SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS

ATUN v. NUÑEZGR
87 PHIL 762
FACTS:
Stefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the possession of the plaintiffs, herneices and
nephews, a parcel of land. Such land was delivered by plaintiff Gil Atun to SilvestraNuñez (sister of
defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuñez) for cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the Atuns a part of the
harvest as rental. In 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant EusebioNuñez, who
thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the produce. The
defendant in turn sold the land to his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the property with the
knowledge that it belonged, not to Nuñez, but to plaintiffs. There was no prior judicial declaration,
however, that the plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a successor of the decedent?
HELD:
Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands registered in the name ofEstefania
Atun, now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record that
Estefania Atun died without any issue or ascendants and left as her only surviving heirs the children
of her brother Nicolas, plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of deceased may
file an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial
declaration of their status as such, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent's estate
LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
66 PHIL 547
FACTS:
Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs.Plaintiff
Ana Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to declare her as
compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's fatherEusebio died,
and because he left some personal and real properties without a will, an intestate proceeding was
instituted and a court order declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one.
Following such court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum payable on a promissory
note then issued in favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate proceedings of
Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties inherited by the defendants
represents that of the successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.
ISSUE:
Has plaintiff the right to collect the sum promised by her father from her grandfather's estate.
HELD:
No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by
representation are not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased
father,who died without leaving any property. While it is true that under the provisions of Articles
924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his father or mother who died before him in the
properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the
saidchild answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as
maybe seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of
inheritances,the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only
answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of
Eusebio Quitco,in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the
indebtedness of their father from whom they did not inherit anything
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USON v. DEL ROSARIO
92 PHIL 530
FACTS:
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson,the
petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land occupied
by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a defense, the
defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson containing
among others a statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the latter renouncing
her rights to any inheritance from Faustino. The defendant also contends that while it is true that
the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are
not entitled to any successional rights,however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status
and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to
the latter (article 2264 and article287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were
declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil
Code).
ISSUE:
Are the contentions of the defendants correct?
HELD:
No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of
at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson(Article 657,
old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the
death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed
for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From That moment,
therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested. The
claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in view of
her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave
upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for the simple
reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced. Nor
does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given retroactive
effect. Article 2253 above provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the
former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired
right of the same origin... As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership
of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in1945 upon the death of her late husband
and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of death(Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right
recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot,
therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute
RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA
17 SCRA 418
FACTS:
Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk ofCourt
of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioner filed a
petition before the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn,and a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently filed in
another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the
settlement of the decedent's estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the
jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan. ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate
proceedings? HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested
upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its
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allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu
proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules
of Court.Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, intestate
succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
absence of a valid operative will.
CHAVEZ v. IAC
GR No. L-68282, November 8, 1990
FACTS:
Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso among her 6
children, while possession of such property still remains with her. Three of her children sold each
their share to private respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of sale were
therefore executed with the conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter sold the
entire property to one of the siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued for the
annulment of the later sale to Raquel which was denied by the trail court but which later decision
overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends that their mother has left a
last will and this will supersede the earlier transfers. ISSUE: Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on
such partition valid? Does a last will supersede that of the partition inter-vivos?
HELD:
Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be
executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not
be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory
heirs. xxx The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a
contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavistawho signed the
same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner
herself, is valid.It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to
revoke thesales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son
only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the
saleshe made of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos.
Spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad vs Court of Appeals
294 SCRA 183
FACTS:
In 1979, Aurora Montinola executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in favor of her three
grandchildren Catalino Valderrama, Judy Valderrama, and Jesus Valderrama. The deed however
provided that the donation shall be effective only 10 years after Montinola’s death. In 1980, the
original title of the parcel of land subject of the donation was cancelled and a new title was given to
the Valderramas. Montinola however retained the original title and she continued to perform acts
of ownership over the parcel of land. In 1987, Montinola revoked the donation because of acts of
ingratitude committed against her by the Valderramas; that the Valderramas defamed her; that she
overheard the Valderramas plotting against her life. In 1990, she petitioned to have her title be
reinstated and her grandchildren’s title be cancelled. She said that the donation is actually a
donation mortis causa and that the same is void because the formalities of a will were not complied
with. In the same year, she sold her property to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. The Valderramas
opposed the petition. In 1993, while the case was still pending, Montinola died. The petition was
continued by the spouses Sicad.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” is actually a donation mortis causa.

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HELD:
Yes, the deed is a donation mortis causa. Montinola not only reserved for herself all the
fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important, specially provided that
without the knowledge and consent of the Montinola, the donated properties could not be
disposed of in any way, thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of
ownership, the power to dispose of the properties. A donation which purports to be one inter vivos
but withholds from the donee (in this case the Valderramas) the right to dispose of the donated
property during the donor’s lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa “the
right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.” The donation is
therefore void because the formalities of a will, which is essentially a donation mortis causa, were
not complied with.
MACROHON ONG HAM vs. SAAVEDRA
51 P 267
FACTS:
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, widower and executor of the joint last will and testament of
Victoriana Saavedra and himself, presented said will for probate, which was ordered by the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga in its decree of February 21, 1924. The married couple, Macario and
Victoriana executed a joint will which was also expressly stated in the will. The only near relations of
the said Victoriana Saavedra, with the right to inherit her estate are her brothers Juan and Segundo
Saavedra; her nephews and nieces, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra, Victoriana Saavedra,
Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, in case
that the said Victoriana Saavedra died intestate, or did not dispose of her property in said will. It
was stated in the will that in case of the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana
Saavedra, the properties be given to Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian jointly, and should either of the
two die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, all the said properties be given to the survivor. In case
Victoriana Saavedra should survive Macario Macrohon Ong Ham,Lot No. 838, Lot No. 817 and Lot
No. 768 shall belong exclusively to Victoriana Saavedra. Should Victoriana Saavedra die before
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, Lot No. 817 be adjudicated to Segunda Saavedra, widow, sister of
Victoriana Saavedra, free of all liens and encumbrances. Lot No. 768 be adjudicated to Segunda
Saavedra and her heirs, on condition that she devote the products of the same to having masses
said for the repose of the soul of Victoriana Saavedra. In case of the death of either of the two, the
surviving spouse will be appointed executor of this our last will and testament. This executor
submitted a scheme of partition and distribution of the property in accordance with the terms of
the joint will, to which Juan Saavedra and others filed an opposition. The executor rejoined, insisting
upon the approval of the scheme and asking that the opposition of Juan Saavedra and others be
overruled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Segunda Saavedra is the only one entitled to the properties and not Juan
Saavedra and the others because the testator did not die partly testate and partly intestate
HELD:
No. The oppositors have a right to the testatrix’s property as well. Assuming that the joint
will in question is valid, it follows that the deceased Victoriana Saavedra specified therein that
parcels 187 and 768 in proceeding No. 7880 be delivered as a legacy to her sister Segunda Saavedra,
the first parcel free of all liens and encumbrances, and the second on the condition that the legatee
devote the products of the same to having masses said for the repose to the testatrix's soul. As to
the remaining sixteen parcels, the testatrix disposed of her part in them conditionally, that is to say,
in case her husband Macario Macrohon Ong Ham died before she died, said parcels were to be
awarded to her husband's nephews, or to either of them in case one should have died before the
said Macario Macrohon Ong Ham. The condition imposed in the will as precedent to the vesting in
the alleged legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian of the right to the legacy, not having been
complied with, the trial court found that the part of said property belonging to the testatrix should
be partitioned among the persons called on to succeed her under the law. We are of the opinion
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that this finding is in accordance with the law, since, under article 791 of the Civil Code, conditions
imposed upon heirs and legatees shall be governed by the rules established for conditional
obligations in all matters not provided for by this section (articles 790 to 805). And, in accordance
with article 1114 of the Code, in conditional obligations the acquisition of rights, as well as the
extinction or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the occurrence of the event
constituting the condition. Such joint will has sometimes been used as a basis for the distribution of
the estate.
Limjoco vs Fragrante
80 P 776
FACTS:
Pedro O. Fragante applied for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and
operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The Public Service Commission approved the application and
held that evidence showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper
and suitable manner by the authorization of the operation of another ice-plant, that Pedro Fragante
was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death and that his intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service. The commission ordered that a certificate of public convenience
be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante. Petitioner contends that the
commission erred in allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O.
Fragante for the latter as party applicant, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate
applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a “person”.
HELD:
Yes. The SC cited the SC of Indiana which held that “The estate of the decedent is a person in
legal contemplation. The word “person” in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes
artificial as well as natural persons.” It said in another work that ‘persons are of two kinds: natural
and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or
succession of natural persons forming a corporation;; (2) a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized
only to a limited extent in our law.” Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as
survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the
same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented
by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the
deceased. The underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of
the deceased person is considered a “person” is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting
from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the
decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Moreover, the citizenship of
Fragrante is also extended. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the
same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality.
The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs,
solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has
already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant
proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this Court.
VIARDO VS BELMONTE
AUGUST 21, 1962
FACTS:
On 27 May 1946 Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte filed in the CFI a complaint against Leon
C. Viardo (civil case No. 161) praying for the reconveyance of the property in question upon payment
of the lawful redemption price. On 11 April 1950 the CFI, absolves the defendant from the complaint
of the plaintiffs, in the same manner that plaintiff are absolved from the counter complaint of the
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defendant, with costs to the plaintiff Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counterclaim,
the defendant Leon C. Viardo appealed to the Court of Appeals which passed a resolution granting
his prayer that the children and only heirs be substituted for the deceased appellee Bartolome Driz
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment awarding damages paid for in the counterclaim of Leon
Viardo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Bartolome Driz could be held personally liable for the judgment
rendered against their father in Civil Case No. 161?
HELD:
No. The substitution of parties was made obviously because the children of Bartolome Driz
are his legal heirs and therefore could properly represent and protect whatever interest he bad in
the case on appeal. But such a substitution did not and cannot have the effect of making these
substituted parties personally liable for whatever judgment might be rendered on the appeal
against their deceased father. The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon C.
Viardo, the creditor, was to proceed against the estate of Bartolome
Driz LAO VS DEE
JANUARY 23, 1952
FACTS:
Ignacia Lao and Domingo Lao filed an action against Francisco Dee and Maria Lao. The
plaintiffs prayed for the annulment of an order approving the sale of real property of the decedent
during the testate proceedings and the sale thereof in favor of Francisco Dee. The order is sought to
be annulled on the following grounds: that Maria Lao the court overlooked the fact that a special
administrator has no power to sell real property; the court approved the sale in the belief that
Ignacia Lao had given her consent to the sale, when in fact she was Induced to sign the deed of sale
by Maria Lao and her attorney through misrepresentation that the deed of sale was a mere petition
for the approval of the proposed sale; the court did not know that the vendee Francisco Dee was
not a Filipino citizen, or that Ignacia Lao executed the deed of sale on the alleged misrepresentation
that Francisco Dee was a Filipino citizen. ISSUE: Whether or not an action to recover the title and
possession of a property which formed part of the estate may be filed by the plaintiffs against the
heirs of the decedent? HELD: NO. Section 8, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, bars the filing of an
action by an heir to recover the title or possession of lands belonging to the estate until there is an
order of the probate court assigning said lands to such heir. In other words, there must be first a
partition of the estate, and delivery of the latter to the heir. The reasons for this rule are aptly
stated by former Chief Justice Moran as follows: "An executor or administrator who assumes the
trust, takes possession of the property left by the decedent for the purpose of paying debts. While
his debts are undetermined and unpaid, no residue may be settled for distribution among the heirs
and devisees. Consequently, before distribution is made or before any residue is known, the heirs,
or devisees have no cause of action against the executor or administrator for recovery of the
property left by the deceased.”
LITONJUA v. MONTILLA
90 PHIL 757
FACTS:
Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of a sum of
P4,039. Failing to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded to
file a claim in the intestate proceeding of the estate of Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the deceased.
The estate has not yet been properly probated.
ISSUE:
Could the petitioner succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of the debtor's
deceased parent?
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HELD:
No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was held
that the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property
which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate have
been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts
of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a person
who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in the
proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. The
foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because the appellant is not
a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the
inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the net assets of the intestate estate have been
determined
DE GUZMAN vda. DE CARRILLO v. DE PAZ
91 PHIL 265
FACTS:
A lot had been mortgaged by spouses Severino Salak and Petra Garcia to Pedro Magat; the
latter then assigned the mortgage to Honoria Salak. After the death Petra, Severino transferred 1/2
of his rights to the property to Honoria for the sum representing 1/2 of the consideratioin paid by
her to the mortgagees Magat. Severino later died leaving the defendants as heirs. Honoria also
died, with the plaintiff as heir. Intestate proceedings were instituted for the settlement and
distribution of the estate of the deceased Severino and Petra, including the lot in question which
was adjudicated, after proper proceedings in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff sued for
reconveyance of the 1/2 of the portion of the lot in her favor as heir of Honoria.
ISSUE:
May the petition prosper?
HELD:
No. The property now sought to be recovered from the defendants was adjudicated in their
favor after all claims, indebtedness and obligations chargeable against the intestate estate of the
deceased Severino Salak and Petra Garcia had been all paid and accounted for out of the estate of
the deceased; so that, in the eyes of the law, the properties now in the hands of the defendants are
presumed to be free from all claims whatsoever. The claim of the plaintiff set up in the complaint
should have been interposed during the pendency and progress of Special Proceeding No. 3; but
plaintiff not having done so, she cannot now bring this action against the defendants, for it is clear
that there exists no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendants upon which plaintiff can
predicate her action against the present defendants.
Estate of K.H. Hemady v. Luzon Surety 100 P 388
FACTS:
Luzon Surety filed a claim against the estate of K.H. Hemady based on 20 different indemnity
agreements or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K.H.
Hemady, a surety solidary (guarantor) in all of them. Luzon Surety prayed for allowance, as a
contingent claim, of the value of the twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the
counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps
affixed to the bonds, with 12% interest thereon. Upon motion of the administratrix of Hemady’s
estate, the Court of First Instance dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety on two grounds. First, the
CFI held that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were not contemplated under the
indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they were
not liabilities incurred after the execution of the counterbonds And second, the CFI held that
whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his
death he ceased to be guarantor. Hence, the instant petition.

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ISSUE:
Whether Hemady’s liability as a solidary guarantor is extinguished by his death..
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Hemady’s liability as a solidary guarantor is not extinguished
by his death. While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their
decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains
intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.
Under the Civil Code, the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession, are subrogated to all the rights
and obligations of the deceased (Art. 661) and cannot be regarded as third parties with respect to a
contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate of the deceased. The heirs take
such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they
derive their rights.
CONDE VS ABAYA
13 P 249
FACTS:
Casiano Abaya died unmarried leaving two unaknowledged children by herein plaintiff: appellee
Paula Conde. The latter, as ascendant heir of her children, sued for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural children of the deceased.
Roman Abaya opposed said appointment and claimed to be declared as the sole heir of Casiano
Abaya being the nearest relative of the deceased. Conde, in her reply, claimed that her right was
superior to his and moved for a hearing of the matter. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff Conde. Hence, this appeal filed by defendant Abaya.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not a right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children can be
instituted against the heirs of Casiano Abaya?
(2)Whether or not Paula can represent her deceased children in an action for the
acknowledgment of natural children?
HELD:
(1) No. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts
during his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs; while
the right of action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does not last during his
whole life, but depends on that of the presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised
against the latter.
(2)An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised
against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter
during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express
acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was
unknown during the life of the latter. But as such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child
can only be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or to his ascendants.
BARRIOS VS DOLOR 2 P 44
FACTS:
The plaintiff has brought an action for the recovery from the defendants, heirs of the late Don
Ciriaco Demonteverde, of 1⁄2 of a sugar estate and the stock thereon, which he claims to have
purchased from the said Don Ciriaco Demonteverde. In support of his contention, he attached to
the complaint a public instrument which appears to have been executed by himself and
Demonteverde, in which a stipulation is made for a contract of partnership for the operation of the
said estate, and a community of ownership is established with respect to the estate in favor of the
two parties to this instrument. It does not appear that this instrument has been recorded in the
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registry of property. Service of the complaint having been had on the defendants, Doña Maria
Pascuala Dolor raised an incidental issue as a previous question, praying that the instrument
referred to be ruled out of evidence on the ground that it had not been recorded in the registry of
property. This motion was granted by the judge, against which the plaintiff appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Don Ciriaco Demonteverde should be regarded as third persons
for the purpose of Mortgage Law with respect to the contract executed by Demonteverde?
HELD: The defendants, therefore, are not third persons with respect to the contract entered into by
their decedent, Don Ciriaco, in the instrument and they therefore cannot avail themselves of the
prohibition contained in article 389 of the Mortgage Law for the purpose of opposing the admission
of this instrument as evidence in the case, because not recorded in the registry of property. This
prohibition was established solely and exclusively in favor of those who, within the meaning of that
law, are third persons. Were it otherwise, the position of the defendants would be superior to that
of the person to whom they derived their rights, because he, not being a third person, could not set
up such an exception.
ALVAREZ vs. IAC May 7, 1990
FACTS:
Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. Aniceto Yanes was survived by his
children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are
the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario
Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib. It is
established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the
outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they
did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to
get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago,
Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. After Fuentebella's death,
Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. On May 26, 1960,
Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a complaint against Fortunato Santiago,
Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the
"return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. During the pendency of said case,
Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment ordering
defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B
could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners without violation of
law and due process.
HELD:
The doctrine obtained in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the rights and
obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. The binding effect of contracts
upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that
money debts of a deceased person must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is
distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the
estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact
diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. "Under our
law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible
to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive 'depersonalization' of patrimonial
rights and duties. Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved
into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative
position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in consideration of its
performance by a specific person and by no other." Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo
Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to
the present claim for damages.

9|Page
REGANON VS IMPERIAL
GR NO. L-24434; January 17, 1968

FACTS:

On February 22, 1963, the heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of about one-hectare portion of a parcel of land situated at Miasi,
Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, with damages, against Rufino Imperial.
On April 23, 1963, the plaintiffs presented their evidence ex partebefore the Clerk of Court
acting as Commissioner. The courta quoon May 6, 1963, rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs
lawful owners of the land in question. On November 29, 1963, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
issuance of a writ of execution. This was granted by the trial court in its order of December 9,
1963.On May 25, 1964, the heirs of said Eulogio Imperial, one of whom is defendant, executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of the residuary estate, wherein was apportioned P1,471.97 as
defendant Rufino Imperial's share. Informed of this development, the plaintiffs filed on June 5,
1964 an
ex parte motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution and of an order directing the manager, or
the representative, of the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch, to hold the share of defendant
and deliver the same to the provincial sheriff of the province to be applied to the satisfaction of the
balance of the money judgment. This was granted by the trial court (Branch II) in its order dated
June 9, 1964.On June 17, 1964, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff issued a sheriff’s notification for levy
addressed to defendant, giving notice of the garnishment of the rights, interests, shares and
participation that defendant may have over the residuary estate of the late Eulogio Imperial,
consisting of the money deposited in the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch.Defendant, on
June 24, 1964 filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 9, 1964, and to quash the
alias writ of execution issued pursuant to it, to which plaintiffs filed their opposition on July 6, 1964.
On July 14, 1964, the trial court denied defendant's aforesaid motion.

ISSUE:
Upon the death of a ward, is the money accumulated in his guardianship proceedings and
deposited in a bank, still considered in custodia legis and therefore cannot be attached?

RULING:
NO. The new Rules of Court now specifically provides for the procedure to be followed in
case what is attached is in custodia legis. The clear import of this new provision is that property
under custodia legis is now attachable, subject to the mode set forth in said rule. Besides, the ward
having died, the guardianship proceedings no longer subsist:
The death of the ward necessarily terminates the guardianship, and thereupon all powers
and duties of the guardian cease, except the duty, which remains, to make a proper accounting and
settlement in the probate court. As a matter of fact, the guardianship proceedings was ordered
conditionally closed by Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in which it
was pending, in its order of February 8, 1964, where it stated —In the meantime, the guardian
Philippine National Bank is hereby directed to deposit the residuary estate of said ward with its
bank agency in Dipolog, this province, in the name of the estate of the deceased ward Eulogio
Imperial, preparatory to the eventual distribution of the same to the heirs when the latter shall be
known, and upon proof of deposit of said residuary estate, the guardian Philippine National Bank
shall forthwith be relieved from any responsibility as such, and this proceeding shall be considered
closed and terminated. And the condition has long been fulfilled, because on March 13, 1964 the
Philippine National Bank-Manila deposited the residuary estate of the ward with the Philippine
National Bank-Dipolog Branch, evidenced by a receipt attached to the records in Sp. Proc. No. R-
145.When Eulogio Imperial died on September 13, 1962, the rights to his succession —from the
moment of his death —were transmitted to his heirs, one of whom is his son and heir, defendant-
appellant herein. This automatic transmission can not but proceed with greater ease and certainty
than in this case where the parties agree that the residuary estate is not burdened with any debt.
For, The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death, and where,
as in this case, the heir is of legal age and the estate is not burdened with any debts, said heir
immediately succeeds, by force of law, to the dominion, ownership, and possession of the
10 | P a g e
properties of his predecessor and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the latter. That the
interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person may be attached for purposes of execution,
even if the estate is in the process of settlement before the courts, is already a settled matter in this
jurisdiction. It is admitted that the heirs of Eulogio Imperial, including herein defendant-appellant,
have on May 25, 1964 executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. This instrument suffices to settle
the entire estate of the decedent —provided all the requisites for its validity are fulfilled—even
without the approval of the court. Therefore, the estate for all practical purposes have been
settled. The heirs are at full liberty to withdraw the residuary estate from the Philippine National
Bank-Dipolog Branch and divide it among themselves. The only reason they have not done so is
because of the alleged illegal withdrawal from said estate of the amount of P1,080.00 by one Gloria
Gomez by authority of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, which
incident is now on appeal before the Court of Appeals. This appeal, however, does not detract any
from the fact that the guardianship proceedings is closed and terminated and the residuary estate
no longer under custodia legis.

FR. RIGOR VS RIGORS

GR NO. L-22036; April 30, 1979

FACTS:
Father Rigor died on August 1935, leaving a will which left devises to his sisters and cousin. In
addition, the will contained a bequest that a riceland shall be transferred to the nearest male
relative who shall take the priesthood, continue his studies therein and become priest, and shall not
be excommunicated from the priesthood. In interim, the riceland shall be administered by the
actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac or his successors. In 1940, the
administratrix submitted a project of partition before the trial court, which includes the Riceland.
The trial court approved the partition and order the delivery of the shares to the respective
devisees after payment of obligations of the estate.

Fourteen years later, the parish priest of Victoria, Tarlac filed a petition praying for an
appointment of a new administrator, and that the possessors be ordered to render an accounting
of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. Later on, the parish priest filed another
petition for the delivery of the Riceland to the church as trustee. This was countered by the
intestate heirs of Fr. Rigor through filing a petition to declare the bequest inoperative and they be
adjudged as the persons entitled to the Riceland since no nearest male relative of Fr. Rigor has ever
studied for the priesthood.

The lower court declared the bequest inoperative. However, when the parish priest filed a second
Motion for Reconsideration, it was granted on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew
who was a seminarian. The administrator was directed to deliver the Riceland to the parish priest as
trustee. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of trial court, holding that the bequest
of Fr. Rigor had created a testamentary trust to the nearest male relative, but such trust could only
exist for twenty years because to enforce it would violate the rule against perpetuities.
Hence, the Parish Priest filed a petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject Riceland be considered in trust with the Parish Priest in
consideration of the bequest of Fr. Rigor.

RULING:
NO. The bequest of Fr. Rigor and instructions as regards the trust of the Riceland were clear
in the will. However, what was not clear is the duration or how long after the testator’s death
would it be determined that he had a nephew who would pursue priesthood. The Supreme Court
therefore held that the bequest refer to the testator’s nearest male relative living at the time of his
death and not to any definite time thereafter. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee
or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation,
when it is proper (Art. 1025). To construe them as referring to the nearest male relative at anytime

11 | P a g e
after the death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the
disposition of the estate.
Following this interpretation, the Court held that the bequest was inoperative. As such, the
Riceland shall be merged into the estate. It was not no longer in trust with the Parish Priest
considering that none of the contingencies of the will were present at the time of the death.

ALMEIDA VS CARRILLO
GR. NO. 45320; January 26, 1939

FACTS:
January 1963: P Rosenda built a mausoleum for the remains of her late husband • Before the
expiration of the period of 5 years for the exhumation of said remains, the children [appellants]
secured the consent of P Rosenda to have the remains transferred to Ermita Church • P Rosenda
gave her consent believing that the same is temporary and it would be easier to transfer from that
place to mausoleum • As the children [appellants] were about to remove and transfer the remains,
P Rosenda moved to enjoin the children from removing the same • The court ordered the children
to abstain from doing it
Macario Carillo died leaving his widow P Rosenda and his 3 children by his first marriage [Corazon,
Romulo, Gracia]
With consent, P Rosenda caused the remains of the deceased to be buried in the private lot
of the Intengan family to be transferred later [3-5 years] upon paying P100 for the use of the lot

ISSUE:
W/n the children have a better right than the spouse to disinter the remains of the deceased and
transfer them to the place they had chosen.

RULING:
No. The intestate proceedings were commenced In the project of partition submitted by all
the co-heirs and approved by the court, they agreed that: [6] P Rosenda shall undertake to pay the
expenses of the last illness of the decedent, such as [medicine, physician’s fees and nurses, cost of
the funeral, care of the tomb]
The agreement of the parties is decisive, in which they agreed in the partition approved by the court
that the widow would undertake to care of his tomb • The word “tomb” has been used without
any restriction or limitation - It should be interpreted as both the grave and that which might be
determined after the 5-year period for the conservation of the remains of the deceased. P Rosenda,
as the surviving spouse has a better right than the children and the children cannot object to the
transfer of the remains of the deceased
P Rosenda erronesously gave her consent, for she was made to believe by the children that
the transfer of the remains would only be temporary and that her consent would facilitate the
subsequent transfer to the mausoleum.

In this jurisdiction, there is no law that expressly determines the right care, possession and
disposition of the remains of the deceased. • Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917, provides that the obligation to bury the remains of a deceased, falls, This legal provision has no
direct application to the controversy; for the simple reason that it refers to the burial of a dead
body, which he is not the case here.
However, it is being mentioned merely to point out that even in the case, the right of the
surviving spouse is considered preferred and superior to that of the next of kin. Art. 305. The duty
and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the
order established for support, under Article 294. • In case of descendants of the same degree, or of
brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. • In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a
better right. Art. 294,,,firstly, on the surviving spouse; 1. Spouse - if the deceased was not married,
the obligation falls upon the closest next of kin; 2. descendants [nearest] - and if he dies with no
surviving relative, the burial is the concern of the authorities of the municipality where he died. 3.
ascendants [nearest] 4. brothers and sisters

CARILLO VS CARILLO
12 | P a g e
IBARLE v. PO
GR No.L-5064, February 27, 1953

FACTS:
Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina Navarro
and some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who later sold the
same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment as guardian of
her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion now belonged to
the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE:
Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD:
The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the
competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff
because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.

OSORIO v. OSORIO
GR No.L-10474, March 29, 1916
41 PHIL 531

FACTS:
Francisco Osorio y Garcia filed a written complaint alleging that he is a natural son of one
Francisco Osorio y Reyes who died in 1896; and that he had been in continuous possession of the
status of natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, as proven by direct acts of the latter and of his family;
that the defendant Soledad Osorio, lawful daughter and lawful heir of said Osorio y Reyes, be
ordered to recognize the plaintiff as a natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, and is entitled to share in
his father's estate; and, furthermore, that said defendant be ordered to furnish subsistence to
plaintiff in such amount as the court might deem proper to fix. The evidence offered relating to the
fact of filiation of Osorio y Garcia to Osorio Reyes is strong and unimpeachable, so that the court
found the legitimacy of claim of Osorio y Garcia to be properly established.

ISSUE:
Has plaintiff the right to be recognized as co-heir and be entitled to the rights appertaining
to his deceased father's estate?

HELD:
Yes. Recognition of the child as a natural child must be made if he has been in continuous
possession of his filiation, proven by the attendance of his father at his baptism, in the certificate in
which his name and that of his mother appear, though the document contains errors, and by his
father's statement to various friends that the boy was his natural son, and by his father's always
having attended to the care, education and support of his son.
So that the plaintiff, Francisco Osorio y Garcia, according to the facts proven in this case and the law
on the subject, is entitled to have his half sister Soledad Osorio, a legitimate daughter of the father
of both of them, recognize him as being the natural, recognized son of Francisco Osorio y Reyes
and as entitled to the rights granted him by law in respect to his deceased father's estate, all of
which is in possession of the defendant spouses.
13 | P a g e
RAMIREZ v. BALTAZAR
GR No.L-25049, August 30, 1968
22 SCRA 918

FACTS:
Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in this
case. Upon demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a petition for
the intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs Felimon and Monica
Ramirez are heirs of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as adminstrator but did not qualify
so that Artemio Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. The mortgagees then
filed a foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded, after Diawan failed to file an answer
against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the property was bought by the mortgagees
themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court. Felimon sued for the annulment of the entire
foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the failure of the judicial administrator to protect
their interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and hava no
cause of action.

ISSUE:
Have plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?

HELD:
Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the
heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or
recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special
circumstances, protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial
declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court
upon the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as
"when the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in his place."

DE BORJA v. MENCIAS
GR No.L-20609, September 29, 1966
21 SCRA 1133

FACTS:
Petitioners Juan De Borja et al. petitioned for the reversal of the order of Judge Mencias,
denying their petition cause the sale of the properties levied upon to satisfy the money judgment in
a civil case rendered in favor of petitioners against respondent Crisanto de Borja. Petitioners levied
aganst the rights, interest and
participation which Crisanto de Borja had in certain real properties, as an heir of the decedents
Josefa Tangco and Francisco de Borja, whose estates were then pending settlement in Special
Proceedings Nos. F-7866 and 1955 of the aforementioned court, respectively.
this Court hereby holds that whatever interest, claim or right which Crisanto de Borja may have in
the testate estate of Josefa Tangco and in the intestate estate of Francisco de Borja are subject to
attachment and execution for the purpose of satisfying the money judgment rendered against the
said heir
ISSUE: May the sale of the property levied for execution proceed?

HELD:
The above question must be answered in the affirmative, provided it is understood that the
sale shall be only of whatever rights, interest and participation may be adjudicated to said heir as a
result of the final settlement of the estates, and that delivery thereof to the judgment creditor or to
the purchaser at the public sale thereof shall be made only after the final settlement of the estates
and in the manner provided by the legal provision mentioned above.

14 | P a g e
USON v. DEL ROSARIO
GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 530

FACTS:
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson, the
petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land occupied
by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a defense,
defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson containing
among others an statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the latter renouncing
her rights to any inheritance from Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are
illegitimate children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any
successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and rights of
natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter
(article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared
for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event
which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

ISSUE:
Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD:
No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of
at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article
657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of
the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a
deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment,
therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question
in view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire
and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for
the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given
retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for
the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have
occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any
vested or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated in the early part of this decision, the
right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death
of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands
that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code).
The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased
cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in
dispute.

ILUSTRE VS. FRONDOSA

GR NO. 6077, November 16, 1910

FACTS:
Fortunata Barcena filed an action to quiet title over parcels of land. Pending the proceeding,
she died. The counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors
Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court
denied the counsel’s prayer for lack of merit, and dismissed the complaint on the ground that a
dead person has no legal personality to sue.

ISSUE:
15 | P a g e
 Whether or not a court action survives, through the heirs, after the death of the plaintiff.

RULING:
YES. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent.” From the moment of the death of the decedent,
the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for
by law. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in
litigation, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her
heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the
case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as
parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

LORENZO VS. POSADAS, JR.

GR NO. L-43082, June 18, 1937

Facts:
Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable amount of real and personal
properties. Proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate
were begun in the CFI of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate.
The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to
administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to nephew Matthew ten years
after the two executors named in the will was appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee until he
resigned and the plaintiff Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue (Posadas) assessed against the estate an inheritance tax, together with the penalties for
deliquency in payment. Lorenzo paid said amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the same
time that unless the amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought for its recovery.
Posadas overruled Lorenzo’s protest and refused to refund the said amount. Plaintiff went to court.
The CFI dismissed Lorenzo’s complaint and Posadas’ counterclaim. Both parties appealed to this
court.
Issues:
1. When does the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be satisfied?
2. Should the inheritance tax be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the
time of the testator’s death, or on its value ten years later?
HELD:
Accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the obligation to pay the same. NCC 657: “the
rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death.” “In other
words... the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.”
Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of the inheritance takes place,
succession takes place in any event at the moment of the decedent’s death. The time when the
heirs legally succeed to the inheritance may differ from the time when the heirs actually receive
such inheritance. ” Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of
the date.

2. If death is the generating source from which the power of the estate to impose
inheritance taxes takes its being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and
the right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the estate
as it stood at the time of the decedent’s death, regardless of any subsequent contingency value of
any subsequent increase or decrease in value

ONG VS. CA
GR NO. 75884, September 24, 1987

16 | P a g e
BLAS VS. SANTOS
GR NO. : L-14070, March 29, 1961

FACTS:
Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz (FIRST WIFE) with whom they had
three children as well as grandchildren. The First wife died and on the following year, Simeon
contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos (SECOND WIFE) but the properties he and his
former wife acquired during the first marriage were not liquidated.
One week before the death of Simeon Blas, he executed a will disposing half of his
properties in favor of Maxima the other half for payment of debts, Blas also named a few devisees
and legatees therein.
In view of the fact that there were no liquidation made on the properties of Simeon Blas and the
First Wife, he asked his son-in-law, Andres Pascual, to prepare a document whereby the Second
Wife, Maxima Santos intimated that she understands the will of her husband; that she promises
that she’ll be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties she’ll be acquiring to the heirs and
legatees named in the will of his husband; that she can select or choose any of them depending
upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said legatees/heirs/devisees.
The preparation and execution of Exhibit "A" was ordered by Simeon Blas evidently to
prevent his heirs by his first marriage from contesting his will and demanding liquidation of the
conjugal properties acquired during the first marriage.
In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became administratrix
of her estate. The heirs of Simeon Blas learned that Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it was
learned that Maxima only disposed not even one-tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon
Blas.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Simeon Blas should receive properties based on the promise of
Maxima Santos contained in Exhibit “A”

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the promise is valid and enforceable upon Maxima’s death.
Though it is not a will, as it lacks the formality, nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said
promise was actually executed to avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas’ estate).
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason
that the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an obligation or
promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired
with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of
the husband.
Simeon Blas contracted his first marriage with Marta Cruz with whom they have three
children as well as grand children. After a year when marta died, simeon contracted his second
marriage with Maxima Santos without liquidating the properties between simeon and his first wife.
A week before the death of simeon, he executed a will whereby he would give half of his
share to his wife, half would be for the payment of their debts, if any.
In view of the fact that no liquidation was made on his first marriage, he ordered his son-in-
law to prepare a document whereby the second wife promises to give, upon her death, half of what
she will get from Simeon to the legatees or devisees named in the will.
The purpose of this document is to avoid the heirs of simeon in contesting the will and ask
for a liquidation on the first marriage.
After the death of the second wife, the heirs of simeon blas learned that the promise of the
second wife contained in the document was not fulfilled. And that only one tenth of the properties
she received from simeon was given to the heirs.
Hence, the issue of whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise
of the second wife.
The SC ruled in the affirmative. The promise is valid and enforceable. Though it is not a will as
it lacks the proper formalities, nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was
actually executed to avoid litigation or partition of the properties of Simeon Blas.

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41. Estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL., petitioners, vs. IGNACIA AKUTIN
AND HER CHILDREN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-47799. June 13, 1941.
FACTS:
Agripino Neri y Chavez had six children by his first marriage. The children are herein
petitioners namely, Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario, and Celerina. Getulia died eight
years prior to Neri’s death and was survived by Getulia’s 7 children. By his second marriage, with
Ignacia Akutin, he had six children namely Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta Estela Maria, and Emma. On
Agripino Neri’s will, he indicated that his children of the first marriage have no longer participation
in his estate as they had already received their corresponding shares during his lifetime. He then
died on 12 December 1931 and his will was admitted to probate on 21 March 1932.
At the hearing for declaration of heirs, the trial court found(contrary to what the testator
haddeclared in his will) that all his children by first and second marriages intestate heirs of the
deceased without prejudice to o1/2 of the improvements introduced in the properties during the
existence of the last conjugal partnership, which should belong to Ignacia Akutin. CA affirmed the
decision but modified that the will was “valid with respect to the 2/3part which the testator could
freely disposed of.
ISSUE:
Whether the omission of the children of the first marriage annuls the institution of the
children of the second marriage as sole heirs of the testator (YES)
whether the will may be held valid, at least with respect to one-third of the estate which the
testator may dispose of as legacy and to the other one-third which he may bequeath as betterment,
to said children of the second marriage.

HELD:
The case was of one of voluntary preterition of 4 of the children by first marriage and of
involuntary preterition of the children of Getulia. And is thus governed by Article 814 (now Art. 854)
which reads at that time: The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the
institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not
inofficious.
Preterition consist in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, thought mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In the instant case, while the children of the first
marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any share in the hereditary property,
without expressly being disinherited. The omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether
voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not
at least manifest. This is contrary to CA’s finding because it ruled that the testator is in fact
disinheriting the children of first marriage when in fact, the testator only mistakenly believed that
the said children had already received more than their share during his lifetime. Thus, cannot be
interpreted to be as disinheritance. Effect of Preterition As enunciated in Art 814(now 854),
Preterition shall void the institution of the heir. In effect, it gives rise to intestate succession. In this
case, the testator mistook that the children of first marriage had already received their share so he
excluded them. If not for this mistake, his intention, as clearly inferred on his will, is to divide his
property equally to his children. With this, the court reversed CA’s decision and affirmed the trial
court’s decision witout prejudice to Ignacia Akutin’s legal usufruct.

42. Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales. Irenea C. Rosales v. Fortunato Rosales, et. al.

G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987

FACTS:

On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband
Fortunato Rosales and their two children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another
child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
18 | P a g e
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The trial court ordered that Fortunato, Magna,
Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled each to ¼ share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the
other hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the
late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-
law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.

RULING:

No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups, namely, those who
inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. There is no
provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her
mother-in-law. The law has already meticulously enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent. The
Court held that Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because the provision refers to
the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does
not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a third
person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

43. Baranda v. Baranda

GR 73275. 20 May 1987

FACTS:

Paulina Baranda died without issue, but before her demise, two of her supposed heirs, the
herein respondents Evangelina and Elisa Baranda, have already taken possession of
6 parcels of land and caused the transfer of such by virtue of questionable sales which the late
widow had also sought the reconveyance which did not however materialized. The petitioners,
siblings of the decedent, now sought the annulment of the supposed sale or transfers.
Respondents question the petitioners legal standing, them being not a party-in-interest in the deed
of sale.

ISSUE:

Can the petitioners impugn the validity of the sales?

RULING:

Yes. This Court has repeatedly held that “the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to
commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased, without separate
judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no pending special
proceeding for the settlement of the decedent’s estate.

There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda’s estate, the
petitioners, as her intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of
the disputed properties, not to them, but to the estate itself of the decedent, for distribution later
in accordance with law. Otherwise, no one else could question the simulated sales and the subjects
thereof would remain in the name of the alleged vendees, who would thus have been permitted to
benefit from their deception, In fact, even if it were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-
fact were not properly represented, the remaining petitioners would still have sufficed to impugn
the validity of the deeds of sale.

45. RIVERA VS PALMORi

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G.R. NO. 14851, SEPTEMBER 13, 1919
FACTS:
Juan Pons, a Spanish subject resident in the Philippines, died in Manila. Subsequently, respondent
Palmaroli, Consul General for Spain in the Philippines, filed a petition for probate of the will of Juan
Pons. Due to great distance between Palma de Mallorca and Manila, petitioner, widow of the
testator, received no information of the probate proceedings. However, upon noticed of her
husband's death, she employed attorneys to look after her interest in the estate of her deceased
lamska nic Bethe fiailiBeinst fiskifiled a motion, prayed that the order of probate be set aside.
ISSUE:
Whether or not testator's widow, who has been prevented by inevitable conditions from opposing
the probate of the will, obtain from the SC, an order for a rehearing in the CFI alleging that the will
was improperly admitted to probate?
RULING:
Yes. As has been repeatedly stated in the decisions of this court, the probate of a will, while
conclusive as to its due execution, in no wise involves the intrinsic validity of its provisions. If,
therefore, upon the distribution of the estate of Juan Pons y Coll, it should appear that any
provision of his will is contrary to the law applicable to his case, the will must necessarily yield upon
that point and the disposition made by law must prevail. The petitioner is therefore free VanaRcan
such coustons or themstanss afcasiteranterun turersed, dinauss ohs. sue stioeaaf the on the facts
before us, this is her only recourse. But if the will in question was in fact proved as the will of a
Spanish subject under section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the intrinsic validity of its
provisions must be determined under the Spanish law applicable to this testator.

46. SEANGIO VS REYES

G.R. NO. 140371-72, NOVEMBER 27, 2006
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio and prayed for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special
administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara
and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition.
It manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the
most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is
a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported
holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will?
RULING:
Court held that need not be witnessed.Segundo's document, although it may initially come across
as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by
law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an
affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act
of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of
the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.Moreover, it is
a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within
the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession.colographic wills,
therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as lustrated in the present
case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, aking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention f the testator. In this
regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Casulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng
Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was xecuted by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance
cannot be given effect.

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47. MONTINOLA VS HERBOSA
No. 23022-R, FEBRUARY 14, 1963
FACTS:
Montinola filed an action against the heirs of Dr. Jose Rizal for the recovery of possession of
personal property (The Rizal Relics) allegedly sold to him by Dona Trinidad Rizal. The trial court held
that neither party is entitled to the possession of such property, relying principally on the fact that
in Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios, there is a line where Rizal bequeathed all his property to the Filipino
people. The court argued that the handwritten work of Rizal constitutes a holographic will giving
the State all his property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mi Ultimo Adios constitute a last will?
RULING:
An instrument which merely expresses a last wish as a thought or advice but does not contain a
position of property and was not executed with animus testandi cannot legally be considered a I.
Rizal's "Ultimo Adios" is a literary piece of work and was so intended. It may be considered a Il in
the grammatical sense, but not in the legal or juridical sense.

48. MERZA VS PORRAS

G.R. NO. L-4888, MAY 25, 1953
FACTS:
Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a codicil (Exhibit B). The testatrix was survived
by her husband and collateral relatives, some of whom, along with the husband, were disinherited
in Exhibit B for the reasons set forth therein. The opposition to Exhibit A predicated on alleged
defects of the attestation clause. The opponent objected that this clause did not state that the
testatrix and the witnesses had signed each and every page of the will or that she had signed the
instrument in the presence of the witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attestation clause in the will in question is legally sufficient?
RULING:
Yes. The Appellate Court dismissed the first objection, finding that "failure to state in the
attestation clause in question that the testatrix and/or the witnesses had signed each and every
page of Exhibit A were cured by the fact that each one of the pages of the instrument appears to be
signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses.

49. VITUG VS CA
G.R. NO. 82027, MARCH 29, 1990

FACTS:
This case involved the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in
New York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona
executrix In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special
administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending
probate.

On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to
sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his
advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal
funds. Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn
from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate,
and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure
to include the sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the
estate." Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same
through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970.

The trial courts upheld the validity of said agreement and granted the motion to sell filed some of
the estate of Dolores L. Vitug to pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug. On the other hand, the

21 | P a g e
CA held that the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not
comply Article 133 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to reimbursement, for the advances made to the decedent's
estate, from saving account no. 35342-028?
RULING:
Yes. The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the
latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No.
35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in
the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate
property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.

50. HERREROS VS GIL

G.R. NO. L-3362, MARCH 1, 1951
FACTS:
Carlos Gil executed a will giving all his movable and immovable properties to his wife, Isabel
Herreros, and if she dies, the remaining assets inherited by her from the testator, be awarded to
Don Carlos Worrel. The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will and
testament of the deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano appealed to this
Court, raising that the alleged will has not been granted in accordance with the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will in question is valid despite the defect on the attestation clause?
RULING:
Yes. Absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it proven that the will
was in fact signed and attested. It is contended that the deficiency in the attestation clause is cured
by the last paragraph of the body of the alleged will, which we have quoted above. At first glance, it
is queer that the alleged testator should have made an attestation clause, which is the function of
the witness. But the important point is that he attests or certifies his own signature, or, to be
accurate, his signature certifies itself.

51. TESTATE ESTATE OF FR. ARANAS VS ARANAS G.R. NO. L-56249, MAY 29, 1987
FACTS:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January 19, 1953. He had
executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to probate on August 31,
1956. The said will stipulated to return to Aniceto and Carmelo or their heirs all properties acquired
by the testator from them and parcels of land inherited by the testator from his parents. Likewise,
the special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator by Vicente, a faithful and
serviceable nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties
after deducting the expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to
the Catholic Church for the eteral repose of the testator's soul.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of Vicente Aranas as administrator of remainder properties of Fr.
Aranas is violative of Art. 870 of the Civil Code?
RULING:
A cursory reading of the English translation of the Last Will and Testament shows that it was the
sincere tention and desire of the testator to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and
unselfish services y allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of
properties until Vicente's death nd/or refusal to act as administrator in which case, the
administration shall pass to anyone chosen by armelo Aranas among his sons and upon Carmelo's
death, his sons will have the power to select one among hemselves. Vicente Aranas therefore as a
usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property of his uncle with all he benefits which result from
the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation to return, at the
designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent.
This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual
as there is a imitation namely his death or his refusal. Likewise his designation as administrator of
these properties is imited by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art.
870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited
22 | P a g e
to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the naked owners
(the other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente Aranas
prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice of course to Vicente's
continuing usufruct.
To void the designation of Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the
desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and unselfish services
rendered during the time when said testator was seriously ill or bed-ridden. The proviso must be
respected and be given effect until the death or until the refusal to act as such of the instituted
usufructuary/administrator, after which period, the property can be properly disposed of, subject to
the limitations provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code concerning a fideicommissary substitution

52. CASTANEDA VS ALEMANY G.R. NO. 1439, MARCH 19, 1904

FACTS:
The court erred in holding that all legal formalities had been complied with in the execution of the
will of Dona Juana Moreno, as the proof shows that the said will was not written in the presence of
under the express direction of the testratrix as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was not duly signed by the testatrix herself?

RULING:
The evidence in this case shows to our satisfaction that the will of Doña Juana Moreno was duly
signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses, who signed it as witnesses in the presence of
the testratrix and of each other. It was therefore executed in conformity with law.
There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the
claim of the appellants that the will must be written by the testator himself or by someone else in
his presence and under his express direction. That section requires (1) that the will be in writing and
(2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign it, that it be signed by someone in his
presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter
of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the
lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence.

54. BAGTAS VS PAGUIO

G.R. NO.L-6801, MARCH 14, 1912
FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of the CFI of, admitting to probate a document which was offered as
the last will and testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro. The testator died on the 28th of
September, 1909, a year and five months following the date of the execution of the will. The will
was propounded by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the opponents are a
son and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased
daughter.
ISSUE
Whether or not the will was executed according to the formalities and requirements of the law on
wills.
RULING:
Yes. At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four testamentary witnesses,
Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Señor Marco, and one Florentino
Ramos. According to the uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will was executed in the
following manner: Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items
which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them
to the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each
time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written
by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that
Señor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the
presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of the
testator and each other. These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the will
23 | P a g e
and we are in perfect accord with the judgment of the lower court that the formalities of the Code
of Civil Procedure have been fully complied with.

55. BONA VS BRIONES

G.R. NO. L-10806, JULY 6, 1918
FACTS:
Counsel for Monica Bona, the widow by the second marriage of the deceased Francisco, applied for
the probate of the will which the said deceased husband executed during his lifetime. Counsel for
Hospicio, Gregoria, and Carmen, all surnamed Briones, the legitimate children by the first marriage
of the testator, opposed the probate of the will presented by the widow of the deceased Briones,
alleging that the said will was executed before two witnesses only and under unlawful and undue
pressure or influence exercised upon the person of the testator who whus signed though fraud and
deciet and he prayed that reason the said will be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will in question was executed by Francisco Briones?
RULING:
Yes. A mere reading of the last four paragraphs or parts of the will Exhibit A shows in a clear
manner that the said will in its form and contents expresses without shadow of doubt the will of
the testator, and that in its execution the solemnities prescribed by the above-mentioned section
618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.
Even though Domingo de la Fuente drafted the will and intervened in its preparation as a notary, by
the order and under the express direction of the testator, it is nevertheless true that he did it as a
witnesses° fee one gustina and s said Billamicd, Positive auest efafela atsearbil in the secondher the
four paragraphs mentioned; for in its they certify that the foregoing testament contains the last will
of the testator Francisco Briones; that the latter told them that before and at the time that he
dictated his will, there was no inducement nor threat by anybody; and that as he did not know how
to write the Spanish language, said testator requested Domingo de la Fuente to write the will, and
he did it as it is now drafted, certifying also, that the testator Briones signed his will voluntarily with
his own hand, in the presence of the declarants who, as witnesses, signed the instrument on the
date expressed. Domingo de la Fuente on his part declared that the two said witnesses formally
swore before him on the certification which precedes the said will and, according to this testimony
as shown in the records and the testimony of the above-mentioned witnesses, the said Domingo de
la Fuente wrote and drafted the said will Exhibit A by the order and under the direction of the
testator Francisco Briones, who signed in the presence of the witnesses, Bustilla and Barrameda
and of Notary Domingo de la Fuente, all of whom immediately signed also in the presence of the
testator, each doing it in the presence of each th the w that, a thoushot ie penito wracK res be
wand writes by the order and under the direction of the testator; that he was a witness to its
execution from the first to its last line; and that he was perfectly aware of the fact that all that he
had written in the document Exhibit A expresses the genuine and true will of the testator. He saw
and was present when the latter signed his will, as also when the two witnesses Bustilla and
Barrameda affixed their signatures; said witnesses also saw and were present when Domingo de la
Fuente signed at the end of the said document.

56. DIZON-RIVERA VS DIZON

G.R. NO. L-24561, JUNE 30, 1970

FACTS:
Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died leaving a will.. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-
named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren. Testate proceedings
were in due course commenced and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of
the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was
appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate. The executrix filed her project of partition which was
"(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired
or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied.
ISSUE:

24 | P a g e
Whether or not the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate
by will?
RULING:
Yes. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her
obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of
her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she
expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance
with the to whom she bequeathed the same.
This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of
Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(Should a person make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the
right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Articles 906 and 907 of the Civil Code thus provides
the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five
oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the
differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash
and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who
admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.

57. VICTORIA VS RIGOR

G.R. NO. L-22036, APRIL 30, 1979
FACTS:
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares. That devise was made in the will of the
late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would
study for the priesthood said devise was inoperative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not bequest in question is valid?
RULING:
No. The testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion
is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the
ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative. It should
be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's
nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the
seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did
not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any
intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.

58. MICIANO VS BRIMO

G.R. No. L-22595, NOVEMBER 1, 1927
FACTS:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. The
judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of
the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it. The appellant's opposition is based on
the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which
are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as
being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine laws?
RULING:
No, although the disposition provides an express provision that it shall be governed by Philippine
Laws and those who opposed the condition of the provision given shall be cancelled from the
disposition, the fact is that the condition itself is void for being contrary to law. Article 792 of the
25 | P a g e
Civil Code provides: "Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide."
It is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the decedent's national law, according to Article 10
of the Civil Code, such national law shall govern his testamentary dispositions. Therefore, the
institution of the legatees are unconditional and are valid, as well as those favorable to herein
appellant-oppositor.

59. BELLIS VS BELLIS

G.R. NO. L-23678, JUNE 6, 1967
FACTS
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will
was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. After the parties
filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court overruled the
oppositions and approved the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will shall be governed by the national law of testator?
RULING:
Yes. A provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 - now Article 16 - of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen
of the State of Texas, U.S.., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

41. ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIA G.R. NO. L-7188, AUGUST 9, 1954

FACTS:
Father Sancho Abadia executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. He died
in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at
P8,000 in value. Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the CFI of
Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will,
filed opposition. During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead,
testified witheut can Vadinäna. Pat op pos Roes end har submhe Rresengenct his co-witnesses,
Father Sancho
The learned trial court found and declared the will in question to be a holographic will. Although at
the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not
permitted by law still. However, at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the
new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, the
trial court is admitted to probate the will in question, as the Last Will and Testament of Father
Sancho Abadia.
The oppositors are appealed from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in
the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will in question is valid though at the time it was executed holographic wills
were not permitted?
RULING:
No. Although, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and
controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order
to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after
the death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said
subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the
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law in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death
of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested
right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in
the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will.
By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow
the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and
declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no
subsequent law with more liberal
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void will.

Enriquez vs. Abadia

G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
FACTS:
In September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed
document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on
January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left
properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees
filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and
nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition. During the
hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction
that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand
the will in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he signed on The left hand margin
of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and
numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at
the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last
will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation
clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any
evidence. The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will; that it was in the hand
writing of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code
permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of
the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect
in form, said trial court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia.
The oppositors appealed from that decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the holographic will should be allowed despite the fact that when it was
executed the civil code proscribes the execution of such wills.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that despite the effectivity of the new Civil Code allowing the
execution of holographic wills, the contested holographic will still cannot be allowed and admitted
to probate. This is because under Art. 795 of the Civil Code, the extrinsic validity of a will should be
judged not by the law existing at the time of the testator’s death nor the law at the time of its
probate, but by the law existing at the time of the execution of the instrument. For the very simple
reason that although the will becomes operative only after the testator’s death, still his wishes are
given expression at the time of execution.
In Re Will of Riosa
G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918
Topics/Doctrines: The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in
force at the time it is made (Art. 795, NCC).
FACTS:
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 The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on
the date of the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls. Jose
Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, in which he disposed of an
estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in
force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance
with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities for the
signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in
writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on
the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law,
therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator,
without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid?
HELD:
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will
made after the date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the provisions of this
law. (Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has
further held in a decision handed down by Justice Torres, as to will executed by a testator whose
death took place prior to the operative date of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is
inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38 Phil., 276.) The instant appeal presents an entirely
different question. The will was executed prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death
occurred after the enactment of this law. The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the
validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution
and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. Retrospective laws generally
if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when the mandate of the
legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according to the
requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful
right of disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death. (Taylor vs.
Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) This court, under such circumstances, should naturally depend more
on reason than on technicality. Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has
provided in detail for the disposition of his property and that his desires should be respected by the
courts. The act of bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In
reality, it becomes a completed act when the will is executed and attested according to the law,
although it does not take effect on the property until a future time. The will of Jose Riosa is valid
and section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the applicable law.
Hernaez vs. Hernaez
G.R. No. L-10027 November 13, 1915
FACTS:
The spouses, Pedro Hernaez and Juana Espinosa, died, leaving several legitimate
descendants. Neither of their estates had been divided up to the date of the institution of this
action, but were both under administration. Their son, Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa, sold all his
interest in both his father's and mother's estate to his son, Vicente Hernaez y Tuason. Domingo
Hernaez y Espinosa had thus parted with all his interest in the estates of his two parents, he
executed a document of sale in favor of Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos. On the same date he
executed another document of sale in which he purported to convey to Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana
four-eighteenths of his interest in his mother's estate. Both of these sales were made with the
connivance of his son, Vicente Hernaez y Tuason. On August 19, 1912, Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana
sold his interest in the estate to Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos. By this transfer, the latter stood
owner of all the interest of Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa in the estate of Pedro Hernaez, and five-
eighteenths of his interest in the estate of Juana Espinosa as against Vicente Hernaez y Espinosa.
ISSUE:
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 Whether or not co-heirs heir may exercise this right of subrogation upon the payment to the
purchaser of another heir's interest.
HELD: Article 1067 of the Civil Code provides that the co-heir may exercise this right of subrogation
upon the payment to the purchaser of another heir's interest, "el precio de la compra" (the
purchase price). Obviously, if the interest had not been resold, the plaintiff, Rosendo Hernaez y
Espinosa, would have had to pay only the price for which Uy-Cana acquired it. The purpose of the
article cannot be evaded by a reconveyance of the interest to a third person at a higher price.
Subsequent purchasers of the interest acquire it burdened with the right of subrogation of co-heirs
at the price for which the heir who sold it parted with it. It is urged that the prices in some of the
deeds of sale by which Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos purchased the interest of various heirs in
the estates are fictitious. This is a question of fact upon which both parties adduced evidence, and
we concur in the opinion of the trial court that there is no basis to the charge. For the foregoing
reasons, the judgment of the court is modified by substituting, as the price of subrogation of the
interest originally purchased by Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana, the sum of P4,500, as set out in Exhibit
7, for the sum of P10,000, the consideration expressed in Exhibit 10. As modified, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Bugnao vs. Ubag
G.R.No. 4445 September 18, 1909
Topic: Testamentary capacity.
Facts:
Before Domingo Ubag died, he allegedly executed a will while he was not of sound mind by
making his wife the sole heir of the said will. The appellant contend that the testator was so sick
that he was unable to speak and understand, or make himself understood and that he was
incapacitated to make a will.
Issue:
When a person can be considered of sound mind and capable of executing a will?
Held:
To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired,
unshattered by disease or otherwise. It is sufficient that a testator knows and appreciate the nature
and effects of the act he is engaged.
Bagtas vs. Paguio
G.R.No.L- 6801 March 14, 1912
Topic: Testamentary Capacity
Facts:
Pioquinto Pagiuo executed a will; the wife was propounded as executrix and opposed by the
son and grandchildren by a former marriage on the ground that the will was executed while the
testator was suffering from debility of the body and poor memory which allegedly lacks
testamentary capacity.
Issue:
Whether or not physical debility or poor memory constitutes incapacity to execute a will?
Held:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility will affect the capacity to make a
will, if sufficient intelligence remains, failure of memory is not sufficient to create incapacity.
Neyra vs. Neyra
GR No.L- 8075 March 25, 1946

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Topic/Doctrine: Test of SIGNING BY THUMBMARK; PRESENCE OF ATTESTING WITNESSES
FACTS:
That Severo Neyra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving certain
properties and two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra,
and other children by his second marriage; that after the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters,
Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in connection with the
properties left by their deceased father, and so serious were their dissensions that, after March 31,
1939, they had two litigations in the Court of First Instance of Manila, concerning said properties. In
the first case, filed on March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and others demanded from Encarnacion Neyra
and others the annulment of the sale of the property located at No. 366 Raon Street, Manila, which
was finally decided in favor of the defendants, in the court of first instance, and in the Court of
Appeals, on December 21, 1943. In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill,
suffering from Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and
confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make confession, Father Garcia talked
to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad
Neyra. Encarnacion accepted said advise and, at about noon of the same day (November 1, 1942)
the two sisters became reconciled. only in the afternoon of the following day, November 2,1942,
when Encarnacion gave him instructions for the preparation of the document embodying their
agreement, and other instructions for the preparation of her last will and -testament; that Attorney
Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new will and testament, naming
Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express
instructions, and the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature,
since the morning of November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, November 3, 1942,
Attorney Panis read said document of compromise and last will and testament to Encarnacion
Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr.
Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if their terms were in
accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion
Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the
help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumb mark at the foot of each one of the two documents, in
duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of the attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr.
Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the
will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The agreement was also signed by
Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a protegé, as witnesses.
Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the two documents, at the request of
Encarnacion Neyra. The foregoing facts have been established by the witnesses presented by
Trinidad Neyra, who are all trustworthy men, and who had absolutely no interest in the final
outcome of this case. Two of them are ministers of the Gospel, while three of the attesting
witnesses are professional men of irreproachable character, who had known and seen and actually
talked to the testatrix. Petitioner Teodora Neyra, half sister of Encarnacion, and her young daughter
Ceferina de la Cruz, and Presentacion Blanco, daughter of petitioner Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco,
substantially corroborated the testimony of the witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, with
reference to the signing of documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, in the afternoon of
November 3, 1942. Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz testified, however,
that when the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the agreement in question, dated
November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were
not present, as they were in the caida.
ISSUE:
Is the contentions of the petitioners are tenable?
HELD:
The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time E. N.
thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were
allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the
time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the

30 | P a g e
testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other, at the time
of the signing of the documents, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they
chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it. all in this case, (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5
Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is
equivalent to her signature. The petition for reconsideration filed by Atty. Lucio Javillonar, on
November 23, 1942, on behalf of a client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been dead since November 4,
1942, and some of her relatives, who have appeared, in accordance with the provisions of section 17
of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, is hereby denied; and the decision of the Court of Appeals for
Manila, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the appeal, is hereby re-affirmed, without costs. So
ordered.
MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant, vs. MARGARITA
LOPEZ, opponent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-24569 26 February 1926
FACTS:
On January 3,1924, the testator Thomas Rodriquez, who was 76 years of age and was in
feeble health for a long time, made his will where he made his cousin Vicente Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as the only and universal heir of his properties. The probate of the
will was opposed by Margarita Lopez, cousin and nearest relative of the deceased. The ground cited
for the opposition was that the testator lacked mental capacity, she claimed that at time of the
execution of the supposed will, the deceased was suffering from senile dementia and was under
guardianship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testator was mentally capacitated during the execution of the will.
RULING:
The deceased testator had mental capacity to make his will during its execution. The
Supreme Court held that at the time of the making of the will, the testator may be of old age, may
have been physically decrepit, may have been week of intellect, have suffered a loss of memory,
had a guardian over his person and property and may have been eccentric, but he still possessed
that spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention, and to summon his
enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention which the law terms ―testamentary capacity.
TESTATE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO. JOSE IL. JUNQUERA petitioner appellee, vs. CRISPIN
BORROMEO, ET AL., oppositors appellants.
G.R. NO. L-18498, MARCH 30, 1967
FACTS:
Vito Borromeo, a widower died on March 13, 1952 at the age of 88 years, without forced
heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
On April 19 of the same year, Jose H. Junquera, filed with the Court of First Instance of said
province a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will left by said deceased,
devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and
undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof. The was dated May 17, 1946,
drafted in Spanish, and allegedly signed, and thumb marked by said deceased, in the presence of Dr.
Comelio G. Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna and Filiberto Leonardo as attesting witnesses. On June 14,
1952, the probate court appointed Junquera as special administrator of the estate.
On November 14 of the same year, Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the probate of
the will contending among others that the signature was not Teofilo's.
ISSUE:
WON the evidence of record is sufficient to prove the due execution of the will in question.

31 | P a g e
RULING:
NO. Upon the face of the original and two copies of the contested will appear a total of six
alleged signatures of the testator. They are all well written along a practically straight line, without
any visible sign of tremor or lack of firmness in the hand that wrote them. In fact, in the respects
just adverted to, they appear better written than the unquestioned signatures, of attesting
witnesses Gandionco and Cabiluna, inspite of the fact that on the date of the alleged execution of
the will (May 17, 1945) the testator was considerably older and in a much poorer physical condition
than they According to the evidence, the testator was then a sick man, eighty-two years old, with
the entire left half of his body paralyzed since six years before. Considering all the attendant
circumstances, we agree with the lower court that Vito Borromeo could not have written the
questioned signatures.
Galvez vs. Galvez
G.R. No. L-6650 December 5, 1913
Topic: Testamentary Capacity
Facts:
Victor Galvez executed a will that he affix his signature by directing Lorenzo Galvez at his
request in his presence.
Issue:
Whether or not directing another person to affix testator’s signature affects the
testamentary capacity?
Held:
The formalities prescribed under the law where complied with as observed the writing
transpired under his direction and presence with the required number of witnesses, this requisites
must concur to comply with the statutory requirements in the affixing or writing of wills.
GONZALES VS. CA
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
Doctrine: Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at
any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthiness and being reliable, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be
believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article
820 of the Civil Code are complied with.
FACTS:
Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent), niece of Isabel,
filed a petition for probate of Isabel's will designating her as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to death of Isabel. The
petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on the following
grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and attested as required by law, 3. the
decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have testamentary capacity due to her age
and sickness, and 4. the will was procured through undue influence. The trial court disallowed the
probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said decision of the trial court. The
petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA erred in holding that the will of the
decedent was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that
the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUE:
1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not be considered
credible as required by Art. 805?

32 | P a g e
 2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the witness to a will has good
standing in his/her community or that he/she is honest or upright?
HELD:
1. YES. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires something more
than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles
820-821 must also be credible under Art. 805. The competency of a person to be an instrumental
witness to a will is determined by the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends on
the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said
witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda.de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de
Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness
is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what
he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is
competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony."
2. NO. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time
during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for
being reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the
contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party) in order that his testimony may be believed
and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the
Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from
his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his
appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind,
deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has
none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.
ANTONIO AMATA, ET AL. v. JUANA TABLIZO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 23483, DECEMBER 18, 1926
FACTS:
Pedro Tablizo was 82 years old when he executed his last will and testament. He was
confined on his bed, unable to stand up when the said will was prepared. Antonio Amata and Felipe
Almojuela, devisees of the said will assisted in its preparation and after the death of the testator
prayed for its probate. The brothers and sisters, as well as their sons and daughters opposed the
probate on the ground that Pedro Tablizo was not of sound mind at the time of the execution of
said document and that it was fraudulently prepared by the two beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
WON the testator is of sound mind at the time of the execution of the will.
RULING:
Yes, the Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence showing that Pedro Tablizo was of
sound mind at the time of the execution of the last will and testament. The testimony of the
petitioners and their witnesses upon the making of the will is so clear, positive and consistent, and
the succession of facts upon which they testified and their incidents is so natural, that it cannot but
convince any one who should read it without bias. If, as above stated, the petitioners and their
witnesses are entitled to a greater credit than the opponents and their witnesses, and if, as above
seen, the testator was in perfectly sound mental condition, there can be no doubt that it was the
testator who signed his signature on the will placed upon a book of music. The testimony of the
opponents and their witnesses is improbable that the will was signed upon a pillow. A pillow being
soft, as it is, cannot serve as a support for writing purposes.
Where the testator is in perfectly sound mental condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor
the fact that somebody had had to guide his hand in order that he could sign, is sufficient to
invalidate his will.
ALBORNOZ VS ALBORNOZ
G.R. NO. L-47428, APRIL 8, 1941

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FACTS:
These two cases were submitted to us by virtue of the appeal against the judgment of the
Court, since they are both legalization of two alleged wills and a codicil, the properties of which the
their author tries to dispose of, they are worth more than P50,000. The Court which heard the two
cases, ordered the legalization of the documents that Dolores Albornoz had presented as a will and
codicil of the aforementioned deceased, and rejected the one presented for the same purpose by
Alfonso Albornoz.
Alfonso Albornoz, brother of the late Perpetua Albornoz Vda. of Soriano and those who
made common cause with him appealed the decision issued by the Court in both files; and in this
instance they now argue that the Court made the errors in its decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will presented by Dolores was valid as against Alfonso?
RULING:
Yes. The appellants did not challenge or even make objections regarding the authenticity
and due execution of the testament and codicil; and Dolores Albomoz fully proved on the other
hand, that the late Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano granted the same on April 25, 1934 and June 19,
1936, respectively, with freedom, while she was in full enjoyment of her mental faculties and in the
presence of the witnesses whose names and signatures are mentioned and appear in the witness
clauses of the aforementioned documents.
It is undoubtedly true also, as Dolores proved, that the deceased was never without
company in her room during her illness. Therefore, it is incredible that Adriano Ruiz and the other
instrumental witnesses to the alleged will of June 24, could enter, inside the room of the deceased,
without being seen or noticed by anyone. The execution of the will in question could not be done in
a short moment; It must have taken some time, long enough for those in the house to realize that
there were strangers in it, at an hour when it is not customary to visit. Add to all this that the expert
calligrapher Arcadio Laperal, who made a careful study of the signatures "PERPETUA A. VDA. DE
SORIANO", comparing the same with the authentic ones of the deceased and those that appear in
the will and in the codicil legalized by the Court a quo, expressed the opinion that both could not
have the same person, helped or not by another, because they differ in all respects. We believe that
the opinion of the aforementioned expert is based on the facts, especially taking into account that
the deceased could no longer see well, as one of the witnesses to the will under discussion said, and
yet the signatures that were attribute are written with a lot of symmetry, straight, and keeping the
letters between them, almost the same distance. Even if the deceased had been helped by another
to stamp said signatures, they would not have come out as well as they appear in the said
document.
In Re will of Bilbao
BILBAO VS BILBAO G.R. NO. L-2200, AUGUST 2, 1950
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental denying the
petition for admission to probate of the last will and testament of Victor S. Bilbao who died on July
13, 1943. The will in question was executed by the deceased Victor Bilbao jointly with his wife
Ramona M. Navarro. The two testators in their testament directed that "all of our respective private
properties both real and personal, and all of our conjugal properties, and any other property
belonging to either or both of us, be given and transmitted to anyone or either of us, who may
survive the other, or who may remain the surviving spouse of may remain the surviving spouse of
the other.."
The petition for probate was opposed by one Filemon Abringe, a near relative of the deceased, that
the alleged will was executed jointly by the husband and wife for their reciprocal benefit and
therefore not valid. After hearing, the trial court found the will to be neither contemplated by Act
No. 190, known as the Code of Civil Procedure nor permitted by article 669 of the Civil Code.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not joint will is valid?
RULING:
No. The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the execution of a will by two or
more persons conjointly or in the same instrument either for their reciprocal benefit or for the
benefit of a third person, is not unwise and is not against public policy. The reason for this provision,
especially as regards husband and wife is that when a will is made jointly or in the same
instruments, the spouse who is more aggressive, stronger in will or character and dominant is liable
to dictate the terms of the will for his or her own benefit or for that of third persons whom he or
she desires to favor. And, where the will is not only jointly but reciprocal, either one of the spouses
who may happen to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless or desperate, knowing as he or she does the
terms of the will whereby the whole property of the spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to
the survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other.
REYES vs. ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VIDAL
G.R. No. L-2862 April 21, 1952
Topic: WILLS- FORMS OF WILLS
FACTS:
On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. On December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuñiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the deceased, filed
an opposition based on several grounds. And, after several days of trial, at which both parties
presented their respective evidence, the court rendered its decision disallowing the will on the
ground that the signatures of the deceased appearing therein are not genuine, that it was not
proven that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which it was written, and that even if the
signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the deceased was not of sound mind when she signed
the will. From this decision petitioner appealed to this Court.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will are genuine
2) Whether or not there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which
the will was written
3) Whether or not the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will.
HELD:
1. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law, petitioner
presented as witnesses the three persons who attested to the execution of the will. These
witnesses are: Cornelia Gonzales de Romero, Quintin Ulpindo and Consuelo B. de Catindig. These
witnesses testified in their own simple and natural way that the deceased signed the will seated on
her bed but over a small table placed near the bed in their presence, and after she had signed it in
the places where her signatures appear, they in turn signed it in the presence and in the presence of
each other. The standards should, if possible, have been made by the same time as the suspected
document. It is preferable that the standards embraced the time of the origin of the document, so
that one part comes from the time after the origin. If possible less than five or six signatures should
always be examined and preferably double that number.
2. Another ground on which the lower court base the disallowance of the will is the failure of
the petitioner to prove that the testratrix knew and spoke the language in which the will in question
appears to have been written. According to the lower court, the law requires that the will should be
written in the dialect or language known to the testator and this fact having been proven, the
probate of the will must fail. And the wIll was disallowed.
3. The remaining ground which the lower court has considered in disallowing the will is the
fact that the deceased was not of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will, and it
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reached this conclusion, not because of any direct evidence on the matter, but simply because the
deceased signed the will in a somewhat varied form. They do not reveal a condition of forgery or
lack of genuineness. These differences or irregularities are common in the writings of old people
and, far from showing lack of genuineness, are indicative of the age, sickness, or weak condition of
the writer. A comparison of the three disputed signatures in the will readily give this impression.
74
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA
BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S.
ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
On 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Dona Florentina Ralla, together with all their children
entered into a duly notarized agreement over the then present and existing properties of the
spouses. On 1955, the spouses separately executed their respective holographic wills, the provisions
of which were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November, 1949.
Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the other to his or her share in the
conjugal properties, the other half already to be partitioned as part of the legitime of the four living
children. On 1959, Dona Florentina died. About 2 weeks after the death of his wife, Don Jesus
executed a new will, thereby revoking and canceling his previous holographic will which he made on
1955 and also its codicil. On 1962, Don Jesus died. Petitioner herein Alsua-Betts, as the executrix
named in the will filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua. Oppositions
thereto were filed by his children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned will was executed in accordance with the requisites
prescribed by law pertaining to the soundness of mind of the testator during execution of his will.
RULING:
Don Jesus was of sound mind at the time of the execution of his will. Between the highest
degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary
capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are
numberless degrees of mental capacity and incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that
mere weakness of mind, or imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person
from making a will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient tenable him to know
what he is about to do and how and to whom he is disposing his property. To constitute a sound
and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by
disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require
that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
75
DALTON VS GIBERSON
G.R. NO. L-4113, JUNE 30, 1952
FACTS:
Lela G. Dalton presented on February 10, 1949 an application with the Court of First Instance
of Cebu for the probate of the holographic will of William R. Giberson, a citizen of the State of
Illinois, United States, dated April 29, 1920 in San Francisco, California. Spring Giberson, legitimate
son of William R. Giberson, presented an opposition alleging that the will is apocrypha (with
questionable authenticity), it does not represent the true will of the late Giberson, and has not been
granted according to the law.

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ISSUE:
WON the wills executed outside the Philippines may be probated without being first
probated in the country of its execution.
RULING:
YES. Section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating that "a will made out of the Philippine
Islands... may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same
effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands" is still in force and has not been
abrogated by Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. Here, the will of William Giberson need not be probated
first in the State of Illinois, USA before it may be probated here in the Philippines. The Court opined
that Section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure is substantive in nature and therefore could not
have been repealed by the Rules of Court which are only procedural in nature.
76
TEMPLETON VS BABCOCK OCTOBER 2, 1928, GR. No. L-28328
FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate
the holographic will of Jennie Rider Babcock.
The petition in this case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 8,
1926, by Beatrice Babcock Templeton to secure probate of a paper writing purporting to express
the wishes of Jennie Rider Bahcock, deceased, with reference to the post mortem disposition of all
her property, consisting of corporate stock, jewelry, personal effects and money. This paper bears
date of May 26, 1926, is written wholly in the handwriting of the deceased and bears her proper
signature.
The aforesaid instrument is admittedly of a testamentary character, but it is not executed as
a will under the provisions of law generally governing the execution of the wills made in the
Philippine Islands.
It is alleged in the petition that the testatrix was at the time of her death a resident of the
State of California, though temporarily residing in Manila at the time of her death; and the parties
have agreed that this paper could be proved in the State of California as the holographic will of the
deceased.
The proponent of the will, Beatrice Babcock Templeton, mother of the three children who
are principal beneficiaries of the will, contends that the testatrix acquired a legal domicile in the
State of California by residence therein over two periods of time between 1917 and 1923, and that
such domicile was never lost. William Rider Babcock, the brother of the proponent, resist the
probate of the will on the ground that the testatrix had never acquired a legal domicile in the State
of California, or that, if she had, such domicile had been lost under the conditions.
ISSUE:
W/N the testatrix, at the time will was made, had the status of a citizen of the State of
California, as required by section 636 of our Code of Civil Procedure?
RULING:
Yes. Again, it is a rule that a citizen of the United States cannot acquire citizenship in the
Philippine Islands by residence here, however long continued (In Re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil.,
156). The testatrix therefore remained at the time of her death a citizen of the United States. Her
will is therefore provable under section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the will of a citizen of
another state or country; and the only question to be determined in this case is, which state of the
American Union has the best claim to her citizenship, a question, which, as we have already seen,
turns upon domicile; and there is no other state whose citizenship she can claim, according the
evidence in this record, with as good right as the State of California Massachusetts, the place of her
marital abode, has not been entered in the competition, and we must decide between California

37 | P a g e
and New York. As between these two states, Califomia was surely the state of her legal domicile,
acquired by choice and by residing therein. Furthermore, this California domicile has not been
supplanted by a later domicile acquired in New York. It results that the trial court committed no
error in considering the testatrix a citizen of the State of California, for the purpose of admitting this
will to probate.
The judgment will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.
77
BELLIS VS BELLIS G.R. NO. L-23678, JUNE 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are
paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis and (c) the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will
was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. After the parties
filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court overruled the
oppositions and approved the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Texas law shall govern the intrinsic validity of will executed by the testator?
RULING:
In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing
that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas
has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of
the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants' position is therefore not rested
on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments.
Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code,
render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
78
ROXAS VS ROXAS
G.R. NO. L-2396 DECEMBER 11, 1950
FACTS:
Pablo Roxas died and left a typewritten will devising all his properties to his wife and
Reynaldo Roxas (adulterous son). The widow submitted the will for probate but the Maria Roxas
(sister of the deceased) opposed the probate proceedings, contending that the will was not

38 | P a g e
subscribed and attested by the witnesses in the presence of the testator and each other, alleging
that after the testator signed the document, it was reinserted to the typewriter for the insertion of
the attestation.
ISSUE:
WON the will complied with the formalities required by law?
RULING:
Yes. Too much emphasis and effort, through experts Cabe and Espinosa, had been placed on
the supposition that after the body of the will had been typewritten, the sheet was removed from
the machine and, after having been folded and crumpled, it was replaced in the typewriter for the
insertion of the attestation clause. The law does not require that the will should be written in one
continuous act; and the supposition does not necessarily, much less conclusively, prove that the
signing was not done on one occasion. For the difference in the ink diffusions and penetrations
between the signatures of the testator and those of the three attesting witnesses may not be due
solely to the folding and crumpling of the sheet on which the will is written, but on such other
factors as class of ink, class of pens, habit of writing, condition of paper, and the use of blotter.79
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-
appellant. G.R. No. L-1787, 81 P 429, August 27, 1948
FACTS:
The will of Don Sixto Lopez was submitted for probate but was opposed by the appellant
alleging the following grounds to wit: (1) that the deceased never executed the alleged will; (2) that
his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of the execution of the will, he
was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever
execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and one of the alleged
instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by duress, influence of
fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries
instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the herein proponent, Jose
S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick. The appellant
also alleges that the trial court has committed an abuse of discretion when it allowed the appellant
to offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the language in which the will is
drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and after the opponent had moved for dismissal of
the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The will in question comprises two pages,
each of which is written on one side of a separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters
or in Arabic numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a fatal defect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lack of pagination in a 2-page will is fatal.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is
guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or the loss of any of its
pages. The omission to put a page number on the first sheet is supplied by other forms of
identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters. The
unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents
considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first
and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the
testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. By their
meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a
continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at
the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption
"TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his
testamentary faculty, — all of which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the
disposition of the marker's property. The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last
will and testament of Don Sixto Lopez is affirmed, with costs.
39 | P a g e
80
REYES vs. ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VIDAL G.R. No. L-2862 April 21, 1952
Topic: WILLS- FORMS OF WILLS
FACTS:
On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. On December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuñiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the deceased, filed
an opposition based on several grounds. And, after several days of trial, at which both parties
presented their respective evidence, the court rendered its decision disallowing the will on the
ground that the signatures of the deceased appearing therein are not genuine, that it was not
proven that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which it was written, and that even if the
signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the deceased was not of sound mind when she signed
the will. From this decision petitioner appealed to this Court.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will are genuine
2) Whether or not there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which the will
was written
3) Whether or not the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will.
HELD:
1. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law, petitioner
presented as witnesses the three persons who attested to the execution of the will. These
witnesses are: Cornelia Gonzales de Romero, Quintin Ulpindo and Consuelo B. de Catindig. These
witnesses testified in their own simple and natural way that the deceased signed the will seated on
her bed but over a small table placed near the bed in their presence, and after she had signed it in
the places where her signatures appear, they in turn signed it in the presence and in the presence of
each other. The standards should, if possible, have been made by the same time as the suspected
document. It is preferable that the standards embraced the time of the origin of the document, so
that one part comes from the time after the origin. If possible less than five or six signatures should
always be examined and preferably double that number.
2. Another ground on which the lower court base the disallowance of the will is the failure of
the petitioner to prove that the testratrix knew and spoke the language in which the will in question
appears to have been written. According to the lower court, the law requires that the will should be
written in the dialect or language known to the testator and this fact having been proven, the
probate of the will must fail. And the wIll was disallowed.
3. The remaining ground which the lower court has considered in disallowing the will is the
fact that the deceased was not of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will, and it
reached this conclusion, not because of any direct evidence on the matter, but simply because the
deceased signed the will in a somewhat varied form. They do not reveal a condition of forgery or
lack of genuineness. These differences or irregularities are common in the writings of old people
and, far from showing lack of genuineness, are indicative of the age, sickness, or weak condition of
the writer. A comparison of the three disputed signatures in the will readily give this impression.
ABANGAN VS ABANGAN
G.R. NO. L-13431, NOVEMBER 12, 1919
FACTS:
The will Of Ana Abangan executed on July 1916 was duly probated on September 19, 1917. The
opponent's appealed, Said document consists Of two sheets, the first Of which contains all Of the
disposition of the testatrix duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under
the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. While, the other sheet contains only the
attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these
40 | P a g e
sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by
letters. These omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of
the will should have been denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid?
RULING: Yes. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left
margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, evidently has for its
object, to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions.
But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the
testator and three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin Of said sheet
would be completely purposeless.
In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly,
the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator
and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that
the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot
attribute to the statute such an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and
the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of the
sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be unneccessary; and if
they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing.
We cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance the place where the testator and
the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the
bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient
security.

82. ACOP VS PIRASO

G.R. NO. 28946; JANUARY 16, 1929
TOPIC: Rules governing the formal validity of wills
FACTS:
Deceased Piraso lived in Baguio. He knew only the igorrote dialect and smattering Of
Ilocano. He allegedly executed a will written in English. When said will was petitioned for probate, it
was denied with the court ruling that the said will is invalid.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in refusing to admit the will in question to probate?
RULING:
No. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that no will may be valid
unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator. Piraso did not know English in
which the will was written. This fact is sufficient to invalidate the will according to the clear and
positive provisions Of the law, and consequently, inevitably prevent its probate.
83. SUROZA vs. JUDGE HONRADO
AM. NO. 2026, DECEMBER 19, 1981
FACTS:
Mauro Suroza, is married to Marcelina Salvador in 1923. They were childless. They reared a
boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considered them as his parents as
shown in his 1945 marriage contract with Nenita de Vera. Mauro died in 1942. Subsequently. Agapito
and Nenita begot a child named Lilia. Agapito also became a soldier. He was disabled and his wife
Nenita was appointed as his guardian in 1953 when he was declared an incompetent.

41 | P a g e
 In that connection, it should be noted that a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz, apparently
Agapito's girl friend delivered Marilyn Sy, a child entrusted to her by spouses Antonio Sy and
Hermogena Talan, to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of
Agapito and as her granddaughter. Marilyn stayed with Marcelina but she was not legally adopted
by Agapito. She married Oscar Medrano.
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73
years old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in
English to the Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked by her (pp. 38-39, CA Rollo). In that
wig, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn. Marcelina died.
The respondent judge subsequently admitted the will to probate_ Nenita then charged Judge
Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. The complainant contented that
the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that
she did not know English, the language in which the win was written.
ISSUE:
WON the will was valid.
RULING:
NO. In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in
English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that
the will is void- In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language
"understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will
was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could only mean that the will
was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of
the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a
language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to
the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed.

84. TAMPOY vs ALBERASTINE

GR NO. L-14322, FEBRUARY 25, 1960
FACTS:
This concerns the probate of a document which purports to be the last will and testament of
one Petronila Tampoy- After the petition was published in accordance with law and petitioner had
presented oral and documentary evidence, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that
the left hand margin of the first of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner
appealed from this ruling but the Court of Appeals certified the case to us because it involves purely
a question of law.
Petitioner now prays that this ruling be set aside for the reason that, although the first page
of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the same however expresses her true
intention to give the property to her whose claims remaims undisputed. She wishes to emphasize
that no one has filed any to the opposition to the probate of the will and that while the first page
does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the second however bears her thumbmark and both
pages were signed by the three testimonial witnesses . Moreover, despite the fact that the petition
for probate is unopposed.
ISSUE:
WON the will is valid?
HELD:
No. Section 618 of Act 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the will and each and
every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other, which requirement should be

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expressed in the attestation clause. This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is
fatal to the validity Of the will, 'A will must be executed in acccrdance with the statutory
requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All these requirements stand as Of equal importance and
must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No power or
discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispense with those
enumerated in the statutes.
Since the will in question suffers from the fatal defect that it does not bear the thumbmark
of the testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses,
we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot
be admitted to probate.
85. GARCIA v. LACUESTA
G.R. NO. L-4067, NOVEMBER 29, 1951
FACTS:
Will is written in the Ilocano dialect and contains the following attestation clause: "We, the
undersigned, by these presents do declare that the foregoing testament of Antero Mercado was
signed by himself and also by us below his name and of this attestation clause and that of the left
margin of the three pages thereof. Page three the continuation of this attestation clause; this will is
written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood by the testator, and it beats the
corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and all them were signed in the
presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the testator and all
and each and every one of us witnesses."
The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of
Antero Mercado, followed below by "A reugo del testator" and the name of Florentino Javier.
Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name.
ISSUE:
Was the will in compliance with Article 805?
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled that the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that
Antero Merexio caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express
direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not here pretended that the
cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by
which he signed his name. After mature reflection, we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of
the cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is obvious- The cross cannot and does not have the
trustworthiness of a thumbmark

86. BALONAN vs. ABELLANA

G.R. No. L-15153, August 31, 1960
FACTS:
It appears on record that the last Will and Testament, which is sought to be probated, is
written in Spanish and consists of 2 typewritten pages. The first page is signed hy Juan Bello and
under his name appears typewritten "Por la testadora Anacleta Ahellana, residence Certificate A-
1167629, Enero 20, 1951, Ciudad de Zamboanga', and on the second page appears the signature of 3
instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian, Faustino Macaso and Rafael Ignacio, at the bottom of which
appears the signature of T. de los Santos and below his signature is his official designation as the
notary public who notarized the said testament- On the first page on the left margin of the said
instrument also appear the signatures of the instrumental witnesses. On the second page, which is
the last page of said Will, also appears the signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses and on
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that second page on the left margin appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose name appears
handwritten the following phrase, "Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana'. The will is duly
acknowledged before Notary Public Attorney Timoteo de los Santos.
Issue:
Whether or not the signature of Juan Bello above the typewritten statement "Por la
Testadora Anacleta Abellana..." comply with the requirements of law prescribing the manner in
which a will shall be executed?
Held:
No. Article 805 of the Civil Code, in patt provides as follows: Every will, other than a
holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or hy the testator's
name written hy some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witness in the presence of the testator and of one another. In
the ease at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the will
by said Abcllana herself, or by Dr- Juan Ahello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the
express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be
affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his express direction.
87. GARCIA VS GARCIA
G.R. NO. L-43367, SEPTEMBER 9, 1936
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila allowing the probate of the will of
Paulina Vazquez Viuda de Garcia. The will was executed on June 12, 1934. The testatrix died on June
27, 1934. Testamentary proceedings were commenced on July 25, 1934, in the CFI Of Manila for the
probate Of this will, the petitioners being Marieta, Luisa and Purificacion Garcia who are among the
forced heirs instituted in the will and who are also named as the universal heirs for the residue Of
the estate left undisposed in the will. The probate Of the will was contested on August 29, 1934 by
Teresa Garcia de Bartolome, one of the forced heirs instituted in the will. Upon the issue drawn by
the pleadings and after consideration of the evidence presented, Judge A. Horrilleno, of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, admitted the will to probate. The oppositor-appellant contend in this
appeal that the will was not executed in conformity with law; that the deceased Paulina Vazquez
Viuda de Garcia did not execute any last will and testament on June 12, 1934; and that the said
deceased on said date was ill and so weak that she could not have made a will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid?
RULING:
Yes. We find no reason for rejecting the testimony of the attesting witnesses in the present
case. No better witnesses could have been presented in support of the due execution of the will. In
the present case, two of the subscribing witnesses are lawyers. This fact, together with the
circumstance that they were not shown to have any interest in the subject of the litigation, led the
trial court to consider their testimony as worthy of credit. The intervention of professional men,
especially lawyers, in the preparation and execution Of wills, has been given by this court the
consideration deserved.
An attesting witness to a will may base an opinion Of the testator's mental capacity upon his
appearance at the time Of executing the will. The fact that the deceased actually signed her name
on the left margin of each and every page of the original and duplicate copy of the will — which she
was capable of doing no less than six times and in the most legible writing and without the aid of
any other person — is strongly indicative of her testamentary capacity. The only evidence offered
by the oppositor to show testamentary incapacity is the testimony of Luz Lopez who described the
physical condition of the deceased Paulina Vazquez Viuda de Garcia as follows: "Ella tenia la vista
turbia, no podia ver y la voz afonica, apenas si podia reconocerme." Even accepting this testimony it

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does not prove mental or physical incapacity Of the testatrix. "Neither senile debility, nor deafness,
nor blindness, nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient to establish the presumption that the person
suffering therefrom is not in the full enjoyment Of his mental faculties, when there is sufficient
evidence of his mental sanity at the time of the execution of the will."
88. MATIAS VS SALUD
G.R. NO. 1—10751, JUNE 23, 1958
FACTS:
Gabina Raquel executed her will. She affixed her thumb mark on the left margin Of each Of
the will's pages. She also allegedly attempted to sign the will. However due to difficulty in signing
the will because Of her illness, her lawyer instructed Lourdes Samonte to sign 'tGabina Raquel by
Lourdes Samonte" next to Gabina's thumb mark.
Basilia Salud contested the validity of the will. She contended that the will's attestation
clause did not State, inter alia, that Lourdes was specially directed by testatrix to sign, as required
under Article 805 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
WON Salud's contention is tenable?
RULING:
No. The law merely requires that the will be signed by the testator. This requitement was
satisfied by Gabina's thumb mark. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that that a
thumbprint is always a valid and sufficient signature for the purpose Of complying with the
requirement Of the article. Hence, the absence in the attestation clause Of the expression that
another person wrote the testatrix' name at her request is not a fatal defect.

89. GARCIA vs. LACUESTA

G.R. No. L-4067, November 29, 1951
FACTS:
Antero Mercado executed a will dated January 3, 1943. The will appears to have been signed
by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero Mercado, followed below by "A reugo del
testator" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross
immediately after his name. The Court of Appeals, reversing the judgement of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, ruled that the attestation clause failed to certify that after the signing Of
the name Of the testator by Atty. Javier at the former's request said testator has written a cross at
the end Of his name and on the left margin of the three pages Of which the will consists and at the
end thereof.
ISSUE:
WON attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused
Atty. Florentino Javier to the testator's name under his express direction, as required by section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
RULING
YES. The herein petitioner argues, however, that there is no need for such recital because
the cross written by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the signature of Atty.
Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner's theory is that the cross is as much a signature as a
thumbmark, the latter having been held sufficient by this Court in the cases of De Gala vs. Gonzales
and Ona, 53 Phil., 104; Dolar vs.Diancin, 55 Phil., 479; Payad vs. Tolentino, 62 Phil., 848; Neyra
vs.Neyra, 76 Phil, 296 and Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil., 429.

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 It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature Of Antero
Mercado or even one Of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, we are not
prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross
cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.

90. IN RE SIASON
G.R. NO. L-4132, MARCH 23, 1908
FACTS:
The First of Instance refused to probate on the ground that the instrument was not
subscribed by the witnesses in the presence of the testatrix and of each other as required by
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The testatrix was ill and confined to her house, the
execution of the will taking place in the sala where she lay upon a sofa. The witnesses differ as to
whether the testatrix from where she lay could read what was written at the table; and the first
witness, after signing, went away from the table. These two circumstances do not impair the
validity of the execution of the will. The witnesses being in the same apartment were all present
and the statute does not exact that either they are the testator shall read what has been written.
Had one of the witnesses left the room or placed himself so remotely therein as to be cut off from
actual participation in the proceedings, then the subscription might not have taken place in his
presence within the meaning of the law. A second objection is suggested on this appeal, that the
signature to the instrument is defective.
ISSUE:
W/N the will is valid?
RULING:
Yes. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows: Requisites of will. - No will,
except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real of personal, nor
charge or effect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and each of the
other. The attestation shall estate the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed
by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that they
attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of
such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed
and attested as in this section provided. The decision of the court below is reversed, without costs,
and that court is directed to admit the instrument before it to probate as the last will of the
testatrix.
91. PEDRO BARUT vs FAUSTINO CABACUNGAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-6285, February 15, 1912
FACTS:
Maria Salomon, deceased, left a will leaving a large part of her property to Pedro Barut,
herein petitioner. The testatrix is unable to read or write but the will was read to her by one of the
witnesses and signed for him by one Severo Agayan. The probate court did found that the will was
not entitled to probate upon the sole ground that the handwriting of the person who it is alleged
signed the name of the testatrix to the will for and on her behalf looked more like the handwriting
of one of the other witnesses to the will than that of the person whose handwriting it was alleged
to be. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the person who signs in behalf of the testator is also required to sign his
own name.

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RULING:
The Court ruled that it is immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix provided it is
written at her request and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the execution
of the will. With respect to the validity of the will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes
the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly appears that the
name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the presence of three witnesses and
that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the presence of each other. That is all the
statute requires.
92. NERA VS RIMANDO
G.R. NO. L-5971, FEBRUARY 27, 1911
Facts:
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the
instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the subscribing witnesses
was present in the small room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight
or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was
hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the
other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.
Issue:
WON the will is void for the failure of the subscribing witnesses to see each other sign?
Held:
No. In the case of Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, the Court held that, the true test of presence of the
testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other
sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so,
considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the
moment of inscription of each signature. And the decision merely laid down the doctrine that the
question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument
in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually
cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment
existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting
the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine
further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and
would defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the
requisites in the execution of a will.
93. JABONETA VS GUSTILLO
G.R. NO. 1641, JANUARY 19, 1906
FACTS:
The Probate proceeding denied the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased,
because the lower court was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio
Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena,
another of the witnesses, as required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. On December 26, 1901, while in the house of Jarandilla, Macario Jaboneta the testator
called Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the document as
his will. They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta signed the document. Jena
and Jalbuena, both signed afterwards as witnesses in the presence of the testator and the other
two witnesses. At that moment Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room. As he
was leaving the house Javellana took the pen in his hand and put himself in position to sign the will
as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the room

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the said Julio Javellana signed as a witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness
Jalbuena.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was signed in the presence of all the witnesses?
RULING:
Yes. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen
in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining
witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces
us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving,
and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being written, is of no
importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the purpose of
executing the testament, and were together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment
when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such
position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely casting
his eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so,
therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before he finally left the room.
We are of opinion from the evidence of record that the instrument propounded in these
proceedings was satisfactorily proven to be the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta,
deceased, and that it should therefore be admitted to probate.

94. NEYRA VS NEYRA

C.A. NO. 4, MARCH 21, 1946
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decree rendered by the Hon. Gervasio Diaz, Judge of the CFI of
Manila admitting to probate a will dated November 3, 1942, executed by the deceased Encarnacion
Neyra; at the same time denying the probate of a previous will dated September 14, 1939, alleged to
have been executed by the said testatrix. Trinidad Neyra, beneficiary in the will executed on
November 3, 1942, filed a petition in the CFI of Manila, for the probate of said will. Teodora, Pilar,
and Maria filed on opposition to the probate of the said will alleging (l) that at the time of the
alleged execution of the said will, the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra no longer possessed
testamentary capacity; (2) that her thumb marks on said instrument had been procured by means
of fraud by petitioner Trinidad Neyra, and that Encarnacion Neyra never intended to consider said
document as will; (3) that the alleged will, dated November 3, 1942, had not been executed in the
manner and form prescribed by law; and(4) that Encarnacion Neyra, since September 14, 1939, had
executed a will, naming as beneficiaries said oppositors and others, and that said will had never
been revoked or amended in any manner whatsoever. On December 26, 1942, petitioner Trinidad
Neyra filed a reply denying the allegations in the opposition. Subsequently, said oppositors filed a
counter petition, asking for the probate of the first will executed by Encarnacion Neyra, on
September 14, 1939.
ISSUE
Whether or not the will in question is void for the attesting witnesses were not present at
the time that the testatrix thumbed marked thereof?
RULING: No. It has been fully shown that the attesting witnesses were present at the time of the
signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was
lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other, at the time of the
signing of the will, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so;
and the attesting witnesses actually saw it in this case. And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix
on the will is equivalent to her signature.

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The oppositors as well as their principal witnesses are all interested parties, as said oppositors had
been named legatees in the will dated September 14, 1939, but eliminated from the will dated
November 3, 1942. On the other hand, the witnesses for the petitioner are all trustworthy men, who
had absolutely no interest in the final outcome of this case. Two of them are ministers of the
Gospel, while the three attesting witnesses are professional men of irreproachable character, who
had known and seen and talked to the testatrix.
95. IN RE SAGUINSIN
G.R. No. L-15025; March 15, 1920
TOPIC: Notarial Wills
FACTS:
An alleged will written by Remigia Saguinsin was presented in CFI Manila for allowance. It
consists of two folios, three of the pages having been written. However, the second page of the
first folio did not contain the signatures of the testatrix and the attesting witnesses. Due to this
condition, the validity of the will was impugned by the sister of the testratix.
ISSUE:
WON the will may be allowed?
RULING:
No. Act No. 2645 requires that signature which guarantee; the genuineness of the testament
shall be placed on the left hand margin of "each page." This requirement is entirely lacking on the
second page that is, on the reverse side of the first. This defect totally vitiates the testament. It is
not enough that the two folios have the signatures where three of the pages were written. Since
three pages were written, the three pages must bear the signatures of the testratix and witnesses
to guarantee its authenticity.
96. ASPE vs. PRIETO
G.R.No.L-17761. April 28, 1922.
FACTS:
The appellant prays for the reversal of the judgment appealed from, denying the probate of
the document which is said to be the last will and testament of Ventura Prieto, on the ground that
the attesting witnesses did not sign on the left margins of the five pages preceding that containing
the attestation.
ISSUE:
WON the omission of the attesting witnesses to sign with the testator at the left margin of
each page is a fatal defect which prevents the probate of the will.
RULING:
YES. From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of
the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2
of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin
of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect
that constitutes an obstacle to its probate. Without the necessity of discussing the other defect
relative to the paging of the sheets of the will in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, the judgment
appealed from must be, and is hereby, affirmed with the costs against the appellant.

97. NERI vs. AKUTIN

G.R. No.L-47799, May 21,1943
FACTS:

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 is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by universal title to
the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his
first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the
testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion of the inheritance,
particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which registration was
denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregite amount of money which the
respondents were indebted to their father.
ISSUE:
Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there
disinheritance in this case?
HELD:
Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground
that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, without
expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had
given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his second
marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the
institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.
98. ICASIANO vs. ICASIANO
G.R. NO. L-18979, JUNE 30, 1964
FACTS:
Petitioner Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the
alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for his appointment as executor thereof. Natividad
Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition; and petitioned to have herself appointed
as a special administrator, to which proponent objected. Hence, the court issued an order
appointing the Philippine Trust Company as special administrator. Likewise, Enrique Icasiano, a son
of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's opposition to the probate
of the alleged will.
The petitioner proponent commenced the introduction of his evidence; but on June l, 1959,
he filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the
decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was
submitting the signed duplicate which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959.
Subsequently, oppositors Natividad and Enrique filed their joint opposition to the admission of the
amended and supplemental petition but the court admitted said petition. After several hearings the
court admitted the will and its duplicate to probate. The oppositors appealed directly to this Court
on the ground that the same is contrary to law and the evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the missing signature of attorney Natividad on page three (3) of the original
invalidates the will in question?
RULING:
No. The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament,
due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to
justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that
the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the
coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by
testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to
penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she
had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its
component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the

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evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in
Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the
attestation clause".
99. CAGRO VS CAGRO
G.R. NO. L-5826, APRIL 29, 1953
FACTS:
This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Samar, admitting to probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan,
Pambujan, Samar, on February 14, 1949. The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that
the will is fatally defective, because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses
on the left-hand margin.
ISSUE
Whether the objection to the will is meritorious.
RULING:
Yes. The attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
will' required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their
signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since
the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. The petitioner
and appellee contend that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform
substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is
untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed
on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at
the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such a clause to a will on a
subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
100. Vda. De Ramos vs. CA
G.R. No. L-40804, January 31, 1978
FACTS:
Adelaida Nista who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a petition for the probate
of the alleged will and testament dated March 9, 1963 and codicil dated April 18, 1963 of the late
Eugenia Danila who died on May 21, 1966. The petitioner prayed that the alleged will and codicil be
probated and allowed and that she or any other person be appointed as administrator of the
testatrix's estate. Buenaventura and Marcelina both surnamed Guerra filed an opposition to the
petition alleging among others that they are the legally adopted son and daughter of the late
spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila; that the purported will and codicil subject of the
petition were procured through fraud and undue influence; that the formalities requited by law for
the execution of a will and codicil have not been complied with as the same were not properly
attested to or executed and not expressing the free will and deed of the purported testatrix; that
the late Eugenia Danila had already executed on November 5, 1951 her last will and testament which
was duly probated and not revoked or annulled during the lifetime of the testatrix, and that the
petitioner is not competent and qualified to act as administration of the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not the will and the codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities of
the law, considering the complicated circumstances that two of the attesting witnesses testified
against their due execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to the contrary?
Held:

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 Yes. There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince us that the will and codicil were
executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. It appears positively and convincingly
that the documents were prepared by a lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero the execution of the same was
evidently supervised by his associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the deeds were also
acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some intricacies
not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth
and authenticity. If there should be any stress on the participation of lawyers in the execution of a
will, other than an interested party, it cannot be less than the exercise of their primary duty as
members of the Bar to uphold the lofty purpose of the law. There is no showing that the above-
named lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently, the respondent court failed to
consider the presumption of ty in the execution of the questioned documents. There were no
incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion of anomaly. While the
opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove their
occurrence. There is no question that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic
signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the attestation claim
far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither is it disputed that
these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of each other and the
testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all the time
present during the execution.
LEYNES VS LEYNES
G.R. NO. L-46097, OCTOBER 18, 1939
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro denying probate of the will of the deceased
Valerio Leynez, on the ground that its attestation clause does not conform to the requirements
section 618, as amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The alleged defect in the attestation clause
of the controverted will is that it fails to state that the testator and the three witnesses signed each
and every page of the will in the manner prescribed by law, because it merely states "firmanos el
presente cada uno en presencia de los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testador Valerio
Leynez."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attestation clause in the will in question is legally sufficient?
RULING:
Yes. It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which would be
applicable to all cases. More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be
considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular
execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in
accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any
suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the
document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. This, in
our opinion, is the situation in the present case, and we, therefore, hold that the requirement that
the attestation clause, among other things, shall state "that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of three witnesses, and that the witnesses signed the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other," is sufficiently complied with, it appearing that the
testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will according to the stipulation of the
parties.; and this fact being shown in the will itself, and there being, furthermore, no question
raised as to the authenticity of the signature of the testator and the witnesses.
UY COQUE VS SIOCA G.R. No. 17430; May 31, 1922 TOPIC: Notarial Wills

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FACTS: Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645 provided the
following as requirements for validity of a will: (a) that the will must now be executed in a language
or dialect known to the testator; (b) that the testator and witnesses must sign each page on the left
margin; (c) that the pages be numbered correclatively; (d) that the attestation clause shall state the
number sheets or page used in the will and (e) that it must appear from the attestation clause itself
that the testator and witnesses signed in the form and manner required by law and that is this can
no longer be proven by evidence aliunde.
The will in question, however, contains an attestation clause which does not state the number of
pages contained in the will nor does it state that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other.
Neither do these facts appear in any other part of the will.
ISSUE: WON the will must be admitted to probate?
RULING: No. The two defects noted in the attestation clause of the alleged will renders it null and
void and that it cannot be admitted to probate. A will must be executed in accordance with the
statutory requirements, otherwise it is entirely void. All these requirements stand as of equal
importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No
power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispose with those
enumerated in the statutes.
GONZALES VS GONZALES
G.R. NO. L-3272-73, NOVEMBER 29, 1951
FACTS:
Testatrix Manuela died leaving five children, namely, Alejandro, Manuel, Leopoldo, Manolita, and
Juan. The estate left by her is estimated at P150,000.
Manuel Gonzales filed in the CFI of Rizal a petition for the probate of an alleged will executed by the
testatrix on Nov 16, 1942, devising to Manuel the greater portion of the estate, without impairing
the legitimes of the other children. Meanwhile, Manolita filed in the same court a petition for the
probate of another alleged will executed by the testatrix on May 5, 1945, leaving to Manolita the
greater bulk of the estate, without impairing the legitimes of the other children.
In his opposition filed, Juan and Alejandro sought the disallowance of the wills executed on
November 16, 1942, and May 5, 1945, on the ground that, assuming their validity, they had been
revoked by the testatrix in an instrument executed by her on November 18, 1948, with the result
that her estate should he distributed as if she died intestate. After a joint hearing, the CFI of Rizal
admitted for probate the will executed by the testratix on May 5, 1945.
ISSUE:
Whether or not testatrix lacked the testamentary capacity when she allegedly executed the
instrument of revocation of the will in question (May 5, 1945)?
RULING:
Yes. We have examined the record and found no valid reason for reversing the finding of said court
which had the benefit of observing and hearing the witnesses testify. Upon the other hand, the
following considerations amply support the appealed decision: For more than ten years prior to her
death, the testatrix had suffered from hypertension. On November 14, 1948, she had aphasia and on
November 15, 1948, she was taken to the hospital upon advice of the family physician, Dr. Jose C.
Leveriza. In the letter introducing her to the hospital authorities (Exhibit E Manuel Gonzales), Dr.
Leveriza stated that the testatrix was suffering from hypertension and cerebral thrombosis.
Particularly on November 18, 1948, when the alleged instrument of revocation was executed by her,
the testatrix was in a comatose and unconscious state and could not talk or understand.

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Estate of the deceased Gabina Lahitoria. ENRIQUE M. PASNO, petitioner-appellee, vs. FORTUNATA
RAVINA and PONCIANA RAVINA, oppositors-appellants. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, appellant.
FACTS:
G.R. No. L-31581, February 3, 1930
An appeal has been taken by the oppositors for the legalization of the will of Gabina Labitoria, and
concerns the validity of that will. It was an admitted fact that the will was executed on July 27, 1928,
although stating that it was executed on February 6, 1926, invalidates the will.
ISSUE:
WON the abovementioned admitted fact invalidates the will. RULING:
NO. Section 618, as amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes the requisites necessary to
the execution of a valid will. The law does not require that the will shall be dated. Accordingly, a will
without a date is valid. So likewise an erroneous date will not defeat a will. (Wright vs. Wright
[1854], 5 Ind., 389; Peace vs. Edwards [1915], 170 N. C., 64; Ann. Cas. 1918-A, 778; L. R. A. 1916- E, 501
note.
JAVELLANA VS LEDESMA G.R. NO. L-7179, JUNE 30, 1955
FACTS: The contestant, Da. Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of said deceased,
appealed from the decision admitting the testator's probate in court, insisting that the said were
not executed in conformity with law. Originally the opposition to the probate also charged that the
testatrix lacked testamentary capacity and that the dispositions were procured through undue
influence.
The contestant argues that the Court erred in refusing credence to her witnesses Maria Paderogao
and Vidal Allado, cook and driver, respectively, of the deceased Apolinaria Ledesma. Both testified
that they saw and heard Vicente Yap (one of the witnesses to the will) inform the deceased that he
had brought the "testamento" and urge her to go to attorney Tabiana's office to sign it; that Da.
Apolinaria manifested that she could not go, because she was not feeling well; and that upon Yap's
insistence that the will had to be signed in the attorney's office and not elsewhere, the deceased
took the paper and signed it in the presence of Yap alone, and returned it with the statement that
no one would question it because the property involved was exclusively hers.
Issue: Whether or not the probate of the will was valid?
Held: Yes. Our examination of the testimony on record discloses no grounds for reversing the trial
Court's rejection of the improbable story of the witnesses. It is contradicted by the testimony of the
witnesses, Yap, Atty. Tabiana, and his wife, who asserted under oath that the testament was
executed by testatrix and witnesses in the presence of each other, at the house of the decedent.
And it is highly unlikely, and contrary to usage, that either Tabiana or Yap should have insisted that
Da. Apolinaria, an infirm lady then over 80 years old, should leave her own house in order to
execute her will, when all three witnesses could have easily repaired thither for the purpose.
Moreover, the cross-examination has revealed fatal flaws in the testimony of Contestant's
witnesses. Paderogao was positive that Yap brought the will, and that the deceased alone signed it;
but she could remember no other date, nor give satisfactory explanation why that particular day
stuck in her mind. Worse still, Allado claimed to have heard what allegedly transpired between Yap
and Da. Apolinaria from the kitchen of the house, that was later proved to have been separated
from the deceased's quarters, and standing at a much lower level, so that conversations in the main
building could not be distinctly heard from the kitchen. Later, on redirect examination, Allado
sought to cure his testimony by claiming that he was upstairs in a room where the servants used to
eat when he heard Yap converse with his mistress;

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The most important variation noted by the contestants concerns that signing of the certificate of
acknowledgment appended to the Codicil in Visayan. Whether or not the notary signed the
certification of acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses, does not affect
the validity of the codicil. The new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the testator,
witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. The subsequent signing and sealing
by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by the participants
therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate
execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses cannot be said to violate the rule
that testaments should be completed without interruption and no reversible error was committed
by the Court in so holding.
BARRERA VS TAMPOCO
G.R. NO. L-5263, FEBRUARY 17, 1954
FACTS:
A petition was filed by Agustin Barrera in the CFI of Tarlac for the probate of the will executed by
Olivia Villapaña on July 17, 1948, and for the appointment of the petitioner as executor. According to
the petition the heirs instituted are nephews and nieces and grandchildren in the collateral line. The
alleged grandchildren of the testatrix in the direct line, Jose Tampoco and Victoriano Tampoco, filed
an opposition claiming that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with the law. That
the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity, that there was undue influence and pressure in its
execution, that the signature of Olivia Villapaña was obtained by fraud and trickery, and that the
testamentary provisions are illegal.
After protracted trial, a decision was rendered by the CFI of Tarlac disallowing the will. The will was
disallowed because it was not the personal last will and testament of the deceased, and it was not
based on the finding that Olivia Villapaña did not furnish the names of the persons instituted as
heirs and that the will was not read to her before she signed it. The second ground is premised on
the conclusion that attesting witness Laureano Antonio was not present when Olivia Villapaña and
attesting witness Honorio Lacson signed the will. From this decision the petitioner has appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the will was executed and attested in accordance with the law?
RULING:
Yes. In the holding that the will was not that of Oliva Villapaña, the trial court found that it was not
read to her; and this finding was premised on the alleged contradiction of Atty. Puno and Honorio
Lacson regarding the sequence of the reading of the will and the placing of the lines for signatures,
and regarding the question whether a copy or the original was handed to the testatrix. As we have
already observed, the discrepancy relates to an insignificant matter which cannot vitally detract
from the credibility of Atty. Puno to the effect that upon arrival at the house of Oliva Villapaña at
about noon, he read the will to her with a view to finding whether she was agreeable thereto. It is
not necessary that said will be read upon its signing and in the presence of the witnesses.
Lacson both attesting witnesses, categorically affirmed that this procedure was followed. At any
rate, even under the testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson, the signing could have taken
place at about or after two thirty, since the former declared that it took place between two and
three o'clock and Honorio Lacson stated that the time was two or two thirty, another point invoked
by the trial court against the probate of the will is the circumstance that, while Atty. Puno testified
that he placed the lines on which the testatrix and the witnesses were to sign before he read the
document to the testatrix whom he gave the original witness Lacson testify that Atty. Puno read
the original after giving a copy to the testatrix, and after reading Atty. Puno placed the lines for
signatures. The discrepancy again refers to a minor detail which is not sufficient to negative the

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truthfulness of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson on the main and important fact that the will was
signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses in the presence of each other.
As a closing observation, it is not for us to discover the motives of Oliva Villapaña in leaving her
properties to the person named in the will, and omitting therefrom the oppositors-appellees.
Suffice it to state that the trial court itself found the will to have been executed free from
falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, with Oliva having testamentary capacity; and in such
a situation it becomes our duty to give expression to her will.
Wherefore, the appealed order is reversed and the will executed by Oliva Villapaña on July 17, 1948,
is hereby allowed.
CORPUS VS YANGCO
G.R. No. L-22469, October 23, 1978 Topic: Notarial Wills
FACTS: Tomas Corpus and Ramona Arguelles had five children. After Tomas' death, Ramona
unionized with Luis Yangco with whom he had a son named Teodoro Yangco. Teodoro Yangco died,
and left a will which was probated.
Teodoro left no forced heirs. His relatives were: (1) Luis Yangco, his half brother; (2) Paz Yancgo, his
half sister, (3) his half brother's Pablo, children: Amalia, Jose, Ramon; (4) his half brother's Jose,
daughter Juanita, who also died and was succeeded by Tomas Corpus, Juanita's son. The legatees
submitted a project partition pursuant to the order of the probate court. Tomas Corpus, Juanita's
son, filed an action to recover his mother's share.
ISSUE: WON Tomas has the right to his mother's share?
RULING: No Juanita Corpus is not a legal heir to Yangoo's estate. Teodoro Yangco is an
acknowledged natural child of Luis Yangco. On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles
and Tomas Corpus, such as Juanita Corpus, are presumed legitimate: "That a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a
child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate
xxx"
Consequently, Juanita is not a legal heir of Yangco as there is no reciprocal succession between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives. Article 943 now found in article 992 of the Civil Code, provides
that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child".
110
Testate Estate of the deceased MARCELO DE CASTRO, ANGELITA DE CASTRO, ISABEL DE CASTRO,
and FELISA DE CASTRO, Petitioner-Appellants, v. EMILIO DE CASTRO, and ALVARO DE CASTRO,
oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-8996. October 31, 1956
FACTS:
Marcelo de Castro died on April 22, 1954, in his residence at 35 Espana Extension, Quezon City,
where he lived in company with all his brothers and sisters of half blood. Upon his death, Marcelo
did not leave any descendants or ascendants, his nearest surviving relatives being his brothers of
full- blood, the oppositors herein, and his sisters, the petitioners mentioned as heirs in the will and
other brothers of half blood.
On June 22, 1954, Emilio and Alvaro de Castro filed their opposition praying that the petition for
probate be denied and that the alleged last will be disallowed with costs against the petitioners.
They state, among other reasons that the alleged last will sought to be admitted to probate was not
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executed and attested as required by law. The trial court did not give much credence to the
witnesses for the petitioners in the belief that they had incurred in marked contradictions.
Subsequently, the trial judge also opined that the attestation clause does not conform with the
requirements of the law and that the evidence is against the recital of the same.
ISSUE:
WON the attestation clause does not conform with the requirements of the law.
RULING:
NO. We find nothing irregular, unusual or illegal in this attestation clause and the only defect that
could be pointed out, if that could be considered as a flaw, is that on the line intended for the date
of the execution of the will is written the sign "&", instead of "21st" which is the real date of the
execution thereof; but we take it that the notary public who proposed the will did not know the
date it was to be executed and Attorney Heraclio H. del Pilar, who notarized it, forgot to fill that the
space left in blank. This flaw, however, is of no importance because a few lines over the space and
at the end of the will over the thumbmark of the testator appears that it was executed on the 21st
day of April, 1953, in Quezon City, Philippines.
Also, the fact testified to by the witnesses for the petitioners that in stamping his thumbmark, the
testator was helped by Atty. del Pilar and Dr. Banuelos, is not in conflict with the recitation of the
attestation clause that "the will was executed by the testator by affixing voluntarily his thumbmark
(right) at the bottom of the Will appearing on this page four and on the left hand margin of each
and every page of said WILL including the pages on which the attestation clause and
acknowledgement are written."
CRUZ vs VILLASOR
G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973
FACTS:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu allowing
the probate of the last will a testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving
spouse of the said decease opposed the allowance of the will, alleging the will was executed
through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was
execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to
what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed
in accordance with law particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the first requiring at
least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the
testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public. Notwithstanding her
objection, the Court allowed the probate of the said last will and testament
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco
Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the same time the Notary
Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged.
ISSUE:
W/N the will was executed in accordance with the law?
HELD:
No. We are inclined to sustain that of the appellant that the last will and testament in question was
not executed in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before
himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow; to own as genuine, to
assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if

57 | P a g e
the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having
signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into
two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the
will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement. That function would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting
instrumental witnesses. For them he would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it
directly involves him and the validity of his own act. It would place him in inconsistent position and
the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and acknowledging
witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be
in contravention of the provisions of Article 80 be requiring at least three credible witnesses to act
as such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses
must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as has been
said, that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In the
circumstances, the law would not be duly in observed.
MOLO VS TANCHUCO
GR No. L-8774, November 26, 1956
FACTS:
Mariano Molo and Juana Juan adopted 2 children and treated them as their own daughters. When
Mariano died, he left all his estate to his wife. Juana, on the other hand, died later and left no forced
heirs. She allegedly executed a last will and testament leaving the bulk of her properties to her
foster children. The foster children, herein petitioners, presented the said will for probate and was
then opposed by the nephews and nieces of the deceased.
The oppositors contended that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with law.
ISSUE:
WON the will can be admitted for probate?
RULING:
Yes. We have carefully gone over the evidence of the record, and we are convinced that the great
preponderance thereof is in favor of the probate of the will. Not only this, but we realize that the
credibility of witnesses is very much involved in the determination of this case, the testimony of
those for the Petitioners being diametrically opposed to and utterly conflicting with that of the
witnesses for the Oppositors. His Honor, the trial judge had the opportunity and was in a position to
gauge said credibility and he evidently found the witnesses for the Petitioners more entitled to
credence, and their testimony more reasonable. We find no reason for disturbing said finding of the
probate court.
Yap vs. Kuan
G.R. No. 6845, September 1, 1914
FACTS: On the 23d day of August, 1909, Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua,
presented a petition, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong he admitted to probate. It
appears that the said Tomasa died on the 11th day of August, 1909. Accompanying said petition and
attached thereto was the alleged will of the deceased. It appears that the will was signed by the
deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Pacz.
On the 28th of February, 1910, Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu appeared and presented a petition,
alleging that they were interested in the matters of the said will and desired to intervene and asked
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that Gabriel La O be appointed a guardian ad litem, to represent them in the cause. Gabriel
accepted said appointment, and presented a motion in which he alleged, among others: That the
will dated the 11th day of August, 1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court on the 29th
day of September, 1909, was null, for the following reasons: (a) Because the same had not been
authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law prescribes. (b) Because at the time of the
execution of the will, the said Tomasa was not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due
to her sickness. (c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and illegal
influence upon the part of persons who were to receive a benefit from the same, and because the
said Tomasa had no intention of executing the same.
Issue: Whether or not the will was executed with all formalities required by law?
Held: Yes. The lower court found that no undue influence had been exercised over the mind of the
said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong. While it is true that some of the witnesses testified that the brother
of Tomasa, one Lorenzo, had attempted to unduly influence her mind in the execution of he will,
upon the other hand, there were several witnesses who testified that Lorenzo did not attempt, at
the time of the execution of the will, to influence her mind in any way. The lower court having had
an opportunity to see, to hear, and to note the witnesses during their examination reached the
conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence showed that no undue influence had been used.
We find no good reason in the record for reversing his conclusions upon that question.
With reference to another assignment of error to wit, that Tomasa was not of sound mind and
memory at the time of the execution of the will, we find the same conflict in the declarations of the
witnesses which we found with reference to the undue influence. Several witnesses testified that at
the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind and memory and
asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finally
signed it. The lower court found that there was a preponderance of evidence sustaining the
conclusion that Tomasa was of sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at
the time she signed this will. In view of the conflict in the testimony of the witnesses and the finding
of the lower court, we do not feel justified in reversing his conclusions upon that question.
TABOADA VS ROSAL
G.R. NO. L-36033, NOVEMBER 5, 1982
FACTS:
Apolonio Taboada filed a petition for probate of the will of the late Dorotea Perez which consists of
two pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or
bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental
witnesses. The second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is
signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand
margin by the testatrix. Since no opposition was filed after the petitioner's compliance with the
requirement of publication, the trial court commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the
petitioner's evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his evidence and presented Vicente
Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, who testified on its genuineness and due
execution. The trial court denied the probate of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in
its execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the notarial will is valid?
RULING:
Yes. Article 805 of the Civil Code uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in
witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those
things are, done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the
59 | P a g e
testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names
upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was executed
by the testator.
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this
case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification. The signatures
of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in
the attestation clause.
CANEDA VS CA
G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993 Topic: Notarial Wills; Substantial compliance rule.
FACTS: Mateo Caballero executed a will with following attestation clause:
"We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the
Opposite of our respective names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and
the testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE
PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in the letters on the
upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament and he has the same and every page
thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence of
the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us."
When the will was probated, herein petitioners appeared as oppositors and asserted that the will is
null and void as its attestation clause does not specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to
the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will
and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. This lack is in
contravention of the requirements of a valid notarial will under Article 805.
The respondent court ruled that there was substantial compliance of Article 805, and upheld the
validity of the will. It provided that under Article 809 of the Civil Code, defects and imperfections in
the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid?
RULING: No. The will does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily
result in the disallowance of the will.
Furthermore, the defect does not merely involve the form of the will or the language used therein
which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule. It involves the total
absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation
clause of a will.
The applicability of the substantial compliance rule under Article 809 must be limited to
disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself. But the total
number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other
must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings.
JOSE ANTONIO GABUCAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. JUDGE LUIS D. MANTA JOSEFA G. VDA.
DE YSALINA and NELDA G. ENCLONAR, respondents-appellees. G.R. No. L-51546 January 28, 1980
FACTS:
This case is about the dismissal of a petition for the probate of a notarial will on the ground that it
does not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp because according to respondent Judge, it was

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not admissible in evidence, citing section 238 of the Tax Code, now section 250 of the 1977 Tax
Code, which reads:
SEC. 238. Effect of failure to stamp taxable document. An instrument, document, or paper which is
required by law to be stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted, or transferred without
being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of transfer
of the same he admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall
have been affixed thereto and cancelled.
No notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths shall add his jurat or
acknowledgment to any document subject to documentary stamp tax unless the proper
documentary stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.
The probate court assumed that the notarial acknowledgment of the said will is subject to the
thirty- centavo documentary stamp tax fixed in section 225 of the Tax Code, now section 237 of the
1977 Tax Code.
ISSUE:
WON the dismissal was valid.
RULING:
NO. We hold that the lower court manifestly erred in declaring that, because no documentary
stamp was affixed to the will, there was "no will and testament to probate" and, consequently, the
alleged "action must of necessity be dismissed".
What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix the
requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the
taxable portion of that document.
That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the non-admissibility of the
document, which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp, subsists only "until the requisite
stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled."
Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is
presented in evidence (Del Castillo vs. Madrilena 49 Phil. 749). If the promissory note does not hear
a documentary stamp, the court should have allowed plaintiff's tender of a stamp to supply the
deficiency, that the lack of the documentary stamp on a document does not invalidate such
document.
Azuela vs CA
G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006
FACTS:
Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. However, this was opposed
by Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent.
According to her, the will was forged, and imbued with several fatal defects. Particularly, the issue
relevant in this subject is that the will was not properly acknowledged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not properly acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses as required by Article 806 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
Yes, the will is fatally defective. An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in
going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an

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extra step undertaken whereby the signore actually declares to the notary that the executor of a
document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual
language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her,
the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless
remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged," and
not merely subscribed and swom to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one
under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their
own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal
safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator.
CAPONONG-NOBLE v. ABADA G.R. No. 147145 (January 31, 2005)
FACTS:
Ahada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Toray died sometime in September 1943. Both died
without legitimate children. On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Ahaja ("Alipio") filed a petition for the
probate of the last will of Abada and another petition for the probate of the last will and testament
of Toray. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Ahaja
("Eulogio") and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio. Caponong opposed both petitions on
the ground that Abada and Toray left no will when they died in 1940 and in 1943 respectively.
Caponong further alleged that the will, if Ahada and Toray really executed it, should he disallowed
because it does not comply with the requirements provided by law.
ISSUE:
WON the will of Abada complied with the formal requisites as required by law.
RULING:
The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate the will of
Abada. Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the
number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule
on substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause
does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses
signed it. An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record
of the facts attending the execution of the will, hence it therefore should not be rejected where its
attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. We rule to apply the liberal construction in the
probate of Abada's will. Abada's will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other
persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the
number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for
presentation of evidence aliunde.
Garcia vs. Vasquez
G.R. No. L-26615, April 30, 1970
FACTS: Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried on 2 September 1965, leaving no descendents,
ascendants, brother or sister. At the time of her death, she was said to be 90 years old more or less,
and possessed of an estate consisting mostly of real properties. The records of the probate
establish the fact that the testatrix, Del Rosario, during her lifetime, executed two wills: one on 9
June 1956 consisting of 12 pages and written in Spanish, a language that she knew and spoke; and
another dated 29 December 1960, consisting of 1 page and written in Tagalog.
On 17 September 1965, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, a niece of the deceased, petitioned
the Court for probate of the alleged last will and testament of Del Rosario, executed on 29
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December 1960, and for her appointment as special administratrix of the latter's estate, said to be
valued at about P100,000.00, pending the appointment of a regular administrator thereof.
The Court issued an order admitting to probate the 1960 will of the deceased. Oppositors now
question the probate and the validity of the December 29, 1960 will, alleging the eyesight of Del
Rosario was so poor and defective that she could not have read the provisions of the will.
Issue: Whether or not the will was valid and the order of allowing the probate is correct?
Held: No. The foregoing testimony of the ophthalmologist who treated the deceased and,
therefore, has firsthand knowledge of the actual condition of her eyesight from, fully establish the
fact that notwithstanding the operation and removal of the cataract in her left eye and her being
fitted with aphakic lens (used by cataract patients), her vision remained mainly for viewing distant
objects and not for reading print. Thus, for all intents and purpose of the rules on probate, the
deceased Gliceria del Rosario was, as appellant oppositors contend, not unlike a blind testator, and
the due execution of her will would have required observance of the provisions of Article 808 of the
Civil Code. "ART. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the
subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged." In
connection with the will here in question, there is nothing in the records to show that the above
requisites have been complied with. Clearly, as already stated, the 1960 will sought to be probated
suffers from infirmity that affects its due execution.
ALVARADO VS GAVIOLA G.R. NO. 74695, SEPTEMBER 14, 1993
FACTS:
Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" which contained provisions that
disinherited the petitioner, his illegitimate son and expressly revoked a previously executed
holographic will. The execution of the notarial will was testified to by the three instrumental
witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent, Bayani Ma Rino, decedent's lawyer. The
testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer
who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the
three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. Thereafter, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng
Paghahago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni
Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for
the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and
revocatory clauses were unchanged. Likewise, the testator did not personally read the final draft of
the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence
of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public who followed the reading using their own
copies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reading of the will is in compliance with the reading provided by Article 808 of
the NCC in cases where the testator is blind?
RULING:
Yes. Private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his
three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator
affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then
did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so
allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and
communicated to the
testator.

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This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the
purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surounding the
execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are
never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict
compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the
will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and
which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will.
SUNTAY VS SUNTAY
G.R. NOs. L-3087 and L-3088, JULY 31, 1954

FACTS:
Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of Amoy,
Fookien China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookie,
China. He had children by the first marriage with the late Manuela namely, Apolonio, Concepcion,
Angel, Manuel. Federico. Ana. Aurora. Emiliano, and Jose. Jr. and a child named Silvino by the
second marriage with Maria Natividad who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in
the CFI.

However, on 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan for
the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the
Philippines in November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the
loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency
of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the facts established by the petitioner warrant the legalization and
allowance of the lost will?

RULING:
No. Although the petitioner has established the execution and validity of the lost will, yet he
has not proved clearly and distinctly the provisions of the will by the least two credible witnesses:
and that. assuming that the will of Jose B. Suntay executed in Amoy, China, was in accordance with
the law of the Republic of China, the certification of the Chinese Consul General in the Philippines as
the existence of such law is not admissible evidence in this jurisdiction. In effect the resolution on
the motion for reconsideration promulgated by the trial court, and the decision of the majority
herein, adopt the position that the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro as to the provisions of
the lost will, while credible and perhaps sufficient in extent, is not corroborated by the witnesses Go
To and Ana Suntay and, therefore, falls short of the requirement in section 6, Rule 77, of the Rules
of Court that the provisions of the lost will must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
witnesses.
GONZALES VS CA
G.R. No. L-37453; May 25, 1979

FACTS:
Isabella Gabriel allegedly executed a will. In the probate proceedings, petitioner opposed.
contending that the will was not duly executed nor attested since there was no proof that the
witnesses are credible witnesses. She argued that under Article 805, before an alleged last will and
testament may be admitted to probate, witnesses must be credible and to be a credible witness,
there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he
is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to her, this "credibility"
requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code is different from that provided in Articles 820 and
821 which pertains to a "competent" witness. Hence, witnesses must not only be competent but
also
credible witnesses
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ISSUE:
WON petitioner's contention is tenable?

RULING:
No. For a witness to be competent, he must comply qualifications under Article 820 of
the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821. But for a witness to be credible. it
is not necessary evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in
the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. Their
credibility need not be established first as it presumed until the contrary is proven. The court may
allow a witness to testify because he is competent, and thereafter determine a witness's credibility
depending on the court's belief and conclusion as to whether he is telling the truth in his testimony.
In re Will of Francisco Varela Calderon, deceased. FRANCISCO CARMELO VARELA, petitioner-
appellee, vs. MIGUEL VARELA CALDERON, ET AL., opponents-appellants
G.R. No. L-36342. October 8. 1932

FACTS:
The deceased, a physician by profession, was a Filipino citizen. He traveled abroad for his
health and temporarily resided in Hendaye-Plage, France. Not feeling very well, but in the full
enjoyment of his mental faculties, he decided to make his last will and testament on April 14, 1930,
in Paris, France, with the assistance of attorneys F. de Roussy de Sales, Gething C. Miller and Henri
Gadd. Sometime later, that is on July 15, 1930, he died in the Grand-Hotel de Leysin Sanatorium in
Switzerland.

On September 20, 1930, the herein petitioner-appellee, Francisco Carmelo Varela, filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, praying that said will be admitted to
probate. Said petition was opposed by the deceased's brother Jose Miguel, Angel, Jesus, Trinidad,
Paula, Pilar and Maria, surnamed Varela Calderon, although, later on, the first mentioned opponent
withdrew his opposition giving as his reason therefor that it was out of respect for the testator's
wishes because the will was executed in his own handwriting. One of the grounds of the opposition
is that they will be sought to be probated was not holographic in character and did not comply with
the requisites prescribed by article 970 of the French Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is holographic in character.
RULING:
YES. The original will be executed in the French language and had been written, dated and
signed by the testator with his own hand, with the exception of the attestation clause which
appears at the bottom of the document. This fact 1s proved by the testimony of the appellee and
his other witnesses. including the depositions and is admitted by the appellants.
The petition for the allowance and probate of said will is based on the provisions of article 970 of
the French Civil Code which considers as a holographic will that which is made or executed, dated
and signed by the testator in his own handwriting without the necessity of any other formality, and
on section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure in force in this jurisdiction which provides that a will
made out of the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws in force in the country in which it was
made and which may be allowed and admitted to probate therein, may, also be proved, allowed
and recorded in the Philippine Islands in the same manner and with the same effect as if executed in
the latter country. Both provisions of law literally copied from the (Article 970, French Civil Code)
A holographic will is not valid unless it is entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator.
No other formality is required. (Article 635, Code of Civil Procedure) Will made out of the Philippine
Islands. - A will made out of the Philippine Islands which might be proved and allowed by the laws of
the state or country in which it was made, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine
Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.
As we have already said, it is an admitted fact that the will was written, dated and signed by
the deceased testator, for which reason, there is no doubt that it had been made and executed in
accordance with article 970 of the French Civil Code were it not for the attestation clause which
appears at the bottom of the document.
DE JESUS VS DE JESUS, G.R. No. L 38338 January 28 1985
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FACTS:
This case involves a petition for certiorari to challenge the order of the court disallowing the
probate of a holographic will left by the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. The court initially allowed
the probate of the holographic will, but later reversed its decision, disallowing the will on the
grounds that the date on the will, which was written as "FEB./61," did not meet the strict
requirements of Article 810 of the Civil Code. Article 810 specifies that a holographic will should be
"entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself."
The petitioner argued that the date "FEB./61" on the holographic will substantially complied
with the law, even if it did not include the exact day, month, and year.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner’s contention is correct.
RULING:
The court accepted this argument and noted that the strict requirements should be
interpreted liberally when there is no evidence of fraud, bad faith, or undue influence and when the
authenticity of the will is established. Therefore, the court allowed the probate of the holographic
will under the principle of substantial compliance.
As a result, the court granted the petition, reversed the previous order disallowing the
probate of the holographic will, and reinstated the order allowing its probate.
ROXAS v. DE JESUS, JR.
G.R. NO. 38338, JANUARY 28, 1985

FACTS:
After the death of spouses Andres de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, a special proceeding
for the spouses intestate estate was filed by Simeon Roxas, the brother of Bibiana. Subsequently,
he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic will of the deceased
Bibiana. At the hearing for the holographic will's probate, the brother testified that after being
appointed administrator, he found a notebook of Bibiana which bore her will in the form of a letter
to her children. It was entirely written and signed in the handwriting of Bibiana and dated "Feb./61."
The brother's testimony was corroborated by Bibiana's two sons that the letter dated as such is the
holographic will of their deceased mother. Both sons recognized the handwriting of their mother
and positively identified her signature. They further testified that the language of the will (English)
was understood by their mother, and that the date was the said date when the will was executed
by their mother. Luz Roxas de Jesus, another compulsory heir, filed her opposition to the will
contending that alleged will was not dated as required by Article 810. She says that the day, month,
and year should be indicated.

ISSUE:
Whether the date "Feb/61" is in compliance with Article 810.

RULING:
YES. As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month and year
of its execution. However, when there is no appearance of bad faith, fraud, undue influence and
pressure and the authenticity of the will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date
"Feb./61" appearing on the will is a valid compliance with Article 810, probate of the will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
Labrador vs. CA
G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990

FACTS:
On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, Zambales, where he was
residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of Title
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No. P-1652, 9 children, all surnamed Labrador and a holographic will. Sagrado, Enrica and Cristobal
Labrador, filed in the court a petition for the probate of the alleged holographic will of the late
Melecio Labrador. Subsequently, Jesus and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition
on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging that
before Melecio's death, testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, conveying in favor of
oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916. Sagrado thereupon filed, against his brothers,
Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of
land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father Melecio under a
holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, the complaint for annulment, being premised on the
fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.

Issue:
Whether or not the holographic will of Melecio is dated?

Held:
Yes. The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated, although
the date is not in its usual place, is impressed with merit. The law does not specify a particular
location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in
the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the
subject will.
Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his
beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves and was not the date of execution of
the holographic will; Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of
the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly
put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio who plainly knew
that what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such
partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio was fully
aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the
testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate.
GAN VS YAP
G.R. NO. L-12190, AUGUST 30, 1958
FACTS:
Felicidad Yap died of heart failure in the UST Hospital. Fausto E. Gan, nephew of Felicidad,
initiated a proceedings in the Manila CFI instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic
will allegedly executed by the deceased. However, the will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried
to establish its contents and due execution by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra,
Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez. Ildefonso Yap, her surviving husband,
opposed the petition asserting that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament
during her lifetime. After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused to
probate the alleged will and a motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a holographic will may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who
have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?

RULING:
No. In the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only one man could
engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and
signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see and read
the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all
good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost - the forger may have
purposely destroyed it in an "accident" - the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the
error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the holographic will may

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consist of two or three pages, and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the
unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature
feasibility of forgery - would be added to the several oblections to this kind of wills listed by Castan,
Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and teachers of Civil
Law.
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses
would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will;
whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the
handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which cannot be tested in court, nor directly
contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
RODELAS VS ARANZA
G.R. No. L-58509; DECEMBER 7, 1982

FACTS:
Bonilla allegedly wrote a holographic will in 1962. When Bonilla died in 1976 or 14 years later,
Rodelas filed a petition to probate an alleged photographic or photostatic copy of Ricardo Bonilla's
holographic will. This was opposed by Aranza contending that the original copy of the holographic
will must be presented. Aranza further argued that holographic wills, unlike ordinary wills, cannot
be proven by secondary instruments.

ISSUE:
WON a lost holographic will may be proved by a copy thereof?
RULING:
Yes. If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said
will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the
testator and the handwritten will. However, if there is photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will, the same may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard
writings of the testator.
FEDERICO AZAOLA, Petitioner- Appellant, V. CESARIO SINGSON, Oppositor-Appellee.
G.R. No. L-14003. August 5, 1960.
FACTS:
On September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died. Thereafter, Francisco Azaola,
petitioner herein, applied for probate of the holographic will, whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was
made the sole heir as against the nephew of the deceased Cesario Singson.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in
the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented
by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting
of the testatrix."

ISSUE:
WON the denial was proper.
RULING:

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 NO. We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he
was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic
will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have
been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil
Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is
a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and
producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature
of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express)
"that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator."
Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present and the rule requiring production
of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the
Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should
be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and
the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to
call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those
produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The
duty of the court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much
interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
Codoy v. Calugay
G.R. No. 123486, August 12 1999
FACTS:
Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño da. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the
holographic will of the deceased. They claimed that the deceased was of sound and disposing mind
when she executed the will, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the
person of the testator, and will was written voluntarily.On the other hand, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy
and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic
will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every
disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not
forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly
done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of
the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will can be probated?
RULING:
No. Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one
witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such
witnesses shall be required.
It provides as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least
three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the
testator. lâwphil.nêThe word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a
statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion
and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory.

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 It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly
that they were familiar with the handwriting of testator.
We cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the
testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to
declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. holographic will. A
visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of
the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in
several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and a
letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the
strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We,
therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
KALAW v. RELOVA
G.R. NO L-40207, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984
FACTS:
Private respondent Gregorio Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of the will of her sister.
He claimed to be the sole heir. However, the will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw as the sole
heir.
Rosa opposed the probate of the will because the alteration, according to her was not
authenticated by the signature of the testator as required by the Article 814. Gregorio's motion for
reconsideration was denied and Rosa filed a petition for certiorari on the sole legal issue of whether
the original unaltered version of the will, instituting her as sole heir can be probated or not.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the entire will was invalidated because of the defective provision which had
been altered but not authenticated
RULING:
Yes, the entire will is invalidated. Although the general rule is that if there are insertions,
cancellations etc. which are not authenticated with the testator's signature. such should be
considered as not having been made and the remainder of the will stands valid. However, this
particular disputed will only contains one substantial provision. Therefore, the effect must be the
entire will is voided because nothing would remain in the will which could be considered valid since
there was only one substantial provision. To state that the will as first written should be given effect
is to disregard the change of mind of the testator. The institution of Gregorio as an heir is not valid
because it was not authenticated by the testator with his signature. Rosa, on the other hand,
cannot inherit because the cancellation of Rosa's name was an act of revocation. As such, she
cannot inherit. Revocation does not need the authentication of the testator.
DELA CERNA VS POTOT
G.R. NO. L-20234, DECEMBER 23, 1964
FACTS:
Spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament in the
local dialect and the same was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before the CFI
which, after due publication as required by law and there being no opposition, heard the evidence.

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and, by. y Order of October 31, 1939; in Special Proceedings No. 499, "declara legalizado el
document". Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca, another petition for the probate of the same will
insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed with the same CFI. The CFI ordered the petition nulland
void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will executed jointly by the spouses Bernabe and Gervasia is null and
void?
RULING:
Yes. The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null
and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil
Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines).
UNSON VS CALDERON
G.R. No. 17857 June 12, 1922
FACTS:
The case of Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella involves the probate of her last will and
testament, executed on July 19, 1918, in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna,
Philippines. The will was witnessed by three individuals and an inventory of her properties was
attached. The testatrix passed away on January 6, 1921, and her executor, Pedro Unson, sought to
have the will probated in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. However, opposition to the probate
was raised by Antonio Abella, Ignacia Abella, Avicencia Abella, and Santiago Vito. They argued that
the will lacked the necessary legal formalities.
ISSUE:
WON there is a valid will.
RULING:
The court affirmed the lower court's decision to probate the will, stating that substantial
justice had been served. Additionally, the court emphasized the importance of raising significant
issues in a timely manner, rather than for the first time on appeal, in the interest of promoting
efficiency and fairness in the legal process.
In summary, the court upheld the probate of Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella's will and
inventory, finding that the legal requirements had been substantially met and that certain minor
technicalities should not invalidate the document.
MACA,VS GATMAITAM, G.R. No. L-42619, March 11, 1937
FACTS:
This is a legal case where the plaintiff, acting as the executrix of the estate of the deceased
Leonarda Macam, sought to recover ownership of a house from the defendants, Juana Gatmaitan
and Magno S. Gatmaitan. The plaintiff appealed the court's decision that had absolved the
defendants.

In 1929, Leonarda Macam and Juana Gatmaitan jointly purchased a house for P3,000.
However, in 1932, they signed a document (Exhibit C) stating that the house belonged to Leonarda,
while the Buick automobile and most of the furniture belonged to Juana. They agreed that whoever
died first would leave their respective properties to the survivor, and this agreement would serve as
a transfer of rights, with no claims from heirs. Leonarda later passed away.
The plaintiff argued that Exhibit C amounted to a mortis causa donation (a gift to take effect
at death) in favor of Juana but was invalid due to not meeting legal will formalities. The lower court
considered it a transfer of ownership to Juana.

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ISSUE:
WON there is a valid contract.
RULING:
The higher court determined that Exhibit C was an aleatory contract, where both parties
bound themselves to give or do something based on the uncertain event of either one's death. This
contract was valid, and since Leonarda passed away first, Juana acquired the house's ownership,
just as Leonarda would have acquired the automobile and furniture if Juana had died first. The court
affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that Juana had indeed acquired the house's
ownership.
MALOTO VS CA, G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
FACTS:
The case involves the contested last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. After Adriana's
death, her heirs initiated an intestate proceeding to settle her estate, believing that she had not left
a will. In the course of this proceeding, the parties executed an extrajudicial settlement agreement
dividing the estate equally among themselves, and the court approved it. Later, a purported last will
and testament of Adriana, dated January 3, 1940, was discovered.
A few years later, certain heirs, who had received lesser shares under the extrajudicial
settlement than what they were bequeathed in the discovered will, sought to have the will
recognized. They filed a motion for the allowance of the will and the annulment of the previous
proceedings.
ISSUE:
WON the discovered will was effectively revoked.
RULING:
The court cited Civil Code Article 830, stating that a will can be revoked by the testator or
another person under the testator's direction, with the intention to revoke, through physical acts
such as burning, tearing, or canceling the will.
The court found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the will had been
effectively revoked, as the discovered document was not proven to be Adriana's will, and the
destruction was not done under her express direction and in her presence. The court also held that
the intestate proceeding's decision could not be construed as a final judgment on the merits
regarding the probate of the will.
As a result, the court allowed the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto and ordered its
probate, reversing the Court of Appeals' decision. The case emphasizes the need for clear and direct
evidence to establish the revocation of a will and differentiates between an intestate proceeding
and an action for probate, with the latter being the proper forum to determine the will's validity.
DAVID VS. SISON, G.R. No. 49108, March 28, 1946
FACTS:
This is an appeal case concerning attorney's fees in the estate of Margarita David. The
petitioner sought to be compensated for services rendered to the estate between March 1941 and
March 1943. Initially, the petitioner requested a fee of 5% of the original inventoried estate, which
amounted to around P72,779.10. However, in a subsequent brief, the petitioner argued that the 5%
fee should be calculated not only on the inventoried estate but also on the income generated
during the two and a half years, totaling P1,627,507.24, which would result in a fee of approximately
P81,375.36. On the other hand, the opposing party considered P3,000 to be a reasonable fee but
expressed flexibility, provided it didn't burden one of the heiresses or affect her properties.
ISSUE:
WON the donation by Margarita David was inter vivos or mortis causa.
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RULING:
The court concluded that it was mortis causa because the properties' essential elements of
ownership remained with Margarita David during her lifetime, transferring to the donees only after
her death.
In summary, the court found the donation to be mortis causa, excluded the donated
properties from the estate inventory, held one heiress responsible for attorney's fees, and
determined a reasonable fee for the petitioner based on the services provided and the specific case
circumstances.
BUSTAMANTE VS. AREVALO, G.R. No. L-48813 August 2, 1942

FACTS:
This is an original petition for mandamus with a preliminary injunction to compel a
respondent judge to approve the record on appeal filed by the petitioner in several special
proceedings. The respondent judge had disallowed the record on appeal, stating that it was filed
out of time.
The petitioner, acting as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Bernabe
Bustamante and as a special administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Rufina Arevalo de
Bustamante, sought to appeal orders authorizing the sale of certain property of the deceased
spouses. The petitioner received notice of the last order on November 12, 1941. After various legal
proceedings, the petitioner filed the notice of appeal on December 27, 1941, and the record on
appeal on March 16, 1942.
The court noted that the petitioner should have perfected the appeal by January 19, 1942, as
per the reglementary period for appeals. The petitioner attributed his delay to the unforeseen
event of World War II. However, the court found that the petitioner did not exercise reasonable
diligence under the circumstances. The Clerk of Court's office had reopened on January 23, 1942,
and the judges had resumed their functions on February 24, 1942.
ISSUE:
WON there is gross abuse of discretion.
RULING:
The court held that the respondent judge's disapproval of the record on appeal was not a
manifest and gross abuse of discretion. It stated that the petitioner should have promptly acted to
file the record on appeal after the justifying circumstance (the war) ceased.
As a result, the petition for mandamus was denied, and the preliminary injunction was
dissolved. The court's decision was in line with the idea that force majeure should not be used to
excuse noncompliance with legal requirements when due diligence could have been exercised to
rectify the situation as soon as the justifying circumstance ended.
SAMSON VS. NAVAL, G.R. No. L-11823 February 11, 1918
FACTS:
In this case, attorney Perfecto Gabriel presented a document as the last will and testament
of Simeona F. Naval, who had passed away in Manila on February 13, 1915. The document appointed
Gabriel as the executor. The court, after hearing the petition for allowance, denied it on the
grounds that the document was not properly executed as a last will and testament, as it didn't meet
the legal requirements of being signed in the presence of three witnesses and having those
witnesses sign it in each other's presence.
Following this denial, the nieces and legatees of Simeona F. Naval filed another document
executed by her on October 31, 1914, seeking its allowance as her will. The court registered this as a
separate case, and the petition for its allowance was opposed by Monica Naval, Rosa Naval, and

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Cristina Naval. They argued that the first will had been revoked by a subsequent one executed
during the deceased's lifetime and that the second will didn't meet the legal formalities required by
law.
After a trial, the court issued an order allowing the second will, dated October 31, 1914, as the
last will and testament of Simeona F. Naval. The opponents appealed this decision and raised
several points of error.
ISSUE:
WON the court will allow the second will of October 31, 1914.
RULING:
The court's decision stated that for a will to be revoked by another document, the
subsequent document must comply with the legal requirements for a will. In this case, the court
had already denied the allowance of the first will due to its lack of proper execution, rendering the
revocatory clause within it ineffective. The court also noted that allowing the prior will when a later
one had been disallowed did not constitute a contradiction, as the determination of whether a will
is executed properly is within the court's purview.
The court affirmed the order allowing the second will of October 31, 1914, as the last will and
testament of Simeona F. Naval, and upheld the lower court's decision.

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