REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3613 OF 2022

(Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 21948 of 2019)

MUZAFFAR HUSAIN …. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

AND ANR. .... RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.

1. The challenge in the instant appeal is to the Order dated

17.04.2019 passed by the High Court of judicature at Allahabad,

Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Writ Petition being no. 496 of 2017

filed by the appellant challenging the order of punishment issued

by the respondent-State pursuant to the decision of the Full Court

of the High Court taken on the report of the Enquiry Officer in

Signature Not Verified respect of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the
Digitally signed by
BABITA PANDEY
Date: 2023.02.18
13:47:19 IST
Reason: appellant for the alleged misconduct committed by him as a

judicial officer.
1
2. Factual Matrix:

i. The appellant had joined the Uttar Pradesh Judicial

Services in the year 1978 and sought voluntary retirement

from the said services in September 2003. Immediately

after the retirement, appellant joined as a Judicial Member,

Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Mumbai.

On 19.07.2005, the appellant was informed vide the letter

dated 19.07.2005 of the O.S.D (Enquiry), Allahabad High

Court, addressed to the Principal Registrar, CAT, New

Delhi that the High Court had initiated a departmental

enquiry, being no. 26 of 2005 against him. A copy of

chargesheet was enclosed therewith. There were twelve

charges levelled against the appellant in the said

chargesheet. It was alleged against the petition inter alia

that the appellant, while posted as the 11th Additional

District Judge, Agra during the period from 23.05.2001 to

19.05.2003, had decided a batch of matters under the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 and had awarded enhanced

compensation which was multiple times more than the

investments made by the subsequent purchasers of the

acquired lands; that such subsequent purchasers had no

right to claim compensation for the acquired lands; that the

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 appellant had determined the compensation in terms of

square yards and not in terms of bighas, and had awarded

such compensation in flagrant violation of the cardinal

principles of law and equity and against all judicial norms

and propriety, with a view to unduly favour such

subsequent purchasers. It was therefore alleged that the

appellant had failed to maintain absolute integrity and

complete devotion to duty, and thereby had committed a

misconduct within the meaning of Rule-3 of U.P. Govt.

Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. The charge no. 12 levelled

against the appellant pertained to an undue favour shown to

the son of a Counsel named Shri KC Jain, by exorbitantly

enhancing the compensation in his favour.

ii. The appellant vide the letters dated 07.09.2005 and

19.09.2005 denied all the charges levelled against him. On

20.01.2006, the appellant received the written submissions

submitted on behalf of the department in the departmental

enquiry initiated against him and the appellant also

submitted his written submissions on 10.02.2006 in the said

enquiry.

iii. The Enquiry Officer vide his Enquiry report dated

05.04.2006 held charges no. 1 to 11 as “Proved” and charge

3
 no. 12 as “Not Proved”. The Enquiry Officer submitted the

said report to the Chief Justice/Administrative

Committee/Full Court for further consideration on the

question of quantum of punishment. The appellant was

called upon and he filed his response on 14.06.2006 to the

said Enquiry report. The High Court of Judicature at

Allahabad in its Full Court Meeting held that 02.09.2006

accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and resolved to

punish the appellant with curtailment of 90% of his

pensionary benefits with immediate effect. Pursuant to the

said recommendation made by the Full Court of the High

Court, the respondent-State passed an order dated

22.01.2007, sanctioning withholding of 90% from the

pension of the appellant in view of the provisions contained

in Article 351(A) of the Civil Services Regulations.

iv. The aggrieved appellant challenged the legality of the said

order dated 22.01.2007 by filing a writ before the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench,

Lucknow. The Division Bench of the High Court vide the

impugned order dated 17.04.2019 found that the

punishment order in reference to the charge nos. 1 to 3 was

not sustainable in the eye of law as the respondents could

4
 not have framed the charges for the incidences which have

taken place 4 years prior to the chargesheet. However, the

High Court held that there was no ground to interfere with

the findings recorded in reference to the charge nos. 4 to

11. The High Court considering the overall circumstances

reduced the curtailment of pensionary benefits to the extent

of 70% in place of 90%. The present appeal is directed

against the said order passed by the High Court.

3. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pradeep Kant for the appellant

raised following contentions:

i. The Enquiry against the appellant was initiated on the basis

of the directions issued by the High Court in Agra

Development Authority, Agra Vs. State of UP and Ors.1,

though there was no complaint pending against the

appellant.
ii. A mere perusal of the charges levelled against the appellant

in the chargesheet on the face of it revealed that the

charges did not make out even a prima facie case of

misconduct and that they were neither factually nor legally

substantiable.
iii. The right to seek compensation is a property right and not

mere a right to sue, and the same could be legally

1 2004 SCC Online All 269

5
 transferred from one person to another as held by the

Supreme Court and High Court in catena of decisions. In

this regard, he has relied upon Union of India & Ors. Vs.

Iqbal Singh2; Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs.

Assistant Controller of Estate Duty3, Food Corporation

of India Vs. Kailash Chand4 and Soran Singh Vs.

Collector & Ors.5.

iv. The compensation was awarded by the appellant on the

market value of the land on the date of issuance of

notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition

Act. It had no relevance to the price offered or investments

made by the subsequent purchasers in respect of the

acquired lands. In this regard, Mr. Pradeep Kant relied

upon UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow Vs. Kalra Properties (P)

Ltd., Lucknow & Ors.6; Meera Sahni Vs. Lt. Governor

Delhi7 etc.

v. Many cases, in which the enhanced compensation was

awarded by the appellant were upheld by the High Court,

and in some cases by the Supreme Court and therefore it

2 (1976) 1 SCC 570

3 (1980) 2 SCC 1
4 2014 (1) ADJ 379 (DB)
5 2018 SCC Online All 5936
6 (1996) 3 SCC 124
7 (2008) 9 SCC 177

6
 could not be said that the appellant was actuated by

extraneous consideration as alleged.

vi. There was no specific charge against the appellant that he

had taken bribe or shown any undue favour to any person

or group of persons. Hence, merely because an enhanced

compensation was awarded, no inference of extraneous

consideration could be drawn. Mere suspicion was not

sufficient to prove that the appellant had acted because of

extraneous consideration. In this regard, Mr. Pradeep Kant

has relied upon the decisions in the case of Krishna

Prasad Verma (Dead) Thr Legal Representatives Vs.

State of Bihar & Ors.8, in case of Sadhna Chaudhary Vs.

State of Uttar Pradesh9, and the latest decision of Supreme

Court in case of Abhay Jain Vs. High Court of Judicature

of Rajasthan & Anr.10.

vii. The appellant being not held guilty of any grave

misconduct or having caused any loss, he could not have

been awarded punishment for ‘grave misconduct’.

4. Ms. Charu Ambwani, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.

2 raised the following contentions:

8 (2019) 10 SCC 640

9 (2020) 11 SCC 760
10 (2022) SCC Online SC 319

7
 (i) The High Court has full control over its judicial officers in

the matter of disciplinary proceedings. In the instant case,

after holding a regular disciplinary inquiry and after

following the due procedure of law, the Inquiry Officer had

submitted his report before the High Court. The same was

placed before the Full Court and collective consciousness

of the High Court was shaken, considering the manner in

which the appellant had misconducted himself while

working as a judicial officer.

(ii) The scope of judicial review is very limited. As per the

settled legal position, the Courts cannot sit in appeal over

the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and

substitute its own findings, unless any perversity or patent

illegality or irrationality in the process was found. The

judicial review is permissible not against the decision but

against the decision-making process only. In this regard,

she has relied upon the decision of this Court in Sarvepalli

Ramaiah (D) Tr. Lrs Vs District Collector Chittoor11 .

(iii) The appellant was given full and fair opportunity during

the enquiry proceedings conducted against him and the

decision was taken by the full Court of the High Court

11 (2019) 4 SCC 500

8
 after considering the entire material on record. The

punishment imposed was also proportionate to the guilt of

the appellant.

(iv) Taking the Court to the evidence recorded by the Enquiry

Officer, she submitted that the appellant had enhanced the

compensation manifolds in order to extend undue favour to

the subsequent purchasers, who had no right to receive the

compensation. She also submitted that the claimants who

were the subsequent purchasers, had made a very meagre

investments and purchased the right to receive

compensation and right to sue in place of the original

owners, which was totally prohibited under Section 6(e) of

the Transfer of Property Act read with the provisions

contained in the Land Acquisition Act.

(v) Lastly, she drew our attention to the observations made by

this Court in case of Union of India vs. K.K. Dhawan 12 in

which it has been held that the judicial officer, if acts

negligently or recklessly or attempts to confer undue

favour on a person or takes a decision which is actuated by

corrupt motive, then he is not acting as a judge. Strict rules

of evidence do not apply to the departmental inquiry.

12 (1993) 2 SCC 56

9
 5. At the outset, it may be noted that maintenance of high standard

of conduct and character of the judicial officers has always been a

matter of great concern for this court. In C. Ravichandran Iyer

Vs. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee & Ors.13, this court emphasizing

the need to maintain high standard of integrity, honesty and moral

vigour by the judges, observed: -

“Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society

is, therefore, entitled to except that a Judge must be
a man of high integrity, honesty and required to
have moral vigour, ethical firmness and impervious
to corrupt or venial influences. He is required to
keep most exacting standards of propriety in judicial
conduct. Any conduct which tends to undermine
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the court would be deleterious to the efficacy of
judicial process. Society, therefore, expects higher
standards of conduct and rectitude from a Judge.
Unwritten code of conduct is writ large for judicial
officers to emulate and imbibe high moral or ethical
standards expected of a higher judicial functionary,
as wholesome standard of conduct which would
generate public confidence, accord dignity to the
judicial office and enhance public image, not only of
the Judge but the court itself. It is, therefore, a basic
requirement that a Judge's official and personal
conduct be free from impropriety; the same must be
in tune with the highest standard of propriety and
probity. The standard of conduct is higher than
expected of a layman and also higher than expected
of an advocate. In fact, even his private life must
adhere to high standards of probity and propriety,
higher than those deemed acceptable for others.
Therefore, the Judge can ill-afford to seek shelter
from the fallen standard in the society.”

13 (1995) 5 SCC 457

10
 6. In Sadhna Chaudhary Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 14, this court

reiterated that the judicial officers must aspire and adhere to a

higher standard of honesty, integrity and probity.

“19. It has amply been reiterated by this Court that

the judicial officers must aspire and adhere to a
higher standard of honesty, integrity and probity.
Very recently in Shrirang Yadavrao
Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra [Shrirang
Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra, (2019)
9 SCC 144 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 582] , a Division
Bench of this Court very succinctly collated these
principles and reiterated that: (SCC pp. 146-47,
paras 5-10)
‘5. The first and foremost quality required in a
Judge is integrity. The need of integrity in the
judiciary is much higher than in other institutions.
The judiciary is an institution whose foundations are
based on honesty and integrity. It is, therefore,
necessary that judicial officers should possess the
sterling quality of integrity. This Court in Tarak
Singh v. Jyoti Basu [Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu,
(2005) 1 SCC 201] held as follows: (SCC p. 203)
‘Integrity is the hallmark of judicial discipline,
apart from others. It is high time the judiciary took
utmost care to see that the temple of justice does not
crack from inside, which will lead to a catastrophe
in the justice-delivery system resulting in the failure
of public confidence in the system. It must be
remembered that woodpeckers inside pose a larger
threat than the storm outside.’
6. The behaviour of a Judge has to be of an exacting
standard, both inside and outside the court. This
Court in Daya Shankar v. High Court of
Allahabad [Daya Shankar v. High Court of
Allahabad, (1987) 3 SCC 1 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 132]
held thus: (SCC pp. 4-5, para 11)
‘11. … Judicial officers cannot have two
standards, one in the court and another outside the

14 (2020) 11 SCC 760

11
court. They must have only one standard of
rectitude, honesty and integrity. They cannot act
even remotely unworthy of the office they occupy.’
7. Judges are also public servants. A Judge should
always remember that he is there to serve the public.
A Judge is judged not only by his quality of
judgments but also by the quality and purity of his
character. Impeccable integrity should be reflected
both in public and personal life of a Judge. One who
stands in judgments over others should be
incorruptible. That is the high standard which is
expected of Judges.
8. Judges must remember that they are not merely
employees but hold high public office. In R.C.
Chandel v. High Court of M.P. [R.C.
Chandel v. High Court of M.P., (2012) 8 SCC 58 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 343 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 782 :
(2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 469] , this Court held that the
standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much
higher than that of an ordinary person. The
following observations of this Court are relevant:
(SCC p. 70, para 29)
‘29. Judicial service is not an ordinary
government service and the Judges are not
employees as such. Judges hold the public office;
their function is one of the essential functions of the
State. In discharge of their functions and duties, the
Judges represent the State. The office that a Judge
holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be a
person of impeccable integrity and unimpeachable
independence. He must be honest to the core with
high moral values. When a litigant enters the
courtroom, he must feel secured that the Judge
before whom his matter has come, would deliver
justice impartially and uninfluenced by any
consideration. The standard of conduct expected of
a Judge is much higher than an ordinary man. This
is no excuse that since the standards in the society
have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from the
society cannot be expected to have high standards
and ethical firmness required of a Judge. A Judge,
like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. The

12
 credibility of the judicial system is dependent upon
the Judges who man it. For a democracy to thrive
and the rule of law to survive, justice system and the
judicial process have to be strong and every Judge
must discharge his judicial functions with integrity,
impartiality and intellectual honesty.’
9. There can be no manner of doubt that a Judge
must decide the case only on the basis of the facts on
record and the law applicable to the case. If a Judge
decides a case for any extraneous reasons then he is
not performing his duty in accordance with law.
10. In our view the word “gratification” does not
only mean monetary gratification. Gratification can
be of various types. It can be gratification of money,
gratification of power, gratification of lust etc., etc.”

7. It may further be noted that when a disciplinary action can be taken

against the officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers, has

also been succinctly laid down by this court in case of Union of

India Vs. K.K. Dhawan (supra): -

“28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises

judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or
recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a
person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the
contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is
important to bear in mind that in the present case,
we are not concerned with the correctness or
legality of the decision of the respondent but the
conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties
as an officer. The legality of the orders with
reference to the nine assessments may be questioned
in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no
doubt in our mind that the Government is not
precluded from taking the disciplinary action for
violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude
that the disciplinary action can be taken in the
following cases:

13
 (i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would
reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith
or devotion to duty;

(ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness

or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;

(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of

a government servant;

(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the

prescribed conditions which are essential for the
exercise of the statutory powers;

(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;

(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however

small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long
ago “though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is
great.”

8. It is trite to say that the power of judicial review conferred on the

constitutional Court is not that of an appellate authority but is

confined only to the decision-making process. Interference with the

decision of departmental authorities is permissible only if the

proceedings were conducted in violation of the principles of natural

justice or in contravention of statutory regulations regulating such

proceedings or if the decision on the face of it is found to be

arbitrary or capricious. The Courts would and should not act as an

appellate Court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic

enquiry, nor should interfere on the ground that another view is

14
 possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and

properly conducted, and the findings are based on evidence, the

adequacy of the evidence or reliability of evidence would not be a

ground to interfere with the findings recorded in the departmental

enquiries.

9. In the High Court Of Judicature At Bombay Vs. Shashikant S.

Patil And Anr.15, this Court held :-

“The Division Bench of the High Court seems to

have approached the case as though it was an
appeal against the order of the administrative/
disciplinary authority of the High Court.
Interference with the decision of departmental
authorities can be permitted, while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if
such authority had held proceedings in violation of
the principles of natural justice or in violation of
statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such
inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated
by considerations extraneous to the evidence and
merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the
authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary
or capricious that no reasonable person could have
arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very
similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that
the departmental authority (in this case the
Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the
sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry has been
properly conducted. The settled legal position is that
if there is some legal evidence on which the findings
can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of
that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before
the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article
226 of the Constitution.”

15 (2000) 1 SCC 416

15
 10. Again, in the State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand

Nalwaya16, it was observed in para 7 as under:

“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act
as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led
in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground
that another view is possible on the material on
record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly
held and the findings are based on evidence, the
question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable
nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with
findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries,
except where such findings are based on no evidence
or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find
out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting
reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or
finding, on the material on record. Courts will
however interfere with the findings in disciplinary
matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory
regulations have been violated or if the order is
found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based
on extraneous considerations.”

11. Reverting to the facts of the case, it may be noted that there was a

regular disciplinary proceedings conducted against the appellant

after serving him the chargesheet and giving him full opportunity of

hearing. Thereafter, pursuant to the enquiry report submitted by the

Enquiry Officer, Full Court of the High Court had resolved on

02.09.2006 to accept the said enquiry report and punish the

appellant with curtailment of 90% of pensionary benefit with

immediate effect. The order of punishment passed by the

16 (2011) 4 SCC 584

16
 respondent-State on the basis of the said recommendation made by

the full court of the High Court, was challenged by the appellant by

filing a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court dropped the

charge nos. 1 to 3 and upheld the charge nos. 4 to 11 against the

appellant, and reduced the punishment to the curtailment of 70% in

place of 90% of his pensionary benefits.

12. Pertinently, the appellant had not made any allegation with regard to

violation of principles of natural justice or contravention of any

statutory rules or regulations having occasioned during the course of

enquiry proceedings or in the decision-making process. Therefore,

in absence of any such allegations, the subjective satisfaction

arrived at by the High Court on the administrative side, and the

impugned order passed by the High Court on the judicial side did

not warrant any interference of this court. When the Enquiry

proceedings have been found to have been conducted in proper and

legal manner, and when the High Court on administrative side as

well as on judicial side, has accepted the findings recorded by the

Enquiry Officer qua the charge nos. 4 to 11 levelled against the

appellant as “proved”, holding him guilty of having committed

“misconduct”, this court was not expected to sit as an appellate

authority and revaluate the adequacy or reliability of the evidence

adduced before the Enquiry Officer. Nonetheless, this court just for
17
 the sake of satisfying its conscience, had permitted the learned

Senior Advocate Mr. Pradeep Kant to argue on the merits of the

charges levelled against the appellant.

13. The bone of contention raised by the learned Senior Advocate Mr.

Kant was that the charges levelled against the appellant were not

sustainable factually or legally in as much as the appellant had

decided the land reference cases as per the law prevailing at the

relevant time. According to him as held in Union of India & Ors.

Vs. Iqbal Singh (supra), Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs.

Assistant Controller of Estate Duty (supra), Soran Singh Vs.

Collector & Ors (supra), the right to seek compensation is a

property right and the same could be transferred. In the opinion of

this court, the said decisions have been rendered considering the

facts of each case, and have hardly any relevance to the facts of the

cases decided by the appellant under the Land Acquisition Act. In

case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Iqbal Singh (supra), this court

was examining the right of the claimant as a legatee under the will

executed by a displaced person under the Displaced Persons

(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. In case of

Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant Controller of Estate

Duty (supra), the question of legality and validity of the notices

issued by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Hyderabad in

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 respect of the compensation received by the legal heirs and

representatives of the deceased owner of the acquired land was

under consideration. So far as the charges levelled against the

appellant were concerned, it was alleged that the appellant had

awarded enhanced compensation at an exorbitantly higher rate in

favour of the subsequent purchasers/investors, who had no right to

receive any compensation, more particularly when Section 6(e) of

the Transfer of Property Act specifically prohibited the transfer of

mere right to sue. The said cases were found to have been decided

by the appellant in flagrant violation of the cardinal principles of

law and equity, and against all judicial norms and propriety, with a

view to unduly favour such subsequent purchasers who had no legal

right to receive the compensation.

14. Much reliance was placed by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Kant

for the appellant on the decision of this court in case of Krishna

Prasad Verma Vs. State of Bihar (supra), Sadhna Chaudhary Vs.

State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) and Abhay Jain Vs. High Court of

Judicature of Rajasthan & Anr (supra) to buttress his submission

that mere suspicion cannot constitute misconduct, and that any

probability of misconduct needs to be supported with oral or

documentary material. He also submitted that the disciplinary

proceedings could not be initiated against the judicial officers

19
 merely because the judgment or orders passed by them were wrong.

We completely agree with the submissions made by the learned

Senior Counsel for the appellant and with the ratio of judgments

relied upon by him. Nonetheless, in the instant case the appellant

was found to have conducted the proceedings in the manner which

had reflected on his reputation and integrity. There was enough

evidence and material to show that the appellant had misconducted

himself while discharging his duties as a judicial officer, and had

passed the judicial orders in utter disregard of the specific

provisions of law, to unduly favour the subsequent purchasers of the

acquired lands who had no right to claim compensation, and that

such orders were actuated by corrupt motive. Under the

circumstances, the High Court was perfectly justified in exercising

its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 235 of the Constitution.

15. In our opinion, showing undue favour to a party under the guise of

passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial dishonesty and

misconduct. The extraneous consideration for showing favour need

not always be a monetary consideration. It is often said that “the

public servants are like fish in the water, none can say when and

how a fish drank the water”. A judge must decide the case on the

basis of the facts on record and the law applicable to the case. If he

decides a case for extraneous reasons, then he is not performing his

20
 duties in accordance with law. As often quoted, a judge, like

Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion.

16. In that view of the matter, we find no merit in the present appeal and

the same is dismissed.

………………………………J.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD]

NEW DELHI ………………………………J.

06.05.2022 [BELA M. TRIVEDI]

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