostitute than I would with my long-
term newspaper delivery man. Of course, there could be (and, sadly, are)
extremely objectifying clients who do not care in the least about those
whom they pay for sex. Even if we grant that such carelessness is harm-
ful, however, this is not an argument against prostitution as such, since
it fails to show that there is something inherent in the activity of buying
and selling sexual services that leads to objectification or makes objecti-
fication likely.
 Is Prostitution Harmful?     489

Thus P2 is doubtful on Mappes’s account, and both P1 and P2 are

doubtful on Klepper’s account. Unless we can find an objectification ar-
gument that appeals to a harmful form of objectification and, at the same
time, applies to prostitution, we need separate arguments to show that
prostitution is harmful.

Argument 4: The Exploitation Argument

P1: That which involves exploitation is harmful.
P2: Prostitution involves exploitation.
C: Prostitution is harmful.

While objectification is the practice of using other persons as objects, ex-

ploitation is the practice of profiting unduly from others’ work. If agent A
works productively all day, yet earns almost nothing, while agent B earns
what is rightfully A’s, then B exploits A. This seems to harm A. If this is
right, and prostitution involves such exploitation (P2), then prostitution
is harmful (C).
For the sake of the argument, I will grant that P1 is true. It is unclear,
however, if P2 is true—or, at least, if buying and selling sex involves or
leads to more exploitation than buying and selling other goods and ser-
vices. Even in today’s context—a context with discriminating laws and
social stigma—it is not clear that people who sell sex are significantly
more exploited than others. For one, there are luxury prostitutes who
earn significantly more than society’s average income. Though these, of
course, are exceptions, the income for ordinary prostitutes also appears to
be fairly good, at least when compared to other kinds of low-skill, labor-
intensive, and female-dominated work, which is the realistic alternative
for most people engaged in prostitution. According to labor economists
Lena Edlund and Evelyn Korn, prostitutes have an average yearly income
between two and six times that of other women in this group.16 Similar
findings have been replicated in other studies. In a recent survey con-
ducted in Chicago, Steven Levitt and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh found that
street prostitutes on average make $25–$30 per hour.17 That is not a huge
salary, but it is four times the minimum wage.18
Nor is it clear that pimps exploit prostitutes as extensively and uni-
versally as we often assume. According to Edlund and Korn, the spot-like
and direct nature of prostitution renders it hard for pimps to profit. They
report, for example, that less than 6 percent of prostitutes in Los Angeles
share income with a pimp.19
This is not to deny, of course, that in many cases, there is indeed
profit involved in organizing prostitution. That, however, fails to single
out prostitution as a harmful profession, since profit is involved in
490     Ole Martin Moen

organizing virtually all professions. It seems, moreover, that a brothel—

at least when run in a civilized manner—has the potential to contribute
to the profit of a prostitute much the same way a hairdressing salon
might contribute to the profit of a hairdresser, by providing facilities,
steady income, safety, advertising, and so forth. This is supported by the
findings of Levitt and Venkatesh, according to which prostitutes work-
ing under pimps on average earn more per week than prostitutes working
alone—even though they work fewer hours and serve fewer clients.20 For
these reasons, we cannot take for granted without further argument that
all profiting from prostitution has an exploitive nature.
Nor can we take for granted that when extremely poor women (or
men) sell sex, and are harmfully exploited when doing so, it is the sell-
ing of sex—and not the poverty—that is the genuine source of the harm.
Within the context of extreme poverty, exploitation can take place in
most professions. This does not establish that these professions per se
are harmful. The fact that construction work performed 15 hours per day
without safety equipment is harmful, does not establish that construc-
tion work is harmful. Similarly, the fact that selling sex 15 hours per day
without safety equipment is harmful, does not establish that selling sex
is harmful. It only establishes that selling sex can be practiced in a harm-
ful manner. That, however, is uncontroversial, and leaves entirely open
the question of how we should assess prostitution in other cases.

Argument 5: The Male Dominance Argument

P1: That which involves male dominance is harmful.
P2: Prostitution involves male dominance.
C: Prostitution is harmful.

This feminist critique of prostitution also seems forceful. Male domi-

nance seems unjust and harmful (P1) and when women earn a living by
satisfying men’s sexual desires, what goes on looks like male dominance
(P2). Thus, it seems that prostitution is harmful (C).
Although I believe we should grant P1, it is not clear that P2 is true.
A first problem with P2 is the fact that prostitution is manifold, and
that there are male and female prostitutes serving male and female cli-
ents. Even if we focus exclusively on stereotypical prostitution involving
female prostitutes and male clients, however, it is not clear that male
dominance is involved. Though there are many ways to account for the
feminist charge of male dominance, I will here consider an influential ar-
gument put forth by Carole Pateman in “Defending Prostitution: Charges
against Ericsson.”21 Pateman argues that “prostitution remains morally
undesirable, no matter what reforms are made, because it is one of the
 Is Prostitution Harmful?     491

most graphic examples of men’s domination over women.” She supports

this by arguing that a market demand for sexual services is the result of a
“culturally distinctive form of masculinity (induced) into the unconscious
development of little boys,” and that Hegel and a “feminist interpretation
of psychoanalytic theory” can help us grasp why. According to Pateman,
“[t]he masculine sense of self is grounded in separateness (from feminin-
ity),” and “Hegel showed theoretically in his famous dialectic of mastery
and servitude that a self so conceived always attempts to gain recognition
and maintain its subjective isolation through domination.” Men thus
experience a need to “affirm themselves as masters” and “prostitution is
the public recognition of men as sexual masters.”22
This is not convincing. Even if we grant that the psychological
mechanism which Pateman describes could perhaps lead to prostitution,
her argument would only be effective against acts of prostitution moti-
vated by a masculine desire to gain recognition and maintain identity by
dominating the gender according to which men define themselves as the
opposite. This appears to be a gross over-theorization of men’s willing-
ness to pay for sex.
Even if we (generously) grant that this is in fact the mechanism be-
hind all or most acts of prostitution, however, it is still not clear why
it follows that prostitution is harmful. What Pateman has argued is that
prostitution is “one of the most graphic examples of men’s domination
over women”—that is, that prostitution is a part of social life where it is
clearly expressed that we live in a male-dominated society. It is not clear,
however, how this has any bearing on the harmfulness of prostitution,
for even if B is a product of A, and A is harmful, it follows neither that
B itself is harmful nor that B is indirectly harmful by reciprocally pro-
moting A. For all that Pateman has argued, prostitution could be a mere
by-product or a litmus test, which by itself is harmless. If Pateman seeks
to argue not only that society at present harms women (which perhaps it
does) but also that prostitution is harmful, her argument fails.23
A way to supplement Pateman’s argument, suggested by Debra Satz,
is that prostitution is harmful because it is degrading, and since most
prostitutes are women, prostitution degrades women (this is a species
of the argument that B is indirectly harmful by reciprocally promoting
A).24 There are, however, two serious problems with this further argu-
ment. First, it relies on a troubling form of collectivism in judging the
prostitute as a representative of one of the groups to which she belongs.25
Second, if prostitution is degrading, it seems that it must be degrading
in virtue of something. Thus calling prostitution “degrading” takes for
granted, rather than establishes, that there is something troubling about
prostitution. Thus we are back in the search for substantial reasons to
believe that prostitution is harmful.26
492     Ole Martin Moen

Argument 6: The Economic Dominance Argument

P1: That which involves economic dominance is harmful.
P2: Prostitution involves economic dominance.
C: Prostitution is harmful.

This is also an argument with strong intuitive appeal. Economic domi-

nance, which we might define as the use of monetary power to subor-
dinate a person to another person’s will, seems harmful (P1). Since such
subordination seems to be involved in prostitution (P2), it seems that
prostitution is harmful (C).
I believe this argument can be put in at least three different ways,
appealing to three different aspects of prostitution that supposedly give
rise to economic dominance. Let’s examine them separately.
First and most crudely, it can be argued that there is something in-
trinsic to the roles of “buyer” and “seller” that tends to put the buyer,
who has the money, in a dominant position over the seller, who must
give up what she has in order to get the money she needs, and that this
applies to prostitution. This is a weak argument, however, since it ap-
plies to a problematically large number of cases. Thus it is easy to come
up with counterexamples. Consider, for example, a grocery store owner
and a man buying bread or a drug dealer and a man buying drugs. In these
cases, it is everything but clear that the buyer has the upper hand, even
though the buyer supplies the money and the seller supplies the goods.
As such, we cannot use the labels “dominator” and “dominated” cat-
egorically on either the buyer or the seller side, and, as such, this cannot
be used to establish that prostitution involves economic dominance.
An alternative reason why prostitution involves economic domi-
nance could be that, at least in the majority of cases, there is a signifi-
cant difference in economic power between the rich buyer and the poor
seller, and it could be argued that this involves or makes likely that the
rich party takes a dominant role in the transaction. This is also a weak
argument, however, since we all take part in economically asymmetri-
cal transactions on a daily basis, and we seem to do so without being
harmed. Whenever I buy an airline ticket from KLM, an electronic device
from Apple, or a hamburger from Burger King, I engage in a transaction
where I have significantly less economic power than my trading partner.
This does not harm me.
A third variant of the argument could appeal, not to the relative dif-
ference in economic power between the prostitute and the client, but
to the absolute economic power of the prostitute, and to the fact that
the prostitute might often be so desperately poor that in order to earn a
living, she must satisfy all of her clients’ whims. Such cases are clearly
tragic, but acknowledging this seems rather to be an argument that
 Is Prostitution Harmful?     493

extreme poverty is harmful than an argument that prostitution is harm-

ful, since—as in the exploitation argument—nothing in particular is said
about the practice of buying and selling sex.
As such, it is unclear why it should follow from the nature of prostitu-
tion that the client holds a dominant position over the prostitute. Indeed,
it seems that we might flip this common argument on its head and claim
that the prostitute naturally holds a dominating position over the client.
After all, what goes on in an act of prostitution is that two parties have
sex, but one party, the client, is required to pay in order to be allowed to
participate. If he will not pay, or he cannot pay, he is not allowed in. After
the sex has come to an end, moreover, the client is left with nothing (but
ebbing pleasure) while the prostitute is left with money.
Appeals to economic dominance, therefore, do not seem to establish
that prostitution is harmful. To account for the alleged harm of prosti-
tution, we have to say something more specific about the very actions
involved in buying and selling sex specifically. I will now examine three
arguments that do.

Argument 7: The Selling One’s Body Argument

P1: That which involves selling one’s body is harmful.
P2: Prostitution involves selling one’s body.
C: Prostitution is harmful.

This argument says something substantial and seemingly forceful about

prostitution. It seems harmful to sell one’s body (P1) and it also seems
that prostitution involves just this (P2). Thus, it seems that prostitution
is harmful (C).
Before we can assess this argument, we must—to avoid equivocation—
get a clear understanding of what we mean by “selling one’s body.”
The phrase “selling one’s body” can mean at least three different
things. It can mean (1) selling one’s body in the same way that one sells
other commodities, such that after one has sold it, one no longer has any
claim on it and the buyer may dispose of it as he pleases. Alternatively,
“selling one’s body” can mean (2) renting out one’s body for a certain
period of time without restrictions on its use in the rental period, or it
can mean (3) renting out one’s body for a certain period with restrictions
on its use in the rental period.27
Selling one’s body according to (1) is clearly harmful. It is very doubt-
ful, however, if this is an apt description of what goes on in prostitution.
Point (1) describes slavery, not prostitution, and it is uncontroversial that
slavery is harmful. The same goes for selling one’s body according to (2),
since there are clear restrictions on what a client can rightfully do to a
prostitute. A client cannot rightfully beat up a prostitute any more than
494     Ole Martin Moen

he can beat up a hairdresser or a plumber. (It is true that in many societies,

violence against prostitutes is taken less seriously than violence against
non-prostitutes. That, however, should speak against those societies,
not against prostitution.) To the extent that prostitution involves selling
one’s body, it seems that it must be according to (3), which is a much
weaker account of “selling one’s body” than the catchphrase hints to.
On this account, however, it is no longer clear that selling one’s body
is harmful, since prostitution is far from the only profession where bod-
ies are sold in this sense. Consider dancers, masseuses, sumo wrestlers,
and football players. Although few would argue that these professionals
are bound to be significantly harmed, it seems undeniable that they sell
their bodies according to (3). Therefore, it seems that making money
from bodily work is at least not categorically harmful.
To single out prostitution, one might twist the argument by saying
that in the same way “selling” does not really mean “selling,” “body”
does not really mean “body.” One might argue that what matters is not
that prostitutes rent out their bodies as such, but rather that they rent
out a specific part of their bodies—namely, their genitals. This can seem-
ingly single out prostitutes, since dancers, masseuses, sumo wrestlers
and professional football players do not earn money from renting out and
doing jobs with their genitals.
In reply to such an argument, Martha Nussbaum has offered the ex-
ample of a colonoscopy “artist” who is paid and consents to having her
colon used by medical researchers to develop efficient and comfortable
colonoscopy equipment. This, Nussbaum admits, would be a strange oc-
cupation indeed, but it would not seem harmful in the sense and to the
extent that most of us believe that prostitution is harmful, even though,
as Nussbaum writes, the colonoscopy artist is “penetrated by another
person’s activity—and, we might add, far more deeply penetrated than is
generally the case in sex.”28 If Nussbaum is right, the fact that prostitu-
tion involves making money from using one’s genitals is insufficient to
establish that prostitution is harmful.29
An alternative suggestion could be that the harm lies not in the seller
having her genitals interfered with, but in the seller having to interfere
with the buyer’s genitals. This distinguishes the prostitute from the
colonoscopy artist. The problem with this suggestion, however, is that
although it would not imply that the colonoscopy artist is harmed by
the colonoscopy, it would imply that the medical doctor performing the
colonoscopy is harmed—at least if he is paid by the colonoscopy artist
for doing his job.30 This suggestion seems even less plausible than the
suggestion that the colonoscopy artist is harmed.
A last suggestion falling under the “selling one’s body” category
could be that the harm lies neither in the genitals of the prostitute nor
in the genitals of the client, but in the interaction of their genitals. This
 Is Prostitution Harmful?     495

would seemingly single out prostitution from all other body-selling

professions, since prostitutes are presumably the only ones who make
money from genital interaction. It is unclear, however, how it could be
harmful that genitals A and genitals B touch and interact for payment if
individually touching and interacting with genitals A and genitals B for
payment is quite harmless. At least, it seems that if one wants to argue
that such interaction is harmful, focusing solely on the bodily move-
ments involved will not do the trick. To account for the alleged harm,
then, rather than looking merely to the body and the bodily movements,
one should look to the movements’ sexual meaning and to the mental
side of making money from providing sexual services, and seek to locate
the harm here. This is the aim of the remaining two arguments.

Argument 8: The Habitual Faking Argument

P1: That which involves habitual faking is harmful.
P2: Prostitution involves habitual faking.
C: Prostitution is harmful.

One psychological hardship associated with selling sex is that it requires

one to fake one’s sexual responses. Perhaps Nagel’s mutual enjoyment
theory (see “The objectification argument” above), assuming it is correct,
leads not to the client caring for the prostitute’s enjoyment but to the
prostitute being required to pretend that she enjoys having sex with her
client. This seems quite plausible, and according to Estes, it is a brutal
fact about prostitution that “every visible response (of the prostitute)
must address the client’s desires and wishes.” This, Estes claims, can
make the prostitute “cognitively and emotionally confused” if it is done
consistently and over time. Indeed, Estes argues, this can destroy a pros-
titute’s sex life, and she asks, seemingly rhetorically, whether someone
who has worked as a prostitute will ever be able to “‘switch on’ her feel-
ings when with her lover.”31 To the extent that the prostitute will not, it
seems that P1 and P2 are true, and thus prostitution is harmful (C).
There are, however, problems with this argument as well. A first
problem is that it is not always clear that “every visible response must
address the client’s desires and wishes.” Though some clients might de-
mand this, others might not. As such, there seems to be limits to how
much faking is required.
Regardless of the possibility of a lack of demand for excessive faking,
however, we should concede that at least some faking is intrinsic to, or
is made very likely by, prostitution. Thus it seems that a prostitute still
could be led to making a habit out of faking, and thus that P2 remains.
Even if we grant that P2 is true, however, it is not clear that P1 is
true. As in several of the above arguments, the allegedly harmful feature
496     Ole Martin Moen

appealed to is also present in professions that we do not think of as harm-

ful. A good example here is professional acting. An actress makes money
from faking: from pretending that things are otherwise than they are.
This can be rough: she can be required to play in a light-hearted comedy
the day after a friend of hers has died or in a tragedy the day after she
has gotten married. If she engages in this for decades, it seems that she
could and would be making a habit out of faking. We do not, however,
think of acting as harmful. On the contrary, we usually think of acting
as enriching. A natural question to ask, then, is why the same cannot be
true of prostitution. Prejudice aside, it does not seem impossible that a
prostitute could handle her acting the same way actresses do and thus
manage to keep her sex with a lover distinct from her sex with a client
the same way an actress keeps the sorrow she expresses over Hamlet’s
death distinct from the sorrow she expresses at her friend’s funeral. At
least, an argument would have to be made as to why—granted the weak
significance view of sex—a prostitute could not do this.
The habitual faking argument, therefore, seems not to be effective as
long as it does not explain how faking while having sex is fundamentally
different from faking in other areas of life. To make the case that it is, one
must seemingly appeal to something in the very personal and emotional
nature of sex.

Argument 9: The Selling One’s Soul Argument

P1: That which involves selling one’s soul is harmful.
P2: Prostitution involves selling one’s soul.
C: Prostitution is harmful.

If we translate “soul” into less mystical terms, and use it to refer to our
deepest values, emotions, and character traits, then this argument has
a plausible P1. The arch example of selling one’s soul is perhaps to sell
the position as one’s closest friend. Close friendships are thought to flow
from our deepest values, emotions, and character traits, and this seems
to be the reason why close friendships should not (or perhaps could not)
be sold. The intimacy of sexual relations might make them share this
characteristic with friendships (P2), and this might in turn explain why
prostitution is harmful (C).
The problem with this argument is that it is forceful only on the
strong significance view of sex. If the strong significance view is false, it
is not clear why selling a close friendship is a good parallel to selling sex.
On the weak significance view, in which casual sex is permitted, it would
be fine to engage in sexual actions without being emotionally involved.
A counterargument to this reply could be that even if the weak
significance view is correct, complete emotional detachment is not
 Is Prostitution Harmful?     497

possible, at least not as long as the person involved has a healthy, non-
repressed emotional life. There might, accordingly, be some personal
elements included in all sex, even though these might not be sufficiently
strong to warrant the strong significance view of sex. I believe this is a
sound counterargument. Even if we concede that there are certain per-
sonal elements involved in all sex, commercial sex included, however,
this need not imply that prostitution is harmful—or, at least, not harmful
to a significant degree. After all, people sell personal elements in a long
line of professions that we do not consider harmful. Nussbaum provides
the example of a philosophy professor, like herself, who “takes money for
thinking and writing about what she thinks—about morality, emotion,
the nature of knowledge” even though these are “all parts of a human be-
ing’s search for understanding of the world and oneself.”32 A philosophy
professor, Nussbaum notes, sells her soul in this sense and should expect,
as part of her work, that strangers invade her private space: On the one
hand, she could be facing students who are not worthy of her philosophi-
cal attention and yet still receive it for payment. On the other hand, she
could experience unexpected arguments that shake her grounds in set-
tings where she must remain calm and professional. A philosophy pro-
fessor, therefore, seems to sell her soul, and the same might plausibly
be said about professional musicians, authors, psychologists, priests,
medical doctors, nurses, teachers, and kindergarten workers. Granted the
weak significance view of sex, it is not clear why a prostitute sells her
soul to a larger extent than these professionals do. As such, we are still
not given a convincing reason why prostitution is harmful.

COSTS AND BENEFITS

Even though, for the reasons provided above, I do not believe that pros-
titution is harmful in the ways and to the extent that is traditionally
assumed, I do not believe it is harmless. Engaging in prostitution has
its costs. Though prostitution is not necessarily a high-risk job, it is
not a low-risk job either, most obviously because it carries with it a
certain chance of catching sexually transmitted diseases.33 For many
people, moreover, it will be a considerable psychological burden to have
sexual contact with someone toward whom one is neither physically nor
mentally attracted (this point is forcefully put by de Marneffe34). These
downsides, moreover, appear to be present regardless of our social or legal
treatment of prostitution, so we should concede that they are genuine
downsides to the practice of selling sex.35
Even on the weak significance view of sex, therefore, we need not
agree with Lars O. Ericsson, who claims that “If two adults voluntarily
consent to an economic arrangement concerning sexual activity and this
498     Ole Martin Moen

activity takes place in private, it seems plainly wrong to maintain that

there is something intrinsically wrong with it.”36 Though this might be
a handy heuristic in a political context, and might serve as an argument
against prohibition, consent is insufficient to ensure harmlessness. We
can be harmed by things we consent to. That is why we are usually care-
ful about giving our consent.
Even if we accept that there are genuine costs associated with prosti-
tution, however, this does not give us sufficient reason to reject it. Before
we reject it, we should also count its benefits. We should then compare
the sum of total costs and benefits in prostitution with the sum of total
costs and benefits in alternative occupations.
One benefit of prostitution is that it renders it possible for young
people—who are the ones most likely to be poor—to earn a significant
income without education and without investment costs, and to do so
while keeping substantial parts of their spare time free to pursue other
goals.
Another benefit is of a more general microeconomic nature: Imagine
a woman, Caroline, who is very skilled at giving others sexual pleasure.
Without prostitution, Caroline is free to give others sexual pleasure, but
the only thing that she herself can get out of it is sexual pleasure in re-
turn. In economic terms, sexual pleasure is the only currency in which
she can be paid. This currency restriction is suboptimal, for there might
be many things Caroline needs more than she needs sexual pleasure.
Perhaps she needs a new dishwasher or to pay for repairs to her car. If
money is introduced as a medium of exchange, she can get this. If she
can get money rather than sexual pleasure in return for sex, she can use
the money she earns to buy herself a new dishwasher or repair the car. If
these are overall more important to her than sexual pleasure is, then she
has gained a higher value than she otherwise would.
A further advantage is that when money is introduced as a medium
of exchange, Caroline can not only get more valuable things in return
from sex but also get them from more people. Without prostitution,
Caroline could only (as long as she wanted something in return) have sex
with people who are fairly good at giving her sexual pleasure. With pros-
titution, she can enter profitable deals with a much larger pool of people.
Now her sex partners need not be good at giving her sexual pleasure.
They can be good at anything (teaching, writing, fixing computers, or
selling newspapers), make money from doing what they are good at, and
use the money to pay Caroline. Thus prostitution can give her something
more valuable in return from a larger pool of people. This is a benefit that
should be counted.37
How does prostitution fare in comparison to other occupations?
When we compare prostitution with other occupations, we see that in the
same way that prostitution does not just have costs, other occupations
 Is Prostitution Harmful?     499

do not just have benefits. This must be taken into account as long as the
alternative to selling sex is not to get money for nothing, but rather to
engage in other kinds of work.
When we compare the risks involved in prostitution with the risks
involved in being a professional boxer, stunt artist, race car driver, deep
sea diver, miner, policeman, or soldier—all of which are widely accepted
occupations—it seems that prostitution is only moderately risky. The
governmental New Zealand Accident Compensation Corporation inter-
estingly categorizes being a prostitute, which is legal in New Zealand,
as safer than being an ambulance nurse.38 When we further compare the
level of felt disgust in prostitution with the level of felt disgust in being
a toilet cleaner, a sewer maintainer, a garbage worker, a coroner, or an
embalmer—all of which are also widely accepted occupations—being a
prostitute does at least not appear to be exceptionally disgusting. Sex,
after all, is by and large a positive activity.
Thus it seems that when the whole context is taken into account,
the harmful aspects of engaging in prostitution, though they are real and
should not be neglected, are not as significant as we tend to assume. In-
deed, it appears that for some—say, those who accept casual sex, have a
high sex drive, need money, and are able to work in a safe environment—
selling sex could be a prudent option.
If this is correct, we must concede that it might be rational to engage
in prostitution, and for some, irrational to opt out of it. This, if true, has
significant implications for how, privately and professionally, we should
view prostitution and treat those who engage in it.

REPLIES TO TWO OBJECTIONS

My argument has met with two main objections. The first states that
my argument runs contrary to basic, observable facts: prostitutes suffer
tragic harms, such as depression, guilt, drug abuse, and suicide attempts,
and no amount of philosophical theorizing can erase this.
This objection kicks in an open door, for I do not deny that prosti-
tutes are harmed. Prostitutes are harmed. What I argue is that this harm
has its main source, not in something intrinsic to prostitution, but in
contingent external factors.
In “The correlation with psychological problems argument” and
“The correlation with danger argument,” I discussed the hypothesis that
the extrinsic source of the harm suffered by people who sell sex lies in
how prostitutes are socially and legally treated. Proving this hypothesis
would require sociological work beyond the scope of this paper. To try
to isolate some of the harms brought about by our treatment of pros-
titutes, however, consider the following thought experiment in which
500     Ole Martin Moen

hairdressers are treated in the same way as prostitutes are treated:

imagine that we were all brought up being told that good girls are not
hairdressers, that many of our common derogatory terms were synonyms
for “hairdresser,” and that most people, upon seeing a hairdresser, would
look away. Imagine that hairdressers had to live in fear of social exclu-
sion if friends or family found out how they struggle to make ends meet,
that very few would knowingly employ ex-hairdressers, and that land-
lords would terminate housing contracts if they discovered that their
tenant is a hairdresser. Imagine that most hairdressers had to work on
the street, in cars, or in the homes of strangers, and that if their work
were organized, it were organized only by criminals that offered no work
contracts, no sick leave, and no insurance.
In such a society, hairdressers would very likely suffer significant
harms. There would be two reasons for this. Most obviously, the social
and legal maltreatment would be a heavy burden to bear for those al-
ready engaged in hairdressing. Less obviously, but statistically just as
important, the maltreatment would skew the sample of who becomes a
hairdresser in the first place. If hairdressers were maltreated, then only
(or almost only) people who were already in serious trouble would find it
worthwhile to become hairdressers. Thus, if hairdressers were treated the
same way prostitutes are treated, we should not be surprised to learn that
hairdressing correlated with depression, suicide attempts, drug abuse and
so on—even if, as we all know, hairdressing is not a harmful occupation.
If the way we treat prostitutes is so grim that it could seriously harm
a perfectly innocent social group, we have reason to suspect that this
indeed is what harms prostitutes. This reason grows in strength if, as I
argue above, we have trouble finding anything intrinsic to prostitution
that accounts for the harm. If this reasoning is sound, my thesis in this
paper is compatible with the fact that, sadly, many people who sell sex
suffer serious harms.
The second objection states that my argument is utopian: that pros-
titution is a complex practice deeply entrenched in a long line of other
social and psychological issues, such as gender inequality, poverty, power
hierarchies, and exploitation, and that in abstracting away from these,
my argument relies on presuppositions so far from the actual world that
the conclusions I draw have few, if any, practical implications.
I am hard pressed, however, to see that my argument is utopian,
at least in any problematic sense. First, my argument does not rely on
traditionally utopian characteristics, such as endless resources, perfect
knowledge, or unbreached rationality. Nor does it assume a society radi-
cally different from our own. For prostitution to become a profession of
only moderate risks, I suggest, what we need is a shift in our social and
legal treatment of prostitutes. History proves, moreover, that our social
and legal treatment of various social groups lies within our power to
 Is Prostitution Harmful?     501

change. In less than two centuries we have, in large parts of the world,
ended slavery, given men and women equal legal rights, and accepted
homosexuality.
It is important to remember, moreover, that these changes were
made possible because some people dared to be a little utopian and
abstracted away from their present context. We can all too easily hear
the voice of someone opposed to homosexuality half a century ago pro-
claiming that homosexuality is deeply interrelated with various complex
social and psychological factors (such as depression, exploitation, rape,
disease, drug abuse, and unstable families), that these form part of what
homosexuality is, and that trying to assess homosexuality apart from
them is hopelessly utopian.
Today, we are glad someone dared question their assumptions and
looked beyond their immediate social context in their assessment of
homosexuality. If my arguments in this paper are sound, we should ap-
proach prostitution in a similar manner, and be open for the possibility
that prostitutes are harmed, not because prostitution is harmful, but
because society at present seriously harms prostitutes.

NOTES

1. Ronald Weitzer, “The Politics of Prostitution in America.” Sex for Sale: Pros-
titution, Pornography, and the Sex Industry, edited by Ronald Weitzer (New York:
Routledge, 2000), 159–80, at 163–66.
2. Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed.
3. David Benatar, “Two Views of Sexual Ethics: Promiscuity, Pedophilia, and
Rape,” Public Affairs Quarterly 16:3 (2002), 191–201 [reprinted in this volume; on the
definition and ethics of casual sex, see Raja Halwani, “Casual Sex, Promiscuity, and
Objectification,” this volume—eds.].
4. There is an extensive literature on psychological problems related to prostitu-
tion. For an overview see Vern L. Bullough and Richard D. McAnulty, “The Sex Trade:
Exotic Dancing and Prostitution,” in Sex and Sexuality, vol. 1, edited by Vern L.
Bullough and M. M. Burnette (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2006), 299–320; Sophie Day,
On the Game: Women and Sex Work (London and Ann Arbor, Mich.: Pluto Press,
2007), 124–47; Melissa Farley and Howard Barkan, “Prostitution, Violence against
Women, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,” Women and Health 27:3 (1998), 37–49.
5. These figures are from my own country, Norway. See Øystein Rian “Seksu-
alpsykologien som forsvant” (“The Sexual Psychology that Disappeared”), in Norsk
Homoforskning, edited by M. C. Brantsæter et al. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001),
104–40; Bera Moseng, “Selvmordsatferd og seksuell orientering” (“Suicidal Behavior
and Sexual Orientation”), in Norsk Homoforskning, 258–67.
6. Yolanda Estes, “Prostitution: A Subjective Position,” in The Philosophy of Sex:
Contemporary Readings, 5th ed., edited by Alan Soble and Nicholas Power (Lanham,
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 353–65.
7. Teela Sanders, Maggie O’Neill, and Jane Pitcher, Prostitution: Sex Work, Policy
& Politics (Los Angeles: Sage, 2009), 33.
502     Ole Martin Moen

8. Bullough and McAnulty, “The Sex Trade,” 314–16.

9. Farley and Barkan, “Prostitution, Violence against Women, and Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder,” 40–41.
10. Ulla Bjørndahl and Bjørg Norli, Fair Game: A Survey of the Violence Experi-
enced by Women Working as Prostitutes (Oslo: The Pro Centre, 2008), 32–37.
11. Gregory M. Herek, “Bad Science in the Service of Stigma: A Critique of the
Cameron’s Group Survey Studies,” in Psychological Perspective on Lesbian and Gay
Issues, Vol. 4: Stigma and Sexual Orientation (London: Sage, 1998), 223–55.
12. This point is forcefully argued by Norma Jean Almodovar in “For Their Own
Good: The Results of the Prostitution Laws as Enforced by Cops, Politicians and
Judges,” Hastings Women’s Law Journal 10:1 (1999), 119–33.
13. Thomas Mappes, “Sexual Morality and the Concept of Using Another Person,”
in Social Ethics: Morality and Social Policy, 3rd ed., edited by Thomas Mappes and
Jane Zembaty (New York: McGraw Hill, 1987), 248–62 [reprinted in this volume—
eds.]; Howard Klepper, “Sexual Exploitation and the Value of Persons,” Journal of
Value Inquiry 27:3–4 (1993), 479–86. These two accounts are meant to be representa-
tive, not exhaustive. For a critical up-to-date overview of the debate over objectifica-
tion in ethics and feminist theory, see Lina Papadaki, “What Is Objectification?”
Journal of Moral Philosophy 7:1 (2010), 16–36.
14. Irving Singer, The Nature of Love, Vol. 2: Courtly and Romantic (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 382.
15. Thomas Nagel, “Sexual Perversion,” Journal of Philosophy 66:1 (1969), 5–17
[reprinted in this volume—eds.].
16. Lena Edlund and Evelyn Korn, “A Theory of Prostitution,” Journal of Political
Economy 110:1 (2002), 181–214.
17. The implications of these findings are discussed in Steven D. Levitt and Sudhir
Alladi Venkatesh, “An Empirical Analysis of Street-Level Prostitution,” unpublished
manuscript, 2007 (cited with permission of the authors), https://international.ucla
.edu/media/files/levitt_venkatesh.pdf (accessed 22 June 2021); Steven D. Levitt and
Stephen J. Dubner, Superfreakonomics (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 19–57.
18. The Illinois minimum hourly wage in 2007 (the year Levitt and Venkatesh
conducted their research) was $6.50. U.S. Department of Labor, “Changes in Basic
Minimum Wages in Non-Farm Employment under State Law: Selected Years 1968 to
2011,” http://www.dol.gov/ whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm (accessed 9 May 2011).
19. Edlund and Korn, “A Theory of Prostitution,” 187.
20. Levitt and Venkatesh, “An Empirical Analysis of Street-Level Prostitution.”
21. Carole Pateman, “Defending Prostitution: Charges against Ericsson,” Ethics
93:3 (1983), 561–65. Feminist rationales along similar lines are found in Kathleen
Barry, The Prostitution of Sexuality (New York: New York University Press, 1996);
Melissa Farley, “‘Bad for the Body, Bad for the Heart’: Prostitution Harms Women
Even If Legalized or Decriminalized,” Violence Against Women 10:10 (2004), 1087–
125. For a methodological critique of these approaches to prostitution research, see
Ronald Weitzer, “Flawed Theory and Method in Studies of Prostitution,” Violence
Against Women 11:7 (2005), 934–49.
22. Pateman, “Defending Prostitution,” 564; Farley, “‘Bad for the Body, Bad for the
Heart,’” 561, 564.
23. This objection has also been raised by Scott A. Anderson: “radical feminists
have failed to explain clearly why selling sexual recreation might itself be particu-
larly problematic—that is, why open commerce in sex would make things worse for
women than they are anyway in a patriarchal, capitalist society” (Anderson, “Prosti-
 Is Prostitution Harmful?     503

tution and Sexual Autonomy: Making Sense of the Prohibition of Prostitution,” Eth-
ics 112:4 [2002], 748–80, at 750).
24. Debra Satz, “Markets in Women’s Sexual Labor,” Ethics 106:1 (1995), 63–85.
25. Even if the assumed collectivism is legitimate, however, the claim is empiri-
cally questionable. Peter de Marneffe writes, “Here we must wonder, though, whether
women as a group are more victimized by sex discrimination in nations where prosti-
tution is tolerated, such as The Netherlands and Germany, than they are in the USA,
where it is not” (de Marneffe, Liberalism and Prostitution [Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010], 9). Another serious problem is that this objection does not fit well with
male prostitution.
26. The rationales offered by Pateman and Satz clearly do not exhaust the range of
arguments against prostitution put forth in the feminist literature. I hope and believe,
however, that the strongest additional arguments are adequately dealt with in other
sections of this paper (see especially “the objectification argument,” “the exploita-
tion argument,” “the economic dominance argument,” and “the selling one’s body
argument”). For a philosophical overview of feminist views on prostitution (for and
against), see Anderson, “Prostitution and Sexual Autonomy.”
27. This taxonomy roughly coincides with Joel Feinberg’s taxonomy of strong and
weak waiving of rights, and relinquishing of rights; see Feinberg, “Voluntary Euthana-
sia and the Inalienable Right to Life,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 7:2 (1978), 93–123.
For a recent application of Feinberg’s taxonomy to prostitution, see Hallie Liberto,
“Normalizing Prostitution versus Normalizing the Alienability of Sexual Rights: A
Response to Scott A. Anderson,” Ethics 120:1 (2009), 138–45.
28. Martha Nussbaum, “‘Whether from Reason or Prejudice’: Taking Money for
Sexual Services,” Journal of Legal Studies 27:2 (1998), 693–723.
29. Strictly speaking, the colon is not part of the genitals. It is hard to see, however,
how this could be argumentatively relevant, since we can presumably change the
example to involve gynecology rather than colonoscopy without deriving different
results.
30. Perhaps the CEO of the medical company wants the equipment tested on her
to ensure its quality.
31. Estes, “Prostitution: A Subjective Position,” 59–62.
32. Nussbaum, “‘Whether from Reason or Prejudice,’” 704.
33. S. O. Aral and J. M. Mann, “Commercial Sex Work and STD: The Need for
Policy Intervention to Change Societal Patterns,” Sexually Transmitted Diseases 25:9
(1998), 455–56.
34. De Marneffe, Liberalism and Prostitution, 20–21.
35. It is also possible that the above considered sources of harm, though they might
individually be small, aggregate to become significant, either because they sum up or
because they interact in unfortunate ways. The former I accept, though I maintain
that the sum would be reasonably low. The latter would have to be positively argued
for.
36. Ericsson, “Charges against Prostitution,” 338–39.
37. In counting the benefits of prostitution, we should perhaps include the benefits
on the side of the client. If we grant that clients are not harmed by buying sex, that
sex (or physical intimacy) is a basic human need, and that, for various reasons, many
people will not have access to sex (or physical intimacy) other than if they pay, it
seems that prostitution can satisfy a legitimate need. Due to the curious nature of
human sexuality, moreover, it seems possible that a slight favor on the side of the
prostitute could give a big surplus on the side of the client. Take a fetish such as feet
504     Ole Martin Moen

licking. If a client is turned on by licking a prostitute’s feet, and she charges $50 for
20 minutes of licking, there could be a considerable surplus for both parties.
38. New Zealand Accident Compensation Corporation, ACC Levy Rates Guide-
book 2010/2011 (Wellington: New Zealand, 2010), 118.

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Moen argues that nine arguments in support of the harmfulness of

prostitution fail. But what is Moen’s overall argument for his own
conclusion? Try to put his own argument in premise-conclusion
form as he does with each of the nine arguments. (There can be
more than two premises in Moen’s argument.) In doing so, make
sure to consider what place the analogy with casual sex has in
the argument. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the argu-
ment?
2. Moen understands harm as what is “detrimental” to someone’s
well-being. What does “detrimental” mean? And, based on your
answer, is Moen’s definition of “harm” too strong? Would a
weaker definition of harm (e.g., as something bad but not necessar-
ily detrimental to someone’s well-being) affect Moen’s evaluation
of the nine arguments?
3. In discussing Howard Klepper’s notion of objectification, Moen
concludes that it is too strong because it converts our daily, regu-
lar interactions with people into objectifying ones. However, Klep-
per himself gives cases in which a man and a woman consent to
sex, but in one case the man brags afterward to his friends about
what they sexually did in bed, and in another case the man does
not attend to the woman’s sexual pleasure during the sex. Are
these cases analogous to our daily interactions with other people,
during which we normally treat them with respect? What if, for
example, someone (unprovoked) throws her money in a grocer’s
face after making a purchase? Would that be a form of problematic
objectification? If yes, how would it affect the objectification-
based argument for the harmfulness of prostitution and Moen’s
evaluation of it?
4. Moen, in evaluating the objectification argument against prosti-
tution (Argument 3), claims that it “is one of the few trades where
it is natural that the buyer to some extent cares for the seller.”
Why does Moen make this intriguing claim? Is it true?
5. In evaluating the economic dominance argument (Argument 6),
Moen argues that the prostitute might be the one in the dominant
position, since if the client does not pay, he won’t have sexual ac-
cess to the prostitute. Can you think of other ways in which the
 Is Prostitution Harmful?     505

 client is in a weak position relative to the prostitute? Does be-

ing under the spell of sexual desire weaken the client’s position
(even further)? (It is instructive in this regard to think about
how power between social groups translates into power between
individual members of these groups—for example, even if men
as a group have power over women as a group, what does this
say about the power dynamics in interactions or relationships
between an individual man and an individual woman?)
6. In discussing the costs and benefits of prostitution, Moen argues
that even if it has costs, we still need to factor in the benefits.
But suppose that the benefits do not outweigh the costs. What
would this show? Would it show that prostitution is wrong, or
only harmful? Are prostitutes at moral liberty to pursue their
profession even if it is overall harmful? Moreover, whose benefits
and costs should we factor in—the prostitutes’, the customers’,
and society at large?
7. Moen often replies to the arguments by arguing that prostitu-
tion “as such” or “per se” is not shown to be harmful. What do
these expressions mean? Suppose that prostitution is not as such
harmful, but harmful under certain conditions or circumstances,
what would this tell us about its ethics? Would the harms of
prostitution under contingent conditions be sufficient to justify
an argument against prostitution as such? What are the connec-
tions between the ethics of prostitution as such and its ethics in
specific circumstances?
8. Moen’s essay is directed at arguments that try to show that pros-
titution is harmful. Are there additional arguments that he fails
to address? For example, what about arguments along the lines of
Robin West’s in “The Harms of Consensual Sex” (this volume)?
What about arguments that try to show that prostitution is mor-
ally wrong? Here, the distinction between harms and wrongs is
crucial. Try to understand this distinction, and try to argue that
even if prostitution is harmful, it is not thereby wrong, and vice
versa.
9. If, as Moen contends, the harms that prostitutes suffer are more
reasonably attributed, not to the inherent harmfulness of sex
work, but to the effects of social factors, including stigma and
poverty, what would this mean for feminist criticisms of pros-
titution and other types of sex work, such as pornography? If
Moen’s argument is sound, would it suggest that our concern
should not be the condemnation of sex work but a healthier,
more secure market for it?
10. In addressing the “economic dominance” argument against pros-
titution, Moen notes that the problem with economic dominance
506     Ole Martin Moen

is not unique to prostitution but highlights that “extreme poverty

is harmful.” To what extent are the harms of prostitution, as
articulated by Moen, endemic to labor markets themselves, and
not specific to the kind of work at issue? If these problems are
problems with labor markets, what are potential ways to address
them, and would these solutions make sex work less problematic?
11. Does each anti-prostitution argument that Moen discusses ap-
ply also to pornography? Which do and which do not? Would
Moen’s replies be as effective to those that do? Can you come up
with replies of your own to those arguments that do not apply to
pornography?